9 secrets of the tanker war

7/30/2019 9 Secrets of the Tanker War

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Replacing

Americas Aerial

Refueling Tankers

with KC-X

SECRETS OF THETANKER WAR9


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9 Secrets of the Tanker War

By Rebecca Grant

September 2010

The cover photo depicts a KC-135R undergoing a landing

gear retraction test at a base in Southwest Asia.

Below, a KC-135R receives patients for aeromedical

evacuation from a base in Southwest Asia.


3/16

In theory, the tanker war is all over. The proposals are

in. The die is cast. This all, the Pentagon will evalu-

ate the bids rom Boeing and EADS North America

or a new aerial reueling tanker plane called KC-X.

K has served as the military designation or reuel-

ing aircrat since converted B-29 bombers strapped

on a British gravity-loop hose system to create the

rst practical air reueling system in 1948.

The Air Force has been waiting nearly 10 years or a

program to start replacing some o its KC-135 tanker

aircrat, which were built rom 1957 to 1965.

Without tankers, were not global, said Air Force

Chie o Sta General Norton Schwartz. The reach

o American military power depends on aerial reuel-

ing tankers to deploy ground orces and top o ght-

ers and bombers attacking targets and to keep vital

surveillance and communications planes in the sky

longer.

Where will new KC-X tankers operate? In every one

o the scenario sets laid out by the Pentagons uture

strategy review o 2010. That includes homeland de-

ense, two overseas wars, counterinsurgency opera-

tions, stability operations and deterring rising military

powers. Tankers support US Air Force, Navy, and

Marine Corps aircrat and oten provide the bulk o

reueling support or Coalition partners. Demand or

tankers is constant.

KC-X is not just a replacement program, o course.

Its a leap ahead in military capability. It will be

able to multi-point reuel joint and coalition aircrat,

carry cargo and/or passengers, conduct aeromedi-

cal evacuation, and sel-deploy, according to the

Air Force. Planners wont have to work around the

limitations o the venerable KC-135 or worry about

catastrophic ailures due to aging that could ground

the whole feet and hobble US military power.

So why has procuring a tanker been so dicult? The

Congressional Research Service summed it up well:

The KC-X acquisition program is a subject o intense

interest because o the dollar value o the contract,

the number o jobs it would create, the importance

o tanker aircrat to U.S. military operations, and be-cause previous attempts by DOD to move ahead

with a KC-X acquisition program over the last several

years have led to controversy and ultimately ailed.1

Really, the re and brimstone should come as no sur-

prise, since its an oshoot o robust Western capital-

ism at work. As soon as the decision was made to

compete commercial aircrat, KC-X was bound to get

loud and noisy. The business rivalry between Boeing

and Airbus is one o the sharpest, most unorgiving

match-ups in the history o capitalism. That was the

point: base the KC-X tanker on a proven commercial

plane and get the best price.

Clear away the smoke, and one cool reality emerges:

the absolute military necessity o KC-X. Discussion

o capability has oten taken a back seat in this very

public competition. With that in mind, here are 9 se-

crets o whats at stake in the tanker war, both in mili-tary operations and in the business o military aircrat

manuacturing including one that may be the best-

kept secret o all.

THE WAR FOR KC-X


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1The rst secrets o the tanker war are really aboutclearing away some myths and taking the broader

view o industry trends that have overshadowed the

attempt to get KC-X underway.

First o all, Boeing and Airbus, a subsidiary o EADS,

compete ercely. The Boeing tanker oering will be

based on the 767 while the EADS North America

tanker oering will be based on the A330. Both com-

pete head-to-head or orders rom airlines around the

globe. As a result, any procurement involving these

two titans was bound to get as loud and noisy as theirrequent commercial airline bidding wars. The KC-X

bids will be helmed by their well-mannered deense

sectors. Still, the bidding styles will refect raw West-

ern capitalism at work.

Boeing and Airbus dominate the medium and large

jet commercial market. Both build aircrat with a base

o global suppliers, and sell aircrat globally. A quick

look back shows why erce competition is actually

routine in this business.

Boeing rst few the 767 in September 1981, and has

gone on to deliver more than 986 o them. Commer-

cial jet sales are notoriously cyclical. Demand or the

767 tapered in recent years, but customers have still

ordered 74 since 2004, predominantly the reighter

variants. A growing airline market in the years ol-

lowing US deregulation and the expansion o interna-

tional markets created a rising tide o airline orders.

In 1990, Airbus introduced the A330, a wide-body,

twin-aisle jet with signicant technical improvements.

By the 2000s, the A330 was typically outselling theolder Boeing 767 in the commercial market. The

chart shows an increase in combined 767 and A330

sales o over 50% rom 1988 to 2008.

The act is that all commercial airliner sales have

boomed over the last three decades as global

passenger air trac (and reight) increased. Sys-tem revenue departures or US airlines rose rom 7.7

million in 1997 to 10.8 million in 2007, an increase

o 40%. Global recessions made 2009 a dicult

year, but top executives regarded it as a severe but

passing storm.

Hence, the Obama Administration rightly insisted on

air and open competition despite the spillover o long-

standing commercial sensitivities. President Obama

assured Frances President Nicolas Sarkozy during

a March 2010 visit that this round o KC-X would be

air and open. What I said to President Sarkozy is, is

that the process will be ree and air, Obama said at

the White House on March 30, 2010. 2

We want a air and open competition or the tanker.And rankly eorts to discourage US companies rom

participating in the competition do not help us, reit-

erated Secretary o Deense Robert Gates.3

KC-X WAS BOUND TO GET LOUD AND NOISY

Medium Long Haul Aircrat Deliveries 1982-200

1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 200

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Airbus 330

Boeing 767


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2It might as well be a air and open competition, be-cause several European-made xed-wing aircrat

and helicopters are already being operated by the

US military, and bids or more are underway. Most

have been brought into the inventory via joint ven-

tures with US companies.

The C-27J Spartan bought for short-haul lift in war-

zones was rst made in the 1960s by Italian rm

Alenia, now owned by Italian parent Finmeccanica.

The US rm L3com acts as the prime contractor and

modies the C-27J at its US plant.

The Armys venerable C-23 Sherpa bought in the

1980s was made entirely by an Irish rm.

The US Armys new UH-72 Lakota Light Attack

Helicopter is actually the Eurocopter, now built in

Columbus, Mississippi, by American Eurocopter, a

subsidiary of EADS North America. Major suppliers

are located in many states. Turbomeca USA manu-

factures the engines near the DFW airport in Grand

Prairie, Texas. To date the Army has taken delivery ofmore than 125 of the successful Eurocopter variant,

and plans to buy up to 360.

The US Coast Guard ies the EADS North AmericaHC-144A Ocean Sentry Maritime Patrol aircraft in

homeland defense and rescue roles. Derived from

the Airbus Military CN235, the Coast Guard plans a

total buy of 36 aircraft.

For that matter, the New York Times reported in June

that the Pentagon has spent $648 million to buy or

refurbish 31 Russian Mi-17 transport helicopters for

the Afghan National Army Air Corps.4

Boeing announced in June 2010 that they will teamwith Italian-owned AgustaWestland in a new compe-

tition for the Presidential helicopter.

In future years, if the Air Force replaces its ad-

vanced jet trainers, the main options are the Alenia

Aermacchi M346 Master, BAE Systems Hawk 128

and Korea Aerospace Industries/Lockheed Martin

T-50 Golden Eagle.5

This is why international partnerships have long been

welcomed by the Pentagon.

THE US MILITARY ALREADY FLIES MANY FOREIGN AIRCRAFT


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3The reality is that KC-X is something close to a drop inthe bucket or both Boeing and EADS in comparison

to their total commercial sales.

While the global recession caused sales to slip, Boe-

ing expected to deliver 460 to 465 commercial aircrat

in 2010 against 481 in 2009, a large number o which

would be rom the short-haul 737 series, according to

Boeing Commercial Airplanes.6 Their new 787 is the

astest-selling new airplane in aviation history.7

KC-X at 15 aircrat per year would be just over 3% o

a total order book o 460 commercial aircrat per year.

Boom years like the last hal o the 2000s saw some

years with 600 or 800 orders or more.

The uture commercial market is set to grow steadily

over the next two decades based on rising interna-

tional demand. EADS orecast that the market or

passenger aircrat with more than 100 seats could

total US $2.9 trillion rom 2009 to 2028. The number

is based on a projected 24,097 new aircrat cominginto service to replenish current feets and meet 3.5%

annual growth over that period. That time span near-

ly matches the lie o the 179 aircrat KC-X contract.

EADS and Boeing will not capture all those sales, to

be sure, but the outlook or those titans is ar rom

gloomy.

KC-X wont be central in keeping either company

in business not by a long shot. While its a prize,

the ultimate health o both rms and the prospects

or their employees and supply chain partners do not

depend on KC-X.

KC-X, however, is essential to US national security

options all the more so i it ends up being the only

new tanker. Accordingly, the next section examines

some secrets o tanker operations that have been

obscured by the business brouhaha.

NEITHER BIDDER IS GOING UNDER IF THEY LOSE KC-X


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4Tanker scheduling and operations are very compli-cated. Too small a tank and it lacks the gas our

orces need, summed up ormer TRANSCOM

commander General Walter Kross. Too big a plane

and it clogs runways, and slows down the primary

mission fow.8

Its a trade-o. Planners want plenty o booms in the

air so that many receiver aircrat can nd tankers

with uel ready and waiting. Tanker statistics domi-

nated by KC-135 sorties indicate that the average

ofoad is about 60,000 lbs. o uel. That said, real

world experience has shown that additional uel otencomes in handy in supporting combat operations.

Long missions over Aghanistan have let ghters

and even big radar planes like JSTARS short on uel

as they overstay mission times while helping troops

under re on the ground.

For the KC-X competition, the government will be

evaluating combat fexibility via one very specic

measure: the Fleet Eectiveness Value. Whats that?

The government will run a simulation o tankers dur-

ing a handul o combat scenarios. Both KC-X con-

tenders will do a better job than the KC-135R. Thatsthe point o the competition. The question is which

one will score best, and how big the gap will be be-

tween its Fleet Eectiveness Value and the tally or

the second-best tanker. A big enough dierence

could earn the better plane a discount ormula that

will boost its chances o winning the KC-X contract.

Although it sounds articial, the ormula strives to get

at real wartime planning actors where perormance

and uel matter. What ollows is not the last word on

tankers but a quick sketch o why capability should

matter a lot in the KC-X competition.

Think about uel. The table shows Air Force planninggures or the KC-10 and the KC-135R, nicely illus-

trating why those big KC-10s are so in demand or

bomber reueling, long missions in bad weather, and

the task o deploying aircrat overseas (also known

as ghter drags.)

The next three examples are notional tankers. They

portray a range o options or KC-X. (Neither bidder

has made the specications o their aircrat public.)

These three notional KC-X simply add 15%, 25% or

35% to the KC-135Rs stated uel load. The table

makes it pretty clear that the Air Force needs a tankerwith more uel than the KC-135R.

Focus in on the key variable o Maximum OfoadAvailable once the KC-X reaches its track. What canit do with the uel?

Refuel bombers, which may take 90,000 to 100,000lbs. per each refueling. Refuel airlift aircraft such as the C-17 or C-5, whichmay need only one refueling on a long deployment,but they must have a tanker with a minimum 90,000

lbs. ofoad available. Wait in the tanker track and refuel ghters. This isthe most typical mission, and planners stack tanker

tracks all over the battlespace to ensure fuel is therewhen needed.

As the table shows, operations close to bases arerelatively easy. Push the tanker tracks out 1000 nmor more, and suddenly not all o the notional tankerscan do the job equally well. I the mission called ora long loiter or ueling a big airplane, the qualitativedierence o more uel available kicks in ast.

FUEL OFFLOAD MATTERS

TANKER OFFLOAD AND ENDURANCE

Maximum Ofoad Available | Mission Radius

2500 nm1500 nm1000 nm500 nmAircraft TakeoffFuel lbs.

Source: Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403

KC-10

KC-135R

15%

25%

35%

327000

180000

207000

225000

243000

233500

122200

140530

152750

164970

195200

99400

114310

124250

134190

156000

76400

87860

95500

103140

78700

30700

35305

38375

41445


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5Tankers also have to cover time on station so that gasis available round the clock in major operations. I

the receivers are scheduled to be ghters, then the

question becomes: how long can the KC-X stay in the

track given a typical ofoad? Assume the ofoad will

be 60,000 lbs. during the mission. More uel permits

more time in the tanker track to wait or receivers.

At 1000 nm, the KC-135 can spend 3.6 hours on

station. However the KC-X with 35% more uel can

spend 6.7 hours on station. Looking at KC-X options,

manning a 24-hour track would take 5 KC-X with 15%

more uel but only 4 o the KC-X with 35% more uel.Doing the job with one less tanker is a signicant di-

erence when multiplied across many tracks.

Saving an additional tanker tail does two things.

First, it make a tanker available or another assign-

ment. Second, it also saves the uel to fy the addi-

tional tanker to the track and home again. Eciency

like this is useul or servicing more aircrat, redistrib-

uting tanker orbits, and taking other measures to get

the most out o the tanker orce. With KC-X, planners

will turn eciency into eectiveness.

MORE FUEL CREATES MORE TIME ON STATION

TANKER OFFLOAD AND ENDURANCE

Tanker Take-off FuelTotal Ofoad

1000 nm radiusAverage Ofoad

per sortieRemaining Fuel

Burn Rateper Hour

Hours in Track

Source: Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403

KC-10

KC-135R

KC-X 15%

KC-X 25%

KC-X 35%

327,000

180,000

207,000

225,000

243,000

195,200

99,400

114,310

124,250

134,190

60,000

60,000

60,000

60,000

60,000

173,500

39,400

54,310

64,250

74,190

17,830

10,718

10,000

10,500

11,000

7.5

3.6

5.4

6.1

6.7


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Now pair time on station with another variable, to

get a sense o the constraints planners ace. A

critical element at any base is the amount o uel it

can store and pump to aircrat per day. A big tank-

er base like Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia

(which was used in 2003 or Operation Iraqi Free-

dom and is now closed to US operations) could

distribute over 1 million gallons o JP8 per day

rom its uel arm. In contrast, one o the most im-

portant operating bases or Aghanistan has been

the much smaller Manas, Kyrgyzstan, a major air-

lit transshipment point. At Manas, Air Force uels

technicians still meet trucks at the gate who trans-

er uel into giant uel bladders. Manas distributes

on average 320,000 gallons o uel per day.

Tankers arent going to operate out o austere,

small bases. Air Force regulations require 7000

t. runways or them and o course, they need uel

to upload. However, nding enough o the right

bases in the right location is always a challenge.

During NATOs Operation Allied Force in 1999, the

Air Force stued tankers into bases well over the

maximum number allowed.

So the combination o gas at the base and endur-

ance o the tankers presents a harsh reality and

some analytic surprises. A notional base with uel

supplies like those at Manas could uel up more o

the smaller tankers. In this example, the notional

base uels ten 15s or nine 25s or eight 35s.

However, once on station, the larger tankers hit

the sweet spot. Fewer tankers fy, but the slight-

ly larger ones use their additional uel to provide

more hours on station while using ewer airrames.Thats operational fexibility.

The chart shows hours on station generated rom

the notional base depending on the distance (as

a radius) to the tanker track. Intriguingly, the real-

world uel constraint also puts a damper on the

KC-10, showing why the Air Force opted or a me-

dium tanker or KC-X.

These calculations do not capture all the complex-

ity o tanker scheduling and mission execution.

What they do show is how the variable o uel

both on the ground, and in the air can shape the

way tankers are used.

6WHEN FUEL IS LIMITED, BIGGER IS BETTERTO A POINT

TANKER HOURS ON STATION

Per Notional Base with 2.176M lbs fuel per day

1000 nm to Tanker Track

KC-135R KC-X15 KC-X25 KC-X35

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0


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7Endurance could become critical out in the Pacic.

In 2009, the Air Force and Navy began working to-

gether on improving their capabilities or an air and

sea campaign against China in the Pacic. While

the US has good trade relations with China, the way

o military planning is to prepare or the most taxing

scenario. The 2010 QDR specically stated that de-

ense strategy assumes the need or a robust orce

capable o protecting U.S. interests against a multi-

plicity o threats, including two capable nation-state

aggressors.9

The Pacic scenario eatures long distances and

heavily deended airspace around China and the

Strait o Taiwan. Its a classic anti-access strat-

egy problem where China has only to deend its

area o infuence, while the US and allies ace the

much tougher problem o projecting power to break

through Chinese deenses.

Any air campaign will demand extremely long reach

and heavy use o tankers. The distance rom Guamto Taipei, or example, is 1474 nm.

Look at a Pacic scenario where tankers meet a B-2

bomber our times at distances 1500 nm away rom

the tankers base. Bombers are key to deterrence

in the Pacic.

Based on operational experience rom the B-2s

intercontinental combat missions in 1999, a typical

bomber mission rom long distance may take our

reuelings o nearly 100,000 lbs. o uel each. KC-10s are usually scheduled due to the amount o uel

ofoad needed and their ability to loiter.

As the chart shows, the larger KC-Xs can handlethe scenario with our aircrat. However, the smaller

notional KC-X would require a minimum o ve and

likely more tankers to meet both the ofoad and the

timing requirements or the mission. Multiply that

over dozens o aircrat and the overall eect o en-

durance stands out: tankers with a bit more uel canhandle the workload with ewer sorties, or most im-

portant, ree tankers or the kind o emergency oper-

ations that seem to occur in every air campaign. Its

interesting to note that while KC-X is not intended to

replace the KC-10, the act that a KC-X with greater

capacity can accomplish some o the longer mis-

sions creates very useul orce sizing and utilization

options.

The military requirement or KC-X is clear and com-

pelling. The competition itsel has been a real saga,but the secret insight here is: thats normal in the

aircrat manuacturing business.

THE PACIFIC IS TOUGH

OFFLOAD REQUIRED TO REFUEL BOMBER

1 B-2 takes 100,000 lbs. per refueling

0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,0

KCX 35

KCX 25

KCX 15

KC-135R

Fuel Need


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8The KC-X tanker at peak production is likely to sup-port about 50,000 jobs or American workers under

either winner. Boeing estimates its tanker program

will employ 50,000 Americans. EADS North Ameri-

ca estimates its tanker program will employ 48,000

Americans.

The key is that not all those jobs are directly with Boe-

ing or EADS North America. Thousands o jobs will

come rom the payroll o what are called suppliers:

big and small rms that contribute parts ranging rom

engines to asteners.

The aerospace industry is dominated by a ew large

rms that contract to produce aircrat with Govern-

ment and private businesses, usually airline andcargo transportation companies. These large rms,

in turn, subcontract with smaller rms to produce

specic systems and parts or their vehicles, ex-

plained the Bureau o Labor Statistics. The Ameri-

can aerospace industry in 2008 totaled about 3100

rms which manuactured aircrat and spacecrat o

all types plus guided missiles.

The idea o an American-made plane is an illusion

that doesnt refect the longstanding reality o how

aircrat are manuactured. Aircrat manuacturingwent global in the 1980s. The aerospace industry in

America relies on a global supply chain o supplier

rms. In turn, American suppliers send parts to big

international rms.

When a supplier excels, it usually sells to multiple

rms or dierent aircrat types.

Here are two examples:

Ateliers de la Haute Garonne, a French rm, sup-

plies fasteners bolts, rivets, etc. to all of Boeingand Airbus widebodies.

Vought Aircraft in Dallas, Texas, manufactures

wing and fuselage elements for both the Boeing

767 and the Airbus 330, as well as for other majoraircraft.

International markets are vital or the US aero-

space industry, and the global supply chain helps

US rms o all sizes stay competitive. Both KC-X

teams list scores o US and global suppliers. Many

o the 50,000 American jobs on KC-X will come rom

supplier rms.

KC-X KEEPS AMERICANS WORKING IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, EITHER WA


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9Heres the ninth and last secret o the tanker war.No one in Washington is saying it yet, but KC-X may

end up being the onlytanker competition. Originally,

plans called or a second phase dubbed KC-Y with

another 179 tankers, ollowed by KC-Z with the nal

179. That was beore deense budgets ballooned

during the Iraq war and the global recession hit.

Then theres the unortunate act that the Air Force

has ailed to restock its ghters and bombers in the

number needed. The Air Force bought 744 B-52

bombers up through 1962, 100 B-1s in the 1980s

and just 21 B-2s in the 1990s. With that track record,prospects or ully replacing the tanker feet arent too

good. Even i the US buys more than the 179 tank-

ers in KC-X, those buys are two decades away.

Whats increasingly likely is that the uture feet willconsist o KC-X, KC-10s and some KC-135Rs. Leg-

acy tankers will outnumber KC-X or a long time.

Commanders will search or ways to insert KC-X e-

ciently into a orce that still has many o the smaller

KC-135Rs.

In that case, its essential to get KC-X right. Factors

like extra uel and endurance o KC-X will be espe-

cially valuable. KC-135Rs will take on stations clos-

est to bases. The best possible KC-X would be big-

ger than a KC-135R, and smaller than a KC-10, andcarry all the uel it could.

KC-X MAY BE THE ONLY NEW TANKER


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The United States government has done all in its

power to assure that this nal KC-X round will be a

air and open competition.

Theres no time to lose. New tankers need to be

fying beore another round o signicant structural

overhauls or KC-135Rs come due in the years rom

2019 to 2037. Costs could rise to $6 billion per

year to maintain 70-year old KC-135s.10 That fies

in the ace o the Pentagons new initiatives to cut

overhead costs.

At the end o the day, the tanker war is an exten-

sion o erce competition between long-term rivals.

Whats more, that competition stands to benet the

US by wringing out the best possible price and by

growing jobs or Americans. It will also boost the

already-positive US trade balance in aerospace

products regardless o who wins.

The ate o commercial aviation giants and Amer-

icas hal million aerospace workers does not rest

solely in the arms o KC-X. However, the global

reach o the American military does.

The real advantage comes with the new capabilities

KC-X will bring. From enhanced reueling to cargo

to improved acilities or aeromedical evacuation,

KC-X will give commanders in theater and around

the globe compelling options or how they use the

tanker feet in the years to come.

Leave the last word to Air Force Chie o Sta

Schwartz: Our nation, our collective security, can-

not wait or the moment o crisis to wake up and

realize the importance o tanker recapitalization.

our joint orce would ace immediate paralysis and

long-term degradation.

The time or KC-X is now.

CONCLUSION

THE TIME FOR KC-X IS NOW


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1 J. J. Gertler, Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program:

Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional

Research Service, May 14, 2010.

2 President Obama and President Sarkozy Media

Availability, March 30, 2010, whitehouse.gov

3 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Media Availability,

June 8, 2010.

4 Craig Whitlock, New York Times, U.S. Buys Russian

Choppers for Afghan Military, June 18, 2010.

5 Stephen Trimble, Previewing the T-X, Flightglobal,

June 21, 2010.

6 Harry Suhartono and Mariko Katsumura, Airshow

Update: Boeing Sees Aircraft Order Book Shrinking,

Reuters, February 2, 2010.

7 James McNerney, 2009 Address to Shareholders,

boeing.com

8 Walter Kross, Try Fighting Without Us, Washington

Times, May 26, 2002.

9 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,

2010, p. 42.

10 Gertler, op. cit.

END NOTES


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