9 freudian science of consciousness: then and now: commentary by david livingstone smith (biddeford,...

7/25/2019 9 Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now: Commentary by David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford, ME)

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/9-freudian-science-of-consciousness-then-and-now-commentary-by-david-livingstone 1/9

This article was downloaded by: [Adelphi University]On: 19 August 2014, At: 23:59Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journalfor Psychoanalysis and the NeurosciencesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20

Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now:Commentary by David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford,ME)David Livingstone Smith

a

a University of New England, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Eleven Hills

Beach Road, Biddeford, ME 04005, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: David Livingstone Smith (2000) Freudian Science of Consciousness: Then and Now: Commentary by

David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford, ME), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the

Neurosciences, 2:1, 38-45, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained

in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/15294145.2000.10773281

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20



8

David Livingstone Smith

Freudian Science

of

Consciousness: Then and

Now:

Commentary by David Livingstone Smith (Biddeford, ME)

On October 20, 1909, Surgeon Major-General Edwin

Hollerung, a member

of

the Vienna Psychoanalytic

Society, gave a presentation to the Society

on

the neu

rophysiological basis of mind. In his response, Freud

said that he appreciated and admired Hollerung for

working on problems that may be

on

the agenda a

century after

us

(Nunberg and Federn, 1962, p. 280).

Nearly a century has now elapsed since Hollerung's

presentation, and Freud has been proven right: the

problem of the neurophysiology

of

mind is now

squarely

on

the scientific agenda.

It

was Freud's cher

ished hope that his psychological research would one

day be placed

on

a sound neuroscientific footing.

Francis Crick and Christof Koch have now

pointed out that Sigmund Freud was one

of

the first

neuroscientific investigators to postulate the existence

of

consciousness-specific neurones, a hypothesis that

enjoys their scientific support. Freud's notion

of

a con

sciousness module is only one

of

several fundamental

points

of

contact between his theory

of

consciousness

and the theory proposed

by

Crick and Koch (and Ray

Jackendoff, whose ideas they endorse in large mea

sure).

In

the present paper I will enlarge upon these

aspects

of

Freud's work, making reference to relevant

contemporary contributions to cognitive science

where this is germane, and I will go on to specify

some of the mechanical properties that Freud tenta

tively attributed to the consciousness-generating neu

rones and the information impinging upon them. I will

confine myself to the model presented in Freud's

Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) and will,

for the purpose

of

this discussion, ignore later theoreti

cal innovations (e.g., the revisions represented in

Freud's letter

to

Fleiss

of

January

1

1896).

Freud's Neuropsychology

in

Context

In

the closing decades

of

the nineteenth century the

philosopher Franz Brentano argued that the property

of intentionality

is the distinguishing

mark of

the men-

David Livingstone Smith, Ph.D., is Visiting Professor in the Depart

ment

of

Social and Behavioral Sciences

at

the University

of

New England

and is a practicing psychotherapist.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Benjamin Yuri Smith,

Chandler Rose, and Dr. Mark Solms for their helpful suggestions.

tal. Brentano used

intentionality in

a technical philo

sophical sense, different from ordinary usage when we

say that we

intend

to do something.

An

intentional

state is a content-bearing

or

representational state: in

tentional states are

about

something. Like most philos

ophers

of

his day, Brentano did not believe that mental

states could be unconscious. He thus held that all in

tentional states are conscious.

Although Brentano was well aware

of

the exis

tence

of

apparently unconscious mental states, he de

nied that these states were truly mental. He believed

that they were merely neurophysiological, without any

mental characteristics. These neurophysiological

states were regarded as nothing more than dispositions

for truly mental (conscious) states. This disposition-

alist theory was widely held by late nineteenth-century

psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists. Gus

tav Fechner, creator

of

the science

of

psychophysics,

summed up the dispositionalist position as follows:

Sensations, ideas, have, of course, ceased actually to

exist

in

the state of unconsciousness, insofar as we

consider them apart from their substructure. Neverthe

less something persists within us, i.e., the psychophys

ical activity

of

which they are a function, and which

makes possible the reappearance of sensation, etc.

(Fechner, cited in Brentano, 1874, p. 104).

Freud studied philosophy with Brentano

at

the

University

of

Vienna. Later, as

an

aphasiologist, he

came under the influence

of

the British neuroscientist

John Hughlings Jackson, who was also a disposition

alist. Freud's monograph

On Aphasia

(1891) proposed

a dispositionalist theory

of

unconscious mental events.

In a discussion

of

the neurophysiological modifica

tions presumed to correlate with latent memories,

Freud remarked that:

It

is highly doubtful whether

there is anything psychical that corresponds to this

modification either. Our consciousness shows nothing

of a sort to justify, from the psychical point of view,

the name

of

a 'latent memory image.' But whenever

the same state

of

the cortex is provoked again, the

psychical aspect comes into being once more as a mne

monic image (p. 55; emphasis added).

He continued to entertain the dispositionalist the

ory as late as 1894 (Freud, 1894), but by the spring

of

1895, Freud's clinical experiences as a psychothera

pist impelled him to reexamine the question of uncon-



Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

scious mental states:

Are

we to suppose that we are

really dealing with thoughts which never came about,

which merely had a possibility

of

existing ?

t

is

clearly impossible to say anything about this until we

have arrived at a thorough clarification

of

our basic

psychological views, especially on the nature of con

sciousness (1895,

p

300).

Freud's thorough clarification was issued in

the Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud,

1895), a document setting out a sophisticated and ad

mittedly speculative neuroscientific model

of

the hu

man mind. Although Freud eventually abandoned the

Project, and only a portion of the manuscript has

survived, it is clear that it was the seedbed for much

of his later work (Kanzer, 1973).

Freud s Theory o Consciousness

Freud's theory of consciousness is central to the model

of mind presented in the Project and much of his

later metapsychological theorizing. There is a sense in

which Freud's better-known theories of the uncon

scious and of repression cannot be fully understood

outside

of

the context

of

his theory of consciousness,

and yet scant attention has been paid to it in the psy

choanalytic literature (Natsoulas, 1984, 1985,

1989a,b, 1991, 1992, is a notable exception).

n

light

of

the remarkable extent to which Freud's theory co

heres with contemporary developments in conscious

ness studies and cognitive science, reconsideration of

it may pay dividends not just to psychoanalysts, but

to ll researchers striving to arrive at a scientific under

standing

of

consciousness.

One of the most striking features of the Project

is its rejection of the legacy

of

Cartesian dualism and

introspectionism that had dominated the European

conception of the mind for over 200 years (Smith,

1999). As conceived within the Cartesian framework,

mind is something radically separate from body and

is constituted from an immaterial substance. Further

more, the mind is described as being transparent to

itself, i.e., as incorrigibly aware of its own contents.

Freud's view expressed in the Project (and in all

of his later writings) is radically different. He de

scribes the mind in materialistic and naturalistic terms:

the mental apparatus is none other than the nervous

system. Introspection is said to provide neither com

plete nor trustworthy (1895,

p

308) knowledge of

the neurophysiological processes that instantiate men

tal states. The mind is a neurophysiological system

9

completely determined by the laws of physics and is

to be studied like other natural things (1895).

Working in the late nineteenth century, when

neuroscience was in its infancy, Freud had little or no

knowledge

of

many features

of

the nervous system

about which there is detailed and impressive knowl

edge today. For example, he knew nothing about the

biophysics of the synapse and neural membrane, in

terneuronal interactions, enzyme-gene interactions,

and the physiology of the organelles. n addition to

these yawning gaps in the scientific knowledge avail

able to him, there are numerous features

of

Freud's

theory that reflect nineteenth-century misconceptions

of

the nervous system. Perhaps the most glaring of

these scientific shortcomings is his description

of

the

physical basis of neural activity. At the time when

Freud wrote the Project electrophysiology was still

a young discipline and it was not yet understood that

neural action potentials propagate by means of local

depolarization. Freud described activation vectors in

terms of passage of a moving quantity of energy

Qp,)

through the brain (McCulloch and Pitts [1943] did not

introduce the information-processing approach to neu

ral activity until several years after Freud's death).

Although Freud and his contemporaries had only a

very sketchy understanding of the physiological de

tails of neural activity, and made a number of mistaken

assumptions and conjectures about them, these short

comings do not have deep consequences for the status

of

Freud's model understood in purely functional

terms.

Freud makes a fundamental distinction between

perception and memory. Memory must involve some

traces or alterations caused by the passage of infor

mation through the central nervous system. Percep

tion, on the other hand, requires neurons that return to

their initial state once information has passed through

them, so as to be ready for fresh perceptual events.

Freud accordingly hypothesized the existence of two

neural systems,

cI

and

$,

corresponding to them. The

cI

system is an input system transmitting information

received by the sense organs. The passage

of

informa

tion through

cI

leaves no lasting modifications, insur

ing that the perceptual apparatus is always ready to

receive fresh input.

Memories are laid down in the $ system so, un

like the

cI

neurones, the $ neurones must in some way

be altered by the passage of information through them.

But how? Freud believed that memory traces are

modifications of neural firing thresholds, modifica

tions brought about by the passage of excitation along

neural vectors. Freud was one of several researchers



4

(which included William James [1892] and Freud's

friend Siegmund Exner [1894]) who wrote about the

mechanism

of

Hebbian learning more than half a

century prior to the publication of Hebb' s classic

The

Organisation

o

Behaviour

(1949). Invoking both Heb

bian and non-Hebbian mechanisms, Freud described

mental representations as the products of learning and

identical to facilitated trajectories through the

brain. Thoughts and psychical structures in general

must never be regarded as localised in organic ele

ments of the nervous system but rather, as one might

say, between them, where resistances and facilitations

[Bahnungen]

provide the corresponding correlates.

Everything that can be an object of our internal per

ception is virtual (Freud, 1900, p. 611).

Freud's approach to the computational activity of

the brain is now called

connectionism.

Contemporary

connectionists trace their pedigree back to the work

of Donald Hebb, and to Karl Lashley before him.

However,

as

Glymour (1991) has pointed out, this sci

entific lineage is more accurately traced back to the

neuropsychologists of the late nineteenth century, in

cluding Helmholz, Exner, and Freud. According to

Glymour Freud himself anticipated both the views

of

Lashley and Hebb, and presented them in detail

that is more congruent to current thinking (p. 59).

Freud stated in the Project that sensory infor

mation received by p passes into \jI where it is cogni

tively processed and recorded in memory. It is only

after the input is processed by

\jI

that it may emerge

into consciousness as a perception. Information from

the internal world consisting of those physiological

states that we experience as feelings is also gathered

by \jI and passes from there into consciousness.

Scientific and philosophical discussions of con

sciousness are frequently bedevilled by semantic am

biguity. Block (1995b) addressed this problem by

drawing a fundamental distinction between access

consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.

Access consciousness is purely informational or func

tional: an access-conscious content is a mental repre

sentation available to participate in action, speech, or

rational thought. Phenomenal consciousness, on the

other hand, is simply experience distinct from any

cognitive, intentional or functional property (Block,

1995b, p. 230). Flanagan (1992) uses the terms infor-

mational sensitivity and experiential sensitivity in

much the same way. In Freudian terminology, access

consciousness is a function of the \jI system, whereas

phenomenal consciousness is not.

When Freud spoke of consciousness he meant

phenomenal consciousness. Freudian consciousness is


qualitative experience, a position later advocated by

Jackendoff (1987), Baars (1988), and Flanagan

(1992). In the contemporary literature these qualitative

dimensions of mind are referred to by the Latin term

qualia.

Qualia, or psychical qualities, include

the

ways it feels to see, hear and smell, the way it feels

to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have

mental states (Block, 1995a, p. 514). Freud held that

qualia are intrinsically sensory, and that only sensa

tions are directly conscious.

Freud identified consciousness with a third neuro

physiological system, the 0> system. The 0> system re

ceives information both from \jI which, as we have

seen, receives information both from the external

world (through <p and from the organism itself.

Freud's theory is therefore in agreement with Crick

and Koch when they describe consciousness as prob

ably caused by the activity of a small fraction of all

the neurons in the brain, located strategically between

the outer and inner worlds. Information proliferating

from p to 0> results in conscious perception. Informa

tion proliferating from \jI to 0> brings about an aware

ness of internal mental representations (thoughts) and

affects. Affects are essentially states of physiological

arousal, and do not, therefore, pose a major explana

tory problem for Freud's theory of consciousness.

Thought-consciousness is more problematic, for if

consciousness is built exclusively from qualia, and

qualia are purely sensory, how do the nonsensory cog

nitive representations in

\jI

become quality-laden con

scious experiences in 0>1

Freud's proposed solution was an ingenious one.

He held that the human brain thinks by manipulating

a propositionally ordered neural code, a position now

adays called sententialism (Fodor, 1975, 1987;

Field, 1978; Maloney, 1989). Freud did not hold that

this

lingua mentis

is a silent, internal version of the

thinker's spoken language. Rather, like the contempo

rary psychologist-philosopher Jerry Fodor (1975), he

claimed that the unconscious language of thought is

distinct from and prior to spoken language, although

unlike Fodor, he held that expressions in neural code

are realized in a connectionist rather than a classical

computational architecture. t::homsky (1986), too, dis

tinguishes between E-Ianguage (external language)

and I-language (internal language). Freud's source for

this idea was apparently the linguist Berthold

De1

brock (Greenberg, 1997).

In order for unconscious, qualityless thoughts to

become conscious, the thoughts must find some

form of qualitative, sensory expression. In other

words, mental representations in \jI must somehow ride



ommentaryo the Unconscious Homunculus

piggyback on information traveling from

<I>

to wand

thereby be reinforced by new qualities (Freud,

1915, p. 202). One way that this might occur is through

the evocation of sensory representations. For instance,

one could become conscious

of

the idea

dog

by

evoking a mental image of a dog. But this picturelike

method

of

becoming conscious has severe limitations.

It can represent concrete particulars, but is able to

represent neither abstractions nor logical relations. To

perform the latter requires a propositionally ordered

system of symbols possessing both semantic and mate

rial (sensory) properties that can be indexed to the

brain's own propositional code. Freud believed that

languages are just such symbol systems. Language is

richly symbolic and propositionally ordered.

t

is also

richly sensory, possessing auditory, visual and kines

thetic dimensions. It also includes expressions for ab

stractions and relations. As Jackendoff (1996a) puts

it: Language is the modality of consciousness in

which the abstract and relational elements of thought

are available as separate units (p. 18). In order for a

thought to become conscious it must therefore activate

a mental representation of a corresponding sentence.

Freud suggested in the Project that thoughts must

activate verbal motor representations in order to pro

duce conscious effects (in later writings he would

speak more generally of verbal presentations. For

an interesting discussion of this issue see Herzog

[1991]). These motor representations do not have to

be awakened to the extent

of

producing speech, al

though we sometimes do think aloud. The motor

speech representations must be activated only to a de

gree sufficient to produce feedback to w. Freud's is

therefore a

kinesthetic

theory of conscious thought.

n

emphasizing the role

of

kinetic qualia in the produc

tion

of

conscious mental events Freud anticipated fea

tures of the behaviorist theory of thought as subvocal

speech (Lashley, 1923), as well as contemporary pro

prioceptive theories of consciousness (e.g., Sheets

Johnstone, 1998).

n Freud's model, there are no direct pathways

for the transfer

of

thought-representations

from'

to

w: the transfer must be mediated by <1> Freud's formu

lation of this problem and its solution are reminiscent

of a suggestion mooted by Daniel Dennett (1991).

Dennett envisages our hominid ancestors using a form

of

verbal autostimulation to become conscious of oth

erwise inaccessible information.

Suppose that although the right information is al

ready in the brain, it is in the hands

of

the wrong

specialist; the subsystem in the brain that needs the

information cannot obtain it directly from the special

ist-because

evolution

has

simply not got around to

providing such a wire. Provoking the specialist to

broadcast the information into the environment,

however, and then relying on an existing pair

of

ears

(and an auditory system) to pick it up, would be a

way

of

building a vir tua l wire between the relevant

subsystems [pp.

195-196].

Manifest verbal autostimulation may have later

become transformed into subvocal autostimulation.

This silent process would maintain the loop

of

self

stimulation, but jettison the peripheral vocalisation

and audition portions

of

the process The private

talking-to-oneself behaviour might well not be the

best imaginable way of amending the existing func

tional architecture of one's brain

t

would be slow

and laborious, compared to the swift unconscious

cognitive processes it was based on, because it had to

make use of large tracts of nervous system designed

for other purposes po 197].

4

As we shall see, Freud believed that this round

about method of expression is required because the

brain operates with two distinct coding systems. In

order for an intentional content-a thought or mem

ory-to be conscious it needs to be recoded as sen

sory information.

Freud believed that thinking occurs outside con

sciousness in system '. He also believed that, strictly

speaking, thought never becomes conscious. What we

loosely refer to as a thought's becoming conscious

is more accurately described as a thought producing

conscious effects

Representations do not

move

from

' to w they cause effects in w. Freud's striking claim

that mental processes are in themselves uncon

scious (1915, p. 171) anticipated Lashley's (1956)

identical claim by 60 years. Jackendoff, too, asserts

that thought is never conscious (p. 7). A further

implication of this position underscored in Jacken

doff's Unconscious Information in Language and

Psychodynamics (1996b) is that there is no such

thing as conscious thinking. So-called conscious men

tal processes are actually conscious representations of

unconscious information structures. Although events

in w supervene upon events in ' it is only a subset of

the unconscious mental processes that are represented

by modifications in consciousness.

For Freud, thought-consciousness is a phonologi

cal-level phenomenon, suspended between acoustic

representations on one side and representations of

ideas on the other. As he describes it in the Project,



4

unconscious thoughts activate acoustic sound-im

ages

that in turn activate motor word-images

(verbal procedural memories) that produce conscious

effects. These sensory indicat ions

of

speech-dis

charge put thought-processes

on

a level with per

ceptual processes (1895, p. 366). For lackendoff

(1987, 1996a), too, conscious thinking is a phonetic

phenomenon occurring between acoustic input and

conceptual content.

The Problem o Qualia

The problem

of

explaining how

it

is that brains gener

ate qualia is perhaps the most vexing theoretical diffi

culty

in

the field

of

consciousness studies. Amongst

philosophers there is a spectrum

of

opinion ranging

from the claim that qualia do not exist (Dennett, 1988,

1991), through the thesis that although qualia are iden

tical to neural states human beings will never be able

to understand the mechanism

of

the connection

(McGinn, 1991) to the more optimistic notion that a

complete neurophysiological explanation of qualia is

in principle within our grasp (Churchland and

Churchland, 1982). Freud does not attempt to answer

what has become known as the hard problem

of

consciousness (Chalmers, 1995): the problem

of

ex

plaining how a physical feature

of

the brain can be

identical to a subjective mental state. He does, how

ever, specify four fundamental explanatory tasks that

a scientific theory

of

consciousness should address

(Freud, 1895):

1

It must strive to explain what we are aware

of,

in

the most puzzling fashion, through our 'con

sciousness' (p. 307).

2. It must strive to explain why consciousness is not

directly aware

of

its own causal basis.

3.

t

must strive to explain

how

qualities originate

(p.308).

4. It must strive to explain where qualities origi

nate (p. 308).

With regard to the first explanatory task, Freud

(1900) unequivocally answers that consciousness is

a

sense organ for the apprehension

of

psychical qual

ities

(p. 574).

n

other words, all that we are ever

conscious of are patterns of sensation (qualia). This

brings us to the second problem. Freud held that con

sciousness does not deliver a direct perception of its

own basis simply because consciousness is restricted

to the registration of qualia, which are the output

avid Livingstone Smith

rather than the causal basis

of

mental processing. Con

sciousness is, like the letter omega,

at

the end

of

the

line.

Where do qualia originate? As I have already

noted, Freud believed that they originate within the

w

system. How do they originate? Freud suggests that

the

nerve

ending apparatus transduce incoming in

formation into a neural code. Each type

of

sensory

receptor responds to a circumscribed spectrum of

stimulation, filtering out information external to it.

The sensory receptors function

as sieves;

for they

allow the stimulus through from only certain processes

with a particular

period

(1895, p. 310). The trans

duced stimulation is expressed as a

temporal code

Periode

in

Freud's German) that is expressed differ

entially as a deviation from the baseline oscillations

of

the'

neurones. According to the

Project,

then,

brains have

at

their disposal two distinct modes for

encoding information; the spatial code

of

facilitated

activation vectors which represents thoughts and

memories (including procedural memories) and the

temporal code that represents qualia. n a much later

work, Freud (1920) returned to the temporal code hy

pothesis suggesting that the sense receptors them

selves operate intermittently rather than continuously,

taking samples

of

perceptual information

at

suffi

ciently rapid intervals to allow effective tracking of

events in the external world.

Freud was not alone in suggesting that temporal

features of neural activity are involved in the genera

tion

of

consciousness. The American neuroscientist

A.

A

Garver, who was inspired

by

the metaphysical

speculations

of

Spence (1879), suggested that neural

oscillations in 36 to 60 Hz range are responsible

for the spectrum of conscious experience (Giizeldere,

1995). Freud's oscillatory theory

of

consciousness is

distinct from that proposed

by

Garver in the nineteenth

century (1880). It is also distinct from the Crick-Koch

hypothesis that synchronized neural oscillations tie

disparate components of visual experience together

into a coherent conscious whole (Crick

and

Koch,

1990). In Freud's view, temporal features

of

neural

activity encode qualitative sensory information. There

is now a body of

neuroscientific research that may be

reasonably interpreted to suggest that sensory infor

mation is represented by a temporal pattern code

(Mountcastle, 1967; Perkell and Bullock, 1968; Hard

castle, 1994; Cariani, 1995, 1997; Cariani and Del

gutte, 1996; Rieke, Warland, de Ruyter van

Steveninck, and Bialek, 1997). Hameroff (1995) sug

gests that qualia may be encoded not by neural firing

frequencies, but by quantum-level phenomena, namely



Commentary on

th ·

Unconscious Homunculus

specific frequencies

of

boson-condensed field excita

tion in the brain.

Freud believed that this neural code is transmit

ted without inhibition as though

it

were a process

of

induction (1895, p. 31). By

induction he

appar

ently meant electromagnetic induction, or some other

field phenomenon allowing for propagation of the tem

poral code across synaptic barriers. Suggestions along

related lines have been made

by

Pribrahm (1971) and

Libet (1995). Freud's hypothesis might also be consid

ered in relation to quantum theoretic hypotheses

of

non-local interactions within the brain (Hameroff,

1995).

According to this model, sensory modalities are

distinguished by temporal features

of

the information

transduced by sensory receptors, and variations within

each modality must be assumed to correspond to pre

cise temporal codes within the larger modal pattern.

Precise temporal spiking patterns have indeed been

observed

by

contemporary investigators (Emmers,

1981; Lestienne and Strehler, 1987; Abeles, Bergman,

Margalit, and Vaadia, 1993; Mountcastle, 1993; Les

tienne, 1996). According to the Project synchro

nized temporal patterns are transformed into qualia by

the w system, which must therefore be assumed to

possess some kind

of

frequency-sensitive mechanism.

Because the temporal code propagates from neuron

to neuron by means of induction or an inductionlike

process, it passes across synapses independently

of

QJL

Even

in

instances when the firing threshold is not

reached, and there is no transmission

of QJL

qualitative

information is transferred. Because the propagation

of

the temporal code has no impact

on

the synaptic

weights

of

the neurones involved,

this

transmission

of

quality is not durable; it leaves no traces behind

and cannot be reproduced (Freud, 1895), hence the

fugitive nature

of

conscious experience. The phenom

enon

of

qualia recognition is not incompatible with

Freud's model, and requires only some neural mecha

nism for temporal pattern matching.

Freud's claim that qualities cannot be remem

bered as such is starkly counterintuitive. When I con

jure

up a memory

of

my wife, I remember her brown

eyes, her fragrance, and the softness of her skin. These

certainly appear to be qualitative memories. What

Freud may have in mind is the hypothesis that qualita

tive memories represent qualia rather than reproduc

ing them. On this view I do not in any sense feel the

softness of my wife's skin when recollecting it.

In-

stead, I am put in touch with a representation or idea

of

the sensation

of

softness (related discussions can be

found in Dennett [1986,1991]). Freud was not entirely

4

consistent about his views

on

qualitative memories. In

The Interpretation o Dreams

(1900), for example, he

claims that memories possess

little

sensory quality, but

does not explain how the memory

of

a

quality-how

ever

attenuated-can be

laid down physiologically.

Conclusion

Freud's systematic theory

of

consciousness advanced

in

his Pro ject for a Scientific Psychology is in

agreement with the Crick-Koch theory in several re

spects, as well as anticipating the views

of

other con

temporary researchers. Freud additionally suggested

that:

1

The brain possesses two means

of

encoding infor

mation. Conceptual and procedural information is

represented through the modification of synaptic

weights. Qualitative information is represented

by

means

of

a temporal code.

2

This temporal code propagates without inhibi

tion, perhaps

by

means

of

electromagnetic induc

tion, or some other field phenomenon.

3. The neurones

of

consciousness must be assumed

to possess special physiological properties enabling

it to recognize temporally coded information.

4. In order for an unconscious mental content to pro

duce a conscious thought it must be re-coded

in

the

temporal mode.

References

Abeles, M., Bergman, R., Margalit, E., Vaadia,

E

(1993),

Spatiotemporal firing patterns in the frontal cortex of

behaving monkeys.

J

Neurophysiol.

70 4):1629-1638.

Baars, B. (1988), A Cognitive Theory

o

Consciousness.

Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Block, N (1995a), Qualia.

In:

Companion to the Philosophy

o Mind ed. S Guttenplan. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

(1995b), On a confusion about a function

of

con

sciousness. Behav. & Brain Sci. 18:228-287.

Brentano,

F

(1874), Psychology from an Empirical Stand

point. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1973.

Cariani, P. (1995), As i time really mattered: Temporal

strategies for neural coding of sensory information. In:

Origins: Brain and Self-Organization

ed.

K

Pribram.

Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 591-598.

(1997), Temporal coding of sensory information.

In: Computational Neuroscience: Trends in Research

ed. J M Bower. New York: Plenum.



44

Delgutte,

B

(1996), Neural correlates of the pitch

of

complex tones. I Pitch and pitch salience.

J Neuro

physiol.,

76(3):1698-1716.

Chalmers, D. (1995), Facing up to the problem

of

con

sciousness.

J Consciousness Studies, 2(3):200-220.

Chomsky, N. (1986),

Knowledge of Language.

New

York: Praeger.

Churchland, P. M., Churchland, P. S. (1982), Functional

ism, qualia and intentionality. In:

Mind, Brain and Func

tion,

ed. J. Biro

R

Shahan. Oklahoma City: University

of

Oklahoma Press.

Crick, F., Koch, C. (1990), Towards a neurobiological

theory

of

consciousness.

Sem. Neuroscientifica,

2:263-275.

Dennett, D. C (1986),

Two

approaches to mental images.

In:

Brainstorms.

Brighton, U.K.: Harvester.

(1988), Quining qualia. In:

Consciousness in Con

temporary Science, ed. A. Marcel E. Bisiach. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

(1991),

Consciousness Explained.

London:

Penguin.

Emmers, R. (1981),

Pain: A Spike-Interval Coded Message

in the Brain.

New York: Raven Press.

Exner, S. (1894),

ntweif zu einer physiologischen Erkliir

ung der psychischen Erscheinungen (Project for a Physi

ological Explanation of Mental Appearances).

Vienna:

Franz Deuticke.

Field, H (1978), Mental representation.

Erkenntnis,

13:9-61.

Flanagan, o (1992),

Consciousness Reconsidered.

Cam

bridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.

Fodor, J.

A

(1975),

The

Language

of

Thought. New York:

Thomas Y Crowell.

(1987),

Psychosemantics.

Cambridge, MA: Brad

ford/MIT.

Freud, s (1887-1904),

The Complete Letters of Sigmund

Freud to Wilhelm Fliess,

ed. trans. J. M. Masson.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

(1891),

On Aphasia: A Critical Study.

New York:

International Universities Press, 1953.

(1894), The neuropsychoses

of

defence.

Standard

Edition,

3:41-61. London: Hogarth Press, 1962.

(1895), Project for a Scientific Psychology.

Stan

dard Edition, 1:281-391. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.

(1900), The Interpretation

of

Dreams.

Standard

Edition, 4 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

(1915), The unconscious.

Standard Edition,


(1920), Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

Standard

Edition,


Garver,

A. A.

(1880), The periodic character

of

voluntary

nervous action.

Amer. J Sci.,

3rd series, 20:189-193.

Glymour, C. (1991), Freud's androids. In: The

Cambridge

Companion to Freud,

ed. J. Neu. Cambridge, U.K.: Cam

bridge University Press.

Greenberg, V D. (1997), Freud and His Aphasia Book.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

avid Livingstone Smith

Gfizeldere, G. (1995), Problems

of

consciousness: A per

spective on contemporary issues, current debates.

J

Consciousness Studies, 2:112-143.

Hameroff, S (1995), Quantum coherence in microtubules:

A neural basis for emergent consciousness?

J Con

sciousness Studies, 1:91-118.

Hardcastle, V. G. (1994), Psychology's binding problem

and possible neurobiological solutions. J Consciousness

Studies, 1(1):66-90.

Hebb, D. O. (1949),

The Organisation ofBehaviour.

New

York: Wiley.

Herzog, P. (1991), Conscious and Unconscious: Freud s

Dynamic Distinction Reconsidered. Madison, CT: Inter

national Universities Press.

Jackendoff,

R

(1987),

Consciousness and the Computa

tional Mind.

Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University

Press.

(1996a), How langauge helps us think. Prag.

Cognit.,4:1-34.

(1996b), Unconscious information in language and

psychodynamics. In:

Languages of the Mind: Essays on

Mental Representation.

Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT.

James, W. (1892),

Psychology: Briefer Course.

Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Kanzer, M. (1973), Two prevalent misconceptions about

Freud's Project (1895).

The Annual of Psychoanaly

sis,

1:88-104. New York: International Universities

Press.

Lashley, K S. (1923), The behaviouristic interpretation

of

consciousness. I

Psycholog. Revue, 30:237-272.

(1956), Cerebral organization and behavior. In: The

Brain and Human Behavior, ed.

H

Solomon, S. Cobb,

W. Penfield. Baltimore: Williams Wilkins.

Lestienne, R. (1996), Determination

of

the precision

of

spike timing in the visual cortex

of

anesthetized cats.

Biolog. Cybernetics, 74:55-61.

Strehler, B. L. (1987), Time structure and stimulus

dependence

of

precise replicating patterns present in

monkey cortical neuronal spike trains.

Brain Res.,

43:214-238.

Libet, B. (1995), A testable field theory

of

mind-brain inter

action.

J Consciousness Studies, 1(1):119-126.

Maloney, J. C (1989),

The Mundane Matter of the Mental

Language.

Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University

Press.

McCulloch, W. S., Pitts, W. (1943), A logical calculus

of the ideas immanent in nervous activity.

Bull. Math.

Biophysics, 5:115-133.

McGinn, C. (1991),

The Problem ofConsciousness.

Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Mountcastle, V. (1993), Temporal order determinants in a

somatosthetic frequency discrimination: Sequential or

der coding.

Ann. NY Acad. Sci., 682:151-170.

(1967), The problem

of

sensing and the neural cod

ing

of

sensory events. In:

The Neurosciences: A Study

Program, ed. G. C. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, F. O.

Schmitt. New York: Rockefeller University Press.



Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

Natsoulas, T. (1984), Freud and consciousness I: Intrinsic

consciousness. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought,

7:195-232.

(1985), Freud and consciousness II: Derived con-

sciousness. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought,

8:183-220.

(1989a), Freud and consciousness ill: The impor

tance of tertiary consciousness.

Psychoanal. Contemp.

Thought, 12:97-123.

(1989b), Freud and consciousness. IV: A propedeu

tic for functions of consciousness in hypercathected

speech-imagery. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought,

12:619-662.

(1991), Freud and consciousness V: Emotions and

feelings. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought, 14:69-108.

(1992), Freud and consciousness VI: A present-day

perspective. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought,

15:305-348.

Nunberg, H., Federn, E., Eds. (1962), Minutes

of

the

Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Vol. 2 New York: Inter

national Universities Press.

45

Perkell, D. H., Bullock, T. H (1968), Neural coding.

Neurosci. Res. Prog. Bull., 6(3):221-348.

Pribrahm, K. (1971), Languages

of

he Brain: Experimental

Paradoxes and Principles n Neurophysiology. New

York: Brandon House.

Rieke, F., Warland, D., de Ruyter van Steveninck, R.,

Bialek, W. (1997), Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sheets-Johnstone, M (1998), Consciousness: A natural his

tory. J Consciousness Studies, 5(3):260-295.

Smith, D. L. (1999), Freud s Philosophy

of

the Uncon

scious. Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer Academic.

Spence, P. (1879), Space and time considered as negations.

J Specul. Philosophy, 13:337-346.


University ofNew England

Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences

Eleven Hills Beach Road,

Biddeford,

M

04005

e-mail: [email protected]

Analyzing First-Person Experience: The Value of Phenomenal Reflection in Providing Signposts for

Investigating Its Neural Correlates: Commentary by Richard Stevens (Milton Keynes, U.K.)

What I find particularly valuable about Crick and

Koch's paper is the rich and lucid discussion

of

issues

relating to our understanding

of

consciousness. Let me

take up three core issues the authors raise and then

conclude with br ief comments

on

two others.

The Importance of Developing a Phenomenal

Description of Consciousness

While Crick and Koch may be correct that

it

would

be premature to advance a definition

of

consciousness,

I appreciate their realization

of

how crucial

it

is,

in

the search for neural correlates

of

consciousness, to

try

to be clear about what precisely constitutes phe

nomenal consciousness. Although, as they state, we

may

all

have a rough idea

of

what is meant

by

being

conscious, this is not enough for effective investiga

tion

of

the topic. Too often the term

consciousness

is used loosely to cover any cognitive functions

of

sufficient complexity

or

personal significance.

Richard Stevens is Head

of

Psychology, The Open University, Milton

Keynes, England, UK.

How we move to a clearer and more effective

description

of

phenomenal consciousness is

of

course

problematic. This is an empirical (in the broad sense

of

the term) though not a logical or philosophical prob

lem. Finding rigorous ways

of

exploring and articulat

ing what we are consciously aware

of

is

at

the heart

of

the problem. I am reluctant here to use the term

introspection.

Usually when philosophers talk about

introspecting, they refer to examples they derive from

thinking about experience in retrospect. Unfortu

nately, this is not an adequate basis for claims about

the nature

of

phenomenological experience and is

likely to be readily influenced

by

preconceptions. I

know this from my own experience. I had initially

assumed, for example, that there is a phenomenal dis

tinctiveness between conscious experience and reflex

ive or self-consciousness. (Such a distinction I note is

also assumed

by

the authors

of

this paper.) However,

systematic phenomenal reflection convinced me that

there is no such distinction in the quality

of

phenome

nal experience itself. It is a conceptual rather than

phenomenological

distinction to

do with implicit

meanings (see below) attached to experiencing rather

than conscious experience itself.

9 freudian science of consciousness: then and now: commentary by david livingstone smith (biddeford,...

Documents