9 5

CHAPTER IV

Causes of the Revolution of 1978-79.

I ran has seen many changes in her h i s tory but the

changes brought about by the Revolution of 1978-79 are

momentous when the i n s t i t u t i o n of monarchy was abolished

and Islamic Republic was establ ished in i t s place. The

events of 1978 proved tha t the Pahlavi regime was incapable

of democratization and a l l the ' l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ' of the

Shah was super f ic ia l and window-dressing. What s tar ted

the ag i t a t ion of l a t e 70s was the publ icat ion of a l ibe l lous

a r t i c l e against -^yatollah Khomeini by a national newspaper.

But the storm had been gathering ever since the events of

1963. In fact . Opposition, however f r ag i l e , had existed

in I ran ian h is tory pa r t i cu l a r ly since the p ro tes t movement

agains t the tobacco concessions. The tobacco pro tes t of

1891-9 2 had heralded the outbreak of the Const i tu t ional

revolut ion of 1905-11, and remained a source of in sp i ra t ion

to a l l future revo l t s and revolut ionar ies in I ran .

I t was towards the end of the 19th C. tha t mini

organizations l ike the Secret Society, the Secret Centre,

the Social Democratic i?arty, the Society of Humanity, the

Revolutionary Committee founded by d i f fe ren t sect ions of

socie ty a t d i f fe ren t places had emerged with the common

objective of es tab l i sh ing a new Const i tu t ion . The

i n t e l l e c t u a l s , committed to secularism, were not very

recept ive to the idea of ulema's prominence. But these

differences were relegated to the background and a l l the

organizat ions became very act ive as a r e s u l t of the

d is rupt ion caused by econaTiic i n s t a b i l i t y .

96

The tobacco pro tes t and the demand for the cons t i tu ­

t iona l government served as the main guidel ines to the

modern revolu t ionar ies in t he i r f ight against au thor i ta ­

rianism of Shah. Mis-government, corruption, foreign

influense worsening socio-economic condit ions and general

f r u s t r a t i o n s pushed Iran and I ranians in to a struggle f ina l ly

leading to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. Many fac tors

played the i r par t but the main cause was the Shah himself.

The Shah was p o l i t i c a l l y , economically and soc ia l ly

out of tune with the masses. He hated the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s

and had contempt for the shia clergy whom he considered the

main obstacle to his plans for the modernization of the

country. His sympathy for Zoroastrians and the Bha i ' i s ,

who were very co-operative with him, only earned him the

i l l - w i l l and scorn of the ulema. The Shah's over-confidence

and arrogance kept him away from his people and made him to

have contempt for gradualism. He Klax "lacked - indeed

did not t ry to cu l t i va t e - the common touch . . . He sought

remoteness and majesty . . . " The highly cent ra l ized

autocracy of the Shah's regime, and the excessive securi ty

control through SAVAK had become counter productive and

roused resentment. Shah's programme and po l ic ies never

worked well because of his negligence, mistakes, i l l u s i o n ,

i r r e s o l u t e temper, coercive methods and his f a i lu re to

secure co-operation from the very eminent opposit ion.

He fa i led to carry his people with him.

1. Desmond Harney, "Some Explanations for the I ranian Revolution", Asian Affai rs , Vol.XI, Part I I , June 1980, P.140.

97

Shah's programme of modernization received b i t t e r

c r i t i c i s m pa r t i cu l a r ly from the orthodox sect ion of the

I r an ians . They saw an attempt to make I ranian society

m a t e r i a l i s t i c and increase the influence of the West in

the guise of modernization. Khomeini has been very

c r i t i c a l of the "ma te r i a l i s t i c mentality" found in America

and other European countr ies both communist and non-communist

which he finds responsible for c o n f l i c t s , bloodshed and war.

The Shah l a t e r admitted tha t "he had been too radical in

t rying to modernise Iran" and acknowledgej^that the pr ice

paid for rapid modernization was c l ea r ly too high and

unacceptable to the people. "I have been blamed for

over-throwing the s t ruc tures of ^n e s s e n t i a l l y t r a d i t i o n a l i s t

and conservative nation . . . our e f for t was too rad ica l and

too rapid perhaps . . . The mass of the people did not support

i t . . . they did not accept t h i s f an ta s t i c leap forward".

The modernization programme of the Pahlavis had

allowed western influence in I ran to grow, i^^estern j / 3 -dominance was a t i t s most imperial , t o t a l and complete^.

There was opposition to t h i s dominance. The ©pposition

was most c e r t a in ly d is t ressed over the presence of the

West and the East in one form or the other in I ran ,

leading to r i g h t i s t and l e f t i s t d iv is ions in the

socie ty . Both Reza Khan and Mohamed Reza Shah were

to be blamed for t h i s . About 50,000 foreign experts were

the highest paid people in I ran and I ranians themselves

1. See, The Messaqd of Peace 21 September 1979. 2 . See, MEED, 9 February 1979 P.24 and "The Shah's Final

Days"""Newsweek January 29, 1979, P. 18. 3.~Siddiqui, Op.ci t . P. 13

98

were treated as second c l a s s c i t i z e n s in the i r own

country. Reza Shah had alloMed fore ign domination 2

and outs ide e x p l o i t a t i o n of o i l resources of Iran.

The Shah sought American support for h i s own p o l i t i c a l

survival and Americans supplanted the Br i t i sh af ter the

Second World V̂ ar fos ter ing a new ro le as "protector and

guarantor" . ^he Americans not only consol idated the ir

p o s i t i o n i n Iran by replacing the B r i t i s h and Russian

inf luence but hoped that the mi l i tary a s s i s tance supply

programme for Iran "wil l increase the strength and

e f f i c i e n c y of Iranian army and the gendermerie so that

the country can guard i t s e l f against internal subversion

or external aggression" . Khomeini and h i s supporters

always denounced Shah as a t r a i t o r who had sold h i s country

i n the name of leading the nation towards a "Great C i v i l i z a ­

tion" . The Iranian c l ergy bel ieved that the West's aim

was to destroy the Islamic f a i t h , cul ture and i way of

l i f e and that the best way of countering outs ide inf luences

was to make Shah the target of t h e i r attack. They f u l l y

appreciated the f a c t that western i n t e r e s t in o i l and

American anxiety t o make Shah the policeman i n the re^itgion

aga ins t communism had resul ted in suf fer ing to the Iranians .

1. See, Ayatollah Gulza«e Ghafoori, 'A brief look at the Is lamic Revolution of Iran' Is lamic cu l ture , Iran V o l . 1 , No. 1, May 1980. P. 28.

2 . See, N.Mehdi, "The Development of Iranian Oil Industry" Is lamic Revolution (Virginia USA, 1980) V o l . 3 , No.3 P. 18

3 . See, K.R.Singh, 'Iran; Quest for Securi ty ' (New Delhi 1980) PP 36-37 and Graham, Op .c i t . P.68.

4 . Report »S to Congress on mutual secur i ty programme from the s ix months ended December 31, 1953 US GPO, Washington, 1954 P. 27 a l so quoted Singh, Op .c i t . P. 38.

5 . See, Vahe Petross ian, "Khomeini's Return Marks Final Stage of Year Long Power Struggle", MEED, February 2, 1979 and "Construction Crusades in Iran" Islamic Republic Party

o q

C r i t i c s of Shah had seen lop-sided development

which had ignored the r e a l i t i e s of I ran ian socie ty .

They iound agr icu l ture being neglected and many indus t r i e s

s e t up by Shah were, according to them unproductive and

a drain on public revenues. Their main contentions^

was tha t there was no attempt to ameliorate the economic

hardship of the average I ran ian . Very l i t t l e of $90

b i l l i o n of o i l revenue during the period 1973-78 was

absorbed for development projects or used for improvement

of l iv ing condi t ions . Shah had maximised o i l production

when the country was unable to x absorb the revenue useful ly .

The r a t e of i n f l a t i on had mounted, agr icu l tu re slackened^

unemployment problem had assumed serious proport ions,

c a p i t a l outflow had increased and was estimated tha t 3

nearly $3 b i l l i o n were going out of I r an every year.

Despite a l l t h i s the Shah kept on purchasing mi l i t a ry

equipment from the west espec ia l ly from the USA, worth

b i l l i o n s of do l l a r s overlooking the basic needs of the

common I ran ians , Shah defended the purchase of arms

thus: "our policy of s t r i c t independence meant tha t we

needed the instruments of war , . . I wanted us to be armed

as be f i t t ed our secur i ty in tha t par t of the world' , H 4

Between 1975 and 1977 alone the US sold I ran about $700 5

mi l l ion of mi l i t a ry equipments. The heavy inflow of

1. See, Vahe Petrosslan, "Khomeini names Cabinet as Shah's men Give Away" - MEED, 16 February, 1979.

2 . "What happened to I r a n ' s o i l Revenue?" ALASTO (Tehran) June 4, 1980, P. 22 and a l so Raja Cooper, "Economic Prospects in the Islamic Republic" MEEB, 26 Jan.1979.

3 . See, Singh, Op.ci t . P.360. 4 . Pahlavi, Shah's Story, Op.ci t , P.128 5. See, Newsweek February 26, 1979 P,21

100

mi l i t a ry weapons was mostly Intended to pol ice the gulf.

The Shah himself had declared tha t "we are the only

country with the economic and mi l i t a ry sophis t ica t ion

necessary t o offer the area protect ion ' . I t I s estimated

t h a t between 1972-1973 and 1978-79 the defence expenditure

increased ten times which enabled the Shah to build one of 2

the l a rges t mi l i t a ry forces in the region.

In 1976 Iran had placed nearly $10 b i l l i o n worth of

orders with the US. The c r i t i c s saw hypocricy in Shah's 3

attempt to make I ran m i l i t a r i l y a super power . Mill ions

of poor and middle c l a s s I ranians were natura l ly angered

by the massive inflow of mi l i t a ry equipment a t a time

when I ran ian economy was col laps ing . The o i l fortune

could have saved I ran from economic des t ruc t ion but the

Shah's government mishandled the economy and Shah's own

personal ambitions destroyed i t , Fred Hal l iday ' s marxian

approach concludes tha t the demands and complaints of the

movement were "eminently ma t e r i a l i s t " and the I ranians

were f ight ing the c a p i t a l i s t system which had come to be

c lose ly linked with the American c a p i t a l i s t i n t e r e s t s " .

Dr. All Afrouz, however, does not accept economic reasons

alone as responsible for the Revolution, He says "Although

1. Quoted, Singh Op.cit . PP 156-157 2. See, ib id : P.238 and N.Mehdi, Op.ci t . P.18 3 . "A small country l ike I ran with an increase of

$18,871 b i l l i o n in revenue from o i l in 1971 spent over $10 b i l l i o n in tha t year alone to achieve mi l i t a ry super ior i ty in the gulf" See, N.Mehdi ib id .P .18

4 . Fred Halliday Op.ci t . PP.38-45, P.294.

101

the economic s i t ua t ion was one of the fac to rs , but by no

means i t was the cause of the Revolution" .

Corruption during the reigns of Shah Reza Shah and

Mohmed Reza Shah had assumed dangerous proport ions. Khomeini

had r i g h t l y pointed out the moral and s p i r i t u a l decadence

when he said " . , . , they destroyed our human resources and

c a p a b i l i t i e s and did not allow these to develop. The

cen t res of corruption and obsceni t ies mult ipl ied in the

c i t i e s to a ca tas t rophic extent and espec ia l ly in Tehran.

So many ways were created to corrupt our youth and the

massive propaganda was launched to a t t r a c t towards these

c e n t r e s . . . . they deprived us of our mental and s p i r i t u a l

independence . . . . " . The extravagant ce lebra t ions of

2 500 years of monarchy in October 1971 and the high

prevalence of corruption within the royal family had

become eyesores and i n t e l l e c t u a l s in pa r t i cu la r had come

to consider them as signs of moral decadence. Corruption

had se t in the educational system as wel l . One of the

a l l ega t i ons against Shah's regime was tha t i t destroyed

the individual honour and self respect of the c i t i z ens 3

of the country.

1. All Afrouz "Dealing with the counter-revolut ionary forces" in Kalim Siddiqui, e t . a l . Op.ci t . P.45

2. Imam Khomeini's speech a t Qom on 31 May 1979 - quoted Che Message of Peace July 10/ 1979 P.15.

3 . Khomeini once said "With a l l h is (Shah) power he pushed down the people, imprisoned them, tor tured theoi, executed them and did not allow them to breathe" - quoted Ministry of National Guidance (Tehran) n.d. P. 51

102

SAVAK had become the most symbolic expression of

the oppressive t a c t i c s of the regimd. Ever since i t was

es tabl ished in 1957,it had worked as "the Shah's eyes and

ears and where necessary h i s i ron f i s t neu t ra l i s ing a l l " 1 those d is loyal to the regime. The Red Cross Report on

pr ison to r tu re revealed tha t "between 90% and 95% of a l l

p o l i t i c a l secur i ty pr isoners in I ran were maltreated by

prison guards during the era of Pahlavi regime" . Shah,

however, defended SAVAK as an agency meant to combat 3

communist subversion. Khomeini considered i t as an

organization to protec t the Shah and t r e a t the people

"with extreme rudeness and contempt", to t e r r o r i s e the

people l e s t one day "some body dare to r i s e in opposit ion."

Among the other fac tors , import of canned meat,

neglect of Islamic education in schools and un ive r s i t i e s

and general westernizat ion e t c . , ) g rea t ly fostered hatered

against Shah's regime. No wonder the Revolution began

i n the mosques and spread through clergymen. Islam became

the r a l ly ing point and the Islamic Republic with independence

and freedom became the watchword of the Revolution. Indeed

the beginning of the Revolution could be traced to the 15th

of Khorded (June 5, 1963) when i t was believed t h a t about

15,000 I ran ians were merci less ly massacred by Mohamed Reza

Shah's armed men. The Faiziyeh school on the day of Ashoora

c l e a r l y emphasised the Islamic or ig in of the r evo l t .

1, Graham Op.ci t . P. 145 2, See, NevB and Views (Tehran) December 22, 1979. 3 . Pahlavi, Op.cit^ PP 174-175. 4. Khomeini a t a meeting with a group of Ajrmy off icers in

Qom, quoted. The Message of Peace October 21, 1979.

103

Shah's government was t o t a l l y geared to serve the

i n t e r e s t of the Shah alone. Ever since 1953 when he

was challenged by Dr. Mossadegh, Shah had concentrated

a l l power in his own hands and used i t against i n s t i t u t i o n s

and individuals who posed a th rea t to him and h is author i ty .

Shah did not l ike sharing power with others and the absence

of other elements in the decision-making process in fac t

worked against Shah himself. He always used to avoid

debates on key issues l ike defence, secur i ty , economy e t c .

Khomeini once pointed out t ha t Shah was "always careful to 2

see t h a t no one spoke about the a f fa i r s of the country".

both No doubt , / in te rna l and external t h r ea t s made Shah

very r ig id in h i s approach to problems of the s t a t e . Ideas

of nationalism, implications of modernization, fears of

coup d ^ ' e t a t and armed r evo l t s , t h rea t s from re l ig ious

and t r i b a l groups e t c . , had l e f t Shah very nervous and

apprehensive. External th rea t s were no less alarming.

I r a n ' s massive o i l fortune had de f in i t e l y a t t r ac t ed outside

powers and competition was becoming a menace to I ran . These

considerat ions were responsible for Shah ge t t ing c lose ly

aligned with U.S. The system was tailor-made for Shah

and worked well un t i l i t was challenged in an organized way.

1. See, Singh, Op.ci t . P. 35. 2 . Interviews of Imam Khomeini t rans la ted by A.A.Ghassemy

(Tehran n.d) P. 11

104

Mohamed Reza Shah held on to power for 37 years

with the help of o i l money, SAVAK, a very « e l l equipped

defence system and ass is tance from h i s a l l i e s , U.S.A.

in p a r t i c u l a r . He however, fa i led "to make the I ranian 2 ^ ^

people happy". All the arms and pe t ro -do l l e r s could

not save the Pahlavi dynasty. Shah had to leave h is

country in the face of the revolutionary onslaught and

could never r e tu rn .

The mass upsurge was confined mostly to the big

c i t i e s and towns and in fac t i t was only af te r the

promulgation of Martial law under Gen.Azhari's govern­

ment t h a t the rura l people a lso joined the fray. The

demonstrators were mostly the urban poor who were facing

the worst economic s i t ua t i on since the World War I I .

What r e a l l y aggravated the i r agony «as the r ea l i za t i on

t h a t t h e i r economic maladies were i ron ica l in the context

of the o i l boom and the huge spending xdi on arms purchase

by the Shah. This condit ion was very e f fec t ive ly exploited

by the Opposition.

^The Opposition made up of d i f fe ren t c lasses and

sec t ions of population re l i ed heavily on the Ideas of

"National F ron t ' s past a c t i v i t i e s " to avoid i so la ted

opposition and form concurrent act ion. I t was headed by

the r e l ig ious sect ion which had been waiting for an

opportunity to remove Shah and es tab l i sh Islamic ru l e .

1. "We were the par t of the Family" Pahlavi, Shah's Story Op.ci t . P. 153

2 . ib id ; P. 157 3 . Graham, Op.ci t . P.212

10 5

I t was t h i s g r o u p which had proved e f f e c t i v e i n t h e

r e v o l u t i o n of 1905-1906 a g a i n s t Shah M u z a f f a r u d d i n Shah .

But t h i s t ime t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s h i p had b e t t e r means

and had a d o p t e d b e t t e r t a c t i c s t o be a b l e even t o

e l i m i n a t e m o n a r c h i c a l r e g i m e . The c o u n t r y ' s c l e r g y m e n

u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of e x i l e d A y a t o l l a h Khomeini d i d n o t

r e l e n t u n t i l t h e y had t o p p l e d t h e Shah . They c o n s i d e r e d

S h a h ' s i m p o r t of w e s t e r n l i f e s t y l e a s c o n t r a o l i c t o r y

t o t h e d i c t a t e s of Quran. They had come t o c o n s i d e r

Shah r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e n e g l e c t of r e l i g i o n i n I r a n .

They were aware of t h e p o p u l a r f e e l i n g a s t h e y t h e m s e l v e s

were v i c t i m s of S h a h ' s r e p r e s s i o n .

I r a n i a n s , i n g e n e r a l , s u p p o r t e d t h e m u l l a h s and

e n c o u r a g e d them t o be p o l i t i c a l a g a i n s t S h a h ' s r e g i m e .

The p e o p l e b e l i e v e d and were c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e ulema

and I s l a m were t h e o n l y means t o s e r v e t h ^ i r i n t e r e s t .

The ulema on t h e i r p a r t s t r e n g t h e n e d p e o p l e ' s b e l i e f by

c r i t i c i s i n g t h e p o l i c i e s and government of t h e Shah and

b l a m i n g t h e Shah f o r h i s e x t r a v a g a n c e and f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s 2

bad economy. The re i s no d o u b t t h a t t h e ulema had a

c l e a r i d e a of t h e needs » and a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e I r a n i a n

p e o p l e and knew t h a t t h e i r own i n f l u e n c e among t h e m a s s e s

was b e c a u s e of t h e i r "mora l c h a r a c t e r , c a l i b r e s c h o l a r s h i p

and i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y and n o t b e c a u s e of any o f f i c e

t h a t t h e y happened t o h o l d " . The r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s

1 . See, Graham, O p . c i t . P.218 2 . Singh, O p . c i t . P.370. 3 . Itnpact I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 26 January t o 8 February 1979.

106

were not united in the i r views. They often represented

conf l i c t ing ideas and yet they a l l found themselves drawn

in to the movdrnent under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Khomeini demanded an end to the Pahlavi regime and worked

for the establishment of an ' Is lamic s t a t e ' . The mullahs

held Shah responsible for foreign domination and western

influence in I ran . According to Khomeini the Shah "wasted

thd count ry ' s resources created mil l ions of refugees who

l e f t the agrarian sector and formed huge slums around the

c i t i e s . . . . " His compelling logic was tha t "an impious

ru l e r can only lead the country to ruin; a corrupt leader

can only appoint corrupt adminis t ra tors ; a head of s t a t e

operating on wrong pr inc ip les of government can only make 3

wrong decis ions" . I t i s c lear tha t through the co-operation

and strong support of the people the r e l ig ious c lass nurtured

a revolut ion to usher in changes in the I ran ian society based

on Islam. Along with the other groups^ the r e l ig ious c l a s s ,

no doubt, remained in the mainstream to d i r e c t the Revolution.

The main grouse of the re l ig ious c lasses against the

Shah's regime was tha t i t had led to corruption* moral

decadence and a r b i t r a r i n e s s . The l i f e s ty le encouraged

by the Shah was considered unlslamic and ruinous. I t was

1. Shariatmadari, for example, was only for cons t i tu t iona l rule and was agreeable to accept l i b e r a l reforms without much basic change. -

Of the re l ig ious leader, the following deserve special mention for the i r cont r ibut ion to the cause of the revolution - Ayatollah Taleghani, Ayatollah Mutahhari, Ayatollah Husain Ali Montazari, Ayatollah Najafi Marashi, Ayatollah Mohamed Reza Golpaygani e t c .

2 . Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad "Secularizat ion, I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and Khomeini's Islamic Republic" P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly (New York) No.2 Stammer 1979 P. 236.

3. i b i d . P.236

107

Indeed true tha t the Pahlavi monarchs had intended to

undermine the t r a d i t i o n a l hold of the mullahs on Iranian

socie ty through the i r modernization and secu la r iza t ion

and there was widespread resentprfment within the t r a d i t i o n a l

c l e r i c a l leadership. But i t would be d i f f i c u l t to ^XBKB

accept the claim of the Sh^h tha t the ulema were opposed

to h is land reforms and emancipation of women. There i s

no evidence to subs tant ia te th i s view. A leading mujtahid

Ayatollah Bourujerdi had c r i t i c i s e d the policy of " l imi t ing

the size of landed e s t a t e as against Islam". But Khomeini

has e x p l i c i t l y stated tha t they are not for the reversal of

the land reforms. Even with regard to the question of

emancipation of women, the ulema have t r i ed to explain

away the i r a t t i t ude by s ta t ing tha t Islam t rea ted men and

women equal ly. They were, however, t rying to be evasive.

But what r e a l l y came to the rescue of the ulema was the

ro le the Iranian women assumed for themselves in the move­

ment. They not only voiced the i r opposition against Shah

but made the chador (veil) the i r symbol of pro tes t against

Shah's modernization programme thus strengthening the clergy.

The revo lu t ion i s t s and the ag i t a to r s found women pa r t i c ipa ­

t i on in the demonstration very helpful and encouraged i t

because they believed tha t the unexpected "female presence

tended to a unnervd<p r i o t police and the army, making

demonstrations more d i f f i c u l t to chal lenge".

1. Ehsan Yar Shater, Op.c i t . P.16. 2 . Graham, Op.c i t . P.227.

108

Many doubted if the mullahs would be capable of the

task they had undertaken unaided, 'the overal l leadership

of the mullahs in general and Khomeini in pa r t i cu la r over

the mi l l ions ag i ta t ing was complete. The d i sc ip l ine of

the mobs was something which took everybody by surpr i se .

I t was o f f i c i a l l y confided by the Americans tha t "Khomeini

can order half a mil l ion people into the s t r e e t s on a few

hours notice, h i s revolutionary guards wi l l throw themselves

joyously on any group defenseless or not".

The ulema and the mullahs were accused of being marxists

and reac t ionar ies by the Shah. The c r i t i c i sm of the mullahs

being marxists was unfair because the re l ig ious leadership

was not only against the a^thism of the marxists but Khomeini

even forbade his followers to havd iaa any truck with marxis ts .

Later developments more than confilmed the anti-communisti

stance of the re l ig ious leaders .

Among the i n t e l l e c t u a l s who played a major ro le in the

Revolution iJr.Ali S h a r i a t i ' s name should get the pride of

place. Through h i s wri t ings he spread the revolutionary

ideas in I ran pa r t i cu l a r l y among the youth and made Islam 2

the key to progress. Many consider Dr .Shar ia t i as primarily

responsible for bringing the western educated youth in I ran

i n t o the Islamic movement and as Instrumental for the success

of the Islamic Revolution. Prof.Abidi bel ieves tha t "In

the context of the recent revolut ion in I ran , Dr.AH Sha r i a t i ,

because of h i s soc io -po l i t i co - re l ig ious ideas, must be

considered as the Teacher of the Revolution".

1. Documents, No. 1-6, P. 576. 2 . See, Baquari, Op.ci t . P. 36 and CF.Loren Jenkins "Teetering

Shah" Newsweek January 1, 1979. 3 . See, Siddiqui, Op.ci t . P. 13. 4. A.H.H.Abidi, "Dr.All Sha r i a t i : The man and his Ideas"

T oi Pim ^nri i-.hp> M o d e r n /^ae (New D e l h i ) May 1982 P . 9 7 .

109

Closely aligned with the intellectuals were the

students who stood by the ideology of the revolution

and BBXHZ never gave in even under very great pressure.

They were right in the front of the movement against the

Shah. They had many reasons of their own to be opposed

to the Shah. Initially the Shah wanted extensive expansion

of university and higher education but when he realized

that increased student population was a menace to his

regime he slowed down the pace of higher education. Students

were closely watched and only those who fully adhered to

the Shah's programme were admitted. 'Wealthy Iranians could

always go abroad for higher education but poor Iranian

students were forced to tolerate the tyrannical rule of

the Shah. Under these strangulating conditions students

cried out for freedom and better living conditions. Iranian

students abroad had also reason to defy and oppose Shah.

This was very evident whenever Shah visited foreign countries,

The militancy of the students was very pronounced. Among

the students one section in particular caused the Shah

the greatest trouble since it believed in force and violence.

It consisted of guerrilla groups believing in the philosophy

of action of Mao and Fidel Castro and guerrilla tactics

of the PLO and trained in different parts of the world

since the second half of the 1960s. Perhaps their

methods resulted in "too many human losses" , but they

1. See, Tehran Journal, 22 January 1977

2. Rouleau, Op.cit. P. 5

ft/lVsORE UNIVERSITY LlBMRt iAYSor£-e70Coe

110

were very effect ive pa r t i cu la r ly in 1975-76 when they

went on a rampage bringing to the notice of the world

the i n t ens i t y of the i r ag i t a t ion .

The Bazaar, as in the past , played i t s role in

fanning the flames of revolut ion. The market had

de f in i t e ly become the representa t ive of the national

middle c l a s s with the inflow of cap i t a l and i t s expansion.

The Bazaar in I ran has always been the headquarters and

centre of p o l i t i c a l vehemence and d i s sen t . The merchant

c l a s s was act ive in developing the economy and was a lso

engaged in foster ing p o l i t i c a l ideology. They co-operated

and co-ordinated with the re l ig ious c l a s s to p ro tes t

agains t Shah's regime and were generous in financing

s t r i kes and demonstrations. Shah's modernization

programme had grea t ly extended the middle c l a s s in

I ran which found Shah's regime very harsh and unbearable.

The middle c l a s s remained "aloof and apart" and was

de f in i t e l y not well disposed towards monarchical system

p a r t i c u l a r l y because of Shah's land reforms programme.

I t was the middle c lass which proved i t s e l f to be the

death-knel l of the Pahalavi regime. Most po l i t i c i an s

and p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s , prominent in the movement had aA?iV^

played notable role under Cr.Mossadegh or in 1960-63. 2

They mostly represented the middle c l a s s .

1. See, W.B.Fisher, "The year in the Middle East" June 1978-79 Middle East and North Africa 79-80 (London, 1979) P.XV and a l so , Arband Abrahammlan "The causes of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Revolution in Iran" In te rna t iona l Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , Vol.10, August 1979 P. 393

2. Some of the prominent leaders were Daruish Farouher who headed the Nat ional is t Party, Dr.Karim Sanjabi who was the leader of the I ranian S o c i a l i s t Party, Dr.Bakhtlar who led the National Front I t s e l f un t i l he agreed to form a government; Mehdi Bazargan vvho had founded the I ran Liberat ion Movernent,Mohsin Peseshkpour,AhmedBani Ahmed e

I l l

The i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the p o l i t i c i a n s and the students

were demanding r e s to ra t ion of t h e i r c i v i l and cons t i tu t iona l

l i b e r t i e s . The National Front issued a twelve - point

programme in August 1978 which included a c a l l for the

^ s o l u t i o n of SAVrtK, re lease of p o l i t i c a l pr isoners ,

guarantee of r igh t s and freedoms, ending of mi l i t a ry

t r ibuna l s e t c .

These d i f fe ren t groups sought guidance and support

from the Ayatollahs in the i r s truggle against Shah.

Each group had i t s own dogma and pr inc ip les but a l l had

joined together to end the Shah's r u l e .

While discussing the role of d i f fe ren t groups in

mobilising support against Shah's regime , one cannot

ignore the ro le of the Tudeh par ty . I t was believed tha t

i n i t i a l l y i t did not formulate any programme of ending

Shah's rule but when i t became aware of the general

discontent and Shah's t o t t e r i n g image, i t joined the

movement of the Students and the ulema and worked for

the Islamic Revolution. Noureddin^ Kianouri leader of

the Tudeh Party, in an interview found no differences

between s c i e n t i f i c socialism on one hand and the socia l

content of Islam on the o ther . For him they have "much

in common". In fact , he did not sde any conf l i c t between

communism and 'Khomeini's v i s ion of Islamic Republic*.

Tudeh Party had i t s major support coming from the o i l

workers. I t was very obvious, immediately af ter the

f a l l of the Pahlavis, tha t Khomeini and h i s supporters

were not well disposed towards the Tudeh Party.

1. Newsweek, 29 January 1979.

112

Apart from the groups working towards revolut ion in

I ran from within, i t would be in t e re s t ing to find out if

any external forces a lso nurtured Mix the revolut ion.

Shah had a l l along been suspicious of Soviet Union's

i n t en t ions . He suspected Russian involvement and believed

t h a t the Russians were supporting the mullahs with a view

to help communism f lour ish in I ran. The Soviet Union,

according t o the Shah, was trying to make use of the

disenchantment and anger "to take over the revolution to

t h e i r ( i t s ) own advantage". Dr.Kissinger saw the

movement as "the r e s u l t of Soviet support of radical

movement on a global basis which has also now reached 3

I ran . One reason for many to believe tha t the Russians

were supporting and master-minding the opposition in I ran

was the Sov ie t ' s global s t ra tegy of undermining the US.

i n t e r e s t s . However these ideas lack c lear evidence and

a re based on circumstant ial conclusions. I t was widely

known tha t the Russians did not handle the movement d i r e c t l y

but "rode on the back of a movement with genuine r o o t s . . . "

But Khomeini denied any kind of contact with the communist

count r ies and in fac t went to the extent of declaring tha t

"the danger of communism to day i s no less than the western

capi tal ism and our dear people should be on guard against 5

t h e i r i n t r i gues" . Any attempt to d i r ec t l y implicate Soviet

Union would be to do in jus t i ce to the revolut ionary leadership.

1. See, Harney, Op.ci t . 2 . Pahlavi, Op.c i t . P. 168 3 . Quoted "Blossoming of the Perennial" Impact In t e rna t iona l ,

26 January to 8 February 1979. 4 . Harney^ Op.ci t . P. 140. 5. "Uuotations from Imam Khomeini", News letter (Iran's

Embassy, Dacca) No. 33, March 31, 1981

113

I t was a lso alleged tha t the West and espec ia l ly

the United States created an opportunity for a revolut ion

with a view to suppress communist influence in I ran .

Jimmy Carter af ter becoming the ^-resident in 1976

gave much importance to a l i be ra l Human Rights policy

throughout the world and indeed appealed to Shah to

ensure more l i b e r a l policy in h i s own country af ter he

was convinced of the excessiveness of the Shah's regime.

C a r t e r ' s r e l en t l e s s f ight for human r igh t s had a very

pos i t ive impact on the Opposition in I ran . They seized

upon i t "as a form of protect ive umbrella". Shah was

d e f i n i t e l y very unhappy with the US and had very reluctantly

i n i t i a t e d a policy of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . Later, he held the

Americans responsible for the militancy of the Opposition

and he accused United Sta tes for the events tha t led to

h i s downfall. In his autobiography the Shah has expressed

surpr i se on the motives behind the American moves such as

the unannounced presence in Iran of General Huyser (the

Deputy Director of NATO) and his advice and tha t of the

American Ambassador Sullivan to the Shah to go into ex i le

and their attempt to hob-J^nob with the new government.

1. Graham, Op.cit . P.210

2. Pahlavi, Op.ci t . P.187. One of the generals and the Commander-in-Chief of the I ran ian Air Force by name Amir Husain Rabii said to the Judges before his execution tha t "General Huyser threw the Emperor out of the country l ike a dead mouse" - Time December 17, 1979.

114

Harney's conclusions and "explanations" on Ga r t e r ' s

role , vjere mainly in the context of the American domestic

scetae. President Carter , he points out, in order to

gain r e -e lec t ion , played the drama and "se t i t a l l in

motion". However, i t would be very unfair to the people

of I ran to give c r e d i t to outside elements for the revolution

in I ran . I t i s t rue tha t the US t r i ed *. i t s best to save

the fahlavi dynasty but i t was only when the posi t ion of

Shah had become hopeless for the Shah and h i s throne 2 t h a t the Americans abruptly looked for a l t e r n a t i v e s .

There i s no doubt tha t the US even t r i ed to get closer to

new government of Islamic I r an and t r i ed to take c r ed i t

for the ouster of Shah. Secretary of S ta te Cyrus Vance said

t h a t "the Carter Administration af ter having backed the 3

Shah wanted him out of I r an . "

Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi fa i led to assess the exact • »

s t rength of the opp^osition in i t ia l ly^ ' he almost ignored

demonstrations against his regime as the work of minority.

He believed tha t he had the support of "700,000 troops,

a l l the workers and most of the people". And whenphe

s i t u a t i o n became alarming he took harsh and inhuman

ac t ion to crush the Opposition and indeed unwitt ingly

made things worse. The mi l i t a ry of the Shah also proved

of no avai l and could not save him. In fac t , the B^ armed

forces were badly divided and the whole system was paralysed.

1. Harney, Op.c i t . P. 134. 2 . See, Singh, Op.ci t . P. 3 56 3 . See, Vahe Petrossian "The Shah Leaves and i s unl ikely

ever to Return" MEED 19 January 1979, P.11 4 . "US News and World Report" quoted in Singh, Op.ci t . P. 352

115

Shah fai led to recognise the leadership of

Ayatollah Khomeini and h is hold over the masses.

He invar iably dismissed the Opposition as the handiwork

of the Communists. He under-estimated the s trength

of popular movement and wrongly assessed the objectives

of the Revolution. He re l ied on group strength to

p ro tec t himself and the throne. There i s no doubt tha t

Shah rea l i sed his mistakes a t one point aad t r i ed to

soften the opposition by bringing an element of l iberal ism

in his administrat ion. He assured tha t the next govern­

ment would be based on the p r inc ip les of Const i tut ion,

socia l j u s t i c e and public w i l l . He guaranteed freedom

of Press, pr iv i leges of the re l ig ious people and i n s t i ­

t u t ions , change of calendar e t c . , but i t was too l a t e .

3y then the revolutionary movement had not only picked

up but had also reached i t s peak. The aim of the

Revolution had become the ouster of Shah. As Karim

Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front put i t "the

only solut ion i s tha t the Shah maast go".

There may be d i f ferent causes tha t led to the

revolut ion xi in contemporary I ran but what astonished

many was the f a s t pace of events during 1978-79. There

i s no doubt many factors and members from more than one

c lass contributed to the success of the revolut ion but

had the people not par t ic ipa ted SZIOBBSS en-masse, t h i s

revolut ion would not have been poss ib le . Here l i e s the

1. "Iran a t the Sxtak Brink.'" Newsweek January 8, 1979.

116

g e n i u s of AyatoXlah Khomeini who providec3 t h e much-needed

l e a d e r s h i p and a r t i c u l a t e d t h e e f f o r t s of t h ^ masse s and

o t h e r g r o u p s .

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI:

R o h u l l a - a l - m u s a v i - a l Khomeini- was b o r n i n Khomeini

n e a r I s f a h a n i n 1900 (some say t h a t he was b o r n i n A p r i l

and o t h e r s say t h a t he was b o r n i n May) . H i s f a t h e r and

e l d e r b r o t h e r s were A y a t o l l a h s and t h e f a m i l y had a t r a d i t i o n

of d i s s e n t and m i l i t a n c y . His f a t h e r Sayy id Mus ta fa

Musavi was murdered by t h e a g e n t s of Ka ja r d y n a s t y when

A R o h u l l a - a l - m u s a v i was h a r d l y 5 months o l d . M u s t a f a - a l -

Musavi a v e r y n o b l e and c o u r a g e o u s man had t o pay f o r h i s

o p p o s i t i o n t o o p p r e s s i o n of t h e K a j a r s w i t h h i s l i f e .

R o h u l l a ' s b e r e a v e d mother demanded j u s t i c e from t h e Tehran

c o u r t and d i d n o t y i e l d u n t i l t h e m u r d e r e r of h e r husband

2

was b r o u g h t t o book and p u n i s h e d w i t h d e a t h s e n t e n c e -

R i g h t from t h e b e g i n n i n g R o h u l l a was t a u g h t t h e l e s s o n

of c o u r a g e and b r a v e r y by h i s mother who p a s s e d away when

h e r son was 15 y e a r s of a g e . R o h u l l a f i r s t s t u d i e d i n

s e m i n a r i e s a t I s f a h a n l a t e r c o m p l e t e d h i s s e c o n d a r y

e d u c a t i o n a t Arak and j o i n e d h i s t e a c h e r A y a t o l l a h H a e r i ,

one of t h e g r e a t e s t muslim t h e o l o g i a n s and f o u n d e r of

Haoze I l m i y a , a t Qom. Haoze I l m i y a had a l r e a d y shewed

s i g n s of becoming t h e nuc l eus of I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y

1 . See , Time (New York) F e b r u a r y 5, 1979

2 . She i s r e p o r t e d t o have t a k e n t h e c h i l d r e n t o t h e s c e n e of t h e p l a c e of t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e o f f e n d e r and t o l d them "Now be a t p e a c e s i n c e t h e wolf h a s a t t a i n e d t h e f r u i t s of t h e e v i l d e e d s " - See, *A word a b o u t A y a t o i i a n Khomein i ' Noor (Poona, I n d i a ) V o l . 1 , J u l y 1980 P . l

117

a c t i v i t i e s and centre of Islamic renaissance. Rohulla

completed his education and secured a degree of I j tehad

and s ta r ted teaching usoole-fique and philosopny in 1927,

a t the Madrase Faiziah. Married in 1928, he became the

Chief Advisor to the leading Marja of the time - Ayatollah

Bourjerdi , 6n the death of Ayatollah Bourjerdi, Ayatollah

Khomeini became one of the chancellors of the Madrasa and

was considered an author i ty on Shiism.

Great many events had l e f t a l a s t ing impression on

the young mind of Khomeini. S tor ies of revol t against

tobacco monopoly and the cons t i tu t iona l revolut ion of 1906

were fresh in his memory. As a young man, Ayatollah

Khomeini was a witness to the d i s in t eg ra t ion of h is country

in the F i r s t VJorld War and to the r i s e of Reza Khan as a

d i c t a t o r . In 1941 he wrote a book severely c r i t i c i s i n g

the ru le of Reza Shah and the overthrew of Dr.Mossadegh

in 19 53 had only hardened his feel ings towards the Pahlavi

dynasty. By 1962 af ter the death of Ayatollah Bourjerdi 2

Khomeini had become the leading Ayatollah, and had indeed

launched a several at tack on the Shah's modernization

programme and his close r e l a t i ons with the West in general

and USA in pa r t i cu la r despi te the fac t tha t Mohamed Reza

Shah had returned to throne with greater power and greater

au thor i ty . Shah's White Revolution, h is secu la r i sa t ion

of I ran and increasiajin western influence had become

1. See, Martin Woolacott, "Does Khomeini Really Understand?" The Guardian January 28, 1979, P. 7 and Graham Op.ci t . P.220.

2. "In 1962 the Ayatollah became head of I r a n ' s Sh i i t e sect to which most of the count ry ' s 34 mil l ion people belong", Angus Bemining and others "The Khomeini Enigma" Newsweek January 29, 1979.

118

focal point of c r i t i c i sm from the Orthodox c i r c l e s of

which Ayatolla Khomeini was the Chief Qlergy.

I n i t i a l l y , h i s g rea tes t support came from the

student community but a f te r the at tack of Madrass-e-

Faiziah many more sect ions of the I ranian society joined

him in his campaign against tyranny and oppression of

the Pahlavi regime^Khomeini ' s provocative and strong

speeches led to h i s a r r e s t and subsequent ex i l e .

There i s no doubt tha t by the time of h i s expulsion in

1964 Khomeini had already become very popular and

famous "by publicly condemning both the Shah's v io la t ions

of the Const i tu t ion and the granting of extra t e r r i t o r i a l i t y

to American c i v i l i a n and mi l i t a ry advisors and the i r

dependents". Even in exi le Khomeini continued to

have his remarkable influence over I r an ians . As Richard

W.Cottam puts i t : "His author i ty r e s t s on h is remarkable

a b i l i t y to appeal to I r a n ' s lower and lower middle c l a s s e s .

He speaks the i r language, understands the i r profound sense

of in jus t i ce and deprivat ion and can a r t i c u l a t e i t " .

Khomeini's br ief stay in Turkey, h is movements in I raq

and close associat ions with the Pales t in ians caused a

grea t deal of concern to the I ranian regime which, in fac t ,

1. Many consider 1962 as the year when Ayatollah Khomeini s ta r ted the revolut ion against the Shah: See, "Ayatollah Khomeini's l i f e sketch in brief" I ran under the Shade! of Islamic. Republic (Tehran) 2 October 1979'"(a book in Urdu)

2 . Rouleau, Op.ci t . P.6 3 . Richard Cottam, "Revolutionary I ran and the War with

Iraq" Current History (Philadelphia, US) Vol.80, June 1981 P.6

119

asked the Iraqi^i government to keep a watch and r e s t r i c t

Khomeini's movement. However, nothing could prevent

Khomeini's contacts with his people in I ran . Khomeini's

message tha t Islam did not j u s t mean prayer and fas t ing

but stood for the pr inciple of social j u s t i c e , had a

profound impact on the I ranians and the movement against

the regime progressively accelerated. And Khomeini's

exhor ta t ion to his countrymen to f ight for the sake of

^ l l a h while describing the v i r t ue s of martyrdom from

ex i l e increased the confrontation between the people and

the secur i ty guards in I ran . A frightened Shah even

asked the I raq i government to force Khomeini out but

tha t only helped the Ayatollah to find refuge in France

and for the " f i r s t time publicised his views through

western Press" . The Ayatollah could keep himself in

touch with h is followers be t t e r from France through

phone c a l l s , wr i t ten messages and v i s i t o r s . He could

divulge the condit ions in Iran and expose the misdeeds

of Shah with the help of l i b e r a l ed i to rs through the

western press . His messages, tape recorded, were f i r s t

sent to Uom from where they were c i rcu la ted c landes t ine ly 2 throughout I ran . All his messages had a very great

impact leaving Shah almost he lp less . With pressure

mounting Mohamed Reza Shah l e f t the country. Khomeini

saw in the e x i t of the Shah only a preface to the f inal

1. See, Time: January 7, 1980 P. 12 2 . See, Rager Homan, "The or igin of the I ranian Revolution",

In te rna t iona l Affairs , (London) Autumn 1980, P.637 and "The Ayatol lah 's Hit Parade" Time February 12, 1979

120

victory which would come about with the ending of all

foreign domination.

Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini symbol and architect of

the Iranian Revolution, returned from exile after the

Shah had left Iran. The people of Iran demonstrated

their support and faith in Khomeini in very clear terms.

Khomeini called upon his people to demonstrate peacefully

in support of Bazargan government and appealed to the

military to join the people. The Iranian Air Force

refused to obey the commanols of their superior officers

following the Imam's appeal. Indeed later the military

also announced its neutrality when police stations, radio

and Television stations etc., fell into the hands of the

people and there was no resistance left. However, for

Khomeini the final victory would come about only with the

establishment of Islam and not just with the disappearance

of monarchy. For him Islam is the answer for all problems

of man since he believes that Islam neglects nothing.

Khomeini'pcii political philosophy is based on the

idea that "Islam is a religion where even its ds divine

1. See, "The Shah Takes His Leave" Time January 29,1979.

2. "It is unimportant if you fail in our Revolution but if you damage the honour of Islam then we have created a catastrophy,... our victory does not mean only overthrow of former regime. Our victory will come when we have succeeded in changing ourselves into proper muslims and acting in strict accordance with Islamic teachings " "Imam Khomeini speaks to the nation" The Message of Peace, July 10, 1979.

3. See, "Lectures on Islamic government" (Viiayat ul Faqih) Islamic Revolution August 1980, P.6

121

i n s t ruc t ions » are p o l i t i c a l . The sermons of the

Friday Prayers, and the f e s t i v a l sermons, the gatherings

a t Mecca, Arfat and Mina are a lso p o l i t i c a l . I t s prayers

a r e p o l i t i c a l and i t s p o l i t i c s are prayers" . He had

ca l l ed upon the ulema not to keep a low prof i le of

themselves in society since Prophet Mohamed himself

was in the midst of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y throughout his

l i f e . He strongly believds tha t nothing but Islam

could unite a nation of 35 mi l l ion people for a common

goal and he i s very c r i t i c a l of the "so cal led nationalism".

For him "the nation arose j u s t for Islam" and Islam i s

"a p o l i t i c a l r e l i g ion . I t i s a r e l i g ion in which p o l i t i c s 4

can c l ea r l y be seen in the ins t ruc t ions and r i t u a l s . . . . "

I t i s Khomeini's bel ief tha t Iran would be an Islamic

Republic only when each and every aspect of the government

" r e f l e c t s the rule of Allah, when our statesmen are a l l

godly people, when the statesmen in author i ty , the higher

government administrators are godly people and free from

the g r i p of concupiscence". This i s where Khomeini

emphasises the role of education and wants education

to be based on Islam without depending on values borrowed

e i t h e r from the ^as t or from the Vfest.

1. "i^ltheologian Cannot be a Dic ta tor" , News and Views March 3, 1980 P. 5

2. See, "laam Khomeini's speech in meeting with a group of Tehran Ulema" Islamic Republic Party >^eekly Bul le t in , July 27, 1981.

3 . See, H.Mashhadi, "Imam Khomeini a t rue defender of Islam" News and Views, July 30, 1980 P.19.

4 . "Islam is a P o l i t i c a l Religion", Selected Messages and Speeches of Imam Khomeini (Tehran) Ministry of National Guidance n.d) PP 22-23. '

"Imam s t r e s ses on Moral i-'ducation Pur i f ica t ion" Islamic Republic Party Weekly Bul le t in . 19 January 1981 See, Tehran Times, June 14, 1981, a lso Islamic Republic Party 'JeeKly Bul le t in 19 uanuary 1981 PP 9-10.

122

Khomeini always identified the Revolution itself

with Islam and associated the nation with both. rie once

declared that the Revolution has been "by the nation

itself; they have the same moral attachment to this

Revolution as they have to Islam". At every stage

Khomeini has not only tried to interpret Islam for the

day to day affairs of the Iranians but has always

attempted to keep the philosophy of the Revolution

2 and the movement alive. His endeavour has always been

to emphasise the need for "Islamic government fully

devoted to Islamic principles and devoid of western

ideas and totally inclined to Islam..." Khomeini

maintains that super powers wished to separate the

clergymen from the people and intended to separate

politics from religion. Time and again he has cautioned

his people that "the defeat of the Islamic clergy si is 4

the defeat of Islam itself"

1. "Islamic Revolution Not Framed by the «Jest or East or by any Group" Islamic Republic Party »''eekly Bulletin, May 8, 1981.

2. "Shedding tears and expressions of grief for those mortyred is a means of keeping alive these great movements... It was the movement of Imam Husain which he has given rise to present revolution ... that this movement is only a ray of that brilliant sun which is the movement of Karbala.... This movement must be preserved at all times at all places... the mourning processions which marched in streets symbolised opposition to oppression and tyranny" "Dialogue with the Nation ... Speeches of ^yatollah Khomeini" The Message of Peace November 30, 1979

3. "Imam's historical Message on Uuds' Day" Basheer (New Delhi) 15 'August 1980.

4. "Dialogue with the Nation:... Op.cit. January 17, 1980 and also "Pakistan ^rmy Officers visit ^yatollah Khomeini" I he Message of Peace November 30, 1979.

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Khooieini's stand a l l through has been tha t "every-

thing must be Islamic in the Islamic Republic". He

had always emphasised tha t the revolut ion was not intended

j u s t for the overthrow of the monarchical rule but "For

the establishment of Islamic government which would be

conducive to the promulgation of divine laws". He

once declared tha t his conception of Islamic government

was l ike the government of ^ l i ibn Abi Talib with a l l

people following Islam and based on a j ud i c i a l system

founded on Islamic divine laws and not the laws borrowed

from the i '̂est'*'. Throughout the Revolution Khomeini

had the unenviable task of defending the t r ad i t i ons of

Islam, c r i t i c i s i n g and attacking the materialism of the

West, and upholding s p i r i t u a l i t y in p o l i t i c s .

Khomeini i s well aware of the need for a fresh

s t a r t with an exuberant Islamic cu l tu re . The Islamic

society should be one in which, one i s afraid of oneself

and not of the government. Crusade against the self

(Jehade-Nafs) i s the g r ea t e s t of a l l crusades in Islam.

Khomeini's conception of Islamic Republic i s one where

oppression and in jus t ice are not possible and where a l l

have equal r igh t s without any sect ion exploi t ing the

other . He gives all importance to the p o l i t i c a l ro le

of the ulema in such a soc ie ty . Khomeini c a l l s for a

1. Islamic Republic Party Weekly Bul le t in 27 July 1981 2 • Imam Khomeini, The Revolutionary Line of Action,

(Srinagar, India) n.d. P. 10. 3 . See, Khomeini I n s i s t s on a Islamic Republic, MEED,

9 March 1979 and 'She Message of Peace rtug.29, 1979.

124

thorough transformation of the I ranian society wiping

out a l l t races of the old regime and materialism and

ushering in Islam a t every level whether i t i s the

m i l i t a r y , police or the judic iary or the fezaar.

His c a l l has always been for a fundamental change

through revolut ion whether i t be with the un ive r s i t i e s

or the communication system. The new Republican

Const i tu t ion is an attempt to Islamize society and

government a t every level and to carry forward the

object ives of the Islamic Revolution.

^ya to l l ah Khomeini has been c r i t i c i s e d by many.

His opponents thought of him as a crazy man who had 2

become a puppet in the hands of the ou t s ide r s . Some

consider Khomeini as having done "more harm to the

Islamic image in one month than a l l the propaganda

of the 15 years" by his word and ac t . His inc i t ing

the people to violence, i n f l ^ a t o r y a t tacks on foreigners

and pa r t i cu l a r ly America, his s i lence on the v io la t ions

of the sanc t i ty of the foreign emissaries e t c . , are 3

mentioned as unlslamic. However, the fac t remains t ha t Ayatollah Khomeini not only comprehended the condit ions

1. See, The Message of Peace, July lo, 1979 and May 14, 1980.

2 . See, Time December 17, 1979; and also February 5, 1979 and Reza Shah Pahlavi Op.c i t . P. 163

3 . See, Lancd, Marrcw "Islam Against the West" Time, December 17, 1979.

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i n Iran from thousands of kilometers away but

successful ly guided the Revolution and f i n a l l y

emerged v ic to r ious . One could be c r i t i c a l of

h is methods and approach but h is undisputed leadership

over the Iranians can not be denied. He was the

most important actor in the Revolution and continues

t o be the single most powerful au thor i ty in I ran today.

l .See, M.Masjid Jameii, The Revolution which Islam Created (Tehran, n.d) P.63. CF Ayatollah Shariatmadari was however c r i t i c a l when he said t h a t "Khomeini i s a man who has been s i t t i n g in Pa r i s , the Land of freedom under an apple t r e e , we are s i t t i n g here under ba r re l s of guns and tanks". ••'Waiting for the Ayatollah", Time February 5, 1979.