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BRILL'S STUDIESININTELLECTUAL HISTORY

GeneralEditor

A J. VANDERJAGT,Universityof G roningenEditorial Boar dM . COLISH,Oberlin College

J.I. ISRAEL, UniversityCollege,LondonJ.D. NORTH, Universityof G roningenH.A. OBERMAN,University of Arizona,TucsonR.H. POPKIN, Washington University, St. Louis-UCLAV O L U M E100

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THEWINGED CHARIOTCollectedEssays onPlatoand Platonism

in Honour of L.M. deRijk

EDITEDBY

MARIA K A RD A UN A N D JOKESPRUYT

BRILLLEIDEN BOSTON K LN2000

U N I VL E I E NI L

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CONTENTSListof Contributors ixEditors' Introduction x iPublicationsby L.M.d e Rijk xvI PhysicalDoxaiin thePhaedo 1

J A A P MANSFELDII Parmenidesand PlatoonWhatis Not 19

D E N I S O B R E NIII Timaeus,Logician andP hilosopherofNature 105DAVID T. RUNIAIV MakingRoomfor Faith:isP lato? 119

J O H A N N E S M .V ANO P H U U S E NV Platonic ArtTheory: AReconsideration 135

M A R I A K A R D A U NV I Recollection and Potentialityin P hiloponus 165

FRANSA.J. D EHAASV II Platoand theF abulous CosmologyofW illiamofConches 185WILLEMENOTTENVIII Gilbert ofPoitierson theApplication ofLanguageto 205theTranscendentand SublunaryDomainsJOKE S P R U Y TK GrammarandSemantics in theTw elfth Century: Petrus Helias 237andG i lbertde laP orreon theSubstantive V erb

C.H. KNEEPKENSX PetrusThom ae'sD e distinctionepredicamen torum 277(withaWorking Edition)E.P.BosIndex of Subjects 313IndexofPassages 316Indexof Names 329

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CHAPTER TENPETRUS THOMAE'SD EDISTINCTIONS PREDICAMENTORUM(WITHAWORK ING ED ITION)'

E.P.Bos

1.In troduction

Plato an d Platonism havecontinually attracted L.M. de Rijk's attention.H eis enchanted, I believe, by the constructive character of theirphilosophies,and by thepart they attributedto theintellect.D eR ijk 's interestisespeciallyin semantics, in the way the ancientand m edieval philosophers them selvesrelated thought and speech to reality.2 F or Plato this meant the problem ofparticipation, inwhich logic an d ontology are interw oven. P lato presented aproblem to his pupils, of whom Aristotle was the most important. Aristotlesolved it in his theory of the categories. His Categories are primarilya partof his logical treatises, the Organon, but he also discussed the categories,from adifferent pointo fv iew ,in thePhysicsand the Metaphysics.Inthiscontribution Ishall discussthe w ay theScotist Petrus Thomae dis-tinguished the categories from each otherand try toplacehim in ahistoricalperspective. This Peter was born around 1280 and died shortly after 1340.Hewas a follower of John Duns Scotus and perhaps a direct pupil. I add tothis paper awork ingeditionof hisD edistinctione predicam entorum .On thebasis of the edition Ihope to clarify some points in the pioneering workby

G . G . Bridges, Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae O.F.M.' . Hoeres'sshort article onPeter's ontologydoes not aim atgiving a fresh study of thetexts; he explicitly follows Bridges's investigationsand tries to appreciatetheirsystem atic im port for other Scotistdoctrines.4I shall discuss the problem of the relation between thought (language)and reality and how Peter interpreted it. Peter m ay interest us, I believe,because he systmatises and clarifies Scotus's somewhat scattered remarkson distinctions and thecategories, and has some original views.' Peter dis-' Iwouldliketo thankA.P.Runia (G roningen)for hiscorrectionsof rayEnglish.2 D eRijk (1978)9 2 .3 1959.4 Hoeres(1961)374-379.5 On the history of d i s t i n c t i o n inmedieval philosophy,see Grajewski (1944).

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278 E.P. Boseusses Aristotle's theory of the categories from a metaphysical point ofview. He can be labelleda P latonist, if one takes this labelin abroad sense.6

D e Rijk once made a provisional transcription of the text ofm anuscriptCambridge, university 1231, used inthis paper, and suggested the period inwhich i t was written. I am grateful for his permission to use this transcrip-tion.2.Ar istotle's C ategories. Theproblem of thenature of th eC ategories

First something on Aristotle's Categories . There are many problems aboutthis work. For our purposes, the problemof the status of the categories isrelevant. Are the members of the categories thingsw hich on e shouldunder-standontologically?Or are they concepts, orlinguistic elements?Are theyacombination of both, i.e. things as far as k n o w n , or concepts as referring tothings?In 1984 K laus Oehler publishedatranslationof and commentaryonAris-totle's Categories . Oehler emphasises that in Aristotle's Categories theterms for subject (itoKEtuevov) and predicate (icaTr|yopov>uvov) have noexclusive reference to linguistic items, butrelateat thesame time and pri-marily toextra-linguistic realities, which are said by words or expressed bysentences.' In a recent work, L.M. de Rijk has defined the categories asnames (designations) and as potential elements for statement m aking." D eRijk 's approach islogico-semantical,as he himself says, rather than onto-logical. His interpretation is different from that of Oehler. Though Oehlerhas included de Rijk's studies in his bibliography, hedoesno tdiscuss theminhis introduction.Aristotle's Categories formsan important partof his logicand of thesub-sequent tradition. To gain a better understandingw e should be aware, Ithink, thatmedievalsstarted from a parallelism betweenthought an dreality.There is no gap between the two that needs to be bridged. Thought, writingand speech approach realityfrom different points of view . Thingsa re appre-hended an dexp ressed by terms. There is asubjective element,but due to theparallelism between thought an d reality the thing conceived is also some-thing in reality. In the Categories, the two elements of this relation can beapproached from tw o sides, namely from the sideof the thing,an d from theside of thought. In Aristotle's Metaphysics another set of terms forms thecontext of discussion. The point of view here is reality, without languageplayingadeterminatepart in the context.

Blum (1989);Beierwaltes(1965)vii-xiv.Oehler (1997) 101.D eRijk (1988) 9.

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P E T R U S T H O M A S S D E D I S T IN C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 7 9In ancient and medieval writers it is impossible, I feel, to separate anepistemological from a semantic or ontological point of view, as is some-

times done in the literature. There is no idealism of the eighteenth centurytype,nor is therea realism w ithoutthem indo rlanguage playing their parts,as some conclude. D epending on the logician's view , one should w rite eithersubstance or 'substance'. In the first case the part played by reality is ex-pressed, in the second the part played by language. In medieval thought,logical, semantic, epistemological and metaphysical points of view wereinterwoven.'2.1 .Some notes on the natureof the Categories in medieval authorsAs I said,medieval logicians holddifferent views on the natureof the cate-gories. Boethius emphasises the part played by words. The impositions ofnouns are the significations, Boethius says. 'Man' is the noun for the sub-stance, w hic h is a subject for accid ents. The first positing of nam es is that bywhich man signifies w hat is subject to the intellect or thesenses.10We find a kind of balance, i.e. that 'substance' means a whole, tow hichview Albert theGreat and Thomas Aquinas bear witness. Something isonlysaid ofsome other thing whenit is thew h oleof it, and the form of thew hole w h i c h names the whole of the thing, and the beingof it.This resultsinapredicationofwholes bywholes."

In Ockhamthe part played by the intellect isim portant.The members ofthecategories areconcepts or intentions,or the writtenan d spok en counter-parts. There is no real essence in things to which they correspond in thesamedegree( in univocalpredication), or towhich they correspond in differ-en t degrees (in equivocal predication). Ockham takes the level of thoughtseriously. Whethe ranoun isabsoluteorconcrete, isfounded precisely in thenoun. Ockham reformulates several metaphysical terms into logicalones,forinstance Boethius's use of 'to participate'. The participation of a subject isitsb eing predicated.122.2. Thedivision of being over theCategoriesBeing is divided over thecategories. The question arises how it is split up.Especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a number of philoso-phers undertake to explain thisdivision of being. Thus they claim to provethatth ere are ex actly ten in num ber, just as Aristotlesaysaccording to them.Tw o examples of this project are Albert theGreat andThomas Aquinas.In

" D eRijk(1982) 161.Some rcmaiksontheauthenticityalsoinPatzig (1973)60-76.10 Boethius(1860).11 Greraper(1956)368-387; (1957), 34-51; 175-196. Albertus MagnusTractatas secunduslibriPratd.DeSubst.(ed.Gremper).p. 75.Grcmpergives textandintroductionof theLiberdeprae.dicame.ntis,but no doctrinal discussion.12 Expos, inlibnimPraedic. (ed. Gal),p 145.

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280 E.P.BOStheir ow n way ,but inprinciple similarly, they present their divisions. Afterthey have determined the nature of something, which is here the natureofthe members of the categories, theyproceed to determine the division, in atraditional medieval fashion.F orAlbert, them ain thingisthatapredica bile iseitherasubstanceor anaccident these form thedivisionp er opposita immediata,accordingtoperse and non per se. Here is a radical distinction, almost as if there are onlytw ocategories. Ens per se asper se ens predicabile is substance, which isthe first gen us of all, one p rinc ipl e of all others. Ens non per se predicabileorsubicibileisnecessarily anacc idens, and inalio ut in subiecto, accordingto Aristotle: secundum inesse,andsecundumaliquemmodumad a liud.Next something about the way Thomas Aquinas divides being." Ac-cording to Thomas Aquinas, too, categories were thingsthat is to say,things qua known.14Thomas left us no commentary on the Categories, buthe did reflect on the matter, especially in his Commentary on Aristotle'sPhysics,15 whereheproves thenumberof ten.In his Commentary (lectiones)on the Metaphysics, 1 he gives a somewhat shorter, and in a few respectsdifferent version.Ishalln otdiscussthelatter com m entaryhere."In the first commentary, Thomas says that 'ens' isdivided into ten cate-gories, not in anunequivocal m anner likeagenus in to species, butaccordingto diverse waysofbeing.Thesew aysofbeing,hecontinues,areprop ortion-ate to the waysof predicating. Thomas apparently takes 'ens'as analogous,though he does not use the term here. He continues: 'for by predicatingsomething of somethingelse, we say that the one is theother ' .On thebasisof three w ays of predication, Thomas 'deduces'the ten categories.18Starting from this proportionate relation between being and predication,Thomas goeson to say that 'the ten categories are arrived at inthree w ays'.The first way is w hen somethingis predicated of asubject w hich belongstothis subject's essence, asw hen I say 'Socrates is a m an ',or 'man is anani-m alin thepossession ofsenses'.Thusw e get thecategory substance.

The second way isp redicationofsom ethingw hichdoesnot belong to thesubject 'sessence, but still inheres in it, in any one ofthree kinds. The firstkindofthis secondway is on thepartof thesubject,w hichgivesus the cate-gory of quantityfor qua ntity properly follows matter. The second kindfollows the form, which gives us the category of qualityand qualities inturn have their foundation in quantity, for instance color on a surface, andfigure on linesor surfaces. According to the third kind the subject is related

13Bos(1998)183-195.14Thomas Aquinas (1931) (Quaestio disputata depotential,q. 7,ait. 9: 'to acategory be-longs only something existingoutsideth e soul'.Thomas Aquinas InMetaphysicam expositio (ed.Cathala.Spiazzi),n. 322.16 Thomas AquinasIn Physicam exposaio (ed.Maggilo),nn.890-892.17 Seefo ra discussion Bos-V an der Helm (199 8).'" Th eterni 'ded uction' is notused byThomas,infact, itprobablyis Kantian.

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PETRVSTHOMAE'S DE DISTINCT/ONE PKEDICAMENTORUM 2 81to something else; then we get the category of relationfor when I say 'aman is a father' nothing absoluteispredicated ofman ,butsomething w hichis withinhim in relation tosom ething outside of him. Thomas clearly has areal relation inm ind here.So farThomas'discussion.D u n s Scotus, however, believes that such a proposition is impossible. Inhis commentary on the Categories, which is an early work,he investigatesthe opinionsof those who try to infer the nature of the categories from thevariousmodipredicandi,thus possibly criticising Albert and Thomas beitjustlyorunjustly.In hisopinion,them embersof thecategoriesreferto dis-tinct 'realities' ('realities' in aScotistsense)."Noneo fthemcan be reduced,either to each other, or to something else. All members possess a certainformal reality, although this is not merely identical wi th the being of anactual exist ing thing.2 0 Scotus accepts the number of ten categories withreference to tradition,2 1 but he gives some negative arguments.Hedemon-stratesthatthereare neither morecategories (for instance motusas anelev-enth category),22 nor less than ten (for instance ens per se an d ens in alioalone). So he arrives at the number of ten in a negative way: there are nomore, and no less.Perhaps Scotus opined that his reasoning on the number of tencategoriesmay look too form al, centeringas itdoeson questions like w hatitm eanstobe agenus, or to be formallydistinctand so on, andm aybebecausethelack

of some kindof 'deduction' m aygive theim pression thatthewhole classifi-cationofcategoriesis no more thana logical construction based on our wayof think ing. Therefore, in question VI of his commentary on the Metaphys-ics, Scotus takes pains to prove that the categories are also distinguishedrealiter (in a Scotist sense). His aim is to refute the arguments according towhich the nine accidental categories could realiter directly or indirectly bereducedto thecategoryofsubstance.What weshould precisely understandby a res, however (whether it is something substantial or something relativeor whatever), we are not told. But we can be sure that it is something inde-pendent of the mind . In scho lium II, it is remark ed on our tw o metaphysicalquaestiones:

The view that thereis noessential distinction between thecategories,but thatthey aredistinguished according to the ways of predication, is criticisedbymany authors w i th regard to the second pan. However, this seemsto be thePhilosopher'sopinion,viz. that the number of thecategoriesistaken from the

"Secbelow , III 3. thesecond distinction.MKobusch(1990)79.MUHIM.I1U W>'11 Justas his(supposed)disciple F ranciso fMeyronnes would.Cf. Bos(1997) 211-227.22 Which is also suggested by Aristotle in one place of his w ork, where il is said thai foreach category there is a substrate, for instance forthequoit,for thequantum,for thewhen,forthewhereand for themotion.SeeAnstoue,M etaphysics V U.iv,(1831-70), 1029b25.

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282 E.P.BOSmodesof predication.Now theD octoris unclear in thisrespect.Seehiscom-mentaryontext 13and see Haleson thesametext."

With reference to a number ofpassages further on in hiscommentaryontheM etaphysics asw e llas in hiscomm entaryon theSentences.2*accordingto the scholium, Scotus aims at a 'distinctio formalis' here, rather than a'distinctio rei are',alsobecause Scotus hims elf seems toallow inBook V IIIthatone and thesamethingm ay fall under diversec ategories.26For the moment we should becareful not to j um p to conclusions. Seeingthat his commentary on theM etaphysics is taken to be aw ork from Scotus'middle period, it is to be doubted whether the ideas and terminology fromhis laterperiodcan beread into this comm entary, especiallyasD uns h imse l fdoesnotex plicitlyinviteu s to do so.3. Petrus Thomae

3. 1.Life and worksIn this paper I shall discuss a Scotist interpretation, viz. by Peter Thomae.Little is known of the life of Peter Thomae. He was a Spaniard, born inCatalonia. He studied theology in Paris, but his main worksare connectedwith his teaching in Barcelona.27 It is uncertain w hether P eter was a directpupil of D uns Scotus. He followed him,but critically, though not as criti-cally asOckham, according toBridges.2"H e wrote theDe distinctionepre-dicamentorum around 1320.A precise date c annot be given. How far hiswork s were prior to those of that other follower of Scotus, Francis of Mey-ronnes, we do not know. Francis wrote his Commentary on the Sentencesaround 1321.Bridgeshascomposed a survey ofPeter's works, which amounts to ninetreatises:2' 1. AC ommentary on theSentences; 2 .D e esse intelligibili;3.Deente; 4. Formalitates breves Cor: de modisdistinctionum); 5. Formalitatesconflatiles (= ou r De distinctione predicamentorum); 6. Quodlibet; 7. De

23 Sententia ponens non distingui Praedicamenla essenuahter. sed per diverses predicandimodos, lateimpugnaturquoad secundam pattern, quae tarnen videturesse Philosophi.nempenuinenim Praedicamentoruni sumj ex modisp raedicandi, se d obscure procedil Doctor'. Videcum hieexponentem textum 13 et Alensem in eundemtextum217a24Johannes D uns Scotus,QuaestionesinM etaphysicam VIII,q. 1.n. 6(d. Vives).25JohannesD unsScotus.OrdinatioII.dist. 1. q. 5(ed.Vatican City)26Theinterestingscholium IIIruns:Satisfit argumenlispositisnum.2probanbbus accidensessecompositum. Adsecundum admittit praedicamenta, ut videtur. nondistingui realiter, quodproblematice tenet2 .dist. I. q. 5.ad 2. pro opin.de quo supra lib.5, q. 6. Videibi scholiumsecundum (p 4S7b).27 Bridges (1959)1-2,D utnont (1988), 186-255,esp.p.187.Here also other literatureonPeter's life.28Bridges (1959) 16829 Bridges(1959)2-5;177-180.

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P E T R U S T H O M A E S D E D I S T I N C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 8 3imitate minori; 8. De divite Christiana; 9 . Liber de originali Virginis con-ceptione.*1

Tracts 4 and 5 are problematic. Tract 4, the Formalitates breves, alsocalled De modis distinctionum, w as written before tract 5. Basically thecontents are the same, but according to Bridges there is evidence ofpolish-ing and embellishment." Tract 5 is the one studied here and is theonlyoneofPeter'sw orks that isavailablein a sixteenth-centuryedition.32Ofthis text,usually called De distinctions predicamentorum, I have made a workingedition. The other work, the Formalitates breves, is much longer. In theappendix, onPeter'sworks.Bridgesgives asurveyof theextant manuscriptsof both treatises as undifferentiated, because he finds it impossible to sepa-rate the tw o.333.2.Peter'sDe distinctione predicam entorum

3.2.1.T he w ork ing edit ionI haveno t attempted to make a critical edition in thestrictest sense, withal lthe variant readings and based on a well developed stemma. Collation ofonly tw o manuscripts makes itim m ediately clear that thedifference betweenthem isvery substantialand thata complete collation results in an apparatusthat is overloaded and hardly intelligible. I give a specimen below.34 Theeditors of Peter*s Quodlibet had only two manuscripts to handle, and fromthe second manuscript they gave only the more importantvariants.35 W ithinthe fram ew ork of this study a critical edition in the strict sense w ould gobeyond the l imits of my investigations an d move the attention from thephilosophicald iscussion.36Peter's De distinctione predicamentorum w as the only text available toscholars up to 1957, when parts of other works were published. For theworking edition I have chosen one of theprobablyolder manuscripts,v i z . Cambridge, University 1231, ff. 240ra-241vb, which is agood manu-script (I gave it assiglum :C)."Them anuscriptdates to the 14th century, I

30On the relative chronology, see Bridges (1959) 12-13.31 Bridges (1959) 11-12.32 1517, ff.109v-l l lv .33Bridges (1959)177-179, givesalislof 29manuscripts.1 add thefollowing manuscriptsthat containP eter's De distinctionepredicame nlorum: I . Cambridge, University 1231 (FSIII,23), ff. 240ra-241vb, 14thc . This manuscriptis the basis of my w orking edition. 2.Munich,StaatsbMiathek I8530, ff. 131v-134r;3.Oxford, Savitle18, ff. 32v-36v;4. Zaragoza,La Seo1793, ff.2r-9v (information thanksto A.d'Ors,Madrid);5.Segovia, Cabildode la Catedral,ultima 31,pars media, ff.129-135r;Sevilla, Bibl Cap.C olumbian7-3-13, ff. I33r(=143r)-135r(=145r)(breaks o f f ) . An incomplete listis inMohan (1975).277 ff.34See theappendix I,below3'PetrusThomae(ed. Hooper,Buytaert),xiv.36 Cf.K ann (1994)1-937A Catalogue o f theM anuscripts (1857) 422.

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284 E.P.Bosthink. The catalogue notes that it was written in the XVI th c., but thereseems to be no basis for this assertion.3* The only year the catalogue men-tions is 1464, when it says that on ff. 111-129 the Questiones ordinarie byJames of Ascoli can be found, w hodied, the catalogue says, in 1464. Thiscertainly is wrong, fo r James died about 1350. In my v iew,the handwritingof our part of the m anuscript dates from the fourteenth century, for whichIalso rely on L.M. de R ijk 's notes in his personal file.3*I collated the Cambridge manuscript with the early print, V enice 1517(siglum: inc.). This edition has more mistakes, gives more examples thanstrictlynecessary, and its style is sometimes sloppy. In this way the readerhas access to an old manuscript, which once circulated, and which I havecorrected.Correctionby the incunablewas in mostcasessufficienttoestab-lish alogicallycorrect text.403 3. The contentsAccording toPeter 'predicamentum' ( 'category') can be taken in two ways ,viz. logically and m etaphysically. In the first sense, the term m eans a secondintention.In thesecond sense,itmeans a first intention. It isthen asubstrateto a second intention, like a foundation to a relation. Already in his earlyCommentary on Porphyry, John D uns Scotus distinguishes betw een the tw oapproaches.41

In our tract we do not obtain any further information. It isdifficult to de-termine what exactlyPeterhas inmind.Theconceptionsof thestatusof firstand second intentions vary considerably among philosophers, no t onlybe-tween nominalists and realists, but also amongrealists themselves, such astheScotists.42 We find some support for this interpretation inPeter's Quod-libet,however. Thereone of thequestions iswhethertheconceptsof the tencategories are equally 'simpliciter simplices', i.e. irreducibly simple.43 Hemakes a distinction. 'Predicamentum' as second intention unitesthecatego-riesin thesensethateachcategorycan becalledacategory. Inanothersenseitstands forthat tow h ichthesecond intentionisattributed. Now , 'category'is subject, that is, it is a first intention, of which it can be said that it is acategory. As first intention, it can be subdivided: a. the whole line of allitems in a category; b. the most general term of a line of items (substance,qualityetc.). There is afurth er subd ivision. 1. the categories can be consid-

31Roth(1936).39M SOxford,M agdalen College 80 isusedbyBridgesassupportlointerpretIhcearly edi-tion.Accordingto thecatalogueitdateslothe late X F V t h c e n t u r y , butthere seemsto be nocluein themanuscript itself.40Referencestotexts that havenotbeen editedso far butonly existinmanuscriptcouldnotbegiven.11 Qu.2.42 Normore(1980)479^95,esp.479-480.43 PetnisThomae(ed. Hooper,Buytaert),partHI,qu. 13, p. 187,1. 12 f.

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P E T R U S T H O M A E S D E D I S T I N C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 8 5crcd asfirstpartso f limited being,or 2. aspartsof anincom plex thatcan betaught, or 3. as proper modes of predication. As parts of being (1), Petersays, thecategories belong to the object of metaphysics; as parts of an in-complex that can be taught (2), they belong to logic;as proper modes ofpredication (3), they belong to the logician in the way heproceeds in theTopics.Applyingthis analysis to the Dedistinctionepredicam entorum,P eter ap-parentlytakes 'second int en tio n' in the first princ iple sense of the Quodlibet.By 'first intention' he means the subject terms (substance, quality etc.), ofwhich it is said that they are a category. F urthe r d ow n in our tract, w e learnthatacategoryin themetaphysicalsenseisdistinguished on thebasisof thenatureof the thing ('ex naturarei'), i.e. before an yoperation of the intellect.According to Peter, 'category' is a firstprinciple ofbeing. He subscribes toPorphyry's remark thatweshouldlaydown,asAristotledoesin theCatego-ries,thatthe ten primary generaare theprimary p rinciplesofthings.44We should realise that in his Categories, Aristotle indeed refers tol in-guistic elements, but that even there his aimis todiscover truths about real-ity.4 ' In hisMetaphysics, Aristotle talks aboutthe categories but within thecontextof reality. In this tract Petrus Thomae's point of view on the catego-ries is thatof a metaphysician.H e interprets thedifferent categories as prin-cipleso fthings.Hisconception is realist.

In the first part of the tract, he presents seven assumptions ('propositio-nes'), in w h ic hdifferent kindsofd istinctionsare defined;in the second partof the tract he formulates sixtheses (conclusiones), which make clear howthepredicamenta are distinguish ed, and how not.Why is Peter interested indistinguishing between thecategories, and notin 'deducing' them from being, as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinasdid?The answerliesin thesixththesis,Ithink .TherePetersaysthatasingleconcept of first intention corresponds to thecategories, viz. 'being' ('ens').As I have said above. D uns Scotus an dScotistsadvocate aunivocal conceptof being, which can equally beapplied to all its members.Therefore, theyw ere interested in explain ing distinction sbehind this unity.Theirquestion iswhat the distinctionsare within being. Thesed istinctionsare formed by theintrinsic modes of being, viz. infinity and finiteness, necessity and contin-gency etc. Within the finite realm, thecategories find their place. Transcen-dental terms, such as 'being', 'one', 'true', can be found in each category,Albert and Thomas, however, uphold an analogous concept of being, inwhich a distinction betw een, for instance, God and creatures, and betweenprimary and secondary created beings, are included in that analogous con-cept itself.

44Isagoge Porphym (Irans).Boethii).6.7-8 (=AristotelesLalmus 1,6-7. Calfgoramm Sup-plements,p.121'3).43A ck r i l l( 1963) 7 1

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286 E.P. BosThe way 'being' is conceived corresponds to our understanding of God.G od is abeing, just like creatures, but theintrinsic modes (infinity, finiteness

etc.) aredifferent.Thequestionarisesabout thenatureofthis distinction;theformaldistinctionplays a pivotal part. Speaking about God therefore givesspecific difficulties. In thirteenthan d fourteenth century theology aproblemw as whether the principle of contradiction could be applied to God. Giventhetrinity,how are 'God isone' and 'God is notone' true simultaneously?The Scotist Francis of Meyronnesstartshis Commentary on theSentences **by asking whether the principleof contradictioncan be formed intheology(qu. 1), andwhether the subject of the principle of contradiction, viz. being,applies equally to God and creatures. As Scotist Francis has aunivocal con-ceptofbeing.Peter applies the following distinctions to thecategories: 1) rational dis-tinction, 2 )d istinction in virtueof thenature of a thing ('ex naturarei').Thelatteris subdivided into:3)real distinction,4) formal distinction,5) essentialdistinction, 6) subjective distinction by themselves as wholes; 7) objectivedistinction by themselves aswholes." It is important to realise that Petermeant other things by 'res' or 'essentia' etc. than one usually thinkson thebasis of e.g. thirteenth-century texts. I shall discuss the nature of these dis-tinctionsand theirapplicationto thecategoriesbelow.In applying the distinctions to the categories, Peter uses some technicalterms.For aproper appreciationof thetractone has tok n o w theirm eaning.1.'Categorical' and 'transcendental' terms.The former aredivided intothe categories (substance, quality etc.), and divide being. The latter 'gothrough' ('transcendere') the categories: every substance is a being, everyqualityis a being etc.2 . 'Inclusion': itmeans tw o things,Peter says:2.1. 'identical or essentialinclusion'('essential'in thesenseof 'asregards itsbeing',not 'as regards itsquiddity' in a thirteenth century sense, as Bridges interprets it48). In thissense, the divine being in clud es the div ine attributes, and each divineattrib-ute includes another; for created being, the soul includes the powers of thesoul; they do not include each other. 2.2. 'Formal inclusion' is whe n on ething includes another in its definition, like the composite includes matterandform,andspecies includes genus anddifference.3. 'Abstraction':w hen something ispicked out from reality leaving apartotheraspects. Ultimate abstraction, Peter says, is when something is takenapartfrom anythingelsethat is not included in its quiddity.49

44Badges(1959) 115.47Notethat in theincunableedition, essential distinction isitself subdivided into subjectiveand objective, which troubles Bridges, as we shall see below Cf. Bridges (1959) 134. Shouldthe phrase 'seIons ('by themselves')justb etranslatedb y 'wholly'? Bridges (1959)70,76;Hoeres(1961) 374.49On 'ultimateabstraction',seeHonnefelder (1979) 141; 212-218.

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P E T R U S T H O M A E S D E D I S T I N C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 8 74.'Concern1:w h atis'abstracted' is also 'concerned' ('concernatio')w ithsomething. 'Abstractio' and 'concernatio' are counterp arts to each other.

Peter distinguishesfivew a yso fthis couple: 1.higher and lower,for instanceanimalan d man;2 .naturean dsuppositum ,forinstance, humanityan d Peter;3. quiddityand quiddity, for instanceanimality and rationality; 4. accidentand subject, for instance colour and wood; 5. relation and foundation, forinstancesonship and son.5. 'Predication' isdiv ide d into essential and accidental. Peter leaves acci-dentalpredication aside,an ddivides essential predication into 'identical'and'formal' . 5.1) 'Identical predication' is a. when subject and predicate areessentially the same and identical;or b. when each of the terms is formallyinfinite, or in thecase of transcendental terms w ithout characterization (i.e.thec onvertible transcendentals, such as 'being' and 'one'.He calls the latterterms 'permissively infinite', which is an unusual term. 'Permissively infi-nite' is opposed to 'formally infinite', which applies to the divine).50 5.2)'Formal pred ication' is w hen the predicate intrinsically belongs to the qu id -dityof the subject,for instance in 'man is anrational anim al'.Thus the categories are distinguished byPeter. In the first article of thetract. Peter enumerates and defines the different kindsofd istinctions.In hissecond article, he applies them in six theses to the categories. Here Ishalldiscussthe theses./.The categories are distinguished in virtueof the nature ofthe thingThe categories are not distinct in virtue of an act of comparative power( 'potentia collativa'), such as thepossible intellect, the wil l or theimagina-tion. The categories are distinc t in virtu e of the nature of the thing. They area 'thing' ('res') in a Scotist sense. It is not easy to define thissense. It be-comes clearer when w ehave studied theother distinc tions, applied byPeterto the categories. I note here that these 'things' can but need not exist. In thisw a y Peter subscribes to the words of Porphyry that thecategories are thefirst principles of things. They are the subjective parts ofreal being, i.e. thepartsthat bearor canbearother things.Accordingly, they are here the objects of areal science, namely meta-physics,not oflogic. Bridges distinguishes here between thecategories (sub-stance, quality, quantity) as objects of physics on the one hand and of meta-physics on the other. However, thisdoes no tseemto be thepoint:the oppo-sition is just between logic an d m etaphysics. F rom a metaphysical pointo fview,thecategories areformally first intentions, according toPeter, becausethe intelligibility is in the thing. The intrinsicmodes of a category are alsodistinct in the same way , for instance being by itself ('perseitas'),being in('inesseitas'), an d being related ( ' ada l iemtas ' ) Bridges does no t discuss

tion50Quodlibet I,qu. 7, p. 126. Bridges (1959)27, n. 37.doesnot give adefinitiveinterpreta-n

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288 E.P . BOStheseScotistneologism s. More importantly, hedoes not note that accordingto Peter the intelligibility is in the thing.

2. Theca tegories areformally distinctThe categories are formally distinct if in ultimate abstraction one categorydoes no t include another quidditatively, or in its quidditative concept. Toconfirm the thesis Peter adds thatthose that can exist without theother areformally distinct, and thecategories are such. If thecategories are formallyidentical, they w ould be m ixed up, w hich is contrary to Aristotle's intention,he says.

Someone objects that a rational distinctionis sufficient for the categoriesto be theprinciples of things." Peter denies this, because then they wouldbediminished beings ('entiad iminu ta ') .So w e should assume a formal distinc-tion between thecategories. Bridgescorrectly calls it a formal d istinc tion ina wider sense, which implies a distinctionof realities. It is not adistinctionin the strict sense, which is of formalities together wi th a real unity. In thissense the formalities have a real unity,as in thecaseof G od ind istinctiontothe Holy Persons, wisdom etc. Th ecategories are also really distinct,as w eshall see. In this subdivision of formal distinctionPeter's theory is differentfrom thatof Scotus, Bridgessays.523. The categories are really distinctThings are really distinct if each is formally positive, and one in ultimateabstraction cannot be predicated of the other, neither formally nor identi-cally.*3 This distinctionexcludesnegationsand privations, Peter adds.Acat-egory isprim arily som ething positive.Categories cannot be predicated of each other in identical predication,because theyareneither formally no r permissively infinite. They are not thesame as God , nor can they be contracted to a formally infinite being, whichispossible for a transcendental lik e'being'.Nor can they be formally predi-cated ofeach other, forthisnecessarily requires an identity.54Categories arealso really distinct, because there is adistinction betweentheir 'realities'('realitates'), Petersays.Thegroundofthisdistinction is thatall categories are distinct in the sense that things('res') are distinct fromother things. Categories are distinct as things because they are distinct as'beings' ('entia').This is shownby the fourth thesis, viz. that the categoriesare 'essentially' distinct. 'Being' and 'thing' are convertible, which is tradi-tionaltheory.WhatdoesPeter mean by 'reality'?Bridges finds difficulty with his useof ithere, for, he says, "Peter has defined reality not as a res, but as a quid

31 Thesubsequentdiscussion is not inBridges (1959).52Bridges (1959) 115.53Cf.proposition IV of the firetarticle.54Hardlydiscussed byBridges (1959)

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P E T R U S T H O M A E S D E D I S T I N C T O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 8 9rei.""Bridges explains that they can be characterised asessential, formal,real perfections of a thing.56 However, itseems that Peter in our textuses'reality' as, for instance, Francis of Meyronnes does in his Tractatus For-malitatum, where he says that "reality is an intrinsic mode, by means ofwhich al l things that are in something are made a thing".51 The intellectun -derstands in a realised substance: 1) the quiddity , contracted by the 'haec-ceity ' ( 'thisness') ,2) the existenceand 3) thereality.So , accordingto Fran-cis,the reality is not identical to thequiddity,nor the existence. Peter proba-bly has the same view and und erstands here by 'reality' the feature thatmakes somethingathing.4. Thecategories are essentially distinctPeter understands by 'essential distinction' th e distinction according towhich somethingcan exist without somethingelse. So by 'essence' hedoesno t mean quiddity in a thirteenth-century sense. Peter says that this kindofdistinction isbasedon thedifference between categories as 'thingan dthing ' .This applies toabsolute categories (substance, qu ality , qu antity).However, there is a problem about the category relation. Peter has de-cided to follow a new opinion (opinio nova), hold by a 'very subtle doctor'('doctor subtilissimus'}. According to this opinion, relations (for instancefatherhood) are 'essentially' distinct from foundation(in this example: gen-eration).In the Venice edition,thetexthas 'subtledoctor' ('doctor subtilis').

Bridges notes that P eter cannot have D uns Scotus in mind.51 Our text has'most subtle' ( s u b t i l i s s i m i ) an d this most probablydoes not refer toD uns ,but toanother author, w homIhave no t been ableto identify sofar.To defend thisne w opinion,Petergives four arguments.The foundation,to w hichtherelationisrelated, can beeitheraefficient, or a final or a mate-rial, or a formalcause.5" In the first two ofthesecases, the essential distinc-tion is clear.These tw o causes are extrinsic causes, and God can alwaysf u l f i l theroleo fefficient or final causes invirtueof hissupernaturalpow er.wN o w , if the foundation w ere a material cause, w eshould take it as matter inqu a (not ex qua), because inthis sense theaccident (here: the relation) canbe separated from the matter in virtue of divinepower. If the foundationwere a formal cause, several problems would arise: 1 .a relation would for-mally be something absolute (he means: a form); 2. relations wouldonly be

55Bridges(1959) 92.157.MHoeres(1961)378.51Franciscusde Mayronis, Traclatusformalitatum, Venetiis 1520,264* (H): 'sed realitases tquidam modusintrinsecusmediantequ o realisanturonmiaque sum inaliquo".5)1Bridges (1959) 159.59Bridgesis nolalwaysclearon thepoint thaithe foundation of arelationis not thesameasthe subject of a relation Medieval tradition calls the subject, for instance, father Peter, thefoundation isgeneration,therelation is fatherhood. ' With regard to thispassage. Bridges thinks it evident that the foundation is not an effi-cientno r afinal cause. Hefailsto seethatth eargument isconditional.

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290 E.P. BOSaccidentally subjective" parts of being, 3. the formal cause would not besomething simple, but a composite (viz.of foundation an d relation); 4 . arelation w ould be a relation in virtue of something ab solute, w hic h is acon-tradiction. So formal causality cannot be advanced as an explanation of therelation between foundation and relation.Next hearguesthatG od can be theterm61ofeach dependent relation, be-cause He is independent of any thing else, and He virtually contains the rela-tion. The latter is an interesting remark for the interpretationof the status ofthecategories.63 'To contain virtually' is a Scotist phrase, which explainsGod's om nipotency. This does not imply pantheism , for G od is notactuallythe created things. In thisway,Scotists exp ress their interpretation ofideasin thedivine mind.

Next, mattercan be w ithout form,sorelation w ithout foundation. Finally,Peter says that nature and supposition are more intim atel y related than rela-tion and foundation.Now, as God can separate the firsttwo,so H e can dowith the latter."In Christ and in the possibility of the incarnation it isclearthat God can separate the person (supposition) from the nature (God). Re-cently, J .Decorte hasconcluded that, according to D uns Scotus, every rela-tion m ust have a foundation.6 '5. Theca tegoriesa re subjectively distinct bythemselves as wholes'Subjective distinction' means: that which is really found in the one is notfound in the other. So thecategories are distinct thingsas individualbearersof all their properties and of all other things thataredependent on them.Thecategories are not mixed. There is an objection that transcendental termssuch as 'being' are found in every category. Peter replies that every tran-scendental is contracted to theproper being of each category. Further, if onesays that 'oneand the same being' is found in all categories, 'one' is takenaccidentally. In the same way, one and the same individualcan belong to thecategory substance, in so far as he is a man, and to the category relation in sofaras he has ason.Next ,Peter argues that whatever isdistinguished innum-ber, gender and spe cies is subjec tively disting uishe d, and this is thecase forthecategories. In a third note, he says that all categories can exist actually,and are therefore subjectively distinct. There is noclaim toexistence.666. Theca tegories are not objectively distinct bythemselves as wholes'Objective' traditionally means that something is k n ow nto a cognitivefac-ulty as such.There is no objective distinction if one concept of the first in-tention can be abstracted from something. This applies to the categories,

61On 'subjective', secthesisV .62Latin:icrminure 1 do notunderstandw hyBridges says 'tobringto anend'.63Bridges(1959)163.64Note that in the text, 'significal' (to be found in the incunable)should be replacedbyquidificat'.w hichemphasisesthe ontologicalside."Decorte(1997). 27-47,esp.4 6.66Honnefelder(1952)203.n. 1.

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P E T R U S T H O M A E S D E D I S T I N C T O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 9 1because 'being' can be said of them all. There is one single quidditativeconcept, for ofeach categorycan be said thatit is abeing, inresponse to thequestion 'what isit?'. 'Being' is a 'real' concept. If thecategorieswere ob-jectively distinct, the term 'category' as second intention would be com-pletely equivocal, and the unityof created being would be lost. Bridges ispuzzled about this distinction, because it is a subdivision of the essentialdistinction.6 7 'Being' an d 'good', and the thisness (theScotist 'haecceitas')of Peter and the thisness of Pau l are objectively distinct according to thisdefinition. However, they are not essentially distinct, Bridges says, and hesuggests thatP eter an d Paul have thesameessence.Onecou ld suggest, thatthis migh t only be true if 'essence' is taken as quiddity, or in a thirteenth-centurysense,butPeter apparently takes it as separate being. This clearly isin agreement w ith the crit eria P eter enum erates.There is no common first intention referring to individual'thisnesses' assuch,exactlybecause they arethisnessesandtherefore unique. Further, w hatfirst intention could there be over 'being' and 'good'? They are absolutelysimple concepts and as such cannot havean yelement incommon. This dis-tinction is the strongest of all. The categories do notunderliethis strongestdistinction. They have a first intention above them, namely the univocalconcept of'being'.

4 . ConclusionFrom a metaphysical point ofview, categories(m an, w hite etc.) are things,the principles of reality. InPeter's tract they are things in a Scotist sense.The part played by language and thought is not relevanthere.The metaphy-sician studies the ultimate truths about reality. Of course, the philosopheruses terms to denote these realities, w hichall have a real counte rpart.Peter distinguishes thecategories notrationally,but really.They aredis-tinguished because of the nature of the thing, not on the basis of any intel-lect.They are reallydistinct, thatis:theypossessareality that makes them athing.They aieformally distinct ,w h ichmeans thatafter ultimate abstractionno predication is possible of the one category by the other. Unlike in God ,this formal distinction does no t imply a real identity. They are essentiallydistinct, i.e. they can exist without the other by divine omnipotence. Theyare subjectively dist inct , i.e. as categories they are not mixed, are numeri-cally, genetically and specifically distinct, and can exist apart from eachother. Thecategorieshave theirow n subjective being; theyare genetically orspecifically ornum erically distinct,and canexist separately. If thecategorieswere also objectively distinct, there would be the strongest distinction, as

' Bridges(1959) 134-5. InBridges'*vein,Hoercs (1961)378. ispuzzled

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292 E.P. Bosbetween being and non-being, or rational and irrational. However, they fallunder 'being'.

The factual existenceof these thingsispotential. Fromasingle remarkinour text w e may conclude that, according to Peter, these category-ideas alsoexist virtually in God. Peter as a metaphysician interprets the categories asPlatonic ideas of some kind. According to another Scotist viz. Francis ofMeyronnes, ideas in a Platonistsense exist from thepointof view ofm eta-physics.**The Scotist Petrus Thomae has in a Platonist fashion elaborated the ideato which Aristotle already subscribes, that categories are about truths inreality. Thinking closely follows reality to the point of being almost identi-cal.Bibliography

Primary SourcesAlbertus Magnus. Tractatus secundus libri Praedicamenlnrum De Substantia, ed. byW .G rem -perOFMCap. (Phil. Thesis). Freiburg, 1975.AniciusManliusSeverinus Boethius.Categoriae, ed . Migne. Patrologia Latina, vol.6 4. Paris,I860.Aristoteles Latinus.ed. L.Minio-Paluello. I,6-7,C ategoriarumsupplements. Porphyrii Isagogetranslalio Boelhti et arutnymi Fragmentum vulgo vocatum 'Liber se x principiorum .

Bruges-Paris, 1966.Aristoteles Opera omnia.ed I.Bekter, Berlin, 1831-70(reprintD armstadt1960)Franciscus de Mayronis,Tractatus formalitatum, V enetiis,1520.G uillelmus deOckham.Expositio in l ibrum PraedicamentorumAristotelis, ed. G.Gal, 135-339(Opera Philosophica,II),S t.Bonaventure. N.Y., 1978.Johannes D unsScotus.Quaesliones inM etaphysician, d.L. V ives,vol V I I ,Paris, 1895.Ortlintiiiti. II,dist. 1, inOpera omnia (vol. V II), studioetcura commissionis Scotislicaead(idem cod icum dita, V atican City, 1973.Petrus Thomae. Dislinaiones predicamentorum, ed. Hieronymus de Nudarellis Romanus,V enice, ff. 109v-lllv, 1517.Quodlibet, editedby Sister M .R.Hooper, OSF, and E. M.Buytaert , OFM ,STD, St. Bona-venture-Louvain-Paderbom, 1957.Thomas Aquinas.In duodecim libresM eiaphysicorum Aristotelisexpositio ed . M. R.Cathala,R.Spiazzi,Torino-Roma,1950.InoclolibrosPhysiconmArislotelisexpositio,ed. M.Maggiolo,Torino-Roma, 1954.Quatstiodisputala depotentia (editor no tmentioned).Torino-Roma, 1931.

Secondary SourcesA C atalogue of theManuscripts P reservedin theLibrary of theUniversity of Cambridge. \857(reprint 1980) vol.0(Cambridge).Ackrill,J .R.(1963).Aristotle's C ategoriesand DeInterpretation (Oxford).Beierwaltes,W .(ed.)(1965).Platonismui imMittelaller (Darmstadt).Blum, P.R. (1989). 'Platonismus', in J. Ritter and K . G rnder(eds.).H istorisches WrterbuchderPhilosophie, vol.VII(P-Q), cols. 977-985 (D armstadt).

68Bos(l997).

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P E T R U S THOMAE'SDED I S T I N C T I O N S P R E D K A M E N T O R U M 293Bos, E.P.(1997). 'The Theory of Ideas According to FrancisofMeyronnes (Comm entary on theSentences (Conflatus) I,dist.47)', in L. Benakis (d.), Noplatonisme ft philosophiemdivale. Actes du colloque internationalde Corfu. 6-8 octobre 1995(Bruges)21 1-227.

(1998) 'The D ivisiono fBeing over the Categories Accordingto Albert the Great, ThomasAquinas and John Duns Scotus', in E P. Bos (ed.), John Duns Scolus (1265-1308), Re-newal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third SymposiumOrganized by the D utch Society forMedieval Philosophy MediumAevum(Amsterdam) 183-195.Bridges, G . G .(1959). Identity and Distinction inPeints Thomat. OFM St.Bonaventure (TheFranciscan Institute)-Luuvam (Paderbom).Decorte. J (1998) 'Creatio andconservatio as relalio', in E.P. Bos (ed.), John Duns Scotus(1265/6-1308). Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the Third Symposium Organized by theDu tchSociety for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (Amsterdam-Atlanta) 27-47.Dumont ,S, (1988). 'The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: II. TheDe enteof PeterThomae', inM edieval Studies50 :186-255G ilson, E , (1952 ).Jean D uns Scot, Introduction sespositions fondamentales, P aris (V rin).Grajewski , MJ. (1944). The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. A Study in Metaphysics(Washington)Gremper, W. (1956-1957) 'Der Traktat "De substana" derPraedikamentenparaphrase AlbertsderGroen', inFreiburgerZ eitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie3:368-387;4:34-51;175-196.Hoeres, W . (1961) 'Zur Ontologie von P etrus Thomae OFM', inFrannskanische Studien 43:374-379.Honnefelder, L. (1979). Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden ais solchen als Gege n-stand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Mnchen (Aschendorf)(BeitragezurGeschichte derPhilosophieundTheologiedesMirtelalters-NeueFolge, vol.16).Kann,C .(1994). Die Eigenschaften der Termini. Eine UntersuchungzurPerutilis logica Albertsvon Sachsen (Leiden - New York-K ln).Kobusch.Th . (1990) 'Substanz und Q ualitt D ie Reduzierung der Kategorien nach Wilhelmvon Ockham'. m D . Koch and KI. Bort (eds.), Kategone und Kategorialitt. Historisch-systematische Untersuchungen zu m Begriff de r Kategorie im Philosophischen Denken.F estschrift fr K laus Hartmann zum 65. G eburtstag, Wiirzburg.Mohan, G . (1975), 'Initia Operum Franciscalium', in Franciscan Studies. 35 (XIII), 277 ff(separate number ing)Normore, C. (1980). 'Intentions and impositions', in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg(eds.).The Cambridge HistoryofLater Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge)479-495.Oehler. K l. (1997). Aristoteles. Kategonen. bersetzt undErlutertvon K l. Oehler (D armstadt)1977(1984).Patzig. G (1973). 'Bemerkungen zu den Kategorien de s Aristoteles', in E. Scheibe, GSumann,(eds.),Einheitu ndVielheit. C.F. vonWeizsckerzum60 G eburtstag, 60-76.Rijk, L M de(1978). 'On Ancient and Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics(2)',m Vivarium16: 81-107.(1982). 'The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms', in N. Kretzmann, AKenny, J . Pinborg (eds.). The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cam-bridge ) 161-173.(1988). 'Categorizationas a K ey Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics', inVivarium26(1): 1-18.Roth, B.(1936). FranzvonMayronnes. SeinLeben,seine Werte, seine Lehrevon Formatunter-schied in G ott,Werl (Franziskus-Druckerei), (Franziskanische Forschungen 3).

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A P P E N D I X I

SPECIMEN COLLATION

C = MSCam bridge, University, 1231, ff.240ra-241vb.E = MS Erfrt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, Amploniana,F . 182,ff. 114rb .O =Ox ford,Bodleian, Saville, 18,ff.32v-36v.P = Padua ,Bibliothec aAntoniana,X IV 405, ff. 70va-73rb (year: 1475).Hancprobo'sie:quecumque distinguuntur2 omni3 actu collativo r a t ionsdestructo4 velcuiuscumque alterius poten tie collative5 , illa distinguuntur exnaturarei;sed6omnia7 predicamenta sunt huiusmodi8 ,ergo etc.9Maior patetex precedentibus10 .Minor" patet , '2 quia sipredicamenta distinguuntur m e-diante actu collativo alicuiuspotentie, ergo13 ipsa non erunt14 predicamen-ta", quod estcontra dictum16 Porphyrii, capitulo de specie. Consequentiaestev idens quia: tunc predicamenta essent cn t i a rat ionis, ens aulcm rationisnonpolestesseprimum17 principiumrerum18vel" entiumrealium .Further, MS E thrice omits unities of about 40 words, to be found in MSC. Of the f i f t h conclusio,asection ofabout 100w ordsism issing.

1Hanc probo: probaturE;oslendoP. -2circumscriptoadd.P. - * et nondistinguunturE. -' om.P .- * rationis...collative: pr cisaE. -6om. f.-1om.E-huiusE. - om.EP. -'dicdsE;pre-dictisP. -"etminorO- probaturE. -nom.E;nineP. -"essent decemE;decemadd.O. -15phncipiaprima E;returnphncipiaprima P .-16dictaE;vulgatumadd.P . - l7om .EP .-ureiE;om.P.- om.P.

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APPENDIXII

PETRUSTHOMAEO.F.M.,D E DISTINCTIONE PREDICAMENTORUM

Manscripta adhibita1.MS Cambridge, Univ.1231,ff.24 0ra-2 41vb (siglum:C)2. Ed. HicronymusRomanusdeN uciarellis, V enetiis1517, ff.30va-32rb(siglum:ine.)I.l 2961.2 2% 2% 297 297 297

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296 E.P .BOS(ED.)P etrus ThomaeOFM,.c.De distinctione predicamentorum

Assitp rincipio sanctaMariam eo'Ad evidentiam differentiarum predicamentorum intendo sic procedere: pri-mo2prem ittam3nec essaria,secundoconcludam4 .

IQuantum adprimum5(M ) premitto6aliquas divisiones,(1.2)secundodecla-raboaliquas propo sitiones.LI1.1.1.De primo estistaprima7 divisio: 'predicamentum' potest accipidupli-citer8: uno modo loyce loquendo', prout10importt ve nominal"secundamintentionem; alio modo metaphysice, prout importt seu nominal12 primamintentionem que substernitur secundo intention tamquam fundamentum re -lationi,etsic" intendode istis inp roposito14 .1.1.2. Secunda divisio est ista15 : eorum que distinguuntur, quedam dis-tinguuntur distinctione rationis16 , quedam17 ex natura rei.Eorum" que dis-t inguunturex natura rei, qued am distinguuntur realiter19 , etquedam [f . 30vb

inc.] formaliter20, quedam2 ' essentialiter, quedam21 se totis subjective, que-dam se totisobjective.1.21.2.l.D esecundo23primapropositioes t ista: i llad istinguuntur ratione2 4que-cumque distinguunturper actuin intellectus possibilis collativi vel alteriuspotentie collative,sicutdiffinitio etdiffinitum loyce loquendo.Dico autem 'collativum', quia duplex est actus intellectus possibilis, sci-

licet23p rimitivus sive26reclus,et secundarius sivecom parativus. 'Primilivusaclus' dicitur quo2 7 fertur in obiectum obiective; secundariusseu comparati-vu sdiciturq uo fertur in obiectum non absolute, sedip sum alteri comparan-1 supra textum.-2 enim add. inc.- l aliquaadd. inc. -4 adduco aliqua probabilia inc. -*primo add. inc. -6 premittam me.-7 prima om .C. - R duobus modis inc. -9 om .inc.- 'scilicet add. inc.-n dnommaiC - 12 seu nominalom. C. -'3 om . inc.-u procedereseunominal inc.-"om.in c -dislmctionerationis:ratione inc.-vero add. inc.- [S leriadivisioesteoniminc.-'9 formaliler inc.-20realitern c .-2 I veroadd. inc.-a q u a n t divisioestdistinctionumessentialiter( ) quedam distinguuntur inc. - 23 primoC. - M hoc estintel-ligentie fabricationea dd. inc.-25 om .inc.~26 scilicet (sic) inc.-27quiinc.-

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I N C T O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 9 7do2 8 tune en im 2 ' aliquid dicitur distingui ab alio ralione quando" 'actu intel-lectusp ossibilis ve lalteriuspotentie,sedtantumactusecundarioe treflexo".Q uiquidem32dicitur 'reflexus' sive 'comparativus'.Non solumautem intel-lectus possibilis es t potentia collativa, sed etiam voluntas et ymaginatio,quia quelibet istarum potentiarum polest unum alteri conferre et33 com-parare. [f .240rb] Et ideo no n solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiamdue34predicte potentie possuntcausare sive originre dis tmctioncm rationis. Isteenim 35 distinctiodiciturc o m m u n i nomine 'rationis', turnquia originre sivecausare actum collativum primo et principaliter convenit rationi, hoc estintellectui possibili (intellectus enim possibilis dicitur ratio quia sibi con-venit proprie ra i iuc inari ) , tum etiam quia ipse intellectus possibilis ut inpluribuscaust seuoriginaldistinctionemrationis.

< P ropositio secunda>1.2.2. Secunda propositie sit ista: ilia distinguuntur ex natura rei precisequorum distinctio3*dpende 37 primarie38 expropriisprincipiis39 term inorumet non ab actu alicuius potentie collative, qualis est distinctio lapidis ablu.m i n e eteconverso.1.2.3. Tertia p r o p o s i t i e ) est ista: illa distinguuntur formaliter quecumque itase habent quod unum ab alio40 ultimate abstractum no n includit alterius41quidi ta tem 4 2 sive ral ionem, sicut patet primo in divinis, quia Bonitas siveV eritas a43 Sapientia abstracta ultimate44 no n includit eius quiditatem45 seualiquid inratione eius q uid itativa , licet illam46 includ at ydem pticevel essen-tialiter.Nam ultimataabstractie indiv inis sive in transcendentibussimplici-te r non tollit ydemptitatem ydempticam,quamvistollitydem pt i t a tem forma-l e m . Secundo patet increaturis,q uia intellectusavoluntateu ltima te abstractusnon includit quiditativevoluntatem47 ,et sic dealiispotentiis anime.

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298 E.P.Bos (ED.)lila inclusio es t ydemptica, quando aliqua;l it a se habent quod unumincluait aliud essentialiter , et econverso, ut patet in divinis; et sic52 divina

essentia includitessentialiter33quodlibet attributum,et econverso, quodlibetattributum 54 d i v m a messentiam includit,et etiam quodlibet at tributum quod-libet attributum.V el35 quan do aliqua duo56 in uno37 tertio includuntur essen-tialiter, sicut proprie passiones insubiecto3*et etiam omnes potentie animein ipsa anima includuntur.Quamvis"enim ipse potentie anime inipsa ani-m a essentialiter includantur,non tarnen unaincluditaliam .Sed ista inclusiodicitur ' formal is ' , quando unum includit aliud in sua ranone formali seu diiTimuone proprie et simpliciter dicta, seu quandounuminest alteri in primo modo dicendi per se, quemadmodum materia et formai n c l u d u n t u r incomposite,et g e n u s et d i f f e r e n t i a inspecie

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I N C T O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 2 9 9Secundasecundum quamnaturaconcernitsuumpropriumsuppositum.Tertia secundum quam unaratio q uiditativa concern it aliam ,sicut a m m a -

litasconcernit rationalitatcm1"Quarta secundum quam accidens concernit suum subiectum, ut colorlignum 82 .Quinta83 secundum quam relatio concernit suum*4fundamentum, sicut fi-liusconcernit sub stratumfiliationi85.< D emodisab stractionis>Secundum ergo numerum et diversitatem istarum86 concernationum secun-dum 87modos8* concernend]numerantur et diversificanturabstractiones8".

Primus abstractionis modus es t secundumquern*0supehus abstrahitur asuo inferiori, sicut animalabh o m m eSecundus modus est secundum quem natura abstrahitur a suo propriosupposito,uthumanitasaPetro".Tertius modus*2 est secundum quem una ratio quiditativa*3 seu una per-fectio abstrahiturabalia, sicutanimalitasarationalitate,eteconverso.Quartus m odus est secu nd um quem accidens abstrahitur a suo subiecto,ut [f.240va] color aligno.Quintus 94 modus es t secundum quem relatio abstrahitur a suo fundamen-to ,sicutfiliatio a flio.

Circaquod"quatuor sunt notanda.Primurn* est" quod in di vin ispossunt fieri quatuor abstractiones velquatuormodiabstrabendi9*.Pr imomodo"quando10 0 superius abstrahitur10 1 asuo102 inferiori, sicut abhoc ente ens, scilicet Deo, et sapientia ab hac sapientia,scilicetdivina,sicutetiam 103filiatioab hac filiatione10 4divina.Patet etiam de secundo modo, quia essentia divina potest abstrahi aquo libet supposito divino1"5 ,sicutDeitas106a P tre etF ilioet SpirituSancto.Detertiomodopatetetiam,quiaessentiadivinapotestabstrahiaquolibetsupposito107 sicut deilas a Bonitate et Sapientia, et unum attributum potestabstrahi10 8 ab alioattribute, ut Bonitas a Sapientia, sicut a Bonitate Sapi-entia.D e quarto"19 modo patet quia relationes indivinispossunt abstrahi ap ro-81 sicul...rattonalitatemom.inc -82 utcolor lignumom. inc. -Bultimataadd. inc.-Mproprium add. inc. - ** sicut ... filiationi: De prima, sicut animal concemit hominem. Desecunda sicul humanitas concerna suumpro-[f. .lira] p n u m suppositum. D e lertia, sicut ani-malitas respiciturarationalitate. Dequarta. sicutcolor rcspicu lignum.Dequinta, sicutfiliussubtractus filiationi inc.-w prcdictarum inc. -87 velinc.-M moduminc.-K ila quod add.inc.-*quod inc.~9I Bernardoinc.-n abstractionis add. inc.-w abahaadd. inc.- ** etultimusadd.inc.~93queinc.-%primo inc.-97om.inc.-"* scilicetprimus,secundus, tertjuset quartus Patetdeadd.inc.-91 om.inc.- ID O qiiiaindivinis aliquid inc.-lal potesl abstrahiinc.-l02om.inc.-ln3 siciit etiam:et sicinc.-10*scilicetadd. inc.-105om.inc.-106 divinitassicsemper inc.-l07 attributoetecontrainc.- IOB polestabstrahiom.inc.-1(W quinto(sic} inc.

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300 E.P.BOS(ED .)priis11 0fundam entis, sicutp aternitasaPtreet filiatio aF ilio.Secundoest notandumquod inpredicamentosubstantie possunt f i e r itiesabstractions vel tres m odi "1 abstractionum tantum"2 , quia11 3 ib i superiuspotestabstrahi a suo inferior , ut substantiaab hacsubstantia''*etnatura11 3asupposito, ut humanitas a Petro ,et'16unaratio quiditativa potest abstrahi abaliis11 7.Tertio notandum est quod in predicamento accidentium absolutorumpossunt fieri tres abstractiones11 8, scilicet prima11 9 , secunda12 " et quarta12 1.Verb i gratia12 2 ,ut quantitas ab hac quantitate,de secunda12 3sicut continuitassivecontinum12 4aratione habendipositionem;dequarta12 3sicut quantitasaqu tQuartonotandumes tquod inpredicamento12 6 accidentiumrespectivorumpossunt fieri quatu or modiabstractions scilicet primus12 7 ,tertius,quartus etquintus12 8. D e primo ut12 9relatio ab hac relatione, de tertio sicut relatio sup-positionisarelatione denominationis,dequartosicutrelatio filii130a sub-stantiafilii, dequinta sicutfiliatio13 1 apotentia passiva13 2.

1.2.4.Quarta propositie principalis si t ilia13 3: ilia dist inguuntur realiter que-cumque ita se habent quod quodlibet est formaliter pos itivum , et unum abalio ultimate abstractum nullo modo includit aliud nee potest de alio pre-dicari ydem ptice,nee formaliter"4.Dico primo13 5quod 'quodlibet sit form aliter po sitivu m ', nam ad hoc quodinter aliqua sic distinctio realis proprie'36, requiritur quod utrumque13 7 si tformaliter posi t ivum,quia13*negationes et139 privationes inter se nee ab alioproprienon14 0d istinguu ntur realiter, qu ia non dic unt formaliter aliquod posi-t ivum, licet negationes et14 1 privationesconnotant14 2 et terminant14 3, seu insu osecundario inlel leclu dicant aliquod positivum .Secundodico quod unumabalio ultim ate abstractum nonpossitde alio14 4predicari.

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I N C T O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 3 0 1suo150,quia(1 )quedames tydemptica, (2 )quedam formalis."11(1 )Ad predicationemydemp ticamduonecessario"1requiruntur:

P r i m u m es t quod predicatum et subiectum sint idem essentialiter,namomnis predicatio ydemptica est essentialis, sed152 non econverso. In pre-dicationeautem essentialisubiectumes tidem essentialitercum predicato'53 .Secundum es t quod utrumque extremorum"4 si t infinitum formaliter,sicut15 5 indivinis, vel permissive15 6sicutin transcendentibus sim pliciter.D i-co autem 'in transcendentibus simpliciter', quia est dare gradus in transcen-dentibus, quia quedam sunt minus, quedam13 7 magis transcendentia. Illudautem est transcendons simpliciterqucd reperitur in omni ente tam creatoquam increato, sicut 'ens', 'unum'158 , 'bonum' .(2 ) Il la 'w predicatio est formalis in quapredicatum pertinet intrinseceadrationem quiditativam subiecti, sive quando predicatum inest subiecto inprimo modo dicendiper se,sicuthec160 'homo es tanimalrationale'.Circa q uod su nt aliquaintelligenda.Primum est16 1 quod omnis16 2 predicatio formalis sit16 3 ydemptica, quam-vis noneconverso.Secundumest164 quod solum in divinis seu in16 3 transcendentibus simpli-citer reperitur predicatio ydemptica absque formali. Verbi gratia 'D ivinitasest Bonitas' et econverso, 'Bonitas est Sapientia' et econverso. Et ratio est

huius [31rb me.] quia solum in predictis reperitur illud quod est ratio prcisapredicationis ydemptice, quod est illimitatio essentialis intimitatis, ut decla-rabitur"*inpenul t imaquestione Demodis distinctionumin principio.[c )Tertium est"7 quod in creaturis non reperitur16 8 proprie et stricte predi-catio ydemptica, nisisitlw formalis. Nam secundum Scotum in tractatu Deprimo principio,m in creaturis omnis predicatio ydemptica es t formalis.Cuius ratio es t secundum eumquia17"ib i17 1 nichil est idem ydemptice altennisi quod pertinet ad rationem eius quiditativam et17 2 quod est idem sibiformaliter. Et ideo secundum eum ibi non potest fieri predicatio aliqua17 3prcise ydemptica nisi sit formalis. Potest etiam addi ratio predicta17 4, quiain creaturis no n potest reperiri proprie illimitatio essentialis intimitatis,que17',utdictumest17 6,estcausaprcisaydem ptice p redicationis.150 suis inc.-sl necessaria inc.-152licet inc.-153uthomo estanimaladd. inc.-154 scilicetsubiectum el predicatum vel altenim ipsomm add. inc. ~ l s < i patet add inc. - I% com*muniss imum C. -l5 7 enim add. inc.-158 verum add. inc.-Lw autem add. inc. -lw om.inc. -161 om.inc. -l62 om.inc. -lw estinc. -l64 om.inc. -l65 seu in: etme.-16A delerminabiturinc. -167 notandumadd. inc. - lfr8 potesteperirinc. -lftt om. inc. -17 quod inc. -'7Iom.inc.-172 velinc. -L73om.inc.-174adducta inc.-175quiainc.-l76eaadd. inc. ~[bj Joh. Duns Scums. Quodlibet,q. 1. n. 1. [c]Petras Thomae,De modis distinctionum,Qu V.f.51vb(Bridges.Identity ...p.141.n. 5). [d]Cp.Joh. DunsScotus.Deprimoprincipio TV.9 (ca.Kluxen,p. 100).

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302 E.P.Bos(ED.)1.2.5. Quinta propositio est ista:illa essentialiter [f.240vb] dislmguuntur

quecumque itase habentquod unoexistentealiud nonex istitvel nonoportetquod aliudex istt17 7,ve lquandounum est natura17 8 prius altero, velquandounum nondependeta balio'79essentialiter, ve lquandounodestructo11 0aliudnondestruitur,velquandounum polest poni sineah operaliquam potentiaminactualiex istentia18 1,sicuthomo"2,angelus et183asinus.1.2.6.Sextapropositio'84:illad istinguunturse totissubiectivequecum que itasehabent quodrealitates eorum sunt distincte num erovel individualiter velin actuali existen'a;vel quando1*5 realitas u mu s es t particularizata etdivisa

a realitate alterius, sicut Petrus et Paulus18 6 et omnia187 individua eiusdemspeciei.1.2.7.Septim apropositio et ultima est ista: iltadistinguunturse totisobiecti-ve que non conveniunt in aliquauna realitate sive rationsquiditativa, vel aquibus nonpotest abstrahi aliquisconceptus18 8unicusrealis seuprim e inten-tionis,sicut sunt differentie formales seu189 individuates et illa que habentconceptualquiditativum etqual i ta t ivem,sicut'ens'et 'bonum' .

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I H C T I O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U H 3 0 3Circa quod est notandum, quod primo, quando determinant d i s inc t i o -nern'9*, sic se habent200 quod quecumque dis t inguuntur se totis objective,

distinguuntur omnibusmodisaliis, et sic de omnibusaliismodis201distinc-i i o n u m respectu aliorumprecedentium. Quecumque enim distinguuntur setotis subjective, d is t inguuntur essentialiter,formaliter, realiter,exnatura rei,rai ioncet sic dealiis,nontameneconverso,ymo202sicarguendoest203falla-cia consequentis. Non enim sequitur 'a et bdistinguuntur ratione,ergo204formaliter, neehec valet 'distinguuntur formaliter,ergorealiter', quia 'ens','verum', 'bonum'distinguuntur formaliter, nontamen realiter205.Nee valet:' d is t inguunturrealiter,ergoessentialiter',quia potentie anime inter se distin-guunturrealiter et ab essentiaanime sicut subiectum etpropriapassio;et-lanr'*conceptus generiset differentie distinguuntur realiter secundumm en -te m Scan indiversis locis, non tamen distinguuntur essentialiter secundumipsum. Nee21" valet: 'distinguunturse totis subiective, ergo objective208',nam individua eiusdem speciei209 etspecies eiusdem generis et et iam pre-dicamentadis t inguunturprimo et non210secundomodo. Individuaenim con-veniuntinspeciespecialissima2",speciesingenere, predicamenta212inente,et ista convenienl ia ob iec t iva vel qu id i t a t i va estrealis, quia preceditomnemactum comparativum2"r a t iomsetetiamcuiuslibetpotentie collative.

Secundo est notandum, quod per oppositum214 se habent pred ic t ] modi,quando accipiuntur cum ydemptitate, quia quecumque sunt idem ratione,sunt idem omnibus aliis modis. Etsiede singulis respectu subsequentium,non tamen econverso, quianonomniaquesunt idemsetotis subiective, suntidem aliis modis215, utpatet216ex predictis. Et sie de omnibus aliis modisprecedentibus.

II.II. 1. Quantum ad secundum articulum217sit ilia218prima conclusio: Omnia

predicamenta distinguuntur ex natura rei.Hancprobosie:(a) quecumque distinguunturomniactucollativo2"ratiomsdestructo220 ve l cuiuscumquealterius potentie collative, illa221distinguuntur[f . 31 va inc.] ex natura rei; sed omnia predicamenta sunthuiusmodi, ergoetc. Maior patet exprecedentibus222.Minor223patet224,quiasi predicamenta199 determinantdistnconem:detemunaturdedistinctionqueinc. -20habet inc.-20' etsic. . .modis om.inc.-202 unosemper wie. -committiturinc. ~** exnatura rei', nee valet'distinguuntur exnaturarei,ergoformaliter'.quia infehusdistinguitura suosuperioriexnaturarei,nontamenadd. inc.-205 utpatetexpredictisadd. inc.~** etinc.-207 etiamadd. inc.-208 ergoobjectiveom.inc. distinguuntursetotis subiective add. inc.-21 om.inc.~2n

om.inc. - 2 I2 etgenera inc. - 2 I3 actum comparativum: intellectus Operationen] inc. - 214obiecQinc.-215 etsic de...modis. inc.-216 apparetinc.-2"principalemW.inc.-2I hecinc.-2"intellectusadd. inc.-22om. inc.-El laliaadd. inc.-222 predictis inc.-223sedminorinc.~224 probaturinc.~

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304 E.P.Bos(ED.)distinguuntur mediante actu collativo223 alicuius potentie, ergo ipsa nonerunt226decemrerumprincipiaprima227,quod est contradictum2 2 8 Porphyrii,capitulo de specie.1*1 Consequentia est evidens quia: tune predicamentaessent entia rationis, ens autem ra lionis non polest esse primum229pr in c ip iu mrerum velentiumrca l ium .(b)Preterea.Partessubjective entis realis distinguunturex naturarei;sedpredicamenta sunthuiusmodi, ergo etc. Maiorpatet quia: {f. 241ra} partessubiective entis realis sunt vere entia realiaet perconsequens distinguunturexnatura rei. MinorpatetperPhilosophumquinto230Metaphysice21', ubi di-viditens reale in decem predicamenta.10

(c)Tertio232.lilaque per se cadunt in2 35considerationscientie realis dis-t inguunturex natura rei; sed predicamenta sunt huiusmodi, ergo etc. Maiorpatet,quia illaque per se cadunt in2 34consideratione seienderealis sunten-tia realia, nam impossibile est ens rationis per se cadere in considerationesciencie realis235;entia autem realia dis t inguunturex natura rei,et non peractum collative236 rationis vel alterius potentie collative. Minorpatet, quiapredicamenta sunt per se de consideratione sciencie metaphysice , utpatetquinto237 Metaphysice, ubi Philosophas dtermint de predicamentis231.Suntetiam239per se de considerationenaturalis2 40 ,ut patet24' primoDegene-rarione'1' et quinto242P hysicorum Quant i l asetiamest per se deconsidera-tionemetaphysice243.(d)Quarto244:illaquesunt formaliterprime intentionis, distinguunturexnatura rei; sed243predicamenta sunt huiusmodi, accipiendo predicamenta24*metaphysice, ut hic loquimur de ipsis247; ergoetcetera24*.Maior patet, quiaratio formalis prime intentionisest exnatura rei,nam intelligibilitas rei estex natura rei;sed intelligibilitas sive ratio formalis intelligibilitatis2 49est ra-tio formalis prime intentionis; ergo ratio formalis prime intentionisest exnatura rei. Maior istius rationis250 probatur: turn2 51 quia precedit omnemactum intellectus;aptitudo252enimsive253potentia intelligendi preceditom-nemactum intellectus,namcircumscripto omniactu intellectus adhuchabetres intelligibilitatem 2 5 4; turn quia2 55 entitaset unitas2 56 ,quesunt rationesin-telligibilitatis257,suntexnatura rei. Istaetiammaiordeclaratur258inquestio-nibus259De esseintelligibili.mMinor260pronunc261 supponitur2 6 2 .225 rationisveladd. inc.-messentinc.-H7 predicamenta inc.-22S vulgatumadd.inc.-wom.inc.~23 secundoinc.-231 principleprimoadd. inc.-M2 prctereainc.-subinc. -234subinc.-235 suntentia ...calisam. inc.-intellectus inc.-"7etsextoadd.C.(Aristotle.Metaphysics,V.7 I017a).-a'ipsisinc.-239entiaadd. inc.-240 philosophiwc.-241 apparetinc.-242 septimoinc.(Aristotle,Physics V.l.225h).-243 septimoadd. inc.-w prctereainc.-245 otttniaadd. inc. -246 om.inc.-247 eisinc.-248 om.C. -M9 sive .. . intelligibilitatisom.inc.-250 syl logism inc.-251 om.inc.-M2 accipiendo inc.-253 utinc.~254 intelligentemine-255 turnquia:cumetiaminc. -256 veritasinc.-25T intelligentis inc.-258 declarabiturinc.-259 conctusionibusinc.-26(> ideoinc.-261nunc inc.-262 supponaturinc.-[f] Porphyrius, inArist. latinos16-7,p 9IZ.[g]Arist, Meiaph. IV71077a22-3 [h]Arist, Maaph.rv.7.[i ]Arist.Degener,elcoir lcapp. 1-10 \j ] Arist.,Phys .Vcapp 1-6.[k]PetrusThomae,Deesse intetiigibii,ubi?

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I N C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 3 0 5(e)Preterea.Quecumque constituunturet distinguuntur permodos intri-necos,distinguuntur ex naturarei;sed predicamenta sunt huiusmodi; ergo

etc. Maiorest evidens2 6 1 ,quia modi intrinseci suntexnatura rei,utapparetinultima questione264Demodis distinctionum265.Minorprobatur,quiaper2Mperseitatem267etinesseitatem2*8et adalienitatem269.

II.2.Secunda conclusieesthec:omnia predicamenta distinguuntur forma-liter.

Hanc probosic:(a) quecumque sic sehabentquod u n u mab alioultimateabstractum noninc ludi t aliudquiditativeseu in suoconceptu quiditativo, illadistinguuntur formaliter; sed omnia predicamenta sic se habent, ergoetc.Maior patet ex premisssis. Minor2 patet discurrendo per singula predica-menta.Confirmatur 2 71:quecumquesic sehabent quod unumpotesl existere sinealio, illa distinguuntur formaliter; sed omnia predicamenta sic se habent;ergoetc.Maior est evidens272 quia:oppositum predicati infert oppositumsubiecti.Et273minor probaturinferius.

(b)Preterea.Si predicamentasint274 idem formaliter275, ipsasunt27'per-mixta 2 77 , quod est contra2 7 8 Philosophum2 primo Posteriorum.m Conse-quentiatenet2*"ex 2 81 se, igituret antecedens.(c)Preterea. Sipredicamenta sint2 82idem formaliter, ergo ipsa non eruntdecem prima principia rerum283. Consequens284 falsum, ut predictumest.Ergoilludex quosequitur. Consequentia patetdese285.Sed forte hic dicitur2 ' quod, licet287predicamenta sint idem formaliter,tarnen288poterit salvari2119 dictumPorphirii, sicut salvatur quod sint decemgenera prima; genera290enimsunt habentia291rationem principii, quia suntprincipia specierum2*2et individuorum,etideo ad istud293 s u f l i c i t ista294dis-tinctiorationis.

Respondeo quod si predicamenta non distinguuntur nisi ratione sola,nullus2 95 potest2" salvare297 illud dictumPorphirii29 * , quiaens rationisnonpotesl habere rationem primi principii, qum-'" est ens diminutum. Ensetiam300 rationis nonpolest esseprincipium entis realis, turnquia estpos-terius,t u mquia est imperfectius.Et301quandodicitur quod 'genera suntprincipia302', dico quod velacci-263 manifesta inc.-264conclusione inc.-2M ParusThomae,Qu. X I,f. 60vb(Bridges. Identity....p.156,n.46).-266quia per:proplerinc.-2ft7 specialilateminc.-26 en ina ie ininc.-awaccidcntalitatem me.-27autemadd.inc.-271 etiamadd.inc.-272 estevidens: paletmr-mwm.mc.-27 4 suntirtc.-27 5 ergoadd. inc.~276 cnintinc. ~277 inpemxtis C-278 ut wc. ~279apparetinc.-280patetinc.-2S1deinc.-282suminc.-2*13om C.-214estadd me.-185de seom.inc.-28

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306 E.P.Bos(ED.)pis303 'genus' formaliter pro secunda intentione, vel pro fundamento eius,scilicet304proprima intentione.Siprimo modo,tunepropositionon estvera.Si303 secundo modo, tune306est vera,et31"habes308propositum309, scilicet310quodconceptuspredicamentales non distinguuntursolaratione, quia primeintentiones non sunt precise entia rationis, ymo sunt vere entia realia, utnuncsuppono.

Preterea.Arguitursicad3"conclusionemgeneralem31 2 . Q u e c u m qu eita sehabent quod aliquid ex natura re i attribuitur uni quod non alteri, ilia dis-t inguuntur for-[f. 31vb inc.]-maliter; sed predicamenta ita se habent ; ergoetc. Maior est evidens, quia oppositum predicati infert oppositum subiecti,quia si datur oppositum predicati, scilicet quod sunt idem formaliter, op-positum subiecti3'3 sequitur31 4: 'quicquid attribuitur uni, attribuitur3" alteriex naturarei'.Minor patet, quiaperseitatesabsolute31*attr ibuuntursubstan-tieabsolute317exnatura rei,et318nonpossum31*attribui320nee321 inesse alteripredicamento. Item, patet in mul t i s - ' "aliis que attribuuntur multisaliis pre-dicamentis, sed nonomnibus323.

II.3. Tertia conclusio [f. 241rb C] est illa: omnia predicamenta distin-guuntur realiter.Probo324sic:(a) quecumque ita se habent quod quodlibet est formali terpositivum,etunumabalioultimate abstractumnonpotest ydempticedealiopredicarinee formal i te r , illa distinguuntur realiter; sed omnia predicamentasicsehabent;ergoetc. Maior patetexpredictis. Et325minor326patet quantumadprimam327pattern, scilicet quod quodlibet predicamentum sit formaliterquid328positivum. Namsecundum commune32*dictum330negationesetpri-vationes nonsuntper se, sed peraccidensinaliquo predicamento.

Secunda pars331 probatur.Et333 primo de predicatione ydemptica sic333.Nullum predicamentum est formaliter vel permissive infinitum; ergo u n u mnonpotestde alio334ydemptice predicari.Consequentia patet exdictis335intertiapropositione.Antecedens etiam patet quod nonsuntinfinitum forma-liter, quianonsunt idem quod Deus,nee33*in Deoformaliter.Preterea,ipsapredicamenta continentur subente finito, quia in ipsa dividiturens imme-diate. Secundo patet quod nonsunt infmita permissive337, turnquianonsunti ranscendcnt ia , turnquianonpossunt contrahiad ensformaliter infinitum.303 accipi lur inc.-304 profundamentocius,scilicet: fundamenta l i le r inc.-305 aulera accip ia-musadd.inc.-306 propositioadd.inc.-yn sicadd.inc.-308 habeoinc.-30* inlemuminc.-310 om.inc.-3"contrainc.-312 primaminc.-313 quiasi ...subiectiom.inc -3 I4 scilicetquod inc.-315uni,atthbuiturom.inc.-316 etabsolubililasinc. -3t7 om.inc. -3"om.inc.-319 potestinc.-320uiuadd.inc.-321 etinc.-322 om.inc.-323que...non omnibusom.inc.-324 hancpmhoinc.-32 om.inc. -326 ctiamadd.inc. -327 suiinc. -328 om.inc.-329 quodinc.-330esladd.inc.-331 secundapars:minorinc. ~332om.inc.*333om.inc.~334 altero inc.-335predictisinc-336suntaddinc.-337permissione.id estpermissiveinc.-

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T IN C T I O N S P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 3 0 7Sed338 probatur33' minor sic de predicatione formali. Predicamenta nonsunt idem formaliter; ergo unum non polest de alio iormali ter predicari.

Co n sequ en t sestevidens, quiaad hocquod aliquade se invicempredicenturformaliter340,oportetnecessarioquod sint idem formaliter;alias341predical ioesset nulla. Sicut en im predicatio ydemptica presupponit ydemptua temydempticam,itapredicatio formalis presupponitydemptitatem formalem34 2.Antecedenspatetex secundaconclusionepremissa.(b)Preterea. Quecumque dis t inguuntur sicutrealitaset realitas343, illa344distinguunturrealiter;sedpredicamentasic sehabent;ergoetcetera345.Maior patet. Et minor probatur qu i a quecumquedistinguuntur sicut reset res3*, dis t inguuntur sicut realitas et realitas; sed omnia347 predicamentadistinguuntur sicut res et res;ergo etcetera. Maior348 patet, quia maiordistinctiearguit m i n o r cm unitatem;seddistinctiorei et rei etessentieet es-sentie est maior q u am realitatis et realnat is . ergo etcetera. Maior istiussillogismi patet. Minor34* probatur dupliciter.Primo350 ex conclusione se-quenti33 1.Secundo sic. Quecumque distinguuntur sicutens etens, ilia35 2 dis-t inguuntursicutres etres;sedomnia predicamenta distnguuntursicut en s35 3et ens; ergoetcetera334. Maior patet, quiaens et res convertuntur secundumAvicennam tertio Metaphysice sue.1"1 Minor probatur, quiaens quiditativeincluditur in rationibusformalibus ipsorum predicamentorum sicut superiusinsuis35' inferioribus35 6 .

II. 4.Quarta conclusio357:omnia predicamenta distinguunturessentialiter.Probo358sic.(a) Resuniuspredicament perdivinam potentiam polestpo-ni in actuali existentia absque rc alteriuspredicamenti, et econverso;ergounum35' distinguiturab alio essentialiter. Consequentia estevidens ex quar-ta3"1propositione premissa. Etantecedenscommuniterconceditur adocto-ribuset361philosophis veris et catholicisde predicamentis absolutis.Sed depredicamentisrespectivisestmagis dubiumetmagnad ifficultas, utrumpos-sintponi absque absolutis.Et ideo tenendo opinionem novam cuiusdam subtilissimi36 2 probo363 sie:nam fundamentum adquodest relatio,sehabet364ingenerecause (1) effici-entis vel (2)formalisvel (3)materialsvel (4) finalis. Si (ad 1)efficientis vel(ad 2) finalis, habeo propositum, quia Prima Causa polest supplere

33g prcteicaine.-339 iliaadd.ine.-34 am.ine.-M1 aliterinc.-M2 sicut cmm foimalemom.ine.-realiterine.-344om. ine.-345 om.C. -3*fi iliaadd.inc.-347 wnniaine.-348istiussyllogismi add.inc. -M9 c t iam p nnc i p ahsadd. C. -35 om.ine.-35) consequent inc. -352 om.inc.-353 rsine.-354 ergoetceteraom.C-353 suoinc.-356 inferioriinc.-357 estistaadd.inc. -358 hancproboinc.-359 predicamentumadd.inc.-360quintainc. ~361 doctoribusetom.inc.-362 subtilisinc.-3E3earnprobandoinc.-304adipsamadd.inc.-|m]Avicenna,inAvicennalattnus,Libtrdephikaophia ...). I I I .2.

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308 E.P.Bos(ED.)o m n e mcausalitatem efficientem vel f inalem.Si au tem (ad 3) m a t ena l i s , quero anesset3'5etus ma t e n a in qua vel exqua.Nonexqua,quia366secundumPhilosophumoctavoMe laphysicel } acci-dentia ta lcm m a te n a m non habent. Nam sicut impossibile est quod367 exnon-substantiis fiat substantia368, secundum Philosophum primo Physico-rum369, eque impossibile est quod ex substantiis fiat non-substantia. Siautemsit371matenainqua,cum accidens absolutumhoc modo dependeat adm a t e n a m vel ad subiec tum, hoc tarnen non obstante potest per divinampotent iamabeo37 2separariet per se poni Ergo non obstante illadependentiarelationis373ad374fundamentum sicutadmateriaminqua,potest375ipsarela-tioactualiterponiper se.Nee376potest377dici quodsicdependeat adfundamentum sicutadcausam(ad 4) formalem, nam (1) tune esset absolutum intrinsecum respectivo, etperconsequens illudquodest formaliter respectivum,essetformaliter abso-lu tum, quod est valde absurdumet378oppositum37' in adiecto380. Illudenimin cuius ratione formali sive quiditativa includitur absolutum aliquod,estformaliterabsolutum. (2)Tuneetiam381predicamentarespectiva nonessentpartes subiective entis per se382, sed per accidens, quod est contra Philo-sophum secundo Physicorum,Mum aliter materia et forma coinciderent,quod estcontraPhilosophum ibidem.(3)Turnetiam384causaformalisnonest385quid simplex, sed quid compositum ex materia et forma.Tuneetiam386,cum quelibet res sit formaliter talis per propriam387 causam formalem,respectus esset formaliter respectus per absolutum, quod est [f. 32rainc.]manifeste [f.241va C] falsum.(b ) Item388,quero quare fundamentum in duobus extremis positum nonpossitponi absque relationeet389quare relationonpotest poni absque funda-mentisve labsque fundamento vel390termine.In3"huiusmodi392enim393 nonpotestalia ratio reddi nisi quod u n u mes-sentialiterdependetab alio.Hocsuppositoarguitur si c39 4: p r i m u m indepen-denspotestsimpliciter terminare395omnem dependentiam sufficientem39 6 adactualemexistentiam397;sed exsupplemento398alicuiusrequisiti399adactua-lem existentiamalterius potestargui400necessario401possibilitasseparationsunius

402 abalio;ergo ex hocquod

403primum404 independens potest depen-dentiam cuiuscumque requisitiad405actualem existentiamalicuius supplereet terminare406, potest quodcumque407 immediate poni per ipsum; ergo365 quiavelitinc.-cuminc.-367 om.inc.-308fiatsubstantia:fierisubslanl iaminc. -369degeneraoneinc.-37similiterinc.-37eiusadd.inc.-372abeoom. inc.-vellespectusodrf.ri:.-374 eiusadd. inc.~375 polentinc.~y76 noninc.-377etiamadd.inc.-378 camadd.inc.-379 obiectuminc.-38 oppositeinc.-M' iliainc.-382 curahocnonessenl enaper seadd. inc.-383curaaliter...ibidemom.inc.-3S4 tuneetiam.curaaliterC.-JK essetinc.-yttuneetiamom.inc.-387 perpropnam:proptereius inc.-3** pretereainc.-8S vline.-390etinc.-391om.inc.-392 huiusinc.-3S)3 om.inc.-394 arguitursicom.inc.-395 determinateinc.-3S6 sufficienter inc.-3y7 cuiuscumque add. inc.-ex supplemento: supplere inc.-3"acqmsitiinc.-400alicuiusinc.-401om.inc.-402 illiusinc.-403om.inc.-404phncipiuminc.-405

mg.,inc.-406

etterminare:veldeterminateinc.-407

quecumqueinc.[n]Arist,M etaph .VH.5.1031al-2 [o]Cp.Anst,Phys.D.l.l93a28-30,b6-8

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P E T R U S T H O M A E , D E D I S T I N C T I O N E P R E D I C A M E N T O R U M 3 0 9perconsequens primum408 independens,quodest"*Deus,polestsupplerevi-cem fundamenti relationis vel respeclus410 et terminare dependentmm rela-tionisad ipsum et , per consequens, polest4" ipsamponere inactualiexisten-tia absque fundamento. Minor de se patet Et41 2maior declarator413, (1) turnquia ipsum 41 4 independens simplicit 415anullodpende etideopolest om -nem dependentiatn lerminare sufficienler; ratio enim independence alleu-us416 ab aliquo precise est ratio lerminandi dependentiam Uhus ad ipsum;(2 ) tu m eliam41 7 quia primum4"1simplicit ""9independens continel virtua-liler120 relationem, el per consequens polest ipsum sive dependentiamipsius42 1 sufficienler lerminare; alias422 virtualiter non conlineret relatio-nem423.(c) Item 42 4, materia polest poni in actua l ] exislenlia sine forma; ergorelatio sine fundamento. Consequenlia patet a simili, (1) tum quia sicutrelatio dependa fundamenlo sie425 maleria a forma,(2) tum42 6 quia siculDeus inseparalionematerie aforma suppletvicem terminandidependenliamipsiusadformam,ilavidelurpossibile quod Deus polest427 supplere vicemfundamenti in terminandodependenliam ipsius relationisad i l lud Antece-denssupponituradpresens,elprobaluraScotoquarto42 8Sententiarum^(d) U l t i moarguitursie:immedialior el intim ior estnatura supposito quamrelatio fundamento; se d Deus polest facere naluram absque supposito42 9proprio;ergopotesl facere relationem sine fundamento43 0. Maiorpalel, (1)tu m

431 quianaturaquidificat

43 2supposilumformaliler, (2) tumquiaest

433for-maliler ipsum;(3) tum 4 '4quiadat sibi nomenet diffinitionem, que noncon-veniunt relationi respectu fundamenti. Minor palet435 de faclo inChristo,et 43 6possel437probariperrationes quas adducunt5cofus'ql el438alii doctores

supra tertiumSentennarumadprobandum possibilitatemincarnationis.II.5.Quinta conclusioest43"quodpraedicamenta distinguuntur selotissub-

iective.Hanc44 "probo sie:(a) i l ladistinguunturselotis subjective velsecundumessesubiectivum quando illud quod realiterreperiturinuno,non reperitur inah o .sed omnia predicamenta sunt hu i us mod i . ergo etc. Maior palel44'. El442minor etiam443 quia44 4 predicamenla445 sunl impermixla, ut habelur primoPosteriorum.^408 principiuminc.-40*quod est: utinc.-410velrespectusom.inc.-411adinc.-412 sedinc.-413 sicadd. inc.-414 principium inc.-41 5 similiterinc.-416 illiusinc. -4t7 om.inc.-*18principium inc. -419 similiterinc. -42 omnem add. inc. -421 ciusinc.-422 aliterinc. -423ipsam inc.-424 prctercainc.-425 sicutC.-42S euzmudd inc.-421 possetinc.-128 secundoinc. -42 V om.inc.-430 polest facere relationem sine fundamento: etceterainc.-431 om.inc. -432 significat inc.~433 d n o m m tinc. ~434 etiama dd inc. ~435 apparelinc.-430 etiaminc.-437 polest inc.-438 caamadd.inc.-439 Klaadd. inc.-440om.inc.-44 1 estevidensinc.-442om.inc.-**3patetadd. inc.-444coordmationesadd. inc.-445predicamentoiuminc. -[p]Joh.DunsScotus,InIVSent.,d.u. q. 3, n. IS. [q]OpusOxiimemt. 111.dist.l, qu.1. n. 5 14,65-66)[r]Arist./UiaiPost.L15.79b8-l1.

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310 E.P.BOS{ED.)Diceres 6fne 1 quod minor est falsa dupliciter quia: (1) entitas et aliatranscendentia reperiuntur in quolibet predicamento; (2) secundo quia se-

cundum448

Philosophum inPredicamentis,capitulo de qualitate**9 in fine,1'1u n u metidemensreperiturind ivers i spredicamentis,sicut patetdescientia.Dicit450enimsic ibi45': 'sicontingat452idemetqule453etrelativumvelrela-tionemesse454, nullum433 est inconveniens in utrisque generibus456enume-rari457.'

Responded4** ad primum (ad 1)quod, licet transcendentia aliqua reperi-anturinpluribusvel inomnibus predicamentis, tarnen quodlibeteorum con-trahituradpropriumessecuiuslibetpredicamenti,et per consequenshabentaliudetaliudessesubiectivuminalioet inaliopredicamento.Adsecundum(ad 2)dico459quod dupliciterpotestdici aliquidensunum,scilicet unitate per se et460 unitate per accidens, ut patet4" per462 Philo-sophumquintoMetaphysice. Quandoergo463dicitPhilosophusquod unumetidemest indiversispredicamentis,accipitunumperaccidenset nonunumperse.

Et hoc patet primo per ra