96 lebanons politics - the sunni community and hariris future current

8/7/2019 96 Lebanons Politics - The Sunni Community and Hariris Future Current

1/39

LEBANONS POLITICS: THE SUNNICOMMUNITY AND HARIRIS FUTURE CURRENT

Middle East Report N96 26 May 2010


2/39

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1II. THE SUNNI COMMUNITY IN THE AGE OF THE FUTURE CURRENT ............. 2

A. RAFIC HARIRI:THE GENESIS OF A CURRENT AND A PROJECT....................................................... 2B. SAAD HARIRI AND THE SUNNI COMMUNITYS REPOSITIONING..................................................... 5

1. Breaking with Syria ..................................................................................................................... 52. Turning inward............................................................................................................................. 73. Turning toward the West ............................................................................................................. 74. Joining the moderate axis ......................................................................................................... 95. Sectarian divisions ..................................................................................................................... 10

C. APARADOXICAL NEW BALANCE OF POWER .............................................................................. 13D. THE FUTURE CURRENTS POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES .................................. 17

III.THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF SUNNI POLITICAL DIVERSITY ........................ 19A. LOCAL PERSONALITIES .............................................................................................................. 19B. SUNNI ISLAMISM........................................................................................................................ 21

1. Dar al-Fatwa (House of Religious Edicts) ................................................................................. 222. Jamaa Islamiyya ......................................................................................................................... 233. Salafis ......................................................................................................................................... 24

IV.CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 30APPENDICES

A.

MAP OF LEBANON ........................................................................................................................... 31B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 32

C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2007 .......... 33

D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................ 34


3/39



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The June 2009 swearing in as prime minister of SaadHariri, leader of the Sunni Future Current movement,marks a turning point, the end of a period of exceptionaldomestic political turbulence and regional tensions thatbegan with the 2005 murder of his father, Rafic; led toinstitutional paralysis; and culminated with the violentMay 2008 showdown between government and opposi-tion. It also presents the new leader with a host of novelchallenges. The man who took the helm of a once deeplydivided Sunni community must discard much of whatenabled his rise, if he is to succeed now that he is inpower. With Hizbollah, the principal Shiite movement, hemust move away from the sectarianism that has becomeLebanons political stock-and-trade. The Future Current

should initiate the process of becoming a more genuine,institutionalised party, breaking from the clientelism thatwill otherwise inhibit the prime ministers transition fromcommunity leader to statesman. And Hariri must continueto navigate the difficult normalisation with Syria, over-coming deep mistrust among his constituency towardDamascus.

Upon his fathers assassination, Saad inherited an almostimpossible task. Rafic Hariri was larger than life: at oncesuccessful businessman, diplomat, politician and states-man. As Lebanon awoke from years of a bloody civil war,

he strove to be the nations saviour. He was not withouthis critics or his failings. Many chastised his propensity tomingle private dealings and public affairs. But few chal-lenged his leadership qualities or his ability to rise forthe most part above confessional politics and to jugglecontradictory international relations.

In death as in life, Rafic was an outsized character whoseinfluence extended far beyond Lebanons borders. Syria,widely viewed as responsible for the murder, faced in-tense international pressure. Unprecedented demonstra-tions forced the withdrawal of its troops after an almost

30-year presence. His death stirred deep, lingering Sunniresentments and anxieties: anger at Syrias heavy-handeddomination and unease stemming from a sense of vulner-

ability. The result was a massive, overwhelming instinctof communal solidarity among Sunnis, who rallied aroundRafics son and dramatically shifted national, regionaland international alliances. The community joined forceswith its historical foes, anti-Syrian Christian parties. Itturned against a traditional ally, Damascus, now seeing itsstruggle with Syria as a conflict between two incompati-ble visions for the country. And, for the first time in itshistory, it turned toward the West, partners in a perceivedlife-or-death battle against Syria, Hizbollah and Iran.

Of all, the most striking transformation in Sunni attitudessince 2005 has been the exacerbation of sectarian feelingsand hostility toward Shiites, nurtured by deepened re-

gional sectarian divisions following the fall of the Iraqiregime. Tensions existed in the past, but for the most partthey had remained dormant or, if expressed, quickly con-tained. There were several turning points: Hariris assas-sination; subsequent expressions of pro-Syrian sentimentby Hizbollah and Amal; the 2006 war with Israel, whichmany Sunnis blamed on Hizbollah and which highlightedthe Shiite movements troublesome military might; and,finally, Hizbollahs swift May 2008 takeover of the capi-tal, which Sunnis suffered as a humiliating defeat.

The net effect was to solidify the Future Currents he-

gemony over the Sunni community and Hariris controlover the Future Current. Stunned by Hizbollahs decisionto turn its weapons inwards, Sunnis rallied as one behindthe movement. Dissent was tantamount to betrayal. InJune 2009, the Future Current buoyed by a large Sunniturnout triumphed in the parliamentary elections. Thevote, a reflection of a powerful communal solidarity, sig-nalled Hariris emergence as the virtually unchallengedSunni leader.

But the Future Currents clear victory also contributed toimportant domestic and regional changes. Syrian accep-

tance of the results and Hariri's selection as prime minis-ter removed important impediments to a Saudi-Syrianrapprochement, which had begun earlier that year. Riyadhencouraged normalisation of ties between Syria and


4/39

Lebanons Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariris Future Current

Crisis Group Middle East Report N96, 26 May 2010 Page ii

Lebanon, notably by pressing Saad Hariri to visit Damascus a trip brimming with emotional and political signifi-cance. Once selected as prime minister, Saad reached outto the opposition, which responded in kind. He now leadsa national unity government whose ability to function willdepend on consensus.

Ruling successfully will require that he takes this evolu-tion a step further. More will be needed to reverse sec-tarianism and deepen the process of Syrian-Lebanesenormalisation. Hariri will have to relinquish his de factoposition as Sunni leader and devolve that role to a moreinstitutionalised Future Current in effect turning it into aparty with clear and accountable decision-making mecha-nisms, an identifiable political platform and professionalcadres as well as to reformed and strengthened religiousbodies better able to manage the community and preventa radical drift. In the same vein, he gradually will need to

break with the type of community-based, patron-clientstyle of politics that, over the past five years, the FutureCurrent has more fully embraced.

Competition from Sunni rivals and loss of hegemoniccontrol almost certainly will be one consequence, but assuming a lessening of confessional tensions it also isan inevitable one. If the goal is to stabilise Lebanon, pro-mote its welfare and avoid any sectarian backsliding, it isa price Saad Hariri will have to pay. It also would be the

best way for him to honour the most promising elementsof his fathers legacy.

Beirut/Brussels, 26 May 2010


5/39



I. INTRODUCTIONSaad Hariri, who inherited from his father the mantle ofleader of the country and of the Sunni community, faces

an unenviable task. His first challenge is to reverse thesectarian-based identification and mobilisation whichserved him so well in recent years and culminated in hisdecisive triumph in the 7 June 2009 legislative elections but no longer can constitute his principal political asset.Insofar as he heads a national unity government, theprime minister can rule efficiently only if he minimisesheretofore dominant confessional and political fault-lines.It will not be easy. Defiance and rejection of the ShiiteHizbollah movement, Syria and Iran played a critical partin his political ascent, providing him with powerful do-mestic and international backing. Moreover, the underly-

ing local and regional factors that fuel these sentimentsremain largely unresolved, making it difficult for Haririto moderate his Sunni base or bring along his foreignbackers.

Hariris difficult internal and external repositioning iscompounded and this represents his second major chal-lenge by the fact that both arenas remain highly fluidand unsettled. Lebanons incipient normalisation withDamascus is a gamble, necessary yet risky nonetheless.Hostility toward Syria among the countrys Sunni com-munity convinced of the regimes role in Rafic Hariris

assassination and chafing after decades of Syrian domina-tion, still runs deep; several of Lebanons foreign supportersare uneasy about Damascuss regional posture; and the twocountries almost certainly will face tremendous obstaclesin their quest for more balanced relations. Resumption ofIsraeli-Lebanese hostilities a possibility not to be dis-counted almost certainly would revive the contentiousissue of Hizbollahs weapons which has been set asidesince the new Lebanese governments inauguration.

Hariris third challenge is that he leads a unity govern-ment which, in many ways, is unprecedented and thuswhose sustainability is unknown. Historically, Lebanonhas tended to be ruled by broad coalitions. But these haveinvolved lopsided power-sharing arrangements in whichsome political parties in effect were in control at the ex-pense of others. In contrast, the current government faith-fully reflects the actual balance of power. The outcome ofa prolonged political impasse and institutional paralysis,the cabinet must prove it can produce something quitedifferent. In other words, even assuming foreign actorsrefrain from destructive interference, the dysfunctionalpolitical system could well generate sufficient crises anddeadlocks on basic issues of governance to render Haririsself-proclaimed priority the countrys economic recov-ery a pipe dream.

Lastly, the Future Current whose influence and promi-nence grew under circumstances of exceptional communalmobilisation is facing the re-emergence of a traditionallymore fragmented, diverse Sunni landscape. Local leadersand Islamist movements seek to reassert their authority,question Hariris leadership or resist his domination. Amore pluralistic, diverse Sunni community would not nec-essarily be a bad thing, arguably signalling the transitiontoward a more peaceful, less polarised form of politics. Butit also could vastly complicate the prime ministers task.1

1For additional analysis of Lebanons politics, see Crisis GroupMiddle East Reports N87, Lebanons Elections: Avoiding a

NewCycle of Confrontation, 4 June 2009; N78, The New Leba-

nese Equation: The Christians Central Role, 15 July 2008;N69,Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis, 10 October 2007; andMiddle East Briefing N23,Lebanon: Hizbollahs Weapons Turn

Inward, 15 May 2008.


6/39


Crisis Group Middle East Report N96, 26 May 2010 Page 2

II. THE SUNNI COMMUNITY IN THEAGE OF THE FUTURE CURRENT

A. RAFIC HARIRI:THE GENESIS OFA CURRENT AND A PROJECT

Rafic Hariri was larger than life, a figure with fewequivalents on either the Lebanese or regional scenes.2He possessed an acute sense of politics, rooted in hisunderprivileged and highly politicised childhood in Sidon.3He was exceptionally savvy in business, amassing a co-lossal fortune in Saudi Arabia in the construction andpublic works sectors; by the 1970s, he had become one ofthe royal familys most important and trusted business-men.4 And he was a gifted diplomat, fostering and main-taining a wide range of often contradictory relationships,

assuming the role of mediator or facilitator in severalintricate negotiations.

By the late 1970s, at the height of the Lebanese civil war,he turned his attention more fully to his home country,putting those three attributes to good use. His vast wealthfunded an array of charitable activities targeting mainlySunnis but benefiting other communities as well.5Thesehelpedmake up for the states deficiencies and gave himan important social base in this predominantly clientelistsystem.6 He set up an independent network which pro-vided education, healthcare, jobs, food and financial aid,

even as he gradually co-opted pre-existing structures.7

2Rafic Hariris official biography is available at www.rhariri.com/general.aspx?pagecontent=biography.3 On this period of his life, see Nicolas Blanford, Killing Mr.

Lebanon,(London, 2009).4Marwan Iskandar,Rafic Hariri and the fate of Lebanon, (Lon-don, 2006); Georges Farchakh,Alfadel Chalaq:My Experiencewith Hariri, (Beirut, 2006).5Georges Farchakh,Alfadel Chalaq, op. cit., pp. 210-221.6Hariri established his first association in Lebanon in 1979, thenknown as the Islamic Association for Culture and Education. Ithas since been renamed the Hariri Foundation. It is best knownfor providing scholarships to over 30,000 students during the war.7Non-governmental associations and social organisations are ofparticular importance to the Sunni community, as one activistexplained. Rafic Hariri had a perfect grasp of Beiruts Sunniresidents. They have very negative memories of political partiesand militias. They see social organisations and associations in adifferent light. Thats where elites are formed, thats where theybegin to acquire political power. Crisis Group interview, Beirut,11 March 2008. Among the pre-existing groups which Haririprogressively took over is the Federation of Beiruts Family As-sociations.Founded in 1960, it was revived in 1997 by Hariri inorder to mobilise voters in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentaryelections. It represented at the time some 20 per cent of Beirutspotential voters. Crisis Group interview, Walid Kebb, formerRafic Hariri advisor, Beirut, 26 April 2010. Another example is

Unlike virtually every other Lebanese leader, Rafic was notin a position simply to convert his pedigree into politicalpower; instead, he worked hard to build his influence bysetting up a remarkable system of social redistribution.

Hariri simultaneously developed ties with key decision-

makers in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia,8

but also Syria,9

France10 and the U.S.11 Between 1983 and 1984, duringmediation efforts in Geneva and Lausanne, he was Ri-yadhs official envoy to Lebanon. To this day, manyLebanese leaders give him credit for contributing to the1989 Taef agreements, which led to the end of the civilwar the following year.12

By then, Hariri had established himself as an importantSunni leader: he had helped the community acquire a moreequitable share of power through the Taef accords and,because so many Sunni figures had died during the war, he

filled the vacuum. An observer of the Sunni scene said:

Many Sunni representatives were killed during thewar, among them sheikh Sobhi Saleh; Nazem al-Qadri[a member of parliament]; prime minister RachidKarameh; and mufti Hassan Khaled. These murdersleft Sunnis to themselves, unprotected, more frag-mented, marginalised and exposed than other, morestructured communities. Sunnis largely were excludedfrom political life, for example during the 1985 tripar-

the Islamic Association of Makassed, the first Sunni charitableassociation, established in 1878 by a group of local notables.Dedicated to the communitys cultural, social and economic de-velopment, it built schools, orphanages and hospitals. In 1997,Hariri began to fund several of its institutions, cf. www.haririfoundation.org.lb/adopt.htm; he also forgave much of the debt itowed to the Mediterranean Bank, which he owned. Sharq al-

Awsat, 25 October 2003. In so doing, he earned the associations,its members and its beneficiaries political loyalty. Crisis Groupinterview, Walid Kebb, Beirut, March 2008.The same patternwas replicated with several Beirut and Saida-based associations.Crisis Group interviews, Future Current officials, social activists

and NGOs workers, Beirut and Sada, March 2008-July 2009.8He is said to have build particularly strong ties to Prince BandarBin Sultan, the then-Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., and Saoudal-Faysal, the foreign minister. See Marwan Iskandar, Rafic

Hariri, op. cit., p. 51.9Hariri reportedly was close to Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syriasformer foreign minister and vice president, and Hikmat Chebabi,the former army chief of staff. Ibid, p. 50. Beginning in the early1980s, Hariri also is said to have forged close relations to Syriasthen-president, Hafez al-Assad. See Ghassan Charbel,The Palace

Malediction,(Beirut, 2008), p. 223.10Hariri and Jacques Chirac developed a tight friendship whilethe latter was mayor of Paris.11Marwan Iskandar,Rafic Hariri, op. cit., pp. 52-62.12Crisis Group interviews, Lebanese officials, Beirut, Tripoli,Sada and Bekaa, 2008-2009.Iskandar, asserted that the Taefaccords were written by Hariri, op. cit., p. 51.


7/39



tite agreement.13 With Rafic Hariri, the communitycould recover part of its former glory.14

Despite being accused by some Christians of favouringSunni interests,15 Hariri presented himself, and to an extentwas perceived, as above confessional politics. Tellingly,

although he developed ties with various Islamist move-ments, many among them criticised him for not helpingthem enough or not displaying sufficient sectarian loy-alty.16 Rather, he strove to be seen as a statesman andsaviour of a nation bloodied by a long civil war and dev-astated by skyrocketing inflation, collapsing livingstandards and public services and the Lebanese poundsdevaluation.17 The first post-war government proveddisastrous, coming to an end as a result of public riots. Inits stead, Hariri promoted an ambitious reconstructionagenda, backed by his personal fortune and internationalcontacts.18 He became prime minister in 1992.19

Very quickly, he set out to redress the economy. Hehelped stabilise the currency, liberalise the economy,stimulate foreign investment, rebuild state institutions andrehabilitate public infrastructure. He went further, seekingto restore Lebanons position on the Arab and interna-tional scenes and, unveiling a project that was little shortof grandiose, turn Beirut into a major regional capital.One of his close associates said, his dream was forLebanon once again to be the regions beating heart, a

13The three-way agreement was reached with Syrian support byWalid Jumblatt, the Druze leader; Nabih Berri, head of the ShiiteAmal movement; and Elie Hobeika, head of one of the LebaneseForces branches. It sought, but failed, to end the civil war.14Crisis Group interview, Abdel Ghani Imad, director, CulturalCentre for Dialogue and Studies, Tripoli, 7 April 2009.15Crisis Group Report, The New Lebanese Equation, op. cit.,pp. 2-3.16An Islamist intellectual with ties to the Jamaa Islamiyya, said:That is the reason why he did not achieve with Sunnis whatHizbollah did with Shiites: a unified communal base. CrisisGroup interview, Tripoli, July 2006. Islamist activists claimed he

did not provide adequate political support to those who werevictims of detention, persecution and torture at the hands ofLebanons and Syrias security services. Crisis Group interviews,salafi sheikhs, Jamaa Islamiyya officials, Islamist activists,Beirut, Tripoli, Sada and Bkaa, May 2006-September 2009.17Boutros Labaki, LEconomie politique des guerres pour lesautres (1975-1990). Les pertes, in F. Kiwan (ed.), Le Libanaujourdhui, (Paris, 1994).18Hariri was instrumental in convening three international con-ferences aimed at providing Lebanon with financial support anddebt relief: the Friends of Lebanon Donor Conference, in Wash-ington in 1996 and the Paris I and Paris II conferences in 2001and 2002. See www.rhariri.com/french.aspx?ID=466.19Analysts believe that his victory was due to the fact that healone was seen byboth parliamentand Damascus ascapable ofredressing the Lebanese pound. See Ghassan Charbel,The Pal-ace Malediction, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

bridge between East and West, a haven for Arab capital.He wanted to revive Lebanons image as the MiddleEasts Switzerland.20

Hariri faced three important obstacles. First, insofar as thevision was very much his own, the line separating public

policy from personal interests had a tendency to blur.21

As a result, he stood accused of promoting his own busi-ness at the expense of the broader good, in particularwhen private companies he owned either in part or in fullundertook colossal public works not always in fulltransparency.22 This was coupled with a broader andoftentimes vehement critique of his economic policy: alaissez-faire approach and a monetarist policy aiming atexchange rate stabilisation that some viewed as overlycostly in social terms23 and massive public expenses thatsaddled the country with heavy debts.24

Secondly, his project depended to a large extent on apeaceful regional context and in particular avoidance ofrenewed Arab-Israeli warfare. This was critical in ensur-ing that Lebanon attracted investments, businessmen andtourists.25 In the early 1990s, this seemed possible. The

20Crisis Group interview, Beirut, April 2009.21According to a close associate, Hariri began preparing his pro-

ject to rebuild Beirut as early as 1982. Crisis Group interview,Beirut, 7 April 2008.

22In 1994, Samir Kassir, a well-known and respected journalist,wrote: The conflicts of interest prompted by the presence, at thehead of the government, of a businessman with a hand in somany diverse activities (construction and public works sectors,banks, insurance, media, real estate, etc) are familiar. Nothingillustrates these better than the company entrusted with rebuild-ing Beiruts city centre (SOLIDERE), of which M. Hariri is thelargest shareholder. Samir Kassir, Au Liban, un pouvoir sansresponsabilit, des querelles sans enjeux, Le Monde Diploma-tique, October 1994. Kassir, a fierce critic of Syrias policies inLebanon, was assassinated on 2 June 2005.23Former Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss once famously de-scribed Hariris economic policy as putting building before

human beings. See Marwan Iskandar, op. cit., p.89.24According to a former finance minister, the public debt,which represented only 45 per cent of the domestic gross productat the end of the war (1975-1990) reached 200 per cent in 2005-2006. Debt service, mostly domestically financed, is drainingpublic finances and leaving very little room for substantial eco-nomic and social reforms. Georges Corm, Les causes de lacrise libanaise: lEurope contribue-t-elle la solution?, docu-ment presented to the meeting of the European ParliamentsCommission on Politics, Security and Human Rights, 26 No-vember 2007, at www.iemed.org/documents/novesrealitats/Alcoverro/a1.pdf.25For Hariri, Lebanon truly seeks peace. It is our only possiblechoice. It is our strategic choice because it is in Lebanons interest.www.liberation.fr/monde/0104224947-hariri-la-paix-ne-se-coupe-pas-en-morceaux-le-premier-ministre-libanais-exclut-un-accord-separe-avec-israel. Hariri reportedly was counting on


8/39



civil war had come to a close, the Israeli-Arab peaceprocess was launched, both Iraq and Iran appeared to becontained, and three-way coordination between SaudiArabia, Egypt and Syria had significantly improved. In1996, Hariri drew on his broad regional and internationalnetwork to help end Israels Grapes of Wrath operation

in Lebanon.26

In 2000, however, whatever prospects existed had dark-ened substantially with the collapse of Israeli-Syrian andIsraeli-Palestinian negotiations and the outbreak of thesecond Palestinian uprising, followed by the elections ofGeorge W. Bush in the U.S. and Ariel Sharon in Israel,neither of whom appeared particularly keen to relaunchpeace talks.

Finally, Hariris gambit hinged on Syrias goodwill,whose presence in and influence over Lebanon were

enormous, intrusive and internationally sanctioned. Thevery fact of his prime ministership reflected an under-standing between Damascus and Riyadh which recog-nised the primacy of Syrian interests in Lebanon, whilegiving Saudi Arabia a role through Rafic Hariri.

In and of itself, Hariris economic policy hardly was in-imical to Syrian interests. Feverish reconstruction inLebanon helped its neighbour, many of whose under-qualified workers found ready employment.27 Lebanonsre-emergence as a commercial, banking and consumptioncentre revived the traditional division of labour between a

more liberal Lebanon and more socialist Syria. Impor-tantly, it also fuelled corruption involving elites in bothcountries and, in so doing, made it easier for Damascus toexercise control over Beiruts political class. At the outsetat least, Hariri tried hard to accommodate his neighbour.In one of his close advisers words, he was a reformistwho strove for a compromise with Syria. He did not wanta confrontation.28

Tensions between Hariri and Syria began to surface in1998. These likely were caused by several interrelatedfactors. To begin, Hariri had acquired an extraordinarystature as de facto head of state,29 bringing together broad

peace between Israel and Syria as the way to lessen the latterscontrol over Lebanon. See Nicolas Blanford, op. cit., pp. 71-7226www.rhariri.com/general.aspx?pagecontent=biography.27John Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage. Syria Migrant Workers in

Lebanon, (Stanford, 2009).28Crisis Group interview, Nouhad al-Machnouk, Future Currentmember of parliament, Beirut, 2 January 2010.29Alongside his large-scale economic and social activities, Haririhad established a media empire. He acquired Radio-Orient,

bought shares in the daily newspaper An-Nahar and foundedboth the Future Television and the daily al-Mustaqbal. He usedthem to promote his policies and, above all, to counter his oppo-nents attacks. See Iskandar, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

Sunni support, a national vision and powerful interna-tional backing. In this, he stood in stark contrast to hisnations traditional leaders, almost invariably feudalchiefs narrowly tied to their community interests, bitterlydivided and thus from Syrias standpoint easy to ma-nipulate. Eager to cut him back to size, Damascus took

advantage of the increasing difficulties encountered byHariris economic project.30 The political transition inDamascus also played a part; Hafez al-Assad, sick and inhis final years, almost certainly was seeking to consoli-date his regimes position in Lebanon prior to handingpower over to his son, Bashar.

The most tangible phase of the crisis occurred in Novem-ber 1998, when Syria orchestrated the election to thepresidency of Emile Lahoud, former army chief of staff.Lahoud immediately positioned himself in opposition toHariri; his inaugural address pointedly stressed the pre-

eminence of the rule of law, the strengthening of govern-mental institutions, the requirement for transparency andaccountability in the conduct of public affairs and thepromotion of social justice and equality, all of whichwere intended as indirect attacks on the outgoing primeminister.31 Ultimately, Hariri ruled himself out32andthecabinet, led by Salim al-Hoss, was almost entirely reshuffled.

30Iskandar wrote: Public debt was increasing at a fast pace fromless than $2 billion in 1992 to $17 billion [in 1998]. The budgetdeficit in 1997 had reached a record of 59 per cent and growthrates had fallen from 14 per cent in 1993 to 3 per cent in 1998. Atthe beginning of the summer of 1998, Lebanon seemed badly inneed of a change in its political climate and leadership. Ibid, p.91.31Excerpts available at www.finance.gov.lb/NR/rdonlyres/7C38A8A7-E998-40AB-9179-F12EAD2CCA18/0/ CountryPro-file2004.pdf. Between 1998 and 2000, Lahoud led a campaignagainst the former prime minister. He claimed to want to cleansethe state of corruption inherited from Hariri. High-profile trials ofseveral of Hariris close colleagues were held, including the fu-

ture prime minister, Fouad Siniora. See Blanford, op. cit., pp. 77-78;Iskandar, op.cit., pp. 96-98.32Syria played a decisive part in government formation. It im-posed certain ministers, negotiated the allocation of posts withthe various parties and ensured that no opponent of the regimeentered the cabinet. Rafic Hariri, who formed three governmentsbetween 1992 and 1998, enjoyed greater flexibility than most inthis respect, due mainly to his economic influence and stronginternational ties. Once Lahoud became president, this began tochange. The new president took several steps that seemed delib-erately intended to weaken and even humiliate Hariri question-ing whether the president was obliged to respect the deputiesprime ministerial preferences (in this case, most backed Hariri);

delaying the prime ministers appointment; and getting a numberof parliamentarians to delegate their choice to Lahoud. WhenHariri was asked to form the government, he refused to do sounder these conditions.See The Economist, 3 December 1998;


9/39



Tensions reached a new level when, after his triumph inthe 2000 parliamentary elections, Hariri regained theprime ministership. This led to a stormy relationship withthe president, reflected in sustained domestic paralysisand growing Syrian intrusion.33 Israels 2000 withdrawalfrom South Lebanon simultaneously encouraged greater

Lebanese opposition to Syrias military presence andHizbollahs armed status,34 both of which were chiefly

justified by the continued occupation. Anti-Syrian criticismceased being a principally Christian affair,35 as others notably Walid Jumblatt, head of the Druze community

joined their voices. The Syrian regime faced the U.S.invasion of Iraq as well as heightened pressure fromWashington and Paris hence its almost obsessive desireto consolidate its hold over its neighbour.36 In 2003,Hariri, under pressure, formed a more pro-Syrian gov-ernment.37 Then, a year later, parliament extended Lahoudsmandate by three years, in violation of the constitution. InAmerican and French eyes, Syria had crossed a redline; inHariris, this was a turning point that pushed him to re-sign the premiership and join the Lebanese opposition.38

Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 19 February 2001; Nicolas Blanford, op.cit.,p. 70.33In particular, the Lebanese and Syrian security servicesstrengthened their political control. Security forces harshly re-pressed several student demonstrations against Syrias presenceand arrested many anti-Syrian critics. According to former par-

liament members, Hariri advisors and journalists, ministersactivities were tightly controlled by the security apparatus. CrisisGroup interviews, Beirut, March 2008-May 2010. In addition,Lebanese authorities censured several international media out-lets critical of Syria. In September 2002, a television stationowned by Gabriel Murr, a parliament member and strong criticof Syrian policies, was shut down by court order, and in No-vember, the Constitutional Council invalidated his election.See LOrient le jour, at www.lorientlejour.com/data/attach_784299884_1232536106.pdf; see also,Le Monde, 15 August2001; and www.le-liban.com/liban/rubrique/la-censure-au-liban, 21 August 2001.34Hizbollah is the only Lebanese movement that did not disarmin the wake of the civil war.35 Crisis Group Report, The New Lebanese Equation, op. cit., p.2-3.36Crisis Group Middle East Report N39, Syria after Lebanon,

Lebanon after Syria, 12 April 2005.37 Among the ministers were Assem Qanso, a member of Leba-nons Baath Party, and Assad Hardan, from the Nationalist So-cialist Syrian Party. See Nicolas Blanford, op. cit., p.87. At thetime, Lahoud called for a new government better able to con-front the challenges triggered by the fall of Saddam Husseinsregime and U.S. pressure on Syria. Al-Hayat, 12 April 2003.Given Syrias role at the time, Hariri was not in a position tooppose this decision. Crisis Group interview, former Hariri advi-

sor, Beirut, 26 April 2010.38Hariri repeatedly signalled his objection to the extension ofLahouds mandate. See Nicolas Blanford, op. cit., p. 92. He de-scribed it as a coup against Lebanons democratic system. See

Shortly thereafter, on 14 February 2005, he was killed ina massive explosion. Although the attack was claimed byan obscure jihadi group, suspicions immediately zeroed inon Syria, which denied any role. Until then, the youngSaad Hariri, who was 35 at the time and resided in SaudiArabia, had shown virtually no interest in or predisposi-

tion for politics. His oratory, political and leadershipskills largely were untested.39 When his father died, heappeared to assume the succession reluctantly, with morethan an afterthought. Far from seizing power as his com-munitys representative, he inherited it by virtue of hislineage, Saudi Arabias support,40 the trauma caused byRafic Hariris murder and the vacuum it left behind. Atthe same time, he inherited his fathers political legacy ina dramatically transformed domestic and internationalcontext.

B. SAAD HARIRI AND THE SUNNICOMMUNITYS REPOSITIONINGIn a mirror image of his life, Rafic Hariris murder wasmultidimensional, its ramifications extending far beyondhis nations boundaries.41 Syria, widely viewed as respon-sible, faced intense and immediate international pressure.Massive, unprecedented demonstrations in Lebanon ledto the withdrawal of its troops after an almost 30-yearpresence. The event had sectarian implications: RaficHariris death awoke deep, lingering fears among the

Sunni community which quickly rallied around his son,Saad, and shifted its national, regional and wider interna-tional alliances.

1. Breaking with SyriaIn the years following the civil war, Lebanons Sunnisentertained ambivalent relations with Syria. They are bestunderstood by comparing them to the approaches of othercommunities. Christians believed they lost most fromthe Taef agreement and, more generally, the civil war.

www.elwatan.com/Le-pere-de-la-reconstruction-de. On 1 Octo-ber 2004, a car bomb seriously wounded Marwan Hamadeh, aDruze minister close to Jumblatt, whose parliamentary blocvoted against the extension. Jumblatt associates openly accusedSyria. Hariri ultimately voted in favour of the extension, thoughhe simultaneously presented the governments resignation, de-clined to submit his candidacy for prime minister and formally

joined opposition ranks. Nicolas Blanford, op. cit., pp. 116-117.39Saad Hariri was the head of his fathers Saudi based construc-tion company, Saudi Oger. See http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/lebanon/2009/06/200962713213871468.html.40Crisis Group interviews, March 14 and Future movement offi-cials, Beirut and Tripoli, 2006-2009.41See Crisis Group Report, Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon afterSyria, op. cit.


10/39



They blamed Syria for their political marginalisation andemerged as its staunchest critic. The ensuing repressionby Syrian and Lebanese security services left the commu-nity more disorganised, disoriented and bitter.42 Shiitemovements, by contrast, strongly benefited from Syriaspresence. It solidified the gains registered in Taef; shored

up Amals position;43 and allowed Hizbollah to pursue itsstruggle against Israel even as Damascus tightly con-trolled how it was waged. Syrias interaction with Shiitesat times was heavy-handed and provoked genuine re-sentment, but overlapping political interests smoothedthe relationship.44

For Sunnis, the situation was more ambiguous. A numberof local leaders, including Omar Karameh in Tripoli andAbdel Rahim Mrad in the Bekaa Valley, became Syriasunconditional allies. At the other end of the spectrumwere (relatively minor) pockets of resistance, chiefly

among Islamist activists who, in turn, were severely hitby the Syrian-Lebanese security services.45 In NorthernLebanon, principally Tripoli, Syrias presence was tanta-mount to an occupation, a reflection of Damascuss alarmat the prospect of an Islamist movement that eventuallycould cross into its own territory.46

Sectarian perceptions were more complex still. In the eyesof many Lebanese Sunnis, Syrias Alawite-dominatedregime and its uneasy relations with its own Sunni majorityexplained Damascuss attempts to keep the community incheck and prevent any expression of an independent iden-tity.47 Syrias support for Alawite communities in Tripoliand Akkar whose members number in the tens of thou-

42Crisis Group Report, The New Lebanese Equation, op. cit., pp.2-4.43Syrias presence contributed heavily to the selection of Amalsleader as speaker of parliament, a post Nabih Berri has held since1992.44Crisis Group Report,Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis, op.cit., pp. 19-20.45Lebanese officials claim that hundreds of Islamists were ar-rested between 1999 and 2003. Crisis Group interviews, Beirutand Tripoli, 2008-2009.46In the wake of Syrias 1982 bloody repression of Islamists inHama, Lebanons Al-Tawhid Islamist movement provided shel-ter and protection to Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members. Cri-sis Group interview, former Al-Tawhid member, Tripoli, March2008.47A parliamentarian from the Akkar region echoed the views ofmany co-religionists: The Syrian regime is controlled by a con-fessional minority. It fears Lebanons Sunnis ever since it re-pressed its own Muslim Brothers in the early 1980s, because offamilial relations between members of the community in bothcountries. Just as in Syria, Lebanons Sunnis are repressed by

Asads regime at every level. Syria has done everything withinits power to prevent the emergence of a strong Sunni leader.Crisis Group interview, Khaled Daher, Future Current parliamentmember, Beirut, 19 August 2009.

sands48 added to the suspicion.49 Sunnis likewise sawRafic Hariris political path through a confessional lens,interpreting setbacks and attempts to sideline him as as-saults on the community.

The perception sharpened markedly with the benefit of

hindsight; since 2005, Rafics past treatment by Syria hasbeen decried as persecution and described as a humilia-tion.50 A leader of the Jamaa Islamiyya, the Lebanesebranch of the Muslim Brotherhood, said, the Syrian erawas very negative for the Sunnis, who were oppressedand weakened for the benefit of the Shiites.51 Althoughthe situation was more ambiguous and nuanced,52 suchwidespread notions are an index of how profoundlyevents in 2005 affected Sunnis, altered their outlook andturned latent, scattered hostility into a powerful, collec-tive and quasi-unanimous rejection of Syria.

The intensity of the Sunnis reaction and their stunningcommunal mobilisation cannot be explained solely byanger at Syrian practices or loyalty toward Rafic. As a

journalist put it, the reservoir of bad memories associ-ated with Syria, both during and after the war,53 is not astrictly Sunni characteristic. Nor did the slain prime min-ister enjoy unanimous support among his co-religionists.54

48Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 June 2008.49In 1985, Syrian forces entered Tripoli and waged a bloodyfight against the Islamic Unification Movement (al-Tawhid).Syrian troops and their local Alawite allies killed hundreds of itsmembers. Over time,Syrias presence strengthened the positionof the previously marginalised Alawite community. Prior to1992, for example, none of its members had been elected to par-liament.50Crisis Group interview, Nouhad al-Machnouk, Future Currentmember of parliament, Beirut, 20 January 2010.51Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 3 April 2009.52Relations between the two sides historically have alternatedbetween alliance and enmity. At the twilight of the OttomanEmpire, Muslims as a whole tended to strongly oppose thecreation of an independent Lebanon, arguing against Greater

Syrias ethno-sectarian breakup and calling for union withSyria. See Fawaz Trabulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon,(Beirut, 2008), pp. 135-138. During thecivil war, Syria alter-nately backed and fought Palestinian forces, which were alliedwith the Sunnis. Syrian forces violently clashed with LebaneseSunni militias, notably al-Mourabitoun and the Movement ofIslamic Unification, before gaining their allegiance.53Crisis Group interview, Ahmad al-Zubi,Al-Mustaqbal jour-nalist, Beirut, 21 January 2010.54According to an activist in Tripoli and Akkar today consid-ered Future Current strongholds far from being perceived as aSunni leader for northern residents, Rafic Hariri was above all awealthy man responsible for their misery. For his part, Fouad

Siniora was the finance minister who made them pay taxes.Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, 17 April 2009. A former aide toRafic Hariri said, the Future Current did not have the kind ofinfluence in Sunni areas that it enjoys today. It was not widely


11/39



Rather, Saad won virtually all parliamentary seats in Sunni-majority districts because his fathers death brought to thesurface a multitude of converging resentments, discom-forts and anxieties: resentment at Syrias ability to thwartHariris project; discomfort at the lack of any crediblealternative; and anxiety stemming from a more general

sense of vulnerability. The end result was a massive,overpowering instinct of communal solidarity. Tellingly,conveying their sense of collective trauma, many Sunniscompare Hariris murder to an earthquake or to a con-spiracy specifically targeting their community.55

This provoked two types of distinct albeit related reactions.On the one hand, Sunni expectations of Saad differedmarkedly from those attached to his father. The son wasalmost unanimously endorsed by his community, chargedwith the task of closing Sunni ranks, guaranteeing theirsafety and obtaining revenge. On the other hand, Syrias

widely assumed guilt prompted the communitys stark po-litical realignment and led to new, unorthodox alliances.56

2. Turning inwardHistorically, Sunnis have tended to identify with the Arabnationalist movement and to seek support in the widerSunni Arab world, an outlook manifested in the decisionto side with the Palestinians during the civil war. RaficHariris more specifically Lebanese project appealed tomany, and the collapse of Arab nationalism further eroded

the pan-Arab ideal. Still, the desire to belong to a widerIslamic, Arab environment lingered. As a Sunni residentof Bab Tebbaneh said, to us, Lebanon remains an artifi-cial construct with which we simply could not identify.57

Rafic Hariris assassination and the ensuing crisis withSyria accelerated the Sunnis change in outlook.58 Manysimply turned inward. Their demand for a Syrian with-drawal echoed that of their Christian counterparts, whohad long opposed their neighbours dominance; like them,the Sunni community rallied behind the call for Leba-nons freedom, sovereignty and independence. Shared

hostility toward Syria enabled a historically anomalousalliance between the Future Current, Samir GeageasLebanese Forces and Amine Gemayels Kataeb. A former

represented in the Bekaa, northern villages or Tripoli. CrisisGroup interview, Mohamad Kichli, Beirut, 7 April 2008.55Crisis Group interviews, Lebanese officials, sheikhs and activ-ists, Tripoli and Beirut, May 2008-April 2009.56Hariris assassination liberated Sunnis from fear of the Syrianregime. Crisis Group interview, Khaled Daher, Future Currentparliamentarian, Beirut, 19 August 2009.57Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, May 2006.58There were other reasons, of course. These include the feelingthat Lebanon had paid a heavy price for defending the Palestiniancause, see Section II.B.4, and the inability of Islamist currents tobecome mass movements, see Section III.

adviser to Rafic Hariri described this as a wholesale shifton our communitys part. It is an unnatural alliance, andthe fact that the Sunni base accepts it is extraordinary.59

One of the more evocative symbols of this change wasthe Future Currents decision and, subsequently, that of

Saad Hariris parliamentary bloc to choose as its sloganLebanon First, leading a journalist with close ties to theLebanese Forces to say, the Sunnis have Lebanisedthemselves.60 Another observer remarked: That some-one from Bab-Tebbaneh could say Lebanon First is hardto believe. The identity of this neighbourhoods residentslargely was shaped in opposition to the very idea ofthe Lebanese state.61

To some, including a number of Future Current sympa-thisers, giving priority to Lebanon was tantamount toturning ones back on the countrys Arab character.62 In

response, the movement made clear that its newfoundslogan was not meant to contradict the nations Arabidentity.63

3. Turning toward the WestFor the most part, Lebanons Sunnis have tended to con-test Western regional policies. They opposed the Frenchmandate and Israels creation; identified with the Arabnationalist movement; and, during the civil war, sided withthe Palestinians.64 Like much of regional public opinion,

59Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 22 March 2008. During thecivil war, Sunnis accused the same Christian movements whichwere fighting the Palestinians of isolationism. Crisis Groupinterviews, 14 March officials, Future Current officials, Sheikhsand Islamist militants, Beirut, Tripoli and Sada, May 2006-February 2010.60Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 20 May 2010.61Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, 17 April 2010. Michel Seurat,a French researcher kidnapped in Beirut in 1985, wrote: rejectionof the state [is] a fundamental component of Bab Tebbbanehspersonality. Michel Seurat, lEtat de barbarie, (Paris, 1989), p. 155.

62Crisis Group interviews, Future Movement officials, Beirut,Tripoli and Sada, April 2009-February 2010. One of the move-ments parliamentarians said: What does Lebanon First mean?Its meaningless. Lebanon cannot divorce itself from its sur-rounding. Crisis Group interview, Beirut, January 2010. WalidJoumblatt was equally sketpical: Lebanon First? But Lebanonhas no meaning without its Arab character, without Palestine andwithout Arab unity .... Unfortunately we have reverted back toneighbourhoods, to fanaticism, to sectarianism .... We were notbrought up on the basis of Lebanon First but on the basis ofArabism, of a wide horizon to which Lebanon belongs. Seewww.almanar.com.lb/Newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=93015&language=ar.63See www.almustaqbal.org/article_details.php?id=MTYzMQ==&c=Nzc=.64Lebanons 1920 creation by Western powers, chiefly manda-tory France, addressed Christian concerns. Most Muslims op-


12/39



they grew increasingly hostile to the U.S., viewed asblindly supporting Israel and unsympathetic to Arab aspi-rations. Their hostility was magnified as the U.S.emerged as the sole superpower in the wake of the SovietUnions demise.65 Anti-American sentiment deepenedfurther in reaction to President George W. Bushs war

against terrorism, perceived by many as a struggleagainst Islam.66

The situation changed with the 2005 assassination ofRafic Hariri. Intensified and more overt Sunni hostilitytoward Syria coincided with a sharp turn in U.S. policywhich heightened its own calls for Syrias withdrawalfrom Lebanon, imposed sanctions on Damascus andhinted at possible regime change. Domestically, thecommunity entered into what a former Hariri aide dubbedan unholy alliance67 with its historical foes, anti-SyrianChristian parties.

The Future Current invoked two rationales to justify itsstark international and domestic realignment. The Westand particularly the U.S. were seen as indispensable part-ners in what was emerging as an uneven, life-or-deathbattle against Syria and its allies, Hizbollah and Iran.Only the U.S. appeared to be in a position to achieveSyrias military withdrawal, the end of its hegemony overLebanon and the trial of Hariris murderers not to men-tion, conceivably, its regimes overthrow.68 March 14leaders openly courted Western support and publiclystaged meetings with Western officials as demonstra-

posed the creation of Greater Lebanon which they saw as aChristian entity enjoying French support. Over subsequentdec-ades, Moslems and Christians often clashed over issues related toLebanons regional and international positioning.65Voir Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Images de l'Amrique vues dumonde de l'islam, Quaderni, Anne 2003, vol. 50, no. 1, pp.265-278, at www.persee.fr.66See Josiane Feghali and Simon Haddad, Les Libanaishassent-ils lAmrique?, Outre-Terre, no. 5, April 2003, at

www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre-2003-4-page-233.htm. RaficHariri, who had close ties to the U.S., was clearly ill at ease inthe wake of the Iraqi invasion. Visiting Moscow after the out-break of the 2003 war, he stated: Iraq needs democracy, but itcannot be forcefully imposed . Whatever the wars ultimateoutcome, it will swell the ranks of desperate people who embraceradical positions. See www.libanvision.com/guerre-irak.htm.The Sunni reaction to the invasion was not monolithic. Whilemany expressed outrage, others nurtured the hope that the events,and Washingtons stated commitment to democracy in the region,could put pressure on Syria, leading to changes in the regime orits withdrawal from Lebanon. Crisis Group interviews, Beirut,October 2003.67Crisis Group interview, a close friend and collaborator of RaficHariri, Beirut, 7 April 2008.68Crisis Group Middle East Report N48,Lebanon: Managingthe Gathering Storm,5 December 2005, p. 12

tions of power.69 For some time, the strategy paid off.Not only did Syrian troops withdraw, but also the March14 coalition remained in power despite relentless effortsby the Syrian-backed March 8 opposition to bring it downand impose a unity government.70

The Future Current also saw its struggle with Syria as anexistential conflict between two incompatible visions forthe country. Under this view, the Syrian regime wasstructurally tied to policies inimical to Lebanese stabilityand well-being. It inevitably would continue to use Leba-non as an arena for its proxy war against Israel, plunderits economy and subjugate its people. Western powers, incontrast, were perceived as backing Lebanons sover-eignty, opposing Hizbollahs armed status71 and embrac-ing a more prosperous, peaceful and modern social modelthat clashed with Hizbollahs resistance culture.

The Future Currents international repositioning pro-voked mixed reactions among its base. Although criticismof Syria and its allies resonated widely, the defence ofWestern and particularly American policy was a hardersell. Many Future Current followers, while grateful forWashingtons support, nonetheless accused the U.S. ofpursuing a foreign policy hostile to both Arab and Musliminterests.72 A Future Current member put it as follows:We need the Americans against Syria and Hizbollah,but when it comes to Iraq or Palestine, we remain pro-foundly anti-American.73 That said, opposition to the

69For an explanation of the meaning of the names of the March14 and March 8 movements, see Section II.B.4 below.70Ibid. Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N20,Lebanon at aTripwire, 21 December 2006; Crisis Group Report, Hizbollahand the Lebanese Crisis, op. cit., pp. 14-17.71Since 2005, the Future Currents position regarding Hizbol-lahs weapons has fluctuated. Many leaders believe the end ofHizbollahs armed status depends entirely on resolution of theIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. However, particularly during periodsof internal crisis, officials have also described the Shiite organi-

sation as an armed militia and its weapons as illegal. CrisisGroup interviews, Future Current officials, Beirut and Tripoli,January 2007-May 2008. See also Saad Hariris statement in

Al-Mustaqbal, 18 April 2007.72As Crisis Group earlier wrote, Sunnis generally reacted angrilyto Israels bombing of Lebanon during the 2006 war; during thatperiod, deep-seated hostility toward Israel and the U.S. at othertimes eclipsed by antagonism toward Syria and Hizbollah re-surfaced. Crisis Group Middle East Report N57, Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss, 25 July 2006, pp.14-15. Many Sunni sheikhs and residents, supporters of the Fu-ture Current and opposed to Hizbollah, nonetheless expresseddeep hostility towards U.S. policy in the region. Crisis Group

interviews, Beirut, Sada, Tripoli and Bekaa, January 2007-March 2008.73Crisis Group interview, former left-wing activist, Tripoli, 9May 2009. Several Sunni activists and sheikhs expressed this


13/39



West gradually ebbed as the crisis with Syria and Hizbol-lah intensified.74 Hariris handful of Sunni opponentssought to take advantage of the Future Currents stance,criticising it for betraying the Palestinian cause, Arabismor even Islamic values.75 But the criticism had little reso-nance; if anything, it led Sunnis to close ranks behind

the Future Current and its leaders.

4. Joining the moderate axisThe Sunni communitys break with Syria pushed it to jointhe so-called moderate axis, a term coined to describeWashingtons Arab allies principally Saudi Arabia,Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority as opposedto the resistance front encompassing Syria, Iran, Hamasand Hizbollah. Polarisation between the two campsgradually intensified during this period as a result of sev-eral developments.

Bush administration policies played an important part.The U.S.s binary vision of the region either you arewith us, oryou are with the terrorists76 and its strongopposition to the Syrian regime helped push Damascusmore firmly into Irans corner and contributed to its deep-ening ties to Lebanese and Palestinian militant groups.Developments, including U.S. disengagement from theArab-Israeli peace process and its invasion of Iraq, simul-taneously strengthened those organizations even as Iranfortified its own position. In contrast, Americas tradi-

tional allies found it increasingly difficult to justify theirrelationship with a U.S. administration widely perceivedby Arab public opinion as hostile.

At the same time, tensions between Damascus on the onehand and Riyadh and Cairo on the other were growingconcerning key regional issues. Syrias militant rhetoricon the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the Iraq war and

same idea. Crisis Group interviews, Beirut and Tripoli, January2008-May 2009.

74Attacks by Syria, Hizbollah or Iran against the Future Currentsrelations with the West only tended to make these relations morelegitimate in Sunni eyes. A Sunni resident of Beirut said, I dontunderstand why our Lebanese foes denounce our alliance withthe U.S. when they themselves are allied with Iran and Syria.Those countries harmed Lebanon more than did the Americans.Crisis Group interview, 7 June 2009.75The head of al-Tawhid, a Sunni Islamist movement based inTripoli, said,the Future Currents pro-American alignment isan historical aberration. Sunnis, especially its leading fami-lies, always expressed their opposition to U.S. power. Haririand Siniora are an exception. They want Sunnis to adopt adifferent culture, at loggerheads with pan-Arabism and the

Muslim nations fundamental interests. Crisis Group inter-view, Bilal Sad Chaaban, Tripoli, 22 March 2008.76http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

at times implicitly, at others explicitly criticism ofEgypts and Saudi Arabias more conciliatory postures;its close ties with Iran; and support for Hamas as well asHizbollah caused substantial Egyptian and Saudi concern,albeit not always for similar reasons.77 Increasingly, thetwo countries questioned Syrias role in Lebanon.

These policy differences were compounded by personalfriction. President Hosni Mubaraks and King Abdallahsearly, high hopes in Bashar Asad whom they saw as ayoung, inexperienced leader they would tutor quicklywere disappointed.78 The Saudi monarch, who was closeto Rafic Hariri, personally blamed his assassination onBashar. Still, efforts to improve relations among the threeand limit the impact of their disagreements continued,even after Hariris murder.79 These only ended with the2006 Lebanon war, during which they adopted radicallydifferent positions. Riyadh condemned Hizbollahs reck-

lessness; 80 after the war, the Syrian regime proclaimed

77For example, Saudi Arabia is principally worried by Syriasclose ties to Tehran and eager to loosen them, while, for Cairo,Syrias support to Hamas, seen chiefly through a domestic lensand the fear of an Islamist-controlled Gaza at its borders, argua-bly is the most immediate concern. Syrias confrontational rheto-ric vis--vis Israel and backing for militant groups also is seen,from Egypt, as a direct challenge to its Arab leadership. See, eg,David Schenker and Simon Henderson, The Saudi-Egyptianrelations Paradox,Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst,8December

2009, at www.islamdaily.net/ar/Contents.aspx?AID=8003.78The relatively quick consolidation of Bashars power, com-bined with his adoption of positions inconsistent with Egyptianand Saudi wishes, is said to have ended Mubaraks and Abdallahshopes. Crisis Group interviews, Egyptian diplomat, February 2010.79Officially, Egypt, like Saudi, adopted a cautious stance afterHariris murder, refraining from joining in the concert of accu-sations waged against Syria. In January 2006, during one ofSyrias most difficult periods, the Saudis were engaging Da-mascus, and Mubarak hosted Assad in Sharm al-Sheikh. The2006 war was seen in Cairo as a betrayal. Syria either provokedit or did nothing to prevent it. It took no step to coordinate withits Arab partners at all. That was the last straw. Crisis Group

interview, Egyptian diplomat, January 2010. That said, there islittle doubt that Hariris assassination deeply affected the Saudimonarch and was a decisive contributing factor in the deteriora-tion between Riyadh and Damascus. Crisis Group interview,former close aide to Rafic Hariri, Beirut, March 2008. See alsoCrisis Group Report,Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm,op. cit., p. 15.80www.metransparent.com/old/texts/egypt_jordan_vs_hizbullah.htm. In an interview with Oukaz, the Saudi daily, Saad Haririasserted: Saudi Arabia expressed the entire truth in its commu-niqu. These adventurers put us in a critical position as a result oftheir thoughtless recklessness . We will hold these adventurerswho provoked a senseless crisis accountable. Quoted in

LOrient le Jour, 18 July 2006. According to a senior UN offi-cial, several pro-Western Arab regimes were privately conveyingthe message that they wanted Israel to finish the job. CrisisGroup interview, New York, September 2006.


14/39



its victory, and Bashar described Arab leaders who hadtaken the opposite side as half-men.81

This series of events ushered in a period of open con-frontation. It culminated with the Saudi, Egyptian andJordanian decisions to send low-level representatives to

the March 2008 Arab League Summit in Damascus; Hiz-bollahs May 2008 takeover of Beirut;82 and mutualaccusations involving members of the two camps.83 Inthis context, Saudi involvement in Lebanon and in par-ticular support for the Future Current intensified.84

The Future Current also began to alter its traditional posi-tion regarding armed struggle against Israel. Increasingly,it highlighted the unsustainability of a situation in whichLebanon bore most of the burden of that fight while otherArabs stood passively by. Mohamad Hajjar, a FutureCurrent member of parliament, put it as follows:

the neutralisation of Lebanon does not mean it willgive up Arab causes, notably the Palestinian cause andthe fight against Israel. Israel will forever remain ourenemy. We need a plan of action that will compel

81www.thenational.ae/article/20090710/FOREIGN/707099796/1011/rss.82Crisis Group Briefing,Lebanon: Hizbollahs Weapons Turn

Inward, op. cit.83Syria implied that Saudi Arabia might have played a role inprovoking strife on Syrian territory. A Syrian analyst with con-nections to local intelligence asserted: There is a growing bodyof hard evidence pointing to Saudi meddling. A Saudi agent hasrecently been caught with bundles of cash designed to fomentsubversive action and was expelled as a result. Syria documentseach step taken, both on its soil and in Lebanon, but wont usethe evidence as long as reconciliation remains a possibility. It isnot Syrias style to lead to a point of no return. Crisis Groupinterview, Damascus, October 2010. During the Gaza war, Hiz-bollahs secretary general said, I am telling the Egyptians, if youdo not open up the crossing at Rafah, you will be complicit in thecrime perpetrated against the people of Gaza. We know thatthe Egyptian army comprises many generals and military offi-

cials whose hearts and blood remain Arab and who worry aboutthe fate of the Arab nation. Full speech available at www.mecanopolis.org/?cat=617.In April 2009, Egypt accused Hizbol-lah of having established terrorist cells on its territory to prepareattacks against Egyptian targets and Israeli tourists in Egypt. Seewww.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/116/article_83949.asp. Referring to aHizbollah cell, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheitdeclared: Iran, and Iran's followers, want Egypt to become amaid of honour for the crowned Iranian queen when she entersthe Middle East. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8000427.stm.84After the 2006 war, Saudi Arabia deposited $1 billion in theCentral bank to support the Lebanese economy and donated $500million to help rebuild the country. www.menafn.com/qn_news_

story_s.asp?StoryId=1093122661. Riyadh also reportedly pro-vided massive financial assistance to March 14 forces in the con-text of the June 2009 parliamentary elections. See The New YorkTimes,22 April 2009.

all Arab parties and states to assume their responsi-bilities so that Lebanon no longer will be the onlyarena of conflict. 85

A Saida resident expressed a view widely shared bymembers of the Sunni community:

Why should we carry the burden of fighting Israel onbehalf of all other Arabs? Why should we alone paythe price? War with Israel is delaying all of RaficHariris former projects. Hizbollah destroyed every-thing Hariri sought to achieve.86

A principal explanation for this shift relates to the grow-ing rift with Hizbollah which, by then, had monopolisedarmed resistance against Israel and was seen as using thatfight for purposes that had little to do with broader Arabobjectives. A Sunni Islamist activist said:

Syria and Iran did what they could to liquidate anySunni resistance and replaced it with a purely Shiiteone. At first, we backed it because our priority was thestruggle against Israel. But it turned out that their goalwas to weaken the Sunnis.87

5. Sectarian divisionsPerhaps the most striking transformation in Sunni attitudessince 2005 has been the intense sectarian polarisation andhostility toward Shiites. Tensions had existed in the past,

but for the most part they had remained dormant or, ifexpressed, quickly contained. The dominant fault linesduring the civil war were either between Christians andMuslims or within communities. Between 1990 and 2005,periodic frictions between Rafic Hariri and the two Shiitemovements, Amal and Hizbollah, never took on the shapeof a confessional conflict.

85Al-Mustaqbal, 17 May 2009. Not coincidentally, the FutureCurrent chose as its slogan for the 2009 elections Lebanon First.86Crisis Group interview, Sada, 23 May 2009.87Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, 17 April 2009. The FutureCurrents stance was in evidence during the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza war when, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia andunlike Hizbollah it refrained from expressing support forHamas. During the war, a Future Current parliamentarian said, Ido not know what were Hamass calculations [in choosing toprovoke this war]. But I hope they serve the interests of the Pal-estinian people.Al-Sayad Magazine, 23-29 Januray 2009. Anobserver in Tripoli claimed: posters expressing solidarity with

Gazans were only plastered on the streets toward the end of thewar, after the Saudi monarch gave a speech in support of thePalestinian people. Crisis Group interview, Abdel Ghani Imad,Tripoli, 7 April 2009.


15/39



The worsening regional climate, marked by Iraqs sectar-ian strife, growing fear of Irans status and the spectre ofa Shiite peril, undoubtedly spilled over into Lebanon.88But the deepening chasm between Lebanons Sunnis andShiites between 2005 and 2008 had also to do with do-mestic developments. It evolved progressively, reaching a

new height at each of five key stages.

Hariris assassination was the first turning point, exposinghow far the two communities interests had drifted. ForSunnis, Syrias weakening held the prospect of a moreindependent future, in tune with Rafic Hariris originalvision. In contrast, Shiites feared that Syrias withdrawal by removing its military cover and thus facilitating im-plementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559which, in 2004, had called for the the disbanding anddisarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

could hasten the end of Hizbollahs armed status; Amalalso worried about the loss of its privileged position in thepolitical system.89Together, these shifting fortunes car-ried the potential of altering the sectarian balance.

Shiite apprehension was most dramatically conveyedduring the massive 8 March 2005 demonstration, whichcoincided with the anniversary of the 1963 coup thatbrought the Baath party to power in Damascus and wasmeant as a gesture of gratitude and loyalty toward Syria.In Lebanons then highly emotional context, this inten-sive display of sectarian and political feelings helped setoff the even larger counter-demonstration which, on 14March, brought together Sunnis and others to mark theone-month anniversary of Hariris death. According to a

journalist close to March 14:

The 8 March demonstration set the Shiites againstall other communities, principally the Sunnis. Sunniparticipation in the 14 March demonstration wasanti-Syrian, but it was mainly confessional. They wereprotesting against Shiites and against all those whoappeared to be thankful for their leaders murder.90

88Several leaders of the moderate axis began to describe regionaltensions as a fight against a Shiite threat, almost certainly in anattempt to gain the support of the predominantly Sunni Arabpublic. Jordans King Abdullah, in particular, warned against theemergence of a Shiite crescent including the Gulf, Iran, Iraqand Lebanon. The Guardian, 27 January 2007.89From the outset, Syria had backed and promoted Amal, in par-ticular during the civil war. After the war, Syria systematicallysought to protect its allys interests and ensure that Hizbollah notachieve a hegemonic position over the Shiite community.90Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, 7 April 2009. An Islamistactivist echoed this view: The 8 March demonstration, whichthanked Syria, profoundly affected the Sunnis. They attendedthe 14 March demonstrations in vast numbers not for RaficHariri alone, but also as part of an existential struggle, in reac-

The second turning point coincided with Hizbollahsdecision to join the government, taken in order to com-pensate for Syrias departure. A Hizbollah leader put it asfollows:

Before 2005, we never had sought to be represented in

government, because Syria was the guarantor of theResistance. After Syrias withdrawal, our govern-mental presence became a requirement to preserve theResistance.91

Reflecting sheer electoral calculations, the Future Current,Amal, Hizbollah and Walid Jumblatts Druze partyformed an alliance in the run-up to the May-June 2005legislative elections. It was short-lived. In December2005, Shiite ministers announced they were boycottingcabinet meetings in protest against governmental ap-proval of the establishment of an international tribunal to

investigate Rafic Hariris murder and the broadening ofits mandate to look into other attacks on Lebanese. Inother words, greater Shiite participation in the politicalscene put them in direct conflict with March 14 on issuesthe Sunni community considered particularly important.

The 2006 war and, more so, its aftermath marked the nextescalation. The conflict itself produced a temporary unityof sorts, driven by hostility toward Israel and solidaritytoward civilian principally Shiite victims; for a time atleast, it overshadowed the periodic, vehement criticism ofHizbollahs conduct.92

This solidarity did not survive the end of the conflict. Thetwo camps once more were at loggerheads when it cameto drawing conclusions from the catastrophic damagewrought by the war. March 8 took the view that Israel'sbehaviour further validated the need for the Resistanceand labelled Lebanon's resilience as a divine victory. Incontrast, March 14 argued that the outcome illustrated thebankruptcy of a strategy that provokes devastating Israeliattacks and then takes solace from mere survival. Thedebate was highly emotional, and Hizbollah's denun-ciation of Future Current leaders as traitors further radi-calised the Sunni base.93

tion to the other sides provocations, in response to the Shiitemasses. Crisis Group interview, Ihab al-Banna, Beirut, 28March 2008. A Sunni sheikh who also is an Hizbollah ally de-scribed 8 March as one of the movements mistakes. CrisisGroup interview, Maher Hamoud, Sada, 23 December 2008.91Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 14 January 2009; also CrisisGroup interview, Hizbollah member of parliament, Doha, Febru-ary 2010.92See Crisis Group Report,Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis ,op. cit.93In a speech on 7 December 2006, Hizbollah's secretary general,Hassan Nasrallah, accused the government of encouraging the


16/39



The war also helped expose Hizbollah's impressive mili-tary advances since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal; many ofits domestic opponents saw this as an acute threat. Sunnisin particular worried that the now more politically activeand far better armed Shiites would be tempted to imposetheir rule.94

Another threshold was crossed when the struggle clearlyshifted from the realm of elite politics to that of streetpolitics. In December 2006, the Hizbollah-led opposition frustrated by the government's decision to ignore theShiite ministers walkout organised a sit-in in the centreof Beirut, a space considered by Sunnis as their own.Participants called for the resignation of Prime MinisterFouad Siniora a former adviser to Rafic Hariri who waschosen by Saad to head the cabinet95 and assumedcontrol of an area that had been entirely rebuilt after thecivil war and stood as the embodiment of the slain lea-

U.S. administration to attack Hizbollah via Israel. Nasrallah alsoaccused Prime Minister Siniora of having ordered the army toconfiscate weapon ammunitions for the Resistance in the Southat the height of the war .... Instead of arresting Israeli spies, oneof the intelligence services beholden to the party in power[Future Current] sought to locate Hizbollah cadres. Some tried tolocate me personally during the war . I call for the establish-ment of a commission of inquiry to look into the conduct of allsides, at http://moqawma.blogspot.com/2006/12/7-2006.html. AJamaa Islamiyya leader claimed that every one of Nasrallah's

accusations cost him Sunni support. If he stuck to speaking aboutthe resistance, he would almost certainly have rallied the Sunnistreet. Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 24 March 2008. A BeirutSunniresident said, I was with Hizbollah during the war and Ibacked its resistance against Israel. But when its leaders accusedthe government of being an Israeli agent, I began to hate them.Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 10 June 2009.94Many Lebanese Sunnis are convinced that Hizbollah is seekingto bolster the Shiite community's domestic status. They contendthat the movement is trying to convert Sunnis, purchase land inSunni areas and buy off Sunni religious figures. Crisis Groupinterviews, Future Current officials, March 14 officials, sheikhs,Islamist activits, and residents, Beirut, Tripoli and Sada, March

2008-June 2009.95March 14 leaders suggested that the opposition was planning toattack the prime minister's offices (Srail) to compel him toresign. Sunnis interpreted the sit-in as an attempt to besiege theSrail, a symbol of Sunni power. A Tripoli sheikh said, "by sur-rounding the Srail, the Shiites were desecrating a Sunni symbol.We were facing an armed community that occupied the centre ofBeirut even as it laid siege to another community's leaders. Thiswas extremely humiliating for Sunnis. Crisis Group interview,Hassan Chahal, Tripoli, May 2007. Lebanon's grand mufti,leader of the Highest Sunni religious institution, led a prayer inthe government's headquarters, declaring that the overthrow ofPrime Minister Siniora and his government is a redline. Al-

Sharq al-Awsat, 9 December 2009. Ihab al-Banna, an Islamistmilitant,said, the mufti equated the government building to amosque, a sacred space for the Sunni community. Crisis Groupinterview, Beirut, 23 March 2008.

der's vision.96 Sunnis were stung by the perceived provo-cation, a symbol of "Shiite expansion" in their sphere ofinfluence.97

The first clashes among militants broke out when, inJanuary 2007,98 the opposition launched a general strike

and paralysed several key transit routes in Beirut.99

Suchincidents became more frequent, as residents of adjoin-ing Sunni and Shiite neighbourhoods got involved.100Clashes spread to other regions and involved othercommunities. In Tripoli, it took the form of armed conflictbetween the Sunni stronghold of Bab Tebbn and theAlawite area of Jabal Muhsen that lasted several weeks.

This new stage in the inter-confessional confrontation ledmany within the Sunni community to ask its leadershipfor a military, self-defence capacity.101 Their case wasbolstered by the security forces relative inability to stand

between the opposing parties. The Future Current, facingcompetition from Sunni rivals in several localities, couldnot remain passive as its constituency became increas-ingly restless.102 At the time, one of Saads advisers said:

96A Beirut-based sheikh claimed that March 8 occupied theheart of Beirut, which is the heart of Rafic Hariris project.Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 15 April 2009.97Crisis Group interview, Future Current officials, Sunni sheikhsand activists, Beirut, Tripoli and Sada, January 2008-April 2009.98One month earlier, in December 2006, a Shiite resident of theSunni neighbourhood of Tariq Jdideh was slain by Sunni gunmen.See www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1566289,00.html.99Several people died and tens were wounded as a result of theseclashes. The army responded by ordering a curfew. www.lebarmy.gov.lb/article.asp?ln=ar&id=13066.100A mixed neighbourhood resident said, virtually every day sawfighting between young militants from Khandaq al-Ghamik[whose residents are mainly Amal supporters] and from Basta

[who tend to back the Future Current]. We were living in apermanent state of war that still haunts us. Crisis Group in-terview, Beirut, May 2009. Several bloody incidents between2006 and 2008 threatened to drag the country toward a farmore violent and destabilising conflict.101During the demonstrations, some Future Current sympathiserswere clamouring: Oh Saad, we want Kalashnikovs, not bread.Crisis Group observations, Tripoli, March 2008. A Future Cur-rent parliamentarian claimed that he and his colleagues had metwith several groups that demanded to be armed. Crisis Groupinterview, Beirut, March 2008.102Crisis Group interviews, Future Current officials, Beirut andTripoli, March-May 2008. A close adviser to Saad Hariri ex-

plained: We had to do something to address the anger of theSunni youth. People were insulting us and insulting Saad Hariri,when we turned down their requests for weapons. Crisis Groupinterview, Beirut, March 2008.


17/39



We cannot rely on the army. Amal and Hizbollah mili-tants can enter any place they want and create disorderbefore the army steps in. Our best and only response isfor our youth to take charge of protecting Sunnineighbourhoods.103

The Future Currents response to growing popular pres-sure was not to establish its own, centralised militia;Hizbollahs overwhelming military power would haverendered any such endeavour futile and counterpro-ductive.104 Instead, it created a private security organisa-tion105 charged with protecting its leaders a reaction tothe assassination of several March 14 figures between2005 and 2007. It also recruited young militants to joinFuture Current-funded and managed groups to defendSunni neighbourhoods.106 Another adviser to Saad Haririexplained:

The January 2007 general strike drove us to createthese groups.107 Beirut was virtually shut down asAmal and Hizbollah set up hundreds of checkpoints.Beiruts Sunni residents were in a state of shock: theywere surrounded by Shiites. Hizbollah had taken

103Crisis Group interview, Beirut, March 2008. Future Currentsupporters were not alone in expressing such demands. JamaaIslamiyya, which, like Hizbollah, continued to back armed resis-tance against Israel, nonetheless formed a group to defend itsheadquarters and Dar al-Fatwa, the official Sunni religious insti-

tution, located in the Sunni neighbourhood of Acha Bakkar.Crisis Group interview,Jamaa Islamiyya senior official, Beirut,24 March 2008. He said, young Shiites riding their scootersregularly invade Tariq al-Jadida (a Sunni neighbourhood), harasswomen, insult the Prophets companions. They regularly fireshots in this area which they dub Tel-Aviv. We feel completelyunsafe.104Our goal is to dissolve all existing militias, not to create newones. But the state and its security forces are unable to protect us.Thats why we have to ensure our self-defence. We have to pro-vide our people with safety. Crisis Group interview, MoustafaAllouch, Tripoli, 6 May 2008.105The organisation is known as Secure Plus. See www.bloggingbeirut.com/archives/1342-LA-Times-Reports-on-Secure-Plus.html.106These groups were managed by the Future Currents formergeneral coordinator, Salim Diab. Crisis Group interviews, FutureCurrent officials, Beirut and Tripoli, March-May 2008. Amongthese groups were Fouhoud Tariq al-Jadideh in Beirut and AfwajTarablos in Tripoli; others were established in Akkar, the Bekaaand Shebaa. Crisis Group interviews, Future Current officials,March 2008. They are said to have numbered several thousandpeople, though the precise number and estimates vary widely.The Tripoli-based Afwaj Tarablos is said to have numberedanywhere between 3,000 and 9,000 militants. Crisis Group inter-views, Future Current leaders, sheikhs, fighters, Tripoli, March-September 2008.107In January 2007, the Lebanese General Workers Union calledfor a strike. In response, March 8 supporters shut down all ofBeirut's street by using burning tires. The strike occurred twodays prior to the skirmishes at Beirut Arab University.

control of all of Beirut, including its Sunni neighbour-hoods. Thats when we decided to recruit people andtrain them to defend their areas.108

The fifth and final stage in this spiralling crisis occurredin May 2008. Reacting to cabinet decisions it viewed as

undermining its operational capacity,109

Hizbollah andsome of its allies mounted a vast military manoeuvre.Within a few hours, the movement was in control ofSunni-dominated West Beirut.110 Saad Hariri was undersiege in his residence, his personal guard, and the FutureCurrents private security and other forces having beenrouted.111 The Sunnis defeat was swift, unambiguousand humiliating.

C. APARADOXICAL NEWBALANCE OF POWER

The May 2008 crisis carried several harsh lessonsfor theFuture Current. To begin, it was utterly outmatched by itsopponents cohesiveness, determination and advanceplanning. Even within Hariris entourage, criticism con-cerning the movements strategic choices was bitter andrampant.112 Sunni militants who joined the fightingblamed their leaders for abandoning them.113 Just asimportantly, the events attested to the impotence of theFuture Currents foreign allies. The U.S., France and

108Crisis Group interview, Beirut, March 2008. Sunni neigh-bourhoods were patrolled at night by young residents. CrisisGroup observations, Beirut and Tripoli, 2008.109The government decided to dismantle Hizbollah's telecom-munications network and to reassign the head of security atBeiruts airport, Wafiq Shuqayr. The later is a general officerclose to the speaker, Nabih Berri, and accused by March 14forces of sharing information with Hizbollah. Crisis GroupBriefing,Lebanon: Hizbollahs Weapons Turn Inward, op. cit.110Ibid.111According to many observers, the recruits lacked preparation,motivation and knowledge. Crisis Group interviews, Future

Current officials, March 14 official and residents, Beirut, Tripoliand Akkar, March-May 2008. The brother of an Akkar fightersaid, these young people had no ideological purpose, they werenot fighting based on a shared conviction. My brother used tosay: when the fighting erupted, we had no weapons and we weresent to Beirut even though we knew nothing of the city. We wereleft to our own devices. For many recruits, joining a group wasnothing more than a means to make money. Crisis Group inter-view, 8 August 2009.112The leadership was criticised, inter alia, for poor managementof the Currents meagre military resources, its attempt to recruityoung people essentially by using financial incentives and the ab-sence of a unifying ideology that might have mobilised fighters.

Crisis Group interviews, Future Current and March 14 officials,Beirut, Tripoli, Sada, Miniyeh and Akkar, May 2008-September2009.113Crisis Group interviews, Akkar and Beirut, August 2009.


18/39



Saudi Arabia watched passively from the sidelines asHizbollah flexed its muscles. During the subsequent Dohanegotiations, March 14, feeling betrayed, had little choicebut to accept most of the oppositions demands which,buoyed by the international communitys support, it hadresisted until then.114

In a way, the outcome also marked the end of the FutureCurrent's brief flirtation with a military logic. From theoutset, the effort to develop a parallel security force wasat odds with the movements avowed agenda to rein-force the state and its monopoly on the use of force, con-solidate the nation's sovereignty and promote nationalunity. It also would have amounted to mimicking the verypractices for which it criticised Hizbollah without theremotest chance of matching the Shiite movementsoverwhelming military might.

Its setbacks notwithstanding, the Future Current enhancedits popular support in the wake of the events. Stunned andalarmed by Hizbollahs decision to turn its weapons in-wards, the Sunni community rallied solidly behind Hariri.In the face of what it experienced as an existential threat,any expression of dissent was viewed as betrayal.115 InJune 2009, the Future Current buoyed by a massiveSunni turnout triumphed in the parliamentary elections.The vote, a reflection of a powerful communal solidarity,signalled Hariris emergence as a virtually unchallengedSunni leader.116

114Between 2005 and 2008, the March 14 coalition registeredseveral important victories. These included Syrias withdrawaland the establishment of the international tribunal over Shiiteobjections. Despite the breakup of the four-way alliance betweenthe Future Current, Jumblatts party, Hizbollah and Amal, andnotwithstanding repeated opposition attempts to bring it down(through demonstrations, the resignation of Shiite ministers, amonths-long sit-in and the refusal to elect a new president), theMarch 14 coalition remained in power.115Thus, when several Salafi leaders signed a joint documentwith Hizbollah in August 2008, without the Future Currentsacquiescence, they faced angry demonstrations and were com-pelled to abrogate the agreement. Al-Safir, 20 August

96 lebanons politics - the sunni community and hariris future current

Documents