9513175 al ramadhani saif thesis - qut ramadhani_thesis.pdf · which, in turn, will lead to saving...

A GAP ANALYSIS OF THE AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND

REGULATIONS IN OMAN

SAIF AHMED AL RAMADHANI Bachelor of Management Information System (Sultan Qaboos University), Oman

Master of Business Administration (Sultan Qaboos University), Oman

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Queensland University of Technology

Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland,

Brisbane, Australia

2019

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman i

Keywords

Automated speed enforcement, Benchmarking, Good practice automated speed

enforcement, Congruence model, Deterrence Theory, Enforcement, Gulf

Cooperation Council Countries, Legislation, Policy-makers, Middle East, Oman,

Operational practices, Road safety, Royal Oman Police, Speed, Speeding, Traffic

Law.

ii A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

Abstract

Road trauma is one of the most important public health concerns in the world

and has gained worldwide attention because of the social and economic costs that

crashes produce. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that road

traffic injuries cause almost 1.35 million deaths every year, and they are the ninth

leading cause of death in the world. WHO also stated that road traffic injuries are the

primary cause of death for young people aged 5 to 29 years old.

This research is centred on Oman, which is one of the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) countries along with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi

Arabia. WHO reports that crash fatality rates for GCC countries are very high, and

Oman has the second highest fatality rate of 25.4 per 100,000 inhabitants compared

with Saudi Arabia (27.4), Bahrain (8.0), UAE (10.9), Qatar (15.2), and Kuwait (16.5).

In comparison, Australia and European countries have rates which are far below the

world average rate of 17.4.

Internationally, speeding is one of the main contributing factors to crashes

(Richter, Berman, Friedman, & Ben-David, 2006; WHO, 2014). To reduce speeding,

different governments and transport authorities have applied a wide range of strategies,

including setting speed limits, police enforcement, and use of manual and automated

speed enforcement. Speeding is one of the major causes of fatal crashes in Oman. This

research has examined the data obtained from Royal Oman Police (ROP) statistics

booklets and found that, although there is a slight downward trend in the total number

of speed-related fatalities, speeding still contributes to more than 50 percent of the total

crashes and to almost 54 percent of the total fatalities. Other crashes, fatalities, and

injuries are caused by various behaviours, such as overtaking, or other causes not

specified in the statistics published by the ROP as they are responsible for such a low

percentage of total crashes.

Similar to other GCC countries, over the past decade, Oman has started to

implement an automated speed enforcement program to counter the speeding problem.

The Royal Oman Police (ROP) is the government authority responsible for managing

and improving road safety. The ROP used automated speed enforcement to deter

drivers from exceeding the posted speed limits. It commenced automated speed

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman iii

enforcement with 125 fixed speed cameras and 40 mobile speed cameras in 2005. At

the time this thesis was written, Oman had a total of 1277 automated speed

enforcement units of five different types: 641 fixed, 120 mobile, 322 red-light cameras,

120 laser-guns, and a total of 74 in-vehicle automated speed enforcement cameras.

The current traffic law in Oman has been in effect since 1993, following Royal

Decree Number 28/93. This law replaced the former traffic law which was first

implemented in 1973 and had several amendments prior to 1993. Furthermore, the

1993 Traffic Law was modified slightly in 1998 and then again in August 2016, when

it was significantly modified by adding four more new articles and changing another

fifteen articles. Although the law covers a number of offences that can be detected

automatically, this research is focused on speed violations detected by automated

enforcement and related sanctions.

To date, there has not been any scientific research examining the effectiveness

of the Omani automated speed enforcement program. In addition, there is limited

formal data available on Omani automated speed enforcement operations and

regulations. However, it appears that the program has not, as yet, had a significant

effect on road safety, as was originally anticipated, and its effectiveness has remained

questionable. This research investigated the operational and theoretical aspects of the

Omani automated speed enforcement program to identify gaps in knowledge and

reasons behind the apparent ineffectiveness, and then to examine if there is a need for

theoretical or operational improvement. This research is the first study conducted on

automated speed enforcement in Oman. It identifies the gaps within the operational

and theoretical practices of the program in Oman. It also suggests further studies and

research to be conducted in order to enhance road safety in Oman that may be

generalizable to neighboring countries in the Middle East. Additionally, this program

of research has identified gaps within the literature of road safety related to speed

enforcement in the area, which is discussed later in this thesis.

The overall aim of this research was to investigate the operational and theoretical

aspects of the Omani automated speed enforcement program to identify ways to

enhance the program and provide specific recommendations for improvements,

thereby reducing speed-related crashes. Therefore, this research had two clear main

sub-aims. Firstly, it identified and examined the operational practices of the automated

speed enforcement program in Oman and compared the characteristics of the current

iv A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

Omani program with what could be considered international good practice programs.

Secondly, it investigated the policies, reasoning and rationale behind the current

automated speed enforcement program in Oman by seeking policy-makers’

perceptions of the deterrent effects of automated speed enforcement on drivers’

behaviour.

This program of research consists of two studies and used a mixed method

approach for data collection for both studies namely: semi-structured interviews,

document review, and personal communication with an ROP officer. For the first

study, there were 18 participants interviewed out of the 25 officers working on the

three managerial levels of ROP whose job is related to the automated speed

enforcement program. In the second study, there were 7 participants interviewed out

of the 9 policy-makers working on the legislative aspects of the program.

The first study of this research used two gap analysis tools; Benchmarking and

the Congruence Model. It sought to identify whether there is a model of operations

guideline for automated speed enforcement operations in Oman or not. Moreover, it

investigated the goals behind implementing automated speed enforcement. In addition,

it looked at areas where improvements can be applied. The Benchmarking part of the

method was used to compare the international good practices of automated speed

enforcement programs with the Omani automated speed enforcement program, while

the congruence model was used to identify the internal gaps and inconsistencies within

the Omani automated speed enforcement operational practices.

The second study built upon the findings of the first study. It was theoretically

framed around three elements of deterrence theory: the perceived severity of

punishment, perceived certainty of punishment, and perceived celerity of punishment.

The three elements were investigated and explored to determine to what extent they

were optimal in the Omani context of road safety when discussing the automated speed

enforcement operations and legislations from policy-makers’ point of view. In

addition, the study examined the alignment between policy-makers’ perception about

deterrence theory elements and the applications of such elements on the regulations

related to traffic and automated speed enforcement.

Based on the participants’ responses, the first study found that there did not seem

to be any written documents about automated speed enforcement program goals,

operations, or even evaluation or analysis of the program performance. However,

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman v

regarding the goals, the interviews revealed that there were different goals stated by

participants which appeared to reflect three main goals; monitor the road and enforce

traffic control; reduce speed and speed-related crashes; and deter speeding drivers,

which, in turn, will lead to saving lives. In regards to the operational aspects of Omani

automated speed enforcement, this study explored the site selection criteria and it

found that different automated speed enforcement, apart from the fixed and red-light

cameras, were mostly used in road sections considered to be part of black spots.

However, findings suggested that black spots were not clearly defined and understood

by participants. The study also found that different automated speed enforcement units

operated in relatively different timing and with different periods of time within one

directorate of traffic. In addition, the operating hours did differ from one directorate to

another and there did not seem to be a clear unified operation manual or guideline to

be followed by all traffic directorates.

The evidence arising from this study suggests that there was very little, if any,

deterrent effect created by this program on drivers. Firstly, when it comes to the

celerity of punishment, there is no legislation forcing the offender to pay fines until

they need to renew their vehicle registration. This could take from one day after the

fine is recorded on the ROP system up to as long as twelve months. This procedure

undermines the likely perceived celerity of the punishment and thus part of its intended

deterrent effect. The second issue is the very low monetary fines. The available

evidence highlights that effective speed enforcement programs work through deterring

drivers from exceeding the speed limit, but the findings of this research suggests that

the Omani automated speed enforcement has not adequately achieved this goal.

Analysis showed a low-level alignment between the Omani practices and good

international practice. For example, the most successful automated speed enforcement

programs apply the demerit point system while the Omani program does not.

Moreover, international good practice suggests that the decision of whether to deploy

fixed or mobile, overt or covert, and point-to-point or other types of automated speed

enforcement is critical, based on whether the aim behind the enforcement is to provide

a specific or general deterrent effect. However, the Omani program did not seem to

take such an important point into consideration. In addition, the Omani Program does

not apply a point-to-point speed enforcement system, which has been shown to be

successful elsewhere. Furthermore, good practice suggests that there should be clear

vi A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

site selection criteria for different units of automated speed enforcement whereas the

Omani program did not have site selection criteria. Finally, the program has never been

evaluated despite evaluation being one of the important steps to be taken after

implementing automated speed enforcement, as with any other road safety

countermeasures. In short, the Omani program of automated speed enforcement might

not be utilised to its optimum level.

In the second study, the research found that participants believed that speeding

behaviour is influenced by both social and legal factors. One reason for continued

speeding behaviour among Omani drivers could be the lack of deterrence achieved by

existing regulations and related practices. Participants did not see that automated speed

enforcement program was effective in promoting a deterrent effect among drivers, and

nor were the penalty system and regulations related to speeding in general. In general,

three participating policy-makers believed that the program has failed to have a

deterrent effect on drivers; two out of seven thought that the program has succeeded

in such, and the last two argued that the program has promoted the deterrent effect to

some extent only.

When discussing the perceived severity of existing sanctions, five policy-makers

believed that people do not perceive the speeding fine as severe and that is reflected in

their driving behaviour when they repeat committing the traffic fines. In contrast, two

participants argued that people perceive the sanction as severe when considering their

financial situations. In addition, participants noted that a demerit point system is

considered a key aspect of a severe penalties and sanctions system, but such a system

is not applied in Oman. Almost all participants, personally, thought that the monetary

value of traffic fines is very low and far from being severe when taking into

consideration the consequences of disobeying the traffic regulations. In short,

participating policy-makers argued that the punishment does not fit the offence at all.

All seven policy-makers seemed certain that once penalty and sanctions

procedures were applied swiftly, the deterrent effect would be enhanced, in turn,

changing drivers’ behaviours in a positive way. Currently the application of penalties

and sanctions in Oman is very slow compared to other countries. Moreover, there is

no specific regulation within the law that imposes a legal commitment against the

vehicle driver or owner if they do not pay the monetary traffic fine recorded against

them. Payment is not required within a specific period of time, but rather is linked to

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman vii

when a service is needed from the ROP. In other words, the offender is only required

to pay the fine when he or she needs a service from the ROP to be provided such as

vehicle registration renewal or driving license renewal. Policy-makers preferred swift

sanctions; however, they believed that the society must be prepared for such a change.

A swift payment procedure should be gradually introduced by starting to implement it

on severe fines first, and by ensuring the community is informed, as suggested by the

participant.

In addition to concerns about the severity and celerity of punishment, the

participating policy makers also questioned the perceived certainty. Although there are

more than a thousand automated speed enforcement units on Omani roads, the

perceived certainty of punishment remains relatively low among drivers. Policy-

makers therefore believed that this is another reason why the automated speed

enforcement program has not produced the desired results.

Participants also agreed that the program has never been evaluated. As one of

the basic procedures for evaluating such a program, the goals of the program must be

clear, otherwise there is nothing to evaluate it against. Therefore, automated speed

enforcement programs should have specific goals towards which all program resources

are driven and guided and against which the program should be evaluated. For

instance, deterring drivers and increasing the compliance level could be among those

goals, according to the participants of this study.

The findings also suggested that there are several barriers to making the deterrent

effect of the automated speed enforcement program more effective. For example, there

are barriers to implementing fast sanctions. It can be difficult to contact the owners of

a vehicle, as the system of postal addresses used in Oman is not sufficiently detailed,

and people regularly change their contact numbers. In addition, the offender (driver)

is not always the owner of the vehicle. Secondly, the concept of punishment celerity

is relatively new to the Omani society, so there is a need to prepare the people for such

system before implementation. On the other hand, the ambiguity of automated speed

enforcement program goals and results was considered as barrier to promoting

deterrent effect on people. Participants argued that people must be well-informed about

such information so that they consider the program as legitimate. More importantly,

not evaluating the program against its goals was considered as one of the most

viii A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

important barriers preventing it from being effective as if it has been evaluated, the

weakness points would be clear and dealt with.

The findings of this research have informed several recommendations and

related suggestions to be considered to enhance the operational and legislative aspects

of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. However, some of these

recommendations may need more research and scrutiny before full implementation

can occur. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that some of the findings related to

operational practices of Omani automated speed enforcement were based on what has

been reported by ROP officers. Accordingly, these cannot be considered as definitive

and there is a need for an observational study that can clearly identify the actual

operational practices of the program.

The findings also suggest that the current penalty and sanction system has not

achieved a sufficient deterrent effect particularly in terms of punishment celerity.

Therefore, the ROP needs to implement swifter punishment processes with regards to

when traffic fines are required to be paid. Nonetheless, there is a strong need to conduct

a feasibility study for implementing a swift punishment process in order to clearly

identify the challenges in the implementation of such a procedure. This study could

consider studying the other elements of classical deterrence theory; severity and

certainty.

The findings of both studies included in this research have shown that the

automated speed enforcement program has not been evaluated since its launch more

than a decade ago. Hence, an evaluation process needs to be performed using the data

and statistics related to traffic safety recorded in the ROP system. A separate

comprehensive study evaluating all aspects of automated speed enforcement program

could be conducted and presented to the policy-makers in the Omani government as

well as to the top managerial level of the ROP.

Finally, given that the first study of this research confirmed that speeding is the

leading contributing factor to crashes and fatalities in Oman, there is a need for further

research into all the variables related to speeding behaviour in the Omani context,

including cultural and social factors as well as various deterrence-related factors such

as experiences of direct and indirect punishment and punishment avoidance.

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman ix

This research helps fill the gap in the literature by investigating the automated

speed enforcement programs in the GCC countries in general and in the Omani road

safety context in particular. The findings derived from this program of research are

anticipated to be of high significance as it has identified the areas where the automated

speed enforcement program in Oman could be improved. Both studies could have

significant outcomes for the ROP in particular and for the other automated speed

enforcement program responsible parties in the GCC countries. Consequently, it has

developed recommendations for more effective implementation strategies for

automated speed enforcement operations in Oman to be provided to the Royal Oman

Police (ROP) and the other responsible government entities. These recommendations

have been developed in a way that makes them relevant and useful for other automated

speed enforcement programs in different countries of the GCC.

x A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

Table of Contents

Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i

Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... x

List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... xiii

List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... xiv

List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. xv

Statement of Original Authorship ......................................................................................... xvi

Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. xvii

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................... 1

1.1 Background and Context ................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Overall Aim and Significance of the Research .............................................................. 5

1.3 Purpose ........................................................................................................................... 7

1.4 Positioning the Researcher ............................................................................................. 8

1.5 Thesis Outline .............................................................................................................. 11

1.6 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 13

Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................... 15

2.1 Introductory Statement ................................................................................................. 15

2.2 Defining Speeding ........................................................................................................ 16

2.3 Relationship between Speeding and Crashes ............................................................... 17

2.4 Addressing Speeding through Deterrence .................................................................... 19 2.4.1 Deterrence Theory as a General Approach to Illegal Behaviour ....................... 19 2.4.2 Application to Road Safety in General and Speeding in Particular ................... 22 2.4.3 Role of Legal Sanctions in Deterrence of Speeding .......................................... 27

2.5 Automated Speed Enforcement as a Speed Management Tool ................................... 31 2.5.1 The Speed Management Approach .................................................................... 31 2.5.2 The Use of Automated Enforcement to Manage Speed ..................................... 32

2.6 The Omani Context ...................................................................................................... 36 2.6.1 Legislation and Penalties Applying to Speeding in Oman ................................ 36 2.6.2 Description of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program ..................... 40 2.6.3 Alignment of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program with

Theory and Good Practice ................................................................................. 41

2.7 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 45

2.8 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 47

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Method ........................... 50

3.1 Introductory Statement ................................................................................................. 50

3.2 First Study .................................................................................................................... 52 3.2.1 Study Rationale .................................................................................................. 53 3.2.2 Method ............................................................................................................... 54

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman xi

Theoretical Approach (Gap Analysis) ......................................................................... 54 Congruence Model ....................................................................................................... 56 Benchmarking .............................................................................................................. 57

3.2.3 Participants .........................................................................................................61 3.2.4 Materials .............................................................................................................62 3.2.5 Procedures and Ethical Consideration ................................................................64 3.2.6 Analytical approach ............................................................................................65

3.3 Second Study ................................................................................................................66 3.3.1 Study Rationale ..................................................................................................67 3.3.2 Participants .........................................................................................................68 3.3.3 Materials .............................................................................................................70 3.3.4 Procedure and Ethical Consideration .................................................................70 3.3.5 Analytical approach ............................................................................................71

Chapter 4: Exploring Police Officers’ Understanding of the Operational Context of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman ..................... 73

4.1 Results ..........................................................................................................................73 4.1.1 Congruence Model Analysis ..............................................................................74

Input ............................................................................................................................. 75 Transformation Process ............................................................................................... 82 Output .......................................................................................................................... 88

4.1.2 Benchmarking Analysis......................................................................................92 Automated speed enforcement type ............................................................................. 92 Site selection ................................................................................................................ 93 Operation hours............................................................................................................ 93 Deterrent effect ............................................................................................................ 94 The program itself ........................................................................................................ 96

4.2 Discussing the findings of the study .............................................................................97

4.3 Strengths and Limitations of the study .........................................................................99

4.4 Chapter Summary .......................................................................................................100

Chapter 5: Investigating Policy-makers’ Understanding of the rationale behind legislation relating to the Omani automated speed enforcement program (Second Study) ........................................................................................................ 103

5.1 Introductory statement ................................................................................................103

5.2 Bridging the first and second study ............................................................................103

5.3 Results ........................................................................................................................105 5.3.1 The Current Speeding Problem from Policy-makers’ Point of View ...............107 5.3.2 The Main Goal of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman .......113 5.3.3 The Deterrent Effect of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in

Oman ................................................................................................................123 5.3.3.1 Deterrent effect (Severity) ............................................................................. 127 5.3.3.2 Deterrent effect (Celerity) .............................................................................. 138 5.3.3.3 Deterrent effect (Certainty) ............................................................................ 142

5.3.4 The Effectiveness of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program .................147 5.3.5 Barriers to Increasing the Effective Implementation and Related

Legislation of Automated Speed Enforcement in Oman ..................................155 5.3.6 The Future of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman ..............168 5.3.7 Other Issues Examined .....................................................................................177

5.4 Summary of the Key Findings ....................................................................................184

5.5 Strengths and Limitations of the Study.......................................................................189

5.6 Chapter Summary .......................................................................................................190

xii A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

Chapter 6: Discussion ...................................................................................... 194

6.1 Introductory statement ............................................................................................... 194

6.2 Overview of the Methods and Findings of research .................................................. 195 6.2.1 Study 1: Reported operational practices .......................................................... 196 6.2.2 Study 2: Policy-makers’ perception of legislative practices ............................ 201

6.3 Contribution of the Findings ...................................................................................... 207

6.4 Practical Implications of the findings ........................................................................ 208 6.4.1 Operational Practices ....................................................................................... 208 6.4.2 Enabling Legislation ........................................................................................ 209

6.5 Options to consider for improving the automated speed enforcement program in Oman 210

6.6 Strengths and limitations ............................................................................................ 212

6.7 Suggestions for future research .................................................................................. 213

6.8 Concluding comments ................................................................................................ 215

Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 217

Appendices .............................................................................................................. 235

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman xiii

List of Figures

Figure 1: Road Fatality Rates (WHO, 2015) ............................................................... 2

Figure 2: Total and Speed-related fatalities ................................................................. 4

Figure 3: Map of Oman (Ministry of Defence, Oman) ................................................ 9

Figure 4: Automated Speed Enforcement traffic offence detection and payment process in Oman ........................................................................................... 40

Figure 5: Three stages of Benchmarking used in this research .................................. 60

Figure 6: The geographical directorates working under the supervision of DGT ..... 62

Figure 7: The flow of Drafting Process for Traffic Law amendments ...................... 69

Figure 8: Number of Total Speed Fines in Oman during the period (2009 - 2014) (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) ........................... 77

xiv A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

List of Tables

Table 1: Comparison of monetary penalties for different speeding violations in Oman and Queensland, Australia ................................................................. 38

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman xv

List of Abbreviations

ROP: Royal Oman Police

DGT: Directorate General of Traffic

M-ON-V: Mounted On Vehicle

GCC countries: Gulf Cooperation Council countries

WHO: World Health Organisation

ANPR: Automatic number plate recognition

ASE: Average Speed Enforcement

GSCM: General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman xvii

QUT Verified Signature

A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman xvii

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I thank Allah for giving me the strength and ability to

complete all related tasks through my doctoral journey away from my home. Then I

would like to thank my mother for her prayers day and night asking Allah to help me

while doing my research in addition to her moral and emotional support in my life as

well as my brothers and sisters who have been always encouraging and supporting.

I would like also to extend my thanks to the people who have been with me

during my doctoral journey and of course my principal and associate supervisors for

their true support when needed, valuable comments and push forward when I was held

back, guidance when I got lost, and encouragement to carry out the tasks related to my

research when I felt disappointed. I would like to acknowledge the huge amount of

help and support I have received from all of my supervisors; Professor Jeremy Davey,

Doctor Ashim Debnath, Associate professor James Freeman, Doctor Mark King, and

Professor Barry Watson in different periods of my research journey.

I would also like to acknowledge the financial support received from Queensland

University of Technology (QUT) as this program of research is funded by one of

(QUT) scholarships.

A very special gratitude with a pocket of flower go to my wife, Ibtisam, for her

different supports and standing by my side since the early stages of my doctoral

journey until the very end.

I am also grateful for CARRS-Q stuff and my colleagues at the centre with a

special mention to Islam Al Bulushi, Buthaina Al Kindi, Mudhar Al Mazrui, and of

course Wahi as well as the other students at the centre. In addition, a special thank

goes to Associate Professor Abdullah Al Maniri and Doctor Hamed Al Raeesi for their

support in different stages of my journey.

I would also like to acknowledge The Omani Government represented by the

Royal Oman Police for their financial support which has enabled me to live

comfortably in Australia for almost four years throughout my doctoral journey.

Moreover, thanking them for providing me the needed support to carry out the data

collection tasks in Oman.

xviii A Gap Analysis of the Automated Speed Enforcement Operations and Regulations in Oman

I would also like to acknowledge Kat Bowman, for her time and effort spent in

professionally editing and proofreading the thesis, according to the university

guidelines and the Australian Standards for editing research theses.

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

This program of research is the first study conducted on automated speed

enforcement in Oman. It identifies the gaps within the operational and theoretical

practices of the program in Oman, and also suggests further research to be conducted

in order to enhance road safety in Oman as well as the neighbouring countries in the

Middle East. Additionally, this program of research has identified gaps within the

literature of road safety related to speed enforcement in the area, which are discussed

in more details later in this thesis.

This introductory chapter consists of six main topics. Section 1.1 (Background

and Context) outlines the background and context of the program of research. It also

describes the road trauma situation worldwide, before narrowing the focus to the

Omani context of road safety. Section 1.2 (Overall aim and Significance of the

Research) reviews the aims and significance of this research, revealing a gap in the

scientific-based literature about automated speed enforcement operational practices in

the Middle East, generally, and Oman, specifically. The third section of this chapter

(1.3 Purpose) discusses the purpose of research and states the objectives, and is

followed by section 1.4 (Positioning the Researcher), which gives the background of

the researcher and the nature of his job as ROP officer. The whole thesis is outlined in

section 1.5 (Thesis Outline), and the following chapters are briefly introduced. Finally,

this chapter is summarized in section 1.6 (Chapter Summary).

1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Road trauma is one of the most important public health concerns in the world

and has gained worldwide attention because of the social and economic costs that

crashes produce. The World Health Organization (WHO) has revealed that road traffic

injuries cause almost 1.35 million deaths every year, and they are the ninth leading

cause of death in the world (WHO, 2018). WHO (2018) also stated that road traffic

injuries are the primary cause of death for young people aged 5 to 29 years old. A

recent study, including 183 countries, which was undertaken to compare road crash

fatalities with the three leading causes of death in the world, namely, malignant

neoplasms, ischaemic heart disease, and strokes, revealed that Oman has the highest

2 Chapter 1: Introduction

crash fatality rates compared with the three causes of death followed by Qatar and then

Saudi Arabia (Sivak, 2017).

This research is centred on Oman, which is one of the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) countries. These Middle Eastern countries sit on the Arabian Peninsula, and

they all speak Arabic, with English as a second language. The largest in area and

population is Saudi Arabia with 2.1 million sq. km and 27.4 million people, whereas

the smallest is Bahrain with 741 sq. km and 1.2 million people. Oman covers an area

of 212,000 sq. km and its population are approximately 3.6 million (WHO, 2015).

WHO (2015) reports that crash fatality rates for (GCC) countries are very high (see

Figure 1), and Oman has the second highest fatality rate of 25.4 per 100,000

inhabitants compared with Saudi Arabia (27.4), Bahrain (8.0), UAE (10.9), Qatar

(15.2), and Kuwait (16.5). In comparison, Australia and other European countries have

rates which are far below the world average rate of 17.4 (WHO, 2015) as it is shown

in Figure 1.

Internationally, speeding is one of the main contributing factors for crashes

(Richter, Berman, Friedman, & Ben-David, 2006; WHO, 2014). To reduce speeding,

different governments and transport authorities have applied a wide range of strategies,

including setting speed limits, police enforcement, and use of manual and automated

25.4

10.9

27.4

8

15.218.7 17.4

5.4 4.3 5.12.8 2.9

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 1: Road Fatality Rates (WHO, 2015)


speed enforcement (Hirst, Mountain, & Maher, 2005). Additionally, some

jurisdictions, such as in New York City, have installed safety countermeasures and

specific street designs, which have helped in reducing various types of crashes

including speed-related crashes (L. Chen et al., 2013).

Speeding is one of the major causes of fatal crashes in Oman. This research

examined the data obtained from ROP statistics booklets (Facts and Figures) and found

that speeding contributes to more than 50 percent of the total crashes and fatalities

(ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), although there is a slight

downward trend in the total number of speed-related fatalities, as shown in Figure 2,

Officers physically visit crash scene and use several criteria to decide if the crash

happened in high speed such as measuring the length of break marks on the road, and

observing how severe the damages on cars are, speeding still contributes to more than

50 percent of the total crashes and to almost 54 percent of the total fatalities. Other

crashes, fatalities, and injuries are caused by various behaviours, such as overtaking,

or other causes not specified in the statistics published by the ROP because they are

responsible for such a low percentage of total crashes. The causes of crashes in Oman

are presented in Appendix A for the period from the year 2009 to the year 2015 (ROP,

2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). It is important to mention that most

statistical data used in this thesis is from the year 2015 or earlier, as crash and offence

data for more recent years within the Omani road safety context is not available or

difficult to access.


Figure 2: Total and Speed-related fatalities

Like other (GCC) countries, Oman has started to implement automated speed

enforcement programs to tackle the speeding problem. Semi-manual speed cameras,

which needed someone to change the film once it was consumed, started being used

in the late 1990s. In 2005, these manual enforcement devices were replaced with

automated and more advanced cameras that use digital technologies to record the

speeding and red-light running vehicles. The Royal Oman Police (ROP) is the

government authority responsible for managing and improving road safety. The ROP

use automated speed enforcement to deter drivers from exceeding the posted speed

limits. They commenced automated speed enforcement with 125 fixed speed cameras

and 40 mobile speed cameras in 2005, and gradually increased the numbers of fixed

and mobile cameras during the period from 2005 to mid-2013. Further technologies

were introduced in 2013 including combined red-light and speed cameras, laser-guns

(which contain cameras), and in-vehicle speed cameras. More details about each type

of automated speed enforcement are explained in Appendix B. However, the

effectiveness of this program overall has remained questionable.

Information about the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, such as

operating hours, site selections, or program strategies are not available in any

published documents or even in the written documents of the ROP. The researcher

tried to find written documents about the goals, plans, or strategies of automated speed

enforcement program in Oman but, unfortunately, there are none publicly available.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Fatalities

Total-fatalities Speed-fatalities


As such, a key goal of this program of research was to obtain this information through

interviewing ROP officers and policy-makers with responsibility for managing the

automated enforcement program and related legislative requirements.

Even from the information available, it is obvious that there is a need for further

research on automated speed enforcement in Oman, noting that this will include

combined speed and red-light cameras. It is important to note that the focus of this

research is not the impact of the current program on crashes. Instead, it examines the

operational practices, the policies, the reasoning and the rationale behind the actual

implementation of the current automated speed enforcement program. This is because

there is a strong base of theory and practice on the operation of speed enforcement in

Western countries like Australia, to ensure that it is effective, whereas it is not clear

whether there is a similar scientific approach in Oman. The research, therefore,

compares the shared understanding of these characteristics of the current Omani

program with what could be considered as international good practice programs. It

investigates perceptions of both police and policy-makers on aspects of the operation

and legislative basis of automated speed enforcement in Oman to establish the

rationale employed and its conformity with good practice.

1.2 OVERALL AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

The overall aim of this research was to identify ways to enhance the automated

speed enforcement program in Oman in order to reduce speed-related crashes.

Thereby, this research had two main sub-aims. Firstly, it identified and examined the

operational practices of automated speed enforcement program in Oman and compared

the characteristics of the current Omani program with what could be considered

international good practice programs. And secondly, it investigated the policies, the

reasoning and the rationale behind the current automated speed enforcement program

in Oman by seeking the legislators’ perceptions of the deterrent effects of automated

speed enforcement on drivers’ behaviour.

The findings derived from this program of research are anticipated to be of high

significance as it has identified the areas where the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman could be improved. Consequently, it has developed

recommendations for more effective implementation strategies for automated speed


enforcement operations in Oman to be provided to the Royal Oman Police (ROP) and

the other responsible government entities. These recommendations have been

developed in a way that makes them relevant and useful for other automated speed

enforcement programs in different countries of the GCC. Such strategies are discussed

as recommendations from this program of research. Furthermore, this program of

research has suggested future studies and research to be conducted within the Omani

context.

Moreover, this program of research has identified two important gaps in the

literature. First, there has been very little, if any, scientific-based research conducted

about the effectiveness of automated speed enforcement in Oman or broadly in the

(GCC) countries. The second gap is related to the technical and theoretical framework

of the automated speed enforcement program implemented in Oman. Regarding the

technical aspects, the automated speed enforcement in Oman has many useful

technical capabilities which have not been used yet, such as automatic number plate

recognition (ANPR), which could be used to distinguish speeds between heavy and

light vehicles and to conduct point-to-point speed enforcement. On the other hand, the

theoretical aspects include investigation of the possible deterrent effects of the

automated speed enforcement program, since the fine for each speeding-related

offence in Oman is not very high, and all offenders are required to pay the fines only

once a year (i.e., there could be a long time lag between the times when a speeding

fine is issued and when the fine is paid). Despite having more than a thousand

automated speed enforcement units on the Omani roads, the fatal and injury crash

numbers remain very high, suggesting that there is an apparent gap between the logical

expected outcomes of the program and the actual outcomes the program currently

achieves. A comprehensive analysis of the Omani automated speed enforcement

program is therefore urgently needed to generate a deeper understanding of its

operational and legislative practices, which can promote suggestions for reducing the

number of speed-related crashes in Oman.

To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, it is important to mention here what

is within the specific scope of this research regarding the speed enforcement currently

implemented in Oman. Although there are various other factors that may influence

road safety in Oman, including public education, engineering road construction,

changes to enforcement tolerance threshold levels, changes in coding of offences, and


changes in driving exposure, the scope of this research is limited to the automated

speed enforcement program. Specifically, this program of research examines the

operation procedures and practices of the current automated speed enforcement

program in Oman, together with the legislation and rationale behind the program.

Therefore, not all of these factors are relevant to this research as some factors (i.e.

social factors) are expected to appear in the results of the second study of this thesis.

In addition, the research examines only four out of the six traffic violations detected

by the automated speed enforcement units and their related sanctions, which are

discussed in section 2.6.1 (Legislation and Penalties Applying to Speeding in Oman).

The other executive regulations of traffic detected by automated speed enforcement

units, which are red-light violations and illegal lane changes, are considered out of the

scope of this research. As classical deterrence theory was used as the main theoretical

framework for this program of research, the focus is on the three central elements of

the theory: the perceived severity, certainty, and celerity of punishment. The theory

and its elements are discussed in more detail in later sections of this thesis.

1.3 PURPOSE

The purpose of this program of research is to analyse the practical and theoretical

aspects of automated speed enforcement use in order to provide opportunities for

improvement. This, in turn, will lead to achieving the overall aim of this research,

which is to enhance the automated speed enforcement program in Oman in order to

reduce speed-related crashes. This purpose is fulfilled by achieving the following

objectives:

1. Describing the operational aspects of the current Omani automated speed

enforcement program.

2. Identifying the perceptions of Royal Oman Police officers toward the

theoretical aspects of the current automated speed enforcement in Oman.

3. Discussing to what extent the practices of the Omani automated speed

enforcement program are aligned with international good practice.

4. Identifying the perceptions of the legislators about the automated speed

enforcement program in terms of its supposed deterrent effect.

5. Determining the best way to evaluate the effectiveness of Omani automated

speed enforcement program against its goals.


6. Identifying the barriers to more effective automated speed enforcement in

Oman.

The fulfilment of the above objectives has led to the collection of very valuable

data, which can be used to focus on improving the road safety context in Oman,

especially in areas related to the different practices of automated speed enforcement

used currently implemented in Oman. Furthermore, it is anticipated that this data could

help clarify automated speed enforcement operational and theoretical practices in

Oman, with a view to extending their effectiveness in reducing crash fatalities and

injuries caused by speeding.

1.4 POSITIONING THE RESEARCHER

The researcher is an Omani citizen working as an officer in the Royal Oman

Police since May, 2005. He has had several roles within the ROP, among which was

supervisory officer of the Automated Speed Enforcement Section for five different

geographical directorates of traffic in Oman. There are 13 geographical directorates of

traffic that work under the supervision of Directorate General of Traffic (DGT). These

geographical directorates are shown in the map of Oman Figure 3: Map of Oman. They

are Khasab, Sohar, Buraimi, Rustaq, Ibri, Sumail, Nizwa, Sur, Ibra, Haima, Thamrait,

Salalah, and Muscat Traffic Directorates as part of DGT.


Figure 3: Map of Oman (Ministry of Defence, Oman)

The researcher has worked as the Head of Control and Support Department for

several different geographical traffic directorates since 2006. The Automated Speed

Enforcement Section is one of the sections under the Control and Support Department.

Besides the general traffic and policing roles conducted by all police officers working

in traffic departments, there are specific roles assigned to each of the officers. From

February 2006 until October 2010, the researcher was one of the supervisory

operational officers of the ASE section in Batina Governorate, Sohar and Rustaq


Traffic Directorates, supervising 24 operators, 10 laser-gun units, 12 mobile speed

camera units, and 86 fixed speed camera units. Following this, he was transferred to

the Northern Sharqeyah Governorate, Ibra Traffic Directorate, for 18 months

supervising 24 operators, 6 laser-gun units, 12 mobile speed camera units, and then the

Southern Sharqeyah Governorate, Sur Traffic Directorate, for 7 months, supervising

36 operators, 8 laser-gun units, 16 mobile speed camera units, 4 combined red-light

and speed cameras, and 41 fixed speed camera units. From mid-2012 until mid-2015,

he supervised the automated speed enforcement section in Sumail Traffic Directorate

in The Interior Governorate, where he was in charge of 42 operators, 6 laser-gun units,

18 mobile units, 2 mounted-on-vehicle units, and 64 fixed speed camera units.

Every officer working on the field of the Omani ASE program has to go through

several courses regarding the technical operations of each type of enforcement unit

used in Oman. In addition, the officer has to make sure that every operator has the

needed skills and knowledge about each type of ASE unit used. During the 10-year

period of working at ROP, the researcher gained experience and knowledge about the

process of how ASE devices detect vehicles and what steps are involved in the issuing

of fines to the registered owner of the vehicle and the payment requirements.

The researcher, as an ROP officer, went through different experiences and

gained different skills and knowledge which have been utilised in this research. For

instance, most of the interviewees were known to the researcher, formally or

informally. More particularly, the researcher had previously worked with most of the

officers interviewed in the first study of the research. In addition, as traffic officers

interact with people on a daily basis, the researcher has developed good

communication skills as well as made connections with a wide range of people within

the Omani road safety context such as other officers, policy-makers, and road users

requesting services at traffic departments as well as different types of offenders on the

road.

There is an annual traffic week held every year in Oman that includes different

policing activities and traffic awareness campaigns. This week has to be prepared,

planned, and executed by the Head of Control and the Support Department in each

geographical Traffic Directorate. The researcher organised more than 10 traffic weeks

during his work in the ROP. During these weeks, a range of activities are undertaken,

including traffic awareness campaigns, intensive police patrolling, and a traffic

exhibition, which all road safety related parties join, such as the traffic geographical


directorate, the emergency department of hospital, the Civil Defence Force, the

Ambulance Department of the ROP, educational institutes, and parties representing

society.

Being an ROP officer helped facilitate the interviews with the police officers, by

reducing hurdles that another researcher would have otherwise experienced. Firstly, if

the researcher was not an ROP officer, it would have been nearly impossible to gain

access to the police officers to conduct the interviews. Secondly, based on the

researcher’s experience, ROP officers tend to be conservative when it comes to

providing information about programs and procedures. As such, being an ROP officer

enabled the researcher to approach the study participants in a positive way, as they

would have perceived him as a as a colleague who understood their situation and

position at ROP, which in turn made them more willing to share information and

provide details. Furthermore, working ten years at the same department in different

areas has made the researcher well-established in terms of experience and knowledge

about the researched topic.

It is important to mention, however, that the researcher, while working as

supervisory officer for almost 10 years, did not had access to any documents about

ASE program operations. Therefore, there was a strong need to communicate

personally with the officer in charge of the ASE program in order to obtain and validate

some of the needed information for this research, especially during the data collection

stage for the first study.

This program of research is funded by a Queensland University of Technology

(QUT) scholarship. Thus, the data collected, the analyses undertaken, and the

conclusions reached were not subject to any requirements of the Omani Government

or the ROP.

1.5 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis includes six chapters. It starts with this introductory chapter, Chapter

one. The introductory chapter presents information about the overall program of

research to be discussed including the background and context, as well as the overall

aim and significance of the research. in addition, it included a positioning statement

relating to the researcher.

Chapter two of the thesis reviews the relevant literature. This chapter includes

the definition of speeding, the relationship between speed and crashes, and the


different speed management tools. Moreover, it includes a brief historical background

of deterrence theory with its following additional components and properties, together

with its application in the road safety context. It also proposes what could be more

effective automated speed enforcement practices which could be suitable for the

Omani automated speed enforcement context. Finally, the chapter discusses the six

research questions in more detail.

Chapter three presents the theoretical framework and methods utilised to conduct

the two studies of this program of research. It discusses the rationale behind each study

as well as the participants approached for data collection. Additionally, the chapter

lists the materials and procedures of data collection together with the analytical

approaches used.

Chapter four details the first study that identifies the operational context of the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman. It states the results and includes a

discussion of the study. The chapter also identifies the strengths and limitations that

accompanied the study.

Chapter five details the second study of this thesis. The study investigates the

rationale behind the legislation governing the automated speed enforcement program

in Oman from the legislators’ point of view. The chapter includes a discussion of the

findings from the first study that lead to conducting the second study, Followed by the

results and discussion sections. Before moving to the strengths and limitations of the

study, there is a section summarising the key findings of the study, as these are more

extensive than the first study.

Finally, chapter six is the discussion chapter of this thesis. It starts by giving an

overview of the methods used for each study together with the findings obtained from

them. It then discusses how these findings have contributed to the available literature

of automated speed enforcement and to the Omani context of road safety. The chapter

then suggests some practical implications of the findings, categorising them into two

main areas: operational and legislative. Furthermore, recommendations for improving

the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman are listed, and

the strengths and limitations of the research are discussed. The chapter includes

suggestions for further research to be conducted in the future, followed by concluding

comments.


1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has established the context of this study, with particular reference to

the issue of road trauma in Oman and the role of speeding in crashes. Additionally, it

discussed the aims and significance of the research program along with the research

purpose, including the objectives to be achieved by conducting two studies under this

program of research followed by a researcher positioning statement. Finally, it outlined

the remaining five chapters included in this thesis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review 15

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Road trauma is one of the most important public health concerns in the world,

gaining worldwide attention because of the economic (Connelly & Supangan, 2006)

and social costs of crashes (WHO, 2017b). The World Health Organization (WHO)

revealed that road traffic injuries cause almost 1.35 million deaths every year and it is

the ninth leading cause of death in the world (WHO, 2018). In addition, road traffic

injuries are the primary cause of death for young people aged from 5 to 29 years old

(WHO, 2018). Speeding is considered as one of the main contributing factors that

cause crashes (Richter et al., 2006; WHO, 2014), and is perceived as the most

significant problem in local communities (Poulter & McKenna, 2007) as it

significantly contributes to the overall road trauma. Statistics indicate that speeding is

the primary cause of one-third of crash fatalities in high-income countries and two-

thirds of crash fatalities in low and middle-income countries (WHO, 2017a). In Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, crashes are a major cause of mortality and

morbidity (Bener, Abu-Zidan, Bensiali, Al-Mulla, & Jadaan, 2003) and speeding is

regarded as the main cause of road crash fatalities (Shaaban, 2014). To reduce

speeding, different governments and transport authorities have applied a wide range

of strategies and speed countermeasures, including automated speed enforcement

programs (Cameron, 2008; Hirst et al., 2005; Hu & McCartt, 2016).

A review of the literature about automated speed enforcement programs and

associated concepts together with deterrence theory was undertaken as part of this

research. The literature accessed to develop this research was limited mostly to

English-language sources, and additionally, a few other Arabic-language sources were

accessed because the researcher’s mother tongue is Arabic. In addition, there is a high

probability that studies done in GCC countries have been written in Arabic (Naji,

2015). This chapter structures the review into nine main sections.

Firstly, this chapter starts with an introductory statement (Section 2.1). Then, in

Section 2.2, it gives an overview of speeding and speed definitions examined from

different perspectives. Thirdly, Section 2.3 discusses the relationship between

speeding and crashes to show how speeding is related to crash involvement, crash

16 Chapter 2: Literature Review

severity, and crash fatalities. This section considers empirical and non-empirical

studies in the literature, with a focus on the most recent research. Crashes and crash

fatality rates in Oman are presented after analysing data obtained from the Royal Oman

Police (ROP) statistics. The fourth section, (Section 2.4), briefly explores deterrence

theory in relation to illegal behaviour and its application to automated speed

enforcement programs, while reviewing different studies conducted in different

countries about automated speed enforcement programs and their effectiveness in

reducing speed, speed-related crashes, crash fatalities and injuries, and promoting road

safety. Within this section, legal factors influencing speeding behaviour are discussed

as they are relevant to the research. There are several other factors which influence

speeding behaviour; however, not all factors will be relevant to or under the scope of

this research as some factors are expected to appear in the results of the second study

of this thesis without further explanation or discussion. This section presents a brief

historical background of deterrence theory and how it has evolved into its current

concept starting from Thomas Hobbes and Beccaria from the eighteenth century,

adding Homel’s concepts, and then ending with the reconceptualization of Stafford

and Warr at the end of last century. Deterrence theory is discussed in this research

because deterrence is the traditional theoretical countermeasure to speeding

behaviours. In Section 2.5, speed management is discussed in terms of the tools and

techniques used by governments and authorities to manage vehicle speeds in order to

improve road safety. One of these tools is automated speed enforcement, which is

discussed in general. In Section 2.6, the Omani automated speed enforcement program

is described, together with the traffic rules related to fines detected by automated speed

enforcement within Omani legislation. This section develops what could be called or

considered good practice for automated speed enforcement related to speeding which

could be suitable for the Omani context. The seventh section of this chapter (Section

2.7), identifies the six research questions that this thesis investigates. Finally, Section

2.8 summarises the chapter and its contents.

2.2 DEFINING SPEEDING

The concept of vehicular speed according to road safety doctrine can be

categorised into three types: design speed, operating speed, and posted speed

(Fitzpatrick, Krammes, & Fambro, 1997; Ng & Sayed, 2004). The design speed is

derived from the horizontal and vertical geometry of the road and it is decided by road


engineers. The operating speed or travel speed is defined as the speed typically

selected by the driver when not restricted by other users (Ng & Sayed, 2004).

Differences between design speed and operating speed always occur, and in order to

minimise these differences while maintaining safety, authorities establish maximum

and sometimes minimum speed limit signs, and this is the posted speed limit

(Fitzpatrick, Carlson, Brewer, & Wooldridge, 2003; Ng & Sayed, 2004). Posted speed

limits and design speed limits are controlled and set by the authorities, whereas the

operating speed is voluntarily selected by drivers. Often, the posted speed limits have

minimal influence on controlling the operating speed as shown by a study conducted

by L. Chen et al. (2013). Another study done in North Carolina showed that the posted

speed limit signs have an insignificant effect on a driver’s choice of speed (Renski,

Khattak, & Council, 1999). In addition, several other studies, conducted in different

years, have also stated that posted speed limit signs are one way of managing the

speeds on roads, but the signs alone do not significantly reduce the speeds (Kanitpong,

Jiwattanakulpaisarn, & Yaktawong, 2013; Kjemtrup & Herrstedt, 1992; Polinsky &

Shavell, 1999; Stigler, 1974). The authors commented that this is because most drivers

consider the speed limit signs as informative rather than deterrents to speeding. In

contrast, a US study found that females and older males display fewer speeding

behaviours because they tend to be more likely to observe the posted speed limits and

consider them as directions to be followed (Shinar, Schechtman, & Compton, 2001).

Speeding is defined as the speed “when a vehicle exceeds the posted speed limit for a

particular road”, whereas inappropriate speed occurs “when a vehicle travels at a speed

that is unsuitable for the prevailing road, weather and/or traffic conditions but within

the speed limits” (WHO, 2017a, p. 6). Further studies have argued that the variation

of vehicle speeds could increase the probability of crashes because the drivers have to

adjust their speed regularly and they may miscalculate the safe following distance

(Lee, Saccomanno, & Hellinga, 2002). In addition, studies have proven that there is a

solid positive relationship between speeding and crashes, which will be discussed in

the next section.

2.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPEEDING AND CRASHES

Numerous studies within the literature have shown that speeding is a major

contributing factor to crashes (M., Moore, & Woodward, 1995; Richter et al., 2006)

and it increases the risk of being involved in a crash (Aarts & Van Schagen, 2006;


Kloeden, McLean, & Glonek, 2002; Renski et al., 1999). According to the WHO,

speeding was responsible for 30 percent to 50 percent of fatal vehicle crashes around

the world; road crash injuries were the second primary cause of death for people aged

5 to 29 years, and the third primary cause of death for people aged 30-44 years (WHO,

2004). As these figures remained similar for almost a decade, in 2014, the WHO again

reported that road crashes are the first primary cause of death among adolescents

(WHO, 2014). The WHO further reported that worldwide fatalities associated with

road crashes rose from one million in the year 2000 to almost 1.25 million in 2015 and

to 1.35 million in 2018 (WHO, 2018). This represents a 35 percent increase over the

18-year period. Furthermore, the WHO (2014) acknowledged that more than half of

these fatalities were associated with young people and 77 percent of them were males.

A relatively recent study in France investigated crash fatalities in which speed was

reported as the main cause and found that most of the crashes involved 18 to 25-year-

old road users (Delhomme, Cristea, & Paran, 2014).

A meta-analysis of research into the relationship between speed and road safety

was conducted by Elvik (2005) and it explored the results of 98 studies within the road

safety literature. The analysis supported the conclusion that an increase in speed leads

directly to an increase in the number of crashes and level of severity. Speed has also

been reported to be associated with crash severity by many other studies which were

not included in the meta-analysis mentioned above (M. et al., 1995; Mountain, Hirst,

& Maher, 2004). These studies reported that the higher the speed the more severe the

crash outcomes are. Further studies such as Richter et al. (2006) applied Nilsson’s

model in an empirical study of 64 crashes in which the findings supported Nilsson’s

assumption of when there is a 3.5 percent to 5 percent reduction in the average travel

speed, there would be a reduction in the probability of fatality by 15 percent to 21

percent.

Furthermore, speeding increases the probability of crash involvement and

crash severity (Aarts & Van Schagen, 2006; Joksch, 1993; Solomon, 1964). A study

by M. et al. (1995) showed that there is a positive relationship between speeding and

the risk of being involved in a severe crash. Similarly, a study conducted by Aarts and

Van Schagen (2006) found a strong positive relationship between an increase in speed

and the crash rate. Furthermore, a report which reviewed the literature on the effect of

speeding on road deaths and injuries by Lynam and Hummel (2002), confirmed the

severe consequences of speed-related crashes. It stated that almost all related studies


have proven this finding. Thus, the higher the speed, the higher the risk of involvement

in a severe crash is, and the higher the severity of the injury is. Likewise, an increase

in mean speed by 1 km/h will result in a 4% to 5 % increase in fatal crashes (WHO,

2017a). Conversely, a small reduction in mean speed will lead to significant reductions

in crash fatality rates (Kloeden et al., 2002).

Speeding in all six GCC countries is one of the main causes of crashes

(Shaaban, 2014), and in Oman speeding is considered the main cause of crashes (Al-

Maniri, Al-Reesi, Al-Zakwani, & Nasrullah, 2013). As discussed in Section 1.1 and

presented in Appendix A, after analysing the reports obtained from the ROP, it was

found that speeding contributes to almost 50 percent of the crashes and causes more

than 52 percent of the road toll in Oman (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,

2015). The next section will discuss several different speed management tools

currently in use in the road safety context worldwide.

2.4 ADDRESSING SPEEDING THROUGH DETERRENCE

It is important to discourage people from speeding, and deterrence theory

provides a framework for understanding how this might be done. The following

subsection will give some background on deterrence theory in general and its

application in road safety, especially for speeding. It will also highlight the role of

legal sanctions as an influence on speeding within the deterrence framework.

2.4.1 Deterrence Theory as a General Approach to Illegal Behaviour

The importance of deterrence theory for this research lies in its contribution to

the theoretical framework to be used in this program of research, as discussed in the

next chapter. In addition, the application of deterrence theory within the Omani road

safety context will be discussed from the study participants’ perspectives. Deterrence

theory has a historical development based on the work of three philosophers: Thomas

Hobbes (1588-1679), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) (Crimmins, 2002; Stafford,

2015), and Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) (Onwudiwe, Odo, & Onyeozili, 2005).

Beccaria asserted that punishment should be applied to people who harm society; but

he preferred preventing those people from harming society by deterring them from

doing criminal acts rather than brutally and inhumanely punishing them after they do

the acts (Brown & Esbensen, 1988; Draper, 2000). As Harcourt (2013) states, Beccaria

did not ask for less punishment, but rather for better punishment. Deterrence, in


Beccaria’s thinking, in its simplest terms, suggests that people’s behaviour can be

regulated by using threats of punishment (Parzen, 2008). This assumption was later

supported by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s work in 1780 (Burns, 2005).

Jeremy Bentham’s assumption of deterrence is that people are rational in taking

decisions and they calculate the loss and gain or pleasure and pain from committing a

particular action (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Crimmins, 2002; Gibbs, 1979). Both

Beccaria’s and Bentham’s work were influenced by Hobbes as he started the field of

deterrence (Harcourt, 2013; Onwudiwe et al., 2005). The classical deterrence theory

of the Italian Beccaria and the English Bentham did not include the behaviour aspect

of criminology, because both focussed mainly on penal modification, not behavioural

modification (Akers & Sellers, 2009).

To better understand deterrence theory, Beccaria included three principles

within deterrence theory: the perceived certainty, severity, and swiftness of

punishment (Ball, 1955; Brown & Esbensen, 1988; Elliott, 2003; Freimark, 2012;

Pyne, 2012; B. C. Watson, V. Siskind, J. J. Fleiter, A. Watson, & D. W. Soole, 2015).

These are the three elements included and discussed in more detail within this thesis.

Firstly, the perceived severity of punishment means that people are to perceive the

amount of punishment as severe enough to prevent them from committing a crime

(Stafford, 2015). In other words, the assumption of punishment severity is that, when

the punishment or sanction is not severe enough, it will not deter potential offenders

from committing crimes. In short, the amount of punishment must be enough to

restrain the same offender from re-committing the same act, “specific deterrence”, and

preventing other people from committing this particular crime, “general deterrence”

(Harcourt, 2013). Secondly, there is the perceived certainty of punishment, which is

simply a person’s perception of getting caught if they commit an offence (Freimark,

2012; B. C. Watson et al., 2015). The punishment must be certain in the sense that

potential offenders are sure that the punishment will take place once apprehended.

Thirdly, there is the celerity of punishment (also known as swiftness), which means

that the time gap between the illegal act and the perceived punishment should be as

short as possible, in order to have a stronger deterrent effect on the offender

(Onwudiwe et al., 2005). Likewise, the faster the punishment is applied, the more

likely it is that the offender will be deterred.

Deterrence theory, as previously mentioned, can be divided into two

interrelated divisions in terms of its deterrent effect on people: general deterrent effects


and specific deterrent effects (Earnhart & Friesen, 2013; Elliott, 2003). General

deterrence is determined by the effect of the punishment on the public. This assumes

that people do not commit crimes because their perception about the severity, certainty,

and celerity of the punishment is high enough to discourage them. Specific deterrence,

on the other hand, is determined by the effect of punishment on specific previous

offenders (Onwudiwe et al., 2005). Offenders, once apprehended and severely and

swiftly punished, will be unwilling to re-commit the offence.

In addition, there are other objective properties than the perceived ones, such

as the perceived severity of actual punishment, objective certainty and public

knowledge of prescribed punishments (Erickson & Gibbs, 1976; Gibbs, 1975).

Stafford and Warr (1993) reconceptualised the classical general and specific

deterrence theory. However, before that reconceptualization of general and specific

deterrence theory, Ross Homel (1988) extended the theory with the concept of social

sanction or non-legal sanctions in addition to the legal sanctions imposed by the law.

This non-legal sanction consists of three components, namely, guilty feelings and

threats of social stigma, including “social degradation and loss of respect due to being

caught” (Williams & Hawkins, 1986, p. 562); the threat of physical loss (injury); and

the threat of material loss (crash). Homel (1988) argued that these non-legal sanction

components might have a greater deterrent effect than the legal sanctions. However,

some non-legal sanctions may work in the opposite direction to legal sanctions, such

as when a peer ridicules his drunk peer if he refuses to drive after drinking. Homel

suggested that legal sanctions should take this into consideration and condemned the

opposing of non-legal sanctions (Homel, 1988). Moreover, it is prudent to mention

that social stigma may be considered as part of general deterrence aroused as a

consequence of legal sanction if the stigma felt was from the committing of the offence

rather than from being caught or fined (Williams & Hawkins, 1986). In a country like

Oman, it is relevant to discuss the social stigma ahead of other non-legal factors as the

Omani community is closely socially connected, and whatever happens to one member

of the community is soon known to others (Koermer, 2013). This can serve as a general

deterrent element in driving behaviours, however, non-legal factors are not examined

in this program research since they were considered out of scope.

Stafford and Warr (1993) proposed a further reconceptualization in deterrence

theory, which involved the addition of the concepts of punishment avoidance and

vicarious learning. They suggested that general deterrence and specific deterrence


should not be treated as two different theories when studying deterrent effects on a

particular person. Instead, a specific person can be affected with both the specific and

general deterrent effects of a crime at the same time. This means that one person can

experience both deterrent effects, assuming that “general deterrence refers to the

deterrent effect of indirect experience with punishment and punishment avoidance and

specific deterrence refers to the deterrent effect of direct experience with punishment

and punishment avoidance.” (Stafford & Warr, 1993, p. 127). In Stafford and Warr’s

Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence, two concepts, previously

mentioned, were added to the classical deterrence theory. Firstly, a person can be

characterized simultaneously with both specific and general deterrence (vicarious

learning) and secondly, it proposed that punishment avoidance should be included in

analysing the deterrent effects of punishment within any given population (Stafford &

Warr, 1993). This supports the suggestion by William and Hawkins (1986) to include

the indirect effects of deterrence while exploring general deterrence.

Deterrence theory and its additions or extras could be simply summarised as: a

person is deterred from committing a crime by his or her perception of punishment

(Brown & Esbensen, 1988; Cullen & Wilcox, 2010; Harcourt, 2013), as well as the

influence of etiological factors, perceived and actual punishment (Gibbs, 1968), and

the threat of non-legal sanction (Homel, 1988); it is also influenced by direct/indirect

experience of punishment and punishment avoidance (Stafford & Warr, 1993).

2.4.2 Application to Road Safety in General and Speeding in Particular

The concept of deterrence has underpinned many of the traffic law enforcement

countermeasures that have been used in road safety (Fleiter, 2010). There have been

numerous studies in the road safety literature of deterrence and its related theories

(Ball, 1955; Elliott, 2003; Pyne, 2012). The classical assumption behind deterrence

theory, as mentioned above, is that people are discouraged from committing illegal

actions when they are more likely to perceive punishment as severe, certain, and swift.

In other words, as Ball (1955) defined deterrence, “the preventive effect that actual or

threatened punishment has on offenders or potential offenders”.

Deterrence theory has informed the design of many road automated speed

enforcement programs. The often-stated goal of automated speed enforcement

programs is to deter drivers from exceeding the speed limit in a way that reduces

crashes and fatalities (Queensland Police, 2016; South Australia Police, 2014; Victoria


Police Traffic Camera Office, 2013). In this section of the literature review, not only

the classical concept of deterrence theory as applied to road safety is explored, but also

later additions to the theory, such as social punishment (Gibbs, 1968), and punishment

avoidance and vicarious learning (Stafford & Warr, 1993). In addition, recent studies

exploring non-legal sanctions will also be discussed. Furthermore, this chapter will

discuss, in more details, the role of severe penalties and sanctions on speeding as well

as the certainty of punishment.

There have been a considerable number of international studies that have

investigated the deterrent effect of automated speed enforcement as an automated

solution for speeding behaviours (Abdulsalam, 2012; Abdulsalam, Hassan, & El

Halim, 2015; Belin, Tillgren, Vedung, Cameron, & Tingvall, 2010; Laurent Carnis,

2008; L. Carnis, 2011; Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; Darei & Humaid, 2009; De

Pauw, Daniels, Brijs, Hermans, & Wets, 2014; Delhomme et al., 2014; Gargoum,

2015; Hamzah, Ng, Khairuddin, & Yusof, 2013; Høye, 2015; Liu, Zhang, Wang, &

Xu, 2011; Marciano & Norman, 2015; Shin, Washington, & Van Schalkwyk, 2009;

Soole, Watson, & Fleiter, 2013; Tay, 2010; WHO, 2017b; Wilson, Willis, Hendrikz,

Le Brocque, & Bellamy, 2010). A recent study revealed that drivers who have been

apprehended during the last five years, at least once for speeding behaviour, tend to

have a high level of perception of sanction (Freeman, Kaye, Truelove, & Davey, 2017).

Another study of 166 drink driving offenders, which examined their perceptions of

legal sanctions, revealed that offenders are less likely to drink and drive when they

perceive the sanction to be of a high severity level (Freeman, Liossis, & David, 2006).

It is important to mention that drinking and driving are out of this study’s scope, but it

is included in the literature review of deterrence as it is one of the most common risky

driving behaviours, and often goes together with speeding behaviour.

In regards to the certainty of punishment, it was found that increasing certainty

of apprehension leads to a reduction in crash fatality rates as a consequence of

deterring drivers from committing risky behaviours (Mamtani, Al-Thani, Al-Thani,

Sheikh, & Lowenfels, 2012; Pyne, 2012). In a city called Al Ain, which is the fourth

largest city in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a study which explored the beliefs and

attitudes of 402 drivers towards speeding behaviour found that police patrols are

needed to increase the certainty of apprehension, and tougher fines must be applied to

increase the severity of apprehension, so that particular beliefs and attitudes could be

changed positively which, in turn, leads to reductions in excessive speed (Mehmood,


2009). This suggests that speeding is a complex issue and that management requires

an understanding of the different aspects and factors which contribute to speeding

behaviour. As the classical deterrence theory suggests, people are rational in choosing

their actions. For drivers, this means that they weigh the loss and gain of risky driving

or speeding and, based on that, they choose whether to speed or not. However, it does

not seem that many drivers stop and think about it in this way because if they did, they

would not speed or would rarely speed, as Fleiter, Lennon, and Watson (2007) have

argued.

Perceived certainty of punishment is seen by some as having a significant

deterrent effect compared to the perceived severity of punishment. One study stated

that drivers who received speeding fines are more likely to receive another one within

a short time, and this could mean that the fine severity is not great enough or that

severity itself has a little deterrent effect (Lawpoolsri, Li, & Braver, 2007). This study

suggested that increasing the perception of apprehension (certainty) would have more

deterrent effect than increasing the severity of the sanction. On the other hand,

perceived certainty of punishment was found, in some cases, to have an insignificant

deterrent effect on speeding drivers, as one-third of Queenslander participants in

another study believed that punishment is uncertain once apprehended (Fleiter, 2010).

In addition, the severity of legal punishment was perceived as moderate which, in turn,

had very little deterrent effect on speeding drivers. These two findings are inconsistent

with the theoretical assumption of deterrence. However, the certainty of punishment

has been proven to have a positive effect on the number of crashes (Tay, 2010). A

study by Tay (2010) found that an increase in certainty in terms of an increased number

of automated speed enforcement operating hours and an increased number of speeding

fines led to a large reduction in the number of crashes. The same result was found

when Queensland automated speed enforcement operating hours per month increased,

leading to a remarkable reduction in an overall number of crashes (Cameron &

Delaney, 2008). A study conducted by Pyne (2012) supported this finding that

increasing the certainty of punishment, by increasing the enforcement presence, can

be more effective than increasing the severity of punishment.

When it comes to severity, a study conducted in Portugal by Tavares, Mendes,

and Costa (2008) about reckless driving behaviour argued that severity of punishment

is the most effective deterrent among the three attributes of deterrence theory; severity,

certainty, and swiftness. Portugal has introduced an “on-the-spot” fine payment policy


in order to enhance the swiftness factor of deterrence theory. The swiftness component

of deterrence theory was investigated in this Portuguese study and it was found that

such a component has a little deterrent effect on drivers’ speed, contrary to the theory

of deterrence. However, perceived severity and perceived certainty of punishment are

always explored together because of the strong relationship between them. As Ritchey

and Nicholson Crotty (2011) argued, severity is never important if the perceived

certainty is very low.

Among the six GCC countries, Qatar’s crash fatality rate started to decrease

after 2007 as a consequence of the implementation of tougher traffic laws, and the

concurrent increase in automated speed enforcement numbers from only 14 to 84 units

(Mamtani et al., 2012). This could be considered as an increase in both certainty and

severity of punishment. Qatar now has the highest monetary fine among GCC

countries for the violation of running red lights and driving in dangerous ways

(Shaaban, 2014). In contrast, in a study conducted in Kuwait, most drivers agreed that

the regulations should be more strict and more rigorously applied (Al-Matawah, 2008).

It has also been found that there is an insignificant negative relationship between

anticipated punishment and risky driving behaviour among young Omani drivers (Al-

Reesi, Armstrong, Edwards, Al Maniri, & Davey, 2015). This could be related to the

non-swift and non-severe fining system in Oman.

Deterrence is strongly related to the effectiveness of non-legal factors

(Paternoster, 2010). The social non-legal factors do differ from one’s perception to

another according to personal capital (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). Personal capital, or

social bond, consists of the investment made through the years by someone in social

commitments, such as education and a future job, and social attachments such as social

relationships with family or friends (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994; Piquero, Paternoster,

Pogarsky, & Loughran, 2011). The fear of losing part of such investments works as a

deterrent. Feeling shame and loss of respect after committing a criminal act could be

added to the non-legal deterrents as they are strongly related to tendencies of behaviour

(Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2011). In addition, a person could be

deterred by a perception of legal sanction indirectly when it comes to his or her

reputation in front of significant others such as peers and parents or family members

(Williams & Hawkins, 1986). In Fleiter’s study (2010), mentioned above, she found

that non-legal sanctions, although they are weak, have a negative relationship with

speeding behaviours, and drivers’ choice of speed is affected by social or non-legal


punishments. In Oman, drivers showed little fear of social punishment, and,

consequently, they still commit risky driving behaviours (Al-Reesi et al., 2015).

However, as Oman is a collectivist society (Koermer, 2013), it is anticipated that the

individual will eventually follow the behaviours of the group to which he or she

belongs, because people are more willing to comply to the rules if they expect others

to do so (Tyran & Feld, 2002). While legal and non-legal sanctions play roles in

deterring drivers from committing risky behaviours, there are other factors that could

work in the opposite direction, such as punishment avoidance and vicarious learning

from others who have escaped the punishment. The next section presents studies about

these factors, which were proposed by Stafford and Warr in a reconceptualization of

classical deterrence theory, in more detail.

Drivers who succeed in avoiding detection while speeding tend to perceive

punishments as not severe enough even though they sometimes get speeding tickets

(Freeman et al., 2017). Freeman et al. (2017) also stated that males are more likely to

experience direct punishment avoidance and indirect punishment avoidance from their

peer group, especially the young groups. In another Australian study, drivers who

experience punishment avoidance tend to be regular speeders as they do not perceive

speeding as a dangerous behaviour, in addition to their perception of the uncertainty

of punishment (Fleiter et al., 2007). These findings are consistent with the study by

Soole (2012) that distributed a survey to 718 Queensland drivers to investigate the

influence of automated speed enforcement on speed limit compliance. It revealed that

drivers who have a low perception of punishment certainty tend to commit more

speeding and risky behaviours on the road. Another study done by Fleiter (2010) about

direct detection avoidance and direct punishment avoidance showed that the former

has a strong positive relation with speeding behaviour, while the latter has an

insignificant relation. This supports the concept of how avoiding punishment leads to

more intention to re-offend in the future (Stafford & Warr, 1993). Fleiter (2010) also

stated, albeit weakly, that drivers who know that others have escaped the detection and

punishment are more willing to offend, as a vicarious learning property is present in

such a situation but with a poor connection with the intention to offend (Stafford &

Warr, 1993). On the other hand, drivers who were more exposed to those who

experienced detection and punishment seemed not to be affected by such indirect

punishment (Fleiter, 2010). The same was proven by Freeman and Watson (2006) with

a group of recidivist drink drivers. Their study showed that the relationship between


vicarious learning and drink driving behaviour is insignificant. However, this study

found that direct punishment avoidance has a strong positive relationship with

intention to re-offend. When a similar study was conducted on drug driving, it found

slightly different results (Watling, Palk, Freeman, & Davey, 2010). Direct and indirect

punishment avoidance were found to be strongly related to drug driving intention,

whereas learning that others have been caught and punished did not work as a strong

deterrent for drug driving behaviour (Watling et al., 2010). These findings have been

partly supported by a Livingstone (2011) study about the relationship between

speeding behaviour and drink driving on one side and the legal and social factors

influencing these two risky behaviours on the other. Direct punishment avoidance

while speeding led to a low-level engagement in drink driving and speeding

behaviours; while, in contrast, an avoidance of drink driving punishment led to a high-

level engagement in both behaviours (Livingstone, 2011). The literature of legal

factors influencing speed was also approached as it is expected that these factors will

be mentioned and discussed during the data collection phases of this thesis.

2.4.3 Role of Legal Sanctions in Deterrence of Speeding

It is crucial to have a legal system in order to enforce road safety mechanisms.

The legitimacy of speed enforcement, posted speed limits, sanctions, speed

enforcement tools, related monetary fines, and drivers’ perception about all of these

are attributes of the legal factors influencing speeding behaviours. A study conducted

by Fleiter (2010) found that drivers are affected differently by legal sanctions. There

is a type of driver who fears apprehension which, in turn, leads them to comply with

the speed limit. Another type of driver, namely excessive speeders, are not deterred by

legal sanctions and they continue their speeding behaviours (Fleiter, 2010).

The legitimacy of speed enforcement and how drivers perceive it is one of the

legal factors that can influence the deterrent effect of such enforcement. In Fleiter

(2010)’s study about Australian drivers and their perceptions on legal sanctions,

frequent speeders did not perceive legal sanctions on speeding behaviour as a deterrent

and they did not seem to fear such sanctions. This could be attributed to the drivers not

perceiving speed enforcement as legitimate. Another study was undertaken by Soole

(2012) about the legitimacy of automated speed enforcement. This study used a focus

group of 39 Australian drivers and found that drivers’ perceptions of speed

enforcement legitimacy could lead to negative or positive effects on their attitudes


toward speeding (Soole, 2012). It suggested that if drivers did not perceive speed

enforcement of any kind as legitimate, they would exceed the speed limit as a negative

reaction towards such illegitimacy. Such a negative reaction is called defiance and it

usually happens when drivers perceive the law imposed on them as unfair or unjust

(Freeman et al., 2006; Sherman, 1993). Speed enforcement legitimacy is sometimes

related to the level of visibility of automated speed enforcement (Soole, 2012).

However, even if drivers perceive speed enforcement as legitimate, they would

commit more traffic violation if the level of police presence is very low, as was

suggested by a study conducted in Kuwait (Al-Hemoud, Simmons, & Al-Asfoor,

2010).

Several studies have found that the effect of the posted speed limit can be

insignificant when it comes to deterring speeding behaviours depending on

enforcement contxt (L. Chen et al., 2013). Driver choice of speed is not always linked

to the speed limit signs on the road, as a study in North Carolina showed (Renski et

al., 1999). In addition, some other studies have proven that speed limit signs do not

have significant effects on reducing vehicle speed and must be combined with other

speed enforcement tools (Kanitpong et al., 2013; Kjemtrup & Herrstedt, 1992;

Polinsky & Shavell, 1999; Stigler, 1974). They are seen as informative signs rather

than deterrents. Additionally, the perceived enforcement threshold, which is the

number of kilometres above the speed limit which the driver feels safe to do before

he/she gets caught for speeding (Cameron, 2008), can have a significant influence on

a driver’s choice of speed (Fleiter, 2010). On the other hand, monetary sanctions have

different deterrent effects on drivers and this is discussed in the next paragraphs.

One component of the classical deterrence theory, as mentioned earlier, is the

severity of punishment. The theory suggests that severe punishments lead to a higher

deterrent effect. In the current research, the severity is measured by the size of sanction

for speeding behaviour, represented in, but not limited to, the monetary fine (Moffatt

& Poynton, 2007), the social punishment (Fleiter, 2010), or demerit points as

mentioned in (Castillo-Manzano & Castro-Nuño, 2012; Mehmood, 2010a; Novoa et

al., 2010). However, there are contrary arguments in regard to the level of deterrent

effect derived from the marginal increase in punishment severity (Moffatt & Poynton,

2007; Pyne, 2012). In addition, there are several studies which have found the opposite

reaction to the punishment severity concept, such as Watson, Siskind, Fleiter, and

Watson (2012), who conducted a study to examine the deterrent effect of increased


penalties. They found mixed results in regard to the deterrent effects: although the

effect was significant during the first year after penalties increased, the second year

did not show any significant changes in drivers’ behaviour. Furthermore, this same

study was repeated a few years later and it found that increased severity of punishment

led to a shorter time for re-offending, but overall it had a very small, not as expected,

specific deterrent effect on drivers (B. Watson, V. Siskind, J. J. Fleiter, A. Watson, &

D. Soole, 2015). On the other hand, a Norwegian study argued that strict speeding

fines lead to significant reductions in speeding (Ryeng, 2012). This finding is

consistent with an American study conducted in Arizona by Roberts and Smaglik

(2012), which used an innovative idea in order to empirically examine how drivers

change their speeding behaviours. The idea was to display the speed of approaching

vehicles in real time so that their drivers could adjust their speed to the limit, and the

result was some reduction in speeding. However, when the displayed speed was

replaced with a display of the related monetary fine for speeding, the speed reduction

was significant. More drivers changed their speeding behaviour when the monetary

fines were highlighted. This supports the concept that the perception of more severe

sanctions prevents people from committing such acts, even when the perception of

certainty is low (Koermer, 2013). Another study supporting such a concept is (Pyne,

2012), which found that increasing penalties and enforcement leads to an increased

deterrent effect on drivers. In addition to the above-mentioned studies, a study that

surveyed 852 drivers in order to measure the perception of the effectiveness of road

safety interventions found that the perception associated with penalties is more

effective than the perception associated with social communication (Auzoult,

Lheureux, Hardy-Massard, Minary, & Charlois, 2015). Therefore, this perception

could be developed by imposing severe, swift, and certain punishment. Moreover,

speeding drivers consider getting caught and being fined as a disadvantage of

speeding, because this costs them financially (Horvath, Lewis, & Watson, 2012) along

with other material loss such as driving license suspension (Homel, 1988). Driving

license suspension based on demerit points could be one of the most effective

deterrents in terms of sanction severity, as argued by Castillo-Manzano and Castro-

Nuño (2012). They used a meta-analysis approach in a sample of 70 estimations from

11 countries about the effectiveness of a point system, to show that it caused a 30%

reduction in the number of traffic violations.


A study conducted in Abu Dhabi, UAE, a very close neighbour of Oman and

one of the GCC countries, recommended introducing tougher traffic laws with

increased fines for road safety enhancement (Mehmood, 2010b). Another study

conducted by Mehmood (2010a) suggested that tougher traffic laws should be

combined with extended traffic monitoring. Moreover, in Kuwait, also a GCC country,

a study which investigated drivers’ attitudes towards road safety found that most

drivers agreed that the regulations should be stricter and more rigorously applied (Al-

Matawah, 2008). In Qatar , also one of the GCC countries, the introduction of new

tough traffic laws in 2007 has led to significant reductions in fatality and injury rates

(Elawad, Diop, Kien, & Shaaban, 2012). This new law included high monetary fines

which led to changes in the speeding behaviours of drivers and their perceptions of

speed. The participants in that study included Omani drivers driving in Kuwait.

However, it is still unknown whether severe fines would increase automated speed

enforcement effectiveness and road safety in Oman, taking into consideration the

cultural and social issues which arise once such severity is implemented. Nonetheless,

an effective road safety strategy needs to consider both speed enforcement and public

concerns (Delaney, Ward, Cameron, & Williams, 2005; Poulter & McKenna, 2007).

This issue will need to be carefully investigated because there is a very high probability

that legislators will have to balance the need for tough traffic rules to deter people,

legal factors, and the social perceptions about monetary sanctions within Omani

society. However, social factors are beyond the scope of this thesis.

To conclude, it is prudent to mention that individuals respond differently to the

same deterrence experiences based on individual differences (Piquero et al., 2011).

Deterrence theory could be applied in Oman while taking into consideration the local

behavioural and cultural aspects. Classical deterrence theory might not be applicable

in the particular Omani context of road safety, but there could be alternative

punishments that fit the context better, such as social punishment, physical loss, or

religious condemnation. The automated speed enforcement program in Oman should

be conceptualized and operationalized in a way that creates the optimal deterrent effect

on people’s perceptions. This will mean using the classical deterrence theory

components and the extended deterrence theory properties to immerse legislation and

rules within the social context in a way that they take into consideration the values of

the society (Tankebe, 2013). However, this current program of research concentrates

on the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, from


ROP officers’ and legislators’ point of view, which come under the classical deterrence

theory, with very little discussion about few of the extended properties of the theory

such as the threat of non-legal sanctions.

2.5 AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT AS A SPEED MANAGEMENT TOOL

Deterrence Theory is applied through various approaches that are labelled as

speed management tools. The following subsections will briefly describe speed

management as an approach before addressing automated speed management in more

detail.

2.5.1 The Speed Management Approach

Speeding must be managed and controlled in order to reduce its impact on road

trauma. "Speed management is about regulating the speed of cars through legislation,

marking, visual or physical effects" (Kjemtrup & Herrstedt, 1992, p. 57). Speed

management can be seen as a strategy implemented to maximise speed limit

compliance by drivers (WHO, 2008), thus increasing road safety. Authorities from

different jurisdictions have implemented a variety of tools to manage vehicle speeds

and traffic flows on the roads, which have led to reduced numbers of crashes (Hirst et

al., 2005; FCM Wegman & Goldenbeld, 2006). There are different tools and

techniques to manage vehicle speeds. Historically, the original focus started from a

traffic engineering perspective, with a key approach of setting speed limits and speed

advisory signs on the roads informing drivers of the legislative speed and appropriate

safe speeds (Chin, 1999; FCM Wegman & Goldenbeld, 2006). In addition, engineers

considered the geometric design of the road, with horizontal and vertical deflections

like narrowing the road and constructing mini-roundabouts to enhance road safety

(Comte, 2001; Hirst et al., 2005; Ng & Sayed, 2004). Moreover, rumble strips are used

to manage vehicle speeds when approaching junctions or roundabouts (Comte, 2001).

Separating the light road users and pedestrians from vehicles and the use of speed

humps are also considered among the tools to manage vehicle speeds (L. Chen et al.,

2013; Comte, 2001; Kjemtrup & Herrstedt, 1992).

Authorities have also used different speed enforcement systems in order to

manage speed and its related issues. Tay (2009) argued that manned enforcement,

described as police officers’ presence on the road and speed monitoring, can apply the

swiftness aspect of deterrence, and increase perceptions about risk of apprehension


and certainty of punishment (deterrence theory will be explained in more detail later

in this chapter). On the other hand, automated speed enforcement can be operated

longer with less cost compared with manned enforcement (Tay, 2009). Thus,

automated speed enforcement, such as speed cameras, is more desirable for

governments because of its lower consumption of resources and longer possible hours

of operation. There are also other modern technological tools for speed management,

such as interactive speed signs, in-car information, and adaptive cruise control.

Therefore, governments tend to have regulations to use one tool or combinations of

tools in order to manage and enforce vehicle speeds (Soole et al., 2013). Oman uses

several of the above-mentioned speed management tools, such as posted speed limits,

speed advisory signs, roads with horizontal and vertical deflections, speed humps,

rumble strips, and automated speed enforcement. Automated speed enforcement is

discussed below, with a focus on automated speed enforcement operations in the

Omani context.

2.5.2 The Use of Automated Enforcement to Manage Speed

Automated speed enforcement, in addition to all other speed management

tools, is there to serve one purpose in general, which is to change the speeding

behaviours of drivers which would lead to other road safety consequences (Soole,

2012). In the last two decades, there has been an increasing amount of literature about

automated speed enforcement programs (Belin et al., 2010; Laurent Carnis, 2007;

Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; Chin, 1999; Delaney, Ward, Cameron, Monash, &

Accident Research, 2005; Delaney, Ward, Cameron, & Williams, 2005; Høye, 2015;

Mountain et al., 2004; Pérez, Marí-Dell’Olmo, Tobias, & Borrell, 2007). In addition,

there have been many studies in the literature into the effectiveness of different

automated speed enforcement programs (Abdulsalam et al., 2015; Ali, Al-Saleh, &

Koushki, 1997; Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; Champness & Folkman, 2003; Chin,

1999; Darei & Humaid, 2009; Høye, 2015; Keall, Povey, & Frith, 2001; Marciano &

Norman, 2015; Mountain, Hirst, & Maher, 2005; Pilkington & Kinra, 2005; Retting,

Farmer, & McCartt, 2008). Some studies (Montella, Punzo, Chiaradonna, Mauriello,

& Montanino, 2015; Soole et al., 2013) have discussed the technology of automated

speed enforcement, while others (Goldenbeld & van Schagen, 2005) have examined

the effectiveness of different automated speed enforcement types, such as mobile and

fixed cameras (de Waard & Rooijers, 1994; Tay, 2009). A few other studies have


reviewed both the program and the results obtained from the programs (De Pauw et

al., 2014; Tay, 2009) and focused on the comparisons between programs deployed in

different places (Belin et al., 2010; Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; Laurent Carnis,

Rakotonirainy, & Fleiter, 2008; Delaney, Ward, Cameron, & Williams, 2005).

Many countries have considered implementing automated speed enforcement

programs for several goals such as to deter speeding drivers and, therefore, reduce

fatalities and crashes (Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013). There have been many studies

in the literature about the different positive effects of automated speed enforcement

programs. For example, Laurent Carnis and Blais (2013) argued that studies measuring

the effectiveness of automated speed enforcement reported varying results in terms of

the rate of reduction in fatal and non-fatal crashes. De Pauw et al. (2014) undertook a

meta-analysis of before and after studies and found a significant decrease in road

crashes after the introduction of automated speed enforcement programs. The

effectiveness of automated speed enforcement programs is often expressed in terms of

the reductions achieved in fatal and injury crash numbers, driver compliance levels,

spill-over effects (the compliance on roads where there is no automated speed

enforcement), and mean speed reduction (Tay, 2009). An American study into the

effectiveness of automated speed enforcement in the state of Maryland found that the

spill-over effect reduced speeds by 16% (Retting et al., 2008). In addition, a meta-

analysis of 35 studies revealed that automated speed enforcement generally reduced

the average speeds, the number of crashes, and the number of fatal crashes (Wilson et

al., 2010).

Overall, numerous studies on the effectiveness of automated speed

enforcement programs have been conducted, and have resulted in a variety of

outcomes (Abdulsalam, 2012; Abdulsalam et al., 2015; Ali et al., 1997; Blakey, 2003;

Cameron & Delaney, 2008; Laurent Carnis, 2007; Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; G.

Chen, Meckle, & Wilson, 2002; Chin, 1999; Darei & Humaid, 2009; Goldenbeld &

van Schagen, 2005; Keall et al., 2001; Mäkinen et al., 2003; Montella, Persaud,

D'Apuzzo, & Imbriani, 2012; Mountain et al., 2005; Pilkington & Kinra, 2005; Soole

et al., 2013; Tay, 2009; Thomas, Srinivasan, Decina, & Staplin, 2008). For instance,

Chin (1999) examined the effectiveness of automated speed enforcement in Singapore

and showed that automated speed enforcement produced halo effects within a distance

of 250 meters from the camera location, a high level of compliance, and a crash rate

reduction in the vicinity of the cameras. Moreover, the study stated that there was a 20


percent reduction in speed along the studied road, 80 percent of the drivers were

compliant with the posted speed limit, drivers tended to exceed the speed limits in

sections where automated speed enforcement was absent, and there was about a 75

percent reduction in total crashes (Chin, 1999). Time and distance halo effect is one of

the interesting effects created by automated speed enforcement, especially the fixed

overt speed cameras. It happens when drivers reduce their speeds before and after the

automated speed enforcement location. It is an immediate effect that regulates the

mean speed of vehicles on the road (Marciano & Norman, 2015; Soole, 2012; Soole

et al., 2013). Furthermore, in British Colombia in Canada, a study identified that speed

variance decreased immediately after the introduction of an automated speed

enforcement program (G. Chen et al., 2002). In addition, a critical review of automated

speed enforcement literature based on 90 studies from 16 countries (GCC countries

were not among them) revealed that all automated speed enforcement programs have

led to a reduction in crashes and 13 programs resulted in a 20 percent to 25 percent

reduction in injury crashes (Thomas et al., 2008). In Queensland, automated speed

enforcement operations were initially introduced in 1997 and there was an immediate

significant reduction in crashes caused by speed in 1998 (Champness & Folkman,

2003). A systematic review was conducted by Wilson et al. (2010) on the effect of

automated speed enforcement on speed-related crashes. The results of this systematic

review showed that automated speed enforcement produced an 11 percent to 44

percent reduction in fatal and serious injury crashes. Again, the systematic review did

not include any study conducted in GCC countries. It is important to state that almost

none of the studies conducted on automated speed enforcement effectiveness discussed

any such program in GCC countries, which is a gap in the literature.

Belin et al. (2010) compared the automated speed enforcement programs of the

State of Victoria in Australia, and Sweden. This study suggested that the programs in

each country used the same technology but had different purposes. The Victorian

program, for example, focused on the driver and legal behaviour, and assumed that

every driver has to calculate the benefit and loss associated with committing an

offence. This means that increasing drivers’ perceptions of getting caught once

exceeding the speed limit is the specific deterrent effect. In contrast, the Swedish

automated speed enforcement program assumed that drivers only speed when they

have a lack of information about how dangerous their speed is. This program assumes

that road safety is very important, and drivers must be clearly informed about the safe


speed limits with obvious signs. This was meant to create compliance to speed limits

among drivers by creating a general deterrent effect. This is why Sweden deployed

overt fixed automated speed enforcement whereas Victoria implemented covert

mobile ones (Belin et al., 2010). It seems, from the literature reviewed, that regardless

of the automated speed enforcement types and the place where they are implemented,

they have always been effective in promoting road safety in terms of speeding

behaviours. When Liu et al. (2011) conducted a study about how drivers respond to

automated speed enforcement in Nanjing in China, they found that vehicle speeds

significantly decreased, which is consistent with almost all studies conducted about

automated speed enforcement effectiveness.

Generally, both hidden and visible automated speed enforcement are effective

in decreasing speeding behaviour (Soole, 2012). However, drivers showed more

readiness to comply with highly visible speed enforcement, while they see the hidden

enforcement as sneaky and unfair. On the other hand, hidden speed enforcement has a

long-term impact on speeding behaviour as it features high levels of unpredictability

(Soole, 2012). Nevertheless, Soole (2012) suggests that an approach involving less

visible monitoring with random site selection has more influence in encouraging

compliance in the long-term. Overt automated speed enforcement creates an effect

called the “kangaroo effect”, increasing speed between locations of automated speed

enforcement (Marciano & Norman, 2015). In other words, drivers tend to exceed the

speed limit in road segments where automated speed enforcement is absent and adjust

their speed in the vicinity of automated speed enforcement. However, one of the

effective automated speed enforcement techniques to tackle such an effect is point-to-

point speed enforcement, which measures the average speeds of vehicles between two

or more points over a long distance (Cameron, 2008). This type of enforcement is also

known as average speed enforcement (ASE) (Montella et al., 2015). A review of

empirical studies in England showed that ASE led to reductions in the offence rates by

11 times and also led to no non-injury collisions, as compared to 13 collisions for a

similar time period prior to the ASE implementation (Soole et al., 2013).

A Qatari study about road injuries for the period from the year 2000 until the

year 2010 showed a sharp decrease in fatality rates after implementing automated

speed enforcement in 2007 (Mamtani et al., 2012). Automated speed enforcement

proved its effectiveness in the fatal injuries rate per 100 000 people in Qatar for four

consecutive years as follows: 2007:16, 2008:16, 2009:14, and 2010:13.4, after it was


26 in the year 2006 (Mamtani et al., 2012). A speed and red-light camera program in

Saudi Arabia called SAHER was perceived by drivers as an effective tool to reduce

fatal crashes and increase traffic rule compliance within the monitored intersections

(Jan, 2014). However, the study did not discuss actual automated speed enforcement

effectiveness in reducing speed-related crashes in Saudi Arabia. This study suggested

that Saudi cultural behaviours are of high significance and need to receive more

attention if the government wants to change risky behaviours.

2.6 THE OMANI CONTEXT

The following subsections provide an overview of the legislative basis of speed

enforcement in Oman, a history of automated speed enforcement in Oman, and a

description of the operational features of the program with some comments on

similarities and differences with other programs and alignment with deterrence

principles and good practice approaches.

2.6.1 Legislation and Penalties Applying to Speeding in Oman

There is limited information publicly available about the penalty system in Oman

except for what is contained in the Omani Traffic Law and its Executive Regulation.

These documents include the classification of traffic violations and their associated

monetary penalties, as well as the provisions for vehicle impoundment and driver

imprisonment for specific traffic violations.

The current traffic law in Oman has been in effect since 1993, following Royal

Decree Number 28/93 ("Oman Traffic Law," 1993). This law replaced the former

traffic law, which was first implemented in 1973 and had had several amendments

prior to 1993 ("Oman Traffic Law," 1993). Furthermore, the 1993 Traffic Law was

modified slightly in 1998 ("Executive Regulations of Traffic Law of Oman," 1998)

and then in August 2016 when it was significantly modified by adding four more new

articles and changing fifteen articles by Royal Decree (No: 38/2016). Consequently,

the Executive Regulations were further changed and implemented on the 1st of March

2018 ("Executive Regulations of Traffic Law of Oman," 2018). However, it should be

noted that the data collection phase was completed before the issuance of the revised

Executive Regulations.


Given that this research is focused on the operation and impact of the automated

speed enforcement, it is important to consider the different types of speeding violations

issued by the program and the associated penalties and sanctions applied to drivers.

There are six types of violations that can be detected by the automated speed

enforcement program in the Omani legislation, which result in different penalties (e.g.

fines and imprisonment) and sanctions (e.g. vehicle impoundment). The first violation,

which has the most serious penalty, is when the driver crosses a red-light, which has a

monetary penalty of 50 Omani Rials (OMR) (approximately $160). In addition, the

driver can be imprisoned for a maximum of 48 hours and the vehicle can be impounded

for 14 days. The second violation is when the vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by

more than 80 km/h, which carries the same penalties. The third violation is when the

vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by at least 50 km/h but not more than 80 km/h.

The owner of the vehicle is then only required to pay a monetary fine of OMR 35

(approximately AUD$ 110). The fourth violation is when the vehicle speed exceeds

the speed limit by at least 35 km/h but not more than 50 km/h over the speed limit, and

this has a monetary penalty of OMR 15 (approximately AUD$ 50). The fifth violation

is when the vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by at least 15 km/h, but not more

than 35 km/h over the speed limit, which carries a monetary penalty of OMR 10

(approximately AUD$ 33). The last violation that can be detected by automated speed

enforcement units is when the driver illegally changes lanes within an intersection,

which has a monetary penalty of OMR 35 ("Oman Traffic Law," 1993). Only four out

of the six violations mentioned above specifically relate to speeding, so only these four

are within the scope of this research. To better understand the Omani context, Table 1

compares the speeding-specific violations and associated penalties and sanctions

applying in the country with those from Queensland, Australia (which has had a speed

camera program in place since 1997). Compared with Queensland, the monetary value

of the fines applied in Oman is noticeably lower. For example, in Queensland, drivers

detected driving less than 13 km/h over the speed limit are required to pay AUD$ 174

within 28 days, while the comparable fine in Oman is the equivalent of AUD$ 33.

Similarly, a driver detected driving more than 40 km/h over the speed limit in

Queensland is required to pay AUD$ 1,218 (which is equivalent to OMR 360), while

a driver detected travelling faster than this in Oman may only be required to pay the

equivalent of AUD$ 50. It is prudent to mention that there is little difference in GDP


per capita PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) between Oman (41331 USD) and Australia

(44643 USD) as for The World Bank website ("GDP per capita, PPP," 2017).

Table 1: Comparison of monetary penalties for different speeding violations in Oman and Queensland, Australia Oman Queensland

1

Violation At least 15 km/h, but not more than 35 km/h over the speed limit

< 13 km/h over the speed limit

Amount AUD$ 33 AUD$ 174 Demerit Pts. 1

2

Violation At least 35 km/h but not more than 50 km/h over the speed limit

At least 13 km/h but not more than 20 km/h over the speed limit


3

Violation At least 50 km/h but not more than 80 km/h

More than 20 km/h but not more than 30 km/h over the speed limit


4

Violation More than 80 km/h over the speed limit

More than 30 km/h but not more than 40 km/h over the speed limit


5 Violation > 40 km/h over the speed limit Amount AUD$ 1,218 Demerit Pts. 8 and 6 months suspension

Sources: Oman Traffic Law, 1993 and Queensland Government

Figure 4 provides an overview of the traffic offence detection and payment

processes within Oman, which is based on the researcher’s knowledge as an officer in

ROP. As can be seen, the processes start when an ASE device detects a vehicle that is

speeding, red-light running, or illegally changing lanes within an intersection.

However, these processes are applicable for only four types of ASE devices, namely:

mobile, fixed, red-light, and vehicle-mounted cameras. The detection of speeding

vehicles using laser-guns happens on the spot, which enables the police to issue the

infringements to the drivers of detected vehicles at the roadside. The camera-detected

violations take up to 30 days until it is recorded in the ROP system under the vehicle

owner’s name. The 30-day period commences from the date of detection, during which

the operator has to download the files relating to the violation from the ASE device


manually using a USB memory stick which is physically attached to the device. The

time required for the files to download ranges from a few minutes to a couple of hours

depending on the number of files. This step is performed every few days for each fixed

and red-light device, and almost every day for the mobile and vehicle-mounted

devices. The files downloaded include data about each violation such as the

photo/photos of the vehicle detected, the time, the date, and the exact location of the

ASE device. These files are electronically sent from the geographical traffic

directorates (excluding Muscat) to the DGT in order to be processed using unified

software for all files obtained from different ASE devices. The processing of files

includes entering the number plate manually by operators. Then, at the end of every

day, all processed files are electronically sent to the ROP mainframe so that every

offence is assigned to the registered owner of the vehicle using the registration number

of their vehicle, or their driving licence number in the case of laser-gun detection when

the infringement is recorded on the spot. The recording of the offence against the

owner’s name needs to occur with the 30-day period following vehicle detection. The

owner can be an individual, a company, a governmental entity, or a diplomatic entity.

Vehicle owners can check whether they have any violations online through the DGT

website or using a ROP app available for smart phones. In addition, owners can

subscribe to receive notification of violations via a mobile phone SMS, the details of

which are held in the ROP system under the owner’s records. This service is not free,

however, and involves a small payment of 1 OMR (approximately AUD$ 3.5) for a 6-

month period. Once the violation is recorded under the owner’s name in the ROP

system, the owner is asked to pay it the next time they need a service from one of the

ROP traffic directorates, such as vehicle registration renewal which happens every 12

months, or driving license renewal which happens every ten years. Unlike the

requirements in many other countries, there is no regulation within the Oman traffic

law requiring the offender to pay the monetary penalty within a specific period of time.


2.6.2 Description of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program

According to police reports, speeding is one of the major causes of fatal crashes

in Oman. The candidate has examined the data obtained from ROP statistics booklets

and it was found that speeding contributes to more than 50 per cent of the total crashes

and to almost 54 per cent of the total fatalities. The causes of crashes in Oman are

presented in Appendix A for the period 2009-2015 (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,

2013, 2014, 2015).

As this program of research is focused on the Automated Speed Enforcement

program in Oman, it is wise to present a brief history about the program to have sense

of how it has been evolved until currently. Similar to other GCC countries, over the

past decade, Oman has started to implement an automated speed enforcement program

to counter the speeding problem. It has been using manual enforcement (film-based)

since the late 1990s. To better manage speed enforcement, this manual enforcement

was replaced with automated and more advanced enforcement units (cameras that use

Send

Detected

Mobile Fixed

Red-Light Vehicle-Mounted

In different Geographical

Directorates of Traffic

Send Download DGT Process

Mainframe

Assigned to registered vehicle’s

Driving license**

Vehicle rego.

Pay within 10 years*

Pay within 12 months

Owner knows by: 1) Online by ROP App or DGT website 2) Subscribe to SMS service 3) Physically visit traffic directorate

*When the offender does not have a vehicle registered under his/her name ** When recording the fine on spot while using Laser-gun

Figure 4: Automated Speed Enforcement traffic offence detection and payment process in Oman


digital technologies) in 2005. The Royal Oman Police (ROP) is the government

authority responsible for managing and improving road safety. It commenced

automated speed enforcement with 125 fixed speed cameras and 40 mobile speed

cameras in 2005. The ROP gradually increased the numbers of fixed and mobile

cameras during the period from 2005 to mid-2013. Further technologies were

introduced in 2013 including red-light cameras, laser-guns, and in-vehicle automated

speed enforcement. At the time this thesis was written, Oman had a total of (1277)

automated speed enforcement units of five different types; 641 fixed, 120 mobile, 322

red-light cameras, 120 laser-guns, and a total of 74 in-vehicle automated speed

enforcement devices. More details about each type of automated speed enforcement

device are given in Appendix B.

There has not been any scientific research about the effectiveness of the Omani

automated speed enforcement program. However, it appears that the program has not,

as yet, had a significant effect on road safety, as it was originally anticipated, and its

effectiveness has remained questionable. This statement has been concluded based on

the basic analysis of ROP statistics about crashes and their causes. This research will

investigate the operational and theoretical aspects of the Omani automated speed

enforcement program to identify gaps in knowledge and reasons behind the apparent

ineffectiveness and examine if there is a need for theoretical or operational

improvement.

2.6.3 Alignment of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program with Theory and Good Practice

Automated speed enforcement programs are generally intended to enhance the

efficiency of enforcement, therefore enhancing road safety. Almost all automated

speed enforcement programs operate under the concept of deterrence theory, so there

must be legislation for speed fines in terms of value (severity) and procedures

(certainty and celerity). There is a body of literature where researchers have

investigated the effectiveness of automated speed enforcement programs. There have

been studies that explored or reported the effectiveness of automated speed

enforcement in terms of crashes, fatalities and injury reduction (Abdulsalam, 2012;

Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013; Jones, Sauerzapf, & Haynes, 2008; Mountain et al.,

2005; Pilkington & Kinra, 2005; Rogers et al., 2016). There have also been several

studies in the literature examining the relationship between automated speed


enforcement and the deterrent effects (Hu & McCartt, 2016; Kanitpong et al., 2013;

Lawpoolsri et al., 2007). Other studies have examined the effects of automated speed

enforcement on driver compliance (Montella et al., 2015; Soole et al., 2013). Simply

put, several researchers have identified the key elements for successful automated

speed enforcement programs. However, taking into consideration the different

countries, cultures and legislation, there is no “magic recipe” for automated speed

enforcement operations that can work for all countries and in all conditions. This study

has gathered and identified, from the literature, several key elements for what could

be called the good or most effective practices of automated speed enforcement

programs, which could be applied in the Omani context of automated speed

enforcement. There are five relevant categories, namely: automated speed enforcement

unit type, site selection, operating hours, deterrent effect, and the program itself. The

criteria mentioned in these five categories are thought to be suitable for use within the

Omani automated speed enforcement program, as this is the first study about this

program and could build a foundation for other research and studies to follow in the

future. Some of the issues discussed here are more complicated than outlined;

however, these will be used as a general guide for good practices which could be used

within the Omani context of automated speed enforcement.

1. In terms of automated speed enforcement unit types:

The Omani automated speed enforcement program uses five different types of

speed detectors, as presented in section 2.6.2 and appendix B, and they are used both

overtly and covertly. When it comes to the level of visibility of speed detectors to be

used, covert speed cameras could be more effective than overt ones in some cases,

especially to obtain long-term specific deterrent effects and for those who use the

“kangaroo” approach (which involves slowing down at enforcement locations but

speeding up immediately after ) between overt speed detectors (Keall et al., 2001;

Marciano & Norman, 2015; Shim, Park, Chung, & Jang, 2015). However, covert and

overt automated speed enforcement should be used together in order to promote the

specific and general deterrence, nonetheless, there is no sufficient evidence to know

what the optimum mix between overt and covert cameras is. In addition, the Point-to-

Point system (average speed system) is possibly more effective in detecting speeders

than overt fixed cameras, as this system covers relatively long distances of roads,

rather than particular points on roads (Cameron, 2008). The average speed system can

be used overtly and covertly but it is mostly used in overt mode. Oman’s automated


speed enforcement program uses five different types of automated speed enforcement

units, but none of these are average speed systems.

2. In terms of site selection:

Sites where automated speed enforcement is deployed should be carefully

selected to address speeding problems which repeatedly occur (Queensland Police,

2016; Victoria Police Traffic Camera Office, 2013) or in locations where accidents re-

occur (Skyving, 2015). Site selection is one of the first steps to be taken before the

deployment of any automated speed enforcement. Careful selection of sites is crucial

in order to gain the highest level of automated speed enforcement effectiveness

(Lynch, White, & Napier, 2011; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

2008). For instance, Sweden did a thorough analysis of road accidents before selecting

sites for speed camera implementation as site selection is a crucial issue (Skyving,

2015). Most jurisdictions interested in automated speed enforcement have site

selection criteria for each type of automated speed enforcement unit, considering the

examples of (Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2009; National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration, 2008; Queensland Police, 2016; Tasmania Police,

2013; Victoria Police Traffic Camera Office, 2013). There must also be clear criteria

for site selections included in operation manuals for automated speed enforcement

(Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2009).

3. In terms of operating hours:

The operating times of different automated speed enforcement units could be

important to increase the effectiveness of the program. Automated speed enforcement

should be operated during the periods of time when the probability of crash occurrence

is high (South Australia Police, 2014). Those hours must be determined based on crash

data analysis within a specific area. In order to know what times are more suitable to

deploy automated speed enforcement, crash data must be obtained and analysed,

taking into consideration the time when speed-related crashes occur.

4. In terms of deterrent effect:

Automated speed enforcement is mostly implemented to deter drivers from

exceeding the speed limits (Delhomme et al., 2014; Montella et al., 2015), thus

reducing the crash risk and crash severity (Pilkington & Kinra, 2005). Deterrence

theory is the conceptual framework behind such programs (Davey & Freeman, 2010;

Soole, Lennon, & Watson, 2008). The properties of this theory were discussed earlier,

however, this thesis considers only the three elements of classical deterrence theory,


which are perceived severity, perceived certainty, and swiftness of punishment. Fines

resulting from speed enforcement should be severe enough and quickly imposed in

order to promote the deterrent effect on drivers, such as in the successful example in

Sweden (Delhaye, 2007; Marciano & Norman, 2015; B. Watson et al., 2015). In

addition, the use of the demerit points system would significantly enhance the deterrent

effect by increasing punishment severity (Bourne & Cooke, 1993; Haque, 1990;

Izquierdo, Ramírez, McWilliams, & Ayuso, 2011; Novoa et al., 2010; Pulido et al.,

2010; Zambon et al., 2007). The use of a demerit point system could be considered as

one of the most effective deterrents in road safety (Castillo-Manzano & Castro-Nuño,

2012). A previous study conducted about road safety in GCC countries has proposed

the introduction of demerit points in all GCC countries (Al-Matawah, 2014).

5. In terms of the program itself:

The program as a whole system should be clear in terms of its operations,

strategies, and goals. There should be written strategies and clear goals for the program

towards which all effort and resources are directed. When the work is aligned with

written strategies and clear goals, it will be more efficient and will be easier to monitor

and evaluate (Edvardsson et al., 2005). The existence of a goal would make all

automated speed enforcement officers work from the same perspective (Stevens,

2015). Setting a clear goal or target works as a motive and directive for a clear path

(Elvik, 2008). Additionally, an operations manual is strongly recommended as it

makes the work easier and more efficient (McLester, Morton, & Satterlee, 2004;

Schmidt, 2013; Stevens, 2015; Toff, 2010). More importantly, automated speed

enforcement program should be assessed and evaluated periodically against its goals

(Skyving, 2015), preferably by an independent external party. As recommended by

Al-Matawah (2014), GCC countries need to adopt a clear system in order to evaluate

road safety performance.

Such an evaluation system could use the Road Traffic Safety Management

System Standard (ISO 39001) which provides clarity around setting the goals for such

program. The ISO 39001 is a global standardised management tool introduced in 2012

to enhance road safety (Crackel & Small, 2010) and works as general guideline. This

general guideline includes several elements to be followed and adapted by the

organisation in order to continually improve the road traffic safety (Crackel & Small,

2010). There are nine elements, within the ISO 39001, a few of which are discussed in

the recommendation section of this thesis. They contain nine main elements, namely,


Scope and Application, Terms and Definitions, Context of the Organisation,

Leadership and Management Commitment, Planning, Support, Operation,

Performance Evaluation and Management Review, and Improvement (Crackel &

Small, 2010). Three of these are used in this research: Planning, which sets the

strategic objectives, (Crackel & Small, 2010), Performance Evaluation, which

identifies what needs to be monitored and measured and when (Johansson, 2012), and

the Improvement element, which requires taking corrective actions in order to improve

the performance of an organisation or a program (Johansson, 2012).

2.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The literature review has shown that a significant amount of research has been

conducted in different countries and jurisdictions about speeding behaviours,

automated speed enforcement programs, the effectiveness of automated speed

enforcement, and the theoretical rationale behind automated speed enforcement.

However, few of the studies on automated speed enforcement and effectiveness have

been conducted in (GCC) countries. Additionally, there is no research on the operation,

theoretical aspects, or even the effectiveness of automated speed enforcement in

Oman, even though they were introduced more than a decade ago. The overall aim of

this research is to investigate the operational and theoretical aspects and identify ways

to enhance the Omani automated speed enforcement program and provide

recommendations for improvements, thereby reducing speed-related crashes in Oman.

To address this aim, six research questions have been developed utilising a qualitative

method.

Research Question One: What are the operational characteristics of the current

Omani automated speed enforcement program as reported by ROP officers?

Information about the automated speed enforcement program in Oman such as

operating hours, site selections, or automated speed enforcement program strategies

are not available in the published documents or even in the written documents of the

Royal Oman Police. The lack of such information is a major constraint for doing this

research. The information could exist, but there are barriers to gaining access to

documents including it. It has been planned that this information will be obtained as

part of the answer to this research question. In order for researcher to assess the Omani

automated speed enforcement program, there must be a full understanding of how this

program is operationalized.


Research Question Two: What are the perceptions of the Royal Oman Police

officers in relation to the rationale for the program and theoretical approaches

to deterrence?

The theoretical framework behind the automated speed enforcement program

needs to be explored. The answer to this question is needed to see if the operational

aspect of automated speed enforcement deployment is consistent with theoretical

approaches to deterrence. Moreover, unless supervisory and operational officers know

why they are deploying automated speed enforcement and the rationale behind such

operations, they would decide on the operational forms based on their limited personal

knowledge about such a big program. Consequently, there would be more operating

hours and efforts which are wasted if not guided by clear theoretical thinking and goals.

Research Question Three: How well do the practices of Omani automated

speed enforcement align with international good practice?

The answer to this research question provides information about the degree of

alignment between the Omani speed enforcement program and good practice programs

worldwide. This could be considered as indicator for how much work is needed in

order to align the Omani program with good practice and in what ways should that

work be done, whether in the operational aspect or in the theoretical aspect or both. In

addition, the Omani program will be analysed against several elements of ISO 39001

in order to answer this research question.

Research Question Four: What are the perceptions of policy-makers about

automated speed enforcement program in terms of its intended deterrent effect?

Policy-makers are those who participated and still are participating in creating,

expanding or amending the traffic law in Oman. They include members of different

government entities, from legal department officers of the Royal Oman Police,

members of the road safety community in the Shura Council, members from the

Ministry of Legal Affairs, and members from the General Secretariat of the Council

of Ministers, who have a role relating to creating or amending traffic rules in general,

or speeding rules in particular. There needs to be an innovative approach in order to

extract information from such members about their perceptions of the deterrent effects

of current automated speed enforcement legislation and the consideration behind

decisions to impose particular monetary sanctions on automated speed enforcement

detected violations, in terms of road users’ perceptions. Therefore, there is a need to

explore the legislators’ approach, to examine whether they reflect the principles of


deterrence theory underpinning automated speed enforcement elsewhere, or by the

common concept in Omani culture that “we do not want to punish poor people”, since

this means people with less money. Once all responses are obtained and analysed, there

could be different ways to measure or evaluate the effectiveness of the Omani

automated speed enforcement program against its goals, which leads us to the fifth

research question.

Research Question Five: What is the best way to evaluate the effectiveness of

the Omani automated speed enforcement program against its goals?

As yet, there has not been any research to explore the effectiveness of the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman. This could be because of the lack of

written resources about the program or it could be due to the lack of stated or defined

goals against which it could be assessed. This part of this research will form a basis

for later studies to measure the effectiveness of such programs, as it will state brief

statistics and detailed qualitative data about the program in terms of its operational and

theoretical dimensions, together with the program’s historical development since it

was first introduced.

Research Question Six: What are the barriers to increasing the effectiveness of

the automated speed enforcement program in Oman?

This question follows on from the previous research questions. Once the gaps

are identified and the aspects of the program requiring enhancement are identified, the

barriers to making the program more effective need to be recognised and addressed.

2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed several topics related to the proposed research. It

started with an introductory statement presenting the current road safety trauma

worldwide, displaying statistics about road fatalities and injuries with a focus on

speeding as the main contributing factors for road crashes. The chapter, then,

considered several definitions of speeding and discussed the relationship between

speeding and crashes, which has been found by many studies to be positive.

Consequently, governments and states have been trying to implement speed

management tools as countermeasures against speeding behaviour, including

automated speed enforcement. The chapter then addressed the speeding through


deterrence and went deeply into automated speed enforcement as speed management

tool. As this research focuses on the automated speed enforcement program in Oman,

this chapter has presented the Omani context of speeding and automated speed

enforcement, as well as the related regulations applied in Oman together with an

outline of the automated speed enforcement traffic offence detection and payment

process. Finally, the chapter ended by listing the six research questions investigated

within this thesis together with the reasoning behind each question before the chapter

is summarized.

From the literature reviewed in this chapter, there appears to be a gap in

knowledge about automated speed enforcement programs in the GCC area in

particular, or the Middle East in general. After searching both the Arabic and English

literature on road safety, it can be clearly seen that automated speed enforcement

programs have not been evaluated in in the Middle East at all. The only relevant

evaluation was of the SAHER program in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, but it was evaluated

for its effectiveness against running red-lights in intersections, not speeding

behaviours. The Omani automated speed enforcement program is no exception, as it

has not been evaluated since its launch more than a decade ago. As a result, this

research is strongly recommended in order to gain a clear understanding of the

operational aspects of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman as an initial

step prior to any evaluation process. Additionally, as the literature showed that

successful speed enforcement programs are traditionally conceptualized under

deterrence theory and its additional properties, there is a need to investigate the

theories and rationale behind the Omani automated speed enforcement program.

Consequently, this will create an evidence base for automated speed enforcement

research, leading to better ways to evaluate programs as well as providing suggestions

for improvements on the operational and theoretical aspects of programs.

The literature reviewed in this chapter is not the only literature relevant to this

thesis, as it is prudent to mention that literature revision is evolving throughout the

thesis. For instance, there are a lot of other studies and research from the literature

which are reviewed and referred to in several sections of the first and second study.

50 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Method

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Method


The operation and effectiveness of the Omani automated speed enforcement

program are unclear due to a lack of data; furthermore, a lack of information about the

rationale and characteristics of its operation makes it difficult to determine the

likelihood that it is being conducted in a way that would contribute to its effectiveness.

This program of research consists of two interrelated studies that investigate the

operational and theoretical aspects of the automated speed enforcement program

currently employed in Oman. To better understand the impact of automated speed

enforcement in Oman, the first study of this research program is a gap analysis of the

program operations in Oman. It is proposed that the automated speed enforcement

program should be considered within the context of deterrence theory so that the

program is likely to be effective in deterring drivers from exceeding the posted speed

limits, therefore reducing crash, fatality, and injury rates. The second study of this

research is based upon the results of the first study. It uses classical deterrence theory

as a framework to analyse the stated rationale of the program as understood by policy-

makers.

In addition to deterrence theory, the first study of this research uses two gap

analysis tools which will be discussed in more detail later: Benchmarking and the

Congruence Model. The study addresses the first three research questions previously

mentioned in section 2.7 (Research Questions). It seeks to identify whether there is a

guideline for automated speed enforcement operations in Oman or not. Moreover, it

seeks the goals behind implementing automated speed enforcement. In addition, it

looks at areas where improvements can be applied. The Benchmarking part of the

method is used to compare international good practices of automated speed

enforcement programs with the Oman automated speed enforcement program, while

the Congruence Model is used to identify the internal gaps and inconsistencies within

the Omani automated speed enforcement operational practices.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Method 51

The second study of this research program answers the last three research

questions stated in section 2.7 (Research Questions). As mentioned above, this study

is built upon the findings of the first study. It is theoretically framed on the three core

elements of classical deterrence theory: the perceived severity, certainty, and celerity

of punishment (also known as swiftness). A fourth element, perceived risk of

detection, is not investigated in this research. The three elements are investigated and

explored to determine the extent to which policy-makers’ perceptions that these

elements are expressed in the operation of the Omani automated speed enforcement

camera program. In addition, the study examines the alignment between policy-

makers’ perceptions about deterrence theory elements and the expression of such

elements in the regulations related to traffic and automated speed enforcement.

Both studies could be of significant outcome for the ROP in particular and for

the other automated speed enforcement programs in GCC countries. This research will

fill the gap in the literature on automated speed enforcement programs in GCC

countries in general and in the Omani road safety context in particular.

The research used a mixed method approach for data collection for both studies

namely: semi-structured interviews, document review, and personal communication

with a ROP officer. Therefore, besides the data obtained from published and

unpublished documents and reports from the ROP, the semi-structured interviews were

conducted in order to obtain data to answer the six research questions. In addition, the

research included data obtained from personal communication with one of the ROP

officers to obtained statistical data about the automated speed enforcement program in

Oman such as number and types of automated speed enforcement used as well as the

definition of each type. The reason for including a document review component within

the research was that there is a very little publicly available information in Oman

relating to the operation of the automatic speed enforcement program. However, as an

ROP officer, the researcher was able to have legal access to various unpublished ROP

documents. It is important to mention that some other information such as type of

committed offences, operational cost and revenue of the Automated Speed

Enforcement program could not be legally accessed. To obtain further insights into the

current situation, the researcher was able to personally communicate with the head

officer of ASE program, which enabled him to obtain additional information relating

to the number, definition, and types of ASE devices used in Oman. In addition, the


researcher relied on his work experience and knowledge for data collection and data

validation. The rationale behind choosing semi-structured interviews in this research

is discussed in a later section of this chapter. However, it is prudent to mention here

that the findings obtained from the interviews, being qualitative in nature, cannot be

considered as definite facts, but rather they are the perceptions of the participants. This

is one of the limitations of this research which will be discussed in more detail in

chapter six.

The chapter consists of two main sections explaining the two studies separately.

Each section includes study rationale, method of data collection, theoretical and

analytical approaches used, and participants and materials within each study

conducted.

3.2 FIRST STUDY

This section presents the theoretical framework used in the first study of this

program of research. It discusses the rationale behind conducting this study together

with the method of data collection used. Within the theoretical approach utilised, this

section explains the three stages undertaken within this study. Furthermore, the

participants and materials are discussed followed by the procedures and the analytical

approach used to analyse the data.

This study utilises a qualitative approach to explore three of the research

questions identified in the second chapter of this thesis: 1) what are the actual

operational characteristics of the current Omani automated speed enforcement

program as reported by ROP officers? 2) How do Royal Oman Police officers perceive

the rationale for the program in relation to theoretical approaches to deterrence? And

3) how well do the practices of Omani automated speed enforcement align with

international good practices? It examines the current operational and legal aspect of

the Omani automated speed enforcement program from ROP officers’ viewpoint. It is

conducted to carefully and completely investigate the operational aspect of the

program together with the current legislation related to the violations detected by

automated speed enforcement. Consequently, this research will identify particular gaps

in the program within its operational and legal aspects from the Royal Oman Police

officers’ view point in order to suggest further improvements which are discussed in

the discussion chapter.


3.2.1 Study Rationale

As the previous chapter outlined, numerous studies have explored the

effectiveness of automated speed enforcement programs in different parts of the world

but not in (GCC) countries or particularly in Oman. There is a lack of studies within

the literature about road safety in (GCC) countries and there is a very little number of

studies conducted about automated speed enforcement in the area. None of those

studies were conducted in Oman as focused in its automated speed enforcement

program, although the program was first introduced more than a decade ago.

The Omani context of road safety is somewhat unclear in regards to the

automated speed enforcement program and its contribution to reducing crash rates as

there are no written documents or studies conducted about such. The study was

conducted based on the assumption that automated speed enforcement program in

Oman is not performing as it is supposed to be, is not effective as it should be, and has

gaps that needed to be explored and investigated. Such assumption has been made for

three reasons. Firstly, there have been more than a thousand automated speed

enforcement units operating on the Omani roads, nevertheless, crash and fatality rates

have remained at high levels (Ahlam, 2016; Al-Maniri et al., 2013) and speeding sill

contributes to more than 50 % of fatal crashes (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,

2014, 2015). Secondly, there has not been any assessment of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman upon which this study could be based and built. And

finally, the operational aspect of the Omani automated speed enforcement program has

never been explored. Due to these three reasons, a need to more closely investigate the

Omani automated speed enforcement program has arisen.

Even from this broad-based information, it is easily identified that there is a

need to further investigate speed enforcement and, within this research, specifically,

the automated speed enforcement program in Oman as it has never been investigated

since its launch in late 2004. Although there are various other factors that may

influence road safety in Oman, including public education, changes to enforcement

tolerance threshold levels, engineering road constructions, changes in coding of

offences, and changes in driving exposure; however, the scope of this study is limited

to the automated speed enforcement program. In particular, this study examined the

operational procedures and practices of the current automated speed enforcement

program in Oman. Again, it is important to note that this overall research was not


intended to be an outcome evaluation of the current program. Rather it a descriptive

study that looks at the operational practices, the policies, the reasoning and the

rationale behind the actual implementation of the current automated speed

enforcement program. In other words, this study is intended to be descriptive in nature,

not evaluative. Basically, this study seeks to answer the general questions about

“WHAT is actually happening in the automated speed enforcement program in

Oman?” The research used gap analysis approaches as will be discussed in more

details later in this chapter. A detailed method used in conducting this study is

discussed next.

3.2.2 Method

As previously mentioned, this study adapted a qualitative approach using semi-

structure interviews in order to collect data. This section explains the theoretical

framework chosen to conduct this study. This framework used two gap analysis tools,

namely; Congruence Model and Benchmarking. In addition, it discusses the method

of collecting data for this study using semi-structured interviews. It gives more details

about why this method of semi-structured interview was chosen. In addition, it gives

further details about how interviews had been conducted, where, the number of

participants, and the nature of their positions within the Royal Oman Police (ROP).

The broader objective of the interviews was to explore, examine, and understand the

operations and strategies behind automated speed enforcement program in Oman and

to find out how different types of automated speed enforcement units have been/are

operated in Omani roads as reported by the ROP officers. Strategies behind the

automated speed enforcement program to be explored in this study could be found

within the program goals, guidelines or operations, its deterrent effects on drivers, or

how it, the whole program, is meant to contribute to the road safety context in Oman.

This method was undertaken in order to clearly answer the first three research

questions as discussed earlier.

Theoretical Approach (Gap Analysis)

In order to explore the context within which the Omani automated speed

enforcement program is conducted, this study used a gap analysis methodology. The

gap, within an organisation, is meant to be the space between the organisation’s current

status and the desired status (Bahaadini & Yogesan, 2008). Therefore, the gap analysis

is conducted to find the gap between an organization’s actual performances against its


potential performance (Bahaadini & Yogesan, 2008). In other words, gap analysis can

be conducted to find out the differences between actual program outcomes and the

expected outcomes. Furthermore, one aim of a gap analysis is to identify the

weaknesses and threats of the program being analysed and then compare it with the

desired potential outcomes (Scott et al., 1993). More comprehensively, the gap

analysis typically lists out the organization’s current state, its desired state, and a

comprehensive plan to fill out the gap between these two states (Jennings, 2000).

As previously mentioned, this study proposes to undertake a gap analysis of the

automated speed enforcement program operations in Oman. It is suggested that the

automated speed enforcement program should be considered within the context of

deterrence theory so that the automated speed enforcement program becomes effective

in deterring drivers from exceeding the posted speed limits, therefore reducing crash,

fatality, and injury rates. However, there is, initially, a need to investigate the

operational aspect of the program and explore the gaps within it using gap analysis

tools which most of them are briefly mentioned in the next paragraphs.

There are different tools by which a gap analysis can be conducted depending

on the purpose of the analysis. The spreadsheet is one of the simple tools that is ideally

suited for analysing gaps in financial results within an organization (Zhu, 2014). It

comprehensively investigates the financial states of an organisation and finds the

differences between income and outcome. Another, but less simple tool for gap

analysis is the fishbone model that uses the 6Ms: man, material, mother-nature,

measurement, machine and method, in order to look for gaps in production results

(Sharma & Naik, 2011). Another, which is more complex, tool for gap analysis is the

McKinsey 7S model that could be used to conduct research into gaps related to

managerial effectiveness (Zairi & Jarrar, 2001). The McKinsey 7S model looks at the

characteristics of the company in terms of seven aspects; strategy, structure, systems,

shared values, skills, style and staff (Zairi & Jarrar, 2001). Furthermore, one of the

most common gap analysis tools is SWOT analysis. SWOT analysis seeks about the

organisation’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as a wider view for the

organisation (Helms & Nixon, 2010). Helms and Nixon (2010) argued that SWOT

analysis is more suitable to investigate the strategic gaps within an organisation.

In addition, within the gap analysis literature, Nadler’s and Tusman’s (1980)

Congruence Model of organisational behaviour appears to have strong applicability to


the current program and, in particular, offers a framework to examine the (ROP)

automated speed enforcement operations. The concept of this model is to divide the

organization, in this case the automated speed enforcement program, into three main

parts: input, transformation, and output. These three parts are meant to interact with

each other in order to maximise the performance of an organisation (Nadler &

Tushman, 1980). The Congruence Model could be used to internally analyse the gaps

between the three organisational parts: firstly, the program input, which includes all

given resources; secondly, there is the transformation, which is the process of using

these given resources in order to generate the third component of congruence model

which is the output and it is simply the performance and effectiveness resulted out of

the program.

Congruence Model

The Congruence model was founded by two associate professors at Graduate

School of Business in Colombia University namely David A. Nadler and Michael

Tushman. The two professors proposed that the congruence model as an organisational

model that gives a framework to consider the organisation as one whole entity rather

than many separated departments (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). This model suggests

that to understand organisation performance, its system must be understood first

(Nadler & Tushman, 2003). In other word, the basic components of the system should

be comprehensively understood. Thus, the model divides the system into three main

well-connected components that must work congruously (Nadler & Tushman, 1980).

The first component is the Input and it is the available resources or the “givens” as

Nadler and Tushman stated. The second component is the output and it is simply what

an organisation produces or achieves such as goals and levels of performance. The

third component is about how an organisation transfers the input into the output and it

is called the transformation process (Nadler & Tushman, 1980).

Input

Nadler and Tushman (1980) argued that there are four types of input for the

congruence model and they are all interrelated with each other. The first type is the

environmental input and it is the givens from outside the organization but have an

impact on the organization performance. The second type is the resources that

organizations use to carry out tasks such as human resources, capital, technology or

even information. The third type of input is the history of the organization performance


and effectiveness. The fourth type is the strategy or plan that the organizations use in

order to fulfil the goals (Nadler & Tushman, 1980).

Transformation Process

The second component of Nadler’s and Tushman’s model is the process by

which an organisation transfers its input into output (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). In this

study, the program transformation processes are defined as the operational aspects of

each type of automated speed enforcement, the time required to process speeding fines,

and the punishment process in regards to deterrence theory. These are discussed in the

discussion chapter.

Output

The third component of Nadler’s and Tushman’s congruence model is the

output. Output could be defined as the organisation’s performance and effectiveness

in achieving its goals (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). The researcher has identified the

output in this study as the statistics, goals achieved, and the deterrent effects as

indicators of automated speed enforcement program’s performance and effectiveness.

Benchmarking

While the Congruence Model offers a strategy to internally investigate the

automated speed enforcement program processes, planning and operations, an actual

benchmark comparison with other identified automated speed enforcement programs

(e.g. Queensland, Victoria, British Colombia, France, Netherland, etc.) offers an

opportunity to identify differences in program operations, goals, strategies and

rationales along with identifying opportunities for improvement and change in the

Omani program. Benchmarking is a gap analysis tool used to better understand current

performance in an organisation or program (Balm, 1996). In using this model, a

benchmark of characteristics have been identified in order to be used as a baseline for

the program compared in this study.

Benchmarking involves identifying a good practice of process or product and

comparing it with the process or product which is subject to analysis (Bhutta & Huq,

1999). One of the best definition of benchmarking is the one mentioned by Shen et al.

(2015, p. 38) obtained from the American Productivity and Quality Centre: “ The

process of continuously measuring and comparing one’s business processes against


comparable processes in leading organizations to obtain information that will help the

organization identify and implement improvements.” Furthermore, there are different

types of benchmarking: performance benchmarking, process benchmarking, strategic

benchmarking, internal benchmarking, competitive benchmarking, functional

(industrial) benchmarking, and generic (transnational) benchmarking (Bhutta & Huq,

1999; McGonagle Jr & Fleming, 1993). Bhutta and Huq (1999) defined the different

types according to their purpose. Some types could be merged and used in this research

to fit the Omani context such as the performance benchmarking, strategic

benchmarking and competitive benchmarking. For instance, performance

benchmarking compares organisational performance with others’ performance,

whereas strategic benchmarking compares the strategies used by different

organizations, and competitive benchmarking compares the results of different

organizations or programs. The benchmarking is recommended in this research

because it is one of the suitable ways that fits in making a comparison between good

practice and current practice. It is a way of identifying how to achieve the maximum

output of an organization or program. Furthermore, benchmarking tool was used in

several road safety studies such as in (Aarts & Houwing, 2015; F. Chen, Wu, Chen,

Wang, & Wang, 2016; Shen et al., 2015; Warmerdam, Newnam, Sheppard, Griffin, &

Stevenson, 2016; Fred Wegman & Oppe, 2010).

In the Omani context, although the country uses different types of automated

speed enforcement, the crash rate is still relatively high and not at expected levels after

implementing automated speed enforcement program (fewer crashes, fewer fatalities,

and more driver compliance rates). In other words, the outcome of automated speed

enforcement program is considered as an indicator for its effectiveness as suggested

by (Fred Wegman et al., 2008) and (F. Chen et al., 2016). This outcome could indicate

that the automated speed enforcement program in Oman has not lessened the number

of crashes, fatalities, and injuries to the expected level. This study proposes, as

presented earlier, within the context of this thesis, to undertake a gap analysis of

automated speed enforcement operations in Oman using the two methodologies

mentioned above: the congruence model and benchmarking. The congruence model

has one form that includes; input, transformation, and output which is used for internal

gap analysis within the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. In regards to

the different types of benchmarking mentioned above, it could be stated that this study


combined three types in order to explore the gaps between what could be called good

or most effective international practices of automated speed enforcement and the

currently implemented practices of Omani automated speed enforcement program. It

uses a combination of performance, strategic, and competitive benchmarking which

were previously explained.

The study has examined the formal academic literature and the grey literature

about automated speed enforcement programs and their deterrent effect, as well as the

literature about speeding and speed management which were presented in the second

chapter of this thesis (Chapter Two: Literature Review). Furthermore, it has briefly

identified what could be called good or most effective practices of automated speed

enforcement programs, and the current automated speed enforcement practices in

Oman. Using this information, this research identified the differences between the

Omani context of automated speed enforcement and international practice or

characteristics of what could be called good or most effective practice. In other words,

this research identified to what extent the Omani automated enforcement practices are

aligned with what could be called good international practices. The gap analysis

identified areas in the current program that could be improved to move towards better

practices in Oman.

This study of research involved three stages in order to answer the first three

research questions more comprehensively, they are shown in Figure 3 and discussed

in more details after that.


Figure 5: Three stages of Benchmarking used in this research

First Stage: Identifying International Good Practice of Automated speed enforcement Programs

The first stage was identified in the previous chapter and it involved a review of

the literature to identify the current international practices and to assess the

appropriateness and feasibility of the practices in the Omani context. Reviewing the

literature has identified general successful characteristics of automated speed

enforcement practices which could be applied within the Omani context (see section

2.6.3). The identified successful key practices have been assessed for their suitability

and appropriateness to the Omani context. From this review, a proposed list for

international good practice of automated speed enforcement operations has been

developed that assisted in the comparison benchmark with the Omani automated speed

enforcement.

Second Stage: Reviewing the Omani automated speed enforcement context

This was done using the data collection method which was semi-structured

interviews with Royal Oman Police officers from three different managerial levels. In

Identifying International

Good Practice for Speed Camera

Programs

Reviewing the practices of the Omani speed

camera program

Benchmarking the Omani

speed camera program against

international good practice


addition, some information has been obtained through personal correspondence with

one ROP officer. Approaching an officer from ROP personally was considered an

important step in order to gather information related to the Omani program which was

not otherwise available in the public domain, such as the number of units of each

camera type and the definitions of them. This stage will be discussed in more details

in the discussion chapter.

Third Stage: Benchmarking the Omani automated speed enforcement program against international good practice.

In the last stage of this study, data gathered via the interviews, (ROP) documents

reviewed and data from the literature reviewed have been analysed and categorized in

order to fit the three components of congruence model; input, transformation, and

output. Furthermore, such information also categorized in order to be plotted into the

benchmarking analysis. The benchmarking analysis was used in conjunction with the

Congruence Model so that the gaps of Omani automated speed enforcement program

are identified and suggestions for improvement are presented.

3.2.3 Participants

Besides its other responsibilities, Royal Oman Police (ROP) is the government

organization responsible for managing and deploying the different automated speed

enforcement on Omani roads. To collect data for this study, interviewing officers from

(ROP), who work in the field of automated speed enforcement, has been chosen as an

appropriate and reasonable way.

The plan was to conduct semi-structured interviews with a number of officers

from three different managerial levels of Royal Oman Police (ROP). The first level is

the top managerial level (strategic management) that involves four high-rank officers;

Inspector General, the two deputy inspectors, and the director of Directorate General

of Traffic (DGT). The second level is a middle managerial level which includes the

thirteen directors (13) of different geographical directorates of traffic which are

working under the supervision of DGT as visualised in figure 4. The third is the lower

managerial level (operational management) which engages officers who operate

automated speed enforcement and work under the supervision of one of the thirteen

different geographical directorates of traffic. The rational for choosing three

managerial level officers for this research is to deeply understand the automated speed

enforcement operations from three different perspectives. In other words, interviewing


officers from three different managerial levels leads to diverse perspectives. In

addition, obtaining information from three different managerial levels would explore

the alignment in thoughts and intentions between the three levels.

There were eighteen (18) interviews conducted with eighteen (18) participants;

one high-rank officer from top managerial level, eight (8) traffic director officers from

middle managerial level, and nine (9) supervisory officers from the lower or

operational managerial level. All participants from both top and middle managerial

levels have been working at (ROP) for at least 16 years and their work experience

ranged from 16 to 34 working years in different areas of Oman within Royal Oman

Police force. On the other hand, lower level management (operational officers) have

work experience on automated speed enforcement operations ranged from 3 and a half

to 11 years.

3.2.4 Materials

As discussed earlier, that from the literature review two tools were identified

which could be used as a framework to help investigate and scrutinize the automated

speed enforcement operations in Oman; congruence model and benchmarking. The

congruence model is based on dividing the automated speed enforcement program in

Oman into three main parts; input, transformation process, and output. Then, it was

used to identify the internal gaps and inconsistencies within the automated speed

enforcement operations in Oman. In other words, the congruence model was used as

Figure 6: The geographical directorates working under the supervision of DGT

DGT

Nizwa

Sumail

Buraimi Haima Thamrait Salalah Musandam

Sur Ibra Ibri

Sohar Rustaq

Muscat


an internal comparison against the goals of Oman automated speed enforcement

program. On the other hand, the benchmarking was simply used to identify issues

where it could be compared internationally.

Interviews are one of the most suitable data collection techniques when seeking

separated individual opinions about an issue or program (Boyce & Neale, 2006).

Interviewing is “A method of data collection that involves researchers asking

respondents basically open-ended questions” (O'Leary, 2004, p. 162). There are three

types of interviews based on the structure of the questions used or posed by the

interviewer, namely; structured interviews, unstructured interviews, and semi-

structured interviews. Firstly, structured or standardized interviews are when the

questions are pre-established and interviewees are expected to give straight and direct

answers (Qu & Dumay, 2011). The structured interview usually uses open-ended

questions imposed to all participants in the same order (O'Leary, 2004). Secondly,

unstructured interviews where not all questions are pre-established in advance, rather

some questions will appear during the interview and could be of a completely new

topic (Qu & Dumay, 2011). It is more close to an informal free conversation between

the interviewee and interviewer, than to an interview (O'Leary, 2004; Qu & Dumay,

2011). Between the structured and unstructured interviews comes the third type of

interviews; semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are when a

combination of pre-established and yet undefined questions are combined together in

an interview (Qu & Dumay, 2011) and it starts with the pre-established questions then

proceed to the undefined ones (O'Leary, 2004). A semi-structured interview was

chosen as an appropriate tool to collect data for this study for several important reasons

which are discussed next. Firstly, the topics to be covered in this study are somewhat

ambiguous such as the concept of deterrence in Omani automated speed enforcement

program. Additionally, most of the information needed are nowhere to be found

written or documented. Secondly, when having few numbers of participants, the semi-

structured interview could be one of the suitable methods to collect data (Cohen &

Crabtree, 2006). Thirdly, Cohen and Crabtree (2006) also argued that in a semi-

structured interview, the participants being interviewed have more space to answer the

questions asked. Fourthly, participants are more likely to give more information and

elaborate on the given information. Moreover, this method undertakes a conversation

during which interviewee feels more comfortable (Boyce & Neale, 2006). Likewise,


the interviewer is more likely to be flexible because one of the most important

specifications of a semi-structured interview is flexibility in asking more or less

questions (Drever, 1995). According to Fylan (2005, p. 66), “Semi-structured

interviews are simply conversations in which you know what you want to find out

about… and so have a set of questions to ask and a good idea of what topics will be

covered… but the conversation is free to vary.” Furthermore, the semi-structure

interview is considered as in-depth-interview as it explores detailed information about

behaviours, thoughts, or an issue (Boyce & Neale, 2006). In addition, it provides full

answers to questions start with what or why while the interviewer is able to ask for

elaboration and more details about the subject in the discussion (Boyce & Neale,

2006). As the researcher has different topics to cover and has a work relationship with

participants, a conversation between him and the participants is the most appropriate

method to gain as much information regarding the Omani automated speed

enforcement program.

A core set of twenty-two (22) questions were asked during the interviews of the

top and middle management officers and all participants were asked almost the same

questions but sometimes in a different order as shown in Appendix C. In like manner,

core ten (10) questions were posed to operational officers as in Appendix D. Questions

were asked in consideration of the second stage of this study in order to identify and

examine the philosophy behind automated speed enforcement operations in Oman and

the existence of any written document about the strategies, objectives, or operation

guidelines of automated speed enforcement. Further descriptions of the current Oman

automated speed enforcement operations were gained throughout the interviews such

as operating hours, sites selection, timing and legislation of speed fines.

3.2.5 Procedures and Ethical Consideration

An ethical clearance for this study has been gained from the Human Research

Ethics Committee in Queensland University of Technology before starting the data

collection by conducting interviews (QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000989). A

formal request for conducting interviews with the Royal Oman Police (ROP) officers

was sent to the training department in the (ROP) and few weeks later, an approval

letter was obtained from the department. After obtaining formal approval from the

(ROP) to conduct interviews with officers, the researcher flew back to Oman to begin

the interviews. The interviews time and date were arranged by phone calls between the


researcher and the participants. As Arabic is the first language spoken and written in

Oman, the interviews were conducted using Arabic in order to explain all the concepts

and terms in a more simple and understandable way, although most interviewees spoke

English. Therefore, the conversations between the researcher and participants were

fully and comprehensively understood and misunderstandings, if any, were minimised

to the lowest level. As the researcher is one of the (ROP) officers, there was a work

relationship between him and almost all participants and that made it easy to arrange

and conduct interviews with more confidence. Additionally, interviewees would have

not been as honest if they were interviews by a person from outside the ROP.

Interviews took place within the buildings of the (ROP) and during the formal working

hours and they took an average time of forty-five (45) minutes per interview. Prior to

starting any interview, an information sheet was given to the interviewee and a signed

consent form was obtained from each participant. In addition, a brief description of the

research and the topics that would be covered during the interview was communicated

to the participant prior to the interview. All participants were given the right to choose

whether their interview will be audio-recorded or not. They were also informed that

they have the full right not to answer any question or to withdraw at any time during

the interview. Moreover, they have been advised that there are no potential risks

involved with this study. Confidentiality and anonymity of the participants were

considered seriously and personal data are not accessible by anyone except the

researcher and the supervisory team. Furthermore, most of the answers were reviewed

with the participant at the end of each interview in order to enhance understanding.

The interviews were identified in the results section as ‘Int##’ and participants’

responses identified in the results as indirect quotes (in italic forms). Names are not to

be included in the thesis.

3.2.6 Analytical approach

The interview transcripts were in Arabic. In addition to writing the exact answers

obtained from each participant, notes were taken during and right after the interview.

Interview responses could be divided into themes or patterns to make it easier to

analyse as explained by Boyce & Neale, 2006. A thematic analytical approach was

used to analyse the data gained through interviews. Transcripts were read and re-read

several times and each time there have been some coding. While doing the coding,

there were main points which the researcher needed to examine. After coding the


transcripts, there seemed to be eight main themes of the interviews. The coding and

final themes were discussed with the supervisory team and agreed upon.

Having finished the coding and thematic analysis with the eight themes on hand,

two main sets of answers were extracted in order to fit the two gap analysis tools used

in this study: congruence model and benchmarking. The first set was used for the input,

transformation process, and output in congruence model while the second set was

simply used for the benchmarking model in order to compare the current Omani

practices of automated speed enforcement operations and legislation with what could

be called the international combination of good practise.

Initially, all processes of data analysis were held in Arabic and once all results

obtained and found, they were translated into English. This approach was adapted to

maximize the understanding and analysis of answers and to minimize the data that

would be lost in translation as there was plenty of time available to do such time-

consuming tasks. This process resulted in there being two versions of transcripts and

results; English and Arabic. In order to obtain a high level of validity, the two versions

were sent to two people who are experts in translation between English and Arabic

whose tongue language is Arabic but have an experience of more than ten years in

translation. The researcher received a few comments and changed the English

translation accordingly.

3.3 SECOND STUDY

As already explained, a qualitative approach was also adopted for the second

study of this research. This study is a continuation of the first study into the Omani

automated speed enforcement program. It is intended to explore the rationale behind

current automated speed enforcement practices and legislation and the extent to which

they fit with international practises in terms of deterrent effect provided from policy-

makers’ point of view. This study has been conducted in order to answer the last three

research questions; 4) what are the perceptions of the policy-makers about automated

speed enforcement program in terms of its supposed deterrent effect? 5) What is the

best way to evaluate the effectiveness of Omani automated speed enforcement

program against its goals? And 6) what are the barriers to increasing the effectiveness

of automated speed enforcement program in Oman? It is important to state here that


the first study sought ROP officers’ perceptions while this study investigated topics

from policy-makers’ perceptions.

3.3.1 Study Rationale

As there is a very small number of studies that have investigated automated

speed enforcement operations in the (GCC) countries or particularly in Oman, there is

also a lack of studies, if any, about theoretical thinking and the rationale behind

automated speed enforcement programs legislation aligned with the operations in the

(GCC) countries. This could be one reason why the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman does not promote deterrent effect on drivers as explained in the first

study of this research. The first study of this research scrutinized the operations and

practices of automated speed enforcement in Oman and it showed a need to further

investigate the reasoning behind Oman traffic rules in general and speed existing

penalty system in particular which is related to the automated speed enforcement

practice. The outcome of this study is to explore the rationale behind automated speed

enforcement legislation and see to what extent they fit with international practises in

terms of deterrent effect provided. In addition, this study investigates the level of

alignment between policy-makers’ thinking towards promoting the deterrent effect and

the reported practice of traffic regulations related to automated speed enforcement.

The current automated speed enforcement practises and legislation have not promoted

the deterrent effect anticipated from such big program with evidence of a very high

number of speeding violations detected every year and the high crash and fatality rates.

In summary, while the first study looked at “WHAT is actually happening in the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman?” this study goes around the “WHY

is that happening?” In other words, it looks at the reasons behind the clear

ineffectiveness of automated speed enforcement program in Oman. Therefore, the

outcome of this study is expected to be a clear understanding of the current operational

and theoretical practices of automated speed enforcement program in Oman together

with the barriers that held it back from being more effective from policy-makers’ point

of view. Barriers could be related to the operational practices such as how ROP

operates automated speed enforcement on the roads or barriers related to how

automated speed enforcement program is conceptualised in terms of legislative

aspects. In addition, there will be a clear understanding of how policy-makers think

about automated speed enforcement, suggestions for best way to evaluate it, how they


would like it to be in the future, and further legislative procedures needed to be done

in order to get there.

Deterrence theory has been chosen to be a general theoretical framework for

this study as the traditional theory behind automated speed enforcement operations and

legislation has been, most of the time, the classical deterrence theory and/or the later

additions to it (Davey & Freeman, 2010; Fleiter, 2010) as discussed earlier in chapter

two of this thesis.

To investigate the automated speed enforcement program in Oman in more

depth in terms of its deterrence practices and other subjects mentioned above, there

will be five main topics to be explored while conducting this study. These topics or

themes are discussed in more details in section 3.3.5 (Analytical approach) later in this

chapter.

3.3.2 Participants

This study needed to investigate the policy-makers’ point of view related to

justifications and rationale behind automated speed enforcement operational and

theoretical practices in Oman. It used the same data collection method used in the first

study which was a semi-structured interview in order to obtain the justifications and

rationale behind current automated speed enforcement practices and legislation in

Oman. It involved participants who are currently working or have worked in creating

or amending traffic rules or particularly speed fine rules. They are individuals

considered as policy-makers in the Omani context. Every rule creation or amendment

goes through clear processes before it is declared to be effective as The Basic Law of

State in Oman, which was introduced in 1996 by Royal Decree (101/96), has clarified

how law creation or amendment is processed ("Basic Law of State of Oman," 1996).

This creation or amendment starts from the government department relevant to the law

and it is called Draft Law. For instance, traffic rule is mostly imposed and executed by

Royal Oman Police, thus the creation or amendment processes start from the legal

affairs department in ROP. Then the draft law goes through several governmental

entities before it is finalized by Royal Decree. For traffic rule, the process starts in

ROP, then it goes to the Ministry of Legal Affairs in order to be scrutinised in terms

of its legitimacy. Once finalized by the Ministry of Legal Affairs, it goes to General

Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (GSCM) and then to Oman Council (OM) that

includes both Council of State and Shaura Council. Council of State to represent the


government point of view and the Shaura council that represents the people. If the rule

is modified farther than what ROP initially did, it will go back to ROP again then to

General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers then to Council of State as it will be

taken to the higher level which is His Majesty for royal declaration. The whole process

is represented in figure 7 the flow of Draft Law of Traffic Law amendments. In this

study, General Secretariat members will not be interviewed as this council represents

the government in a way parallel to the representation of Council of State, so there is

no need to obtain views of people representing the same viewpoint. Therefore,

interviews were conducted with members from four government entities, namely;

ROP, Shaura Council, Ministry of Legal Affairs, and the Council of State. These

individuals had to be members of one of the following groups:

ROP officers who are currently working or previously worked in the ROP

department of legal affairs,

Shaura Council individuals who are members of the road safety committee,

Individuals working in the Ministry of Legal Affairs, or

Members from the Omani Council of State.

Figure 7: The flow of Drafting Process for Traffic Law amendments These nine (9) individuals have been selected for the interviews because they played

and are still playing role in traffic rule creation and amendment. The researcher could

approach seven (7) out of the nine (9) individuals planned to be interviewed. The sign

“(…/…)” in the above figure indicates the number of policy-makers interviewed from

Royal Decree

Discussions & modifications of Draft

Law

Needs modifications

Royal Oman Police (3/4)

Shaura Council (1/2)

His Majesty

General Secretariat of the Council of

Ministers

Oman Council

Council of State (2/2)

Approved

LAW

Ministry of Legal Affairs (1/1)


each group. Individuals were asked about the justifications and rationale behind

legislation of automated speed enforcement and the long term expected results of

automated speed enforcement deterrent effect in Oman. Their perspectives and ideas

about automated speed enforcement practices as a whole system; operational and

theoretical, are very vital for this study.

3.3.3 Materials

As this study focused on distinguished individual opinions, an interview

methodology represented the best tool to collect the data that fits this criterion (Boyce

& Neale, 2006). This study did not use the structured interview as there are a lot to be

discussed about Omani automated speed enforcement program which could not be

limited to pre-set/pre-structured questions. Moreover, unstructured interviews did not

seem to be suitable to investigate the road safety context in Oman in terms of

automated speed enforcement operations and legislation, this is why this study did not

use this type of interviews. It, rather, used the semi-structured interview method

whereby a combination of pre-established and yet undefined questions were combined

together in an interview (Qu & Dumay, 2011) and started with the pre-established

questions then proceeded to the undefined ones (O'Leary, 2004). A semi-structured

interview was chosen as an appropriate tool to collect data for this study for the same

important reasons justified for the first study, most of which were stated earlier in this

chapter in section 3.2.4 (Materials).

Around forty questions were asked during the interviews with participants from

the four different government organisations. These questions have been grouped into

five topics as well as other questions which were asked during the interview depending

on the answers obtained. These questions under each theme of the five topics can be

found in Appendix E. The questions were driven by a general inquiry into WHY the

current legislative and practices of automated speed enforcement program exist and

WHY they are implemented the way they currently are. In addition, the interview

sought ways to pursue evaluation and future recommendations for the program to be

more effective.

3.3.4 Procedure and Ethical Consideration

Ethical clearance for this study was given by the Human Research Ethics

Committee at Queensland University of Technology (QUT Ethics Approval Number


1500000989). A formal letter was sent to the training department in the Royal Oman

Police (ROP). A confirmation letter was obtained from the same department in which

the ROP indicated its willingness to facilitate all interviews with the four government

entities. The ROP provided the researcher with a letter briefly describing the research

aim and asking individual from the different four government entities to cooperate

with the researcher. This is a typical approach in similar situations in Oman. As the

data collection field is the Omani context, the researcher had to fly back to Oman and

spent around five weeks to conduct interviews. Times and dates were arranged to

interview individuals at their convenience.

Conducting the interviews in the Arabic language had a number of advantages

since it enabled the researcher to clarify and explain all concepts and terminologies

used in the questions as the participants were all Arabic speakers. This minimised

misunderstandings while discussing the interview questions and responses. Interviews

took place within the buildings of each participant’s work place after contacting him

and setting up a convenient time to conduct the interview. Each interview took an

average time of ninety minutes. An information sheet about the research was given to

participants before starting the interviews as well as obtaining from them a signed

consent form. Prior to start posing the interview questions, a brief description of the

research and the topics that will be covered was communicated to the participant. As

the ethical application requested that participants must be given the choice to accept

their interview to be audio-recorded or not; however, in both cases the interview was

planned to take place. One of the participants’ rights which was clearly communicated

to participants that they can withdraw at any time during the interview. The interviews

are identified in the results section as ‘Int##’ and participants’ responses are identified

in the results as indirect quotes (in italic forms). To preserve the anonymity of the

participants, names are not included in the results.

3.3.5 Analytical approach

As the method used to conduct this study was a semi-structured interview, a

thematic analysis was used to analyse the data obtained from participants. All

interview transcripts were in Arabic and notes were taken during the interviews while

maintaining the exact same responses provided by participants. Interview transcripts

were analysed immediately after the researcher left the interviewee work place in order

to recall any unwritten information during the interview and to write more notes related


to the responses. Five potential themes were identified in advance of the interviews;

however, themes were not limited to those specific five and others evolved from the

responses. The previously identified themes were to guide the interview questions and

provide some structure and organisation.

The same procedure in analysing data used in the first study was used in this

study. The initial analysis was undertaken in the Arabic language as all interviews

were conducted in Arabic. Then, the analysis was translated into English and validated

with two people who are experts in translation between English and Arabic whose

primary language is Arabic but have an experience of more than ten years in translation

as was done with the first study interviews transcripts.

Chapter 4: Exploring Police Officers’ Understanding of the Operational Context of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman 73

Chapter 4: Exploring Police Officers’ Understanding of the Operational Context of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman

This chapter presents the results and findings relating to the first study of this

program of research. It focuses on the first three research questions and addresses the

first three objectives of this program of research. The chapter includes four main

sections, namely; Results, discussion summary, strengths and limitations of the study,

and chapter summary. Results section discusses the findings in regards to the two gap

analysis tools approached; congruence model and benchmarking. Before summarizing

the chapter in the fourth section, the results are discussed in light of research questions

and objectives then the strengths of this study and the obstacles which have limited the

processes of this study are discussed.

4.1 RESULTS

This section of this chapter reports the results of the first study which

investigated the operational aspects of the Omani automated speed enforcement

program. It applied the concepts of the congruence model and benchmarking on the

data obtained from ROP officers’ interviews together with the data gained from the

literature and from personal communication with a ROP officer. There seemed to be

eight main themes of the interviews. The first theme was identifying the goals or

objectives of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. It was investigated

if there have been clear goals behind automated speed enforcement program. The

second theme was the investigation whether the goals are written and documented or

not. In addition, the theme included if those goals are communicated within the

hierarchy of automated speed enforcement officers. Thirdly, seeking the

demonstration to what extent these goals have been met and if there has been any

assessment done. Fourthly, the availability of strategies or instructions were examined

and checked if they have been understood by the middle and operational officers of

74 Chapter 4: Exploring Police Officers’ Understanding of the Operational Context of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman

the (ROP). The fifth theme was about the operational guidelines for such relatively big

program in terms of resources used. The sixth theme indicated if there has been any

data analysis for automated speed enforcement which could help in making decisions

about automated speed enforcement deployment strategies or plans such as sites

selection and timings. The seventh theme explored the deterrence theory elements;

swiftness, severity, and certainty. The three elements were discussed within the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman and to what extent they exist. The

discussion of deterrence elements in this study was from officers’ perspectives while

these elements are discussed deeply in the second study when investigating the policy-

makers’ perspectives. Finally, different suggestions for the program improvements

were obtained from the participants. As some of the participants have work experience

of more than 30 years, they are considered as an experts and suggested valuable steps

for improving automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

In regards to the congruence model, the data obtained from ROP documents and

interviews were categorized into the three elements of the model; input, transformation

process, and output. In addition, the benchmark list of good practice, identified from

the literature, was compared with the Omani automated speed enforcement operations

gathered from the interview transcripts in order to check to what extent the Omani

practices are aligned with international good practice. The discussion starts with the

congruence model then it goes through the benchmarking tool.

4.1.1 Congruence Model Analysis

The Omani Automated speed enforcement Program is one of the most important

programs implemented by the Royal Oman Police (ROP) to enhance road safety in

Oman. The program commenced in late 2004 and continued to develop in number and

type of automated speed enforcement until 2015. Despite having more than a thousand

automated speed enforcement units on the Omani roads, the fatal and injury crash

numbers still remain very high, suggesting that there is an apparent gap between the

expected outcomes of the program and the actual outcomes Oman currently has. This

study used the congruence model to identify the internal gaps and inconsistencies

within the automated speed enforcement operations in Oman which could be behind

such lack of success. The researcher asked, during the interviews with ROP officers,

several questions based on the data needed for the three components of the congruence

model. In addition, further topics were covered during the interviews. The next


paragraphs discuss each component; input, transformation process, and output, in more

details.

Input

This study considers the automated speed enforcement program in Oman with

its resources, operations, and performance as an organization. For Nadler and

Tushman’s model to be applied for this program, the researcher has classified the

inputs accordingly and they are four inputs as stated earlier in Chapter (3), namely;

environmental, resources, program history, and program strategy.

Environmental Input

Firstly, the environmental input could be defined, in this study, as the tarmac

road distance of (31,365 KM) as for the year 2014, the rate of speed fines per driving

license (4.8) or per vehicle (5.1) (ROP, 2015, 2014). However, it is prudent to say that

some inputs do interrelate with each other. For instance, the number and types of

automated speed enforcement could be considered as environmental input,

nevertheless to avoid confusion, this study considered automated speed enforcement

number of units and types as program resources which are discussed in more detail

next.

Program Resources

Secondly, the resource input, data has been gained from a personal

communication with one of the (ROP) officers. The reason for the strong need for

using such data collection method is because there is no complete document including

all resources of the program, rather this information is written in separate documents

and were not available for the researcher. The program resources include human

resources, number of vehicles, and the number of different automated speed

enforcement units which are being used for the program. The program allocates

eighteen (18) operational supervisors, more than five-hundred (500) operators, and one

hundred and thirty (130) vehicles (Ba Alawi, personal communication, April 2016). In

addition, a number of (1277) units of five different types of automated speed

enforcement are being used in this program; fixed cameras (641), mobile cameras

(120), red-light/speed cameras (322), laser-gun units (120), and mounted-on-vehicle

cameras (74) (Ba Alawi, personal communication, April 2016). More details about


each type of automated speed enforcement have been explained in section 2.6.2

(Description of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program).

Program Historical Data

Thirdly, the program historical data that includes the change in resources for the

years (2005 - 2015) such as number of units and types of automated speed

enforcement, and change in performance in terms of number of speed fines, crashes,

fatalities, and injuries during the period of the years (2009 - 2015). Regarding the

historical data of automated speed enforcement unit numbers which was obtained from

personal correspondences, the ROP commenced automated speed enforcement with

125 fixed speed cameras and 40 mobile cameras in 2005. However, these cameras

covered a relatively small segment of the total road network. The ROP has gradually

been increasing the numbers of fixed and mobile cameras during the period from 2005

to the mid-2013. Further technologies were introduced in 2013 including the red-

light/speed cameras, laser-gun (which contains camera), and mounted-on-vehicle

speed cameras. These new systems have contributed significantly to the automated

speed enforcement program in Oman, but their contribution to the road safety was still

questionable. As at November 2015, 641 fixed and 120 mobile speed cameras were

used on Oman roads. Additionally, 322 red-light/speed cameras together with 120

laser-guns and a total of 74 mounted-on-vehicle speed cameras are being deployed (Ba

Alawi, personal communication, April 2016), consequently, as shown in Figure 8 these

speed enforcement programs have led to an increase in the annual total speed fines

from 2009 to 2014 (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).


Figure 8: Number of Total Speed Fines in Oman during the period (2009 - 2014) (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)

Looking at the offence data, one can see that during the first five years; from

2009 to 2013, there was a slight increasing trend in the number of speed fines.

However, in 2014 the number of speed fines jumped to more than 6 million. This

sudden increase in the number of speed fines could be attributed to the significantly

expanded number of speed detectors. Nonetheless, with an increasing number of

automated speed enforcement units, it could be expected that drivers will be more

cautious about being detected and consequently there will be a drop in the number of

crashes related to speed. However, there are still millions of speeding fines recorded

on Oman roads with approximately the equivalent of six speeding fines per car. From

an overall perspective, the effect of automated speed enforcement on slowing the

driving speed in Oman is, to some extent, debatable. Examination of crash data

obtained from ROP documents showed a very gentle decreasing trend in speed-related

crashes over the years (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011). For example, in 2014, there were

more than 816 fatalities compared with 913 in the year 2013 representing a decrease

of only 9% in respect to an increase of 670% in the number of automated speed

enforcement units (ROP, 2013, 2014). As presented in the previous chapter in section

2.6.2 (Description of Oman’s Automated Speed Enforcement Program), the causes of


crashes in Oman for the period from 2009 to 2015 (ROP, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,

2013, 2014, 2015), speeding contributes to more than 52% of the total crashes and to

almost 54% of the total fatalities.

Program Strategy

Finally, the fourth input is the program strategy which includes the automated

speed enforcement legislation and the intended goals of the program. There are six

types of violations that could be detected by automated speed enforcement units. The

Omani policy-maker has identified them and stated the exact penalty for each one in

the ("Oman Traffic Law," 1993). The first violation, which has the most severe

penalty, is when the driver runs the red-light and it has a monetary penalty of Omani

Rials (OMR) 50 (approximately AUD$ 160), the driver could be imprisoned for a

maximum of 48 hours and the vehicle could be impounded for 14 days. Although this

violation is detected by automated speed enforcement units, it is out of the scope of

this research as the research is focused on the speed-related violations only. The second

violation is when the vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by more than 80 (km/h)

and the penalty is exactly the same as the first violation. The third one is when the

vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by at least 50 (km/h) but not more than 80 (km/h)

over the speed limit. The owner of the vehicle will have to pay an only monetary fine

of (OMR) 35 (approximately AUD$ 110). The fourth one is when the vehicle speed

exceeds the speed limit by at least 35 (km/h) but not more than 50 (km/h) over the

speed limit and it has an only monetary penalty of (OMR) 15 (approximately AUD$

50). The fifth violation is when the vehicle speed exceeds the speed limit by at least

15 (km/h) but not more than 35 (km/h) over the speed limit and it has an only monetary

penalty of (OMR) 10 (approximately AUD$ 33). The last violation that could be

detected by automated speed enforcement units is when the driver illegally changes

lane within intersection lanes and it has only monetary penalty of (OMR) 35 ("Oman

Traffic Law," 1993) and of course the discussion of this type of violation is out of

scope of this research. It is clearly seen, from the fifth type of violation, that Oman

Traffic Law has identified the threshold of 15 Km above the speed limit which is

relatively high. Meaning that driver can do 135 km/h without getting detected as all

highways speed limit is 120 km/h. The first fine starts on 136 km/h in such roads.


In regards to the intended goals and the strategies or plans for automated speed

enforcement program in Oman, the researcher tried to find written documents about

the goals, plans, or strategies of automated speed enforcement program in Oman but

unfortunately, there is none. The attempt to find such documents was by approaching

officers in the ROP headquarters and the general directorate of traffic. To deeply

investigate the program and its goals and strategies, interviews with eighteen (18) ROP

officers from three different managerial levels were conducted. All participants from

the top and middle managerial levels agreed that they know and understand the

objectives of the automated speed enforcement program. They all agreed that there are

somehow clear goals and objectives behind the automated speed enforcement program

in Oman. However, three out of eight participants from middle managerial level

expressed the goal in very general statements and one of them said that it is the goal

of any automated speed enforcement program in the world as quoted:

“This program has general goal which is reducing speeds on Omani roads”

(Int8).

“The general concept of this program is that it exists in order to monitor the

roads and speeds like any other automated speed enforcement program in the world”

(Int9).

“The general idea behind this program was to reduce accidents and to reduce

speeding fines which was the reason for about 70% of the accidents” (Int7).

On the other hand, the other five participants from middle managerial level stated

specific goals such as reducing the number of accidents, monitor vehicles speed,

enforce traffic control, deter offenders, and save lives. While the top-level officer

stated that the goals of automated speed enforcement program are very clear and he

listed them as four main goals; reducing very high speeds, reducing number of

accidents, speed detection, and offenders deterring when he said:

” Automated speed enforcement program in Oman has four main objectives;

to reduce the very high-speed fines, to reduce traffic accidents, to detect speeds on the

roads, and to deter speeding drivers.” (Int1).

Most middle management officers mentioned these goals but none of them stated

the four goals together. Some said the goal is to monitor the roads, some claimed it is

to deter offenders, another participant argued that the goal is to reduce crashes, and

while others expressed the goal as a combination of above-mentioned objectives.


Furthermore, when interviewing the lower managerial level (operational officers), all

of them have stated that there are no clear goals or objectives to guide our work in

automated speed enforcement program. Some of them stated that they might know the

goals of automated speed enforcement program from their work experience only and

some said that they knew the goals from the higher rank officers by a chance. All

operational officers agreed that they knew the goals while working in the field of

automated speed enforcement and no one of the high-rank officers acknowledged them

of clear goals of automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

Four out of nine operational officers interviewed stated that the goal is to reduce

speed-related crashes while the remaining five officers mentioned that the goal is to

detect and control high-speed vehicles. However, three operational officers among the

nine suggested that the goal could be derived from the name of this program. The

literal English translation of the program name is Speed Control Devices Program,

quoted:

“The goal is to control speed as the name of program shows; Speed Control

Devices.” (Int11).

“There were no clear goals about automated speed enforcement program….

But we could identify the goal from the name of the program which is to control

vehicles speed.” (Int14).

“The first goal could be derived from the name of the program (Speed Control

Devices)” (Int16).

As it could be clearly seen that operational officers are not sure about the exact

goals of the automated speed enforcement program, though it is their core job.

In accordance to whether these goals/objectives have been written or

documented, all participants were asked if they have read the goals in one of the (ROP)

documents or if the goals were communicated to them verbally. The top managerial

officer declared that goals are written and they are available only for those who work

on the field of automated speed enforcement. It means that middle and operational

level officers have access to such document. However, when asking middle managerial

officers and operational officers about the goals, they revealed that they have not seen

the goals or the objectives written or documented, this could be of absence of written

goals, the officers have not accessed the document, or simply there was no written

document in regards to the goals of this program. Here are two quotations from middle

managerial officers’ transcripts that explain their knowledge about the written goals.


“I have not seen these goals written, but when we started working with

automated speed enforcement program, I realise that the goals are so” (Int2).

“They are written, but I have not seen them.” (Int4).

Although four participants stated that the goals are written, none of the

participants have seen them actually, rather they are known to them as general

unwritten goals as the other five officers believe.

“This is a general traffic concept that does not have to be written in more

details.” (Int3). It could be true that this is general traffic concept but the question imposed was

about the specific goals of automated speed enforcement program in Oman. It is worth

stating here that the Royal Oman Police has general policies and discipline which

contain general rules such as in Article (35) of the Omani Traffic Law: “It is prohibited

to drive any vehicle with speed exceeding the speed limit…” ("Oman Traffic Law,"

1993, p. 12). This is a very general concept which some middle officers follow and

take as a guideline when it comes to speed violations. Surely, the goal of automated

speed enforcement program is much more than that and they should have been clearer

to the people working within this program in the first place.

When reviewing the operational officers’ interview transcripts, it seemed that no

one believes that the goals are written. All nine operational officers agreed that they

have not seen any documented or written goals. Five of them believe that they have

known the goals through the verbal instructions from high-rank officers.

“Instructions come from higher rank officers and from DGT. Most of them are

not written because we usually get them by phone call.” (Int12).

“This goal is not written but I knew it from my daily work and from the

meetings with high-rank officers.” (Int13).

“This goal was not written or documented but I knew it from higher rank

officers.” (Int15).

While the other three reported that they knew the goals through their working

years as operational officers as they came across such goals several times.

“I knew the goals from my work experience. To be honest with you, there is

nothing written about these goals (unfortunately).” (Int16).

“We haven’t seen them written, but we know that getting fine deters you from

committing it again. We have learnt that automated speed enforcement are to reduce

vehicles speeds while we are working in this field.” (Int17).


There is strong support that the automated speed enforcement program

objectives have not been written. Additionally, when asking the question “What are

the automated speed enforcement objectives/goals?” all participants hesitated while

responding and it took them a while until they delivered their responses. They also

have not given identical responses. It was clear to the researcher that the

goals/objectives were not written, and even if they are written as some participants

stated, they were not clear to the participants and there might be miscommunications

when it comes to the goals. After long discussions about whether there are written

documents or not, it has become apparent that the automated speed enforcement

goals/objectives have not been documented at all, at least that is what most participants

thought and agreed on.

Transformation Process

The second component of Nadler’s and Tushman’s model is the process by

which an organisation transfers its input into output (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). In this

study, the program transformation processes are defined as the operational aspects of

each type of automated speed enforcement units, the time required to process speeding

fines, and the punishment process in regards to deterrence theory. Each section of the

transformation process is discussed in depth next.

Automated speed enforcement operations

Automated speed enforcement operations of the Omani program include the site

selection criteria for the five different types of automated speed enforcement units, the

time when they are deployed, and the operating hours of each of them. As explained

earlier that the researcher could not find written documents about automated speed

enforcement operations in Oman such as operation manual or operation guidelines.

Based on the researcher’s experience and knowledge, automated speed enforcement

devices are deployed on all kinds of roads with speed limits of 60, 80, 100, or 120;

however, there are some technical requirements as some will be mentioned by

participants interviews during the data collection. In addition, semi-structured

interviews with ROP officers contributed significantly to obtain most of the

information needed regarding the Omani automated speed enforcement operations.

The sites of fixed speed camera and red-light/speed cameras have been decided on by

Directorate General of Traffic (DGT) and these units are working 24 hours a day and

7 days a week. Of course, red-light/speed cameras have been fixed in intersections


where traffic lights are. Whereas sites and operating hours of the other three types of

automated speed enforcement: mobile, mounted-on-vehicle and laser-gun, are decided

by traffic geographical directors or supervisory officers. Royal Oman Police did not

seem to have a written operation guideline that guides the work of automated speed

enforcement operators, rather the operators are working according to verbal

instructions from the high-rank officers such as the traffic geographical directors or

supervisory officers. Three detailed questions were posed to the eight (8) directors of

geographical traffic directorates as the middle managerial officers and one

comprehensive question was posed to the nine (9) operational officers in order to

deeply investigate the automated speed enforcement operations.

Middle managerial officers’ responses: -

All officers agreed that they choose the sites themselves without referring to

DGT and they always choose the black spots in regards to deploying mobile, mounted-

on-vehicle, and laser-gun units. However, two of the officers stated that black spots

are not clearly identified, quoted:

“There isn’t clear statement that defines black spot.” (Int7).

“… unfortunately, there isn’t specific number of accidents to consider the site

as black spot.” (Int6)

Nevertheless, it seemed that there is an understanding of what black spots are as

two officers believed that the road segment is declared black spot when there are more

than three accidents happened in that segment during a year, quoted:

“A location is to be called black spot when it happens to have at least three

accidents in one year.” (Int2).

“A place is considered as black spot when, within a year, more than three

accidents happened on it.” (Int9).

However, these statements come in contrast with an Omani study to analyse

traffic crashes in Oman by (Ahlam, 2016). The author’s source was personal

communication with ROP officer when the black spot is defined by one of the two

cases: when there are three road crash fatalities in one spot within three years, or when

five serious crash injuries happen in one spot during a five-year period. The finding of

this study and finding of Ahlam’s (2016) assume that there is no one clear definition

of black spot.


In addition to deploying automated speed enforcement in what could be

considered as black spots, there are many other places to deploy automated speed

enforcement. Most officers agreed that they can deploy the three types of automated

speed enforcement at any places and any time except when there is heavy rain, strong

wind, very hot weather during mid-summer, or traffic jam as five of them stated almost

the same as these quotes:

“…every time except when there is rain, wind, or traffic jam.” (Int4).

“We deploy automated speed enforcement in almost all places unless there is

rain, wind, or hot weather during the summer.” (Int5). The reason for such an identical response about the exceptional situation for

deploying automated speed enforcement could be the written technical guidelines

which was provided for the ROP by automated speed enforcement manufacturers as

has been obtained during the interviews. One officer stated that there are no clear

criteria for choosing sites of automated speed enforcement, and he said:

“…but there aren’t specific criteria to choose sites. I mean that I can put it

anywhere and no one would say a thing.” (Int6).

All managerial levels officers assured the researcher that there are no written

guidelines for automated speed enforcement operations. However, when it comes to

the operating hours, the officers had two different responses. Three of them mentioned

that the number of operating hours is determined by DGT and they just follow the

instructions while the other five officers stated that they determine the hours

themselves as geographical directors based on the situation and the traffic flow. Here

are two responses of three officers who get the instructions from DGT:

“Operating hours are determined by DGT and they are as follow: Mobile

radar: three periods per day and 5 hours per period. Mounted-on-vehicle: three

periods per day and 8 hours per period. Laser Gun: we rarely use it.” (Int2).

“Operating hours are determined by DGT and they are as follow: Mobile

radar: three periods per day and 8 hours per period. Mounted-on-vehicle: three

periods per day and 8 hours per period. Laser Gun: five days a week, one to two hours

each day.” (Int4).

Even though both two officers reported that they get the instructions from DGT,

each one of them had different responses in regards to mounted-on-vehicle and laser-


gun operating hours. The third officers did not mention the number of hours but he

said that he is not encouraged to use the laser gun as it is old fashion and basic, quoted:

“Regarding the laser gun, I see it is rudimentary as we cannot see the pictures

as a proof of the fine and that causes embarrassment for us in front of drivers. In

addition, laser gun does not bring high number of fines.” (Int5).

The last part of this response reflects a lack of appreciation of the deterrent role

of speed detectors. On the other hand, five managerial officers stated that they

determine the operating hours for the three types of automated speed enforcement

themselves. The operating hours vary from geographical directorate to another and

differ from automated speed enforcement type to another. This variation could be

attributed to the road structure of the area under which different directorates operate

and how occupied are those roads. One officer did not mention the operating hours at

all (avoid mentioning) and another officer mentioned the number of hours for only

mobile automated speed enforcement stating:

“…we work three short periods of 3 hours a day or two long periods of 5 hours

a day with mobile automated speed enforcement.”(Int9).

Two officers argued that they work three periods with the mobile and mounted-

on-vehicle cameras but with different operating hours for each directorate, they said:

“Operating hours are determined by us and they are as follow: Mobile radar:

three periods per day and 5 hours per period. Mounted-on-vehicle: three periods per

day and 8 hours per period. Laser Gun: three times per week and 1-2 hours each time.

It requires at least 3 operators and two police cars.” (Int3).

“Operating hours are determined by us and they are as follow: Mobile radar:

three periods per day (4-6 hours per period). Mounted-on-vehicle: three periods per

day (6-7 hours per period). Laser Gun: 2 hours a day.” (Int7).

While the fifth geographical officer has only two periods for the mobile and the

mounted-on-vehicle cameras and one to two hours per day for the laser gun.

Operational officers’ responses: -

Operational officers were asked only one question regarding the guidelines of

automated speed enforcement operations that included site selection, timing and

operating hours. Out of the nine officers, six of them stated that operators choose the


sites and the other three said that DGT determines the sites. A 10 years experienced

officer said that it always depends on the operator, quote:

“Automated speed enforcement units are deployed without unified mechanism.

Operator does not have any guidelines where to put it and why to put in that particular

place. Site selection always depends on the operator.” (Int14).

Another officer supported this statement and added that it depends on the

geographical directorate itself, saying:

“Each geographical directorate has its own plans for operating different

automated speed enforcement.” (Int17).

This could be proportionately right if we take into consideration the traffic

volume and the type of roads; rural or urban as reported by participants. Additionally,

an important issue was raised by one officer when he said that they do not follow DGT

instructions because they do not seem rational and he stated:

“We get instructions from DGT to deploy automated speed enforcement in

places where there are more accidents happened. But these places have less speed

violations and DGT blames us when we get small number of speed fines. I have decided

that I choose the sites myself based on my experience.” (Int15).

In regards to the operating hours, three officers stated that operating hours are

determined by DGT but two of them said that they do not follow these instructions and

they said:

“Operating hours are determined by DGT, but not all operational officers

follow exactly what DGT says.” (Int13)

“The instruction says we have to work 6 hours of mobile automated speed

enforcement. However, we only work 4 hours…none of the operators work 6 hours per

period because of the technical issues (batteries, automated speed enforcement units

are not capable of working such a long time, and the weather of high temperature).”

(Int16).

While the other six officers mentioned that they determine the operating hours

of each automated speed enforcement type according to the situations. The operating

hours for mobile speed cameras ranged from 4 to 5 hours per period and all directorates

work three periods. Moreover, the operating hours for mounted-on-vehicle speed

cameras ranged from 6 to 8 hours and all directorates work three periods except one

directorate in remote area where it works only two periods. It always varies and there


does not seem to be a unified guideline within the automated speed enforcement

operations.

Time required to process speed fines

The time required to process speed violations ranges from 1 day to 30 days (Ba

Alawi, personal communication, April 2016). This time is considered from the

moment when automated speed enforcement unit detects violating vehicle until this

fine is registered in ROP system. It is important to note that this time does not include

the speed fine payment by drivers. For the four types of automated speed enforcement:

fixed, mobile, mounted-on-vehicle, and red-light/speed, it starts with downloading

pictures from the unit then processing them manually using specific software and

finally sending them electronically (in a digital form) to the mainframe to be registered

in the ROP system. For the laser gun unit, the fine is written and given to the driver on

spot and it takes less than one week to be registered in ROP system as they are much

less in numbers compared with the fines collected from other automated speed

enforcement units and, of course, the data is entered manually.

Punishment process

As mentioned above in Program Strategy in (Input) section, automated speed

enforcement program can detect six types of violations. Each violation has its own

monetary sanction and punishment process. Two of them have a severe penalty of

(OMR) 50, the driver could be imprisoned for a maximum of 48 hours and the vehicle

could be impounded for 14 days. These two fines occur when a driver crosses red-light

or does more than 80 km/h over the speed limit. Unfortunately, the other four

violations have relatively small monetary fines such as (OMR) 35, 15, or 10 ("Oman

Traffic Law," 1993). The monetary punishment does not have a specific time or period

to be paid; rather the period could range from one day to 356 days once it is recorded

in the ROP system. The driver can postpone fine payments until the car registration

renewal is due or sometimes it could be further. There could be a long-time lag

between the times when a speeding fine is issued and when it is paid. The researcher

has known all this information because he had worked in the ROP for almost 10 years

as a supervisory officer in automated speed enforcement program.


Output

The third component of Nadler’s and Tushman’s congruence model is the

output. Output could be defined as the organisation’s performance and effectiveness

in achieving its goals (Nadler & Tushman, 1980). The researcher has identified the

output in this study as the statistics, goals achieved, and the deterrent effects as

indicators of automated speed enforcement program’s performance and effectiveness.

The statistics about number of fines, fatality and injury rates, and number of crashes

related to speed were gained from (ROP) documents and they have been previously

mentioned and discussed in Program Historical Data in (section 4.1.1 Input). The

researcher could not find any written document about the deterrent effect and

effectiveness of automated speed enforcement program in Oman. In addition, goals

were neither clear nor written and they have not been measured or evaluated. Most of

the data needed were obtained from the semi-structured interviews conducted with the

ROP officers.

Program’s Statistics

The statistics of Omani automated speed enforcement program are defined in

this study as the number of speeding fines, crash rates, and fatality rates which have

been discussed earlier in this chapter. Recently, speeding fines increased dramatically.

Speed-related crashes are still representing more than 50% of total crashes and total

fatality crashes.

Goals of Automated speed enforcement Program

The intended goals were discussed previously in Program Strategy in (Input)

section and there does not seem to be clear goals. Furthermore, almost all participants

stated that they have not seen the goals documented or written. In this section of the

output, the intended goals themselves are not of a concern right now; rather the

achievement of the declared goals occurred or not is the concern of it. Declared goals

are the goals stated by participants as there were no written clear goals for automated

speed enforcement program. The declared goals mentioned, such as to reduce speed,

monitor the roads, reduce crashes, detect vehicle speeds, and deter speeders. In regards

to achieving these declared intended goals, various responses from the officers of three

managerial levels were obtained. The top management officer stated that the (ROP)

has achieved the intended goals of automated speed enforcement program and vehicles


speed rate has decreased especially the very high speeds (above 80 km/h). All middle-

managerial level officers believed that automated speed enforcement have contributed

significantly in reducing crash and fatality rates. One of the middle-managerial officers

said that automated speed enforcement caused crash reductions if you compare any

random two years, quoted:

“Actually, there wasn’t any specific goal written. It is just comparison between

two years.” (Int5).

All participants referred to the statistics of crashes as a support to their responses.

Unfortunately, as presented in Appendix A (The causes of crashes in Oman) that

speeding contributes to more than 50% of the total crashes and total fatalities annually.

It seemed that all participants thought that the reduction in numbers always means

good indicator of performance without taking into consideration the increased number

of automated speed enforcement units and to what extent that increase contributed to

crash reduction. In addition, the number of the newly registered vehicle should be

taken into consideration too. The Directorate of Traffic (DGT) does not have

evaluation mechanism for automated speed enforcement program; rather it compares

numbers of crashes, fatalities, and injuries between year and another as Facts and

Figures booklets show. This simple comparison could be misleading because it ignores

other surrounding variables such as the increase of new issued licences, new registered

vehicles, and the increase in roads and population. However, simply counting crashes

or injuries is often an imperfect indicator of level of road safety. A question about

automated speed enforcement evaluation was posed to top and middle managerial level

officers. Two officers stated that there is evaluation and one of them mentioned studies

about automated speed enforcement program and they showed good results, quoted:

“Yes, there have been many studies about the automated speed enforcement

statistics and they showed that the automated speed enforcement are effective… No, I

haven’t seen or read any of the studies.” (Int6).

Another two officers believed that there is evaluation but not for the

effectiveness of the program but for the number of speed fines and to change sites and

types of automated speed enforcement used in a particular place. However, other five

officers argued that there is no evaluation at all, quotes are:

“There is none, but we just see good results from deploying automated speed

enforcement.” (Int2).


“Nothing at all, I think they must do it in DGT.” (Int5).

“Not a single person did evaluation for this program.” (Int7).

“Not evaluation but maintenance only.” (Int8).

“We cannot do the evaluation because we do not have the needed tools for that

such as experience.” (Int8).

Almost all operational officers believed that automated speed enforcement

program has caused speed-related crashes to decrease and they referred to the statistics

to support this argument. However, one of them stated that a person cannot judge the

program because no evaluation has been done, quoted:

“I am not sure, because I could not see any evaluations so how do I say if the

goals have been met or not. Another thing is that we are asked about the number of

speeding fines; if the number is high, it means we are working well and if it is low, it

means that our work is not good enough.” (Int12).

The only evaluation or what they perceive as evaluation was about the solid

numbers of speed fines, crashes, or fatalities. This might not be considered as

evaluation because there is no analysis or readings behind the numbers.

In summary, it is problematic to evaluate a program when there are no written

goals or at least clear ones against which the program would be evaluated. Several

participants stated very general goals for the program and some of them argued that

there are no clear goals. Most of them indicated that they have not seen them and the

participants who said that they have seen the written goals, when asked by the

researcher to see the document, the response was negative.

Deterrent effects of the program

Starting with the middle and operational level officers, when they were asked

the question about the three elements of deterrence theory, severity, celerity, and

certainty within the automated speed enforcement program, among their responses

were:

“None of what you’ve just mentioned ‘severity, celerity, and certainty is

available in our system.” (Int2).

“None of what you’ve just mentioned is available in our system. And the solid

proof for that is the very big number of speed fines we have in Oman. Additionally, we

still have high number of crashes and fatalities.” (Int4).


“All what you have just mentioned are absent in the fining system. There must

be traffic courts in all governorates.” (Int7).

“If we assume there is certainty, so why most drivers have many speed fines

and they still exceed the speed limit.” (Int8).

“Unfortunately we do not have these three elements within the automated

speed enforcement fines… sometimes you do not know if you were caught by

automated speed enforcement or not unless you check DGT website… Likewise, you

are not forced to pay unless you want to renew your car registration.”(Int11).

It might be that the top managerial officer had biased responses towards his

position at ROP or there is miscommunications between the three managerial levels,

because the other two levels officers have not supported almost all of his responses.

Supporting the assumption of interviewee number 8, the rate of speed fines per driving

license (4.8) or per vehicle (5.1) (ROP, 2015). It seemed that people are aware of

getting caught if they exceed the speed limits but they still drive over speed limits. The

three elements of deterrence theory are deeply discussed in the second study of this

research in chapter five.

As mentioned above that there is nothing written about the program performance

or effectiveness generally or about its deterrent effect specifically. When interviewing

officers from the (ROP), almost all of them agreed that the (ROP) does not impose the

deterrence theory elements within its system. Firstly, there is no swiftness in the

process of punishing the offenders and it was mentioned and discussed in the

Punishment Process in (Transformation Process) section. Top managerial officer

believed that there is swiftness in serious violations which require imprisoning

offender. The offender is approached by a phone call and asked to attend in the (DGT)

or one of the geographical traffic directorates and punishment will take place.

However, both seventeen middle and operational officers agreed that there isn’t any

swiftness in speed violations at all. Secondly, the severity of punishment in ROP

system cannot be seen as the fine value is very low in regards to the driving behaviour

itself. For instance, a driver could drive up to 195 km/h where speed limit is 120 km/h

and gets only to pay a fine of OMR 35. Top managerial officers stated that there is

severity in the punishment of serious fines. However, all other participants stated that

severity is not present in speed violation system in Oman. Thirdly, the punishment

certainty does not seem to be present too. Top managerial officer said that the program


has created punishment certainty in people’s minds. In addition, another six officers

believed that there is certainty sometimes but the other eleven officers declared that

ROP has none of the three elements within speed existing penalty system.

One important finding of this study is that ROP officers have failed to show clear

understanding of the strategies and goals of automated speed enforcement program.

This failure could be attributed to the absence of a clearly communicated operations

guideline and a written document of the program.

4.1.2 Benchmarking Analysis

This section of this study involved comparing the Omani automated speed

enforcement practices with the benchmarking list developed earlier in the literature

review chapter. Therefore, the benchmarking analysis could show to what extent the

Omani practices are aligned to good practices of automated enforcement. The

discussion in this section will use most of the results obtained and discussed previously

in the congruence model analysis. There have been five benchmarks identified to be

compared against the current Omani automated speed enforcement program’s

practices: automated speed enforcement type, site selection, operating hours, deterrent

effects, and the program itself. Each benchmark is discussed separately in the

succeeding paragraphs.

Automated speed enforcement type

The type of automated speed enforcement to be deployed in a particular place or

time should be carefully selected. In addition, the level of automated speed

enforcement visibility should be decided depending on the aim behind its deployment,

whether to provide a specific deterrent effect with hidden (covert) cameras or general

deterrent effect with highly visible (overt) cameras. The decision of whether to deploy

fixed or mobile, overt or covert, and point-to-point or other types of automated speed

enforcement is very critical.

In Oman, more than 75 percent of automated speed enforcement are overt and

not all of the remaining 25 percent are deployed covertly. For instance, all mounted-

on-vehicle speed cameras are well recognized by the road users. In addition, operators

are not able to hide mobile speed cameras in all sites because of the geographical

composition of road environment in Oman even though they are supposed to be

hidden. However, there is no average speed system deployed in Oman, even though


this system can be applied with the current available automated speed enforcement

units (Ba Alawi, personal communication, April 2016). It could be stated that the ROP

is not making the optimum use of automated speed enforcement program as currently

and this could be because of technical or operational limitations.

Site selection

Site selection is one of the first steps to be taken before the deployment of any

automated speed enforcement in order to enhance the effectiveness of the speed

enforcement. For example, officers do not operate laser-gun during rainy day or mid-

night because it needs very clear sight. Thus, there must be clear criteria on how to

select a site for each type of automated speed enforcement. The ROP does not seem to

have written or even unwritten criteria on site selection. As previously discussed in

Automated speed enforcement Operations in (Transformation Process) that ROP

officers who participated in answering interview questions stated that they choose the

sites themselves and they do not have unified criteria for such procedure. In addition,

they stated that DGT has identified and pre-selected the sites for only fixed and red-

light/speed cameras, whereas sites for the other three types of automated speed

enforcement: mobile, mounted-on-vehicle, and laser-gun, are not pre-identified by

DGT. Participants explained that all sites which have been selected by DGT were

selected based on analysis on previous crash data and DGT has chosen places where

accidents mostly happen such as what they consider black spots.

Operation hours

Operating hours must be determined based on crash data analysis within specific

area. The Omani automated speed enforcement program did not seem to implement

such strategy on determining the duration and timing of all automated speed

enforcement operations. However, fixed and red-light/speed cameras work 24/7. As

previously discussed in Automated speed enforcement Operations in (Transformation

Process), when eight (8) managerial officers and nine (9) operational officers were

asked to explain how the operating hours for automated speed enforcement are

determined. Managerial officers had two different responses: three stated that

operating hours are determined by DGT, while the other five officers argued that they

determine the hours themselves. Nonetheless, officers who claimed that they get the

instructions from DGT, they have provided different answers in regards to operating

hours. It is whether because of the instructions from DGT are not clear enough or the


managerial officers do not follow them exactly as they are. On the other hand, three

out of nine operational officers stated that the operating hours are determined by DGT,

but two of the officers said that they do not follow those instructions for the reasons

discussed earlier in (Transformation Process) such as long operating hours and lack of

resources. There was a sense, during the discussions about unified operating hours,

which DGT did send instructions to all geographical traffic directorates in regards to

the number of hours by which each automated speed enforcement type should operate.

The other six operational officers determine operating hours for each type of

automated speed enforcement according to the current circumstances. As mentioned

above, the operating hours for mobile speed cameras ranged from 4 to 5 hours per

period and all directorates work three periods. Moreover, the operating hours for

mounted-on-vehicle speed cameras ranged from 6 to 8 hours and all directorates work

three periods except one directorate in remote area where it works only two periods.

The operating hours vary from geographical directorate to another and differ from

automated speed enforcement type to another. This is could be considered as a strong

proof that traffic directorates do not work with unified operating hours for each type

of automated speed enforcement.

Deterrent effect

In Oman, although automated speed enforcement has been extensively used,

there are still speeding drivers. In addition, the speeding fine rate in 2014 is relatively

high (4.8) per driving licence, which means that drivers repeatedly exceeded the speed

limit. The three elements of deterrence theory: speeding fine severity, speeding fine

certainty, and speeding fine celerity, are discussed in more details relating such

concepts to the current practices of Omani automated speed enforcement program.

Severity of Speeding fines

Based on the reported answers of participants, it is believed that drivers

repeatedly exceed the speed limit because the fine magnitude is very low, as discussed

in the Punishment Process in (Transformation Process), compared with the

consequences derived from speeding. Participants, when asked about the fine severity,

agreed that there is no such element within automated speed enforcement program

except for the serious fines as previously mentioned. The "Oman Traffic Law" 1993)

does not consider the violation as serious unless it happens under one of the two cases;

when driver runs red-light or does more than 80 km/h over the speed limit. However,


fine severity could be considered as of high deterrent effect if the drivers are sensitive

to the monetary fine increase. Moreover, the ROP does not implement the demerit

point system. The demerit or penalty point system is when points are associated with

every offence and the sanction severity will be increased as the points increase. The

demerit point system significantly enhances the road safety and reduce crashes

(Zambon et al., 2007). There are several studies which have proven the effectiveness

of the implementation of demerit point system on speeding fines reduction (Haque,

1990; Izquierdo et al., 2011; Novoa et al., 2010; Pulido et al., 2010). For example, the

Victorian Police in Australia started using a demerit point system in 1989 and it has

proven its effectiveness in changing driving behaviours (Bourne & Cooke, 1993). The

implementation of demerit point system in Oman could lead to a significant positive

effect in road safety because it seemed that drivers are not deterred by the low

magnitude of fines. Additionally, there is no punishment other than monetary fines

when speeding up to 195 km/h in 120 speed-limit roads.

Certainty of speeding fines

According to the top managerial officer interviewed for this study, Oman’s

automated speed enforcement program has created the perception of punishment

certainty. In contrast, eleven officers from middle and operational managerial levels

agreed that the ROP did not promote the certainty of punishment on drivers within the

existing speed penalty system, while the other six officers believed that certainty of

punishment is sometimes present in drivers’ perceptions. However, there seemed to be

a good level of certainty of apprehension, which could be related to the presence of

1277 widely spread automated speed enforcement units, but it seemed that such

certainty does not have deterrent effect on drivers within the Omani context of road

safety, as reported by most of the participants.

Celerity (swiftness) of speeding fines

There is a very long-time lag between detecting a speed violation and imposing

the associated punishment. This time lag could start from one day and up to 365 days

and is sometimes even longer. In the Omani automated speed enforcement context,

there is no swiftness in imposing the punishment except for the laser-gun operations,

when offenders are issued the fine immediately. Even when issued, however, offenders

are not forced to pay the fine immediately or even in a specified period of time.


To conclude, most participants in this research believed that the Omani

automated speed enforcement program does not impose any of the three deterrence

theory components. That is why this program, with its current practices, does not seem

to have a significant deterrent effect. There is a strong need to think about the deterrent

effect within the context of the Omani automated speed enforcement program and to

further monitor and evaluate its effects.

The program itself

In the case of Omani automated speed enforcement program, from the responses

of participants, it did not seem that the program has clear goals. The ROP has not

identified clear goals for the program, and thus participants gave different responses

about the goals. They also stated that there are no guidelines for the automated speed

enforcement program and they work according to their experience and what they

believe is right and suitable in terms of the operations. The ROP must have faced

difficulties in managing such a big program without clear goals and without written

operational guidelines. A program with 500 operators, 130 vehicles, and 1277 units of

five different types of automated speed enforcement units working across Oman under

the supervision 13 different geographical directorates must have clear goals and

operational guidelines in order to make the work easier and more efficient, as well as

easy to monitor and evaluate. In addition to that, clear goals and guidelines could help

avoid wasted effort and operating hours. Monthly hours if increased will lead to less

fatal and injury crashes (Cameron & Delaney, 2008). The ROP does have an hour

counter for each period of operation every day, however, these hours are not

accumulated nor considered on a weekly or monthly basis or even on a daily basis.

Moreover, the program has never been evaluated, which is an important step after

implementing automated speed enforcement (Skyving, 2015). In addition, if

considering few elements, the Omani program seems to lack important elements from

the ISO 39001 standards, such as Planning, Performance Evaluation, and

Improvement. There are no clear goals (Planning), the program was never evaluated

(Performance Evaluation), and no steps have taken to improve its effectiveness in

terms of its deterrent effect (Improvement). These three elements are only general

guidelines, but each one has more detailed criteria which could be used specifically

for the Omani automated speed enforcement program. This could be done in a separate

study or research.


4.2 DISCUSSING THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

This section summarizes the findings of the first study and discusses them in

light of the first three objectives of this program of research identified in section 1.3.

The first objective was to describe the operational aspects of the current Omani

automated speed enforcement program. Operational aspects included the different

types of automated speed enforcement used, the duration of deploying each type, the

time when they are deployed, and the site selection for each type. In addition, it

explored the strategies and goals of the program currently applied in Oman. This study

has several main findings related to the operational aspects of the Omani program.

There is a huge number (1277) of different automated speed enforcement units

operating on Omani roads; specifically, there are 641 fixed speed cameras, 120 mobile

speed cameras, 322 red-light/speed cameras, 120 laser-gun units, and 74 mounted-on-

vehicle speed cameras as when this study was conducted. A dramatic change in the

number and types of automated speed enforcement took place during the year of 2013.

The new automated speed enforcement units have significantly increased the level of

detection, and therefore increased the number of speed fines recorded to more than 6

million fines in 2014. At the same time, there was only a 9% decrease in the fatality

rates between 2013 and 2014, despite the increase of 670% in detection devices.

Although there was downward trend in total crashes and fatalities, speed-related crash

fatalities remained above 50% of total fatalities, which led to the question of what

could be wrong with the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. It is not

accomplishing what is logically anticipated, which is to decrease the speed related

crash and fatality rates. Based on the participants’ responses, there did not seem to be

any written documents about automated speed enforcement program goals, operations,

or even evaluation or analysis of the program performance. However, regarding the

goals, the interviews revealed that there were different goals stated by participants

which could be themed into three main goals: monitor the road and enforce traffic

control, reduce speed and speed-related crashes, and deter speedy drivers, which, in

turn, leads to saving lives. In regards to the operational aspects of Omani automated

speed enforcement, there were several questions posed to the participants to gain full

understanding of the criteria of automated speed enforcement site selection together

with the duration and time by which each automated speed enforcement type operates.

This study explored the site selection criteria and found that different automated speed


enforcement, apart from the fixed and red-light cameras, were mostly used in road

sections considered to be black spots. However, further findings suggested that black

spots were not clearly defined or understood by participants. It is strongly suggested

that black spots be clearly defined and communicated to the ROP officers who work

in the field. The study also found that different automated speed enforcement units

operated with relatively different timing and at different periods within one directorate

of traffic. In addition, the operating hours differed from one directorate to another and

there did not seem to be a clear unified operation manual or guideline to be followed

by all traffic directorates. This leads to strong recommendation for having a unified

operation manual to guide the automated speed enforcement practices in Oman.

The second objective of this study was to identify the perceptions of ROP

officers toward the theoretical aspects of the current automated speed enforcement in

Oman relating to the program deterrent effects. Further investigations were carried out

in order to explore the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program.

The evidence provided by this study argued that there was very little, if any, deterrent

effect created by this program on drivers. Firstly, when it comes to the celerity of

punishment, speed fines take from one to thirty days to be processed and recorded on

the ROP system. While this processing time is not excessive, considering the manual

data entry of the huge number of speed fines, is the fact that there is no legislation

forcing the offender to pay fines until the next time they renew the vehicle registration.

This could be up to twelve months after the fine is recorded on the ROP system. This

procedure disregards the deterrent effect of celerity of punishment. The second issue

is the very low severity of speeding fines. An increase in the severity of punishment is

likely to have a much greater deterrent effect.

The final objective of the study was to discuss to what extent the practices of

Omani automated speed enforcement program are aligned with international good

practices. A benchmarking analysis was used to fulfil this objective, and analysis

showed that there is only a low-level of alignment between the Omani practices and

the best international practice. For instance, most successful automated speed

enforcement programs apply a demerit point system, while the Omani program does

not. Moreover, the international good practice suggests that the decision of whether to

deploy fixed or mobile, overt or covert, and point-to-point or other types of automated

speed enforcement is very critical based on the aim behind the enforcement whether


to provide specific or general deterrent effect. However, the Omani program does not

seem to take such an important point into consideration, as more than 75 percent of

the automated speed enforcement is overt, and not all of the remaining 25 percent are

successfully covert. In addition, the point to point average speed system is known to

be successful internationally, but the Omani program does not apply such a system.

Furthermore, the good practices suggest that there should be clear site selection criteria

for different units of automated speed enforcement, but the Omani program does not

have site selection criteria. Finally, the program has never been evaluated, and

evaluation is one of the important steps to be taken after implementing automated

speed enforcement (Skyving, 2015). In short, the Omani program of automated speed

enforcement does not yield its maximum impact.

4.3 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study has several strengths to be considered, as well as weaknesses that

could be considered limitations. Firstly, there are several strengths evident during the

data collection phase. As the researcher is originally from an Arabic speaking country,

he has the privilege of looking for sources in two different languages, English and

Arabic. This strength was utilised to search the road-safety documents written in

Arabic which have often not been translated into any other language. In addition, the

researcher has been working in the ROP for almost ten years, and that gave him an

advantage when interviewing ROP officers, as they felt more confident talking with

someone who belongs to the same organisation. Another strength of this research is

the background of the supervisory team, who are very knowledgeable about the

Middle-East road safety situation and practices, and who helped direct this research as

a whole.

Like any study of this kind that seeks opinions and facts which have not been

documented, there are also several limitations. Firstly, there was no previous

assessment of or study about the automated speed enforcement program in Oman,

which is considered a limitation in the literature. Consequently, it was a challenge

starting research which did not have any data to be based on or a study to be built upon.

Secondly, very far distance to the data collection field could be considered as limitation

but more than that is gaining access to the high ranking officers in the ROP was very

difficult due to their responsibilities and commitments, particularly when the


researcher has only limited time in Oman for data collection, and also limited time

during the usual working hours (7:30 am-2:00 pm). Thirdly, a limitation of using the

interview method for collecting data is that it requires engagement with people. People,

psychologically and naturally, want to be liked and to avoid being ashamed of

something or someone (O'Leary, 2004). While asking ROP officers about ROP

performance, there might be some dishonest responses or biased answers which could

be attributed to impression management. Although the rationale of the study was

communicated to participants before conducting interviews in order to minimize

dishonesty, there might be some officers who did not want ROP automated speed

enforcement operations to be seen as insufficient or ineffective. As previously

mentioned, the researcher is a ROP officer, and this may have significantly helped in

reducing the dishonesty of responses, as interviewees consider the researcher one of

them, and not external or an intruder. Additionally, the results derived from using a

qualitative method of data collection cannot be considered definitive facts about the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman, as the results are what have been

reported by ROP officers. Finally, the conclusion about lack of effect of the automated

speed enforcement program on the reduction of crash and fatality rates during the

period included in this study cannot be considered highly accurate, as there are other

factors that could contribute to the statistics, such as road construction, driver

compliance, personal factors, and social factors, and these factors are not included in

this study.

4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter presented the first study of this program of research. It discussed

the results of the study using a qualitative method of data collection. This qualitative

study conducted eighteen (18) semi-structured interviews with Royal Oman Police

officers in order to gain full understanding about WHAT is currently happening in

regards to the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. This study answered

the first three research questions of this program of research. It looked at the current

practices of automated speed enforcement and compared them with the international

practices. In addition, the study identified the perceptions of ROP officers in relation

to the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program currently applied

in Oman. It also identified the gaps between the Omani practices and the international


good practices. Finally, this chapter presented the strengths and limitations of the

research.

One of the conclusions derived from this study is that the current practices of

automated speed enforcement in Oman should be documented and the rationale for

such practices should be well-communicated to the officers working in this field. It

also concluded that the deterrent effects promoted by the program need more scrutiny.

Moreover, the study found that the Omani automated speed enforcement program has

never been evaluated in terms of its performances and effectiveness, such as before-

after study like others from Norway (Høye, 2015), Sweden (Skyving, 2015), Italy

(Montella et al., 2015), France (Laurent Carnis & Blais, 2013), Singapore (Chin,

1999), Abu Dhabi (Darei & Humaid, 2009), and Belgium (De Pauw et al., 2014). The

statistics provided by the ROP documents show that the automated speed enforcement

has not significantly contributed to the reduction of speed-related fatalities and crashes

in Oman. Additionally, the high number of violations, regardless whether speeding or

other traffic violations, could be considered an indicator of the ineffectiveness of law

enforcement. However, it is hard to say that the little reduction of fatalities and crashes

is attributed to the automated speed enforcement program, as there could be many

other contributing factors, and this needs to be further investigated. More importantly,

the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman is

questionable and requires further scrutiny. While this study has answered the question

of what is happening within the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, the

second study is designed to answer the question of why it is happening.

Chapter 5: Investigating Policy-makers’ Understanding of the rationale behind legislation relating to the Omani automated speed enforcement program (Second Study) 103

Chapter 5: Investigating Policy-makers’ Understanding of the rationale behind legislation relating to the Omani automated speed enforcement program (Second Study)


This chapter documents the results of the second study of this research. It

explores the last three of research questions underpinning this program of research: 4)

What are the perceptions of policy-makers about the automated speed enforcement

program in terms of its intended deterrent effect? 5) What is the best way to evaluate

the effectiveness of the Omani automated speed enforcement program against its

goals? 6) What are the barriers to increasing the effectiveness of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman?

The chapter includes six main sections, starting with this introductory statement

then moving on to Section 5.2, Bridging the first and second study, which connects the

first study with the second one. The third section presents the results and discusses

them in the Omani context of road safety, the fourth section discusses the results of

the study in respect to the three research questions examined in this study, together

with the study objectives. The chapter concludes with the strengths and limitations of

the study, and the chapter summary.

5.2 BRIDGING THE FIRST AND SECOND STUDY

This second study was designed to further investigate the Omani automated

speed enforcement program, thereby building on and complementing the findings of

the first qualitative study of this research. The first study explored perceptions of the

current automated speed enforcement practices in Oman and shed light on the penalty

system and the ROP operational practices within its automated speed enforcement

program. One of the interesting findings was that the Omani automated speed

enforcement program consists of a considerable number of resources. However, there

104 Chapter 5: Investigating Policy-makers’ Understanding of the rationale behind legislation relating to the Omani automated speed enforcement program (Second Study)

appeared to be minimal written documentation about either the number or types of

automated speed enforcement used in Oman. The program involves five different

automated speed enforcement types within a total of 1277 devices, including 641 fixed

speed cameras, 120 mobile speed cameras, 322 red-light/speed cameras, 120 laser-gun

units, and 74 mounted-on-vehicle speed cameras.

The first study also found that there did not seem to be any written documents

about the goals or operations of the automated speed enforcement program. Not only

have the goals not been documented, but they also have not been clearly communicated

to officers of the ROP who work in the field. There should be a clear understanding of

why the automated speed enforcement program exists in the first place, but this

understanding was, to some extent, missing during the interview discussions with

participants in the first study. Further investigation of the reasons behind this lack of

understanding and documentation has been incorporated in the second study

interviews with individuals from the ROP.

The most important finding of the first study is related to the deterrent effects

of the Omani automated speed enforcement program. The evidence highlighted that

there is very little, if any, deterrent effect created by this program on drivers, possibly

due to the lack of celerity or severity of punishment. Firstly, although speeding fines

are often recorded on the ROP system within 30 days, there is no legislation forcing

the offender to pay the fine until the vehicle registration is renewed, which may be up

to one year later. Secondly, the very low monetary fines mean that the severity of

punishment is minimal.

This lack of deterrent effect is one of the main reasons for conducting this

second study. Policy-makers were asked about their perceptions of the deterrent effect

anticipated from automated speed enforcement in terms of punishment severity and

celerity. In addition, participants were asked about what they have done or planned to

do in terms of increasing the level of deterrence provided by the program.

Additionally, as the first study found that there could be some barriers to increasing

the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program, these obstacles were

explored in terms of the possibility of reducing their effect.

The findings of the first study also revealed that there has not been any

evaluation for the Omani automated speed enforcement program in terms of its

operations and practices. The currently implemented Omani automated speed

enforcement program started in late 2004 and has never been evaluated for its


effectiveness. The only evaluation cited by participants was a simple comparison of

crash and fatality numbers between two consecutive years. This cannot be considered

an evaluation, but more monitoring or observation; however, the participants referred

to it as an evaluation. The second study aimed to scrutinise the process of evaluation

(if any) and/or to explore the reasons why there has not been an official evaluation

since the program started. Moreover, this study will investigate the best way of

evaluating the automated speed enforcement program from the policy-makers’ point

of view.

5.3 RESULTS

There were five themes extracted from the interviews for the second study. The

first theme was the current speed problem. This theme was to investigate the problem

of speed in the Omani context and its magnitude, as perceived by policy-makers. This

topic was the starting point of each interview, and led to further discussions on related

topics. Participants’ perceptions about speeding in Oman, and whether or not they

consider it a problem needed to be clearly understood.

The second theme concerned the participants’ perceptions of the main goal

behind the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. This general theme was

explored with several questions which led to a clear understanding of why the program

was implemented in the first place. Moreover, the decisions made about the

implementation were to be identified in the hope that there would be rationale and

reasoning behind them. This topic needed to be examined due to its high importance

in identifying the deterrent effect of the Omani automated speed enforcement program.

In this section of the interview, the researcher sought the policy-makers’ perceptions

about the current automated speed enforcement penalty system in terms of its

perceived legitimacy, deterrent effect on drivers, and effectiveness on crash and

fatality rates. In addition, the three components of deterrence theory were investigated

to gain a full understanding of what policy-makers think about these issues. The

answers showed to what extent policy-makers understand the components of the

theory and if they have utilised that understanding in creating or amending traffic rules.

The answers were helpful in determining the goal behind automated speed

enforcement program and the theoretical thinking behind it.


The third theme concerned the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement

program, and this section of the interview sought to understand how policy-makers

perceive this. Effectiveness and high performance could be used as indicators of the

program’s success. A clear and comprehensive evaluation would lead to identifying

the weakness that could be eliminated and its strengths that could be enhanced. The

answers obtained under this theme would enable the researcher to understand how the

effectiveness and performance of the automated speed enforcement program are

perceived by policy-makers. Furthermore, policy-makers could recommend ways to

evaluate the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program according to

its effect on drivers’ speeding behaviour.

The fourth theme was about barriers preventing more effective legislation and

implementation of automated speed enforcement in Oman. The responses obtained for

the questions under this theme identified the reasons why effective implementation is

difficult to apply in the road safety context in Oman. It also looked at recommendations

and suggested actions which should be undertaken in order to overcome such barriers.

In addition, these questions investigated to what extent these solutions can be

implemented. The responses contributed significantly to the research as a whole, as

they helped to clearly understand what should be done in order to make the automated

speed enforcement program more effective in terms of its operations and legislation.

The final topic examined the future of the automated speed enforcement program

in Oman. This theme built on the previous one, as it sought suggestions for improving

the current program. There were questions about future recommendations for Omani

automated speed enforcement program in terms of additional legislation to ensure

swiftness, severity, and certainty of punishment, as well as additional technologies,

mechanisms to change people’s perceptions or behaviours, and better alignment of

operational practices with the legislative aspects. The answers obtained from

participants under this theme were used for the recommendation section of this

research, and will also be discussed in relation to the barriers preventing more effective

automated speed enforcement.

These five themes are outlined below to address Research Questions 4-6. The

themes are discussed individually in the next pages. Note that example quotes have

been cited below, while additional supporting quotes are provided in Appendix F.


5.3.1 The Current Speeding Problem from Policy-makers’ Point of View

Questions were posed to policy-makers to explore their perceptions on the

current road safety situation in Oman. The assumption behind these questions was that

if the policy-makers are not convinced that there is a road safety problem in Oman,

they would not be motivated to look for solutions and thus their level of intervention

would depend on how serious and severe they think the problem is. It was found, from

the responses obtained, that all participants from the four different government

organizations agreed that the road safety in Oman is a big issue and its problem is of

high-level authority concern, as one participant stated:

“It is of a big concern as His Majesty talked about it in one of his speeches” (Int18)

The speech was given in October, 2009 by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said,

ruler of Sultanate of Oman. He mentioned the issue of road crashes and fatalities and

his speech placed significant stress on the problem and its basic solution of obeying

the traffic rules. Quoting from his speech: “What is happening in our roads must be a

concern of each and every single person in the Omani society” (MrDhofar4ever,

2009). His Majesty requested people to be more careful while driving and more

committed to traffic rules and regulations (MrDhofar4ever, 2009).

In addition, one participant stated, after he said that the road safety problem has

been talked about by everyone:

“I can assure you that this problem has been, for a long time, a discussion of the Omani people not only while meeting and during family gatherings, but also in the social media networks” (Int21)

In the researcher’s experience, discussion about crashes and fatalities always

occurs at Omani social gatherings. It often seems that every family has lost a family

member in a road crash. The fatality rate per day in Oman is 1.8 (ROP, 2016).

Additionally, road safety is discussed from time to time in social media networks such

as Facebook, Twitter, and other networking applications that can be accessed via smart

mobile phones, like WhatsApp. Such discussion usually occurs when there is a fatal

crash or a crash that blocks the traffic for a considerable amount of time, which is a

regular occurrence in Oman.

The dilemma of traffic crashes in Oman is considered one of the significant and

distressing issues in the road safety context, as two other participants described, for

example:


“It is one of the significant problems in Oman and it needs all parties within the society to get involved in the solutions; the ROP, schools, universities and responsible ministries” (Int22)

They stressed that more efforts are needed to tackle this problem, although there

is a very little decrease in the number of traffic crashes and fatalities.

It can be understood from the responses that all seven participants agreed that

there is an obvious and significant road safety issue in Oman. Almost all participants

stated that speed is the most contributing factor for the road safety problem in Oman

in terms of the number of crashes and fatalities, which was statistically clear and

explained within the first study of this research. However, participants had different

points of view when it came to categorising the speed if it is social or legal problem.

Four participants stated that speed is a combination of both social and legal problems,

and both aspects need to be addressed in order to solve it:

“It, the speed problem, is considered as both social and legal problem and to

solve it we need to socially encourage the drivers AND legally force them to obey to traffic regulations” (Int18)

One participant (Int20), mentioned an interesting point about the road safety

culture in Oman, which related to the way people perceive or think about road safety

as the participant meant in his phrase (Int20) see Appendix F. The participant brought

up people’s perceptions about road safety while stressing the need for plans to change

such perceptions by working from both the legal and social sides. Another participant

agreed, and acknowledged that the current traffic regulations do not achieve a good

deterrent effect:

“Its route starts from the behaviour within the society and the non-deterrent traffic Law” (Int19).

This phrase about non-deterrent traffic regulations was reinforced by another

participant (Int23), who also mentioned that society, indirectly, encourages such

behaviour when it does not condemn speeding and does not see it as a problem.

Speeding is, of course, legally condemned but the rules are not seen to have a deterrent

effect. In addition, the society does not condemn speeding which, in turn, does not

discourage drivers from exceeding the speed limit.


While these four policy-makers saw that speeding stems from both legal and

social issues, there were three other policy-makers who perceived it as a purely a social

issue, such as when one stated:

“I think speeding is a pure social behaviour issue” (Int21).

They perceived speed as an issue which does not have to do with the legislation.

In addition, they consider the current traffic regulations to have a sufficient deterrent

effect, and that they do not need to be amended by any means, as in response of

participant (Int22). Among the possible explanations for such responses is that these

two policy-makers did not seem to consider legal regulations among the possible

solutions for this problem, as one of them assumed:

“It is social issue and we do not need any more legal interventions” (Int24).

However, they believed that social solutions are strongly needed.

When seeking the legal solutions implemented or thought about by Omani

policy-makers in regards to solving the road safety issue in general and exceeding the

speed limit in particular, all participants agreed that Omani Traffic Law was the most

significant legal solution implemented to reduce the magnitude of road safety problem

in Oman together with the amendments of it and its executive regulations. In addition

to the Traffic Law, there have been other actions parallel to the legislative ones, such

as geometric solutions and the existence of the automated speed enforcement program,

as one of the participants said:

“Creating Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations together with the geometric solutions such as speed breakers and roundabouts. The automated speed enforcement program is considered one of the legal interventions” (Int19).

Two participants stated that Traffic Law is considered a significant solution, but

nevertheless they both doubted the application of its executive regulations in some

cases:

“There was the Traffic Law in 1993, then the addition of Article 50 in 2001 that increased the sanction to imprisonment if there is fatality resulting from a crash. Unfortunately, none of the judges have used it, even though the fatalities resulting from crashes are very high” (Int23).

Article 50 gave judges the authority to imprison the driver who causes a crash

with at least one fatality for a maximum of two years ("Traffic Law and Executive

Regulations of Traffic Law," 2016). According to the response from the participant,

this power has not been used by judges, even though some crashes resulted in more


than four fatalities on site, not one of the at-fault drivers was imprisoned. Two other

policy-makers believed that the current traffic law is enough, stating:

“There has not been any major solution as the current traffic regulations are enough” (Int21).

A follow-up question in regards to the legal intervention implemented within the

road safety issue in Oman was posed in order to see to what extent the intervention

was effective in tackling the problem. Participants had different views and perceptions

when it came to the results derived from the current Traffic Law implemented. This

could be because of the law itself or it could be because of the way it is implemented,

as previously when two participants doubted the applications of some Executive

Regulations of the law. One participant thought that the Law worked but not up to the

expectations:

“Yes, it worked, but of course not as expected” (Int18).

While another mentioned that automated speed enforcement program

contributed to solving the problem together with the current law:

“They did, the Traffic Law and automated speed enforcement program, the results can be clearly seen from the statistics” (Int19).

As previously mentioned in the first study, Oman had more than one thousand

automated speed enforcement units of five different types, as of the year 2015. With

such large number of automated speed enforcement units, one participant believed that

the results of implementing the automated speed enforcement program were not

remarkable when compared to the number of speed detectors, stating:

“They have decreased this dilemma to some extent; however, the reduction is not remarkable because crashes are still happening and with relatively high numbers when compared with the number of countermeasures implemented” (Int23).

On the other hand, legal intervention is considered a small part of the solution

and there must be more interventions from different parties as one participant

expressed:

“In my point of view, such problem cannot be solved from one side only; the legal intervention which contributes partly to solving the problem. There must be other interventions like academic, social, and even from vehicle sellers’ side; commercial intervention.” (Int20).

The participant placed emphasis on the academic and social interventions to help

solve such issue, saying that more scientific research is needed. Furthermore, he


mentioned that the society must be held partly responsible, and also must be part of

the solution. Surprisingly, the participant suggested that automobile traders should be

part of the solution. Usually, in Oman, automobile sellers are contacted by the Ministry

of Commerce and Industry in order to assure that particular safety and technical

specifications are included in the vehicles imported to Oman. However, the participant,

as a policy-maker, believed that this party must be involved in the solution of road

safety situation in Oman and that this involvement should be assured by law.

Legal intervention against individuals can be either monetary sanctions or

imprisonment of a person or impounding of a vehicle, as one participant explained:

“Legal interventions are about monetary sanctions and imprisonment. Some people react positively to the monetary sanctions while others are deterred by imprisonment and I see that imprisonment is much better in terms of deterrent effect” (Int21).

This statement suggested that the fine value is not considered a strong deterrent

compared to imprisonment. This could be because the fine value is very low, and it

can be paid quite easily by anyone who owns a car. The recent new amendments in the

Omani Traffic Law are still not in effect when this research was conducted, as the

Executive Regulations have not been prepared yet. However, the new Executive

Regulations of Traffic Law and how effective they will be is a question for future

research.

From the statistics obtained from the Royal Oman Police and analysed in the

first study, it is known that speeding contributes to more than 50 percent of the crashes

and fatalities, and it is considered the factor that contributes most to road trauma in

Oman. When seeking the reason behind this high percentage or the person(s) who

should be held responsible, from the policy-makers’ points of view, there were

different opinions. One participant indicated that drivers must bear the whole

responsibility of the crash in which the fault is the driver’s.

“Logically it must be the driver’s, but unfortunately the driver is never held accountable equal to the magnitude of the problem caused. Insurance companies pay the expenses and the regulation has very low sanctions. Policy-makers must impose sanctions which fit the act” (Int18).

The insurance system exists in almost all motorized countries, and has many

benefits, such as making sure that losses are covered for all parties including the at-

fault person and any others involved. However, the participant saw that in Oman the

responsible driver does not get sanctions that deter him/her from continuing such


negligent behaviour. On the other hand, three participants out of seven advised that all

road safety-related people and entities should hold the responsibility of such:

“The related entities such as the house, the school, the masjid, colleges and universities, government ministries, and the Royal Oman Police. They all should hold part of the responsibility” (Int19).

This response suggested that solutions must start from the families (houses) as

the first ring in the chain of road safety responsible parties. In addition, the Masjid is

partly responsible, as a place of religious and social outreach on good behaviour and

guidance to avoid and discourage the behaviours that harm society as a whole. Another

participant blamed the society and holds it accountable for road safety in Oman:

“It is a pure social problem, so the society holds complete responsibility. I am saying that because of the very simple example, they all know that not wearing a seat belt is illegal and unsafe behaviour but they still do not wear it” (Int21).

Another participant believed the ROP is the only entity who is responsible:

“I hold the ROP fully responsible as it is in charge of road safety in Oman.” (Int24).

The ROP is in charge of road safety in Oman, but in co-operation with other

government and social organisations. Another participant thought differently when he

explained why the ROP should hold a large portion of the responsibility, but not all of

it:

“We cannot say that the ROP is the only one responsible for the problem, but it is the most responsible organisation as it is the one that mostly deals with and is concerned about road safety in Oman” (Int23)

This response supported previous responses which assumed that the road trauma

responsibility is held by everyone in society, and not by one entity. However, the ROP

deals with the road safety aspects in Oman by different means, such as that it is in

charge of operating automated speed enforcement, patrols, and fine processing.

Additionally, the ROP holds the responsibility of road monitoring in order to keep

them safe for the users. Throughout the discussions with participants about who should

be held responsible, the idea that the ROP should bear most of the responsibility was

dominant.

This theme has concluded that there is a general consent from all participants

that road safety in Oman has issues that need to be solved. They pointed out that speed

is the most contributing factor to crashes and fatalities in Oman. Four of them consider

speed a problem related to both social and legal factors, whereas the other three believe


it is a purely social issue. In addition, there is an emphasis on the academic institute to

participate in solving the road safety problem by doing scientific-based research, and

a general consent that the ROP should hold the greater portion of road safety

responsibility in Oman.

5.3.2 The Main Goal of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman

In the first study, it was found that the automated speed enforcement program

did not have clear goals. In other words, the people who work in the field of automated

speed enforcement, management and operations, did not have clear understanding of

the goals. That could be because the goals were not written or clearly communicated

to the police officers. In this second study, the researcher investigated the issue to learn

if policy-makers have the same perception about goals of the automated speed

enforcement program. In addition, the objectives behind the traffic regulations in

general were sought. In regards to the general objectives behind traffic regulations,

policy-makers have slightly different points of view; however, at the end, all responses

obtained from participants mentioned the punishment aspect behind the existence of

regulations. Three policy-makers stated that the ultimate goal of traffic law is to reduce

the road crashes and fatalities when one said:

“I do not think there is clear written goal for this program; however, the appropriate one that can be derived from it is to countermeasure the negative phenomena in the Omani roads, which in turn leads to fewer crashes and lower fatality rates.” (Int20)

The negative phenomena meant in this statement are the behaviours of risky and

speedy drivers on the Omani roads. These behaviours are a serious issue, in the first

study, the statistics of speed fines have proven. As the rates of road crashes and

fatalities in Oman are relatively high, the two policy-makers related the existence of

traffic law and regulations with the ultimate goal of reducing such rates, participants

(Int18) and (Int24).

While the other three policy-makers expressed their understanding about the

general goals of traffic law and regulations by laying emphasis on the enforcement of

law and order in the Omani roads, quoting one of the responses that linked the order

enforcement to the general deterrent effect of the Traffic law and mentioned the

specific deterrent effect when it comes to detecting drivers who disobey the law:


“Firstly, to enforce order on the roads which is general deterrence, and secondly, to deter drivers from disobeying the law when using specific deterrence.” (Int23)

One policy-maker thought that the law exists in order to give details for each act

considered crime or infringement with the sanction against such act when he stated:

“In general, Traffic Law exists to regulate the traffic on the roads so there always be an article against any irresponsible behaviour. Additionally, Traffic Law is subject to change from time to time to adjust the type and strength of a sanction.” (Int19).

This theme started with asking questions about the general goals and objectives

of Traffic Law and its regulations, and then the discussion was narrowed into asking

about the specific goals of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. As

discussed earlier in the first study of this research, the goal/goals of the automated

speed enforcement program did not seem to be clear among the people working in the

field of automated speed enforcement in Oman. Both the managerial and the

operational officers did not have a clear statement of the goals and the researcher could

not find any written document about the goals. It was assumed that the goals could be

obtained more clearly from the policy-makers who have created or amended the Omani

Traffic Law or its Executive Regulations. Based on these assumptions, the researcher

asked a question in order to seek such goals and understand the rationale behind the

program. However, the responses from the policy-makers did not seem to show a clear

understanding of the goals either, which supports the findings of the first study. The

responses provide evidence that there is no written or otherwise communicated goal

for the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, but rather there are

assumptions about the goals. The following statements obtained from policy-makers’

responses vary based on the policy-maker’s perception of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman. For example, one policy-maker stated that the goal is

to stop drivers from exceeding the speed limits:

“The goal could be seen as to stop the illegal driving speed in the Omani roads.” (Int20)

This is an assumption about the goal, but there is no written document or proof

that the goal is as stated above. Another policy-maker assumed that the goal of the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman is to reduce crashes:

“To mitigate the crashes and save properties and lives.” (Int22)


This could be the ultimate goal of the program, as it is the ultimate goal of the

Traffic Law and regulations. As the cameras are meant to be speed detectors, other

policy-makers suggested that the goals are to reduce the speed and enforce order in

terms of vehicle speed:

“The automated speed enforcement program exists in order to enforce the order in the roads in terms of vehicles speed.” (Int21)

On the other hand, one of the participants connected the goal with the general

and specific deterrent effect of automated speed enforcement. Moreover, he pointed

out changing the behaviour of drivers when it comes to speeding:

“To generally deter drivers so their speeding behaviour will be changed and to specifically deter those who exceed the speed limit in the roads.” (Int23)

However, another policy-maker stated that there are no clear goals for the

automated speed enforcement program, at least not mentioned by the ROP when he

said:

“In fact, I do not know what the main goal of this program is, even though I always read most of the articles published by the ROP in the local newspapers and the social networks.” (Int18)

He suggested that if there is a clear goal, it must have been talked about

somewhere as the automated speed enforcement are talked about in many occasions

and in almost all media and social networks. It could be that the ROP does not write

specific goal or goals for each program within its responsibility, but it relates the

program goals to the wider and more general goals of the Traffic Law or to why the

ROP exists in the first place. Another assumption is that the automated speed

enforcement program goal is a combination of or consists of all of the above-

mentioned goals, but surprisingly it is not written or documented, as a participant

believed:

“I think there are several goals for automated speed enforcement program such as reducing crashes, fatalities, and detecting speeders. However, I have not seen these goals documented and that is how it works in most government organisations here.” (Int24).

The next theme discussed with the policy-makers was the documentation of the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman, which is considered one of most

significant programs implemented by the ROP within the road safety context and has

been operating for more than 15 years. In the first study, the researcher looked into the

rationale behind the automated speed enforcement program, but found no written


documentation about it. A question was asked about this issue during the first study,

and there were different responses from ROP officers in the field of automated speed

enforcement management and operations. Adding to this, the policy-makers were

asked about the basis for the automated speed enforcement program decision. There

were different responses, but most pointed to statistical analysis done by the ROP, for

example:

“It was based on statistical analysis and studies conducted by the ROP, as they claim” (Int22)

In the first study, when seeking the written documentation of the automated

speed enforcement goals or operational manuals, some officers claimed that there were

written documents but they did not have the chance to see or read them. There could

be written document that they did not have access to. However, another policy-maker

stated that according to statistics, speeding is the main contributing factor for fatal

crashes in Oman, and because of that, the Omani government decided to implement

such big program. He expressed:

“It was based on analysis of traffic statistics. As the government considers speed a main contributing factor to most fatal crashes in Oman, the automated speed enforcement program was initiated in order to tackle the issue.” (Int19)

Speed contributes to 52 percent of the total crashes and between 2009 to 2015,

it contributed to 54 percent of total fatalities in Oman. While two policy-makers

acknowledged that the decision was made based on only statistics, two other policy-

makers argued that the decision was made based on both statistics and experience:

“It was based on the statistics obtained by the ROP and on the experience of some western and middle eastern states. However, I cannot say that those statistics have been scientifically analysed” (Int23)

It could be that the numbers themselves were enough evidence of the problem

and they did not need to be analysed. In addition, such negative phenomenon, as one

expressed, did not need scientific analysis in order to come up with the solution of

automated speed enforcement program, quoting the other policy-maker’s response:

“The decision of automated speed enforcement program was based on a combination of experience and analysis. In addition, it is a result of negative phenomenon on the roads.” (Int21)

It could be true that there was no need for scientific analysis to decide on using

automated speed enforcement on Omani roads, however, the scientific analysis could

be needed for directing the usage of such speed countermeasure tools in order to make


the best use of them. On the other hand, one policy-maker, when asked if the statistics

have been analysed or not, explained that some of the obvious problems like speed do

not need a deep understanding in order to decide upon their solutions:

“I do not know if they have been scientifically analysed or not, but from my point of view, there are a few phenomena you do not need to scrutinise or deeply analyse to make a decision. Speed is one of those phenomena.” (Int20)

This response represents how some policy-makers thought about such issues,

showing that a deep understanding of the problem does not need to be scientifically

proven, but personal knowledge and experience are enough.

One policy-maker stated that he had not come across any document that

discusses the decision on which such big program was based.

“I have not come across any study or document that discusses this issue.”

(Int18)

It could be that the ROP does not pay attention to written documents, as

previously seen in the issue of the specific goals behind the automated speed

enforcement program. It seemed that such documentation was not a big concern to the

ROP as long as they are doing the job in the right way from their viewpoint.

This answer was supported by another participant who said that when he

searched for a study or analysis on which the automated speed enforcement program

was based, he found that it was based on knowledge and experience rather than

research and study.

“To be honest, I did search within ROP internal documents and external publications to find the rationale behind introducing automated speed enforcement program. However, the summary of my search is that this program was based on the knowledge and experience of people who decided on it.” (Int24)

Such knowledge and experience could be based on previous research and studies

done or read by those decision makers, but this was not mentioned when discussing

the process of deciding on the automated speed enforcement program.

Under the same theme, to the policy-makers were asked how the automated

speed enforcement program was perceived in terms of its legitimacy. As mentioned

and discussed earlier in the first study of this research, the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman consists of more than 1200 units of five different types

of automated speed enforcement devices. They are deployed in different places in


Oman and at different times. The policy-makers were asked what they think the

people’s opinion of the legitimacy of deploying automated speed enforcement in the

Omani roads. This question assumed that policy-makers might consider how society

reacts to and looks at automated speed enforcement and their related regulations, as

the Omani road safety context may require such consideration. The perceptions were

divided, as only two policy-makers believed that people do not see automated speed

enforcement as legitimate. Both justified the reason behind society opinion by pointing

to the places where automated speed enforcement is deployed:

“I think, to some extent, people do not accept automated speed enforcement and do not consider it as more than a revenue maker. This could be, from my perspective, because of firstly, unclear or unavailable criteria for where the ROP places automated speed enforcement and secondly the society was never involved when deciding on the automated speed enforcement program in the first place” (Int23)

He assumed that if the government is to make people comply with the rules or

make the society accept such program, it should involve the society in making the

decision. If this is the case, clarification of the site selection criteria, supported by

scientific evidence, could change society thinking in this regard. In most countries of

the world, automated speed enforcement is not welcome and is not seen as legitimate

by people, as the cameras limit their freedom of speed. Oman is no exception, as

another policy-maker believed:

“I cannot say that people do not see automated speed enforcement as legitimate and this is because a big portion of any society does not like any procedure that limits their freedom, regardless of its overall benefits to them” (Int20)

Other policy-makers believed that some Omani people see the automated speed

enforcement as legitimate and he expressed that people in Oman consider speed

detectors as a necessary tool for road safety:

“Yes, people do see automated speed enforcement as a legitimate and necessary tool. I sense that from them when I give lectures about the law and regulations in different places in the society” (Int19)

It is hard to tell if the majority of people see automated speed enforcement as

legitimate or not because there are always supporters and opponents when talking

about automated speed enforcement particularly. The reason behind this conflict could

be the way automated speed enforcement is deployed as one policy-maker thought:

“It depends on how automated speed enforcement is deployed. When they are deployed in hidden and sneaky sites, they are not seen as legitimate.” (Int24)


Alternatively, it may be because of the level of traffic awareness delivered to the

society, as another policy-maker believed:

“Yes, most of the people see them as legitimate, except a small group who does not see automated speed enforcement as legitimate, however, this group has not been given enough of a dose of traffic awareness.” (Int21)

During the discussion with this participant, he mentioned that most traffic

awareness lectures and workshops are attended by people who generally comply with

the traffic rules, whereas they should actually address the risky drivers more often.

Speeding is considered as an issue in the Omani context of road safety, yet, the

reason behind that has not been clearly identified. There is a huge number of speed

detectors on the Omani roads, yet drivers still exceed the speed limit and the rate of

speed fines indicates high level of traffic disobedience. As discussed earlier, the rates

of speed fines are 4.8 per driving license, and 5.1 per vehicle (ROP, 2015). When

trying to find out what policy-maker think is the reason behind such high-speed fine

rates, each gave a different reason, however, three of them referred to the non-deterrent

traffic regulations as one of the reasons for drivers to continue exceeding the speed

limit. The non-severe sanctions were also mentioned when one policy-maker said:

“Currently, the high number of speeding fines are for the ones exceeding the speed by few kilometres. This type of speeding fine has a very low value which is not deterring the drivers. I suggest doubling the fine value of this type of speed fines.” (Int19)

This could be a logical conclusion of the road safety situation in Oman in terms

of automated speed enforcement and the regulations behind them. The participant

assumed that most speed fines are the type recorded when driver does more than 15

km/h, but not more than 35 Km/h above the speed limit. This type of speed fines is the

fourth type, and has a monetary sanction of OMR 10, which approximately equals to

AUD$33. Even if this assumption is taken as fact, the speed is still very high, as the

speed limit on Oman highways is 120km/h, meaning that the driver can do 135 Km

per hour before the vehicle gets detected and fined by automated speed enforcement.

All three policy-makers referred to the non-deterrent effect of traffic regulation

in terms of the monetary value of the fine. Surprisingly, no one mentioned the

procedures of the existing penalty system. As a supplemental reason for traffic

regulations deterring speeding drivers, it could be because of how the sanctions are

handled or applied, and not only because of the severity of the sanctions. The


procedures were discussed in the first study of this research and they did not seem to

have any deterrent effect on drivers.

The other policy-makers mentioned several more reasons, but did not bring up

either the value of speed fine, or the procedures of the existing penalty system in Oman.

One stated that speeding is accepted and not seen as bad behaviour:

“Here, speed is accepted and most middle-eastern people do not see it as wrong or bad behaviour and within this way of thinking, you should expect that all drivers exceed the speed limits. In other word, you are stranger if you don’t speed.” (Int24).

While another policy-maker believed that external factors, such as distances

travelled and traffic jams, cause drivers to exceed the speed limit:

“The longer distance you drive, the more mistakes you make on the road. People drive to complete many important tasks like going to/coming from work. Another reason for exceeding the speed limit is when there is traffic jam and once it comes back to normal, drivers speed up in order to compensate the time spent in the traffic jam.” (Int22)

As the car is the dominant mode of travel in Oman, where the public transport

network is very small compared with many other countries, people use cars for almost

all their travel. Oman does not have trains or metros, and the bus network is not

widespread. This response assumes that when the car is the only mode of travel in

Oman, people use it more, which in turn leads to more probability of committing

mistakes on the road. However, another policy-maker thought that the reason for

drivers to continue exceeding the speed limit lays in poor deterrent effect of the current

regulations and the situation will never change unless there is a change in current

traffic legislation, when he said:

“I think the problem lies in the concept behind these automated speed enforcement devices which are deterring drivers from exceeding the speed limits. This concept has not yet been in Omani drivers’ minds and it will never be if the current situation continues” (Int23)

This response supports the results obtained from the first study when almost all

the participating officers were asked about the deterrent effect derived from automated

speed enforcement program and its regulations, and they agreed that the effect is very

low.

Although the goals of the automated speed enforcement program have not been

written or documented, there are several intended goals indicated by the participants,

such as reducing speed and detecting speeding vehicles, increasing the compliance


level, reducing speed related crashes and saving property and lives, enforcing order in

terms of vehicle speed, and generally deterring drivers from speeding. During the

interviews, policy-makers who have roles in amending or changing the Traffic Rule

and its Executive Regulations, were asked about the alignment of the traffic

regulations with the intended goals of automated speed enforcement program. Six of

the seven policy-makers believed that the existing penalty system is not aligned with

the intended goals, for example:

“It is not aligned at all if the goal is to deter drivers from exceeding the speed limits as drivers are still exceeding speed limits according to the statistics from ROP.” (Int23)

This participant suggests that the intended goal is to deter drivers from exceeding

the speed limit and the existing penalty system, as he believed, does not provide a

deterrent effect, based on the statistics of speed fines and accidents caused by speed.

Another believes that the regulations themselves are outdated and there is a need to

change and upgrade them according to the dynamic changes in the road safety context

in Oman, saying:

“I can say that this penalty system is somehow not aligned with the goals. This penalty system is old and it needs to be updated regularly considering changes that have happened since the last update of the regulations.” (Int21)

Moreover, a response indicated that there are a few regulations which are not

properly applied and that may bring the deterrent effect to lower level when one said:

“No, this is because not all regulations are applied” (Int18)

This statement could be considered as true because there are some Traffic Law

Regulations which are not applied properly or not applied at all, such as demerit point

procedures, which in turn, reduce the deterrent effect of the law.

It could be stated, based on several responses, that there could be some

regulations which are not applied properly. When asked about why a demerit points

system is not applied, even though it is stated in the regulations, the responses were

negative. However, one policy-maker believed that the existing penalty system, in

terms of the fine value and the procedures, is aligned with the goals of automated speed

enforcement program. He referred to the financial situation in Oman because of the

crises of oil prices in the world.

“Yes, it is when taking into consideration the per capita income and the financial situation currently happening in Oman” (Int19)


This response reflects the common sentiment in Oman, “We do not want to

punish the poor people”, and considers the financial situation of the Omani people,

who depend on cars as the dominant mode of travel, and any slight increase in the fuel

prices will significantly affect their financial abilities.

In contrast, there was one policy-maker who believed that the existing penalty

system is aligned with the intended goals of the automated speed enforcement

program. He thought that the most important goal of automated speed enforcement is

to detect speeders, and he did not go farther than that in discussing this question:

“They are there to detect speeders and they do the job perfectly. This goal is met and the regulations are aligned to it. I am convinced that there is no more important goal than this and I see that other goals come later.” (Int24)

As discussed in the first study, the literal English translation of automated speed

enforcement program name is ‘Speed Control Devices’. It could be that the participant

based his response on the name of program in Arabic. However, his point of view

changed over the discussion, as will be explained later on this chapter.

To conclude the theme of automated speed enforcement goals, the participants

agreed that the ultimate goals behind the traffic regulations are to enforce the order,

regulate traffic, and reduce the crashes and related fatalities. It was thought that the

goals of the automated speed enforcement program could be clearly obtained from

policy-makers; however, the goals which have been mentioned by policy-makers

varied, including, but not limited to, stopping illegal driving speed, saving properties

and lives, providing evidence against speeders, and generally and specifically deterring

drivers. It was also made clear that there are no goals written or documented about the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman, which supports the findings of the

first study of this thesis. Among the possible explanations is that the automated speed

enforcement program goal is a combination of all of the above-mentioned goals, but

surprisingly it is not written or documented. Interestingly, a policy-maker stated that

is the way it works in most government entities, where specific goals are not written

or documented but rather the general goals are. In regards to the decision made about

the automated speed enforcement program, it was very clear from the basic numbers

obtained from the ROP that speeding is the main contributing factor to crashes and

fatalities, thus, the automated speed enforcement program decision was based on such

statistics. Besides the statistics, there is the personal knowledge and experience used

by policy-makers to decide on issues like this. However, such knowledge and


experience are not mentioned in the process of making decisions. Speed is still a major

issue in Oman and policy-makers think that one of the reasons behind it the non-

deterrent traffic regulations, particularly in terms of severity. Moreover, policy-makers

think that there is a lack of traffic awareness campaigns within the Omani society.

Consequently, automated speed enforcement is not seen as legitimate by some Omani

people, particularly when it is hidden and considered sneaky. At this stage of the study,

policy-makers did not think that the very slow non-deterrent process of the existing

penalty system could be one of the reasons which make exceeding the speed limit a

habit among drivers. More importantly, the intended goals of automated speed

enforcement program might not be aligned properly with the existing penalty system,

or the procedures and regulations, as some participants stated. In addition, it is believed

that there are a few regulations that are not applied, but which could increase the

deterrent effect of the law, such as the demerit point system. This suggests that the

policy-makers believe that the existing penalty system needs to be updated.

5.3.3 The Deterrent Effect of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman

The deterrent effect achieved by the automated speed enforcement program is a

questionable given that the number of speeding fines and the rate of speed-related

crashes remains relatively high. In this theme of the interview, the three elements of

deterrence theory were discussed from the policy-makers’ points of view, including

how they understand it in relation to speed enforcement in Oman.

The discussion started with the question of whether the current penalty system

was effective in preventing drivers from exceeding the speed limit or not. A question

in this regard was posed to all seven policy-makers from different government

organisations. When talking about detecting speeding, some said that the program has

done a great job, but when it comes to preventing speeding, the responses were both

positive and negative. Two policy-makers believed that the system has deterred drivers

to some extent. Supporting quotes can be found in Appendix F.

Next, suggestions and solutions for how speed driving behaviours could be better

deterred were discussed. In this regard, policy-makers were asked about their

perceptions on how that could be accomplished. There were different responses

obtained but six out of seven responses suggested more severe sanctions. One of the

participants added that increasing the detection level could be helpful:


“Firstly, severe and quick sanction and secondly, more traffic awareness for the society. In addition, increasing the level of detection.” (Int18)

It is important to mention that the level of detection could be seen as high due to

the number of detectors in Oman. Other participants also mentioned the need for severe

sanctions, and one even considered taking offenders to courts rather than just giving

them fines. In addition, another policy-maker recommended issuing warnings before

an increased sanction. The idea of giving offenders an advice will be discussed further

later, with the issue of voluntary compliance.

“Giving a warning first, then a severe sanction if already warned” (Int20)

Moreover, one policy-maker believed that severe sanctions are more important

and have a greater deterrent effect than fast punishment and court trials do.

“The severe sanction is the solution, then comes fast punishment procedures and court trials.” (Int21)

On the other hand, one of the policy-makers mentioned that the traffic

regulations must be applied without exceptions in order to have a better deterrent effect

on drivers, because some of the regulations are not applied properly or not applied at

all. He was not sure about the reasons for why some regulations are not applied, when

he said:

“I think if we start applying the regulations as they are, we may get a good deterrent effect. The additional sanctions, such as suspending the driving licence after gaining a specific number of points is not currently applied, I do not know why. I think there is some negligence from the Directorate General of Traffic in terms of applying some traffic regulations.” (Int23)

This could be because of the principle of reconciliation that is routinely applied

in most cases of traffic fines. The principle of reconciliation in Article No.138 of the

Executive Regulations of Traffic Law states that once a monetary fine is paid, the

offender is forgiven from being imprisoned or given further sanctions. It says that this

principle can always be used with the offender once the fine is paid, except when at

least one fatality resulted from the crash caused by the offender. This principle can be

used with offenders who drive more than 80 Km/h above the speed limits or run a red-

light signal. This explains most of the practices of the ROP. However, the usage of this

principle should be in exceptional cases, but it is currently applied in almost all cases.

The idea of not applying some traffic regulations to some offenders was repeated by

another policy-maker. He thought for a deterrent effect to take place, there must be a

few hard decisions to be taken by government:


“If you want it to happen in the near future, I am telling you this is very hard and needs very decisive decisions. For example, tripling the fine value and implementing every single regulation in the law literally. In other words, punishing the society” (Int24)

This again reflects the common sentiment in Omani society of not punishing the

poor people. It seems that most people were driven by such thought within the Omani

social context. Religiously, Muslims must have mercy on other people around them

and be considerate while dealing with them in different aspects of life. However,

regulations are written against actions not against specific people. Regardless if the

offender is poor or not, the punishment is linked to the action committed by a person.

Unfortunately, the thought about not punishing the poor people is dominant when the

discussion is with society members or representatives.

Only one of the seven policy-makers did not mention severe sanctions when

discussing ways to improve the deterrent effect on speed driving behaviours. The

participant instead placed the emphasis on traffic awareness campaigns starting from

early ages, as well as explaining how dangerous the speed is:

“By starting the traffic awareness from elementary schools and informing the society of the dangerous consequences of speed” (Int22)

This could be a good idea if applied carefully and monitored against its results

and effects on society and roads (Gharaibeh & Abdo, 2011), but it would take very

long time to execute and see results. If the Omani government is to create generations

who are well educated in terms of road safety in the future, it should start now with

elementary school children, or even before that. There is currently some attention paid

to school students of different levels in relation to road safety and traffic awareness,

according to responses obtained from participants. However, these efforts are not

evaluated or monitored against the results; they are more like informative lectures that

are often not very creative, and may not be particularly effective.

Rules and regulations are mostly about enforcing compliance, but there is also

voluntary compliance which is thought to be more effective and long lasting (Tyler,

Dienhart, & Thomas, 2008). Voluntary compliance comes from the moral belief and

thoughts which are expected to be strongly present in middle-eastern societies. In a

discussion about compliance, participants were asked about voluntary compliance, and

if they had tried or thought about encouraging voluntary compliance with the traffic

regulations. One said that the role of encouraging voluntary compliance is social rather

than official, while another policy-maker believed that this role is partially social and


that the ROP is doing the job in co-operation with the society and educational

organisations such as schools and universities.

Regardless of whether it is voluntary or enforced, the ROP does encourage

compliance through programs such as the traffic awareness lectures, traffic week, and

traffic exhibitions, when they promote the ideas of traffic safety among people and

sometimes conformers get awarded for their compliance to the traffic regulations. This

was clear in the response of one of the policy-makers:

“Yes, this is done through instilling traffic principles in the children and honouring the conformers during traffic weeks.” (Int19)

Likewise, another policy-maker mentioned that voluntary compliance could be

encouraged through traffic awareness lectures and involving the society in forming the

regulations. However, these procedures must be evaluated in order to see to what

extent they work:

“Encouraging voluntary compliance could be through the different ways of traffic awareness. However, these ways should be effective and evaluated against its results and goals. Another way to encourage voluntary compliance is to involve the society in forming the regulations.” (Int23)

Actually, society is involved by involving the society representatives from

Shaura Council and some members of the Council of State talk in the name of society

as they are part of it. Going deeper in the voluntary compliance when a policy-maker

linked it to Islamic religion and Arabic culture. He stressed the importance of making

use of such a concept:

“In an Islamic and Arabic society like the Omani society, there is a need to work on the voluntary compliance as this concept exists deeply in the Islamic religion and Arabic culture” (Int20).

Religiously, people are required to comply to the rules voluntarily, and several

Arabic social voluntary compliance concepts are driven and obtained from the Islamic

regulations. As Oman is one of the Arab Islamic states, the idea of voluntary

compliance was mentioned by one policy-maker, but rejected:

“The idea of voluntary compliance was suggested but got rejected for the time being as it needs very long time to be executed in addition to the continuous monitoring with a need of significant number of human resources.” (Int21)

However, one of the participants thought that voluntary compliance can be

promoted by stopping fining people and politely asking them not to commit the offence

again:

“Voluntary compliance could be obtained by giving advice/warning instead of fines” (Int24)


It could be that he based his response on a deep social concept which is that

being nice to people will get them to do what you want. In addition, giving advice in

such a situation could embarrass the offender, which can be more effective in Omani

society than the low-value monetary fine.

The discussions were taken deeper into the deterrent effects of the Omani

automated speed enforcement program on drivers. In addition to the general questions

asked about deterrent effect, the three elements of classical deterrence theory,

perceived severity, celerity, and perceived certainty of punishment, were explored.

These three concepts will be discussed in more details from legislature point of view

below.

5.3.3.1 Deterrent effect (Severity)

Firstly, the perceived severity of penalties and sanctions was discussed and

responses obtained from policy-makers about how people perceive the severity of the

current traffic fines. As the demerit point system is also considered a severe sanction,

it was included in the discussion. Five out of the seven policy-makers interviewed

believed that people do not perceive traffic fines as severe and gave different reasons

for that. The other two thought that some people do consider traffic fines sufficiently

severe. The demerit point system does exist within the Omani Executive Regulations

of Traffic Law, but has never been used against offenders for unknown reasons, as a

few participants acknowledged. The responses obtained from the policy-makers who

argued that people do not perceive sanction against traffic fines as severe included:

“They never perceive it as severe and the facts on Omani roads reflect that. The demerit point system is still in the regulations and there has not been any request to cease it, however, I do not know why it is not applied” (Int18)

The participant referred to traffic statistics as an indicator of people not

perceiving the sanctions are severe, as the number of speed fines is still high, as are

the rates of fatalities and crashes caused by speed. He also stated that the demerit point

system still exists within traffic regulations but there was no clear reason for not

applying it. While another policy-maker believed that the punishment could be certain

but not severe, as there is a very large number of speed detectors in Omani roads,

however, he said that the demerit point system is never applied in Oman when stating:

“I think they perceive it as certain but not severe. Automated speed enforcement devices were suddenly spread all over Oman, this did not happen gradually. In regards to the demerit point system, I have never heard of any incident when it was applied in Oman.” (Int22)


This response was supported by the response of another participant (Int23) when

he expressed that the demerit point system is not applied. The participant had the same

opinion in regards to the perceived severity of sanction related to traffic fines. In other

words, if it is perceived as severe, there would not be so many speeding fines.

While five participants agreed that drivers do not see traffic fines as severe

punishment, there were two participants who thought differently. They believed that

people within Omani society do see the traffic fine as severe because of their financial

situation. One assumed that the society is not ready yet for a demerit point system to

be applied, and if applied, more than 80 percent of driving licences would be

suspended:

“I think they do as their financial situation is affected by traffic fines payment. However, they do not sense it when they disobey the law, but rather when they pay the fines few months later. Regarding the demerit points system the society is not ready yet. I meant that if this system is applied, I believe that more than 80 percent of the driver licenses will be suspended.” (Int24)

The other policy-maker linked his opinion with the way people react towards

traffic fines. When asked about why the ROP ceased the application of demerit point

system, he said that the system was never ceased but did not clarify why it is not

applied. One reason for not applying the demerit point system could be the very high

rate of speed fines per driving licence, which means that there would be considerable

number of licences suspended.

Apart from how people perceive the sanctions in terms of their severity, policy-

makers were asked about their own opinion on the monetary fine value. Six

participants out of the seven interviewed thought that the fine value is not high while

only one participant thought it is acceptable, saying:

“The fine value is acceptable to some extent. However, the perception has not been changed yet, this is why the number of speed fines is still high” (Int22)

Two of the other six policy-makers suggested increasing the fine value in order

to raise the level of the deterrent effect derived from the monetary sanctions. As

discussed in the interview, one policy-maker stated that they have suggested increasing

the monetary value of traffic fines when discussing amendments of the Traffic Law.

This will appear in the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law once issued. This

suggestion has been made because, in the current traffic regulations, when the ROP

recommend a specific fine value to be increased, the procedures must be done through

court, as one of the policy-maker explained:


“I don’t see it high at all. And if we wanted to increase the fine value for any offence, we would have to go to court which normally takes very long time” (Int23)

The participant recalled a few incidents when specific fines were taken to courts

and he said they took not less than eight months, which is a considerably long time for

traffic fine procedures. The other three policy-makers shared the same opinion that the

monetary value of the fines is very low:

“The fine value is seen as very low by both society and officials.” (Int24)

The participant considered himself as society member first, before being a

policy-maker, and he considered the fine value very low compared to what it should

be according to the goal behind its existence.

As some of the policy-makers mentioned in their responses, above, some

regulations are not applied properly or not applied at all. As a consequence of that,

there could be an existence of a gap between the perceived punishment and the actual

one. Policy-makers were asked about such a difference if they think it really exists.

Five out of the seven policy-makers argued that there is a difference and gave different

justifications for their responses. The other two had different opinions. Interestingly,

one of the two stated that people do not consider the punishment as severe at all and

that they act accordingly, saying:

“I don’t think that people perceive it as a severe punishment in the first place, although they suffer financially. It is not severe in their perception.” (Int22)

The other policy-maker supported this response in regards to the absence of that

gap in drivers’ mind and he considers such drivers as careless. On the other hand, the

remaining five policy-makers agreed that there is a difference between what is

perceived by drivers and what is actually happening, for example:

“There is always a difference between the theoretical and the practical. We should bring this difference to its lowest level” (Int20)

The participant called for lowering the magnitude of such a gap, the same as was

heard during another interview when the participant stressed that this role should be

done through traffic awareness.

Surprisingly, two policy-makers had put the blame on the ROP as their

procedures are the reason for creating this gap in drivers’ perception. One said that the

ROP is responsible for this because they do not apply the regulations as they should

be:

“Of course, there is a difference, I hold the ROP full responsibility for creating this gap. For example, when running a red light, the driver must be imprisoned for 48 hours and the car is impounded for two weeks. Nonetheless, in reality this does not


happen. Female drivers are never imprisoned and in a governorate like the Southern Governorate drivers of any gender do not get imprisoned for running red lights and you know why” (Int23)

Another (Int24) blamed the ROP and suggested removing such regulations from

the law. His point was to take it out of the law so that its existence within the law will

not negatively affect the other procedures in terms of their deterrent effect. For

example, if a driver runs a red-light and does not get the punishment as specified and

stated in law, that driver will get a perception that punishment may not occur, even

when committing other offences. Such a perception will also be transferred to other

drivers.

Policy-makers were also asked about the magnitude of traffic punishment and

whether it is commensurate with the act done by offenders or not. The seven

participants gave different responses based on their experience and knowledge in this

field. Two participants believed that the punishment related to traffic fines is suitable

to the act committed:

“It is suitable if we take into consideration the givens of Omani society” (Int22)

The givens of Omani society means the social and financial situation, as the

participant expressed during the discussion, such as the long list of basic financial

commitments each family has, like bills and services fees. It could be that he

considered the traffic fines as among those basic financial commitments, as almost

every driver has a few traffic fines to pay when the car renewal is due. Another two

thought that the current punishment within the Traffic Law is suitable for some drivers,

but not for all of them.

It is prudent to mention here that when fatal crashes happen, there will be other

traffic fines recorded against the driver responsible for the crash. However, the

financial value of these fines does not exceed the maximum fine value specified in

Executive Regulations of Traffic Law which is OMR 50 (approximately AUD$167).

In addition, the driver can be imprisoned as a precaution procedure to protect him from

getting hurt by relatives of the dead person seeking revenge ("Executive Regulations

of Traffic Law of Oman," 1998). The other participant of the same opinion suggested

increasing the severity of punishment, stating:

“I consider it fits the offence for some people only, whereas for the majority of drivers it does not fit the offence. Meaning that such people need more severe punishment” (Int20)


The other three policy-makers stated that current punishments related to traffic

fines and specified by law do not fit the act related to them and they do not change

drivers’ behaviour:

“Not at all. I suggest that the punishment should be 10 times more than the currently applied in order to change the behaviour of speeding” (Int18)

The suggestion of increasing the monetary sanction by ten times could be an

indicator that the participant did not see the current punishments fitting the offences to

which they are assigned. He also stated that they have suggested tripling the fines in

order for the punishment to be more deterring, but this was not included in the law.

Another participant added that these punishments do not promote a deterrent effect as

long as the principle of reconciliation exists within the procedures, when he stated:

“Of course, it does not because the principle of reconciliation blows up the objective of punishment and every single effect of deterrence” (Int23)

As most policy-makers agreed that the punishment did not fit the offence, they

were followed up with another question in relation to increasing the punishment. If the

monetary sanction of traffic fines was to be increased to double or triple the current

value, what do policy-makers think would happen to the level of compliance with

traffic regulations? All but one, agreed that the level of compliance would increase

significantly and each one gave his perception on this regard. The only one who did

not believe that the level of compliance would increase once the fine value is increased

stated that this is attributed to the principle of reconciliation applied in almost all cases

of traffic fines. He said:

“High fine value could be part of the solution but in my point of view, as long as the principle of reconciliation is there, the deterrent effect on people’s minds will stay at its lowest” (Int23)

He assumed that if the government is to increase the fine value, it should also, at

the same time, stop applying the principle of reconciliation and take it out of the

regulations. Consequently, the deterrent effect will be clearly noted on drivers’

behaviour and that is what he believed, as the fines are part of the solutions but not the

only solution. One among the six other policy-makers who agreed that high fine value

wold lead to high level of compliance supported the idea that the monetary sanction is

only part of the solution, even though it could have significant effect on drivers’

behaviour:

“Monetary sanctions are not the only solution and it is a bit hard to increase the fine value meanwhile. Nevertheless, if the fine value increased, there will be a remarkable change in a very short time” (Int21)


In contrast to the first response, the other six policy-makers agreed that once the

fine value is raised, the compliance level would be increased too. People are more

careful when it comes to paying a considerable amount of money as participants

believed. Another stated that increasing the fine value would ultimately bring the

fatality crash rates to a low level. He predicted a significant decrease in fatal crashes,

as most of them are caused by committing a simple offence on the roads, such as

driving a few kilometres above the speed limit. This was also supported by another

participant:

“They will not exceed the speed limit any more” (Int19)

However, two policy-makers went deeper during the discussion of this point

and mentioned few aspects of how the increase in monetary fines could be seen from

a social perceptive. One mentioned that the increase in monetary fine value would

affect the driver’s family as well as the driver. He suggested imprisonment because it

could affect the driver only not his/her family:

“I do not think that they will continue offending and of course they’d be more cautious while driving. I would like to mention here that the high fine value does not affect only the driver but also the financial situation of driver’s family, while the imprisonment will affect the driver only not the family.” (Int20)

However, he also thought that imprisonment for a traffic fine is not accepted

by Omani society regardless of how serious the fine or how dangerous the violation.

On the other hand, increasing the fine value could deter most drivers, but not all of

them as one participant thought. He suggested increasing the fine value must be

accompanied by other procedures which could increase the deterrent effect on drivers

who do not have problem paying speed fines:

“If the fine value increased, the compliance level would increase and the number of speed fines would dramatically drop. It is prudent to mention that the monetary sanction does not deter all types of drivers, especially those who don’t have problem with money and they will continue exceeding the speed limit and paying the fines. I suggest there should be another solution or procedure parallel to increasing fine value” (Int22)

Policy-makers were also asked about their opinion on an incremental fine value

in the case of repetition. Four of them believed that the current penalty system is not

fair, as it does not differentiate between the habitual offenders and those who rarely

commit offences; two of them did not comment on the fairness of current system, and

one did not think that the current system is not fair. However, all seven participants

agreed that the incremental fine value system would be more effective than the current


system. The existing penalty system should distinguish between different types of

offenders as one stated:

“It is not fair, because we have to distinguish between conformers and defiers.” (Int23)

While another supported the idea of distinguishing between types of offenders,

he justified the application of one punishment regardless of the repetition when said:

“Of course, it is not fair to punish the habitual offender and the one who rarely commits an offence with the same sanction. However, most rules look at the act not the person, which is why there is one punishment regardless of the repetition.” (Int20)

The participant assumed that most of traffic offences are committed

unintentionally by those who rarely commit offences while the same offences are

committed intentionally by habitual offenders and that is where existing penalty

system should distinguish between the two types and increase the fine value

accordingly.

There was a point mentioned about the driver of a car and its owner. Most of the

time, cars are driven by a person other than the owner, as it is very common in Omani

society that the owner allows their relatives and friends to use their car. A policy-maker

thought that it is not rational to fine the owner when he/she has never committed an

offence. There should be a procedure to easily transfer the recorded offence from the

owner to the driver who committed that offence. This is done in other countries such

as Australia. If the vehicle was not driven by the owner at the time of the offence, a

confirmation from the driver can be obtained and sent to the police so that the offence

is transferred to the driver of the vehicle (Queensland Government). This needs more

procedures and amendments within the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law. If the

system allows transfer of the recorded fine from one person (as owner) to another (as

driver), this procedure could result in people avoiding paying fines when renewing the

registration of their vehicles. The incremental fine value is still seen as rational by

another policy-maker. Nonetheless, not applying this procedure could be attributed to

the need to change the whole penalty system, in addition to preparing the society to

accept it:

“It is much better to have incremental punishment for the same offence. Nonetheless, this procedure needs the whole penalty system to be updated and a society to accept such system.” (Int21)


In contrast, one of the policy-makers refused to call the current system unfair

even though he believed that the incremental penalty system is much better than the

current one, he said:

“We cannot say that the current regulations are not fair but the incremental punishment concept is fairer. I strongly recommend that the policy-makers consider such a concept” (Int22)

The participants’ perceptions were sought in relation to whether offenders

should be given a warning rather than fined. The seven policy-makers provided

different responses. Four of them preferred giving the advice over the traffic fine, two

preferred the fine to be issued against offenders, and one of the seven believed that this

procedure should depend on the level of offence and on the type of driver. One

commented on the effect of a warning on drivers’ behaviour:

“In my perspective, advice is very important to gain people favour and encourage voluntary compliance. Such advice must be recorded so that a double value fine will be issued against the driver who repeats the offence. As long as such system of recording the incidents is not available in our legislative context, drivers must be given a ticket as the regulations are very clear” (Int23)

There is currently no system to track if offenders have been given warnings or

not. The participant assumed that the driver must be given a traffic fine, but he

preferred the advice over the issuance of traffic fine. Additional supported quotes are

in Appendix F.

As discussed in the first study of this research, there are four categories of speed

fines in terms of the monetary sanction level depending on the number of km/h by

which the speed limit is exceeded. They are, in ascending order, OMR 10, OMR 15,

OMR 35, and OMR 50, approximately equal to AUD$33, AUD$50, AUD$117, and

AUD$167 respectively. The seven participating policy-makers were asked about their

opinion in relation to the monetary sanction of speed fines, whether they see it as

punitive or preventive. There were mixed responses obtained from the participants, but

nevertheless, the perception of seeing it as punitive was dominant. Four of the

participating policy-makers stated that the monetary speeding fines are considered as

punitive, quoting one of the responses:

“It is punitive and I see it very far from being a preventive. In my opinion, for a punishment to be preventive, it should be very severe and certain so that people will never have the courage to commit it” (Int20)

He believed that it should be considered preventive not punitive. One believed

that for the fine to be considered preventive, it must be of a very high value. Its value


could work as deterrent and discourage drivers from exceeding the speed limits. While

two of them believed the monetary fines have a mixed effect of punishing and

preventing drivers from exceeding the speed limit:

“Preventive for those who have not committed an offence yet, and punitive for those who already have” (Int19)

The mixed effects promoted by the monetary sanctions, as two participating

policy-makers thought, appear to be less logical when it comes to specific and general

deterrence. Such sanctions do not seem to promote specific deterrence as there are still

repeat offenders. Even when it comes to general deterrence, there did not seem to be

much effect, as people do not fear the punishment, as discussed earlier. Moreover, one

of them assumed that this sanction should be introduced as preventive rather than

punitive when he said:

“It should be considered as preventive procedure” (Int21)

It seemed that exceeding the speed limits on the Omani roads is very common

among drivers. Almost all Omani drivers have exceeded the speed limit at some time,

and have been given a speeding fine, as the rate of speed fines showed in the first

study. The automated speed enforcement program is deployed to tackle this problem.

However, with the introduction of automated speed enforcement, drivers’ reactions to

the speed detectors can be categorised into four types (Corbett & Simon, 1999). First

are the conformers, who always complied with the speed limits and who did not change

their speeding behaviour after the introduction of the automated speed enforcement.

Second are the deterred, who did not comply with the speed limits before the

introduction of speed detectors, but they changed to being compliant with the speed

limits after the introduction of automated speed enforcement. Thirdly, the

manipulators are those drivers who adopted techniques such as the kangaroo effect

after the introduction of automated speed enforcement in order to avoid detection.

Finally, there are drivers who do not pay attention to the existence of automated speed

enforcement on the roads and they keep exceeding the speed limits, called the defiers.

In relation to the four types of drivers, the seven participating policy-makers

were asked about their opinion of the dominant type of drives under which Omani

drivers could be categorised. There were different responses given by the seven

participants, however, the dominant category which was included in the four responses

is the deterred. Four out of seven believed that most Omani drivers could be

categorised as deterred drivers, and this was reflected in their responses as deterred


drivers need more deterrent tools to force them to comply with the speed limits.

Another two participating policy-makers believed that most Omani drivers could be

categorised as conformers. One of the participants thought that they are manipulators,

based on his own experience while driving on the roads, as he observed many drivers

who adapt the kangaroo effect.

After discussing the types of Omani drivers, participating policy-makers were

asked about what should be done in order to change speeding behaviours of the

different types of drivers. All responses obtained from the seven participants,

suggested strict procedures or severe fine values. In addition, some of the participants

suggested traffic safety training and promoting traffic awareness within the society.

One suggested that traffic safety workshops should be included in Traffic Law when

they said:

“Making traffic safety training workshops compulsory by law, procedures and tests to get driving licences must be clearer and more difficult. I mean that we have to solve the problem from its root before dealing with the consequences” (Int18)

If talking about the root of the traffic safety problem, it could start from the early

ages of drivers within the society, and not only when they want to get driving licences.

However, the idea of introducing more complex procedures to get the driving licence

could have a significant positive influence on road safety in Oman. The current

procedures and driving test are relatively easy compared to some other countries such

as Sweden (Henriksson, Sundström, & Wiberg, 2004). In addition, there is no

evaluation period for the driver after obtaining driving licence. Three participating

policy-makers suggested, as part of severe sanctions, implementing incremental fine

value in the case of repeating an offence. One said:

“I believe that we need to be more strict in the case of offence repetition, taking some of the re-offenders to court and forcing others to attend traffic safety training sessions” (Int19)

The suggestion of taking drivers to court was supported by another participant

(Int23). Nonetheless, he requested introducing specialised courts for traffic matters, as

the current system implemented now requires traffic issues to go to the normal Trial

Courts, which the Courts of First Instance. The judges in these courts do not have

experience about traffic matters as they rarely get such issues. Another participant who

suggested the incremental sanction in case of repetition recommended legislation and

road safety awareness as part of the solution to tackle speeding behaviour in Oman.

Likewise, as part of the severe sanction suggestions, a participant believed that


imprisoning the driver is better than forcing him/her to pay monetary sanctions, and

he justified this with the suffering which could cause the driver’s family. The concept

of affecting the driver’s family will be discussed in more detail later in this study. Most

responses above could be summarized in this response:

“I think the best and fast solution we can apply now is implementing a severe and quick sanction” (Int21)

The findings suggested that almost all of the participating policy-makers agreed

that the current penalty system is not effective to deter drivers and change their

speeding behaviour, thus they suggested the implementation of severe and quick

sanctions. Whereas one (Int24) of them believed that they have to know the type of

drivers first, then suggesting solutions which go with each type. He assumed that most

Omani drivers are of deterred type and suggested solutions accordingly.

Participants were also asked if there are any other solution to be implemented

apart from raising the monetary fine value in order to increase the level of deterrent

effect on drivers. In other words, what could be done in order to increase the level of

compliance with traffic regulations? Those other solutions could be related to Islamic

religion or Omani culture as perceived by policy-makers. There have been several

responses obtained from the participants. Two of the participating policy-makers gave

clear responses that they do not think of any culture or religion related procedure to be

used for increasing the level of deterrent effect. They included the imprisonment and

vehicle impoundment as non-monetary sanctions, for example:

“Imprisonment and vehicle impoundment. I do not think we can use any deterrent related to the culture or religion meanwhile.” (Int19)

Another four participants mentioned ways by which religious concepts could be

used within the road safety context in Oman, as one stated:

“The two procedures of driver’s imprisonment and vehicle impoundment are enough to deter drivers on the road with avoiding using the principle of reconciliation. In regards to the religious deterrence, the Islamic law condemns and prohibits hurting oneself or others by any means” (Int23)

The principle of reconciliation was discussed earlier in this chapter. The

participant suggested that such principle not to be used in traffic offences. He also

mentioned a very general and well-known principle in Islamic law which is the

prohibition of harming or hurting oneself or the others by any mean. This is an

interpretation for several verses in the Holly Quran such as the one says “…And do

not kill yourselves. Indeed, Allah is most merciful to you.” (Qur'an 4:29). Not killing


yourself is interpreted in two ways; not killing yourself literally, and not doing

anything dangerous that harms you which may lead to killing yourself. However, one

participant did not mention religion or culture in his response.

5.3.3.2 Deterrent effect (Celerity)

Having discussed the perceived severity of traffic fines within the Omani

legislative context, this section reports findings related to the celerity of traffic fine

procedures from policy-makers’ perceptions. This matter is important to the research

in order to know the reasoning and rationale behind policy-makers’ decisions when

creating or amending laws and regulations related to the road safety in Oman. The

seven participating policy-makers were asked about the deterrent effect on drivers if

the punishment was implemented in a swift way. All of them agreed that this procedure

would have a positive effect on drivers’ behaviour, which was clearly stated in most

of the responses, such as:

“Of course, that will have positive effect on drivers’ behaviour.” (Int19)

Another participant (Int18) argued that the procedure of fast punishment has a

greater deterrent effect than raising the fine value, as he considered such value as

nothing but financial commitment or obligation. This response was supported by

another two participants who preferred punishment to be executed against the offender

within a short time. Another participant considered the delay in applying punishment

against offenders as the reason behind making drivers repeat the offence every time

they have a chance to. This happens in the current penalty system, as discussed in the

first study, as owner of the vehicle can postpone fine payment until he or she needs a

service from the traffic department. This service could be renewing the vehicle

registration which happens annually, or a driving licence renewal, which happens

every 10 years ("Executive Regulations of Traffic Law of Oman," 1998). One

participating policy-maker believed that such procedures of accelerating punishment

need one important prior step, preparing the society to accept such new procedure:

“Yes, it does, but first we need to get the society ready for such system before we apply it.” (Int23)

He assumed that the society may be prepared to accept this idea when it is

introduced gradually. This can be done in co-operation with the media and social

networks used by the Omani society. In contrast, a participating policy-maker doubted

the applicability of swift sanctions in the Omani context of road safety, arguing that it


will change the risky driving behaviours if applied, but questioning whether if it can

be applied at all:

“Of course, it will change driving behaviour positively as I mentioned previously that most drivers are deterred drivers, such procedures will work well on them. The question to ask is (Can it be done in the Omani context?)” (Int24)

Based on the above discussed responses, policy-makers preferred the swift

sanctions. In addition, they were all convinced that such procedures would increase

the deterrent effect of traffic fines and consequently, would change risky and speedy

driving behaviours. The next step was to ask them if they have thought about

implementing this in the regulations. As one of the participating policy-maker said the

question to be asked is “can this procedure be done in the Omani context or not?”

The first step towards applying swift punishment is to enforce offenders to pay

their traffic fines within a specific period of time. This could be done by including a

legislative regulation requesting people to pay traffic fines in a specified time. In this

regard, participating policy-makers were asked if such procedure or regulation exists

in the current penalty system, or has been considered or suggested for future

amendments. Different responses were obtained from the seven participating policy-

makers in which some of them are contradicting each other. For example, one of the

participants stated that, as policy-makers, regulation which forces the offender to pay

traffic fines within a specific period of time was not included in any discussion

between policy-makers. In contrast, another two participants stated that this matter was

discussed and it might be included in the future amendments, quoting one of the

responses:

“I do remember that this issue has been humbly discussed and it gets very little

attention from most legislative parties” (Int20)

The legislative parties meant in this response are the governmental organisations

involved in creating or amending laws in Oman, which have been mentioned earlier.

In the case of creating or amending laws related to traffic and road safety in Oman, the

ROP is included among the governmental entities in addition to Shaura Council, the

Ministry of Legal Affairs, and the Council of State. Three other participants argued

that the Omani society is not ready yet for a procedure of swiftness of punishment and

that is the reason why such procedure was not included within the law. One stated:

“As for my information, there is no regulation for such. The society is not ready for that” (Int18)


While another one added that traffic fines are not of importance to the society

and he believed that the whole idea of traffic fines and procedures against drivers are

seen as a simple matter by the society:

“I believe that the society will never accept such enforcement to be used in traffic fine sanctions. At the end it is just a traffic fine to the society.” (Int21)

Another participating policy-maker argued that there are administrative barriers

in addition to the social ones, quoting his response:

“Meanwhile, this idea cannot be applied because of the current social and administrative barriers.” (Int23)

As one of the main themes of this study is to investigate the reason why the

current penalty system is not promoting deterrence as it should be, the barriers

preventing it from being a system of high deterrent effect will be discussed later in this

chapter. Surprisingly, one of the participants compared the payment mechanism used

in the penalty system and the payment mechanism used for other regulations in Oman.

He stated that there are issues far more important than traffic and there is no specified

period for payment:

“There are other monetary sanctions which are of higher value, more necessary, and urgent but still no strict regulation executed to force the responsible person to pay in specific time.” (Int22)

Participating policy-makers were asked about the sanctions for not paying a

traffic fine, and what change needs to be done to put such procedure in practice. There

were different responses given by the seven participating policy-makers. Four

participants stated that there is no specific regulation within the law that imposes a

legal sanction against a driver or vehicle owner for non-payment of a monetary traffic

fine recorded against them. One of the four participants suggested increasing the

monetary sanction if there is a delay in payment, he said:

“It is better to have a regulation stating that any delay in payment leads to increasing the punishment itself.” (Int20)

This means that there should be a specific period of time once exceeded, the

payment could be described as delayed. However, as it was previously discussed,

offenders are not required by law, to pay traffic fines within specific period of time,

thus first the period of time needs to be specified in the law, and then payment can be

described as delayed. Another participant looked at it from a different angle and

provided a suggestion which could be considered as preventive rather than punitive:

“I think we should first think how to prevent people from getting fined by complying with the regulations. However, as you raised this issue, there is no


regulation forcing offenders to pay unless getting service from the traffic departments.” (Int24)

Another participant (Int18) suggested updating the law in order to force

offenders to pay fines within a specified period of time, a get further punishment. This

is considered in the new amendments as another participant argued:

“There is no regulation within the current Traffic Law, however, there are some updates in the new Traffic Law which will be seen in the Executing Regulations of Traffic Law very soon. These include no ROP service will be given to a person unless traffic fines are paid” (Int21)

The current system forces vehicle owners to pay their fines when they are to get

a service from traffic department such as vehicle renewal or driving licence renewal.

Whereas the new amendments in the Executive Regulations if Traffic Law will expand

these services to include any other services provided by the ROP:

“There is a regulation, in the shortly coming amendments of the Executive Regulation, that forces people to pay their traffic fines when performing a service with the ROP such as renewing a car, identification card, passport, or driving license. In addition, foreigners cannot leave the country before paying their traffic fines.” (Int19)

Unfortunately, this payment is not tied to a specific period of time, but rather

with a service needed from the ROP. These services vary in terms when they are

needed. For example, the passport is renewed every 10 years and the maximum period

of stay for a foreigner is two years. Consequently, if the first service needed from the

ROP is one or two years after the offence, the driver will not have to pay the fines until

then. In addition, not all offenders own a vehicle to renew, as many use others’

vehicles.

Surprisingly one of the seven participating policy-makers stated that such a rule

is included within the current regulations but it has never been used with a traffic fine

incident.

“Legally, it is there and the ROP can take any one to court for a traffic fine regardless of how simple the traffic fine is, but in reality, nothing of this happening.” (Int23)

He supported his response with the statement included in Article 140 of the

Executive Regulation of Traffic Law. The article gives the authority for specific

officers in the ROP to proceed in court trials for any traffic fine if one of five particular

conditions is fulfilled. Two of these conditions are; if the offender refused to perform

the payment that leads to the principle of reconciliation, or if the Head of the General

Directorate of Traffic or the Head of the Geographical ROP Headquarters thinks that

the value of the monetary sanction assigned to specific traffic fine is not severe enough


for a specific offender ("Executive Regulations of Traffic Law of Oman," 1998). It is

very clear in the Executive Regulation, but it has never been used, according to the

participant. Another participant did not see any need for a procedure that punishes the

offender for not paying the fine committed within a specific time as he said:

“I do not think that we need such procedure as the monetary commitments are there in the person’s records and they will be paid sooner or later.” (Int22)

The monetary sanction stays in the ROP records linked to the offender’s ID

number or vehicle registration until it is performed by payment.

5.3.3.3 Deterrent effect (Certainty)

This section reports the findings relating to the third core component of classical

deterrence theory as it relates to the effect of the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman, namely, the perceived certainty of apprehension or punishment

from policy-makers’ point of view. The discussion has been always from policy-

makers’ perceptions as they are the ones who create or amend laws and regulations

according to how they perceive things in addition to other tools used in policy-making

decisions such as knowledge, experience, and research or studies. The seven

participating policy-makers were asked their perceptions about how the general

population sees the certainty of punishment for speeding, particularly in relation to the

large number of speed detectors currently used in Oman. Three out of the seven

participants believed that people do not consider speed fines as certain, even though

there is a high number of speed detectors deployed on the Omani roads. One of the

three participants supported his response by pointing to the annual increase in the

number of speeding fines:

“I don’t think so, if they perceive it as such, the speed fine number will not increase every year.” (Int18)

The very low level of deterrent effect promoted by regulations within the Traffic

Law and the penalty system could be partly attributed to people not perceiving the

punishment as certain, regardless of the number of automated speed enforcement units.

The second participant of the three assumed that the reason is related to the society

and the culture, while the third participant believed that government did not promote

the automated speed enforcement units sufficiently, so people are unaware of the

details of the program:


“They do not perceive them as they should because they have not been clearly

informed about the detectors and the goals behind their existence in such a big

number” (Int22).

On the other hand, two other participants argued that the punishment is perceived

as certain by some people, for example:

“There might be some people who think that they will be apprehended if they exceed the speed limit because of the high volume of speed detectors in our roads. Nevertheless, most people don’t.” (Int24)

Furthermore, one of the participants believed that all people do have the

perception that punishment is certain. However, they do not always react according to

what they think and perceive:

“People may have this perception in their mind but there are differences in their reactions towards such perception. There is a conflict between what they perceive and what they actually do.” (Int21)

Interestingly, participating policy-makers believed that the volume of automated

speed enforcement units is not of high importance. In other words, punishment

certainty is less important when compared to the punishment severity. He argued that

the large number of units is not needed if there is a strict law, saying:

“I do not see that the number of speed detectors has much to do with the deterrent effect on drivers. I mean that if there is strong deterrent law, the government would never need to spend millions for such big number of speed detectors.” (Int20)

As seen above, there were different responses and justifications from each

participant. However, the high number of speed fines recorded every year could be

used as an indicator that a large number of automated speed enforcement units has not

had a deterrent effect in terms of certainty of punishment. The participants were then

asked if they think drivers fear apprehension if they exceed the speed limit, and why,

or why not.

All but one of the seven participants believed that people do fear the

apprehension and provided several reasons. However, most of them thought that the

fear from apprehension does not last long enough to deter drivers from repeating the

offence. In addition, a slow and weak punishment will not change speeding behaviour

of drivers as one claimed:

“Drivers could have little fear of getting caught exceeding the speed limit, but as the punishment is weak and slow, it would not have an effect on drivers’ speeding behaviour.” (Int18)


While another two participants thought that people fear apprehension as it

embarrasses them, especially in two situations. The first is when the speed detector is

a laser gun and the fine is issued on the spot:

“Yes, they do fear the apprehension because it puts them in embarrassing and uncomfortable situation. However, this only happen for the laser gun technique as the driver is fined on spot whereas for the other speed detectors, drivers know about their speeding fines when they go to renew their vehicles or if, by chance, they checked their fines online.” (Int19)

The embarrassment and discomfort happen with the laser gun only. It is believed

that such embarrassment does not happen with the other speed detectors such as red-

light, fixed, mobile, and mounted on vehicle automated speed enforcement types. The

second situation that particularly embarrasses drivers is when there are other

passengers in the vehicle:

“They feel the embarrassment for few minutes, especially when they have other passengers on the vehicles” (Int21)

It is the same in terms of duration as it does not last more than few minutes as

he claimed. Likewise, drivers’ fear of apprehension could be attributed to their position

in society, as they consider how society thinks about them if they get caught speeding:

“Of course, they fear the apprehension due to how society looks at them in such a situation, especially those who have a good position within their societies. However, it is a temporary fear that vanishes in a few hours or even minutes.” (Int20)

This fear of apprehension also seems to be temporary, and supports the responses

discussed above. This could be attributed to the slow procedures of punishment as

stated by participant (Int18) and another participant who said:

“They have a temporary fear because fines do not deter drivers when it comes to the easy-slow procedures and very low value.” (Int23)

The idea of very short-lasting effect of the apprehension fear by drivers kept

being mentioned in the discussions at this point when another participant said:

“I believe that they do have such feeling once they are caught but this feeling won’t last forever.” (Int24)

Another participant linked the fear of apprehension with the financial obligation

that comes with it. However, he thinks that drivers do not perceive it in this way:

“I think that everyone fears apprehension due to the monetary sanction that has to be paid, but no one perceives it as such.” (Int22)

Almost all participating policy-makers saw that drivers do fear apprehension

when exceeding the speed limit. However, this fear is not reflected in drivers’ speeding

behaviours, or in other words, it does not have long-lasting effect on them.


To sum up the above responses on the theme of deterrent effect promoted by the

automated speed enforcement program, some policy-makers believed that the penalty

system has not had the anticipated deterrent effect on the drivers, as the penalty system

does not seem to be severe at all in terms of the financial sanction and the fining

procedures. In addition, there is a need to prepare society for further fining procedures

in order for such procedures to promote a better deterrent effect on people. Based on

the responses, it could be also believed that the penalty system has deterred drivers

who exceed the speed limit by more than 75 km/h. According to the responses above,

there is evidence that most of the deterrent effects anticipated from the automated

speed enforcement program are weakened by the existence of the principle of

reconciliation. In addition, a policy-maker thought that the DGT does not perform its

job as it should. In the current situation, policy-makers suggested imposing fast and

severe sanctions ranging from doubling the monetary fine to taking offenders to court,

while one policy-maker preferred warnings over fines. On the other hand, some of the

policy-makers argued that voluntary compliance has a better effect than enforced

compliance, by using the religion and culture of the Omani people.

In regard to the perceived severity of punishment, it is clear that people do not

perceive the traffic fine punishment as severe. This conclusion is derived from both

the policy-makers’ opinion and the statistics obtained from the ROP regarding speed

fine and crash rates. Nonetheless, two policy-makers thought that drivers do perceive

speed fines as severe, however, they do not act accordingly. On the other hand, policy-

makers considered the speed monetary fine a very low sanction and they suggested

increasing the fine value in order to increase the severity level of punishment. Another

issue which was considered important and a reason for traffic fines not being perceived

as severe is the existence of some regulations which are not applied such as the demerit

point system and driver imprisonment after running a red light. It was thought that the

demerit point system has been ceased, however, it still exists in the law but if applied,

participants believe that most driver licenses would be suspended based on the high

number of speed fines issued. One policy-maker believed that the society is not ready

yet for demerit points or driver imprisonment. Interestingly, the policy-makers

believed that the monetary fine does not fit the offence and it is far below what it

should be in order to fit the action. Doubling or tripling the current monetary fine

would lead to an increase in compliance with traffic regulations, as stated by almost


all participating policy-makers, although one of them prefers driver’s imprisonment,

as paying more in speed fines could affect the financial situation of driver’s family,

and not only the driver alone. Furthermore, increasing the fine value could be a

solution for most drivers, but not all of them. One policy-maker strongly recommended

that the law should distinguish between the habitual offenders and those who rarely

offend by applying an incremental fine value in the case of repetition. Moreover, the

monetary speed sanction is seen by almost all participating policy-makers as punitive,

serving a specific deterrence on drivers rather than being preventive. Preventive

sanctions should be of high value and a high level of severity so that people are

discouraged from committing it. In order for speed fines to be severe, policy-makers

provided several recommendations such as application of incremental fine value,

application of demerit point system, and increase the monetary fine value. In addition,

they have suggested few non-monetary sanctions to increase the severity of traffic

fines such as driver’s imprisonment, taking offender to court, vehicle impoundment,

and focused traffic awareness campaigns.

In regards to celerity of punishment (swiftness), all seven participating policy-

makers agreed that if the punishment is applied swiftly, it would increase the level of

deterrence. Moreover, a few of them argued that the punishment celerity would have

more effect on changing drivers’ behaviour than punishment severity would. However,

the findings suggested that society needs to be prepared for such a system in terms of

procedures and penalties non-payment within a specified period of time. There is

currently no regulation within the law that forces offenders to pay their fines within a

specific period of time, but only when a service needed from the ROP is due.

Additionally, their responses revealed that there is no financial penalty if the offender

does not pay the fines.

When it came to the perceived certainty of apprehension, the speed fine

apprehension is not seen as certain as policy-maker believed. Although there is a large

number of speed detectors, drivers still exceed the speed limit and the best indicator

for that is the increasing annual number of speed fines recorded in the ROP system.

This could be due to several factors, including the lack of deterrent effect promoted by

the perceived certainty of sanction. However, this specifically could be attributed to

several factors such as culture, the insufficient and ineffective promotion of speed

detectors, or simply the effect does not last long on drivers’ perceptions. In short, there


must be social and legal procedures taken in order to increase the level of deterrent

effect promoted by the Omani automated speed enforcement program.

5.3.4 The Effectiveness of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program

As discussed earlier, the automated speed enforcement goals were not clearly

identified, and therefore the research assumed different goals based on the results of

the first study of this research. Participating policy-makers were asked about the

program effectiveness in terms of achieving the different goals assumed. The research

suggested three goals, and the questions were asked separately. Firstly, the

effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman was sought in

relation to crash and fatality rates. The simple statistical analysis undertaken as part of

the first study showed that the fatality and crash rates in Oman are relatively high

compared with other (GCC) countries. A considerable percentage of these high rates

is caused by speeding behaviour. Secondly, participating policy-makers were asked

about the effectiveness of the program in terms of the role played in changing speeding

behaviour among Omani drivers, as speeding is one of the main contributing factors

to crashes in Oman. More than 50 percent of the fatal crashes in Oman are caused by

speed. Thirdly, they were asked to what extent the Omani automated speed

enforcement program is effective in promoting compliance with traffic regulations

related to speed.

The first assumed goal of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman,

which could be considered the most important one, is reducing crash and fatality rates.

The seven participants were asked if they think that the program has accomplished its

goal of reducing the number of crashes and fatalities. There were mixed responses

obtained in this regard.

One believed that the program has been effective and he referred to the small

reduction in crashes as a supporting evidence:

“Yes, it is effective and that can be seen on the reduction of fatal crashes number in particular and number of crashes in general” (Int19)

However, the simple statistical analysis done in the first study suggested that the

reduction in fatal crashes is modest compared to the number of automated speed

enforcement and the time they have been deployed. These statistics were published by

the ROP and they show a very small reduction every year. However, some thought

that these reductions are indicative of the automated speed enforcement program

effectiveness:


“It is somehow effective according to the statistics published by the ROP” (Int22)

While another participant thought that the program is effective in promoting

general deterrent effect on drivers, nonetheless it has not changed drivers speeding

behaviour as of yet, stating:

“I believe that the automated speed enforcement program is effective for general deterrence but not specific. Drivers’ behaviour is in a very slow pace of change.” (Int21)

This statement was based on the participant’s claim that older people and female

drivers rarely exceed the speed limit. This statement is still to be confirmed as it needs

more statistical data from the ROP, such as the number of drivers who have not been

given a speed fine during the last one or two years as well as the demographical data

about those drivers. In contrast, the other participant did not see that the reduction in

crash and fatality rates is caused by the automated speed enforcement program, as there

have been other projects on the Omani roads for a long time, even before the automated

speed enforcement program was introduced:

“I do not think that the automated speed enforcement program is the reason for the small reduction in fatality and crash rates. The reduction has happened due to the programs executed on the roads to make them better and safer.” (Int20)

These statistics of crashes and fatalities should be scientifically analysed, taking

into consideration all variables and changes since the automated speed enforcement

program was implemented. Furthermore, one of the participants called for identifying

the causes behind such ineffectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program

and other road safety programs when he said:

“This program has done an effective job, but fatalities and crashes are still at unacceptable rates. We have to search for the deficiency on this program and other programs of road safety.” (Int18)

The causes should be identified using scientific methods so that decisions will

be made based on evidence, as one of the participants wondered if the automated speed

enforcement program decision was made based on studies or research done, stating:

“I do not know much about this program, if it has been implemented based on scientific studies done in Oman. I believe that its results are not commensurate with the human, financial, and technical resources which have been spent on it” (Int23)

He thought that the program is not effective enough, considering the resources

it has used, and this was supported by another participant:

“If we consider the resources given to this program, I would say it is not effective and my answer is based on the reality I see every day in the roads. Drivers


still exceed the speed limit and fatal crashes happen every single day of the year.” (Int24)

The participant referred to the every-day life observations on the Omani roads

to support his statement. Statistically, the fatality rate per day in Oman for the year of

2015 is 1.8 (ROP, 2015). That supported the statement given by this participant. The

findings suggest that the automated speed enforcement program is not effective

enough in reducing the crash and fatality rates in Oman.

The participating policy-makers were next asked about the second suggested

goal of the automated speed enforcement program, which is the effectiveness of Omani

automated speed enforcement program in changing the speeding behaviours of drivers.

Two participating policy-makers believed that the program has changed drivers’

behaviour in general, while another three participants stated that the program has

changed only the risky behaviours. Likewise, one of them thought that the program is

effective to some extent but this needs to be proven scientifically. The responses are

discussed in more details next.

A participant who thought that the program has changed the speeding behaviour

of Omani drivers believed that this change happened in the early stages of the program,

stating:

“Behaviours have been changed during the first period of time before and a few months after implementing the automated speed enforcement program and it has been constant since then. We need to do other changes in order to keep behaviour changing positively.” (Int18)

The participant indicated that there could be several reasons for such a change.

For example, there was a trial of different types of automated speed enforcement on

Oman roads and rumours were spread that those detectors were capable of detecting

several offences, such as using a mobile phone while driving and not wearing the seat

belt. In addition, people were convinced that those cameras can detect speeding

vehicles from a very long distance, and not only when the vehicle approaches them.

He believed that there is a need to intervene more in this matter in order to keep such

change continuous. Whereas another participant thought that the change is reflected in

the reduction in number of crashes happening in Omani roads, he said:

“Yes, I think that what has happened, behaviours have been changed and the proof for that is the reduction in crashes.” (Int19)

The reduction in crashes in addition to the reduction in fatalities in Oman could

be attributed to other reasons, as one of the participants stated:


“It could be effective to some extent in changing drivers’ speeding behaviour. However, we have to scientifically prove that, if this has not been proven so we have to stop this program immediately. Crash and fatality rates reduction could be attributed to factors other than speed detectors.” (Int20)

Fatality and crash rates have been decreasing annually by a small amount since

the year 2012, as seen in the first study, but the automated speed enforcement program

started before that in late 2004. Additionally, the number of speed fines has been

increasing throughout the years from 2009 until 2014, which is the last year in which

the data could be legally accessed. The factors which could have roles in reducing

crash and fatality rates in Oman, as the participant mentioned, are those such as

replacing the cross roads with roundabouts, replacing the roundabouts with bridges,

increasing the number of lanes on the highways, or implementing the cameras that

detect red-light violations. All these changes could have played a role in reducing the

crash and fatality rates, however, there has not been any study or research within the

road safety context in Oman exploring the role of such changes. One participant

believed that regardless of what role they played in reducing crash and fatality rates

for the last few years, the results are positive and desired:

“As the statistics indicate a positive change, this means that there is a change in drivers’ speeding behaviour. Regardless of the reason behind such change, the result is appreciated and sought.” (Int21)

However, there is still a need to investigate the factors behind the positive

changes which have led to decreasing the crash and fatality rates in order to enhance

those factors and eliminate the barriers that hold the positive change back.

There were three participating policy-makers who thought that the automated

speed enforcement program has changed the risky behaviours of driving at a very high

speed. One of the three participants stated that they are aiming for more positive

changes in the driving behaviour generally, not only the very high-speed driving:

“I think there are some risky behaviours which have been changed because of speed detectors but we would like much more to be changed.” (Int22)

This response was backed up by the second participant of the three when he said:

“It has been effective in reducing the very high-speed drivers (200 km/h) but not the other speedy drivers.” (Int24)

If the goal of automated speed enforcement program was to reduce the number

of drivers who committed very high-speed offences on the Omani roads, then it could

be said that the goal has been achieved to some extent, although it needs further

investigation and more data from the ROP. However, this goal has not been listed by


the ROP officers who participated in the first study, and it is not one of the suggested

goals of the automated speed enforcement program. The third participant who

supported the idea that the automated speed enforcement program has reduced the very

high-speed behaviours believed that the program has not yet reduced the fatal crashes,

as they can happen even at the speed of 120 km/h:

“I strongly believe that automated speed enforcement program has changed the risky and the high-speed behaviours but there is still high number of speeding fines. If the goal behind it is to reduce fatal crashes, even at speed of 120 km/h fatal crash could happen.” (Int23)

However, the penalty system applied when these interviews were conducted

gives drivers a threshold of 15 km/h, which means that they can drive up to 135 km/h

in 120 km/h zone before they get detected by automated speed enforcement.

The third suggested goal of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman

is to increase compliance with the traffic regulations. Policy makers were asked about

this in relation to legal, social, and religious factors. All seven policy-makers believed

that almost all the current compliance is attributed to the legal factors.

One of the participants argued that the legal interventions play a significant role

in forcing people to comply with regulations, and there is more work to be done in this

regard:

“In the current time, there is no better than legal factors and we have to concentrate our work on them.” (Int21)

Two participants thought that the only factor affecting drivers’ compliance is the

legal factor. This could be caused by the lack of voluntary compliance which one

participant assumed is most affected by the social or religious influences. Another

participant went a bit farther into voluntary compliance within the Omani context and

gave few examples:

“I think that most of the conformers exist because of the law. However, when it comes to voluntary compliance which is derived from social and religious commitments, we find very few people in very few cases. For example, if the passenger is an old man or lady, the driver is more likely to be more cautious while driving” (Int18)

While all participants linked the compliance to the legal factor, there were few

who believed that a small portion of the compliance could be related to religious or

social factors:

“I relate a little compliance to religious factors, a little more to social factors, and almost all compliance is related to the legal factors.” (Int24)


In addition, one of the policy-makers believed that when they need to have a

strong and quick influence on drivers, they should use legal interventions and not

social or religious ones as they take a very long time. The participant argued that the

social and religious concepts need a deep understanding in order to affect the road

safety context, regardless of the general concept derived from the Islamic Law that

prohibits harming someone or own self.

It is noted that all participating policy-makers strongly supported the legal

intervention in order to enforce compliance with traffic regulations. However, there

did not seem to be a strong intervention to reach an acceptable level of compliance.

The participants were next presented with statistics obtained from the first study

of this research and asked about any other things which could be done in order to

increase the compliance level of Omani drivers. The statistics presented included the

rate of speed fines per person or per driving licence, and were to show the participating

policy-makers that the current penalty system does not seem to be effective in

changing drivers’ behaviour. Unexpectedly, most of the participants looked like they

have not heard about any analysis done to statistics published by the ROP, as one of

the participants stated:

“I haven’t heard about the speeding fine rate until now and it seems very high, is that really happening? We should have discussed this rate when updating the Traffic Law so that everyone knows the real problem. I suggest that the fine value be increased far more than what we currently have.” (Int20)

He also mentioned that most statistics they come across are those of solid

numbers without analysis. Once he learned the actual rate is so high, he appreciated its

importance and called for increasing the fine value, as most of the participants had also

suggested. In addition to the suggestion of increasing the fine value in general, two

other participants suggested the increase of the fine value to be implemented in the

case of repetition, and one stated

“Double the fine value if repeated within specific period of time.” (Int23)

This response also proposes a specific time for the payment, which improves the

celerity of punishment, in order to increase the deterrent effect of the penalty system.

Similarly, three other participants supported the idea of forcing offenders to pay the

fine in a specific period of time. There are some technological improvements necessary

in order to implement an immediate payment procedure. For example, the fines

recorded on the spot must have an immediate synchronisation process with the ROP

mainframe and the hardware and software tools for the payment system must be


present on the spot. In addition, the Omani society needs to be prepared for that in

terms of making people willing to use and trust the card payments on spot. It is believed

that such a change would need long time and it should be presented gradually.

In contrast, one of the participants did not think that the existing penalty system

needs any addition in order to be more effective in changing drivers’ behaviours, but

rather that implementing the current regulations properly could increase the level of

deterrence and raise the level of compliance with regulations. He said:

“I suggest that applying all existing regulations in traffic law, such as demerit points, vehicle impoundment, and driver imprisonment will be enough. In addition, the names should be published in local newspapers.” (Int21)

The suggestion that offender’s name be announced in the local newspaper refers

to the social factor of shame or losing respect among others when getting caught for

an offence (Pratt et al., 2011). The solutions suggested could lead to significant change

in drivers’ behaviours as a considerable amount of research has proven (Pratt et al.,

2011).

As talked about and noted from the findings of the first study of this research,

the automated speed enforcement program has never been evaluated against its general

goals or suggested goals. The researcher posed a question about this in order to get

ideas and opinions about how to evaluate the program. One of the participants made it

very clear that first identifying clear goals is vital for an effective evaluation:

“First of all, goals must be clear and solid, second, goals must be monitored periodically if any of them has been achieved or not.” (Int18)

Another process suggested within the evaluation of the automated speed

enforcement program is a periodic check of its achievements towards the suggested

goals. In contrast, another participant believed that they must have identified

procedures in order to evaluate programs or even law implementation against the goals

they are meant to meet:

“I believe there are no clear procedures for evaluating the implemented programs or rules. Every program or law must be monitored after implementation in order to check its effectiveness towards its goals.” (Int21)

While the other four participating policy-makers suggested that the evaluation

process should start from the statistics and numbers related to road safety in Oman

gathered by the ROP. Two of the four participants suggested a before-after analysis of

those numbers. One thought that the easy and quick way to evaluate the program is the


simple comparison of the crash and fatality related statistics before and after the

program implementation:

“By looking at the statistics on roads where most fatal crashes happen or used to happen. I meant it should be a before-after comparison which is the easy way to see if the program is effective or not.” (Int20)

The other one believed that society members should be involved in getting

suggested solutions and while the implementation of those solutions. In addition, he

recommended that data should be scientifically analysed. The participant believed that

scientific analysis of such statistics will lead to a better decision-making process for

the program’s operational and legal practices, which could make it more effective.

This idea of the need to scientifically analyse the ROP statistics was supported by other

two participants, for example:

“I think that the ROP should evaluate the automated speed enforcement program using a scientific method in analysing the numbers obtained from this program. Once done, such an analysis should be published in the newspapers.” (Int22)

What is currently happening is the comparison between the current year and the

last three or four years in terms of the number of crashes, fatalities, and injuries in

order to produce the numbers and percentages which represent the positive or negative

differences. Such numbers and percentages do not seem to have been scientifically

analysed. For example, they did not take into consideration any changes during the

comparison period such as the increased number of officers and patrols deployed.

Also, these percentages and numbers did not include the increase in licences issued or

vehicles registered, although these were mentioned as an informative figure only.

Another interesting issue mentioned within the responses is the data to be used for

research and studies which could be obtained from the ROP. It is prudent to mention

that such data is hard to get, even though it is recorded on the ROP system. For

example, the current number of speed fines cannot be obtained from the ROP. The last

data that could be legally obtained was for the year 2014. One of the participants

brought up this issue:

“Through research and studies, but information must be transparently provided by people in charge such as the ROP” (Int23)

He, as a policy-maker, did not have access to such data, but stated that these

numbers are very important for policy and decision makers. Furthermore, the

evaluation of such programs cannot be effectively carried out unless such important

data is transparently obtained from the government organisation in charge.


In conclusion, the theme of the automated speed enforcement program

effectiveness was discussed according to the three main goals: reducing crash and

fatality rates, changing speeding behaviour, and increasing the level of compliance

among drivers in Oman. The findings suggest that the small reduction in crash and

fatality rates in the years since the automated speed enforcement program started could

be attributed to different factors, such as road construction and public awareness, and

not only to the program. Based on the findings, the automated speed enforcement

program was not seen as effective enough in reducing crash and fatality rates, but It is

believed to have been somewhat effective at reducing speed-related risky behaviours

and red-light running. Finally, the program could be considered to have contributed to

an increased level of compliance among drivers. There seemed to be no religious or

social factors affecting the level of compliance in Oman, although such factors could

be significant if applied.

The findings also support the idea that the automated speed enforcement

program has not been evaluated since it was launched more than a decade ago.

However, from the basic analysis of fine statistics and the number of automated speed

enforcement units together with the crash and fatality rates, it seems that the program

is particularly effective. Consequently, participating policy-makers suggested

increasing the speed fine value and forcing offenders to pay within a specific time.

Furthermore, they recommended that the automated speed enforcement program

should be evaluated against its goals. More importantly, the goals against which the

program should be evaluated must be clearly identified. Consequently, statistics

should be carefully and scientifically analysed in order to be used in making decisions

related to legislation or operations of automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

In addition, a simple way of evaluating the program would be to use the statistics from

before and after the implementation of the program, which are gathered by the ROP.

Such statistics would have to be provided by the ROP to those who conduct such

studies, as well as to the policy-makers to help them in deciding on creating or

amending rules related to road safety.

5.3.5 Barriers to Increasing the Effective Implementation and Related Legislation of Automated Speed Enforcement in Oman

The first study discussed the gaps within the automated speed enforcement

program operational practices and shed light on the legislative gaps related to the


deterrent effect of the program. There seemed to be several barriers that prevent the

automated speed enforcement program from being more effective, or in other words,

from having a high deterrent effect on drivers. Part of this study discusses the barriers,

from policy-makers’ point of view, that prevent the automated speed enforcement

program from being more effective in general, as well as the barriers related to

implementing faster punishment in particular. The barriers to increasing the

punishment severity is not discussed in detail in this study for two reasons. Firstly, the

barrier of increasing the fine value was clearly identified from the findings discussed

earlier, which showed that the society representatives, the Shaura Council members,

always stand against increasing the monetary sanctions as they do not want to “punish

the poor people”. The policy-makers also mentioned that the amended Traffic Law has

increased the minimum and maximum value of some fines which, in turn, should be

reflected in the Executive Regulation of Traffic Law that will be issued very soon, and

this is the second reason for not discussing the barriers to increasing the fine value.

Several questions were discussed during the interviews in relation to the barriers

to increasing the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program and the

solutions to overcome such barriers. Firstly, participating policy-makers were asked if

they believe that there are barriers preventing the implementation of fast punishment

procedures, and if so, what they are. Secondly, the general barriers which hold the

automated speed enforcement program from being more effective were discussed.

Thirdly, the discussion went deeper to understand the nature of the barriers to

determine if they are social or legal barriers. Finally, suggestions and solutions towards

eliminating such barriers were sought.

In regards to the celerity of punishment and its implementations, participating

policy-makers listed several barriers within the Omani penalty system context. While

six participants believed that there are barriers, only one of the seven participants

thought that the process of fast punishment can be implemented without any barrier:

“I do not see any barriers if we want to implement the fast punishment procedures.” (Int22)

The other six participants disagreed with this to some extent. One of them

believed that there are two specific barriers that need to be addressed before

introducing the fast punishment:

“I think there are two; communicating with the vehicle owner such as address and phone number… and the driver is not necessarily the owner of the vehicle.” (Int18)


One of these barriers is the way by which the vehicle owners could be contacted,

as the address system in Oman is not widely used because it is not detailed. For

example, the house number and the street name are never mentioned at any transaction

conducted whether with the government or with a private organisation. People have

their own mechanism to reach a specific person, which is not of concern in this study.

The mobile phone number of any vehicle owner is obtained when registering the car

and is checked again when renewing the car registration each year. However, people

tend to change their contact numbers regularly or have more than one mobile phone

number, and it can be very hard to obtain the new contact number unless the owner

goes to the traffic department and updates his/her contact details. This could be a

significant challenge when implementing the fast punishment process as another

participant said alike:

“The obvious barrier is the addressing mechanism in Oman. However, ROP should make a study on the feasibility of implementing fast punishment procedures in order to know the exact barriers and overcome them.” (Int24)

In addition, the participant suggested that a feasibility study should be conducted

in order to more scrutinise the matter and clearly see the challenges which could stand

against the implementation of fast punishment procedure. This was supported by

another participant who also recommended that such a study should be carried out by

an educational institute:

“I believe such system needs a very decisive decision after giving educational institutes the opportunity to scientifically study and examine the possibility of implementing the system” (Int23)

There is a strong recommendation for such a study to be conducted and the

current research could be a starting point or reference for this. Furthermore, one of the

participants believed that there is a barrier related to how society perceive the

procedures of fast punishment, as it is relatively new to the Middle Eastern societies:

“The idea of celerity of punishment is relatively new to our middle eastern society, even in the cases of the courts there is weak enforcement for paying monetary sanctions in a specific short time. The proof for my statement is that there are many warrants of arrest on the system and the responsible people are still free.” (Int20)

Furthermore, he addressed the legal deficiency when it came to implementing

the fast punishment, as there is no regulation forcing traffic offenders to pay within a

specific time. To support his response, he referred to the warrants issued by courts

against those who have not committed to some of their financial obligations. Another


participant backed the idea of the absence of regulation to enforce the payment within

specific period of time, which he considered an obstacle:

“Yes, there are few obstacles. One of them is that there is no legal regulation forcing the offender to pay a fine in a short time unless it is a serious fine, and even if it is a serious fine, they put a note on the system just to stress the importance of paying this fine as soon as possible.” (Int19)

As discussed in the first study of this research, a fine is considered serious when

the driver runs a red light or does more than 75 km/h above the speed limit. In these

cases, a note is attached to the fine so that the fine cannot be paid unless the owner

attends the traffic directorate and specific procedures are taken against him/her.

Drivers do not know about this note until they go to renew their vehicles; additionally,

the specific procedures against the driver are rarely executed. This is another barrier

to the implementation of fast punishment procedures.

One participant believed that there is a need for a complete system that includes

all required tools to implement a fast payment system for traffic fines. It should include

legislation that holds the vehicle owner responsible for updating his/her contact details,

including the bank account and authorisation to debit the fine value from the account:

“Definitely there are barriers. There needs to be a complete system in order to implement the fast punishment procedures… updating the owner details in the ROP system including the bank account to take money from. In addition, involved road safety parties must work together towards one goal as currently there is little cooperation between them. Parties such as the ROP, Ministry of Education, Ministry of High Education, Municipalities, schools and universities, etc.” (Int21)

The interpretation for his response is that the current penalty system cannot be

used to enforce the fast punishment procedures as it lacks important tools and

regulations. Moreover, he believed that the current collaboration between road safety

parties needs more attention and must be directed towards clear goals.

From the responses of the seven participating policy-makers discussed above,

there are several perceived barriers which could hold back the implementation of fast

punishment procedures in the Omani traffic penalty system. Most importantly is the

address mechanism and how to contact and inform the vehicle owner or driver of the

traffic fine in order to advise him/her about the given time for fine payment. Another

barrier is that even if the vehicle owner or driver is informed about the fine and the

time in which it must be paid, there needs to be a regulation within traffic law that

enforces that payment within the given time, and imposes further punishment for not

paying a fine in time. The third barrier, according to the answers obtained during the


interviews, is the absence of study or research about implementing fast punishment

within the Omani context, in terms of society, legislature, and the practice itself.

On the other hand, there were several obstacles or barriers which affect the

automated speed enforcement program effectiveness in general as they are related to

the program itself. Such barriers are discussed in more detail based on the participants’

responses. Six out of the seven participating policy-makers believed that there are

barriers preventing the automated speed enforcement program from being more

effective, whereas one of the seven did not consider what he said as a barrier. The

barriers discussed in this section are apart from the barriers mentioned above in

relation to the celerity of punishment.

Three of the participants included in their responses the ambiguity of the

automated speed enforcement program to the society, two of them considered it as a

barrier, while the third one did not see it as a barrier. One of the responses provided in

this matter was:

“I think the only barrier is that the ROP does not share the program goals and results with the society in a transparent way.” (Int23)

The participant believed that all this information, such as statistics, number of

automated speed enforcement, and deterrent effect of the program, must be published

and the society must be made aware of such important topics because that could help

people to accept the program. This was also supported by another participant (Int20).

In addition, a third participant (Int23) assumed that sharing such information with

society would encourage compliance with regulations related to it, as people still see

the program as ambiguous. A fourth participant agreed:

“Yes, there are, according to my knowledge and experience. One barrier is the ambiguity of this program to the society. This statement is proven by simply searching for the statistics of the automated speed enforcement program, when you will never find transparent and clear answers. You need to dig very deep so that you MAY find some answers.” (Int18)

The participant claimed that he has searched by every possible way to get

information about the program but he has not found any. He searched for information

such as the goals of the automated speed enforcement, any studies behind it which

were conducted before implementation, evidence of its effectiveness, and statistics

about fines in relation to crashes and fatalities. This confirms the researcher’s

experience when searching for relevant documents, as nothing could be found, even

within the ROP’s unpublished documents. In contrast, one of the three participants


who shared the same response about the ambiguity of the program did not consider

such ambiguity a barrier to its effectiveness. However, he supported the statement that

says information related to automated speed enforcement program were very hard to

find:

“I do not think there are barriers but there is a strong shortage in informing the society about this program. For example, during this interview you have mentioned so many important topics which I have not came across previously even though I am a policy-maker who has been working on Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations for a considerable amount of time, do you know why? Because they are nowhere to be found.” (Int20)

Likewise, while conducting the first study of this research, there was an attempt

to find written documents related to the automated speed enforcement program in

Oman which could include information such as goals, plans, or strategies of the

program but this was unsuccessful.

In terms of barriers preventing the automated speed enforcement program from

being more effective, one of the participants believed that the society is a very

important player in making this program more effective. For example, as previously

mentioned, society needs to know the details about the program, as it affects all its

members. As the program is, to some extent, ambiguous, people do not see it as

legitimate. Consequently, most society members do not accept the program, including

some who are considered influencers, as stated by participant (Int19). Those

influencers are people who are very well known in the society by their social positions.

They could be writers, social media activists, or even heads of tribes in Oman

(Shaikhs) who are followed by large group of people.

Interestingly, three participating policy-makers considered the program not

being evaluated as a barrier, because if it was evaluated, the causes behind its

ineffectiveness would be identified and dealt with accordingly. One of them simply

said it in this way:

“I do not see barriers other than the need to scientifically evaluate the program.” (Int22)

While the other two participants elaborated in their responses and gave some

explanation for why they have provided such responses. Evaluation is essential for a

program effectiveness, otherwise how can the program be considered effective (Int21).

He believed that the evaluation is a very important procedure to be considered and

taken as it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the program. In addition, if the


program was evaluated, the evaluation data could be of significance for decision

makers and for the legislature:

“Yes, there are, one of the most important barriers is that this program is not evaluated. If it had been evaluated, we could use the information in making decisions related to law and regulations. In addition, if it has been evaluated, where is the result? It should be published so that people have more trust in the program and the ROP as a responsible organisation for road safety.” (Int24)

The idea of publishing the data transparently is restated again in the above

response, which implies that people do not know much about the program or, in other

words, the program is ambiguous.

The interpretation of the discussion above has led to identifying three major

barriers based on the different responses of participating policy-makers. Firstly, the

ambiguity of the automated speed enforcement program in terms of its goals, research

or studies before implementation of the program, speed fine statistics, and the stated

results of program effectiveness. The second barrier to its effectiveness, considered by

policy-makers, is the negative perception of social influencers about the automated

speed enforcement program which, in turn, affects a large group of people in terms of

the program legitimacy. Finally, policy-makers believed that the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman misses a very important process which is evaluation.

They believed that evaluating the program could lead to solving obstacles and

introducing better decision-making process in relation to the speeding problem in

Oman. Moreover, the discussion about barriers standing against the effectiveness of

the automated speed enforcement program continued and participating policy-makers

had different opinions in regards to the nature of those barriers, and whether they are

social, legal, or a combination of both. Two of the seven participating policy-makers

believed that the barriers are considered social while other two considered them

administrative barriers which are linked to legal. However, the other three policy-

makers have confidence that the current barriers standing against the effectiveness of

the automated speed enforcement program are a combination of social and legal

barriers.

One believed that Omani society is not ready to accept and adapt to new

procedures, referring to the fast punishment procedure, which he considers as one of

the obstacles towards more effective penalty system, he said:

“Social, as the society will never accept such procedures.” (Int20)


Another participant suggested that such social barriers need ROP intervention in

order to make people accept such procedures. For example, the ROP should be more

transparent in sharing information about the program as he claimed in his response:

“It is more likely to be social but should be solved by the ROP by sharing the programs goals and results with the society.” (Int23)

Another participant considered the barriers both social and legal, but he thought

that they are not important in affecting the performance of the automated speed

enforcement program:

“They are a combination of both; legal and social, but they are of little concern.” (Int19)

On the other hand, when referring to the evaluation of the program as a

significant barrier, as considered by policy-makers, four participants viewed it

differently. Two of them linked it to the administrative roles, one believed that it can

go under the legal considerations, and the other one argued that the evaluation has a

nature of a combination of administrative and technical issues. One has stated that it is

an administrative and legal barrier:

“They are pure administrative and legal barriers.” (Int21)

He suggested that there should be a law forcing any government entity to

evaluate programs under its responsibility, whether by the organisation itself or by an

external party. However, he preferred the external party as it would be less biased.

Another participant considered an evaluation procedure administrative.

“I think the barrier is administrative more than legal or social.” (Int22)

He assumed that the evaluation process is a pure role of the responsible

organisation itself in which it does not need a law to start the evaluation. Supporting

his response, the participant mentioned that each government organisation has its own

Quality Control Department which should be responsible for evaluations of any

program executed. There was another response considering the evaluation barrier to

be a technical one that goes under the legal, quoting:

“It is more likely to be technical, which could be part of the legal barrier. Additionally, the society is not ready yet to accept the fast punishment system.” (Int18)

The participant argued that the barriers could be of a social and legal nature. He

also stressed the idea the Omani society will not accept the fast punishment procedures.

One of the interesting responses during the interviews was when a participant

acknowledged that whether the barriers are social or legal would be much clearer once


the program is evaluated. He considered the evaluation an important step before

identifying the true nature of the barrier when saying:

“I think that the first barrier is a combination of technical and administrative which is evaluating the program in scientific way. Then if there are social or legal barriers, they will be apparent after the comprehensive evaluation of the automated speed enforcement program.” (Int24)

Another participant provided elaboration for this response when he stated that

the evaluation will identify legal barriers to having a more effective automated speed

enforcement program and those barriers need to be solved. Consequently, solving legal

barriers will lead to the existence of social barriers:

“I believe that the evaluation will lead to legal barriers and when solved, they would lead to social barriers. It is a bit complicated as the society will never accept unjustified changes.” (Int21)

The explanation for such a response could be that once the Omani automated

speed enforcement program is evaluated against its suggested goals, legal barriers

would appear. The legal barriers could be those regulations needed in order to apply

the fast punishment procedures, which could be solved by other suggested solutions,

as will be discussed in more details later, such as obtaining bank account details and

authorisation from the vehicle owner to take traffic fines directly from accounts, as

participants suggested. Once legal barriers are solved, regardless of the way and tools

used to solve them, there will come the social barriers. One of the most expected social

barriers is the lack of acceptance of such procedures by the Omani society, as they are

used to paying fine on an annual basis when renewing a vehicle. This will be a sudden

and undesired change to the penalty system in Oman. This scenario is highly expected

from the Omani society. For example, when there was suggestion to increase the

monetary fine value, the society representatives strongly rejected it, as one of the

participants claimed:

“There are some socio-legal barriers such as when suggesting to increase the fine value, Shaura Council did not agree to that.” (Int18)

This suggested that the barriers are considered both social and legal and there is

a need for more collaboration between policy-makers and society as explained in

another participant’s response:

“Ultimately they are a combination of both and cannot be solved unless policy-makers work with society representatives.” (Int23)

Society representatives are the members of the Shaura Council.


The discussion was taken farther in regards to the effectiveness of automated

speed enforcement program and what needs to be done in order to overcome the

barriers. All participating policy-makers agreed that the effectiveness could be

increased and the barriers could be brought to the lower level of effect by going

through general steps. Such steps, as called by participants, must be executed towards

aligning the operational and legislative aspects of the automated speed enforcement

program with its suggested goals. As the participants represent the legislature system

in the Omani automated speed enforcement context, the discussion will not include the

operational aspect of the program. Participating policy-makers were required to

explain what should be done in order to align the regulations with the suggested goals

of the automated speed enforcement program. They provided different responses on

which their perceptions, knowledge, and experience are based.

One of the participants stated that the automated speed enforcement program

goals are aligned with the related regulations. His response was clear of that no more

work needs to be done as there are no important barriers:

“There is alignment between legislations and the goals of the automated speed enforcement program and I do not see any big barriers that we need to consider.” (Int19)

The only barriers he saw were the negative social influencers, which are not of

concern, as mentioned in his previous responses. Surprisingly, one participant refused

to provide a response for this question, which he justified by pointing to the unclear

goals and unapplied rules. Likewise, another participant deflected the question, saying

that there are no goals to be aligned to, when he said:

“What are the program goals? If you have a clear and written goal, say it to me and I will tell you whether the legislation is aligned to it or not” (Int20)

One possible interpretation for this response is that the participant was

confirming that there were no clear goals for the program, at least to the best of his

knowledge. On the other hand, two participants stated that the alignment between the

automated speed enforcement program goals, or suggested goals, and the legislation

related to it is of a high significance. One believed that if the alignment is not

considered and worked for, then the program resources are wasted:

“The alignment between these two is an important requirement, if not applied then the time, effort, and money are wasted. Nonetheless, goals need to be specified clearly” (Int23)


Additionally, he supported another participant’s response in regards to the clarity

of the program goals. The participant assumed that such resources should be directed

towards specific goals. These goals must be aligned with the regulations related to the

program, such as the speed fine values and the penalty system procedures. The

evaluation issue was brought up again in this discussion, as one of the participants

suggested using people not working in the ROP in order to carry out the evaluation

process of automated speed enforcement program, he said:

“The alignment between legislation and goals is vital of course and this should reduce the barriers and make the task smoother. I believe that the ROP should use an external expert to evaluate the program as a whole and consider the recommendation derived from the evaluation.” (Int24)

The idea of evaluating the automated speed enforcement program kept being

mentioned throughout the discussions which reflected its significance. Furthermore, a

participant suggested that several organisations in Oman must collaborate in order to

overcome the above-mentioned barriers. He suggested a complete system to be

introduced out of such collaboration, stating:

“There must be a complete system involving all road safety responsible parties in Oman such as the ROP, Ministry of Legal Affairs, the society, schools, colleges, universities, drivers, automobile traders, and Ministry of Commerce and Economics.” (Int21)

Moreover, a participant provided more details related to the legal and social

aspects of the barriers. He suggested that updating the vehicle owner’s contact details

must be enforced by law and the monetary fines should be taken directly from the

owner’s account once the fine is committed:

“From a legal perspective, the ROP should be authorised to take financial guarantees for every vehicle owner when registering the vehicle so that once they commit an offence, the money will be subtracted from the owner’s account. In addition, the regulations of enforcing owners to update their contact information in the ROP system must be applied properly. Furthermore, the demerit point system must be activated. From a social perspective: the society must be involved in and informed of such programs by different ways such as promoting the program history, goals, results, and operations with a detailed booklet” (Int18)

There were different suggestions in order to overcome the barriers. The

importance of aligning regulations with the goals of the automated speed enforcement

program has been dominant during the discussions. However, those were suggestions

which could or could not be implemented within the Omani context of road safety and

its related penalty system. The discussion went farther and participating policy-makers

were asked about what has been done in terms of regulations and laws towards the


current road safety issue related to speeding behaviour. There were two types of

responses obtained, the first from policy-makers who provided some details about the

amendments of Traffic Law in regards to speeding, and the second from others who

repeated their previous responses in the form of confirming their suggestions.

When asked about the latest amendments in Traffic Law, one participant

believed that the current legislative situation will have minor changes in terms of

increasing the fine value. The responses did not reveal that there will be incremental

fine value in case of repeating the fine as he explained. In addition, he suggested that

traffic regulations must be properly applied:

“I think that the situation will stay the same except for increasing the value of few traffic fines. There should be an incremental fine value for repeating the offence. In the future, some regulations must be activated and monitored to be applied properly.” (Int18)

As previously discussed, there are a few traffic regulations which are not applied

properly, as some policy-makers argued, such as the demerit points system and driver

imprisonment in the case of red-light violations and serious speeding fines. This cannot

be said to be illegal as the principle of reconciliation is still there, however, such a

principle could be misunderstood and thus, misused. There have been a few articles

modified in the Traffic Law according to the changes evolved since the last time it was

modified. However, there needs to be more modifications as the change never stops:

“What we have done is just modifications on some articles within the Traffic Law. Nevertheless, there is much to be done more than just modifying articles such as involving the society in solving this issue.” (Int21)

The amendments in the Traffic Law must be reflected in the Executive

Regulations of Traffic Law, which had not been issued at the time these interviews

took place. Another participant (Int24) confirmed that the only procedures done by

policy-makers were the recent amendments on the Omani Traffic Law. On the other

hand, three participating policy-makers did not mention what had been recently done

on the legislative aspect. It could be because they thought the amendments done will

not have a significant effect on the current speeding problem in Oman, or it could be

just because they thought that they should work on the suggestions for the future, as

the amendments have already been confirmed and issued. One participant suggested

seeking society support in order to get people comply with the related regulations:

“I think we should try to convince the society of these speed detectors in order to get people’s support, which in turn, raises the compliance level.” (Int19)


This response could be stated in other words such as correcting the society

thoughts about automated speed enforcement. The participant argued that the society

support should have been sought from the early stages of the program, but as the

program has been implemented for more than ten years, the images and thoughts about

it are already in people’s minds and need to be corrected. Another participant shared

the same concern about convincing the society of the program’s importance and

objectives. He proposed starting the process as if the program has just started, saying:

“Increasing the level of awareness about the program. Let’s say that we start informing people about it from the scratch because most people think that speed detectors are for revenue raising not for road safety as it is the first idea they have heard of.” (Int20)

This response represented the idea of correcting people’s thoughts about the

automated speed enforcement program as the initial thought about automated speed

enforcement was to collect money from people. Another participant called for

identifying the barriers as an initial step, after confessing that there were barriers. He

stated that the barrier he previously mentioned was still there without a change. He

considered when the ROP does not share information about the program and its

statistics as a barrier and he recommended that such information and statistics must be

available to the people.

“We need first to confess that there are some barriers and identify them precisely then look for solution to tackle them. The barriers I have previously mentioned are from my viewpoint and I do not think that the ROP did anything towards them. Furthermore, the ROP should tell people about its programs in a very transparent way.” (Int23)

More detail about the program in terms of is statistics and goals need to be clear

and available, especially for those who make decisions and create laws and regulations

so that the decisions and regulations are based on accurate information. Most of the

discussions about the program’s ambiguity point to a possible reason for the limited

suggestions and solutions provided by the participants, which is the limited data and

information about the program on hand. For example, not all data are provided by the

ROP, the program has not been evaluated, and current limited published data has not

been scientifically analysed.

In conclusion, this theme discussed the general barriers preventing the

automated speed enforcement program from being more effective and the barriers to

implementing fast sanctions. The findings suggested that there are several barriers

holding the automated speed enforcement program from being more effective in


promoting a deterrent effect on drivers. The barrier which was not discussed in this

theme is the one that could be considered a pure social barrier, related to the resistance

to any increase in monetary fine value because of the common sentiment “we do not

want to punish the poor people”.

When it came to the application of punishment swiftness, there were several

obstacles stated by participants, such as the difficulty of communicating with vehicle

owners due to the address system used in Oman not being detailed enough to be used

for such purpose. In addition, people regularly change their contact numbers and the

offender (driver) is not always the owner of the vehicle. Moreover, the concept of

punishment celerity is relatively new to the Omani society so there is a need to prepare

the people for such system before implementation.

On the other hand, the ambiguity of the automated speed enforcement program

goals and results was considered as barrier to promoting deterrent effect on people.

Participants argued that people must be well-informed about such information so that

they consider the program as legitimate. Additionally, not applying some traffic

regulations properly is considered a barrier to more effective automated speed

enforcement. More importantly, not evaluating the program against its goals was

considered one of the most important barriers preventing it from being effective as, if

it has been evaluated, its weaknesses would be clear and able to be dealt with. The

findings strongly suggest that the evaluation is a vital step before going through the

process of making decisions on the automated speed enforcement program regulations

and practices. As a participating policy-maker argued, the evaluation would identify if

the regulations are aligned with the program goals or not. Besides that, the evaluation

would examine to what extent the operations and practices are aligned with the goals.

There were several suggestions from the participants to tackle a few of the barriers.

For instance, there must be a regulation forcing vehicle owners to update his/her

contact details when they change, as well as a regulation enforcing offenders to pay

their fines within a specific period of time. Currently there are no such regulations

within the penalty system.

5.3.6 The Future of the Automated Speed Enforcement Program in Oman

Suggestions and solutions were investigated from the participants’ perspectives

in order to identify potential ways to enhance the automated speed enforcement

program. In addition, suggestions and recommendations were sought from them of


how they would like to see the automated speed enforcement program in the future in

order to improve its effectiveness. There were four main aspects on which the

recommendations were sought, legislation, technology, changing people’s

perceptions, and the operational practices of the automated speed enforcement

program.

New legislation related to the punishment swiftness, severity and certainty was

suggested. As seen from the responses of participating policy-makers, the speed fine

punishment is neither severe nor swift. Participants were asked to provide

recommendations in order to increase the deterrent effect of the current penalty system.

The most dominant recommendation was to apply an incremental fine value for

repeating the same offence during a specific period of time. Punishment swiftness was

the second dominant recommendation during the discussion. One participant stated it

very clearly:

“We need swiftness in applying the monetary sanctions” (Int22)

As mentioned earlier, the current punishment is not swift and drivers do not

perceive it as swift, from the policy-makers’ point of view. Similarly, another

participant recommended that the law should include punishment against those who

do not pay the fine during a specific period of time. In addition, he called for forcing

owners of vehicles to update their contact details into the ROP system. These

recommendations were interpreted from his response:

“I see that we better add an article in Traffic Law or a regulation in its Executive Regulations that punishes the offender if not paying the fine in specified short time. In addition, there should be a monetary sanction for those who do not update their contact details on the system. Finally, we need to apply the incremental fine value in case of repetition within specific period of time.” (Int18)

He also requested the application of incremental fine value in the case of

repetition as another participant recommended the same, saying:

“The incremental fine value when repeating the offence is one of the important law additions needed. A short window of time should be specified by law” (Int19)

Besides the request of the incremental fine value, there was a strong request to

specify the time within which the monetary sanction must be paid. In the current

penalty system, time is not specified and there is no penalty for not paying a fine.

Specifying the time by which fines must be paid is a crucial step towards increasing

the swiftness of punishment. As previously mentioned, the fine payment is currently

determined by the next time the vehicle owner has to complete a service in the traffic


department. In addition, the participant believed that the speed limit that leads to

vehicle impoundment and driver imprisonment when exceeded is very high at 75 km/h

above the speed limit. This means that such penalties are applied when drivers do 196

km/h in 120 zone, which needs to be reconsidered:

“We have to lower the maximum speed limit by which a vehicle is impounded and the driver is imprisoned when exceeded. Additionally, the incremental sanction in the case of repetition within, let’s say, a time of two or three months.” (Int23)

There were two contrary suggestions obtained from two participating policy-

makers. One recommended the specifying courts to handle and deal with any trials

related to traffic such unsolved crash incidents, trials against traffic departments, or

even unsolved traffic fine issues.:

“Allocating special courts for traffic matters because the more the judges deal with traffic issues, the more experience they get and less doubts about some complicated traffic issues they will have. Consequently, judges can (finish/complete/decide on/give final decisions on) trials in very short time. Unfortunately, what is happening now is that some judges give aggressive talks against Traffic Departments and Traffic Regulations and they do not see the full picture of road safety issue in Oman.” (Int21)

The reason behind requesting special courts was to make judges gain more

experience in related trials as the participant claimed. In addition, judges are people

from the society itself and they most probably perceive road safety programs and their

related regulations the same as most people perceive them. This is why there is a need

for special courts in the participant’s point of view.

In contrast, the other participant argued that such suggestions would lead to

requesting special courts for several other subjects such as family, clubs, and society:

“Some policy-makers have called for having traffic courts but I see this is not a good suggestion because we will need, then, to have specialised courts for other issues such as family, society, and sport club courts. For this concern, such suggestions will never be considered. Regarding the regulations, I think there is nothing to be added in this regard as we have to wait for the Executive regulations of Traffic Law to be introduced.” (Int20)

He added that they had to wait until the new Executive Regulations is issued

after recent amendments to several articles in the Traffic Law and there is no need for

any further addition to the current law. Likewise, another participant believes that the

current regulations are enough when he said:

“The current system is working fine and no need to add more sanctions against people.” (Int24)

The best interpretation for this response could be what is always stated in the

road safety context in Oman “we don’t want to punish the poor people”. Regardless of


the overall losses and the effectiveness which would be missed if not, for example

increasing the fine value, there are some policy-makers who thought that people should

not be punished severely.

Secondly, recommendations provided by the participating policy-makers related

to the additional technology needed for the current automated speed enforcement

program in order to make it more effective and guided towards it suggested goals. One

of the participants recommended that some of the current manual processes in the

existing penalty system need to be automated and he gave one example:

“The ROP needs to automate some of the procedures such as blocking services for vehicles that exceed the speed limit by 75 km/h. Currently this is happening manually and sometimes vehicles are skipped unintentionally” (Int23)

The current penalty system has several manual processes in relation to the

vehicles required to be impounded and drivers required to be imprisoned for a traffic

fine, especially those linked to red-light running and exceeding the speed limit by more

than 75 km/h. Such automation will reduce the manual process and thus eliminate

human errors. Another two participants recommended that the penalty system should

be able to notify the vehicle owner of any offence recorded against the vehicle. This

notification could take any form, such as sending the details via e-mail or post:

“It is better to have a system where speed fine details are automatically sent to the owner as soon as possible by e-mail or normal mail” (Int18)

The participant stated that as the Omani government is working towards ‘e-

government’ to gradually use less papers, it should encourage the use of tools such as

e-mail. Traditional mail is not widely used in Oman as it is not compulsory that

everyone has to have a mail box. It is an optional service where people can choose to

use it or not. Alternatively, an SMS could be sent to owner of the vehicle once an

offence is recorded in the system as another participant stated:

“Drivers should receive an SMS when detected by automated speed enforcement.” (Int24)

The option of receiving an SMS via mobile phones is currently available but a

person needs to subscribe and pay a small amount. However, it is not compulsory and

the owner has the option to subscribe or not. Furthermore, a participant recommended

using the modern technologies of automated speed enforcement as he said:

“We should keep speed detectors up-to-date and use the best technology in this field.” (Int19)

However, the current automated speed enforcement in Oman is considered to be

one of the best in terms of technology worldwide, as confirmed by another participant:


“To the best of my knowledge, we have the best speed detectors in the middle east if not in the world. They are capable of doing several tasks at the same time but ROP is not making the best use of them.” (Int22)

This response supported what was mentioned in the first study of this research

that the automated speed enforcement available in Oman includes several technologies

which are not utilised. One of these technologies is that the fixed automated speed

enforcement devices are capable of implementing a point-to-point average speed

system. In addition, they are able to send the speeding tickets via the mobile network,

which would save time and accelerate the processing of offences.

Two participants went a bit farther and recommended that the technology should

be used in the payment process in a way that fine value is taken directly from the

owner’s account. One participant recommended this procedure to enhance the

swiftness of punishment:

“It is recommended that the owner’s bank account is connected to the traffic system at the ROP to assure the swiftness of punishment” (Int20)

Another one recommended this to be stated in law and applied to everyone:

“Introducing the compulsory fine payment system, by law, in a way that the amount is automatically deducted from the vehicle owner’s bank account once the fine is recorded in the ROP system.” (Int21)

To sum up, the participating policy-makers recommended four main additions

in terms of the technology to be added to the current penalty system within the

automated speed enforcement program. Firstly, procedures within the penalty system

should be automated to eliminate human errors. Secondly, the owner of the vehicle

should be informed automatically once an offence is recorded against the vehicle.

Thirdly, better use could be made of the technologies already built into the current

automated speed enforcement devices used in Oman. Finally, paying traffic fines

should be done by obtaining authorisation from the vehicle owner to deduct the amount

directly from their bank account by direct debit.

Thirdly, recommendations in regards to mechanism and tools to be used in order

to change people’s perceptions about automated speed enforcement and drivers’

speeding behaviour in a way that makes the automated speed enforcement program

more effective. All seven participating policy-makers agreed that traffic awareness

must be used beside traffic regulations in order to alter drivers’ perceptions and,

consequently, behaviours. One participant believes that the ROP is currently using

classic methods in promoting traffic awareness to the society and he recommended


that there should be different tools used. He thought that bringing external experience

is one way of shifting from the currently used classic tools, as he said:

“Focusing on traffic awareness using different tools rather than the classic ones used currently. The ROP can bring some experience from other countries in this regard.” (Int18)

While another participant believed that traffic safety should be planted in society

by different several ways and in several places, stating:

“Traffic safety concepts must be instilled in society members by different ways such as TV, Radio, schools, and families” (Int19)

One participant recommended that the ROP should use ordinary people to

promote traffic awareness, as it is directed at them and therefore, they know the best

ways to communicate it:

“The ROP should involve people from the society in traffic awareness roles because they know better what convince them to change their behaviours.” (Int24)

On the other hand, a participant suggested evaluation of the traffic awareness

lectures given to the society and schools. The ROP is doing a considerable amount of

traffic awareness and road safety lectures in the society and schools but there is no

evaluation of the results. In other words, there is no follow up with the results after

providing such lectures. The participant called for evaluation to see the results:

“Traffic safety awareness lectures and tools which will be evaluated against its results later. We have to see the results in reality.” (Int20)

During the discussion, he thought that it was not a good strategy when lecturing

in traffic awareness and telling people about how dangerous speeding is, and then it is

not known whether behaviours change afterwards or not. He believed that an effort

paid without following up the outcomes is wasted. Traffic awareness and road safety

lecturing should be supported by research and studies, as one participant commented.

In addition, he recommended a comprehensive plan for traffic awareness which must

be followed up:

“Traffic safety awareness should be performed in a better way. For example, making a clear, thorough plan for traffic awareness, and this plan must be supported by evidence-based research and studies. In addition, the plan must be evaluated” (Int21)

Furthermore, one of the participants believed that traffic awareness classes

should be made mandatory for habitual offenders and included in the regulations. He

believes that this addition will change the behaviours of habitual offenders, not

because of the procedures and monetary payments, but rather due to the time they lose

during the classes:


“Traffic awareness must be linked with the law so that it will be compulsory at least for the habitual offenders. Offenders will try to avoid such procedures as they think about the time wasted on classes.” (Int22)

He assumed that the habitual offenders will stay as they are as long as the law

does not take something valuable from them, which in this case is time. Debatably,

time could also be taken from them by imprisonment, which is included in the current

penalty system. However, this is not always applied against offenders. Another

mechanism which could be used in promoting the traffic awareness and road safety

concepts is the short films produced to explain the concepts or the reality happening

during a crash or while speeding, as one participant explained. He believed that this

kind of practical traffic awareness mechanism, as he called it, will lead to better results

than the classic theoretical mechanism in terms of convincing people of particular road

safety concepts:

“Using a practical traffic awareness mechanism is much better than theoretical ones in terms of effect and results. For example, making a five-minute film about what exactly happens in a crash is better than lecturing in traffic awareness for an hour or so” (Int23)

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the participating policy-

makers agreed that the traffic awareness is the second solution after changing the law

to change people’s perceptions and behaviours. The participants provided several

recommendations in terms of how to use the traffic awareness in a way that could

change people risky behaviours. Traffic awareness procedures should use different

tools, be promoted among all people in the society, and involve ordinary people from

society to act as influencers. In addition, the traffic awareness procedures must have a

clear plan which is based on scientific research and studies and be evaluated after

implementation. Traffic awareness classes should also be mandatory by law, while

using a practical mechanism to promote road safety concepts.

Finally, the future recommendations for the fourth aspect which is aligning the

operational practices of the Omani automated speed enforcement program with the

related regulations. The operational practices of the program have been investigated in

more details in the first study of this research. It was found that the operational

practices currently implemented in Oman are not documented and not directed towards

clear goals. In addition, there are no clear criteria for site selection for the different

automated speed enforcement types, and the timing and operating hours of the


different automated speed enforcement types are not clear and each traffic directorate

deploys them differently.

Several recommendations were provided by the seven participating policy-

makers in regards to the operational practices of the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman. The recommendations are discussed based on the interpretations of

their responses. One participant did not have enough knowledge of the operational

practices and he said:

“I do not know much about automated speed enforcement operational practices but what I know is that legislation is always modified according to the changes happening within the road safety context.” (Int19)

This could be attributed to the lack of any written document about the automated

speed enforcement operational practices in Oman, and that supports the findings of the

first study. That study found that the ROP does not have an operation manual for the

automated speed enforcement practices, but instead there are verbal instructions

directed from the Directorate General of Traffic to the geographical directorates of

traffic. These instructions include direction on the number of operating hours for

automated speed enforcement and sometimes locations where to deploy the units.

However, as mentioned in the first study of this research that not all instructions are

followed by the geographical directorates of traffic.

Participant Int19 said that the legislation is always modified according to

changes happening, however this statement is questionable as the legislation takes a

long time to be changed. Comparing the very slow pace of legislation change with the

changes which are happening in a very fast manner, his statement does not apply to

the case of Traffic Law.

As there has not been any document written about the automated speed

enforcement operations, two participants recommended having a document prepared.

One stated that the document should be written in a language understood by everyone

in the Omani society when he said:

“I think it is better to issue an official booklet that includes all operational practices supported by scientific evidence in lay language to make it understandable by all levels of people within the Omani society” (Int22)

Another participant recommended that such a document should be written by the

ROP and should contain goals and results of the automated speed enforcement

program:


“The ROP needs to have a very clear and explicit document about automated speed enforcement operations, including goals and results achieved until now” (Int23)

In addition, the idea of goals and directing all resources to fulfil such goals was

stated by another participant stressing its importance, quoting:

“The whole system must be reviewed according to the program goals. When the goals change, all directions and operations will be accordingly changed.” (Int23)

The two studies included in this research have investigated the goals of the

automated speed enforcement program and revealed that there were no clear goals, but

rather the research suggested goals based on the responses obtained from participants

interviewed during the data collection phases of the two studies. One of the participants

believed that there must be clear goals for the program as a very first step:

“First of all, there must be very clear and solid goals that direct and guide the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. Secondly, these goals must be well communicated and explained to all officers working in this field. In addition, goals should be justified to the public and they should be made aware of the rationale behind this program.” (Int21)

The second part of the above response aligns with the finding of the first study

of this research that the goals were not clear to most of the operational and supervisory

ROP officers working in the field of automated speed enforcement. Interestingly, the

participant requested a justification for the program goals so that people understood

why the program was introduced in the first place. The idea of justifying why there are

such automated speed enforcement practices to the people was mentioned by two other

participants. One stated that:

“The operational practices must be clear to everyone. I meant that ROP should justify for the people why it is doing what it is doing.” (Int18)

As the ROP is the governmental organisation responsible for the automated

speed enforcement in the Omani roads. There have always been questions about

automated speed enforcement deployment, especially in regards of the location where

they are deployed, as one participant stated the need for justification for some

locations:

“People need to see justification for automated speed enforcement operations, especially those related to site selection, and this cannot be achieved unless there are clear goals for the program as a whole.” (Int24)

On the other hand, one of the participants recommended that the automated

speed enforcement program operational practices to be backed up by law, meaning

that guidelines for operational practices should be included in the Traffic Law or its

Executive Regulations:


“I see that the ROP is requested to support its automated speed enforcement operational practices with articles within the Traffic Executive Regulations. I think there are several correspondences between the Directorate General of Traffic and the Geographical Traffic Directorates in relation to the operational practices. These could be the starting point of the articles to be included” (Int20)

When it came to the law to support the operational practices of automated speed

enforcement, there is an article that supports such practices generally. However, this

article is not mentioned in Traffic Law, rather it is mentioned in the Police Law. Article

No.11 in the Omani Police Law has very general guidance for the existence of the ROP

("Oman Police Law," 1990). Part of this article could be translated as “The Royal

Oman Police is responsible for maintaining order and public security…and protecting

lives…” ("Oman Police Law," 1990, p. 5). This is interpreted as the ROP could use

different tools and mechanism in order to protect lives; among them are those

automated speed enforcement devices used on the Omani roads.

In conclusion, the participating policy-makers provided three different

recommendations in relation to aligning the automated speed enforcement program

operational practices with the regulations. Firstly, as legislation is modified according

to the changes, the law should include an article supporting the current automated

speed enforcement operations. Secondly, the ROP should justify to the people the

rationale and reasons behind current automated speed enforcement operations.

Thirdly, there should be an operation manual that includes criteria for site selection,

operating hours, and results derived from the current automated speed enforcement

program.

5.3.7 Other Issues Examined

The participating policy-makers were asked about the 15 km/h enforcement

threshold currently applied in Oman and the speed limit considered dangerous from

their point of view. This question was posed in order to understand how policy-makers

think about dangerous speed, as they are the ones who create laws and regulations

according to their experience, knowledge, and thinking. Two participants believed that

the current speed limit on highways (120 km/h) is too high and fatal crashes could

happen. They thought that 100 km/h is more reasonable. Quoting one of the two

responses:

“Driving with a speed of 120 km/h has a lot of danger. What about if this speed is accompanied with texting or reading messages!? I recommend that this limit be decreased to 100 km/h.” (Int18)


Another participant believed that the 120 km/h is enough as a limit for speed and

policy-makers should keep it this way without the threshold of 15 km/h, stating:

“120 is suitable and anything above that is dangerous and unacceptable, regardless of the reason.” (Int22)

He believed that there is nothing important enough to make people exceed the

speed limit of 120 km/h, as it is already a high speed. However, another three

participating policy-makers provided justifications for the application of the 15 km/h

threshold. One participant argued that one reason for this threshold is to overcome the

errors in vehicle manufacturing in regards to the accuracy of the speedometer:

“One reason for having the threshold of 15 km could be the inaccuracy of the speedometer in some vehicles” (Int21)

The second one believed that this threshold of 15 km/h is to be used during the

urgent situations such as moving injured people from a crash site to a hospital:

“A speed of 120 km/h is suitable for the Omani roads and the 15 km threshold is there to give drivers range to take over other vehicles in urgent situations. However, I have heard that in some countries the threshold is not publicly known, but here we have it as part of regulations.” (Int19)

The participant also brought the idea of an unpublished or unknown threshold.

The third participant who gave justification for the existence of 15 km/h threshold said

that this is going to change in the coming Executive Regulations of Traffic Law. He

believed that another reason for the 15 km/h threshold application is the geometric

features of some roads, such as downhill sections:

“A speed of 120 km/h is more than enough. The threshold is for some geometric features of the road such as in downhill roads. However, this regulation has been changed and will be effective once the Executive Regulations of Traffic Law are issued.” (Int23)

The changes which are supposed to be included in the Executive Regulations

could not be obtained from participating policy-makers as they do not know them until

the Executive Regulations is issued in the near future, as they hoped. More

interestingly, one participant recommended increasing the speed limit from 120 km/h

to 140 km/h, but with an increase in the monetary fine value of triple the current value.

The possible interpretation for his statement to justify such increase is that promote

the general deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program when he said:

“I agree that 120 is dangerous enough but if the policy-maker put the speed limit at 140 km/h and tripled the fine value for causing an accident, it would be better so that drivers will be more careful while driving. This is about making people fear the punishment as it is very high” (Int24)


As mentioned by other participants, the speed limit of 120 km/h is already

dangerous and fatal crashes could happen, so there is no need to increase the speed

limit to 140 km/h, even if the monetary fine value is increased.

It could be said that there are two speed limits: the speed limit posted by law

(e.g. 120 km/h), and the speed limit perceived by people after which the automated

speed enforcement detects vehicle if exceeded (e.g. 135 km/h in the case of a 120 km/h

posted speed limit). The participating policy-makers were asked if the drivers consider

keeping their speeds under the posted speed limit or under the limit after adding the

threshold of 15 km/h. All the responses indicated a perception that drivers do not

consider the posted speed limit as the one to follow, but rather they consider the

addition of threshold as the speed limit they have to comply with. Three participants

clearly stated this issue, for example:

“Threshold of course and that is what has been known for long time.” (Int23)

It could be considered a mistake to mention the threshold of 15 km/h in the

regulations, as one of the participants expressed:

“Of course, they consider the threshold as the speed limit for their driving. This is a big mistake in the regulations. We need to update the regulation and update speed limits on the roads.” (Int18)

It is expected that this matter will be solved in the new Executive Regulation of

the amended Traffic Law, because as mentioned above this mistake could be attributed

to the current regulations. Another participant said:

“Drivers consider the 15 km above the speed limit. No one talks about a speed limit of 120, they always talk about the 135 km/h. For example, drivers consider themselves compliant to the speed limit when they do not exceed the 135 not the 120.” (Int19)

However, even the 135 km/h in 120 zone, the 115 km/h in 100 zone, the 95 km/h

in 80 zone, and the 75 km/h in 60 zone are being exceeded by drivers, as shown by the

high rate of speed fines discussed earlier. One participant included this matter in his

discussion when explained:

“Most of the Omani drivers do not look at the speed limit where it is dangerous to drive, rather, they look at the limit where they get apprehended and fined. I support my statement with the statistics of speed fines you’ve previously mentioned. A driving speed of 135 km/h is very dangerous, nevertheless drivers stick to it as it is the speed limit and they go further than that, they exceed it.” (Int21)

This response reflected that the majority of Omani drivers are not the conformer

type of driver, as previously argued by four participants. Although the speed at which

vehicles are detected is very high, people still exceed it. This is supported by another


participant who believed that this is the way people perceive the threshold of 15 km/h,

saying:

“Regardless of the posted speed limit, when does the driver get fined? At 136 not 121, that is how people think.” (Int24)

The responses suggested that drivers do not comply with the posted speed limit,

but rather consider the added threshold as the speed they are allowed to drive at. This

could be caused by the indirect promotion of the threshold as the speed limit to comply

with.

The idea of social condemnation was discussed during the interviews conducted

with the seven participating policy-makers. Participants were asked about their opinion

on whether social condemnation could be used to promote deterrence within the Omani

road safety context. Only one participant believed that social condemnation could

work as better deterrent, albeit with a short-term effect:

“I think it works better but unfortunately it doesn’t last longer than few days at its best.” (Int19)

The other six participants believed that social condemnation cannot be used as a

deterrent in the Omani road safety context and each participant justified his response.

One participant considered it an emotional state that does not last more than a few

hours as an interpretation for his response when said:

“I consider this as an emotional deterrence which will end once I sleep and wake up again. I think we should be more realistic in dealing with the society.” (Int18)

Another participant supported this statement when stated that social

condemnation does not work as a better deterrent in the Omani context at any time:

“I do not think social condemnation works as a better deterrent, not currently and not in the near future.” (Int20)

On the other hand, three participants from those who did not see social

condemnation as a good deterrent stated that such a concept takes a very long time to

be planted in society:

“Currently, no I do not think so. However, this idea needs a very long time to be applied because we need to change the thoughts of the entire society as the society now does not see speed as unacceptable behaviour.” (Int21)

Another participant added the large effort beside the long time needed in order

to reach the point where people disapprove of speeding behaviours (Int22). The

financial aspect was also added to the time and effort required for such concept to be

correctly and effectively promoted as another participant expressed (Int23). Moreover,

a participant stressed the idea of involving the society in programs such as the


automated speed enforcement program, in order to make people accept it and be more

willing to comply with the regulations related to it. Consequently, the noncompliant

drivers will be socially condemned:

“From the current givens and situation, no I do not think so. Conversely, if the society is involved in the programs and legislation of traffic safety, the society might be driven towards condemning speed behaviour.” (Int24)

Considerably more research needs to be conducted in regards to social

condemnation, as this is based on the perceptions of policy-makers who are part of the

society, but do not represent the whole society. They all agreed that social

condemnation cannot be applied as it takes long time and needs more effort and

resources.

The participating policy-makers were next asked if they think that there is a

discrepancy between what drivers know to be wrong and their reactions towards that

specific wrong behaviour. This deep investigation was to understand how policy-

makers think about drivers and how that is reflected in their decisions about the laws

and regulations related to road safety in Oman.

All seven participating policy-makers believed that this discrepancy exists and

some of them also stated reasons for why this is happening, from their point of view.

One of the participants argued that this gap exists as a consequence of the current

regulations:

“There is a very big gap between what is real and what is in a driver’s mind in terms of road safety. This is a consequence of low traffic awareness and non-deterrent regulations.” (Int18)

One explanation for his response could be people’s thoughts about the threshold

as being the speed limit they have to comply with rather than the actual posted speed

limit. This is a consequence of the absence of traffic awareness. Another participant

(Int24) supported this statement, while a third (Int19) stated that this discrepancy will

not last forever. Then during the discussion, he explained how it will vanish in time.

He argued that the policy-makers need to act differently towards the road safety

problem and need to introduce more tough traffic regulations:

“If we change our strategies in dealing with the road safety issue. We, as policy-makers have to make traffic regulations stricter.” (Int19)

Almost all participating policy-makers called for tougher regulations in terms of

the monetary fine value and the fining procedures, as discussed earlier in this chapter.


Furthermore, three participants stated the seat belt as example of something that

drivers know is wrong, but still do:

“The discrepancy is there and the best example is not wearing the seat belt.” (Int20).

The responses suggested that there was an issue regarding the gap between what

is known by drivers as wrong behaviour and what they really do when they insist on

committing such behaviour. There needs to be a solution to reduce this gap, and thus

positively change drivers’ behaviours. One participant provided a suggestion in this

regard when he said:

“Yes, there is always a difference between what I think and what I do. These two sides always fight inside someone’s head until the “do” wins in most cases. The solution for this is that we, as policy-makers, have to force the drivers to think of punishment before thinking about consequences of a crash. Making drivers think about crash consequences is the role of society and educational institutes.” (Int21)

As clearly stated in his response, policy-makers do not play a role in traffic

awareness in regards to social consequences of crashes, as they have more important

jobs to do, which is stating the road safety related regulations.

Based on the basic analysis of data obtained from the ROP, as part of the first

study of this research, it is believed that the automated speed enforcement program is

effective in detecting speeding vehicles, due to the high number of speeding fines

recorded every year. Nevertheless, the program did not show high effectiveness in

reducing speed related crashes, as the number of crashes caused by speed has been

stable for many years at a level of almost 50 percent of total crashes. The participating

policy-makers were asked why this rate of crashes caused by speed has remained the

same even after more than ten years of implementing the automated speed enforcement

program. Participants provided different insights in this respect. Two participants

thought that most of the fatal crashes happen at lower speeds after exceeding speed

limits, as the automated speed enforcement program has not deterred drivers from

committing these violations:

“In my point of view, the automated speed enforcement program has deterred drivers who exceed the speed limit by more than 75-80 km/h because the fine value is high and sometimes the driver is imprisoned for a day or two and the vehicle impounded for a week or two. This program, as you mentioned, has not shown effectiveness in reducing fatal crashes as anticipated because most fatal crashes do not happen because of a very high speed such as the ones over 75 km/h above the speed limit.” (Int20)


Excess speed of more than 75 over the speed limit is punished with a fine of

OMR 50, but even the lower levels of speeding fine apply up to 75 km/h above the

limit, which means drivers can do up to 195 km/h (120+75) and the fine does not

exceed OMR 35 (AUD$117). Another considered the program of significant effect:

“I believe that the automated speed enforcement program has had a significant role in reducing traffic crashes and deterring speeding drivers. The situation is much better than before.” (Int19)

This response is derived from observation of the road situation before and after

the automated speed enforcement program. It could be true to some extent, however,

observation is not enough and statistics prove differently. In relation to the need for

research, another suggested a very detailed analysis of the results obtained from the

ROP:

“If the results you have just stated are based on research, so the publications and statements given by the ROP officials are based on what? We have to do a detailed study to know the exact reasons behind this problem. Generally, I see that crashes have decreased” (Int21)

It could be stated that number of crashes has decreased if all other variables are

ignored. Although the participant argued that there has been a decrease in the number

of crashes after the automated speed enforcement program implementation, this

decrease is not up to his expectations as he stated:

“As I said we need a scientific analysis” (Int21).

There is a need for detailed and scientific analysis considering all other variables,

such as the number of registered vehicles and issued driving licenses.

Another participant suggested alternative ways of travel:

“I do not expect crashes to reduce as the number of registered vehicles is growing every year. We need to find alternative for transport such as trains or buses that can help employees to get to their work place without using their own cars.” (Int22)

In conclusion, there were four other relevant topics brought up by participants

during the automated speed enforcement legislative discussion. They were the

threshold for speeding detection, social condemnation, the discrepancy between what

drivers know is wrong their reactions towards that specific wrong behaviour, and the

high rates of speed-related crashes after more than ten years of automated speed

enforcement deployment. The threshold of 15 km/h exists for urgent situations and

because of potential inaccuracy in vehicle speedometers. Nonetheless, policy-makers

believed that the threshold is very high and needs to be reduced, as well as not be made


public. Policy-makers believed that social condemnation does not have a deterrent

effect within the Omani context of road safety, as it is emotional and it does not last

long. In addition, if it is needed to be one of the good deterrents, it takes very long time

and great effort until it reaches a useful level in society. There is a discrepancy between

what drivers know and what they do and this can be clearly seen within the example

of seat belt use, as one participant believed. Drivers know it is crucial to wear a seat

belt, but they still do not use it. Furthermore, policy-makers argued that speed related

crashes happen at low speeds after exceeding the speed limit, and even within the

posted speed limits of 120 km/h. The automated speed enforcement program has

deterred the very high speeds but not the lower ones. Participants believed that there

is a lot more to be done in relation to the automated speed enforcement program in

Oman such as scientific analysis and studies and legislative change. In short, the

automated speed enforcement program in Oman needs to be looked at as a whole

system, and the operational and theoretical aspects need to be aligned.

5.4 SUMMARY OF THE KEY FINDINGS

This chapter presented the second study of this program of research and focused

on the reasons and justifications behind the current practices of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman from policy-makers’ point of view. In other words, it

investigated the theoretical grounding and the rationale behind traffic rule regulations

related to automated speed enforcement. This study was conducted in order to obtain

answers for three research questions examined within this research. Firstly, what are

the perceptions of policy-makers about the automated speed enforcement program in

terms of its intended deterrent effect? Secondly, what is the best way to evaluate the

effectiveness of Omani the automated speed enforcement program against its goals?

Thirdly, what are the barriers to increasing the effectiveness of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman? In addition to the answers to these research questions,

the responses obtained from the seven participating policy-makers have led to several

conclusions and key findings to be stated within this research or studied in the future.

This summary of findings will be structured around the fourth, fifth and sixth

objectives of this program of research (see Section 1.3). The first objective of this

study was to identify the perceptions of the legislators about the automated speed


enforcement program in terms of its supposed deterrent effect. The perceptions of

policy-makers have been obtained through different stages of the interview. This

objective is discussed in the next few paragraphs.

Participants believed that speeding behaviour has evolved from both social and

legal factors. One reason for a continuous speeding behaviour among Omani drivers

could be the non-deterrent regulations. The deterrent effect of the automated speed

enforcement program was sought from the participants’ perception. Automated speed

enforcement devices are mostly to deter drivers from exceeding the speed limit and

that should be the case in the Omani context. Participants did not see that the automated

speed enforcement program as effective enough in promoting a deterrent effect among

drivers. Furthermore, the findings revealed that the existing penalty system and

regulations related to speeding in general were not considered of good deterrent effect

on drivers. Among the reasons that have led to this situation could be the application

of the principle of reconciliation within traffic regulations. The study sought the

participants’ general perceptions about the deterrent effect of the automated speed

enforcement program, and then went into the details of each element separately. In

general, three participating policy-makers believed that the program has failed to have

a deterrent effect on drivers, two out of seven thought that the program has been

effective, and the last two argued that the program has had a deterrent effect to some

extent only.

When discussing the perceived severity of sanctions, five policy-makers

believed that people do not perceive the speeding fine as severe and that is reflected in

their driving behaviour when they repeat the offence. Two participants argued that

people perceive the sanction as severe when considering their financial situations,

however, this perception does not last long enough in drivers’ mind. In addition, the

demerit point system is considered a severe sanction, but is not applied for reasons

unknown to the participants. Moreover, some regulations are not applied properly and

that could be a result of the principle of reconciliation. Almost all participants,

personally, thought that the monetary value of traffic fines is very low and far from

being severe when the consequences of disobeying the traffic regulations are taken

into consideration. Remarkably, participants strongly recommended that fine values

be much higher. In short, participating policy-makers argued that the punishment does

not fit the offence at all.


The celerity of traffic fines procedures was then discussed. All seven policy-

makers seemed certain that once fining procedures are applied in a swift way, the

deterrent effect level would increase which, in turn, would change drivers’ behaviours

positively. Currently the fining procedures could be considered very slow compared

with other existing penalty systems, such as in the state of Queensland, Australia,

where the driver is given 28 days to pay the fine and non-payment results in an increase

in the fine monetary value. Currently in Oman, the fine payment period could range

from one day up to 365 days after the fine is recorded in the system. Moreover, there

is no specific regulation within the law to impose legal sanctions against a vehicle

driver or owner for not paying a monetary traffic fine recorded against them. The

payment time is not bound to a specific period of time, but to a service needed from

the ROP. Policy-makers preferred swift sanctions, however, they believed that the

society must be prepared for the new procedures. Additionally, the swift payment

procedure should be gradually introduced by starting to implement it on severe fines

first after informing the society.

The last aspect of the deterrent effect discussed was the perceived certainty of

punishment. Policy-makers were asked about their opinion about to what extent people

think they get apprehended if they exceed the speed limit, given the fact that there is a

high number of automated speed enforcement units on the roads. Policy-makers

believed that the automated speed enforcement program has not produced the desired

results on drivers in terms of promoting punishment certainty.

Participants have suggested updates and changes to be considered within the

practices of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. Among those

suggestions is the implementation of a better penalty system in terms of fine severity

and procedural celerity in order to increase the effectiveness of the program in

deterring drivers from exceeding the speed limits. However, participating policy-

makers identified several barriers preventing the program from being more effective.

There is a need for legislative change and technological upgrades in order to

implement punishment swiftness as well as social preparation for accepting a new

system. There should be an additional article in the Traffic Law or within its Executive

Regulations which forces offenders to pay the traffic fine within a specific period of

time or face further penalties. Participants suggested that there should also be a

connection between the ROP penalty system and the bank accounts of vehicle owners


to make it easy to deduct the fine amount when a violation is committed. As the idea

of applying swift punishment is relatively new to middle-eastern societies, the society

should first be informed about the system and it should be introduced and applied

gradually, for example, starting with payment for serious fines first. There is also a

need to make the automated speed enforcement program less ambiguous to the people

in terms of its goals, practices, and results. Additionally, not evaluating the program is

considered one of the barriers standing against its effectiveness. Evaluation provides

weakness points and strengths to be considered when making decisions.

Almost all participants agreed that the current compliance is attributed to the

legal factors represented in law and regulations. Although there could be some social

factor affecting compliance, participants did not believe these were significant.

The second of the research objectives examined in this study concerned the best

way to evaluate the effectiveness of the Omani automated speed enforcement program

against its goals. When seeking answers to this question, participants agreed that the

program has never been evaluated. In order to evaluate a program against its goals,

those goals must first be made clear. Participants also suggested a basic before-after

analysis as an initial evaluation of the program, as it appeared from the findings that

the automated speed enforcement program does not have clear written goals, rather

there are several goals assumed by participants. These goals could be directly or

indirectly related to the ultimate goals of the traffic regulations in Oman, which are

enforcing order and regulating traffic. However, the automated speed enforcement

program should have specific goals to guide all program resources and against which

the program should be evaluated. For instance, deterring drivers and increasing the

compliance level could be among those goals.

The third objective examined in this study concerned the identification of the

barriers to more effective automated speed enforcement in Oman. The findings

suggested that there are several barriers preventing the automated speed enforcement

program from being more effective in deterring drivers. For instance, there are barriers

to enabling the sanctions to be applied swiftly, such as the difficulty of contacting the

owners of the vehicle as the address system used in Oman is not so detailed that it

could be used for this purpose. In addition, people regularly change their contact

numbers and the offender is not always the owner of the vehicle. Moreover, the


concept of punishment celerity is relatively new to the Omani society, so there is a

need to prepare the people for such a system before implementation.

The ambiguity of the automated speed enforcement program goals and results

was considered another barrier to deterring drivers. Participants argued that people

must be well-informed about such information so that they consider the program

legitimate. Additionally, not applying some traffic regulations properly is considered

a barrier to more effective automated speed enforcement. More importantly, not

evaluating the program against its goals was considered as one of the greatest barriers

preventing it from being effective, since such an evaluation would identify points of

weakness which could then be dealt with. The findings strongly suggested that an

evaluation is a vital step before going through the process making decisions about the

program regulations and practices. As one participating policy-maker argued, the

evaluation would identify whether the regulations are aligned with the program goals

or not. Besides that, the evaluation would examine to what extent the operations and

practices are aligned with the goals. There were several suggestions from the

participants in order to tackle a few of the barriers. For instance, there must be a

regulation forcing vehicle owners to update their contact details when they change, as

well as a regulation forcing offenders to pay their fines within specific period of time.

Currently there are no such regulations within the penalty system.

In addition to the responses obtained to answer the three research questions, there

were several other key findings and conclusions derived from the responses obtained

from interviews. The participating policy-makers showed their expectations and

desires about the future of the automated speed enforcement program in the form of

recommendations. They recommended four main additions in terms of the technology

to be added to the current penalty system. Firstly, procedures within the existing

penalty system should be automated to eliminate human errors. Secondly, the owner

of a vehicle should be informed automatically once an offence is recorded against the

vehicle. Thirdly, better use should be made of the existing technologies in the current

automated speed enforcement devices used in Oman. Finally, traffic fines should be

paid by obtaining authorisation from the vehicle owner to deduct the amount directly

from a bank account by direct debit.

The participating policy-makers also agreed that traffic awareness is the second

solution after the law to change people’s perceptions and behaviours. The participant


provided several recommendations in terms of how to use the traffic awareness in a

way that could change risky behaviours. Traffic awareness procedures should use

different tools, promoted among all people in the society, and involve ordinary people

from society to have some roles on it. In addition, the traffic awareness procedures

must have a clear plan which is based on scientific research and studies and it must be

evaluated after implementation. Moreover, traffic awareness classes should be

mandatory by law, which is a practical mechanism to promote road safety concepts.

Furthermore, the participating policy-makers identified three different strategies

to better align the automated speed enforcement program operational practices with

the regulations. Firstly, as legislation is modified according to the changes, the law

should include an article supporting the current automated speed enforcement

operations. Secondly, the ROP should explain to the people the rationale and reasons

behind current automated speed enforcement operations. Thirdly, there should be an

operation manual that includes criteria for site selection, operating hours, and results

derived from the current automated speed enforcement program.

There were four additional topics brought up by the participating policy-makers,

which were the speeding detection threshold, social condemnation, the discrepancy

between what drivers know is wrong actions, and the high rate of speed-related crashes

after more than ten years of automated speed enforcement deployment.

5.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

As with all research, this study featured a range of strengths as well as

limitations, and many were very similar to those in the first study. The strengths and

limitations of the first study are discussed in detail in section 4.3, above.

The strengths of this study are almost the same as the ones in the first study. To

begin with, the privilege of searching both Arabic and English resources is considered

one of strengths, as is the option to conduct the interviews in Arabic or English based

on interviewee choice. All interviews were conducted in Arabic in order to make

clarification of concepts, questions, and answers much easier for both the researcher

and the participants.

The limitations of this second study are also very similar to the first study.

Firstly, among those limitations is not having any research or study previously

conducted about the automated speed enforcement program in Oman which, in turn,


made it more difficult to conduct the research as there is no previous document to refer

to. Secondly, the data collection field is Oman which is far from Australia, and much

time was spent in travelling back and forth. Thirdly, approaching participants was

more difficult and took longer than expected, as some of them had urgent matters to

attend to abroad. In addition, some participants have many responsibilities, which

made it hard to obtain an appointment with them for interviews. It was also very

difficult to spend enough time with them. Fourthly, as most participants are

representing government organisations, there is a high possibility that they provided

biased responses. In other words, there is a possibility that some responses are biased

by the participant’s social or political status. This was shown when some participants

had conflicting responses and there was no way to reach the agreeing point between

their opinions unless they are gathered and interviewed at the same time which is

nearly impossible in such context and situation. In addition, the findings of this

research are based on what has been reported by participants and cannot be considered

a reflection of the actual practices of the program. The fifth limitation appeared when

some of the data needed to support policy-makers responses could not be obtained

from the ROP, as such data are not published or documented, such as the number of

fines in each category of speed fine. Finally, as for the first study, this study also cannot

claim to be highly accurate in its conclusion about the limited effect of the automated

speed enforcement program on the reduction of crash and fatality rates during the

period included in this study, as there are other factors that could contribute that are

not included in this study, such as the road construction, driver compliance, personal

factors, and social factors.

5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The chapter started with an introductory statement followed by a section that

explained the connection between the first study and this study. As in the first study,

this study used semi-structured interviews for collecting data needed for this part of

the research. There are nine main people from four different government organisations

that involved in the legislative aspect of traffic regulations, namely, the Royal Oman

Police, the Ministry of Legal Affairs, the General Secretariat of the Council of

Ministers, and the Oman Council which includes both the Council of the State of Oman

and the Shaura Council. Seven of those nine people were interviewed and each was

asked around forty questions over an average time of one hour and a half for each


interview. The study pre-identified six main themes which were used to guide and

direct the interviews.

Firstly, the interviews started by investigating the current speeding problem as

seen by policy-makers, and all participants agreed that there is no doubt that the

problem exists and it is of high importance to the Omani government. It was assumed

that this perception should be reflected in the way this problem is dealt with by the

different government organisations involved in or responsible for road safety in Oman.

It was clearly seen that all participants take the problem very seriously. They have

taken steps towards solving the problem of road safety in Oman, such as the issuance

of Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations, as well as enhancing road safety by

introducing the automated speed enforcement program. The introduction of the

automated speed enforcement program is considered a part of the solution but not all

of it. However, the responses related to deciding on the automated speed enforcement

implementation did not seem to be based on scientific facts and research, but rather on

personal knowledge and experience. In addition, speeding is seen as a behaviour which

consists of a combination of social and legal aspects. The policy-makers did not

believe speeding is socially condemned and that has contributed to making it a

continuing problem. Therefore, there is a high-level need for more effort to be taken

in relation to social and legal aspects affecting speeding behaviour. Besides the ROP,

who bears the most responsibility for road safety in Oman, there are several other

entities which are partly responsible, such as society, research institutes, and

automobile traders.

Secondly, the study investigated the main goals behind the automated speed

enforcement program as the second theme in the interviews. As discussed and found

in the first study of this thesis, the ROP officers of the two managerial levels, middle

and operational, do not seem to have a clear perception and understanding about the

automated speed enforcement goals. This is mainly because those goals are not written

and have not been communicated to the ROP officers. On the other hand, this study

examined the perceptions about the goals of Traffic Law in general together with the

goals of the automated speed enforcement program specifically. The Traffic Law

exists in order to identify each undesired act as well as its sanction. Additionally, it

exists to enforce the law and as a general deterrent effect and to deter specific drivers

from disobeying the law when promoting the specific deterrent effect which, in turn,


reduces the road crashes and fatalities. The automated speed enforcement program

goals, in policy-makers’ perceptions, are to reduce speed and detect speeders in an

evidenced way, to increase the compliance levels, to reduce speed related crashes and

save properties and lives, to enforce order in terms of vehicle speed, and to generally

deter drivers and to specifically deter speeders. However, this study has proven what

was found by the first study, that the goals of the automated speed enforcement

program are unwritten. More importantly, policy-makers believe that such goals are

not aligned with the regulations related to automated speed enforcement or traffic

enforcement. On the other hand, there did not appear to be any studies or analyses on

which the decision of introducing the automated speed enforcement program was

based, other than the very obvious speeding phenomenon, the high percentage of speed

related crashes, and the personal knowledge and experience of policy-makers.

The third theme discussed in this study was about the deterrent effect promoted

by the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. The theme was categorised

into three main points which are the elements of deterrence theory: perceived severity

of punishment, perceived certainty of punishment and punishment celerity (swiftness).

The fourth theme explored the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement

program in terms of accomplishing its intended goals as reported by the participants.

As there are no clear goals written or documented that could be related to the

automated speed enforcement program, the investigation used three suggested goals

obtained from the discussion in the first and second study interviews. They are

reducing the crash and fatality rates, changing speeding behaviour, and promoting

compliance with traffic regulations. Participating policy-makers argue that these goals

have been, to some extent, met. However, the results related to those goals could be

attributed to several other factors, and not only the automated speed enforcement

program. All results obtained through this theme cannot be considered definite as the

automated speed enforcement program has never been evaluated.

The fifth theme discussed in this chapter was the barriers to increasing the

effective implementations and legislation related to the automated speed enforcement

program. There were expectations about the existence of barriers or obstacles within

the automated speed enforcement program that are preventing it from being more

effective in promoting a deterrent effect on drivers. Those barriers were discussed from

policy-makers’ point of view. The social barriers are out of the scope of this thesis.


There are barriers preventing the application of punishment swiftness such as the

address system used in Oman, and updating vehicle owners’ details not being

compulsory by law. In addition, the concept of punishment swiftness is relatively new

to middle-eastern societies. Furthermore, the program not being evaluated is

considered an indirect barrier preventing it from being improved towards its suggested

goals.

Finally, the chapter discussed what policy-makers expect or would like the

automated speed enforcement program to be in the future. The discussion was sought

in terms of four main aspects which are legislation, technology, changing people’s

perception, and the operational practices of automated speed enforcement. The

dominant desired change in the future is the amendments in traffic law to be

comprehensive in addressing all gaps and barriers that currently exist.

The chapter also presented a summary of results obtained from this study, and

discussed its strengths and limitations.

194 Chapter 6: Discussion

Chapter 6: Discussion


The overall aim of this program of research was to investigate the operational

and theoretical aspects of the Omani automated speed enforcement program to identify

ways to enhance the program and provide recommendations for improvements,

thereby reducing speed-related crashes in Oman. This research took a pragmatic

approach to collection of data through interviews, however future research might

benefit from inclusion of some additional theoretical perspectives in order to examine

their potential use. The first study involved interviewing police officers; however, the

findings suggested there was a strong need to investigate the rationale behind

automated speed enforcement practices in Oman from policy-makers’ perspectives.

The first study revealed significant findings with regards to perceptions of the current

operational practices within the automated speed enforcement program. As found from

participants’ responses that the ROP middle management, supervisory, and operational

officers did not seem well aware of the automated speed enforcement goals, if they

exist, or the theories and rationale behind the automated speed enforcement program

implementation. The need to further investigate the rationale behind the automated

speed enforcement practices and regulations was highlighted, which in turn led to the

second study of this program of research. The second study investigated this rationale

from policy-makers’ point of view. It sought information about the reasons behind the

automated speed enforcement legislative practices from people who have created or

amended regulations related to automated speed enforcement within the Omani Traffic

Law.

This chapter has eight main topics starting with Section 6.1, the introductory

statement then moving to Section 6.2, the overview of methods used in both studies,

together with the significant findings of each study. Section 6.3 discusses the

contribution of the findings, while the implications are discussed in Section 6.4. As

the research program included two studies of the Omani automated speed enforcement

program, there were implications derived from each study. There were implications

which could be categorised under the operational practices of automated speed

enforcement, and other implications related to the enabling legislation for automated

Chapter 6: Discussion 195

speed enforcement program. Then, in section 6.5, a list of recommendations is

discussed, aimed at improving the automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

These recommendations are suggested based on the findings of both studies of this

program of research. Strengths and limitations are summarized in section 6.6, followed

by suggestions for further research in section 6.7, and finally the concluding comments

in section 6.8.

6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE METHODS AND FINDINGS OF RESEARCH

This program of research has analysed the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman in regards to both operational and theoretical aspects. The first study

investigated the current operational practices of the five different types of automated

speed enforcement used in Oman, fixed speed cameras, mobile speed cameras,

mounted on vehicle speed cameras, laser guns, and combined red-light and speed

cameras, as reported by ROP officers. In the second study, the policy-makers’

perceptions and theoretical thinking behind the automated speed enforcement program

were explored in terms of the legislative practices associated with the program.

Therefore, there were two sub-aims of this program of research. The first was

identifying and examining the operational practices of the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman as well as comparing those practices with what could

be called the best international practices obtained from the literature reviewed in this

thesis. The second sub-aim was to investigate the regulations related to automated

speed enforcement program and explore the policy-makers’ perceptions about the

deterrent effect associated with related regulations. These two sub-aims were pursued

by examining six key research questions:

1. What are the operational characteristics of the current Omani automated speed

enforcement program as reported by ROP officers?

2. What are the perceptions of Royal Oman Police officers in relation to the

rationale for the program and theoretical approaches to deterrence?

3. How well do the practices of Omani automated speed enforcement align with

international good practice?

4. What are the perceptions of policy-makers about the automated speed

enforcement program in terms of its intended deterrent effect?

5. What is the best way to evaluate the effectiveness of the Omani automated

speed enforcement program against its goals?


6. What are the barriers to increasing the effectiveness of the automated speed


The methods in the two studies, along with the key findings, are summarised in

the next sections.

6.2.1 Study 1: Reported operational practices

Answers for the first three research questions were sought through conducting

the first study. The first study applied gap analysis as a framework for investigating

automated speed enforcement operational practices in the Omani context. It utilised

two gap analysis tools, benchmarking and the congruence model. The benchmarking

was used to investigate the gaps between the Omani automated speed enforcement

practices and what had been identified as good international practice, based on the

relevant literature and key elements of the ISO 39001 standards; Planning,

Performance Evaluation, and Improvement. The congruence model was used to

explore the internal gaps within the automated speed enforcement practices in Oman.

The benchmarking went through three stages. Firstly, good practices of automated

speed enforcement programs internationally were identified in the literature. Secondly,

the Omani automated speed enforcement program was reviewed in terms of its

operational practices. Thirdly, the Omani automated speed enforcement program was

benchmarked against the good international practices. The data for the congruence

model were obtained during the second stage of benchmarking while reviewing the

Omani automated speed enforcement program in terms of its internal consistency of

approach. The congruence model was then used for an internal investigation of

automated speed enforcement program.

As mentioned earlier, there were no written documents about the Omani

automated speed enforcement operational practices, so a semi-structured interview

process was used to collect data for the second stage of this study to be used for both

benchmarking and the congruence model analysis. Officers (N=18) from three

different managerial levels of the ROP were interviewed to obtain the needed

information for the study. There were several topics discussed during the interviews

such as the existence of written documents about the automated speed enforcement

program’s goals, strategies, and operations. Criteria for site selection, automated speed

enforcement type, and operating hours were also discussed. Interviews were analysed

thematically, resulting in eight themes obtained from the answers. The themes, as


previously stated, were the existence of clear program goals, documenting and

communicating the goals, accomplishing these goals, availability of strategies and

officers’ understanding of them, availability of operational guidelines for the program,

the analysis of automated speed enforcement program data, officers’ perception of

automated speed enforcement deterrent effect, and suggestions for improving

automated speed enforcement program. Data about these eight themes were used in

both the congruence model and the benchmarking.

The congruence model analysis divides the automated speed enforcement

program into three main categories, input, transformation process, and output, and they

are supposed to work congruously as one system. Input itself has four categories. First

is the environmental input, which is, in this study, the tarmac road distance of 31,365

KM. Secondly, the program resources input includes human resources of 18

operational supervisors, more than 500 operators, 130 vehicles, and 1277 units of five

different automated speed enforcement as for the year 2016 when the data was

collected. Third is the historical data of the automated speed enforcement program,

which is represented in the change in number of automated speed enforcement and

change in performance in regards to the number of speed fines and rates of crash,

fatalities, and injuries. The increase of automated speed enforcement number reached

its peak in 2013, when it was 670% above the year of program implementation in 2004.

This increase was accompanied with only a small decrease in fatalities of 9% between

the years 2013 and 2014. Speeding contributed to more than 50% of total fatalities

annually from 2009 until 2015. Finally, the fourth input is the program strategy that

includes both goals and legislation related to the automated speed enforcement

program obtained from the Omani Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations. There

were no written goals or strategies related to the automated speed enforcement

program or its practices, but there are six violations of the Traffic Law which can be

detected by the automated speed enforcement program.

The second category of congruence model is the transformation process during

which the input is transformed into output. This study has defined the transformation

process as the operational aspects of each type of automated speed enforcement, the

time required to process speeding fines, and the punishment process in regards to

deterrence theory. The operational aspects of automated speed enforcement include

site selection criteria, time of deployment, and operating hours of each type of


automated speed enforcement. This information would normally be found in an

operation manual, however, such a manual did not exist. According to the participants

interviewed, the fixed and combined speed and red-light cameras locations are decided

by the DGT and they operate 24/7. The locations of the other three types of automated

speed enforcement, mobile, mounted on vehicle, and laser gun, are chosen by middle

managerial officers and supervisory officers in the different traffic directorates. They

did not follow a unified guideline, but rather chose the sites, timing, and operating

hours based on their personal knowledge and experience. The second component of

the transformation process is the time required to process speed fines. It takes up to 30

days to process a speeding fine, from the moment when the automated speed

enforcement unit detects the speeding vehicle until this fine is registered in the ROP

system. It is important to note that this time does not include the speed fine payment

by drivers. The final component of the transformation process in this study is the

punishment process, which includes the monetary fines imposed against vehicle

owners, vehicle impoundment, and driver imprisonment, as well as the time required

to execute such punishment. Monetary fines for traffic offences in general do not have

specific time to be paid, but are paid on occasions such as vehicle or driving licence

renewal, which could be up to 365 days from the day when the traffic fine is recorded

in the system. This is considered a very long-time gap between committing a traffic

offence and paying the related monetary fine. Among the six violations detected by

the automated speed enforcement program, only two require the maximum monetary

fine of OMR 50 (AUD$167) and in some cases the vehicle can be impounded for up

to two weeks and the driver imprisoned for not more than 48 hours.

The third and final category of the congruence model analysis of this study is the

output derived from the transformation process. The output could be defined as the

program performance and effectiveness. In this study, the effectiveness of the

automated speed enforcement program, as indicated by related statistics, goals

achieved, and the deterrent effect on speeding behaviour, are considered the output.

Firstly, the statistics on the number of fines, the fatality and injury rates, and the

number of speed-related crashes were examined. These statistics were discussed

earlier in this chapter, showing that the number of speeding fines increased

dramatically, but speed-related crashes still represent more than 50% of total crashes

and total fatality crashes. Secondly, the goals of automated speed enforcement


program were examined to understand if the program is achieving them. As these goals

were not documented, they were obtained from the interviews with the ROP officers,

and included reducing speed, monitoring the roads, reducing crashes, detecting vehicle

speeds, and deterring speeders. It is believed that the only goal achieved is reducing

the number of cars travelling at very high speeds, more than 80 km/h above the speed

limit. There is no evidence in the statistics that any other mentioned goals have been

met. To further investigate the achievement of such goals, there is a strong need for a

formal evaluation of the automated speed enforcement program. The final indicator of

automated speed enforcement program performance and effectiveness is the deterrent

effect promoted. This effect was discussed under the three elements of classical

deterrence theory; severity, certainty, and celerity. It was found that certainty of

punishment did exist, as shown by the high volume of automated speed enforcement

units, however both severity and celerity are lacking within the automated speed

enforcement penalty system.

The second gap analysis tool, benchmarking, was used to explore the gaps of

the program when compared with practices of other automated speed enforcement

programs. There were five benchmarks identified, automated speed enforcement

types, site selection, operating hours, deterrent effects, and the program itself.

The automated speed enforcement type should be carefully selected depending

on the aim behind its deployment. Studies showed that covert automated speed

enforcement could be more effective than overt ones in reducing crashes and

increasing the level of driver compliance and it is used for promoting specific deterrent

effect among drivers (Keall et al., 2001; Marciano & Norman, 2015). In a different

study, Cameron (2008) found out that point-to-point automated speed enforcement

(average speed enforcement) is more effective than an overt fixed camera system in

enforcing general deterrent effects. The practices of the automated speed enforcement

program in Oman showed that 75% of the cameras are deployed overtly, and not all

the remaining 25% of the cameras are deployed covertly. For example, all mounted-

on-vehicle speed cameras, which are supposed to work covertly, are well recognized

by the road users. In addition, because of the geographical composition of road

environment in Oman, operators are not able to hide mobile automated speed

enforcement on all sites. However, there is no optimum mix of overt and covert

automated speed enforcement and this topic needs more research. The average speed


system is not implemented in Oman, although the currently used automated speed

enforcement units are able to apply this technology. It could be stated that the ROP is

not currently making the optimum use of its automated speed enforcement program

and this could be because of technical or operational limitations.

The effectiveness of automated speed enforcement also depends on where it is

deployed (Lynch et al., 2011; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008).

Unfortunately, there are no clear criteria on site selection for the automated speed

enforcement units in this program, especially, for the mobile speed units including

those mounted on vehicles, and the laser guns. Most other jurisdictions that use

automated speed enforcement have site selection criteria for each type of automated

speed enforcement (Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2009; National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008; Queensland Police, 2016; Tasmania

Police, 2013; Victoria Police Traffic Camera Office, 2013).

The third aspect examined was the operating hours of each type of automated

speed enforcement. The fixed and combined speed and red-light cameras operate

around the clock, but the other three types of automated speed enforcement do not

have clear guidelines in regards to the number of hours they are operated. The DGT

does send instructions in this regard, however, most of the geographical traffic

directorates do not follow these instructions.

The deterrent effect promoted by the automated speed enforcement program,

as seen by the ROP officers interviewed, was also examined, particularly in terms of

the severity, certainty and celerity of punishment. In general, the existing speed fines

are not seen as severe enough to deter drivers from exceeding the speed limits, and the

ROP does not implement a demerit point system, which has been found to be effective

in other countries. Although there seemed to be a good level of certainty of

apprehension, which could be related to the presence of 1277 speed detector devices,

such certainty does not seem to deter drivers from exceeding the speed limit for reasons

unknown as yet. The current penalty system also cannot be considered swift, due to

the previously mentioned long time lag between committing a traffic violation and

paying its monetary fine. Thus, it can be stated that the automated speed enforcement

program has not had the deterrent effect intended.

The fifth and final benchmark assessed in the operation of the Omani

automated speed enforcement program, was the program itself. The program does not

have either clear written goals towards which all resources are directed, nor a clear


written guideline by which it is operated, as suggested by the ISO 39001 standards.

Additionally, the program has never been evaluated. It should be evaluated to assess

its performance in achieving the intended goals as recommended by the ISO 39001.

From all of the points examined in the benchmarking process, it is concluded that the

Omani automated speed enforcement program needs to be modified operationally and

theoretically in order to align with the good international practices.

To sum up, the first three research questions were answered within different

stages of this study. Police officers reported the operational practices of the different

types of automated speed enforcement. In addition, their responses reflected the extent

to which they perceived the automated speed enforcement program achieved a

deterrent effect in Oman. Moreover, the Omani program does not appear to be aligned

with best international practice relating to automated speed enforcement or to the

elements of the ISO 39001 standards, based on the findings of the first study.

6.2.2 Study 2: Policy-makers’ perception of legislative practices

The second study built on the first study and also used a qualitative approach. It

sought answers for the last three research questions about how policy-makers perceive

the deterrent effect of the program and the best way of evaluating automated speed

enforcement program as well as the barriers to more effective automated speed

enforcement program. While the first study was conducted from the ROP officers’

perceptions, this study has investigated the policy-makers’ perceptions of the

automated speed enforcement practices with regards to the regulations associated with

them, as well as the deterrent effect promoted by the automated speed enforcement

program and the barriers to its effectiveness. Another reason for conducting this study

is to fill the gap in the literature about theoretical thinking and the rationale behind the

legislation of the automated speed enforcement program, which has never been

investigated in the area. Deterrence theory was chosen to be a general theoretical

framework for this study as it has been the traditional theory behind automated speed

enforcement operations. Again, for the same reasons discussed in the first study, this

study used a semi-structured interview method for data collection. Seven (7) out of

nine (9) key policy-makers were interviewed from four different governmental

organisations, all of whom have worked in creating or amending traffic rules in Oman.

Among those seven were ROP officers, Shaura Council members, individuals from

the Ministry of Legal Affairs, and members of the Omani Council of State. There were


around forty questions categorised under five main themes used to guide the interview

discussion. Themes included in the discussion were the current speed problem, the

main goal behind the automated speed enforcement program, the effectiveness of the

program, the barriers preventing effectiveness, and future suggestions for the program.

The first theme was the current speeding problem in Oman. All of the policy-

makers agreed that there is a significant speed problem in Oman, and that it needs

further action to be taken. However, four policy-makers considered speeding a

combination of social and legal problems, and that social solutions are needed as well

as regulation amendments. The other three believed that speeding is a pure social

problem, and society should solve it without legislative interventions, as the current

traffic regulations are enough. The term society in this sentence includes, but is not

limited to, school, family, and educational institutes, but not legislative parties. It was

generally believed that society does not condemn speeding, even though it is clearly

condemned by law; nonetheless, the law was considered one part of the solution and

should have a deterrent effect on drivers. However, the current fine value is not

considered a strong deterrent compared with imprisonment. Consequently, policy-

makers recommended increasing the fine value and properly applying the

imprisonment sanction when needed.

The main goal behind the automated speed enforcement program was the second

theme discussed. It was found that the goals were not documented and if they existed,

they could have not been well-communicated to the managerial and operational

officers working in the field of automated speed enforcement. However, several

intended goals were identified from the answers of ROP officers in the first study. The

general objective of the traffic regulations and the specific goals of the automated

speed enforcement-related regulations were sought from the policy-makers’

perceptions. The interviewees agreed that the Traffic Law existed to enforce law and

order on the Omani roads by stating specific punishment for every dangerous act. The

policy-makers supported the findings of the first study in saying that the goals of the

automatic speed enforcement program are not documented or written, rather policy-

makers assumed several different intended goals. These are reducing speed and

detecting speeders in an evidence-based way, increasing the compliance level,

reducing speed related crashes and saving properties and lives, enforcing order in

terms of vehicle speed, and generally deterring drivers from committing offences and


specifically deterring speeding. In general, most of the intended goals led to what could

be called the ultimate goal of automated speed enforcement program, which is to

mitigate crashes and save properties and lives. Furthermore, it could be stated that the

decision to implement the automated speed enforcement program did not need a

scientific analysis, but was clear from even a simple understanding of the statistics that

there was a strong need to stop speeders on Omani roads. However, scientific analysis

could result in better use of the program and increase its effectiveness in deterring

speeding drivers. Currently, speeding still occurs at a high rate among Omani drivers,

as indicated by the speed fine rates, 4.8 per driving license or 5.1 per vehicle, per year

(ROP, 2015). The policy-makers believed that the reasons behind this phenomenon

are the non-deterrent traffic regulations, speed being socially accepted, and the tools

used in promoting traffic awareness. In other words, speed monetary fines within the

Oman Traffic Law are not severe enough, most middle-eastern societies do not

condemn speeding behaviour, and most people do not watch TV or listen to the radio,

and so it is much better to use the social media for promoting traffic awareness. More

importantly, the policy-makers indicated that the existing penalty system procedures

and regulations associated with the automated speed enforcement program are not

aligned with the intended goals of the program, and therefore this needs to be updated.

The third and possibly most important theme analysed in the second study was

the deterrent effect promoted by the automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

In this theme, the validity of most responses was checked against the indicators of

speed fine rates which are 4.8 per driving license or 5.1 per vehicle, per year, and the

proportion of speed-related crashes, which is more than 50% of the total crashes in

Oman. The study investigated the deterrent effect promoted by the automated speed

enforcement program in terms of fine severity, certainty, and celerity from the policy-

makers’ point of view. The automated speed enforcement program is effective in

detecting speeders and red-light runners, which is considered a high level of certainty

of punishment. However, the existing penalty system associated with the program did

not prevent drivers from re-committing the violations, as indicated by the speed fine

rates, and that shows a low level of deterrent effect.

The perceived lack of severity of sanctions, not applying the demerit point

system, as well as not properly applying a few other traffic regulations, negatively

affected the deterrent effect of the automated speed enforcement program. In addition,


application of the principle of reconciliation from the Executive Regulations of Traffic

Law has also negatively affected the deterrent effect of the program. Policy-makers

believed that people do not perceive the existing penalty system as severe in terms of

both procedures and monetary fine value. Moreover, policy-makers strongly believed

that the fine value is not severe enough to deter drivers. As a result, they suggested

increasing the fine value or applying the incremental fine value in case of repetition in

order to differentiate between the habitual offenders and the drivers who rarely commit

violations. In terms of the perceived celerity of punishment within the existing penalty

system associated with the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, all policy-

makers agreed that the deterrent effect would be increased if the punishment

procedures were implemented swiftly. The current procedures were not considered

swift, as the traffic fine payment is bound to a service from the traffic directorate, such

as the annual vehicle registration renewal or driving licence renewal, which is only

needed every ten years. Policy-makers recommended the application of a faster

punishment process to increase the deterrent effect of traffic regulations. However,

firstly, the public needs to be prepared for such a process, as it would be a relatively

new concept within Omani society. Secondly, there must be a regulation stating that

traffic fines are to be paid within a specific period of time, and a punishment imposed

for not paying the fines on time. Such procedures could increase the deterrent effect in

terms of punishment celerity.

Finally, the perceived certainty of punishment promoted by the automated speed

enforcement program and its associated fining system was discussed. Although there

are more than one thousand speed detectors on Omani roads, three policy-makers

believed that people do not perceive speed fines as certain; however, the other policy-

makers thought that people do perceive the punishment as certain, but do not always

act accordingly. It is obvious that there is a lack of deterrent effect promoted by

perceived certainty of sanctions. This could be attributed to several factors, such as

culture, the insufficient and ineffective promotion of speed detectors, or simply that

the effect does not last long in drivers’ perceptions.

The fourth theme was the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement

program in achieving its intended goals. As the goals were not clear and not

documented, the goals that evolved from both studies were considered. Among the

goals discussed, three were chosen for this theme: reducing crash and fatality rates,


changing speeding behaviour among Omani drivers as a result of the deterrent effect,

and promoting compliance with traffic regulations related to speed. Firstly, what could

be considered the ultimate goal of the automated speed enforcement program is

reducing crash and fatality rates. Statistics published by the ROP indicated that crash

and fatality rates have decreased humbly and speed-related fatalities and crashes are

still above 50% of the total fatalities and crashes. While two policy-makers thought

that such a reduction was caused by the automated speed enforcement program,

another policy-maker believed that this reduction was caused by other factors, such as

upgrades to the roads to make them safer. Two other policy-makers stated that

regardless of the level of effectiveness the program has achieved, it is not enough when

the resources spent on it are considered. Secondly, when it came to the effectiveness

of the automated speed enforcement program in changing speeding behaviours, it is

believed that some behaviours changed during the first years of the program. Three

out of seven policy-makers thought that this change stayed the same, however this

statement requires further research. Other policy-makers believe that the automated

speed enforcement program has been effective in reducing the risky behaviours of

running red-lights and exceeding the speed limit by more than 75 km/h. The third goal

discussed in this theme was the automated speed enforcement program effectiveness

in increasing the level of compliance with the traffic regulations. Although religiously

Muslims are required to follow rules that prevent them from harming themselves or

others, policy-makers strongly agreed that the current compliance is attributed to the

law and regulations, and not to any social, cultural, or religious factors. Nonetheless,

the policy-makers believed that the law and regulations have not yet promoted the

anticipated level of compliance. Moreover, all policy-makers hoped for more effective

results from the automated speed enforcement program.

The fifth theme discussed in the second study was about the different barriers to

increasing the effective implementation and legislation of the automated speed

enforcement in Oman. This theme explored the general barriers for making the

program more effective, and the specific barriers to implementing a swift punishment

process within the Omani context. Six out of seven policy-makers believed that there

are specific barriers preventing the implementation of swift punishment, as well as

general barriers to the effectiveness of the automated speed enforcement program,

while only one policy-maker thought that there was no barrier. The policy-makers


mentioned several barriers, including difficult communication with the vehicle owner,

and the fact that the driver is not necessarily the owner of the vehicle. In addition, there

is a deficiency within the regulations in regards to forcing the owner to update his or

her contact details in the system when they change. Moreover, the absence of any study

or research to explore the possibility of applying a swifter punishment procedure is

considered a barrier from the policy-makers’ point of view. There were also general

barriers considered by policy-makers as reasons for automated speed enforcement

program not being more effective. For instance, policy-makers believed that the

ambiguity of the program’s strategies and goals is considered an indirect barrier, as

sharing information about the program could lead to an increase in society’s trust of

ROP operations, which could, in turn, increase the level of compliance. Furthermore,

the program not being evaluated is considered a barrier. Policy-makers argued that if

the program had been evaluated, the weaknesses and strengths would be clearer, and

the government would act accordingly. Additionally, policy-makers believed that not

applying some of the traffic regulations properly could affect the perceived certainty

and severity of the punishment anticipated from the automated speed enforcement

program.

Finally, this study sought suggestions from policy-makers to make the

automated speed enforcement program better at deterring drivers and changing their

speeding behaviour. The suggestions were sought in relation to four main aspects:

legislative, technological, changing people perceptions, and aligning the operational

practices of automated speed enforcement with the associated regulations. Firstly,

suggestions were made regarding the legislative aspects of severity, celerity, and

certainty of punishment. Policy-makers suggested applying an incremental fine value

if the violation is committed again within a specific period of time, specifying a period

of time for payment of fines, introducing a regulation to punish owners for not paying

fines on time, and operating special courts for road safety matters, including speeding.

Secondly, policy-makers suggested several technological changes, such as automating

some of the manual processes within the current penalty system, compulsory

notifications of recorded traffic fines (which it is now optional by SMS), making better

use of all built-in technologies in automated speed enforcement units, and automated

direct payment of traffic fines using owners’ account details. The third suggestion was

changing people behaviours. Policy-makers agreed that the traffic awareness is the


second solution after law implementation for changing people behaviours. They

suggested using different tools and creative methods for promoting traffic awareness,

as well as involving the society in this role, and promoting road safety concepts using

practical mechanisms more than theoretical ones. Finally, aligning the operational

practices of automated speed enforcement program with the related regulations was

suggested. Although policy-makers did not have enough knowledge about automated

speed enforcement operations, they provided three main suggestions which are:

automated speed enforcement operations should be supported by specific articles or

regulation within the law, there must be justifications for current automated speed

enforcement practices provided by the ROP to the society, and an operation manual

that includes criteria for site selection, operating hours, and results derived from the

current program is strongly recommended.

6.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE FINDINGS

This program of research has identified several important findings in regards to

the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. One of the most important

findings of this research, from a simple analysis of crash data, is that speeding

contributed to more than 50% of both crashes and fatalities during recent years in

Oman. The findings contribute to road safety context in two ways. Firstly, the research

program is the first research of its type examining the operation and regulation of the

Omani automated speed enforcement program. This research could be considered the

starting point for further research about automated speed enforcement in the Middle

East. Findings of the first study of this research have added to the available literature

and provided a comprehensive understanding of how automated speed enforcement

units are operated in the Omani context. Furthermore, the findings have demonstrated

the perceptions of ROP officers about the deterrent effect of the automated speed

enforcement program, while the second study has drawn clear picture of the legislative

processes and regulations that relate to the automated speed enforcement practices. In

addition, the findings highlighted the lack of a clear consensus around the rationale for

the automated speed enforcement program. It also acknowledged the different ways

policy-makers think while creating or amending traffic safety related regulations.

Moreover, the personal knowledge and personal experience are dominant over

scientific analysis when discussing the traffic safety related regulations. Secondly, the

research program has identified the internal and external gaps in the automated speed


enforcement program in Oman. In other words, the research has identified the position

of Omani automated speed enforcement within the international automated speed

enforcement doctrine in a way that identified areas of the Omani program that could

be improved in order to align with good practice, such as having unified operational

practices and stating clear goals towards which all resources and practices are directed.

Moreover, this study considered several ways to increase the deterrent effect of the

Omani automated speed enforcement program. The research also identified specific

barriers to increasing the effectiveness of the program and specific solutions to tackle

such barriers. In short, the findings of this research program have provided a

comprehensive gap analysis of automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

However, these findings would not be of significance unless they have implications in

the current automated speed enforcement practices, which are discussed in the next

section.

6.4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

This program of research has identified several important findings as discussed

in the previous section. These findings are considered significant, as they have several

practical implications for the ROP regarding the current automated speed enforcement

operational practices in Oman, as well as for similar programs in other GCC countries

and comparable countries. The implications have been categorised according to two

main aspects of the program. The first aspect discussed is the implications of these

findings for the operational practices of the automated speed enforcement program,

while the second relates to the legislative framework underpinning the program.

6.4.1 Operational Practices

The operational practices of each type of automated speed enforcement have

been clearly identified, and these findings could provide the groundwork for producing

an automated speed enforcement operation manual for the Omani automated speed

enforcement program, which could be used in other GCC or Middle Eastern countries.

It should include, but not be limited to, the purpose of each type of automated speed

enforcement, the timing of deployment, the number of daily/weekly/monthly operating

hours, the number and types of automated speed enforcement devices to be deployed

each day/week/month, clear criteria for site selection, and the goals to be achieved by

each type of automated speed enforcement. The operations manual would clarify and


increase the knowledge of ROP officers about the automated speed enforcement goals

and practices which, in turn, would affect their perceptions and influence their

practices positively. The findings of both studies have revealed that the automated

speed enforcement program does not currently have clear goals, and thus, goals must

be identified and communicated to ROP officers working in the program. These goals

can be obtained from the findings of this research, and could include detecting vehicle

speeds, reducing speed-related crashes, and deterring speeding. Findings have also

revealed that the automated speed enforcement program has never been evaluated

against its goals, and therefore an evaluation using scientific tools is strongly

recommended once the goals are set. Goals must be specifically identified for each

automated speed enforcement type in order to guide the practices of that particular

type. For instance, the available evidence suggests that overt fixed automated speed

enforcement is best used to promote general deterrence, while hidden mobile ones are

more suitable for promoting specific deterrence.

6.4.2 Enabling Legislation

The program of research findings have clearly indicated that speeding in Oman

is the factor that has most contributed to crashes and fatalities for several consecutive

years. Consequently, legislative efforts should be directed towards reducing speeding

before considering other road safety issues. There are several properties of deterrence

which could be studied and used in the Omani context; however, this research has

focussed on the three elements of deterrence theory: the perceived severity, perceived

certainty, and perceived celerity of punishment. The findings have indicated that these

elements are not sufficiently achieved by the current penalty system associated with

the automated speed enforcement program. Therefore, legislation should be created or

amended in order to address such issues. It is believed that if the legislative practices

succeeded in promoting the deterrent effect, compliance with traffic regulations would

significantly increase, even when taking into consideration other social and cultural

factors. Additionally, legislative objectives associated with the automated speed

enforcement program should be clearly identified, monitored, and evaluated. There are

also several recommendations to improve automated speed enforcement practices

suggested by this program of research which are listed in the next sections.


6.5 OPTIONS TO CONSIDER FOR IMPROVING THE AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN OMAN

This program of research has been conducted in order to identify gaps within the

automated speed enforcement program operational practices and the underlying

theoretical rationale for the program. The automated speed enforcement program in

Oman has been investigated throughout the two studies included in this thesis, which

has resulted in the identification of several gaps. In order to fill these gaps, a range of

procedural changes are recommended. These recommendations represent a mix of

changes to operational, legislative, and administrative practices.

First of all, automated speed enforcement program goals must be clearly

identified and well communicated with the ROP officers working in the field of

automated speed enforcement. This program of research recommends that goals could

include, but not be limited to, reducing speed and detecting speeders using an

evidence-based approach; increasing the compliance level; reducing speed related

crashes and related fatalities, injuries and property damage; enforcing order in terms

of vehicle speed; and generally deterring drivers and specifically deterring speeders.

Goals should be set in a way that they could be monitored and assessed periodically.

The ROP should consider the steps recommended in the ISO 39001 standards as a

guideline for improving road safety in terms of goal setting. These goals should be

included in an operation manual for the automated speed enforcement program which

is the next recommendation suggested from this research.

As noted in Section 6.4.1, an operation manual is strongly recommended for the

Omani automated speed enforcement program. This manual should include, but not be

limited to, guidelines on how to use the different types of automated speed

enforcement implemented in Oman and criteria for operating hours, as well as criteria

for site selection for each type of automated speed enforcement. It could also include

a background and history of the program. In addition, black spots should be clearly

defined within the criteria of site selection, as participants stated that automated speed

enforcement devices are deployed in places considered black spots, but the researcher

could not find a clear definition for black spots or risky road segments. Black spots

can be defined in terms of number of crashes, fatalities, and injuries within a specific

period of time in a road segment, and the definition can be informed by definitions

employed elsewhere in the world. The operational practices included in the manual


should be supported by scientific evidence written in lay language to make it

understandable by all levels of people within Omani society. Having such a manual

would give the automated speed enforcement program a clear focus and organised

procedures, and ensure that operations are aligned with program goals.

Setting clear goals for the program and introducing a comprehensive operation

manual, as recommended above, provides the basis for the next recommendation,

which is evaluating the program against its goals periodically using scientific methods.

As previously mentioned, the automated speed enforcement program has never been

evaluated against its goals to check to what extent it is effective in achieving them.

The level of deterrent effect promoted by the automated speed enforcement program

should be included in the evaluation process, as most automated speed enforcement

programs operate with the aim of deterring speeding, not just detecting violations.

Performing such an evaluation would be of high significance for decision makers in

facilitating improvement of the effectiveness of the program in achieving its goals.

The evaluation process for the automated speed enforcement program would require

data and statistics from the ROP including, but not limited to, numbers of each type of

speed fine, demographic information on drivers committing violations, and the time

and location of violations. These data should be provided transparently by the ROP for

the purpose of studies, research and analyses. Timeliness of data is a key requirement

because policy-makers should use the most recent and updated analysed statistics

regarding road safety in Oman before making legislative decisions, as it was found in

this research that policy-makers do not have access to most of this information and

analysis at present. Furthermore, there should be a high level of alignment between

legislative practice and operational practice, which could be achieved by supporting

the operational practice of the automated speed enforcement program with legislation

directed at the same goals.

Another important recommendation is involving society in any road safety

program by informing them in a comprehensive and accessible way about the program

goals and results. This could increase the level of people perceiving the program as

legitimate and improve the level of voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance is

believed to be more effective and longer lasting than enforced compliance (Tyler et

al., 2008). Voluntary compliance can be supported by moral beliefs and concepts

already present in Oman’s culture and religion. More importantly, an effective road


safety strategy considers both speed enforcement and public perceptions about speed

(Delaney, Ward, Cameron, & Williams, 2005; Poulter & McKenna, 2007).

Some legislative changes are recommended as a result of the findings of this

research. Firstly, limiting the use of the reconciliation principle within the road safety

context is strongly recommended, as it seems that this principle can diminish the

anticipated deterrent effect of traffic regulations (see section 5.3.3). Secondly,

regulations and procedures such as the demerit point system should be applied

properly, or if not applied, should be taken out of the legislation. Having such

regulations and not applying them could negatively affect how people perceive the

importance of compliance. Thirdly, increasing the monetary fine value and applying

an incremental fine value is strongly recommended by policy-makers, as they believed

that current fine values do not fit the risks of the behaviour associated with each fine.

An incremental fine value is recommended in case of repetition of offence in order to

distinguish between the habitual offenders and those who rarely commit traffic

violations. Finally, the gradual application of swiftness in fine payment is suggested.

This could start with high value fines and then, once accepted by society, be extended

to include other types of traffic fines. The idea of discount for paying fines on time

and an increment if paid late may also be effective.

6.6 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

This program of research is the first to be conducted on the automated speed

enforcement program in Oman and the first to investigate the gaps within the program

operational practices and the theoretical rationale underpinning the program. This

program of research has several strengths and limitations, which are discussed in this

section.

One of the important strengths of this research is the use of two languages,

Arabic and English, in searching the literature on automated speed enforcement

practices in particular, and on road safety in general. In addition, most of the ROP

documents were written in Arabic and have not been translated into English. The

researcher being one of the ROP officers is considered another strength in the data

collection process, as the interview method was used in both studies. The ROP officers

interviewed in the first study were confident to talk to a person considered one of them

and that was reflected in their answers not being overly conservative. Finally, a


member of the supervisory team of this research is highly experienced in the context

of Middle-Eastern road safety, which has positively affected the guidance and the

direction of this research. The above-mentioned strengths have significantly helped

the program of research to reach its final form, however, there are also several

limitations that must be taken into account.

The first limitation is that there were very limited documents about the data

needed for this research, and that forced the data collection to be in the form of

interviews. In addition, the researcher, for data validation, had to rely on his

background information and experience as an ROP officer working in the field of

automated speed enforcement. A second limitation is the challenge of researching in

an area that has no previous studies to build upon. The third limitation is the very long

distance of travel to Oman where interviews had to be conducted. This meant that the

interviews had to be conducted in a limited time period, which made it particularly

difficult to gain access to the high-ranking officers and officials because of their

responsibilities and tight schedules. Fourthly, the little reduction in crash and fatality

rates cannot be attributed only to the automated speed enforcement program, but some

participants did not consider this when talking about the program. There could be some

other contributing factors which are not included in this research, such as the road

construction, drivers’ compliance, personal factors, and social factors. The fifth

limitation was related to the participants interviewed. It is possible that some of the

participants did not provide their honest perceptions, or their answers were biased due

to their political or social status. This was clearly noticed when some participants

provided conflicting answers. The usual limitations associated with qualitative

methods for data collection also need to be acknowledged. The findings derived from

the two studies cannot be considered as definite facts about the actual operational and

theoretical aspects of automated speed enforcement in Oman, as they are only what

have been reported by the participants interviewed. Finally, there was not enough

information available to support or validate policy-makers’ responses.

6.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The findings of this research have suggested several recommendations and

interventions to be considered within the operational and legislative aspects associated

with the automated speed enforcement program in Oman. However, some

recommendations may need more research and scrutiny before being implemented.


As noted above, some of the findings related to operational practices of Omani

automated speed enforcement are based on what has been reported by ROP officers,

and cannot be considered as definite, actual practices of the program. Therefore, there

is a need for an observational study that can clearly identify the actual operational

practices of the program.

The findings indicate that the current penalty system has missed the potential

deterrent effect from punishment celerity, therefore the ROP needs to implement a

swift punishment process with regards to traffic fines. Nonetheless, there is a strong

need to conduct a feasibility study for implementing the swift punishment process in

order to examine the matter more carefully, and clearly identify the challenges which

could stand against the implementation of such procedure. This study could also

consider examining the other elements of classical deterrence theory, severity and

certainty. In addition, such research could benefit from interviews with people who

influence popular views, such as tribal and religious leaders.

The findings of both studies included in this research have revealed that the

automated speed enforcement program has never been evaluated using scientific

analysis since its launch more than a decade ago. Hence, an evaluation process needs

to be performed using the data and statistics related to traffic safety recorded in the

ROP system. A separate comprehensive study evaluating all aspects of automated

speed enforcement program could be conducted to analyse the statistics and then

presented to the policy-makers in the Omani government as well as to the top

managerial level of the ROP.

As indicated by the analysis undertaken in the first study of this research,

speeding is the single most contributing factor to crashes and fatalities in Oman.

Therefore, research should be undertaken to consider all variables related to speeding

behaviour in the Omani context, such as cultural and social factors as well as the other

aspects of classical deterrence theory, such as non-legal sanction, direct/indirect

experience of punishment, and punishment avoidance. Further related study about

behavioural change between the two periods of time, before and after the

implementation of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman, is also

suggested. This study could use the data and statistics obtained from the automated

speed enforcement units which are already recorded in the ROP system. However,


such a study should take into consideration the other factors, including the road

constructions, number of registered vehicles, and number of driving licenses.

Finally, there could be a study analysing the Omani drivers in order to categorize

them into types of driver, manipulator, defier, conformer, or deterred driver (C. Corbett

& Caramlau, 2006; Claire Corbett & Simon, 1999). This would inform interventions

aimed at changing risky behaviours on the road.

6.8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This research has fulfilled its main aims, which was to investigate the operational

and theoretical aspects of the Omani automated speed enforcement program, and to

identify ways to enhance the program and provide recommendations for improvements

in the Omani road safety context in order to reduce speed-related crashes. It has

identified several gaps suggested different ways to enhance and improve the automated

speed enforcement program. The two sub-aims were also achieved, as operational

practices were examined and identified and compared with good practice. In addition,

the rationale behind the automated speed enforcement program was investigated from

policy-makers’ point of view, together with their perceptions about the deterrent effect

of the automated speed enforcement program in Oman.

Bibliography 217

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236 Appendices

Appendix B

Types of Automated speed enforcement Technology (Ba Alawi, personal

communication, April 2016)

1. Fixed automated speed enforcement are cameras posted

permanently in one spot of the road to reduce vehicle speeds.

2. Mobile cameras are cameras put on tripod beside the road and

could be moved from site to site.

3. Red-light/automated speed enforcement are cameras posted

permanently at intersection to capture red-light runners as well as

speeding vehicles.

4. Laser-gun is mobile gun that uses laser to measure vehicle speeds

and apprehend the driver on the spot if the speed limit is exceeded

as well as providing photo of the incident as it contains camera. It

is considered as a semi-automated speed enforcement device.

5. Mounted-on-vehicle automated speed enforcement are cameras

mounted on a vehicle used to detect speeders while it is in motion

or stand by.

Appendices 237

Appendix C

Interview questions (Top and middle managerial level officers)

Personal details:- Rank: Job title: Years of Experience: AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN OMAN

- What is your own understanding of the importance of automated speed


- What are the intended goals of the program?

- How did you know about these goals? Were they written?

- Do you believe that these goals have been met? To what extent?

- What are the major challenges that face the implementation of the automated

speed enforcement program (infrastructure, human/financial resources/

cultural or social challenges)?

- Are there any specific formal or informal plan/strategies/instructions with

respect to the automated speed enforcement program?

- Are these formal or informal plan/strategies/instructions known and

completely understood by the low/operational-managerial level officers?

- Are these formal or informal plan/strategies/instructions available for

low/operational-managerial level officers?

- Was there a study about automated speed enforcement program?

- Has that study resulted on actions related to road safety in terms of automated

speed enforcement?

- Do you get feedback from the lower rank officers regarding automated speed

enforcement operations?

238 Appendices

- What are the guidelines that you use while implementing automated speed

enforcement?

- How do you choose the sites?

- What determines the number of operating hours for each site/ day/ operator?

- Are these guidelines documented?

- Do you have any idea about the number of accidents that happened in a place

where automated speed enforcement is deployed?

- Is there any data analysis done in order to evaluate the program?

- Is there any deterrent effect derived from the automated speed enforcement

program?

- To what extent do you believe the deterrent effect is present in terms of

swiftness, severity and certainty of the speed fine as a punishment?

- Do you think that people have accepted the automated speed enforcement as a

tool to reduce the burden of traffic crashes?

- Why do you think that some people still think that automated speed

enforcement in Oman are deployed for raising revenue more than safety

enforcement?

- Do you have any other suggestion that could increase the effectiveness of

automated speed enforcement program in terms of deterrence?

Appendices 239

The Arabic version of interview questions (Top and middle managerial level officers)

محاور المقابلة مع ضباط شرطة عمان السلطانیة (المستوى االستراتیجي)

بیانات شخصیة: .1

الرتبة: الوظیفة: العمل:طبیعة وظیفة الحالیة:السنوات الخبرة في

:مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة .2

ما ھو مفھومكم لدور مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة في السلطنة؟ ما ھي األھداف المتوخاة من المشروع؟ دد الحوادث ا (ـع د تم تحقیقـھ د ـق داف؟ إلى أي ـح ذه األـھ د تم تحقیق ـھ ھ ـق أـن د ـب ل تعتـق ـھ

الوفیات، عدد مخالفات السرعة)؟المروریة، عدد ھل ھناك خطة أو اســتراتیجیة أو تعلیمات رســمیة/ غیر رســمیة متعلقة بأجھزة ضــبط

السرعة في السلطنة؟ــباط وأفراد ــتراتیجیة/ التعلیمات (أن وجدت) مفھومة من قبل ضـ ھل ھذه الخطة/ االسـ

المرور؟ ــتراتیجیة/ التعلیمات (أن وجدت) موجو ــباط وأفراد ھل ھذه الخطة/ االس دة ومتاحة لض

المرور؟ ھل كانت ھناك أي دراسات موجھة لمشروع ضبط السرعة في السلطنة؟ ــتوى ــین مسـ ــیات تتعلق بتحسـ ــات (أن وجدت) أیة توصـ ھل تمخض عن ھذه الدراسـ

السالمة على الطرق من خالل استخدام أجھزة ضبط السرعة؟لقة بآلیة تشـغیل أجھزة ضـبط ھل ھناك أیة مقترحات من قبل ضـباط وأفراد المرور متع

السرعة؟ ما ھو توجھ القیادة/ االدارة العامة للمرور حیال ھذه المقترحات؟ ھل تم تقییم فاعلیة مشروع ضبط السرعة من خالل تحلیل البیانات المتحصل علیھا؟ ھل ھناك أیة أثار للردع تعزى لمشروع ضبط السرعة؟ (ایمان المخالف واعتقاده بانھ ســیتم ) الیقین1(إلى اي حد ترون أن العناصــر التالیة:

ــلوك ـخاطئ)، ( ) الشــــدة (مـقدار المـخالـفة المترتـبة على 2مـخالفـتھ اذا ـما ـقام ـباي ســــلوك الخاطئ)، ( ــل زمني طویل بین المخالفة 3السـ ــرعة العقاب (عدم وجود فاصـ ) سـ

ووقت تسدید المخالفة) ظاھرة وملموسة في العقوبات الخاصة بالسرعة؟عتقد بأن مـستخدمي الطریق یوقنون بأن أجھزة ـضبط الـسرعة أداه فاعلھ للحد من ھل ت

الحوادث المروریة؟ ــیلھ لجبایة ــرعة وس ــبط الس ــباب التي تدفع البعض لالعتقاد بأن أجھزة ض ما ھي االس

األموال من مستخدمي الطریق ورفع نسبة المخالفات؟ ــتخدمي الطریق حیال ــلوك مس ــیتم اتخاذھا لتغیر س ما ھي االجراءات المتخذه/ التي س

أجھزة ضبط السرعة؟ ما ھي أكبر التحدیات التي تواجھ تطبیق مشــروع أجھزة ضــبط الســرعة في الســلطنة

ادات ة/ الـع افـی ة/ الجواـنب الثـق الـی ة/ الموارد الـم ــرـی ة/ القوة البشــ ـــی ة االســـــاســ (البنـی االجتماعیة)؟

240 Appendices

ــرعة؟ ھل ھناك ھل ــبط الس ــروع أجھزة ض ــة بمش كانت ھناك أیة حمالت توعیة خاص حمالت قائمة حالیا؟

ما نوع وســائل االعالم التي اســتخدمتھا شــرطة عمان الســلطانیة لتعریف مســتخدمي الطریق ببرنامج ضبط السرعة؟

شاكرین لكم جھودكم المبذولة في تحقیق أمن وسالمة مستخدمى الطریق

Appendices 241

Appendix D

Interview questions (Operational officers of ROP)

Personal details:- Rank: Job title: Years of Experience:

1. Are you aware of the exact intended goals of automated speed enforcement

program in Oman? What are they?

2. How did you know about these goals? Are they written or did you get them

from superior officers?

3. Do you believe that these goals have been met? To what extent?

4. Are there any specific formal or informal plan/strategies with respect to the

automated speed enforcement program?

5. Are these formal or informal plan/strategies known and completely

understood by the low/operational-managerial level officers?

6. Are these formal or informal plan/strategies written or documented?

7. What are the guidelines that you use while implementing automated speed

enforcement? (Site selection, timing, and operating hours)

8. To what extent do you believe the deterrent effect is present in terms of

swiftness, severity and certainty of the speed fine as a punishment?

9. Do you think that automated speed enforcement program in Oman is effective

enough?

10. What could be added to the current situation of automated speed enforcement

so that they would be more effective?

242 Appendices

The Arabic version of interview questions (Operational officers of ROP)

لتنفیذي في مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة في سلطنة عمانأسئلة المقابلة لضباط المستوى ا

بیانات شخصیة: .3 الرتبة: الوظیفة: طبیعة العمل: وظیفة الحالیة:السنوات الخبرة في

ھل أنت على درایة باالھداف الرئیسیة لمشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعھ وعالقتھا .1

بالسالمة المروریة؟ ما ھي ھذه االھداف؟ خاللھا استطعت االطالع على ھذه األھداف؟ ھل كانت مكتوبة أم ما ھي اآللیة التي من .2

من خالل الضباط األعلى رتبة؟ إذا كانت مكتوبة، ھل رأیتھا واطلعت أنك قد تعرفت علیھا علیھا؟

ھل تعتقد بأنھ قد تم تحقیق ھذه األھداف؟ إلى أي حد قد تم تحقیقھا من حیث عدد .3 مخالفات السرعھ؟ الحوادث المروریة، وعدد الوفیات، وعدد

ھل ھناك خطة أو استراتیجیة أو تعلیمات رسمیة/ غیر رسمیة متعلقة بأجھزة ضبط .4 السرعھ في السلطنة؟

ھل ھذه الخطة/ االستراتیجیة/ التعلیمات (أن وجدت) مفھومة من قبل ضباط وأفراد .5 المرور؟

اط وأفراد ھل ھذه الخطة/ االستراتیجیة/ التعلیمات (أن وجدت) موجودة ومتاحة لضب .6 المرور؟(تم توزیعھا ونشرھا كمنشورات او مطویات أو حتى مجرد مذكرات)

ما ھي االجراءات المتبعھ في تشغیل أجھزة ضبط السرعھ؟ الموقع: من یختاره وكیف؟ .7 التوقیت؟ عدد ساعات عمل الجھاز في كل یوم وفي كل فترة من الیوم؟

ین (ایمان المخالف واعتقاده بانھ سیتم ) الیق1إلى اي حد ترون أن العناصر التالیة: ( .8) الشدة (مقدار المخالفة المترتبة على السلوك 2مخالفتھ اذا ما قام باي سلوك خاطئ)، (

) سرعة العقاب (عدم وجود فاصل زمني طویل بین المخالفة ووقت تسدید 3الخاطئ)، ( المخالفة) ظاھرة وملموسة في العقوبات الخاصة بالسرعھ؟

جھزة ضبط السرعة في سلطنة عمان(بوضعھا الحالي) فعالة من حیث ھل ترى أن أ .9 خفض السرعات وعدد الحوادث والوفیات؟

ما الذي یمكن اضافتھ أو تطبیقھ من أجل أن تكون أجھزة ضبط السرعة أكثر فاعلیة؟ .10

Appendices 243

Appendix E

Interview questions for policy-makers

What is the current speed problem?

1. How big you think is the road trauma in Oman?

2. Do you think that speeding is a major problem in the Omani context of road

safety? Why?

a. Is speeding legal problem or social one in the way that it needs legal

solution or social solutions?

3. What legal solutions have been made / implemented to tackle such problem?

4. Do you think these legal solutions worked? How effective have they been?

5. Who can be held responsible for the current high fatality and crash rates with

all their consequences and negative effects on the Omani context of road

safety? And why?

What is the main goal behind automated speed enforcement program in Oman?

1. What is the purpose of traffic rules in general and speed fines in particular?

2. What is the main goal behind automated speed enforcement program? (If there

is a clear goal, all resources should be directed to serve it in a way that shows

the maximum benefit)

a. Why does the automated speed enforcement program exist in Oman?

3. Were decisions made in this regard carefully chosen after studies or analysis

of previous data? What was the decision based on?

b. Follow-up question: if decision was not based on clear understanding

of the problem, what should be done now to make decisions based on

comprehensive understanding of speeding problem?

4. Automated speed enforcement are there all over Omani roads, are they seen

by people as legitimate?

5. Why do you think people still exceed the speed limit? (it could be social not

legal)

6. Is current penalty system aligned with the goals of automated speed

enforcement program? (Yes, explain. No, why? There might be some barriers

which will be discussed in more details later on during the interview)

244 Appendices

Deterrent effect

1. Do you think that current penalty system has good effect on preventing drivers

from exceeding the speed limit? Why? Why not?

2. How can speedy driving behaviours be deterred, in your point of view as

policy-maker?

3. Have you tried or thought of encouraging voluntary compliance? Not the

enforced compliance?

Deterrent effect (Severity)

1. Do you think that drivers perceive the punishment as severe? Why? Why not?

What about the demerit point system? Why it has been ceased? What

prevents it from being re-implemented?

2. Do you think the fine value is high? Do you feel it deters drivers from

exceeding the speed limit? (if yes, what about the high number of speed fines

and high crash and fatality rates?)

3. Does a difference exist between the perceived severity of punishment and the

actual punishment? e.g.: running red-light

4. Does the punishment fit the offence?

5. If the speed fine value was set to be double or triple the current value, do you

think that people would still exceed the speed limit?

6. Is it right/fair/just/rationale to have one law for all types of driver? The

habitual and the ones who rarely commit violations? Shouldn’t the

punishment be incremental?

7. Do you think that offender once apprehended should be given an advice,

other chance, or harsher punishment if it is the second time within specific

period of time like a year or 6-month period?

8. What do you think of monetary speeding fine? Are they considered, by

policy-maker, as preventive or punitive?

9. What type of drivers do you think most Omani drivers belong to? (Confirmer,

deterred, manipulator, and defier)

10. As a policy-maker, what do you think, should be done to change such drivers’

behaviour?

Appendices 245

11. From your point of view as policy-maker, what do you think could have a

deterrent effect on Omani drivers rather than high value speeding fines?

Could be there any deterrent related to religion or culture?

Deterrent effect (Celerity)

1. What about if the punishment process is fast and certain? Does that affect the

driving behaviours?

2. No rule to force offender to pay the fine during a period of time have you

thought about such procedures? (If yes, what has the outcome been and why?

a. If someone did not fulfil the punishment, what procedure are there

(penalty of not paying fines)? What needs to change to make sure

people pay fines?

Deterrent effect (Certainty)

1. Considerable number of automated speed enforcement (1277) of five

different types which means significant increase in level of detection and high

level of certainty of punishment but do you think that drivers perceive it as

such?

2. Do you think that drivers fear the apprehension? Why? Why not? If yes, why

there are a lot of speed violations and offenders who keep exceeding the

speed limit.

Automated speed enforcement program effectiveness.

1. Do you think that the Omani automated speed enforcement program as a whole

is effective in reducing crashes and related fatalities? What is your answer

based on?

2. Do you think that the Omani automated speed enforcement program as a whole

is effective in changing drivers’ speedy behaviour which, in turn, leads to

reduce crashes and related fatalities? Based on what?

3. Can you relate compliance, if any, to social, legal, or religious influences or

factors?

4. The statistics of ROP and the qualitative analysis of previous study of the

research showed that the current penalty system has very little, if any, effect

246 Appendices

on changing drivers’ behaviour (more than 4 speeding fine per driver

license), what do you suggest in order to increase the effectiveness of penalty

system?

5. What is the best way to evaluate the effectiveness of Omani automated speed

enforcement program against its deterrence goals?

Barriers standing against increasing the effective implementations and legislation

of automated speed enforcement in Oman:

1. Are there any barriers to implementing fast punishment procedures? What are

they?

2. Do you think there are barriers preventing automated speed enforcement from

being more effective?

3. What are they? Why are they considered as barriers?

a. Are they legal, social, or combination of both?

b. Probe more within the discussion whether its social barriers or legal

barriers

4. As a policy-maker, what do you think should be done to overcome such

barriers? Such as aligning the legislation with the main goal/s of automated

speed enforcement?

c. What have been done towards such barriers or what could be done to

overcome such issues?

Future of automated speed enforcement program in Oman?

1. What would you like this program to be in the future?

d. In terms of additional legislation (swiftness, severity, certainty)

e. In terms of additional technologies

f. In terms of mechanism to change people’s perceptions or behaviours.

g. In terms of operational practices to be aligned with legislative aspect

of the program.

There might be some other questions posed during the interview to gain more

understanding about the specific subjects discussed above or when answers lead to

Appendices 247

other new subjects which are not mentioned or thought while preparing questions

for this interview.

6. What is the speed limit considered dangerous from policy-maker’s point of

view? (Why is threshold of 15 km/h)

7. Do you think that the threshold of 15 km/h affect drivers’ choice of speed?

Do they consider the threshold or the posted limit while driving? Why?

8. Do you think that social condemnation works as better deterrent in Omani

context?

9. Do you think that exceeding the speed limit over-benefits the risk of crash

involvement?

10. Do you think there is a discrepancy between what is known as wrong by the

driver and he/she still commits it? i.g: knowing excess speed is dangerous but

still exceeding the speed limit! (or people might not see speed as a problem)

11. This program showed its effectivity in detecting speeders but not in reducing

crashes, why, do you think, is that?

248 Appendices

The Arabic version of interview questions for policy-makers

الرأي الشخصي للعضو المقابل أي أن إجابات معظم األسئلة من األفضل أن (مالحظة: الدراسة تتطلع لمعرفة

تكون معبرة عن وجھة نظر الشخص المبنیة على المعرفة التي یمتلكھا ولیس بالضرورة أن تكون إجابات دقیقة)

مشكلة السرعة الحالیة في شوارع السلطنة ما مدى كبر حجم المشكلة المروریة في شوارع السلطنة؟ .1

تعتقد بأن السرعة تعتبر مشكلة كبیرة في شوارع السلطنة؟ لماذا ھي كذلك؟ ھل .2

a. ھل ھي مشكلة اجتماعیة او قانونیة بحیث انھا تحتاج الى حلول اجتماعیة او قانونیة؟

ما ھي التدخالت أو الحلول القانونیة التي تم العمل بھا فیما یتعلق بحل ھذه المشكلة أو التخفیف منھا؟ .3

ھذه الحلول القانونیة وضعت حدا للمشكلة المروریة؟ إلى أي مدى كانت فاعلیتھا؟ ھل تعتقد بأن .4

من الذي یتحمل مسؤولیة المشكلة المروریة الحالیة في السلطنة مع جمیع تبعاتھا االجتماعیة .5

واالقتصادیة وغیرھا؟ لماذا؟

األسباب الرئیسیة لمشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة في السلطنة السبب الرئیسي/

ا الھدف من قوانین المرور بشكل عام والمتعلقة بضبط السرعة على نحو خاص؟ م .1

ما ھو الھدف الرئیسي وراء مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة؟ (إذا كان ھناك ھدف واضح فإن جمیع .2

الموارد سوف توجھ نحو تحقیقھ مما یؤدي إلى أقل ھدر للموارد المستخدمة)

a. لماذا المشروع موجود أساسا؟

ماذا استند قرار العمل بمشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة؟ دراسات، احصائیات، تحلیالت؟على .3

a. إذا كان القرار لم یستند على معرفة وفھم للمشكلة، ما الذي یجب فعلھ اآلن من أجل أن یكون

القرار مستندا على فھم كامل للمشكلة المروریة في السلطنة؟

السرعة؟ بسبب كثرتھا وأماكن تواجدھا! ھل تعتقد أن المجتمع یقر بشرعیة أجھزة ضبط .4

لماذا تعتقد أن السائقین ال زالوا یتجاوزون الحد األقصى للسرعة؟ .5

لماذا؟ ال، نعم، اشرح.( السرعة؟ مشروع أجھزة ضبط أھداف مع یتماشى الحالي المخالفات نظام ھل .6

خالل الحق وقت في لالتفاصی من بمزید مناقشتھا سیتم التي الحواجز والعقبات بعض ھناك تكون قد

)المقابلة

تأثیر الردع

للسرعة؟ األقصى الحد تجاوز من السائقین منع على جید تأثیر لھ الحالي المخالفات نظام أن تعتقد ھل .1

؟ ال لما لماذا؟

كمشرع؟ نظرك وجھة من السریعة، القیادة سلوكیات ردع یمكن كیف .2

القسري؟ االمتثال لیس الطوعي؟ االمتثال تشجیع في فكرتم أو حاولتم ھل .3

تأثیر الردع (شدة المخالفة أو صرامتھا)

Appendices 249

النقاط السوداء المعمول نظام عن ماذا ال؟ لما ا؟ لماذا شدیدة؟ العقوبة یرون بأن السائقین أن تعتقد ھل .1

؟یمنع من العودة للعمل بھ الذي ما توقف؟ لماذا بھ سابقا؟

یمنع تظن بأن ھذا الحد من العقوبة المالیة ھل ؟حیث الجانب الماليالمخالفات عالیة من أن تعتقد ھل .2

مخالفات عدد ارتفاع عن فماذا بنعم، اإلجابة كانت إذا( للسرعة؟ األقصى الحد تجاوز من السائقین

)والوفیات؟ االصطدام معدالت وارتفاع رعةالس

مخالفة تخطي االشارة : المثال سبیل على الفعلیة؟ والعقوبة المتصورة العقوبة شدة بین فرق ھناك ھل .3

الحمراء

الجریمة؟ مع تتناسب العقوبة ھل .4

الناس أن تعتقد ھل الحالیة، القیمة أضعاف ثالثة أو مزدوجة لتكون السرعة مخالفة قیمة تعیین تم إذا .5

للسرعة؟ األقصى الحد تجاوزستستمر في

على مخالفة المعتادون ؟المخالفین لجمیعتكون ھناك غرامة موحدة أن لمنطقالعدل أو ا من ھل .6

او مختلفة باختالف تدریجیة العقوبة تكون أن ینبغي أال انتھاكات؟ یرتكبون ما نادرا والذین القانون

؟ التكرار

إذا أشد عقوبة أو أخرى فرصة أو نصیحة علی یحصل أن ینبغي ضبطھ بمجرد المسرع أن تعتقد ھل .7

؟ على سبیل المثال أشھر 6 فترة أو سنة مثل محددة زمنیة فترة خالل الثانیة المرة ھي ھذه کانت

أوأنھا اجراء وقائي المشرع یعتبرھا ھل ؟بالقیمة المالیة لتجاوز الحد األقصى للسرعة رأیك ما .8

؟عقابي

متالعبون ،مرتدعون ،ملتزمون( إلیھ؟ ینتمون العمانیین السائقین معظم أن تعتقد الذي السائقین نوع ما .9

مستھترون) ،

السائقین؟ سلوك لتغییر ابھ القیام ینبغي ھي اإلجراءات (من الناحیة القانونیة) التي ما كمشرع، .10

السائقین على رادع تأثیر لھ یكون أن یمكن ھي االجراء القانوني الذيما كمشرع، نظرك وجھة من .11

ثقافة أو بالدین یتعلق رادع أي ھناك یكون أن یمكن ھل ؟عالیة السعر الغرامات من بدال العمانیین

؟المجتمع

تأثیر الردع (سرعة العقوبة)

؟ لدیھم ؟ ھل یؤثر ذلك على سلوكیات القیادةحتمیة في نظر الناسماذا لو كانت عملیة العقاب سریعة .1

في مھل فكرت ،الزمنخالل فترة من المالیة للمخالفة على دفع الغرامة المخالف یجبر یوجد قانونال .2

)مثل ھذه اإلجراءات؟ (إذا كانت اإلجابة بنعم، فما ھي النتیجة والسبب؟

a. إذا كان شخص ما لم یستوف العقاب، ما ھي اإلجراءات (عقوبة عدم دفع الغرامات)؟ ما

بحیث یكون رادع لھم من ارتكاب الذي یجب تغییره للتأكد من أن الناس یدفعون الغرامات

؟مستقبلمخالفات في ال

تأثیر الردع (حتمیة المخالفة)

250 Appendices

) من خمسة أنواع مختلفة مما یعني زیادة إدراك السائقین 1277عدد كبیر من أجھزة ضبط السرعة ( .1

بحتمیة ضبطھم في حالة تجاوز الحد األقصى للسرعة وبالتالي حتمیة المخالفة، ھل تعتقد بأن

ك؟ السائقین یدركون ذلك ویتصرفون على نحو ھذا اإلدرا

ھل تعتقد أن السائقین یخشون أن یضبطوا مخالفین؟ لماذا ا؟ لما ال؟ إذا كان الجواب نعم، لماذا ھناك .2

الفات تجاوز الحد األقصى للسرعة؟ الكثیر من مخ

فاعلیة مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة

بكل متعلقاتھ (أجھزة، وموارد بشریة، وآلیات في السلطنةالسرعة أجھزة ضبطھل تعتقد أن مشروع .1

من جراء الحوادث بشكل عام والوفیات معدالت الجرحى فعال في الحد منتشغیل، وأنظمة وقوانین)

؟ أو حوادث السرعة بشكل خاص؟ ھذه اإلجابة مبنیة على ماذا

فعال أنظمة وقوانین)بأن ھذا المشروع بكل متعلقاتھ (أجھزة، موارد بشریة، وآلیات تشغیل، ھل تعتقد .2

؟ الشوارعوفیات ي بدوره یؤدي إلى تقلیل حوادث ولذ المتعلقة بالسرعة، ا السائقین یاتفي تغییر سلوك

بناء على ما؟

ھل یمكنك ربط االمتثال، إن وجد، بالتأثیرات أو العوامل االجتماعیة أو القانونیة أو الدینیة؟ .3

ي للعضو المقابل أي أن إجابات معظم األسئلة من األفضل أن تكون معبرة عن وجھة (مالحظة: الدراسة تتطلع لمعرفة الرأي الشخص

نظر الشخص المبنیة على المعرفة التي یمتلكھا ولیس بالضرورة أن تكون إجابات دقیقة)

أن نظام في ھذا البحثوالتحلیل النوعي للدراسة السابقة شرطة عمان السلطانیةأظھرت إحصاءات .4

مخالفات 4أكثر من المعدل ھو سلوك السائقین ( تغییر لھ تأثیر ضئیل، إن وجد، على الحالي الغرامات

؟اتزیادة فعالیة نظام الغرام من أجل)، ماذا تقترح مسجلة لكل رخصة قیادة سرعة

في السلطنة تماشیا مع أھداف السرعة أجھزة ضبطما ھي أفضل طریقة لتقییم فعالیة مشروع .5

؟المشروع

التي تحول دون زیادة فاعلیة مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة من حیث آلیات التشغیل أو العوائق العقبات والقوانین المتعلقة

؟يھ ما ؟سرعة العقوبة إجراءات تنفیذ أمام عوائق أي ھناك ھل .1

فعالیة؟ أكثر مشروع أجھزة ضبط السرعة من أن یكون تمنع عقبات أو عوائق ھناك أن تعتقد ھل .2

؟عقبات أو عوائق تعتبر لماذا ؟ھي ما .3

a. تشمل على عوائق مشتركة؟ أم اجتماعیة أم قانونیة ھي ھل

مع التشریعات مواءمة مثل ؟العقبات والعوائق ھذه على للتغلب بھ القیام ینبغي الذي ما كمشرع، .4

؟للمشروع الرئیسي الھدف

a. ؟علیھا للتغلب حاال أو مستبقال بھ القیام یمكن ما أو العقبات ھذه تجاه بھ القیام تم الذي ما

النظرة المستقبلیة لمشورع أجھزة ضبط السرعة في السلطنة في المستقبل؟المشروع ھذا كیف تحبذ أن یكون .1

a. (السرعة، الشدة، الیقین) من حیث التشریعات اإلضافیة

Appendices 251

b. من حیث التكنولوجیات اإلضافیة

c. ھم فیما یتعلق بالقیادة واستخدام الطریقسلوكیاتتغییر تصورات الناس أو اتمن حیث آلی

d. من حیث الممارسات التشغیلیة لتكون متوافقة مع الجانب التشریعي للمشروع

أسئلة أخرى كم / ساعة) 15ما ھو الحد األقصى للسرعة الذي یعتبر خطرا من وجھة نظر المشرع؟ (لماذا عتبة )1

م / ساعة تؤثر على اختیار السائقین لسرعاتھم؟ ھل مرجعھم ھو العتبة أو السرعة ك 15ھل تعتقد أن عتبة )2

المحددة على الطریق أثناء القیادة؟ لماذا ا؟

ھل تعتقد أن اإلدانة االجتماعیة تعمل كرادع أفضل في السیاق العماني؟ )3

حادث تحطم؟ قوعتطغى على التبعات السلبیة من جراء السرعة كولسرعة تجاوز ا فوائد ھل تعتقد أن )4

؟ وبین ما یقوم بھ السائق على أرض الواقعھل تعتقد أن ھناك تباین بین ما یعرف بالخطأ من قبل السائق )5

ولكن ال یزال یتجاوز الحد األقصى للسرعة! (أو قد ةالسرعة الزائدة خطیربأن على سبیل المثال: معرفة

ال یرى األشخاص السرعة كمشكلة ) أساسا

زة ضبط السرعة فاعلیتھ في ضبط المسرعین ولكن لم یظھر فاعلیة ملموسة في التقلیل أظھر مشروع أجھ )6

من الحوادث، لماذا برأیك؟ أین الخلل؟

تقبلوا فائق إحترامنا وأجل تقدیرنا على وقتكم الثمین وإجاباتكم ذات األھمیة الكبیرة للدراسة الحالیة

252 Appendices

Appendix F

Supporting Quotes for the Second Study

5.3.1 The Current Speeding Problem from Policy-makers’ Point of View

“It is a very distressing issue in Oman, even though the traffic statistics indicate

an acceptable level of improvements, we still need very long time to make such

improvements to constantly continue” (Int23)

“Of course it is related to both social and legal aspects and government needs

to change the road safety culture in Oman” (Int20).

“Exceeding the speed limit brings other dangerous behaviours on the road like

tailgating. Unfortunately those drivers are not deterred by traffic Law and the society

does not see speed as a big problem” (Int23).

“It is social problem coming from the social behaviour and way of thinking

about speed. I consider the current traffic regulations as deterrent but there is a need

for more social effort towards this dilemma” (Int22).

“The first solution was Traffic Law in 1993. Few amendments have happened

since then and the last major amendment in this Law was in 2016” (Int18).

“The recent amendments in Traffic Law” (Int22)

“Traffic Law even though it is not implemented with all its regulations. The

good thing that there have been some modifications on it recently with the hope that

all amendments will be implemented” (Int20).

“I think the Traffic Law is good solution and we do not need more than that.”

(Int24).

“It has been of positive effect and we are still to see the effect of new Traffic

Law and its Executive Regulations once they take place.” (Int24).

“These solutions have reasonably contributed to solving the problem, whereas

we still cannot see the effect of new amendments on Traffic Law as the executive

regulations are still not issued yet” (Int22).

“This is a responsibility of everyone; starting with driver, then the society,

ROP, and ending with other government entities.” (Int20)

“All related government organisations/entities and everyone on the society

who uses the road” (Int22).

Appendices 253

5.3.2 The Main Goal of the Speed Camera Program in Oman

“It is, according to my understanding, to punish the wrong and risky

behaviours on the roads and to mitigate the numbers of crashes and fatalities.” (Int18)

“Almost all traffic rules, in general, and those related to speed and risky

behaviours, in particular, are meant to reduce traffic crashes, then in turn, the

fatalities.” (Int24)

“To enforce the law in a way that everyone complies.” (Int22)

“The law is there to enforce the order and reduce the risky and speeding

behaviours.” (Int21)

“To reduce the speed and detect speeders in a very clear and evidenced way.”

(Int19)

“I do not see that the Omani society confirms the legitimacy of speed cameras.

This is because of the sites where they deployed” (Int22)

“It is possible that some people see speed cameras as legitimate and they do

comply with the rules and regulations.”(Int18)

“I think this is because the sanctions are not severe enough and they do not

deliver either specific or general deterrence effect.” (Int18)

“Firstly, misunderstanding of traffic concepts in people minds and secondly,

non-deterrent regulation within the law” (Int20)

“There are several reasons such as poor traffic awareness and the socially

accepted negative behaviour of speeding. The mistake currently happening is that ROP

broadcasts traffic awareness programs in the TV and Radio while the ROP is sure that

few people watch TV or listen to Radio.” (Int21)

“No, it is not aligned at all, let’s say that the goal is to deter drivers from

exceeding the speed limit, we do not see this happening in the Omani context of road

safety.” (Int20)

“I think it is aligned if applied exactly the way it is written” (Int22)

5.3.3 The Deterrent Effect of the Speed Camera Program in Oman

“I do not think so, because the fine value is very little and it does not exceed

the financial sanction in almost all cases.” (Int18)

254 Appendices

“No, it does not have any good effect in terms of deterring drivers from

exceeding the speed limit. This is because the sanction is not severe in terms of value

and procedures.” (Int20)

“In my personal opinion, it does not have an effect that we should talk about.

The effect you have just mentioned needs more than just penalty system in order to

accomplish. It needs social changes first of all.” (Int24)

“Yes, I think so, the proof is that the number of fines of driving above the speed

limit by more than 75 km/h has sharply decreased. This is an evidence that serious

fines (R.O 50) are considered deterrents” (Int19)

“Yes I can see that the current traffic regulations have helped in reducing the

speed fines” (Int22)

“I think that the executive regulation, though it has some weaknesses, is of

good deterrence effect. However, it is not properly applied and each one of ROP

officers should follow the regulations the way they are written.” (Int21)

“By taking offender to the courts and posing severe sanctions.” (Int19)

“It has acceptable effect in reducing speed fines but it is not the desired effect.

I suppose there should be more deterring procedures, especially when it comes to re-

offending. The traffic fines are based on the principle of reconciliation, but this

principle must not be used in the case of repeating the same offence during specific

period of time.” (Int23)

“Encouraging the voluntary compliance is usually social not official work. For

example, you see many people advising their friends and relatives to obey the traffic

rules. I believe this is a pure social task not related to policy-makers. Rules are there

to be followed regardless in voluntarily or obligatory manner” (Int22)

“This is traffic awareness role done by the ROP in co-operation with

educational and social parties.” (Int18)

5.3.3.1 Deterrence effect (Severity)

“The demerit point system is still there but I have no idea why they don’t apply

it.” (Int21)

Appendices 255

“I do not think that people perceive it as severe because in reality it is not

severe at all. This can be clearly seen from the statistics of fines, accidents, and

fatalities.” (Int21)

“I do not think so, if drivers perceive it as severe, they wouldn’t repeat the

offence of exceeding speed limit. Demerit point system is there but not applied. In

short, the punishment is neither deterrent nor accepted by people.” (Int23)

“The logic says if the punishment is severe, it will deter drivers from

committing the offence. As they still exceed the speed limit so it means that punishment

is not severe at all” (Int20)

“Yes, I think so, because the drivers always complain about severity of fines.

The demerit points system is still there, never ceased.” (Int19)

“I do not see the value as high. If we want to reduce the speeding phenomenon,

we have to increase the minimum monetary value of speed fine from OMR 10 to OMR

50” (Int21)

“It is not high of course and it does not deter drivers, we have suggested rising

the fine value” (Int18)

“I do not think there is a difference because the punishment is clear enough

but some drivers are negligent” (Int19)

“Of course there is a difference and the proof for that is some drivers run the

red light intentionally” (Int18)

“There is a clear difference and here comes traffic awareness role to change

this perception and reduce the gap between the perceived and the actual punishment.”

(Int21)

“Yes, there is a clear difference and that was created by the ROP. I am not

with imprisoning drivers at all but as long as there is a regulation you must apply it

or just take it out of the law.” (Int24)

“Yes, the punishment related to traffic fines is suitable to the act committed”

(Int19)

“It does for some drivers, but for most drivers, it does not. Some offences could

lead to a fatal crash while the monetary sanction is OMR 10. Do you think it fits?”

(Int24)

256 Appendices

“Although it is not a crime, and it is categorised as offence, punishment needs

to be more serious if we are to change behaviour.” (Int21)

“For sure their behaviour will change because currently there is no voluntary

compliance and the only compliance exists is due to fearing the loss of money in fines”

(Int18)

“I believe this procedures will dramatically decrease the number of fatal

crashes as a consequence to high level of compliance with traffic regulations.” (Int24)

“However, getting imprisoned for a traffic offence is never acceptable in our

society though the regulations are clear in this regards. I personally know people who

were supposed to get imprisoned but they didn’t.” (Int20)

“It is not fair and there should be gradual increase on fine values when the

same offence is repeated by the same driver” (Int18)

“Of course it is not fair but you better not punishing the offender than

punishing the innocent. I mean that most Omani people give their cars to their relatives

to use and all offences are recorded under the name of the owner who actually has

never committed an offence but will be punished as re-offending because of others’


“Incremental punishment is rationale and logic but it is not applied in Oman”

(Int19)

“An advice if we are to promote voluntary compliance but of course there is

always exception.” (Int24)

“It depends on the type of fine; serious or simple, and also depends on the type

of offender; conformer or defier” (Int21)

“An advice first time then fine the next time” (Int20)

“The advice has large effect on driver before issuing a ticket. However, how

do I know if that offender has been advised already or not” (Int22)

“The punishment must be present as the regulations are clear and solid”

(Int18)

Appendices 257

“Must be given the ticket as the regulations are clear. In addition, driver must

be informed of a specific period of time to pay the fine” (Int19)

“I believe it is punitive as the preventive should be very severe in a way it

promotes general deterrence” (Int22)

“In the current regulations, it is considered punitive and that is part of the

specific deterrence, but if it is doubled or tripled then it could be considered as

preventive as part of general deterrence” (Int18)

“It should be preventive, but from the statistics it seems that it is pure punitive

as it has not prevent drivers from committing it except for exceeding the speed limit by

more than 80 km/h. This one could be considered preventive” (Int24)

“Punitive for the offender as it reflects specific deterrence and preventive for

others as it promotes general deterrence” (Int23)

“I see them as deterred that is why the regulations must be high level

deterrent” (Int20)

“Most probably deterred.” (Int24)

“Most of them are deterred, few are manipulators and defiers, and conformers

are the very few who we barely see them” (Int23)

“I think that most of the Omani drivers are considered conformers” (Int19)

“I guess they are of conformer type of drivers” (Int21)

“I think that most of them are manipulators, I saw many of them reducing their

speed when approaching a fixed speed camera” (Int18)

“I believe they are a combination of conformers and deterred” (Int22)

“Sanctions must be severe when it comes to re-offending, introducing traffic

courts different from the current system as the judges are not experienced enough,

involving the society in the legislative procedures, and of course the traffic awareness”

(Int23)

“Regulations awareness, the danger of speed awareness, and incremental

sanction for repeating an offence” (Int22)

258 Appendices

“I see that imprisonment is better than monetary sanction in terms of

deterrence effect as the imprisonment affects the driver while monetary sanction, in

most cases, affects both the driver and his family” (Int20)

“Once we know the type of drivers, we act accordingly. I suppose most of them are

deterred, so increasing the value of fine and introducing tough procedures will be a

good solution.” (Int24)

“I believe we can use what is inside our culture and religion to promote

compliance but this needs creative ways to convince people of such and make them

understand the real connection between religion and every day practices of life. As for

the current circumstances, we need focused traffic awareness and tougher

regulations.” (Int24)

“Imprisonment, even for few hours only, will deter all drivers because it hold

their freedom. We need a relatively long time to make use of religious or cultural

concepts to deter drivers or encourage them towards the voluntarily compliance.”

(Int20)

“I suggest, as there are punishments against offenders, there should be

rewards for compliers. It should be a complete system and this could be derived from

Islamic rules when there is a punishment and rewards” (Int21)

“Including a regulation in the law that enforces society regulation awareness

because we always face the question: why is that particular regulation used or

implemented? For the time being, I cannot think of any fast procedures from the

religion or culture” (Int22)

“Traffic safety workshops or even enforce the offender to do a road safety

voluntary work on the road such as giving advices or helping in distributing road

safety vouchers.” (Int18)

5.3.3.2 Deterrence effect (Celerity)

“Yes it does and I think its effect will be more than rising the monetary fine

value. Fine is just a financial commitment if not applied swiftly” (Int18)

“The swift punishment always has better effect as the offender is held

responsibility for the action in a very short time after the act” (Int21)

Appendices 259

“The sooner the penalty is executed, the stronger and the greater the

deterrence effect is.” (Int22)

“Yes, it will affect their behaviour, otherwise why people re-commit offences

over and over again? Because the punishment is not swift and the offender is not forced

to pay unless he or she has to complete a service with the ROP” (Int20)

“Actually, we have not discussed this matter even with the new Traffic Law, I

hope the Executive Regulations considers that.” (Int24)

“We have thought of that and we will limit the period by not more than one

year from the date of the offence” (Int19)

“Currently there is no clear rule or regulation that punishes offender who do

not perform payments. It is better to update Traffic Law or its executive regulation to

include part that force vehicle owner or driver to pay committed fine in specific short

time and punished if not comply.” (Int18)

5.3.3.3 Deterrence effect (Certainty)

“I don’t think they perceive it this way and the reason is not clear, it could be

a social culture nothing more” (Int19)

5.3.4 The Effectiveness of the Speed Camera Program

“Compliance can only be connected to legal factors nothing else.” (Int19)

“The existing current compliance is because of legal factors and speed

detectors. To prove that, imagine the roads without regulations and no speed

detectors on them, how would the situation be?” (Int22)

“Religious and social influences lead to voluntary compliance which is better

and long lasting compared with enforced compliance caused by law. Nevertheless, we

rarely see such compliance on the roads which means that religious and social

influences are completely absent.” (Int23)

“The legal factors are of strong and fast influence when compared to the social

and religious ones as they need more time and deep understanding of the concepts. I

personally do not see, currently, any effect of social or religious influence on drivers’


260 Appendices

“I suggest having incremental fines when an offence is repeated, even very

little increase will do the job.” (Int19)

“Accelerating payment procedures may have deterrence effect and lead to

change speeding behaviours.” (Int22)

“I believe that increasing fine value and make the payment compulsory in short

time will lead to better penalty system” (Int24)

“I think the high value fine with immediate payment would change risky driving

behaviours and increase compliance.” (Int18)

“They already have records, number, and statistics before and after the

implementations of the program. They need to analyse them in scientific way and tell

people about the result. Moreover, they need to involve society to suggest and

implement solutions.” (Int24)

“Statistics should be scientifically analysed not as the way it is currently done

when comparing numbers of one year with the other.” (Int19)

5.3.5 Barriers to Increasing the Effective Implementation and related

Legislation of Speed Cameras in Oman

“Society must be acknowledged and informed about speed camera program

goals and results.” (Int20)

“Yes and one of the barriers is that a lot of influencers in the society do not

accept this program and such influencers have followers of course.” (Int19)

“For a program to be considered ineffective or effective, I have to evaluate it

after implementation. Unfortunately, I could not find any real evaluation for speed

camera program, thus this program is not utilised to its maximum effectiveness”

(Int21)

“Nothing as to the best of my knowledge. In the legal aspect, we have amended

few articles within Traffic Law in the hope that the Executive Regulations will be

issued accordingly very soon to solve some of the current matters.” (Int24)

5.3.7 Other Issues Concerned

Appendices 261

“Doing 100 km/h is dangerous what about 120 and the 15 km threshold on top

of it!” (Int20)

“Always considering the threshold as reference for speed limit.” (Int20)

“They take threshold as the speed limit.” (Int22)

“Not much, I see that we need very long time and lots of efforts to reach to that

point of social condemnation against speed behaviour.” (Int22)

“No, I do not think so, we have to change the routes of thoughts within our

society. I am saying it is too hard, costly, and takes very long time if you want the

society to strongly disapproves risky driving behaviours.” (Int23)

“Yes I do believe that there is always different between knowing and doing.”

(Int24)

“Yes there is of course, but it will vanish by the time” (Int19)

“Yes it is there and you can see it through the example of not wearing a seat

belt, though people know its importance.” (Int22)

“Yes there is a discrepancy but with unknown reasons, take for example not

wearing the seat belt.” (Int23)

“This is because the bigger portion of fatal crashes do not happen because of

high speeds but 120 km/h is enough to cause a fatal crash.” (Int18)

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