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mattersfrom1962onward.MyresearchwassupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundation.ThepaperwasfirstpublishedinSynthse,17(1967),304-23.Copyright1967byD.ReidelPublishingCompany,Dordrecht-Holland,andreprintedbypermissionofD.ReidelPublishingCompany.Essay3,'TruetotheFacts',wasfirstpresentedatasymposiumonTruthinDecember1969atameetingoftheEasternDivisionoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation.TheothersymposiastwasJamesF.Thomson.ThepaperfirstappearedintheJournalofPhilosophy,66(1969),748-64,andisprintedherewiththepermissionoftheeditors.'SemanticsforNaturalLanguages',Essay4,wasreadatasymposiumorganizedbytheOlivettiCompanyinhonourofitsfounder,andheldinMilaninOctober1968.TheproceedingswerepublishedinLinguagginellaSocietenellaTecnica,EdizionidiComunit,Milan,1970.endp.ixEssay5,'InDefenceofConventionT',wasreadataconferenceonAlternativeSemanticsheldatTempleUniversityinDecember1970,andwaspublishedinTruth,SyntaxandModality(thetitleTruthValued,suggestedbyDanaScott,wasunfortunatelyrejected).ThebookwaseditedbyHuguesLeblancandpublishedbyNorth-HollandPublishingCompany,1973.Itisreprintedherebypermissionofthepublishers.ThenextEssay,number6,'Quotation',waspublishedinaspecialissueofTheoryandDecisiononLanguageTheoryeditedbyH.L.Berghel(TheoryandDecision,11(1979),27-40).Copyright1979byD.ReidelPublishingCompany,Dordrecht-Holland,ReprintedbypermissionofD.ReidelPublishingCompany.'OnSayingThat',whichisEssay7,waspublishedinadoubleissueofSynthsedevotedtotheworkofW.V.Quine(Synthse,19(1968-9),130-46).ItwassubsequentlypublishedinWordsandObjections,EssaysontheWorkofW.V.Quine,editedbyD.DavidsonandJ.Hintikka,D.Reidel,1969,pp.158-74(revised

edition,1975).Copyright1969byD.ReidelPublishingCompany,Dordrecht-Holland.ReprintedbypermissionofD.ReidelPublishingCompany.Quine'sreplytothisessayisonpages333-5ofWordsandObjections.Essay8,'MoodsandPerformances',wasreadatthesecondJerusalemPhilosophicalEncounter,heldinIsraelinApril1976,andwascommentedonbyW.V.Quine.ItwaspublishedinMeaningandUse,editedbyA.Margalit,D.ReidelPublishingCompany,Dordrecht-Holland,1979'RadicalInterpretation',Essay9,wasreadatacolloquiumonPhilosophicalProblemsofLanguageinBiel,Switzerland,inMay1973,andinanotherversionataconferenceonLanguageandMeaningatCumberlandLodge,GreatPark,WindsorinNovemberofthatyear.ItwaspublishedinDialectica,27(1973),313-28,andisreprintedherewiththepermissionoftheeditor,H.Lauener.Essay10on'BeliefandtheBasisofMeaning'waspreparedforaconferenceonLanguage,Intentionality,andTranslationTheoryheldattheUniversityofConnecticutinMar

ch1973,andwaspublishedinadoubleissueofSynthseeditedbyJ.G.TroyerandS.C.WheelerIII(Synthse,27(1974),309-23).ThisissuealsocontainsvaluablecommentsbyW.V.Quine(325-9)andDavidLewis(331-44)andmyreplies(345-9).DavidLewis'sreplyhasthetitle'RadicalInterpretation'.Copyright1974byD.ReidelPublishingendp.xCompany,Dordrecht-Holland.ReprintedbypermissionofD.ReidelPublishingCompany.Essay11,'ThoughtandTalk',wasa1974WolfsonCollegelecture,andwaspublishedinMindandLanguage,editedbySamuelGuttenplan,OxfordUniversityPress,1975.ItisreprintedherewiththepermissionofOxfordUniversityPressonbehalfofWolfsonCollege.InJune1974JohnFosterreadapaper,'MeaningandTruthTheory',totheOxfordPhilosophicalSociety,andEssay12,'ReplytoFoster',ismyreplytothepartsofhispaperthatconcernedmywork.Foster'spaperandmyresponsewerepublishedinTruthandMeaning:EssaysinSemantics,editedbyGarethEvansandJohnMcDowell,OxfordUni

versityPress,1976.MypaperisreprintedherewiththepermissionoftheOxfordUniversityPress.Essay13,'OntheVeryIdeaofaConceptualScheme',wasslowtoreachitspresentform.ThesixthandlastofmyJohnLockelectures,titled'InvariantsofTranslation',wasanearlydraft,deliveredinTrinityTerm,1970,atOxford.InJanuaryofthenextyearIgavetwolecturesonAlternativeConceptualSchemesat


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theUniversityofLondonwhichcontainedmuchofwhatisinthepresentessay.ThematerialwasdistilleddowntoalmostfinalformformypresidentialaddresstotheEasternMeetingoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociationinAtlanta,28December1973.Afterthat,butbeforepublication,Igaveacloselyrelatedtalk,'TheThirdDogmaofEmpiricism',tothePhilosophicalSocietyatOxford.ThediscussionwasopenedbyW.V.Quine,andhiscommentshelpedmewritethefinaldraft.Somelaterfall-outfromthatdiscussionwillbefoundinQuine's'OntheVeryIdeaofaThirdDogma'.MypaperwaspublishedintheProceedingsandAddressesoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,47(1974),andisreprintedherewiththepermissionoftheAssociation.Essay14,'TheMethodofTruthinMetaphysics',wasfirstpublishedinMidwestStudiesinPhilosophy,2:StudiesinthePhilosophyofLanguage,editedbyP.A.French,T.E.Uehling,Jr.,andH.K.Wettstein,TheUniversityofMinnesota,Morris,1977.Tomygreatprofit,GilbertHarmanandW.V.Quinecommentedonearlierversions.Essay15,'RealityWithoutReference',wasfirstgivenindifferentformataSemanticsandLinguisticsWorkshopattheUniversityofWesternOntario,London,OntarioinApril1972.Criticismsandendp.xisuggestionsfollowed,andchanged,thepaperovertheyears.ItwasfirstpublishedinDialectica,31(1977),247-53,andisreprintedherewiththepermissionoftheeditor.'TheInscrutabilityofReference',Essay16,waswrittenforaspecialissueofTheSouthwesternJournalofPhilosophydevotedtotheworkofW.V.Quine,butImissedthedeadlineandthepaperappearedinalaterissue,TheSouthwesternJournalofPhilosophy,10(1979),7-19.ItisreprintedherewithpermissionoftheJournal.Quinerepliedtomypaperalongwithothersin'RepliestotheElevenEssays',PhilosophicalTopics,11(1981),

242-3.Essay17,'WhatMetaphorsMean',wasreadataconferenceonmetaphorattheUniversityofChicagoinFebruary1978.ItwasfirstpublishedinCriticalInquiry,5(1978),31-47;1978byDonaldDavidson.Theextractfrom'TheHippopotamus'onp.256isfromCollectedPoems1909-1962byT.S.Eliot,copyright1936byFaberandFaberandHarcourtBraceJovanovich,Inc.;copyright1963,1964byT.S.Eliot.Itisreprintedbypermissionofthepublishers.Inasubsequentissueofthesamejournal,NelsonGoodmanandMaxBlackrespondedtomypiece.NeitherfoundmuchtoagreewithinwhatIhadwritten.(NelsonGoodman,'MetaphorasMoonlighting',CriticalInquiry,6(1979),125-30andMaxBlack,'HowMetaphorsWork:AReplytoDonaldDavidson',CriticalInquiry,6(1979),131-43.)Thelastessay,Essay18,on'CommunicationandConvention',wasreadatthefirstCampinasEncounterinthePhilosophyofLanguageattheUniversidadeEstadualdeCampinasinAugust1981.ItwaspublishedinSynthese59(1984)3-17.TheAppen

dixtoEssay10containsmyrepliestoDavidLewis'sandW.V.Quine'scommentsonthatessay.SeetheprovenanceofEssay10fordetails.endp.xiiPrefacetotheSecondEditionIhaveaddedtothiseditionmyrepliestocommentsbyW.O.QuineandDavidLewiswhichwereaddressed(inQuine'scase)toareadingofEssay10and(inDavidLewis'scase)tothesametopic.Quinehadnotseenmypaperuntilhearingit;Lewisknewonlythesubject.Ihaveeditedmyrepliestoindicatesomethingofthecontentsofthecommentstowhichtheyareaddressed.Throughoutthebookmisprintshavebeencorrected.Onpage229Ihavecorrectedarealerror.ItwasspottedbyBoMouwhenhewastranslatingtheessayintoChinese.SofarasIknow,mymistakehadnotbeennoticedbythetranslatorsinto(seven)otherlanguages.Theoriginalessayshavenotbeenalteredinotherrespects.IanHackinggavethebookawonderfulsendoffintheNewYorkReviewofBooks,andofcourseithascomeinforafairamountofcriticism.Afriendisknown

tohavesaidthattheideasinitsetEnglishphilosophybackbyadecade,andFreddieAyerwassoincensedthatheinsertedabroadswipeatitsinfluenceinareviewofabookbyanotherauthoronanunrelatedtopic.Manyofitsclaimsremainindisputeordisreputeinonequarteroranother,andIhavegivenuporseriouslymodifiedsomeofthoseclaimsmyself.Ihavelearnedmuchfrommycriticsas


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wellasfromthosecongenialtomyapproach,anumberofwhomhaveimprovedoraugmentedmyapproach.Iamgratefultoall.endp.xiiiIntroductionWhatisitforwordstomeanwhattheydo?IntheessayscollectedhereIexploretheideathatwewouldhaveananswertothisquestionifweknewhowtoconstructatheorysatisfyingtwodemands:itwouldprovideaninterpretationofallutterances,actualandpotential,ofaspeakerorgroupofspeakers;anditwouldbeverifiablewithoutknowledgeofthedetailedpropositionalattitudesofthespeaker.Thefirstconditionacknowledgestheholisticnatureoflinguisticunderstanding.Thesecondconditionaimstopreventsmugglingintothefoundationsofthetheoryconceptstoocloselyalliedtotheconceptofmeaning.Atheorythatdoesnotsatisfybothconditionscannotbesaidtoanswerouropeningquestioninaphilosophicallyinstructiveway.Thefirstfiveessaysaremainlyconcernedwiththequestionwhatsortofatheorywouldsatisfythefirstcondition.Essay1,'TheoriesofMeaningandLearnableLanguages',urgesthatasatisfactorytheorymustdiscoverafinitebasicvocabularyintheverbalphenomenatobeinterpretedifitistoproveusefultoacreaturewithfinitepowers.Ifthisisso,thereisnoescapefromtheneedtotreatthesemanticfeaturesofthepotentialinfinityofsentencesasowedtothesemanticfeaturesoftheitemsinafinitevocabulary.Itturnsoutthatanumberoffamiliartheoriesfailtomeetthiscondition:Frege'sanalysisofobliquecontexts,Church'slogicofsenseanddenotation,Tarski'sinformaltreatmentofquotationareexamples.Standardtheoriesofadverbialmodificationmightwellbeaddedtothelist.Essay2,'TruthandMeaning',arguesthatatheoryoftruthalongthelinesofTarski'struthdefinitions,butmodifiedinvariouswaystoapplytoanaturallanguage,wouldbeenoughfora

ninterpretertogoon.Suchtheorieshaveclearvirtues.Theymakenouseofmeaningsasentities;noobjectsareintroducedtocorrespondtopredicatesorsentences;andfromafinitesetofaxiomsitispossibletoprove,forendp.xveachsentenceofthelanguagetobeinterpreted,atheoremthatstatestruthconditionsforthatsentence.Further,theproofofsuchatheoremamountstoananalysisofhowthetruthorfalsityofthesentencedependsonhowitiscomposedfromelementsdrawnfromthebasicvocabulary.Ifsuchtheoriesreallydosatisfythetwoconditionslistedinthefirstparagraph,wecantaketheword'theory'in'theoryofmeaning'seriously.Manyobjectionshavebeenmadetotheclaimthattruththeoriescandodutyastheoriesofmeaning.SomeoftheobjectionsIhavetriedtomeetordeflectinotheressaysinthisbook.Butwhetherornottheclaimcanbemadegood,someoftheargumentsforitin'TruthandMeaning'arefaulty.ThereaderwillfindthatIshiftedgroundmorethanonceasItried

toimproveorclarifythiscentralthesis.OnethingthatonlygraduallydawnedonmewasthatwhileTarskiintendedtoanalysetheconceptoftruthbyappealing(inConventionT)totheconceptofmeaning(intheguiseofsamenessofmeaning,ortranslation),Ihavethereverseinmind.Iconsideredtruthtobethecentralprimitiveconcept,andhoped,bydetailingtruth'sstructure,togetatmeaning.Theseareremarksabouttheoriesoftruth,ofcourse,notremarkstobefoundinthem.SomethingelsethatwasslowcomingtomewasthatsinceIwastreatingtheoriesoftruthasempiricaltheories,theaxiomsandtheoremshadtobeviewedaslaws.Soatheoremlike'"Schneeistweiss"istrueinthemouthofaGermanspeakerifandonlyifsnowiswhite'hastobetakennotmerelyastrue,butascapableofsupportingcounterfactualclaims.Indeed,giventhattheevidenceforthislaw,ifitisone,dependsultimatelyoncertaincausalrelationsbetweenspeakersandtheworld,onecansaythatitisnoaccidentthat'Schne

eistweiss'istrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite;itisthewhitenessofsnowthatmakes'Schneeistweiss'true.Howmuchofaconcessionthisistointensionalitydepends,Isuppose,onone'sanalysisoftheconceptoflaw.Whatseemsclearisthatwhatevertheconcessioncomesto,itisonethatmustbemadeforanyempiricalscience.ThesemattersarediscussedinEssay12.


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Essay3,'TruetotheFacts',askswhetheratheoryoftruthinTarski'sstyleshouldbecalledacorrespondencetheory.Suchtheoriesdonot,likemostcorrespondencetheories,explaintruthbyfindingentitiessuchasfactsfortruesentencestocorrespondto.Andtherearegoodreasons,whichcanbetracedbacktoFrege,forrejectingfactsasentitiesthatcouldplaythisrole.Onetheotherhand,endp.xvitheoriesoftruthofthekindconsideredheredorequirethatarelationbetweenentitiesandexpressionsbecharacterized('satisfaction').Itisnoteasytoseehowasatisfactoryroutetotruthcanescapethisstepifthelanguagethetheorytreatshastheusualquantificationalresources.'SemanticsforNaturalLanguages',Essay4,urgesthattruththeoriescouldprovideaformalsemanticsfornaturallanguagestomatchthesortofformalsyntaxlinguistsfromChomskyonhavefavoured.Whenthisessaywaswritten,thedeepstructuresofsyntaxwerethoughttobethevehiclesforsemanticinterpretation.Essay4suggestedthatthedeepstructureofasentenceshouldcorrespondtothelogicalformatheoryoftruthassignedtothatsentence.Tarski'sConventionT,whichisdefendedinEssay5,isaninformal,butpowerful,instrumentfortestingtheoriesoftruthagainstone'spriorgraspoftheconcept.Inthemostdirectapplication,thetestmerelycallsonustorecognizethedisquotationalfeatureoftruthpredicates;sentenceslike'"Snowiswhite"istrueinEnglishifandonlyifsnowiswhite'aretriviallytrue.SincethetotalityofsuchsentencesuniquelydeterminestheextensionofatruthpredicateforEnglish,atheorythatentailsallsuchsentencesmustbeextensionallycorrect.Criticshaveoftenmadetheerrorofthinkingthatsincethetheoremsthatshowatheorytobecorrectaretrivial,thetheoryortheconceptoftruthitcharacterizes,mustalsobetri

vial.Atheoryoftruthwouldservetointerpretaspeakeronlyifthetheorywereuptoaccountingforallthelinguisticresourcesofthespeaker.ButisatheorythatsatisfiesConventionTadequatetoanaturallanguage?Heretherearetwoquestions.Oneiswhatdevicestomakeorconsideravailableinthelanguageofthetheory;theotherishowtoapplythesedevicestothelanguageofthespeaker.Myworkingassumptionhasbeenthatnothingmorethanstandardfirst-orderquantificationtheoryisavailable.Indeed,Iwaslongconvincedthatmanyalternativeapproachestosemantics,employing,forexample,modallogics,possibleworldsemantics,orsubstitutionalquantification,couldnotbeaccommodatedinatheorythatmetthedemandsofConventionT.Inowknowthiswashasty.ConventionTdoesnotsettleasmuchasIthought,andmorepossibilitiesforinterestingtheorizingareopenthanIhadrealized.Thewell-knownvirtuesoffirstorderquantificationtheorystillprovideplentyofmotivation,however,toseeho

wmuchwecandowithit.Inthenextthreeessays,collectedundertheheadofapplication,Iattempttheendp.xviisemantictamingofthreerelatedbutrecalcitrantidioms:quotation,indirectdiscourse,andmoodoperators.Essay6pointsoutthatnocurrenttheoryofquotationisentirelysatisfactory,anditproposesanexplicitlydemonstrativeapproachwhichmakesquotationaspecialcaseofthedemonstrativereferenceofwordstootherwordsintheverbalneighbourhood.Essay7,'OnSayingThat',concentratesononeofthemanykindsofsentenceusedtoattributeattitudes;theparatacticsolutionsuggestedhasobviousaffinitieswiththetreatmentofquotationinEssay6.InEssay3therearehints(whichIthinkcouldbedeveloped)onhowtheanalysiscouldbeextendedtobeliefsentences.Ifthestrategyweretobepursued,itmightservetogiveasemantics(thoughnotalogic)forthemodalities,forcounterfactuals,andfurthersentencesabout'propositional'attitudes.Essay8,'MoodsandPerformances',stresse

stheoftenneglecteddistinctionbetweengrammaticalmoodsontheonehandandvarioussortsofillocutionaryforceontheother.Onlythefirstisofconcerntoatheoryofwhatwordsmean.Hereaparatacticanalysisofimperativesissuggestedwhichisintendedtoaccommodateournaturalfeelingthatimperativesdon'thaveatruthvaluewhileremainingwithintheresourcesofatheoryoftruth.Inthecompanionvolumetothisone,EssaysonActionsandEvents,Ishowhowatheoryoftruthcanbeappliedtoanumberoffurtherproblemcases:sentencesaboutactionsandotherevents,adverbialmodification,andsingularcausalstatements.


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Thethirdsectionofthepresentbookisaddressedtothequestionwhetheratheoryoftruthforaspeakercanbeverifiedwithoutassumingtoomuchofwhatitsetsouttodescribe.In'RadicalInterpretation',Essay9,asintherestoftheessays,IfollowQuineinsupposingthatevenifwenarrowattentiontoverbalbehaviourthatrevealswhen,andunderwhatconditions,aspeakergivescredencetoasentence,thereisnodirectwayofsortingouttherolesofbeliefandmeaninginexplainingthatcredence.Elicitingseparateaccountsofbeliefandmeaningrequiresatheorythatcanbringtobearontheinterpretationofeachsentenceanditsaccompanyingattitudesthecontributionoffurtherdata.Onlybystudyingthepatternofassentstosentencescanwedecidewhatismeantandwhatbelieved.Dependingonevidencewhich,withouttheaidoftheory,makesnodistinctionbetweenthecontributionsofbeliefandmeaningtoendp.xviiilinguisticbehaviour,requiresamethodforeffectingtheseparationtoadegreesufficientforcommunication.Devicestothisendaredescribedanddefendedinthepresentessays.Butallofthem,inonewayoranother,relyonthePrincipleofCharity.ThephraseandthebasicideacomefromNeilWilson,'SubstancesWithoutSubstrata'.Quineputsitthisway:'...assertionsstartlinglyfalseonthefaceofthemarelikelytoturnonhiddendifferencesoflanguage'(WordandObject,p.59).Quineappliestheprincipleprimarilytotheinterpretationofthelogicalconstants.BecauseIfindIcannotuseQuine'snotionofstimulusmeaningasabasisforinterpretingcertainsentences,IapplythePrincipleofCharityacrosstheboard.Soapplied,itcounselsusquitegenerallytoprefertheoriesofinterpretationthatminimizedisagreement.SoItendedtoputthematterintheearlyessays,wantingtostresstheinevitabilityoftheappealtocharity.

Butminimizingdisagreement,ormaximizingagreement,isaconfusedideal.Theaimofinterpretationisnotagreementbutunderstanding.Mypointhasalwaysbeenthatunderstandingcanbesecuredonlybyinterpretinginawaythatmakesfortherightsortofagreement.The'rightsort',however,isnoeasiertospecifythantosaywhatconstitutesagoodreasonforholdingaparticularbelief.ThesubtlepressuresonthePrincipleofCharitybegintoemergeinEssays10and11.Yetheretoothereareonlyhints;inworknowinprogressIattempttodevelopthesubjectinmoredetail.Essay10,'BeliefandtheBasisofMeaning',insistsonthesymmetryofbeliefandmeaningintheexplorationofverbalbehaviour.Inoneimportantrespectitgoesfurther.ItdevelopsastrikingparallelbetweenBayesiantheoriesofdecisionandtheoriesofmeaning,andgivesreasonswhythetwotheoriesshouldbeconsideredmutuallydependent.Thehintsdroppedhere,whichgivepromiseofaunifiedtheoryofspeechandaction,havebeentaken

upinsubsequentpublications.IntheAppendixtoEssay10IexpressagreementwithDavidLewisonseveralpoints.ThePrincipleofCharityshouldbemodifiedassuggestedinmycommentsaboveonEssay9.Charitypromptstheinterpretertomaximizetheintelligibilityofthespeaker,notsamenessofbelief.Thisentails,asLewissays,thatinterpretationmusttakeintoaccountprobableerrorsduetobadpositioning,deficientsensoryapparatus,anddifferencesinbackgroundknowledge.Heisrightalsoinsayingthatinpracticeaninterpretationshouldexplain,endp.xixandsobecheckedagainst,observednon-verbalbehaviour.IdonottakethistoprovethattheevidentialbaseonwhichIdependisnotintheoryadequate.Igrant,however,thatitmaynotbe.QuineandIare,asonewouldexpect,prettymuchinaccord.Adifferenceemerges,however,ontheextentofpossibleindeterminacybothinlogicandintheinterpretationoftheoreticalsentences;myviewthatquantificationalstructurecanbedetectedatanearlys

tageandmypreferenceforasemanticaltheoryovertranslationstiffentheconstraints.Thefirsttwoessaysonradicalinterpretationstressthefactthatunderstandingthewordsofaspeakerrequiresknowingmuchaboutwhathebelieves.Essay11,'ThoughtandTalk',attendstothereciprocaldependence,andconcludes,ratherspeculatively,thatonlyacreaturewithalanguagecanproperlybesaidtohaveafull-fledgedschemeofpropositionalattitudes.


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Essay12,'ReplytoFoster',asremarkedabove,recognizesthatifatheoryoftruthistosufficeforinterpretation,itmustbemorethantrue:itsaxiomsandtheoremsmustbenaturallaws.Ifaninterpreterknewsuchatheory,hecoulduseittounderstandaspeaker,butonlyifheknewthatthetheory'spronouncementswerenomic.Thenextfouressaysmaybedescribedasphilosophicalfall-outfromtheapproachtotruthandinterpretationrecommendedhere.AtheoryoftruthcanbecalledacorrespondencetheoryintheunassumingsenseofEssay3,butthatsensedoesnotencouragethethoughtthatweunderstandwhatitwouldbeliketocomparesentenceswithwhattheyareabout,sincethetheoryprovidesnoentitieswithwhichtocomparesentences.Alongrelatedlines,Essay13,'OntheVeryIdeaofaConceptualScheme',scoutstheintelligibilityofclaimsthatdifferentlanguagesorconceptualschemes'divideup'or'copewith'realityinimportantlydifferentways.Ourgeneralmethodofinterpretationforestallsthepossibilityofdiscoveringthatothershaveradicallydifferentintellectualequipment.Butmoreimportant,itisarguedthatifwerejecttheideaofanuninterpretedsourceofevidencenoroomisleftforadualismofschemeandcontent.Withoutsuchadualismwecannotmakesenseofconceptualrelativism.Thisdoesnotmeanthatwemustgiveuptheideaofanobjectiveworldindependentofourknowledgeofit.Theargumentagainstconceptualrelativismshowsratherthatlanguageisnotascreenorfilterthroughwhichourknowledgeoftheworldmustpass.Givingupthedualismofschemeandcontentamountstoabandoningathemecentraltoempiricisminitsmainhistoricalmanifestations.endp.xxButIdonotthink,asfriendsandcriticshavevariouslysuggested,thatmyargumentagainstempiricismmakesme,oroughttomakeme,apragmatist,atranscendentalidealis

t,oran'internal'realist.AllthesepositionsareformsofrelativismthatIfindashardtounderstandastheempiricismsIattack.AccordingtoEssay13,nosensecanbemadeoftheideathattheconceptualresourcesofdifferentlanguagesdifferdramatically.Theargumentthatmakesforthisconclusionmakesequallyfortheconclusionthatthegeneraloutlinesofourviewoftheworldarecorrect;weindividuallyandcommunallymaygoplentywrong,butonlyonconditionthatinmostlargerespectsweareright.Itfollowsthatwhenwestudywhatourlanguageanylanguagerequiresinthewayofoverallontology,wearenotjustmakingatourofourownpictureofthings:whatwetaketheretobeisprettymuchwhatthereis.ThisisthethemeofEssay14,'TheMethodofTruthinMetaphysics'.Atheoryoftruthistestedbytheoremsthatstatetheconditionsunderwhichsentencesaretrue;thesetheoremssaynothingaboutreference.Essay15,'RealityWithoutReference',accordinglycontendsthathowatheoryoftruthmapsn

on-sententialexpressionsontoobjectsisamatterofindifferenceaslongastheconditionsoftrutharenotaffected.Thequestionwhatobjectsaparticularsentenceisabout,likethequestionswhatobjectatermrefersto,orwhatobjectsapredicateistrueof,hasnoanswer.InEssay15IamwithQuineinholdingreferencetobeinscrutable.Essay16,'TheInscrutabilityofReference',warnsagainsttakinginscrutabilityasareasonfortryingsomehowtorelativizethereferenceandontologyofsingulartermsandpredicates.Forsincenothingcanrevealhowaspeaker'swordshavebeenmappedontoobjects,thereisnothingtorelativizeto;andinterpretationbeingunaffected,thereisnoneedtorelativize.Nodiscussionoftheoriesofmeaningcanfailtotakeaccountofthelimitsofapplicationofsuchtheories.Thescopemustbebroadenoughtoprovideaninsightintohowlanguagecanserveourendlesspurposes,butrestrictedenoughtobeamenabletoserioussystematization.Essay8tookanecessarystepbydisti

nguishingbetweengrammaticalmood,whichthemeanesttheorymustaccountfor,andtheforceofutterances,whichisbeyondthereachofcomparableregimentation.Essay17,'WhatMetaphorsMean',ismainlydevotedtothethesisthatweexplainwhatwordsinmetaphordoonlyendp.xxibysupposingtheyhavethesamemeaningstheydoinnon-figurativecontexts.Weloseourabilitytoaccountformetaphor,aswellasruleoutallhopeofresponsibletheory,ifwepositmetaphoricalmeanings.Essay18,'CommunicationandConvention',drawsanotherboundary.Itisalwaysanopenquestionhowwellthetheoryaninterpreterbringstoalinguisticencounterwillcope.Inpracticeaninterpreterkeeps


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theconversationgoingbyadjustinghistheoryonthespot.Theprinciplesofsuchinventiveaccommodationarenotthemselvesreducibletotheory,involvingastheydonothinglessthanallourskillsattheoryconstruction.Theessayshavebeenretouchedinminorwaystoreducerepetition,toeliminateunnecessaryorconfusedpassages,ortobringearlymoreintolinewithlatterthoughts.Thesetemperingshavebeenlimitedtothetrivial.WheremyerrorsorlapseshaveearnedattentionIhaveletthingsstand,ormarkedthechangewithafootnote.ManymorepeoplehavehelpedmethanIcanpossiblythankhere,butIdoespeciallywanttomentionPaulGrice,GilbertHarman,SaulKripke,DavidLewis,RichardRorty,SirPeterStrawson,andBruceVermazen.SueLarsonandAkeelBilgramididindispensableworkonthefootnotes,bibliography,andindex.Muchmorethanthat,theygavemephilosophicaladviceandmoralsupport.SueLarsonhastaughtmemuchaboutphilosophyoflanguage;herinfluenceisespeciallystronginEssays8and18.In1970IgavetheJohnLockelecturesatOxford.Thecontentsofthoselecturesturnuphere(muchmodified)inEssays2,3,6,7,and13.AfurtherlectureonadverbialmodificationdrewonmaterialnowprintedinEssays6-11ofEssaysonActionsandEvents.AnearlyinfluenceonmythinkingwasMichaelDummett,wholecturedonFregeandphilosophyoflanguageseveraltimesatStanfordUniversitywhileIwasthereinthefifties.Ourdiscussionstookapublicformin1974whenwegaveajointseminarontruthwhileIwasavisitingfellowatAllSoulsCollege.OvertheyearsJohnWallaceandItalkedendlesslyabouttheissuesraisedinthisbook.HeearlyappreciatedthepowerofTarski'sworkontruth,andmuchthatIhavewrittenreflectshisinsightandsympatheticcriticism.W.V.Quinewasmyteacheratacrucialstageinmylife.Henotonlystarted

methinkingaboutlanguage,buthewasthefirsttogivemetheideathatthereissuchathingasbeingright,oratleastwrong,endp.xxiiinphilosophy,andthatitmatterswhich.Withouttheinspirationofhiswriting,hispatienttutelage,hisfriendlywitandhisgenerousencouragement,thisbookwouldnotbeworsethanitis.Itwouldnotbe.endp.xxiiiTruthandMeaningendp.1endp.21TheoriesofMeaningandLearnableLanguagesPhilosophersarefondofmakingclaimsconcerningthepropertiesalanguagemusthaveifitistobe,eveninprinciple,learnable.Thepointoftheseclaimshasgenerallybeentobolsterortounderminesomephilosophicaldoctrine,epistemological,metaphysical,ontological,orethical.Butiftheargumentsaregoodtheymusthaveimplicationsfortheempiricalscienceofconceptformation,ifonlybywayofsayingwhatthelimitsoftheempiricalare.Oftenitisassertedorimpliedthatpurelyaprioriconsiderationssufficetodeterminefeaturesofthemechanisms,orthestages,ofl

anguagelearning;suchclaimsaresuspect.InthefirstpartofthispaperIexamineatypicalexampleofsuchaposition,andtrymyhandatsortingoutwhatmaybeacceptablefromwhatisnot.Incontrasttoshakyhunchesabouthowwelearnlanguage,Iproposewhatseemstomeclearlytobeanecessaryfeatureofalearnablelanguage:itmustbepossibletogiveaconstructiveaccountofthemeaningofthesentencesinthelanguage.SuchanaccountIcallatheoryofmeaningforthelanguage,andIsuggestthatatheoryofmeaningthatconflictswiththiscondition,whetherputforwardbyphilosopher,linguist,orpsychologist,cannotbeatheoryofanaturallanguage;andifitignoresthiscondition,itfailstodealwithsomethingcentraltotheconceptofalanguage.Nevertheless,asItrytoshowinthesecondpartofthispaper,anumberofcurrenttheoriesofmeaningdoeitherconflictwithorignorethisconditionforbeinglearnable.


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IFirstwelearnafewnamesandpredicatesthatapplytomedium-sizedlovableorediblephysicalobjectsintheforegroundofsenseendp.3andinterest;thelearningtakesplacethroughaconditioningprocessinvolvingostension.Nextcomecomplexpredicatesandsingulartermsforobjectsnotnecessarilyyetobserved,orforeveroutofsightduetosize,date,attenuation,orinexistence.Thencometheoreticalterms,learnedperhapsbywayof'meaningpostulates'orbydintofbeingembeddedinsuitablyscientificdiscourse.Somewhereearlyinthegamethegreatjumpismadefromtermtosentence,thoughjusthowmaybeobscure,thetransitionbeingblurredbytheexistenceofone-wordsentences:'Mama','Fire','Slab','Block','Gavagai',andsoon.Thus,inbriefcaricature,goesthebuilding-blocktheoryoflanguagelearning,echoing,chapterbydustychapter,empiricistepistemology.Thetheoryisnowdiscreditedinmostdetails.Foronething,thereisnoobviousreasontothinktheorderoflearningisrelatedtoepistemologicalpriority.Foranother,someoftheclaimsseemcontradictedbyexperience:forexample,achildlearnsthegeneralterms'cat','camel','mastodon',and'unicorn'inwhatmaybe,toalltelling,auniformway(perhapsbypagingthroughapicturebook),thoughthechild'srelationtotheextensionsofthesetermsisaltogetherdifferent.Insomecases,theorderoflanguagelearningisarguablythereverseoftheepistemologicalorder:sense-datamaybethebasisforourknowledgeofphysicalobjects,buttalkofsense-dataislearned,iflearnedatall,longaftertalkofphysicalobjectsisachieved.Finally,theunderlyingepistemology,withitsassumptionofassociationistpsychologyanditssimplereductionisttheoryofmeaningisnolongerappealingtomostphilosophers.Inthelightofallthisitisastonishingthatsomethingverylikethedoctrine

oflanguagelearningwhichbeganasafeebleoutgrowthofearlyempiricismshouldnowflourishwhiletheparentplantwilts.Whatfollowsisasingleexampleofdependenceonthisoutmodeddoctrine,buttheexamplecouldeasilybemultipliedfromcurrentliterature.P.F.StrawsonhasattackedQuine'swellknownviewthat'thewholecategoryofsingulartermsistheoreticallysuperfluous'.1Strawsongrants,atleastforargument'ssake,thatwithinalanguagealreadycontainingsingularterms,wecanparaphrase'allthatweatendp.4presentsaywiththeuseofsingulartermsintoformsofwordswhichdonotcontainsingularterms'(434).WhatStrawsondeniesisthatfromthisassumptiontherefollowsthetheoreticalpossibilitythatwecouldspeakalanguagewithoutsingularterms,'...inwhichweneverhadusedthem,inwhichthecategoryofsingulartermssimplydidnotexist,butinwhichwewereneverthelessabletosay,ineffect,allthatweareatpresentabletosaywiththeuseofsingularterms'(433,434).

Strawsonthensetsouttoestablishindependentlythetheoreticalimpossibilityofsuchalanguage.Inordertofocusonthepointatissue,letmeexplainthatIhavenointerestincontestingtwoofStrawson'stheses,namely,androughly,theeliminabilityofsingulartermsdoesnotfollowfromparaphrasability,andthateliminability,asdescribed,isimpossible.Bothpointsaremoot,sofarasIamconcerned,pendingclarificationofthenotionofbeingabletosaythesamething.Nottotryconclusions,then,myconcernisentirelywiththemainargumentStrawsonusesintheattempttodiscreditQuine'seliminabilitythesis.Twoclaimsessentialtothisargumentarethese:(1)foranypredicatetobeunderstood,somepredicatesmustbelearnedostensivelyorby'directconfrontation';(2)forsuchlearningtotakeplace,theostensivelearningsituationmustbe'articulatedinthelanguage'byademonstrativeelementwhichpicksoutoridentifiesentitiesofthesorttowhichthepredicateapplies(445,446).Quinehas

counteredthat(1)and(2)donotsufficetoestablishthenecessityforsingularterms,becausedemonstrativesmaybeconstruedasgeneralterms.2Thismaywellbetrue;myinteresthoweverisintheimplicationof(1)and(2)thatsubstantivequestionsaboutlanguagelearningcanbesettledonpurelyapriorigrounds.3


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Summarizinghisownargument,Strawsonsays:'Someuniversaltermsmustbeconnectedwithourexperienceifanyaretobeunderstood.Andtheseuniversaltermsmustbeconnectedwithparticularbitsorslicesofourexperience.Hence,iftheyaretobeendp.5learntaspredicatesofparticulars,theymustbelearntaspredicatesofdemonstrativelyidentifiedparticulars.'(446.Italicsinoriginal.)Hereitisperhapsobviousthatthenotionoflearningappearsvacuouslyintheconclusion;soletusturnbrieflyto(1)and(2).Surelyitisanempiricalquestionwhether,asaresultofcertainexperiences,apersonturnsouttohavesomeabilityhedidnothavebefore;yet(1)and(2)claimitisapurely'logical'matterthateveryonewhohasacquiredalinguisticabilityofaspecifiedkindhastravelledaprescribedroute.Strawsonapparentlyequatestheostensivelearningofapredicatewithlearningby'directconfrontation'.Onecanimaginetwowaysinwhichsuchaprocessisintendedtobemorespecialthanlearningthemeaningofapredicatethroughhearingsentenceswhichcoupleitwithdemonstrativesingularterms.Oneis,thatostensivelearningmayrequireanintentiononthepartoftheteachertobringanobjecttotheattentionofthelearner.Itseemshoweverthatnosuchintentionisnecessary,andinfactmostlanguagelearningisprobablyduemoretoobservationandimitationonthepartofthelearnerthantoanydidacticpurposeonthepartofthoseobservedandimitated.Aseconddifferenceisthatdirectconfrontation(andprobablyostension,atleastasStrawsoninterpretsit)requiresthepresenceofanappropriateobject,whilethecorrectuseofademonstrativesingulartermdoesnot.Butitisnotanaprioritruth,norprobablyevenatruth,thatapersoncouldnotlearnhisfirstlanguageinaskillfullyfakedenvironment.Tothinkotherwisewould,asStraw

sonsaysinalaterbook,butperhapsinmuchthesameconnection,'betolimittoomuchthepowerofhumanimagination'.4Indefending(2)StrawsonrevealswhatIthinkistheconfusionthatunderliestheargumentIhavebeencriticizing.Onthefaceofit,thereisnoreasonwhytheostensivelearningofpredicatesmustbe'articulatedinthelanguage'inonewayratherthananother;noreasonwhythereferencetoparticulars(assumingthisnecessary)mustbebywayofdemonstratives.NordoesStrawsonprovideanyreason;insteadhegivesgroundsfortheclaimthat'nosymbolismcanbeinterpretedasalanguageinwhichreferenceismadetoparticulars,unlessitcontainsdevicesformakingdemonstrative...referencestoparticulars,i.e.unlessitcontainssingulartermsforreferringtoparticulars...'.5LaterinthesamepaperStrawsonendp.6attacks'...theuncriticalassumptionthatapartonlyofthestructureofordinarylanguagecouldexistandfunctioninisolationfromthewholeofwhichitisapart,

justasitfunctionswhenincorporatedwithinthatwhole...Tothisextent,atleast,languageisorganic'(451,452).Herethethoughtemerges,clearofanyimportantconnectionswithlanguagelearning,thatQuine'seliminabilitythesisisfalsebecausewewouldmakeamajorconceptualchangealterthemeaningsofallretainedsentencesifwecutthemofffromtheirpresentrelationswithsentencescontainingsingularterms(ordemonstratives,orpropernames,etc.).Isuggestthatfromargumentsfortheconceptualinterdependenceofvariousbasicidioms,Strawsonhasillegitimatelydrawnconclusionsconcerningthemechanismandsequenceoflanguageacquisition.Onthequestionofconceptualinterdependence,Quineseems,uptoapointatleast,inagreement,writingthat'thegeneraltermandthedemonstrativesingularare,alongwithidentity,interdependentdevicesthatthechildofourculturemustmasterallinonemadscramble'.6Itremainstrue,ifsuchclaimsofinterdependencearetenable,thatwecouldnotlearnal

anguageinwhichthepredicatesmeantwhatpredicatesinourlanguagedomeanandinwhichtherewerenodemonstrativesingularterms.Wecouldnotlearnsuchalanguagebecause,grantingtheassumption,therecouldnotbesuchalanguage.7Thelessonfortheoriesoflanguagelearningiswhollynegative,butnotperhapswithoutimportance:insofaraswetakethe'organic'characteroflanguageseriously,wecannotaccuratelydescribethefirststepstowardsitsconquestaslearningpartofthelanguage;ratheritisamatterofpartlylearning.8


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IIItisnotappropriatetoexpectlogicalconsiderationstodictatetherouteormechanismoflanguageacquisition,butweareentitledtoconsiderinadvanceofempiricalstudywhatweshallcountasknowingalanguage,howweshalldescribetheskillorabilityofaendp.7personwhohaslearnedtospeakalanguage.Onenaturalconditiontoimposeisthatwemustbeabletodefineapredicateofexpressions,basedsolelyontheirformalproperties,thatpicksouttheclassofmeaningfulexpressions(sentences),ontheassumptionthatvariouspsychologicalvariablesareheldconstant.Thispredicategivesthegrammarofthelanguage.Another,andmoreinteresting,conditionisthatwemustbeabletospecify,inawaythatdependseffectivelyandsolelyonformalconsiderations,whateverysentencemeans.Withtherightpsychologicaltrappings,ourtheoryshouldequipustosay,foranarbitrarysentence,whataspeakerofthelanguagemeansbythatsentence(ortakesittomean).Guidedbyanadequatetheory,weseehowtheactionsanddispositionsofspeakersinduceonthesentencesofthelanguageasemanticstructure.Thoughnodoubtrelativizedtotimes,places,andcircumstances,thekindofstructurerequiredseemseitheridenticalwithorcloselyrelatedtothekindgivenbyadefinitionoftruthalongthelinesfirstexpoundedbyTarski,forsuchadefinitionprovidesaneffectivemethodfordeterminingwhateverysentencemeans(i.e.givestheconditionsunderwhichitistrue).9Idonotmeantoargueherethatitisnecessarythatwebeabletoextractatruthdefinitionfromanadequatetheory(thoughsomethingmuchlikethisisneeded),butatheorymeetstheconditionIhaveinmindifwecanextractatruthdefinition;inparticular,nostrongernotionofmeaningiscalledfor.10Thesemattersappeartobeconnectedinthefollowinginformalwaywiththepossibilityof

learningalanguage.Whenwecanregardthemeaningofeachsentenceasafunctionofafinitenumberoffeaturesofthesentence,wehaveaninsightnotonlyintowhatthereistobelearned;wealsounderstandhowaninfiniteaptitudecanbeencompassedbyfiniteaccomplishments.Forsupposethatalanguagelacksthisfeature;thennomatterhowmanysentencesawould-bespeakerlearnstoproduceandunderstand,therewillremainotherswhosemeaningsarenotgivenbytherulesalreadymastered.Itisnaturaltosaysuchalanguageisunlearnable.Thisargumentdepends,ofcourse,onanumberofempiricalassumptions:endp.8forexample,thatwedonotatsomepointsuddenlyacquireanabilitytointuitthemeaningsofsentencesonnoruleatall;thateachnewitemofvocabulary,ornewgrammaticalrule,takessomefinitetimetobelearned;thatmanismortal.Letuscallanexpressionasemanticalprimitiveprovidedtheruleswhichgivethemeaningforthesentencesinwhichitdoesnotappeardonotsufficetodeterm

inethemeaningofthesentencesinwhichitdoesappear.Thenwemaystatetheconditionunderdiscussionbysaying:alearnablelanguagehasafinitenumberofsemanticalprimitives.Roughasthisstatementoftheconditionis,Ithinkitisclearenoughtosupporttheclaimthatanumberofrecenttheoriesofmeaningarenot,eveninprinciple,applicabletonaturallanguages,forthelanguagestowhichtheyapplyarenotlearnableinthesensedescribed.Iturnnowtoexamples.Firstexample.QuotationMarks.Weoughttobefarmorepuzzledthanwearebyquotationmarks.Weunderstandquotationmarksverywell,atleastinthis,thatwealwaysknowthereferenceofaquotation.Sincethereareinfinitelymanyquotations,ourknowledgeapparentlyenshrinesarule.Thepuzzlecomeswhenwetrytoexpressthisruleasafragmentofatheoryofmeaning.Informalstabsatwhatitisthatweunderstandareeasytocomeby.Quinesays,'Thenameofanameorotherexpressioniscommonlyformedbyputtingthenamedexpressioni

nsinglequotationmarks...thewhole,calledaquotation,denotesitsinterior';11Tarskisaysessentiallythesamething.12Suchformulasobviouslydonotprovideeventhekernelofatheoryintherequiredsense,asbothauthorsareatpainstopointout.Quineremarksthatquotationshavea'certainanomalousfeature'that'callsforspecialcaution';Churchcallsthedevice'misleading'.Whatismisleadingis,perhaps,thatwearetemptedtoregardeachmatchedpairofquotationmarksasafunctionalexpressionbecausewhenitisclampedaroundanexpressiontheresultdenotesthatexpression.Buttocarrythisideaout,wemusttreattheexpressionsinsidethe


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quotationmarksassingulartermsorvariables.Tarskishowsthatinfavourablecases,paradoxesresult;inunfavourablecases,theexpressionwithinhasnomeaning(159-62).Wemustthereforegiveuptheideathatquotationsare'syntacticallycompositeexpressions,endp.9ofwhichboththequotationmarksandtheexpressionswithinthemareparts'.TheonlyalternativeTarskioffersusisthis:Quotation-marknamesmaybetreatedlikesinglewordsofalanguageandthuslikesyntacticallysimpleexpressions.Thesingleconstituentsofthesenamesthequotationsmarksandtheexpressionsstandingbetweenthemfulfilthesamefunctionasthelettersandcomplexesofsuccessivelettersinsinglewords.Hencetheycanpossessnoindependentmeaning.Everyquotation-marknameisthenaconstantindividualnameofadefiniteexpression...andinfactanameofthenamenatureasthepropernameofaman(159).

Inapparentlythesamevein,Quinewritesthatanexpressioninquotationmarks'occurstheremerelyasafragmentofalongernamewhichcontains,besidesthisfragment,thetwoquotationmarks',andhecomparestheoccurrenceofanexpressioninsidequotationmarkswiththeoccurrenceof'cat'in'cattle'13andof'can'in'canary'.14Thefunctionoflettersinwords,likethefunctionof'cat'in'cattle',ispurelyadventitiousinthissense:wecouldsubstituteanovelpieceoftypographyeverywhereinthelanguagefor'cattle'andnothinginthesemanticalstructureofthelanguagewouldbechanged.Notonlydoes'cat'in'cattle'nothavea'separatemeaning';thefactthatthesamelettersoccurtogetherinthesameorderelsewhereisirrelevanttoquestionsofmeaning.Ifananalogousremarkistrueofquotations,thenthereisnojustificationintheoryfor

theclassification(itisonlyanaccidentthatquotationsshareacommonfeatureintheirspelling),andthereisnosignificanceinthefactthataquotationnames'itsinterior'.Finally,everyquotationisasemanticalprimitive,and,sincethereareinfinitelymanydifferentquotations,alanguagecontainingquotationsisunlearnable.Thisconclusiongoesagainstourintuitions.Thereisnoprobleminframingageneralruleforidentifyingquotationsonthebasisofform(anyexpressionframedbyquotationmarks),andnoproblemingivinganinformalruleforproducingawantedquotation(enclosetheexpressionyouwanttomentioninquotationmarks).Sincetheserulesimplythatquotationshavesignificantstructure,itishardtodenythattheremustbeasemanticaltheorythatexploitsit.NorisitentirelyplainthateitherTarskiorQuinewantstodenythepossibility.Tarskiconsidersonlytwoanalysesofquotations,butheendp.10doesnotexplicitlyruleoutothers,nordoesheopenlyendorsethealternativeh

edoesnotreject.Andindeedheseemstohintthatquotationsdohavesignificantstructurewhenhesays,'Itisclearthatwecancorrelateastructural-descriptivenamewitheveryquotation-markname,onewhichisfreefromquotationmarksandpossessesthesameextension(i.e.denotesthesameexpression)andviceversa'(157).Itisdifficulttoseehowthecorrelationcouldbeestablishedifwereplacedeachquotationbysomeotherarbitrarysymbol,aswecoulddoifquotation-marknameswerelikethepropernamesofmen.Quinetakesmattersabitfurtherbyassertingthatalthoughquotationsare'logicallyunstructured'(190),andofcourseexpressionshavenon-referentialoccurrencesinsidequotationmarks,stillthelatterfeatureis'dispelledbyaneasychangeinnotation'(144)whichleavesuswiththelogicallystructureddevicesofspellingandconcatenation.Theformulaforthe'easychange'canapparentlybegivenbyadefinition(189,190).Ifthissuggestioncanbecarriedout,thenthemostrecalcitrantas

pectofquotationyieldstotheory,forthetruthconditionsforsentencescontainingquotationscanbeequatedwiththetruthconditionsforthesentencesgotfromthembysubstitutingforthequotationstheirdefinitionalequivalentsintheidiomofspelling.Onsuchatheory,thereisnolongeraninfinitenumberofsemanticalprimitives,inspiteofthefactthatquotationscannotbeshowntocontainpartswithindependentsemanticalroles.Ifweacceptatheoryofthiskind,weareforcedtoallowaspeciesofstructurethatmaynotdeservetobecalled'logical',butcertainlyisdirectlyandindissolublylinkedwiththelogical,akindofstructuremissinginordinarypropernames.15SecondExample.ScheffleronIndirectDiscourse.IsraelSchefflerhasproposedwhathecallsaninsc


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riptionalapproachtoindirectdiscourse.16Carnapatonetimeanalysedsentencesinindirectdiscourseas


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involvingarelation(elaboratedintermsofanotionofintensionalisomorphism)betweenaspeakerandasentence.17endp.11ChurchobjectedthatCarnap'sanalysiscarriedanimplicitreferencetoalanguagewhichwaslackinginthesentencestobeanalysed,andaddedthathebelievedanycorrectanalysiswouldinterpretthethatclauseasreferringtoaproposition.18Schefflersetouttoshowthatacorrectanalysiscouldmanagewithlessbydemonstratingwhatcouldbedonewithanontologyofinscriptions(andutterances).Schefflersuggestsweanalyse'Tonkinsaidthatsnowiswhite'as'Tonkinspokeathat-snow-is-whiteutterance'.Sinceanutteranceorinscriptionbelongseternallytothelanguageofitsephemeralproducer,Church'sreproachtoCarnaphasnoforcehere.Theessentialpartofthestory,fromthepointofviewofpresentconcerns,isthattheexpression'that-snow-is-white'istobetreatedasaunitarypredicate(ofutterancesorinscriptions).Schefflercallsthe'that'anoperatorwhichappliestoasentencetoformacompositegeneralterm.'Composite'cannot,inthisuse,mean'logicallycomplex';not,atleast,untilmoretheoryisforthcoming.Asinthecaseofquotations,thesyntaxisclearenough(asitisinindirectdiscoursegenerally,giveortakesomerewritingofverbsandpronounsonprincipleseasiertomasterthantodescribe).Butthereisnohintastohowthemeaningofthesepredicatesdependsontheirstructure.Failingatheory,wemustvieweachnewpredicateasasemanticalprimitive.Giventheirsyntax,though(putanysentenceafter'that'andspicewithhyphens),itisobviousthereareinfinitelymanysuchpredicates,solanguageswithnomorestructurethanSchefflerallowsare,onmyaccount,unlearnable.Eventheclaimthat'that'isapredicateformingoperatormustberecognizedasapurelysyntacticalcommentthathasnoechoint

hetheoryofmeaning.Thepossibilityremainsopen,itmaybecountered,thatatheorywillyetbeproducedtorevealmorestructure.True.ButifSchefflerwantsthebenefitofthispossibility,hemustpayforitberenouncingtheclaimtohaveshown'thelogicalformandontologicalcharacter'ofsentencesinindirectdiscourse;19moretheorymaymeanmoreontology.Iflogicalformtellsusaboutontology,thenQuine'strickwithquotationswon'twork,forthelogicalformofaquotationisthatofasingulartermwithoutparts,anditsmanifestontologyisjusttheexpressionitnames.Butthedefinitionthattakesadvantageendp.12ofitsstructurebringsinmoreentities(thosenamedinthespelling).Itisonlyanaccidentthatinthisapplicationthemethoddrawsonnoentitiesnotalreadynamedbysomequotation.20ThirdExample.QuineonBeliefSentences.Wecanalwaystradeproblemsofontologyraisedbyputativelyreferentialexpressionsandpositionsforproblemsoflogicalarticulation.Ifanexpressionoffend

byitssupposedreference,thereisnoneedtopluckitout.Itisenoughtodeclaretheexpressionameaninglesspartofameaningfulexpression.Thistreatmentwillnotquitekillbeforeitcures;afterallsingulartermsandpositionsopentoquantificationhavebeenweldedintotheircontexts,therewillremainthelogicalstructurecreatedbytreatingsentencesasunanalysableunitsandbythepuresententialconnectives.Butsemanticswithoutontologyisnotveryinteresting,andalanguagelikeourownforwhichnobettercouldbedonewouldbeaparadigmofunlearnability.Quinehasnot,ofcourse,gonethisfar,butinanisolatedmomentheseemstocomeclose.Nearthecloseofalong,brilliant,anddiscouragingsearchforasatisfactorytheoryofbeliefsentences(andtheirrelativessentencesinindirectdiscourse,sentencesaboutdoubts,wonderings,fears,desires,andsoforth)heremarksthatoncewegiveuptryingtoquantifyoverthingsbelieved

...thereisnoneedtorecognize'believes'andsimilarverbsasrelativetermsatall;noneedtocountenancetheirpredicativeuseasin'wbelievesx'(asagainst'wbelievesthatp');noneed,therefore,tosee'thatp'asaterm.HenceafinalalternativethatIfindasappealingasanyissimplytodispensewiththeobjectsofthepropositionalattitudes...Thismeansviewing'Tombelieves[CicerodenouncedCatiline]'...asoftheform'Fa'witha=Tomandcomplex'F'.Theverb'believes'hereceasestobeatermandbecomespartofanoperator'believesthat'...which,appliedtoasentence,producesacompositeabsolutegeneraltermwhereofthesentenceiscountedanimmediateconstituent.21


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Inonerespect,thisgoesastepbeyondScheffler,foreventhemainverb('believes'inthiscase)ismadeinaccessibletologicalanalysis.Talkofconstituentsandoperatorsmustofcoursebetakenaspurelysyntactical,withoutbasisinsemanticaltheory.Ifthereisanyelementbeyondsyntaxcommontobeliefsentencesasaclass,Quine'saccountdoesnotsaywhatitis.And,ofcourse,alanguage


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endp.13forwhichnomoretheorycanbegivenis,bymyreckoning,unlearnable.Quinedoesnot,however,ruleouthopeoffurthertheory,perhapssomethinglikewhatheoffersforquotations.Butinthecaseofbeliefsentencesitisnoteasytoimaginethetheorythatcouldyieldtherequiredstructurewithoutaddingtotheontology.FourthExample.ChurchontheLogicofSenseandDenotation.Inthelasttwoexamples,lossofadesirableminimumofarticulationofmeaningseemedtobetheresultofoverzealousattentiontoproblemsofontology.Butitwouldbeamistaketoinferthatbybeingprodigalwithintensionalentitieswecansolveallproblems.Fregeasksustosupposethatcertainverbs,like'believes'(or'believesthat'),dodoubleduty.22First,theycreateacontextinwhichthewordsthatfollowcometorefertotheirusualsenseormeaning.Second(assumingtheverbisthemainverbofthesentence),theyperformanormalkindofdutybymappingpersonsandpropositionsontotruthvalues.Thisisadarkdoctrine,particularlywithrespecttothefirstpoint,andFregeseemstohavethoughtsohimself.Hisviewwas,perhaps,thatthisisthebestwecandofornaturallanguages,butthatinalogicallymoretransparentlanguage,differentwordswouldbeusedtorefertosenseandtodenotation,thusrelievingtheburdenedverbsoftheirfirst,andmoreobscure,duty.Butnowitisonlyafewstepstoaninfiniteprimitivevocabulary.Afterthefirstappearancesofverbslike'believes'weintroducenewexpressionsforsenses.Next,wenoticethatthereisnotheorywhichinterpretsthesenewexpressionsaslogicallystructured.Anewvocabularyisagainneeded,alongthesamelines,eachtimeweiterate'believes';andthereisnolimittothenumberofpossibleiterations.ItshouldnotbethoughtthattherewouldbelesstroublewithFrege'soriginalsuggestion.Eve

nsupposingwemadegoodsenseoftheideathatcertainwordscreateacontextinwhichotherwordstakeonnewmeanings(anideathatonlymakesthemsoundlikefunctors),therewouldremainthetaskofreducingtotheorythedeterminationofthosemeaningsaninfinitenumbereachforatleastsomewords.Theproblemisnothowtheindividualexpressionsthatmakeupasentencegovernedby'believes',giventhemeaningstheyhaveinsuchacontext,combinetodenoteaproposition;theendp.14problemisrathertostatetherulethatgiveseachthemeaningitdoeshave.ToreturntoourspeculationsconcerningtheformFregemighthavegivenalanguagenotationallysuperiortoordinarylanguage,butlikeitinitscapacitytodealwithbeliefsentencesandtheirkin:thefeaturesIattributedabovetothislanguagearetobefoundinalanguageproposedbyAlonzoChurch.23InChurch'snotation,thefactthatthenewexpressionsbroughtintoplayaswescalethesemanticladderarenotlogicallycomplexissuperficiallyobscur

edbytheirbeingsyntacticallycomposedfromtheexpressionsforthenextlevelbelow,pluschangeofsubscript.Thingsaresodevisedthat'if,inawell-formedformulawithoutfreevariables,allthesubscriptsinallthetypesymbolsappearingareincreasedby1,theresultingwell-formedformuladenotesthesenseofthefirstone'(17).Butthisrulecannot,ofcourse,beexploitedaspartofatheoryofmeaningforthelanguage;expressionandsubscriptcannotbeviewedashavingindependentmeanings.Relativetotheexpressiononanygivenlevel,theexpressionsforthelevelabovearesemanticalprimitives,asChurchclearlyindicates(8).Idon'tsuggestanyerroronChurch'spart;heneverhintsthatthecaseisotherthanIsay.ButIdosubmitthatChurch'slanguageofSenseandDenotationis,eveninprinciple,unlearnable.endp.15endp.162TruthandMeaningItisconcededbymostphilosophersoflanguage,andrecentlybysomelinguists,thatasatisfactorytheoryofmeaningmustgiveanaccountofhowtheme

aningsofsentencesdependuponthemeaningsofwords.Unlesssuchanaccountcouldbesuppliedforaparticularlanguage,itisargued,therewouldbenoexplainingthefactthatwecanlearnthelanguage:noexplainingthefactthat,onmasteringafinitevocabularyandafinitelystatedsetofrules,wearepreparedtoproduceandtounderstandanyofapotential


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infinitudeofsentences.Idonotdisputethesevagueclaims,inwhichIsensemorethanakerneloftruth.1InsteadIwanttoaskwhatitisforatheorytogiveanaccountofthekindadumbrated.Oneproposalistobeginbyassigningsomeentityasmeaningtoeachword(orothersignificantsyntacticalfeature)ofthesentence;thuswemightassignTheaetetusto'Theaetetus'andthepropertyofflyingto'flies'inthesentence'Theaetetusflies'.Theproblemthenariseshowthemeaningofthesentenceisgeneratedfromthesemeanings.Viewingconcatenationasasignificantpieceofsyntax,wemayassigntoittherelationofparticipatinginorinstantiating;however,itisobviousthatwehaveherethestartofaninfiniteregress.Fregesoughttoavoidtheregressbysayingthattheentitiescorrespondingtopredicates(forexample)are'unsaturated'or'incomplete'incontrasttotheentitiesthatcorrespondtonames,butthisdoctrineseemstolabeladifficultyratherthansolveit.Thepointwillemergeifwethinkforamomentofcomplexsingularterms,towhichFrege'stheoryappliesalongwithsentences.Considertheexpression'thefatherofAnnette';howdoestheendp.17meaningofthewholedependonthemeaningoftheparts?Theanswerwouldseemtobethatthemeaningof'thefatherof'issuchthatwhenthisexpressionisprefixedtoasingulartermtheresultreferstothefatherofthepersontowhomthesingulartermrefers.Whatpartisplayed,inthisaccount,bytheunsaturatedorincompleteentityforwhich'thefatherof'stands?Allwecanthinktosayisthatthisentity'yields'or'gives'thefatherofxasvaluewhentheargumentisx,orperhapsthatthisentitymapspeopleontotheirfathers.Itmaynotbeclearwhethertheentityforwhich'thefatherof'issaidtostandperformsanygenuineexplanatoryfunctionaslongaswesticktoindividualexpre

ssions;sothinkinsteadoftheinfiniteclassofexpressionsformedbywriting'thefatherof'zeroormoretimesinfrontof'Annette'.Itiseasytosupplyatheorythattells,foranarbitraryoneofthesesingularterms,whatitrefersto:ifthetermis'Annette'itreferstoAnnette,whileifthetermiscomplex,consistingof'thefatherof'prefixedtoasingulartermt,thenitreferstothefatherofthepersontowhomtrefers.Itisobviousthatnoentitycorrespondingto'thefatherof'is,orneedstobe,mentionedinstatingthistheory.Itwouldbeinappropriatetocomplainthatthislittletheoryusesthewords'thefatherof'ingivingthereferenceofexpressionscontainingthosewords.Forthetaskwastogivethemeaningofallexpressionsinacertaininfinitesetonthebasisofthemeaningoftheparts;itwasnotinthebargainalsotogivethemeaningsoftheatomicparts.Ontheotherhand,itisnowevidentthatasatisfactorytheoryofthemeaningsofcomplexexpressionsmaynotrequireentities

asmeaningsofalltheparts.Itbehovesusthentorephraseourdemandonasatisfactorytheoryofmeaningsoasnottosuggestthatindividualwordsmusthavemeaningsatall,inanysensethattranscendsthefactthattheyhaveasystematiceffectonthemeaningsofthesentencesinwhichtheyoccur.Actually,forthecaseathandwecandobetterstillinstatingthecriterionofsuccess:whatwewanted,andwhatwegot,isatheorythatentailseverysentenceoftheform'treferstox'where't'isreplacedbyastructuraldescription2ofasingularterm,and'x'isreplacedbythattermitself.Further,ourtheoryaccomplishesthiswithoutappealtoanysemanticalconceptsbeyondthebasic'refersto'.Finally,thetheoryendp.18clearlysuggestsaneffectiveprocedurefordetermining,foranysingularterminitsuniverse,whatthattermrefersto.Atheorywithsuchevidentmeritsdeserveswiderapplication.ThedeviceproposedbyFregetothisendhasabrilliantsimplicity:countpredicatesasaspecialcaseof

functionalexpressions,andsentencesasaspecialcaseofcomplexsingularterms.Now,however,adifficultyloomsifwewanttocontinueinourpresent(implicit)courseofidentifyingthemeaningofasingulartermwithitsreference.Thedifficultyfollowsuponmakingtworeasonableassumptions:thatlogicallyequivalentsingulartermshavethesamereference,andthatasingulartermdoesnotchangeitsreferenceifacontainedsingulartermisreplacedbyanotherwiththesamereference.Butnowsupposethat'R'and'S'abbreviateanytwosentencesalikeintruthvalue.Thenthefollowingfoursentenceshavethesamereference:(1)R))(2)x(x=x.R)=x(x=x)))(3)x(x=x.S)=x(x=x)


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(4)SFor(1)and(2)arelogicallyequivalent,asare(3)and(4),while(3)differsfrom(2)onlyincontainingthesingularterm'(x=x.S)'where(2)contains'(x=x.R)'andtheserefertothesamethingifSandRarealikeintruthvalue.Henceanytwosentenceshavethesamereferenceiftheyhavethesametruthvalue.3Andifthemeaningofasentenceiswhatitrefersto,allsentencesalikeintruthvaluemustbesynonymousanintolerableresult.Apparentlywemustabandonthepresentapproachasleadingtoatheoryofmeaning.Thisisthenaturalpointatwhichtoturnforhelptothedistinctionbetweenmeaningandreference.Thetrouble,wearetold,isthatquestionsofreferenceare,ingeneral,settledbyextra-linguisticfacts,questionsofmeaningnot,andthefactscanconflatethereferencesofexpressionsthatarenotsynonymous.Ifwewantatheorythatgivesthemeaning(asdistinctfromreference)ofeachsentence,wemuststartwiththemeaning(asdistinctfromreference)oftheparts.UptoherewehavebeenfollowinginFrege'sfootsteps;thankstoendp.19him,thepathiswellknownandevenwellworn.Butnow,Iwouldliketosuggest,wehavereachedanimpasse:theswitchfromreferencetomeaningleadstonousefulaccountofhowthemeaningsofsentencesdependuponthemeaningsofthewords(orotherstructuralfeatures)thatcomposethem.Ask,forexample,forthemeaningof'Theaetetusflies'.AFregeananswermightgosomethinglikethis:giventhemeaningof'Theaetetus'asargument,themeaningof'flies'yieldsthemeaningof'Theaetetusflies'asvalue.Thevacuityofthisanswerisobvious.Wewantedtoknowwhatthemeaningof'Theaetetusflies'is;itisnoprogresstobetoldthatitisthemeaningof'Theaetetusflies'.Thismuchweknewbeforeanytheorywasinsight.Inthebogusaccountjustgiven,talkofthestructureofthesentencea

ndofthemeaningsofwordswasidle,foritplayednoroleinproducingthegivendescriptionofthemeaningofthesentence.Thecontrastherebetweenarealandpretendedaccountwillbeplainerstillifweaskforatheory,analogoustotheminiaturetheoryofreferenceofsingulartermsjustsketched,butdifferentindealingwithmeaningsinplaceofreferences.Whatanalogydemandsisatheorythathasasconsequencesallsentencesoftheform'smeansm'where's'isreplacedbyastructuraldescriptionofasentenceand'm'isreplacedbyasingulartermthatreferstothemeaningofthatsentence;atheory,moreover,thatprovidesaneffectivemethodforarrivingatthemeaningofanarbitrarysentencestructurallydescribed.Clearlysomemorearticulatewayofreferringtomeaningsthananywehaveseenisessentialifthesecriteriaaretobemet.4Meaningsasentities,ortherelatedconceptofsynonymy,allowustoformulatethefollowingrulerelatingsentencesandtheirparts:sentencesaresynonymouswhosec

orrespondingpartsaresynonymous('corresponding'hereneedsspellingoutofcourse).Andmeaningsasentitiesmay,intheoriessuchasFrege's,doduty,onoccasion,asreferences,thuslosingtheirstatusasentitiesdistinctfromreferences.Paradoxically,theonethingmeaningsdonotseemtodoisoilthewheelsofatheoryofmeaningatleastaslongaswerequireofsuchatheorythatitnon-triviallygivethemeaningofendp.20everysentenceinthelanguage.Myobjectiontomeaningsinthetheoryofmeaningisnotthattheyareabstractorthattheiridentityconditionsareobscure,butthattheyhavenodemonstrateduse.Thisistheplacetoscotchanotherhopefulthought.Supposewehaveasatisfactorytheoryofsyntaxforourlanguage,consistingofaneffectivemethodoftelling,foranarbitraryexpression,whetherornotitisindependentlymeaningful(i.e.asentence),andassumeasusualthatthisinvolvesviewingeachsentenceascomposed,inallowableways,outofelementsdrawnfromafixedfinitestocko

fatomicsyntacticalelements(roughly,words).Thehopefulthoughtisthatsyntax,soconceived,willyieldsemanticswhenadictionarygivingthemeaningofeachsyntacticatomisadded.Hopeswillbedashed,however,ifsemanticsistocompriseatheoryofmeaninginoursense,forknowledgeofthestructuralcharacteristicsthatmakeformeaningfulnessinasentence,plusknowledgeofthemeaningsoftheultimateparts,doesnotadduptoknowledgeofwhatasentencemeans.Thepointiseasilyillustratedbybeliefsentences.Theirsyntaxisrelativelyunproblematic.Yet,addingadictionarydoesnottouchthestandardsemanticproblem,whichisthatwecannotaccountforevenasmuchasthetruthconditionsofsuchsentencesonthebasisofwhatweknowofthemeaningsofthewordsin


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them.Thesituationisnotradicallyalteredbyrefiningthedictionaryto


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indicatewhichmeaningormeaningsanambiguousexpressionbearsineachofitspossiblecontexts;theproblemofbeliefsentencespersistsafterambiguitiesareresolved.Thefactthatrecursivesyntaxwithdictionaryaddedisnotnecessarilyrecursivesemanticshasbeenobscuredinsomerecentwritingonlinguisticsbytheintrusionofsemanticcriteriaintothediscussionofpurportedlysyntactictheories.Thematterwouldboildowntoaharmlessdifferenceoverterminologyifthesemanticcriteriawereclear;buttheyarenot.Whilethereisagreementthatitisthecentraltaskofsemanticstogivethesemanticinterpretation(themeaning)ofeverysentenceinthelanguage,nowhereinthelinguisticliteraturewillonefind,sofarasIknow,astraightforwardaccountofhowatheoryperformsthistask,orhowtotellwhenithasbeenaccomplished.Thecontrastwithsyntaxisstriking.Themainjobofamodestsyntaxistocharacterizemeaningfulness(orsentencehood).Wemayhaveasmuchconfidenceinthecorrectnessofsuchacharacterizationaswehaveintherepresentativenessofoursampleandourabilitytosaywhenparticularexpressionsareendp.215meaningful(sentences).Whatclearandanalogoustaskandtestexistforsemantics?Wedecidedawhilebacknottoassumethatpartsofsentenceshavemeaningsexceptintheontologicallyneutralsenseofmakingasystematiccontributiontothemeaningofthesentencesinwhichtheyoccur.Sincepostulatingmeaningshasnettednothing,letusreturntothatinsight.Onedirectioninwhichitpointsisacertainholisticviewofmeaning.Ifsentencesdependfortheirmeaningontheirstructure,andweunderstandthemeaningofeachiteminthestructureonlyasanabstractionfromthetotalityofsentencesinwhichitfeatures,thenwecangivethemeaningofanysentence(orword)onlybygivingthemeaningofeverysentence(a

ndword)inthelanguage.Fregesaidthatonlyinthecontextofasentencedoesawordhavemeaning;inthesameveinhemighthaveaddedthatonlyinthecontextofthelanguagedoesasentence(andthereforeaword)havemeaning.Thisdegreeofholismwasalreadyimplicitinthesuggestionthatanadequatetheoryofmeaningmustentailallsentencesoftheform'smeansm'.Butnow,havingfoundnomorehelpinmeaningsofsentencesthaninmeaningsofwords,letusaskwhetherwecangetridofthetroublesomesingulartermssupposedtoreplace'm'andtorefertomeanings.Inaway,nothingcouldbeeasier:justwrite'smeansthatp',andimagine'p'replacedbyasentence.Sentences,aswehaveseen,cannotnamemeanings,andsentenceswith'that'prefixedarenotnamesatall,unlesswedecideso.Itlooksasthoughweareintroubleonanothercount,however,foritisreasonabletoexpectthatinwrestlingwiththelogicoftheapparentlynon-extensional'meansthat'wewillencounterproblemsashardas,orperhap

sidenticalwith,theproblemsourtheoryisouttosolve.TheonlywayIknowtodealwiththisdifficultyissimple,andradical.Anxietythatweareenmeshedintheintensionalspringsfromusingthewords'meansthat'asfillingbetweendescriptionofendp.22sentenceandsentence,butitmaybethatthesuccessofourventuredependsnotonthefillingbutonwhatitfills.Thetheorywillhavedoneitsworkifitprovides,foreverysentencesinthelanguageunderstudy,amatchingsentence(toreplace'p')that,insomewayyettobemadeclear,'givesthemeaning'ofs.Oneobviouscandidateformatchingsentenceisjustsitself,iftheobjectlanguageiscontainedinthemetalanguage;otherwiseatranslationofsinthemetalanguage.Asafinalboldstep,letustrytreatingthepositionoccupiedby'p'extensionally:toimplementthis,sweepawaytheobscure'meansthat',providethesentencethatreplaces'p'withapropersententialconnective,andsupplythedescriptionthatreplaces's'withitsownpredicat

e.Theplausibleresultis(T)sisTifandonlyifp.WhatwerequireofatheoryofmeaningforalanguageListhatwithoutappealtoany(further)semanticalnotionsitplaceenoughrestrictionsonthepredicate'isT'toentailallsentencesgotfromschemaTwhen's'isreplacedbyastructuraldescriptionofasentenceofLand'p'bythatsentence.Anytwopredicatessatisfyingthisconditionhavethesameextension,6soifthemetalanguageisrichenough,nothingstandsinthewayofputtingwhatIamcallingatheoryofmeaningintotheformofanexplicitdefinitionofapredicate'isT'.Butwhetherexplicitlydefinedorrecursivelycharacterized,itisclearthatthesentencestowhichthepredicate'isT'applieswillbejustthetruesentencesofL,forthecondition


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wehaveplacedonsatisfactorytheoriesofmeaningisinessenceTarski'sConventionTthatteststheadequacyofaformalsemanticaldefinitionoftruth.7Thepathtothispointhasbeentortuous,buttheconclusionmaybestatedsimply:atheoryofmeaningforalanguageLshows'howthemeaningsofsentencesdependuponthemeaningsofwords'ifitcontainsa(recursive)definitionoftruth-in-L.And,sofaratleast,wehavenootherideahowtoturnthetrick.Itisworthemphasizingthattheconceptoftruthplayednoostensibleroleinstatingouroriginalproblem.Thatproblem,uponrefinement,ledtotheviewthatanadequatetheoryofmeaningmustcharacterizeapredicatemeetingcertainconditions.Itwasinthenatureofadiscoverythatendp.23suchapredicatewouldapplyexactlytothetruesentences.IhopethatwhatIamsayingmaybedescribedinpartasdefendingthephilosophicalimportanceofTarski'ssemanticalconceptoftruth.Butmydefenceisonlydistantlyrelated,ifatall,tothequestionwhethertheconceptTarskihasshownhowtodefineisthe(ora)philosophicallyinterestingconceptionoftruth,orthequestionwhetherTarskihascastanylightontheordinaryuseofsuchwordsas'true'and'truth'.Itisamisfortunethatdustfromfutileandconfusedbattlesoverthesequestionshaspreventedthosewithatheoreticalinterestinlanguagephilosophers,logicians,psychologists,andlinguistsalikefromseeinginthesemanticalconceptoftruth(underwhatevername)thesophisticatedandpowerfulfoundationofacompetenttheoryofmeaning.Thereisnoneedtosuppress,ofcourse,theobviousconnectionbetweenadefinitionoftruthofthekindTarskihasshownhowtoconstruct,andtheconceptofmeaning.Itisthis:thedefinitionworksbygivingnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforthetruthofeverysentence,andtogivetruthconditionsisawayo

fgivingthemeaningofasentence.Toknowthesemanticconceptoftruthforalanguageistoknowwhatitisforasentenceanysentencetobetrue,andthisamounts,inonegoodsensewecangivetothephrase,tounderstandingthelanguage.Thisatanyrateismyexcuseforafeatureofthepresentdiscussionthatisapttoshockoldhands;myfreewheelinguseoftheword'meaning',forwhatIcallatheoryofmeaninghasafterallturnedouttomakenouseofmeanings,whetherofsentencesorofwords.Indeed,sinceaTarskitypetruthdefinitionsuppliesallwehaveaskedsofarofatheoryofmeaning,itisclearthatsuchatheoryfallscomfortablywithinwhatQuinetermsthe'theoryofreference'asdistinguishedfromwhathetermsthe'theoryofmeaning'.SomuchtothegoodforwhatIcallatheoryofmeaning,andsomuch,perhaps,againstmysocallingit.8Atheoryofmeaning(inmymildlyperversesense)isanempiricaltheory,anditsambitionistoaccountfortheworkingsofanaturallanguage.Likeanytheory,i

tmaybetestedbycomparingsomeofitsconsequenceswiththefacts.Inthepresentcasethisiseasy,fortheendp.24theoryhasbeencharacterizedasissuinginaninfinitefloodofsentenceseachgivingthetruthconditionsofasentence;weonlyneedtoask,insamplecases,whetherwhatthetheoryaverstobethetruthconditionsforasentencereallyare.Atypicaltestcasemightinvolvedecidingwhetherthesentence'Snowiswhite'istrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite.Notallcaseswillbesosimple(forreasonstobesketched),butitisevidentthatthissortoftestdoesnotinvitecountingnoses.Asharpconceptionofwhatconstitutesatheoryinthisdomainfurnishesanexcitingcontextforraisingdeepquestionsaboutwhenatheoryoflanguageiscorrectandhowitistobetried.Butthedifficultiesaretheoretical,notpractical.Inapplication,thetroubleistogetatheorythatcomesclosetoworking;anyonecantellwhetheritisright.9Onecanseewhythisisso.Thetheoryrevealsnothingnewabout

theconditionsunderwhichanindividualsentenceistrue;itdoesnotmakethoseconditionsanyclearerthanthesentenceitselfdoes.Theworkofthetheoryisinrelatingtheknowntruthconditionsofeachsentencetothoseaspects('words')ofthesentencethatrecurinothersentences,andcanbeassignedidenticalrolesinothersentences.Empiricalpowerinsuchatheorydependsonsuccessinrecoveringthestructureofaverycomplicatedabilitytheabilitytospeakandunderstandalanguage.Wecantelleasilyenoughwhenparticularpronouncementsofthetheorycomportwithourunderstandingofthelanguage;thisisconsistentwithafeebleinsightintothedesignofthemachineryofourlinguisticaccomplishments.Theremarksofthelastparagraphapplydirectlyonlytothespecia


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lcasewhereitisassumedthatthelanguageforwhichtruthisbeingcharacterizedispartofthelanguageusedandunderstoodbythe


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characterizer.Underthesecircumstances,theframerofatheorywillasamatterofcourseavailhimselfwhenhecanofthebuilt-inconvenienceofametalanguagewithasentenceguaranteedequivalenttoeachsentenceintheobjectlanguage.Still,thisfactoughtnottoconusintothinkingatheoryanymorecorrectthatentails'"Snowiswhite"istrueifandonlyifsnowiswhite'thanonethatentailsinstead:(S)'Snowiswhite'istrueifandonlyifgrassisgreen,endp.25provided,ofcourse,weareassureofthetruthof(S)asweareofthatofitsmorecelebratedpredecessor.Yet(S)maynotencouragethesameconfidencethatatheorythatentailsitdeservestobecalledatheoryofmeaning.Thethreatenedfailureofnervemaybecounteractedasfollows.Thegrotesquenessof(S)isinitselfnothingagainstatheoryofwhichitisaconsequence,providedthetheorygivesthecorrectresultsforeverysentence(onthebasisofitsstructure,therebeingnootherway).Itisnoteasytoseehow(S)couldbepartytosuchanenterprise,butifitwereif,thatis,(S)followedfromacharacterizationofthepredicate'istrue'thatledtotheinvariablepairingoftruthswithtruthsandfalsehoodswithfalsehoodsthentherewouldnot,Ithink,beanythingessentialtotheideaofmeaningthatremainedtobecaptured.10Whatappearstotherightofthebiconditionalinsentencesoftheform'sistrueifandonlyifp'whensuchsentencesareconsequencesofatheoryoftruthplaysitsroleindeterminingthemeaningofsnotbypretendingsynonymybutbyaddingonemorebrush-stroketothepicturewhich,takenasawhole,tellswhatthereistoknowofthemeaningofs;thisstrokeisaddedbyvirtueofthefactthatthesentencethatreplaces'p'istrueifandonlyifsis.Itmayhelptoreflectthat(S)isacceptable,ifitis,becauseweareindependentlysureofthetruth

of'Snowiswhite'and'Grassisgreen';butincaseswhereweareunsureofthetruthofasentence,wecanhaveconfidenceinacharacterizationofthetruthpredicateonlyifitpairsthatsentencewithonewehavegoodreasontobelieveequivalent.Itwouldbeilladvisedforsomeonewhohadanydoubtsaboutthecolourofsnoworgrasstoacceptatheorythatyielded(S),evenifhisdoubtswereofequaldegree,unlesshethoughtthecolouroftheonewastiedtothecolouroftheother.11Omnisciencecanendp.26obviouslyaffordmorebizzaretheoriesofmeaningthanignorance;butthen,omnisciencehaslessneedofcommunication.Itmustbepossible,ofcourse,forthespeakerofonelanguagetoconstructatheoryofmeaningforthespeakerofanother,thoughinthiscasetheempiricaltestofthecorrectnessofthetheorywillnolongerbetrivial.Asbefore,theaimoftheorywillbeaninfinitecorrelationofsentencesalikeintruth.Butthistimethetheorybuildermustnotbeassumedtohavedirectinsightintoli

kelyequivalencesbetweenhisowntongueandthealien.Whathemustdoisfindout,howeverhecan,whatsentencesthealienholdstrueinhisowntongue(orbetter,towhatdegreeheholdsthemtrue).Thelinguistthenwillattempttoconstructacharacterizationoftruth-for-the-alienwhichyields,sofaraspossible,amappingofsentencesheldtrue(orfalse)bythealienontosentencesheldtrue(orfalse)bythelinguist.Supposingnoperfectfitisfound,theresidueofsentencesheldtruetranslatedbysentencesheldfalse(andviceversa)isthemarginforerror(foreignordomestic).Charityininterpretingthewordsandthoughtsofothersisunavoidableinanotherdirectionaswell:justaswemustmaximizeagreement,orrisknotmakingsenseofwhatthealienistalkingabout,sowemustmaximizetheself-consistencyweattributetohim,onpainofnotunderstandinghim.Nosingleprincipleofoptimumcharityemerges;theconstraintsthereforedeterminenosingletheory.Inatheoryofradicaltranslation(asQ

uinecallsit)thereisnocompletelydisentanglingquestionsofwhatthealienmeansfromquestionsofwhathebelieves.Wedonotknowwhatsomeonemeansunlessweknowwhathebelieves;wedonotknowwhatsomeonebelievesunlessweknowwhathemeans.Inradicalinterpretationweareabletobreakintothiscircle,ifonlyincompletely,becausewecansometimestellthatapersonaccedestoasentencewedonotunderstand.12InthepastfewpagesIhavebeenaskinghowatheoryofmeaningthattakestheformofatruthdefinitioncanbeempiricallytested,andhaveblithelyignoredthepriorquestionwhetherthereisanyseriouschancesuchatheorycanbegivenforanaturallanguage.Whataretheprospectsforaformalsemanticaltheoryofanatural


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endp.27language?Verypoor,accordingtoTarski;andIbelievemostlogicians,philosophersoflanguage,andlinguistsagree.13LetmedowhatIcantodispelthepessimism.WhatIcaninageneralandprogrammaticway,ofcourse,forheretheproofofthepuddingwillcertainlybeintheproofoftherighttheorems.Tarskiconcludesthefirstsectionofhisclassicessayontheconceptoftruthinformalizedlanguageswiththefollowingremarks,whichheitalicizes:...Theverypossibilityofaconsistentuseoftheexpression'truesentence'whichisinharmonywiththelawsoflogicandthespiritofeverydaylanguageseemstobeveryquestionable,andconsequentlythesamedoubtattachestothepossibilityofconstructingacorrectdefinitionofthisexpression.(165)

Lateinthesameessay,hereturnstothesubject:...theconceptoftruth(aswellasothersemanticalconcepts)whenappliedtocolloquiallanguageinconjunctionwiththenormallawsoflogicleadsinevitablytoconfusionsandcontradictions.Whoeverwishes,inspiteofalldifficulties,topursuethesemanticsofcolloquiallanguagewiththehelpofexactmethodswillbedrivenfirsttoundertakethethanklesstaskofareformofthislanguage.Hewillfinditnecessarytodefineitsstructure,toovercometheambiguityofthetermswhichoccurinit,andfinallytosplitthelanguageintoaseriesoflanguagesofgreaterandgreaterextent,eachofwhichstandsinthesamerelationtothenextinwhichaformalizedlanguagestandstoitsmetalanguage.Itmay,howeverbedoubtedwhetherthelanguageofeverydaylife,afterbeing'rationalized'inthisway,wouldstillpreserveitsnaturalnessandwhetheritwouldnotrathertakeonthecharacteristicfeaturesoftheformalizedlanguages.(

267)Twothemesemerge:thattheuniversalcharacterofnaturallanguagesleadstocontradiction(thesemanticparadoxes),andthatnaturallanguagesaretooconfusedandamorphoustopermitthedirectapplicationofformalmethods.Thefirstpointdeservesaseriousanswer,andIwishIhadone.Asitis,IwillsayonlywhyIthinkwearejustifiedincarryingonwithouthavingdisinfectedthisparticularsourceofconceptualanxiety.Thesemanticparadoxesarisewhentherangeofthequantifiersintheobjectlanguageistoogenerousincertainways.ButitisnotreallyclearhowunfairtoUrduortoWendishitwouldbetoviewtherangeoftheirquantifiersendp.28asinsufficienttoyieldanexplicitdefinitionof'true-in-Urdu'or'true-in-Wendish'.Or,toputthematterinanother,ifnotmoreseriousway,theremayinthenatureofthecasealwaysbesomethingwe

graspinunderstandingthelanguageofanother(theconceptoftruth)thatwecannotcommunicatetohim.Inanycase,mostoftheproblemsofgeneralphilosophicalinterestarisewithinafragmentoftherelevantnaturallanguagethatmaybeconceivedascontainingverylittlesettheory.Ofcoursethesecommentsdonotmeettheclaimthatnaturallanguagesareuniversal.Butitseemstomethatthisclaim,nowthatweknowsuchuniversalityleadstoparadox,issuspect.Tarski'ssecondpointisthatwewouldhavetoreformanaturallanguageoutofallrecognitionbeforewecouldapplyformalsemanticalmethods.Ifthisistrue,itisfataltomyproject,forthetaskofatheoryofmeaningasIconceiveitisnottochange,improve,orreformalanguage,buttodescribeandunderstandit.Letuslookatthepositiveside.Tarskihasshownthewaytogivingatheoryforinterpretedformallanguagesofvariouskinds;pickoneasmuchlikeEnglishaspossible.SincethisnewlanguagehasbeenexplainedinEnglishandcontain

smuchEnglishwenotonlymay,butIthinkmust,viewitaspartofEnglishforthosewhounderstandit.ForthisfragmentofEnglishwehave,exhypothesi,atheoryoftherequiredsort.Notonlythat,butininterpretingthisadjunctofEnglishinoldEnglishwenecessarilygavehintsconnectingoldandnew.WherevertherearesentencesofoldEnglishwiththesametruthconditionsassentencesintheadjunctwemayextendthetheorytocoverthem.MuchofwhatiscalledforistomechanizeasfaraspossiblewhatwenowdobyartwhenweputordinaryEnglishintooneoranothercanonicalnotation.Thepointisnotthatcanonicalnotationisbetterthantheroughoriginalidiom,butratherthatifweknowwhatidiomthecanonicalnotationiscanonicalfor,wehaveasgoodatheoryfort


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heidiomasforitskeptcompanion.Philosophershavelongbeenatthehardworkofapplyingtheorytoordinarylanguagebythedeviceofmatchingsentencesinthevernacularwithsentencesforwhichtheyhaveatheory.Frege'smassivecontributionwastoshowhow'all','some','every','each','none',andassociatedpronouns,insomeoftheiruses,couldbetamed;forthefirsttime,itwaspossibletodreamofaformalsemanticsforasignificantpartofanaturallanguage.ThisdreamcametrueinasharpwaywiththeworkofTarski.Itwouldbea


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endp.29shametomissthefactthatasaresultofthesetwomagnificentachievements,Frege'sandTarski's,wehavegainedadeepinsightintothestructureofourmothertongues.Philosophersofalogicalbenthavetendedtostartwherethetheorywasandworkouttowardsthecomplicationsofnaturallanguage.Contemporarylinguists,withanaimthatcannoteasilybeseentobedifferent,startwiththeordinaryandworktowardageneraltheory.Ifeitherpartyissuccessful,theremustbeameeting.RecentworkbyChomskyandothersisdoingmuchtobringthecomplexitiesofnaturallanguageswithinthescopeofserioustheory.Togiveanexample:supposesuccessingivingthetruthconditionsforsomesignificantrangeofsentencesintheactivevoice.Thenwithaformalprocedurefortransformingeachsuchsentenceintoacorrespondingsentenceinthepassivevoice,thetheoryoftruthcouldbeextendedinanobviouswaytothisnewsetofsentences.14OneproblemtouchedoninpassingbyTarskidoesnot,atleastinallitsmanifestations,havetobesolvedtogetaheadwiththeory:theexistenceinnaturallanguagesof'ambiguousterms'.Aslongasambiguitydoesnotaffectgrammaticalform,andcanbetranslated,ambiguityforambiguity,intothemetalanguage,atruthdefinitionwillnottellusanylies.Thechieftrouble,forsystematicsemantics,withthephrase'believesthat'inEnglishliesnotinitsvagueness,ambiguity,orunsuitabilityforincorporationinaseriousscience:letourmetalanguagebeEnglish,andalltheseproblemswillbecarriedwithoutlossorgainintothemetalanguage.Butthecentralproblemofthelogicalgrammarof'believesthat'willremaintohauntus.Theexampleissuitedtoillustratinganother,andrelated,point,forthediscussionofbeliefsentenceshasbeenplaguedbyfailuretoendp.30observeafundamentaldistinctionbetweentasks:

uncoveringthelogicalgrammerorformofsentences(whichisintheprovinceofatheoryofmeaningasIconstrueit),andtheanalysisofindividualwordsorexpressions(whicharetreatedasprimitivebythetheory).ThusCarnap,inthefirsteditionofMeaningandNecessity,suggestedwerender'Johnbelievesthattheearthisround'as'Johnrespondsaffirmativelyto"theearthisround"asanEnglishsentence'.HegavethisupwhenMatespointedoutthatJohnmightrespondaffirmativelytoonesentenceandnottoanothernomatterhowcloseinmeaning.15Butthereisaconfusionherefromthestart.Thesemanticstructureofabeliefsentence,accordingtothisideaofCarnap's,isgivenbyathree-placepredicatewithplacesreservedforexpressionsreferringtoaperson,asentence,andalanguage.Itisadifferentsortofproblementirelytoattemptananalysisofthispredicate,perhapsalongbehaviouristiclines.NotleastamongthemeritsofTarski'sconceptionofatheoryoftruthisthatthepurityofmethod

itdemandsofusfollowsfromtheformulationoftheproblemitself,notfromtheself-imposedrestraintofsomeadventitiousphilosophicalpuritanism.Ithinkitishardtoexaggeratetheadvantagestophilosophyoflanguageofbearinginmindthisdistinctionbetweenquestionsoflogicalformorgrammar,andtheanalysisofindividualconcepts.Anotherexamplemayhelpadvertisethepoint.Ifwesupposequestionsoflogicalgrammarsettled,sentenceslike'Bardotisgood'raisenospecialproblemsforatruthdefinition.Thedeepdifferencesbetweendescriptiveandevaluative(emotive,expressive,etc.)termsdonotshowhere.Evenifweholdthereissomeimportantsenseinwhichmoralorevaluativesentencesdonothaveatruthvalue(forexample,becausetheycannotbeverified),weoughtnottoboggleat'"Bardotisgood"istrueifandonlyifBardotisgood';inatheoryoftruth,thisconsequenceshouldfollowwiththerest,keepingtrack,asmustbedone,ofthesemanticlocationofsuchsentencesinthelanguage

asawholeoftheirrelationtogeneralizations,theirroleinsuchcompoundsentencesas'BardotisgoodandBardotisfoolish',andsoon.Whatisspecialtoevaluativewordsissimplynottouched:themysteryistransferredfromtheword'good'intheobjectlanguagetoitstranslationinthemetalanguage.endp.31But'good'asitfeaturesin'Bardotisagoodactress'isanothermatter.Theproblemisnotthatthetranslationofthissentenceisnotinthemetalanguageletussupposeitis.Theproblemistoframeatruthdefinitionsuchthat'"Bardotisagoodactress"istrueifandonlyifBardotisagoodactress'andallothersentenceslikeitareconsequences.Obviously'goodactress'doesnotmean'goodandanactress'.Wemight


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thinkoftaking'isagoodactress'asanunanalysedpredicate.Thiswouldobliterateallconnectionbetween'isagoodactress'and'isagoodmother',anditwouldgiveusnoexcusetothinkof'good',intheseuses,asawordorsemanticelement.Butworse,itwouldbarusfromframingatruthdefinitionatall,forthereisnoendtothepredicateswewouldhavetotreataslogicallysimple(andhenceaccommodateinseparateclausesinthedefinitionofsatisfaction):'isagoodcompaniontodogs','isagood28-yearsoldconversationalist',andsoforth.Theproblemisnotpeculiartothecase:itistheproblemofattributiveadjectivesgenerally.Itisconsistentwiththeattitudetakenheretodeemitusuallyastrategicerrortoundertakephilosophicalanalysisofwordsorexpressionswhichisnotprecededbyoratanyrateaccompaniedbytheattempttogetthelogicalgrammarstraight.Forhowcanwehaveanyconfidenceinouranalysesofwordslike'right','ought','can',and'obliged',orthephrasesweusetotalkofactions,events,andcauses,whenwedonotknowwhat(logical,semantical)partsofspeechwehavetodealwith?Iwouldsaymuchthesameaboutstudiesofthe'logic'oftheseandotherwords,andthesentencescontainingthem.Whethertheeffortandingenuitythathavegoneintothestudyofdeonticlogics,modallogics,imperativeanderoteticlogicshavebeenlargelyfutileornotcannotbeknownuntilwehaveacceptablesemanticanalysesofthesentencessuchsystemspurporttotreat.Philosophersandlogicianssometimestalkorworkasiftheywerefreetochoosebetween,say,thetruth-functionalconditionalandothers,orfreetointroducenon-truth-functionalsententialoperatorslike'Letitbethecasethat'or'Itoughttobethecasethat'.Butinfactthedecisioniscrucial.Whenwedepartfromidiomswecanaccommodateinatruthdefinition,we

lapseinto(orcreate)languageforwhichwehavenocoherentsemanticalaccountthatis,noaccountatallofhowsuchtalkcanbeintegratedintothelanguageasawhole.Toreturntoourmaintheme:wehaverecognizedthatatheoryofendp.32thekindproposedleavesthewholematterofwhatindividualwordsmeanexactlywhereitwas.Evenwhenthemetalanguageisdifferentfromtheobjectlanguage,thetheoryexertsnopressureforimprovement,clarification,oranalysisofindividualwords,exceptwhen,byaccidentofvocabulary,straightforwardtranslationfails.Justassynonymy,asbetweenexpressions,goesgenerallyuntreated,soalsosynonymyofsentences,andanalyticity.Evensuchsentencesas'Avixenisafemalefox'bearnospecialtagunlessitisourpleasuretoprovideit.Atruthdefinitiondoesnotdistinguishbetweenanalyticsentencesandothers,exceptforsentencesthatowetheirtruthtothepresencealoneoftheconstantsthatgivethetheoryitsgriponstructure:thetheoryentailsnotonlythatt

hesesentencesaretruebutthattheywillremaintrueunderallsignificantrewritingsoftheirnon-logicalparts.Anotionoflogicaltruththusgivenlimitedapplication,relatednotionsoflogicalequivalenceandentailmentwilltagalong.Itishardtoimaginehowatheoryofmeaningcouldfailtoreadalogicintoitsobjectlanguagetothisdegree;andtotheextentthatitdoes,ourintuitionsoflogicaltruth,equivalence,andentailmentmaybecalleduponinconstructingandtestingthetheory.Iturnnowtoonemore,andverylarge,flyintheointment:thefactthatthesamesentencemayatonetimeorinonemouthbetrueandatanothertimeorinanothermouthbefalse.Bothlogiciansandthosecriticalofformalmethodshereseemlargely(thoughbynomeansuniversally)agreedthatformalsemanticsandlogicareincompetenttodealwiththedisturbancescausedbydemonstratives.Logicianshaveoftenreactedbydowngradingnaturallanguageandtryingtoshowhowtogetalongwithoutdemonstratives;theircritic

sreactbydowngradinglogicandformalsemantics.Noneofthiscanmakemehappy:clearlydemonstrativescannotbeeliminatedfromanaturallanguagewithoutlossorradicalchange,sothereisnochoicebuttoaccommodatetheorytothem.Nologicalerrorsresultifwesimplytreatdemonstrativesasconstants;16neitherdoanyproblemsariseforgivingasemantictruthdefinition.'"Iamwise"istrueifandonlyifIamwise',withitsblandignoringofthedemonstrativeelementin'I'comesofftheassemblylinealongwith'"Socratesiswise"istrueifandonlyifSocratesiswise'withitsblandindifferencetothedemonstrativeelementin'iswise'(thetense).endp.33Whatsuffersinthistreatmentofdemonstrativesisnotthedefinitionofatruthpredicate,buttheplausibility


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oftheclaimthatwhathasbeendefinedistruth.Forthisclaimisacceptableonlyifthespeakerandcircumstancesofutteranceofeachsentencementionedinthedefinitionismatchedbythespeakerand


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circumstancesofutteranceofthetruthdefinitionitself.Itcouldalsobefairlypointedoutthatpartofunderstandingdemonstrativesisknowingtherulesbywhichtheyadjusttheirreferencetocircumstance;assimilatingdemonstrativestoconstanttermsobliteratesthisfeature.Thesecomplaintscanbemet,Ithink,thoughonlybyafairlyfar-reachingrevisioninthetheoryoftruth.Ishallbarelysuggesthowthiscouldbedone,butbaresuggestionisallthatisneeded:theideaistechnicallytrivial,andinlinewithworkbeingdoneonthelogicofthetenses.17Wecouldtaketruthtobeaproperty,notofsentences,butofutterances,orspeechacts,ororderedtriplesofsentences,times,andpersons;butitissimplestjusttoviewtruthasarelationbetweenasentence,aperson,andatime.Undersuchtreatment,ordinarylogicasnowreadappliesasusual,butonlytosetsofsentencesrelativizedtothesamespeakerandtime;furtherlogicalrelationsbetweensentencesspokenatdifferenttimesandbydifferentspeakersmaybearticulatedbynewaxioms.Suchisnotmyconcern.Thetheoryofmeaningundergoesasystematicbutnotpuzzlingchange;correspondingtoeachexpressionwithademonstrativeelementtheremustinthetheorybeaphrasethatrelatesthetruthconditionsofsentencesinwhichtheexpressionoccurstochangingtimesandspeakers.Thusthetheorywillentailsentenceslikethefollowing:'Iamtired'istrueas(potentially)spokenbypattifandonlyifpistiredatt.'Thatbookwasstolen'istrueas(potentially)spokenbypattifandonlyifthebookdemonstratedbypattisstolenpriortot.18Plainly,thiscoursedoesnotshowhowtoeliminatedemonstratives;forexample,thereisnosuggestionthat'thebookdemonstratedbythespeaker'canbesubstitutedubiquitouslyfor'thatbook'salvaveritate.Thefactthatdemonstrativesareamenab

letoendp.34formaltreatmentoughtgreatlytoimprovehopesforaserioussemanticsofnaturallanguage,foritislikelythatmanyoutstandingpuzzles,suchastheanalysisofquotationsorsentencesaboutpropositionalattitudes,canbesolvedifwerecognizeaconcealeddemonstrativeconstruction.Nowthatwehaverelativizedtruthtotimesandspeakers,itisappropriatetoglancebackattheproblemofempiricallytestingatheoryofmeaningforanalientongue.Theessenceofthemethodwas,itwillberemembered,tocorrelateheld-truesentenceswithheld-truesentencesbywayofatruthdefinition,andwithintheboundsofintelligibleerror.Nowthepicturemustbeelaboratedtoallowforthefactthatsentencesaretrue,andheldtrue,onlyrelativetoaspeakerandatime.Sentenceswithdemonstrativesobviouslyyieldaverysensitivetestofthecorrectnessofatheoryofmeaning,andconstitutethemostdirectlinkbetweenlanguageandtherecurrentmacroscopicobjectsofhumaninterestandattention.19Inth

ispaperIhaveassumedthatthespeakersofalanguagecaneffectivelydeterminethemeaningormeaningsofanarbitraryexpression(ifithasameaning),andthatitisthecentraltaskofatheoryofmeaningtoshowhowthisispossible.Ihavearguedthatacharacterizationofatruthpredicatedescribestherequiredkindofstructure,andprovidesaclearandtestablecriterionofanadequatesemanticsforanaturallanguage.Nodoubtthereareotherreasonabledemandsthatmaybeputonatheoryofmeaning.Butatheorythatdoesnomorethandefinetruthforalanguagecomesfarclosertoconstitutingacompletetheoryofmeaningthansuperficialanalysismightsuggest;so,atleast,Ihaveurged.SinceIthinkthereisnoalternative,Ihavetakenanoptimisticandprogrammaticviewofthepossibilitiesforaformalcharacterizationofatruthpredicateforanaturallanguage.Butitmustbeallowedthatastaggeringlistofdifficultiesandconundrumsremains.Tonameafew:wedonotknowthelogicalformofcounte

rfactualorsubjunctivesentences;norofsentencesaboutprobabilitiesandaboutcausalrelations;wehavenogoodideawhatthelogicalroleofadverbsis,northeroleofattributiveadjectives;wehavenotheoryformasstermslike'fire','water',and'snow',norforsentencesaboutendp.35belief,perception,andintention,norforverbsofactionthatimplypurpose.Andfinally,thereareallthesentencesthatseemnottohavetruthvaluesatall:theimperatives,optatives,interrogatives,andahostmore.Acomprehensivetheoryofmeaningforanaturallanguagemustcopesuccessfullywitheachoftheseproblems.20endp.36


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3TruetotheFactsAtruestatementisastatementthatistruetothefacts.Thisremarkseemstoembodythesamesortofobviousandessentialwisdomabouttruthasthefollowingaboutmotherhood:amotherisapersonwhoisthemotherofsomeone.Thepropertyofbeingamotherisexplainedbytherelationbetweenawomanandherchild;similarly,t

8887986 donald davidson inquiries into truth and interpretation 2001

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