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CENTER FORHUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWPeter A. Schey (Cal. Bar No. 58232)Carlos R. Holgun (Cal. Bar No. 90754)256 S. Occidental Blvd.Los Angeles, CA 90057Telephone: (213) 388-8693 (Schey Ext. 304, Holgun ext. 309)

Facsimile: (213) [email protected]@centerforhumanrights.org

Additional counsel listed next page

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARTIN R.ARANAS,et al.,

Plaintiffs,

-vs-

JANETNAPOLITANO,Secretary of theDepartment of Homeland Security; et al.,

Defendants.__________________________________

))))))

)))))))))))

SACV12-01137 CBM (AJWx)

JOINT RULE 26(f) REPORT.

Case 8:12-cv-01137-CBM-AJW Document 67 Filed 10/27/12 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:1554

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Additional counsel for plaintiff Aranas:

PUBLIC LAW CENTERJulie Greenwald (Cal. Bar No. 233714)Monica Ashiku (Cal. Bar No. 263112)601 Civic Center Drive West

Santa Ana, CA 92701Telephone: (714) 541-1010 (Greenwald Ext. 263, Ashiku Ext. 249)Facsimile: (714) 541-5157

[email protected]@publiclawcenter.org

ASIAN LAW ALLIANCEBeatrice Ann M. Pangilinan (Cal. Bar No. 271064)184 Jackson Street, San Jose, CA 95112Telephone: (408) 287-9710

Facsimile: (408) 287-0864Email: [email protected]

Additional counsel for plaintiffs Rodriguez and DeLeon:

LAW OFFICES OF MANULKIN &BENNETTGary H. Manulkin (Cal. Bar No. 41469)Reyna M. Tanner (Cal. Bar No. 197931)10175 Slater Avenue, Suite 111Fountain Valley, CA 92708

Telephone: 714-963-8951Facsimile: [email protected]@yahoo.com


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STUART F. DELERYActing Assistant Attorney General, Civil DivisionAUGUST FLENTJEActing Deputy Assistant Attorney GeneralDAVID J. KLINEDirector, Office of Immigration Litigation

JEFFREY S. ROBINSAssistant DirectorJESI J. CARLSON (DC 975478)Senior Litigation CounselP.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin StationWashington, D.C. 20044Telephone: (202) 305-7037Facsimile: (202) 305-7000Email: [email protected] M. BELSAN (KS 24112)

Trial Attorney

Attorneys for Defendants

/ / /


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Paul D. [email protected]. Christopher [email protected]

Nicholas J. [email protected]

Michael H. [email protected]

BANCROFT PLLC1919 M Street, N.W.Suite 470Washington, D.C. 20036202-234-0090 (telephone)202-234-2806 (facsimile)

Of Counsel:Kerry W. Kircher, General [email protected] Pittard, Deputy General [email protected] Davenport, Senior Assistant [email protected] B. Tatelman, Assistant [email protected] Beth Walker, Assistant Counsel

[email protected]

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES219 Cannon House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515202-225-9700 (telephone)202-226-1360 (facsimile)

Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant

the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of theUnited States House of Representatives

/ / /


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The parties submit the following joint report pursuant to Rule 26(f),

Fed.R.Civ.P. and C.D. Cal. Loc. R. 26-1:

I NATURE AND BASIS OF CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

A. Plaintiffs claims.

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging

discrimination in the granting of benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act

(INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, et seq., against lawfully married couples solely because

the spouses are of the same sex. Section 3(a) of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L.

104-199, 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, codified at1 U.S.C. 7 (DOMA), bars federal

agencies from recognizing marriages between spouses of the same sex,

notwithstanding the lawfulness of those marriages under state law.1

Plaintiffs allege that defendants applying DOMA 3 to deny validly married

bi-national couples benefits under the INA merely because the spouses happen to be

of the same sex violates (1) the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution; and (2) the right to privacy and personal autonomy

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

1 1 U.S.C. 7 provides:

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, orinterpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, theword marriage means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husbandand wife, and the word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is ahusband or a wife.


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B. Defendants Position & Defenses

This case involves a constitutional challenge to Section 3 of the Defense of

Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7 (DOMA), which defines marriage under federal law

as only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.

Plaintiffs challenge Section 3 of DOMA as it applies to the immigration rights of a

married same-sex couple.2 The suit is brought by individual Plaintiffs Jane DeLeon,

Irma Rodriguez, and Jane DeLeons son, Martin Aranas (collectively, Plaintiffs or

named Plaintiffs), and on behalf of the following proposed class:

All members of lawful same-sex marriages whom theDepartment of Homeland Security, pursuant to 3 of theDefense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, has refused or willrefuse to recognize as spouses for purposes of conferringlawful status and related benefits under the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.

Mot. for Class Certification at 3, ECF No. 13.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Defendants

application of Section 3 of DOMA in this case, as well as Defendants regulations,

Id.2As explained by the Attorney General on February 23, 2011, the Attorney General and thePresident have determined that Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as applied to same-sexcouples whose marriages are legally recognized under state law, and the Department of Justice willnot defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA under the equal protection component ofthe Fifth Amendment. The President, however, has instructed the Executive Branch, including theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services(USCIS), to continue to comply with Section 3 of DOMA unless and until Congress repealsSection 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive decision against the laws constitutionality. 28U.S.C. 530D Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. (Feb. 23, 2011), at 5. See ECF No.5-2.


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policies and practices applying Section 3 against Plaintiffs and those similarly

situated, are unlawful. Compl. at 29, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs also seek a preliminary

injunction enjoining Defendants from:

(1) deporting or removing immigrants denied lawful statussolely because they and their U.S. citizen or permanent residentspouses are of the same sex, and from instructing oradvising such immigrants to depart the United States;(2) denying employment authorization to immigrants lackinglawful permanent resident status solely because they andtheir U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouses are of thesame sex;(3) denying immigration benefits under the INA solely

because the immigrant or the non-immigrant has a spouse of

the same sex; and(4) treating immigrants who have applied for benefits underthe INA as acquiring unlawful presence thereby triggeringthe three- and ten-year bars to future lawful admission set outin 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) solely because they and theirU.S. citizen or permanent resident spouses are of the samesex.

Mot. Prelim. Inj. Mem. at 2-3, ECF No. 12.3

Finally, Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from

denying U.S. citizen petitioners and their immigrant spouses applications for

benefits under the INA solely because the lawfully married U.S. citizens and

immigrant beneficiaries are of the same sex. Compl. at 29-30.

3Plaintiffs have set forth three different requests for relief (in their Motion for PreliminaryInjunction, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for PreliminaryInjunction and in the Proposed Order). While the language is similar in many respects, it is notidentical and does not request identical relief. Defendants citation is to the language set forth in thebody of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 12,at 2-3).


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Defendants agree with Plaintiffs that Section 3 of DOMA discriminates on the

basis of sexual orientation in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth

Amendment. That is why the Attorney General informed the Speaker of the House

of Representatives on February 23, 2011 that he would instruct the Department of

Justice to stop defending Section 3s constitutionality. See February 23, 2011 Letter

from U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to U.S. House of Representatives

Speaker, John A. Boehner, Notice to the Court, Ex. 2, ECF No. 5-2. Indeed, Plaintiff

Jane DeLeons consideration for an immigration benefit a discretionary waiver

under 8 U.S.C. 1182(i) of her inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)

has been curtailed because of the application of Section 3 of DOMA, a statute that

violates the Constitution. But Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs efforts to obtain a

broad preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Section 3 of DOMA for a

nationwide class because they have not shown a likelihood that there are class

members who are suffering imminent and irreparable harm. Further, such harm is

even less likely in the time frame presented. The Supreme Court is currently

considering petitions for certiorari in four cases involving the constitutionality of

Section 3 of DOMA. If the Court grants one of these petitions, the constitutionality

of Section 3 will be resolved in the next year. Thus, the balance of harms and the

public interest weigh in favor of foregoing a class-wide injunction at this time.

Rather than a broad, class-wide injunction, the injury caused to Ms. DeLeon and

the derivative injury caused to the other two named plaintiffs can and should be

remediated by a final judgment on the merits that Section 3 of DOMA is


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unconstitutional and that Ms. DeLeons waiver request must be considered without

regard to DOMA. See Opposition to Pls Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 39.

Moreover, Defendants believe Plaintiffs present motion for class certification

should be denied for the following reasons: (1) the class definition is defective

because it is overly broad and is not limited to individuals who have standing; and

(2) the putative class fails to meet the requirements for class certification set forth in

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Opposition to Pls Mot. for

Class Certification, ECF No. 35.

Lastly, consistent with the Attorney Generals direction, the Department of

Justice will defend DOMA Section 3 against claims that do not involve the equal

protection component of the Fifth Amendment, and will defend against other

challenges unrelated to DOMA. On that basis, on September 28, 2012, the Secretary

of DHS, the Director of USCIS, and USCIS (collectively Defendants) moved to

dismiss Plaintiffs Martin Aranas and Irma Rodriguez from this action for lack of

standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Defendants also

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs substantive due process claim and Plaintiffs sex

discrimination claim brought under the Immigration and Nationality Act at 8 U.S.C.

1152(a)(1)(A), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.

Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 46.

C. Intervenor-Defendants defenses

Intervenor-Defendants Defenses: Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge DOMA

Section 3. Even if plaintiffs had standing, DOMA Section 3 is constitutional under


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both the equal protection and substantive due process components of the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Memorandum of Intervenor-

Defendant . . . in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Oct. 9, 2012), attached at Tab 2 to

Ex Parte Application of Intervenor-Defendant for Leave to File Two Separate Legal

Memoranda, Each in Excess of 25 Pages (Oct. 9, 2012) (ECF No. 50).

II POSSIBILITIES FOR SETTLEMENT

A Plaintiffs position

Defendants agree that DOMA 3 unconstitutionally denies same-sex spouses

equal protection of the law, but have indicated they will continue to follow 3 until

the judicial branch delivers a definitive verdict against the laws constitutionality.

Letter from Hon. E. Holder to Hon. J. Boehner, February 23, 2011, reprinted in

Attachment 2 to [Defendants] Notice to Court, July 25, 2012 (Dkt. No. 47).

Given this concession, plaintiffs believe settlement of this action all but certain

should the U.S. Supreme Court disapprove DOMA 3, an outcome plaintiffs

consider increasingly likely before post-appellate final judgment could issue in this

matter. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558; 123 S.Ct. 2472; 156 L.Ed.2d 508

(2003); andRomer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620; 116 S. Ct. 1620; 134 L. Ed. 2d 855

(1996);Massachusetts v. United States HHS, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).

As explained in their pending motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs

believe that immigrants who areprima facie eligible for lawful status but for DOMA

3 should be protected from irreparable injury via interim relief pending a definitive

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ruling on the constitutionality of DOMA 3. Plaintiffs have sought defendants

agreement to such a plan, albeit as of yet without success.

B. Defendants position

Defendants do not believe that further settlement discussions would be

beneficial at this time.

C Intervenors position

Intervenor-Defendant does not believe settlement in this case is possible

because the constitutionality of federal statutes is at issue.

III DISCOVERY PLAN

A. Changes re: disclosures under Rule 26(a)

Plaintiffs Position:

At this time plaintiffs propose no changes to the initial disclosure requirements

of Rule 26(a), Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

Defendants Position:

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants do not believe discovery should

move forward at this time. Accordingly, Defendants object to providing initial

disclosures until either 14 days after the Court has ruled on the pending dispositive

motions (in the event that the litigation goes forward) or the Court rules that

discovery should commence prior to that time, at which time the Defendants will

serve initial disclosures 14 days after such an order. Defendants also request that the

Court stay any other pretrial deadlines pending the outcome of the dispositive

motions.


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B. Subjects for discovery, discovery cut-off date, and whether

discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited

Plaintiffs Position: Plaintiffs proposed to conduct discovery in two phases: In

the first, plaintiffs propose to conduct discovery into the factual claims defendants

raise in opposition to plaintiffs motions for preliminary injunction and class

certification.4 Defendants have thus far declined to cooperate in discovery, and

plaintiffs intend to seek a court order requiring that defendants answer limited

discovery prior to the time plaintiffs replies to defendants opposition to class

certification and preliminary injunction are due, or latest prior to the hearing on

plaintiffs pending motions.

Plaintiffs propose a general discovery cutoff date of February 1, 2013, with the

parties having 30 days from the date expert witnesses, if any, are identified, to

conduct depositions of experts.

Defendants position:

As previously indicated, Defendants believe that any discovery should be

stayed until the Court has ruled on the pending motions to dismiss.

Moreover, Defendants believe it is necessary to revisit the discovery cut-off

deadlines proposed by Plaintiffs after the Court rules on the dispositive motions. As

stated, even if the Court were to conclude that discovery may commence at this time,

4 On September 10, 2012, and September 25, 2012, plaintiffs served defendants with a notice ofdeposition pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) and a first set of interrogatories, requests for admissions, andrequests for production of documents, respectively.


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the deadlines are far too short and would likely need to run at least until the summer

of 2013.

Intervenor-Defendants position:

Because plaintiffs have insisted on commencing discovery, Intervenor-

Defendant intends to serve comprehensive written discovery requests on plaintiffs

and the Executive Branch defendants by the end of October. Intervenor-Defendant

will determine later whether any depositions are needed.

Regarding Plaintiffs proposed discovery cutoff, Intervenor-Defendants

position is that it is too early in this proceeding, with dispositive motions pending, to

set a time for the close of discovery. At a minimum, Intervenor-Defendant believes

that the discovery cut-off date proposed by Plaintiffs is too early. Accordingly,

Intervenor-Defendant proposes that discovery end no earlier than April 30, 2012.

Finally, Intervenor-Defendant does not agree with , and sees no need for,

Plaintiffs proposed two-phase discovery approach.

C. Issues re: discovery of electronically stored information

Plaintiffs anticipate no such issues at this time.


Defendants do not believe this case should involve electronic discovery.

However, Plaintiffs have indicated that they will likely want electronically stored

information, which Defendants understand to mean documents that are stored or

maintained in an electronic format. The parties have agreed to revisit the specifics

concerning this issue when and if it becomes necessary.


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No position on this issue at this early stage of the case. Intervenor-Defendant

reserves the right to revise its position as circumstances warrant.

D. Claims of privilege

Plaintiffs anticipate no such claims at this time.


Defendants will assert all appropriate objections and privileges to discovery

requests at the appropriate time. To the extent such privileges are asserted with

regard to requests for the production of documents, Defendants will provide an

appropriate privilege log specifying any documents withheld or redacted for

privilege and the specific privilege being invoked.

The parties have agreed that the inadvertent production of information subject

to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, deliberative process

privilege, law enforcement privileges, and/or any other applicable privileges

(Privileged Information) will not constitute a waiver of any such privileges or

protections. Promptly upon discovering that it has produced any Privileged

Information, the producing party will notify the other party in writing and designate

the inadvertently produced document on a privilege log. Upon receipt of such

notice, the receiving party will not review such documents further (except for the

purposes of identifying them for their return to the disclosing party and/or

destruction) and will then either return all copies of the same to the producing party

or, at the producing partys option, destroy them.


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Intervenor-Defendant proposes that the parties agree to return any privileged

or work-product materials as soon as it is discovered they were produced and the

receiving party or parties is/are notified of the disclosure by the producing party,

without any need to show that production was inadvertent. Intervenor-Defendant

further proposes that the parties agree to meet and confer in good faith concerning

this and other issues that arise in this area.

E. Changes in the limitations on discovery

At this time plaintiffs propose no changes to the limitations on discovery.


As Defendants have stated above, any discovery should be stayed until the

Court has ruled on the pending motions to dismiss.


No position on this issue at this early stage of the case. Intervenor-Defendant

reserves the right to revise its position as circumstances warrant.

F. Other discovery orders the court should issue

If discovery proceeds, Plaintiffs, Defendants, and BLAG agree that a

Stipulated Protective Order regarding confidentiality issues will be negotiated at the

appropriate time.

G. Other Issues:

Plaintiffs, Defendants, and BLAG have agreed to permit the service of

discovery requests by electronic mail, while still permitting an additional three days


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to be added to the date of service for responses to such discovery, as provided by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d).

Defendants do not consent to the transfer of this case to a Magistrate Judge

and believe the case should remain before the assigned District Court Judge.

Defendants reserve the right to assert all appropriate objections to any and all

discovery requests, to assert all appropriate privileges, and to update this document,

as appropriate.

IV COMPLEXITY OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs, Defendants, and BLAG do not believe this a complex case within

the meaning of Local Rule 26-1(a) or that any part of the part of the procedures of

the Manual For Complex Litigation should be utilized in the management of this

action.

V MOTION SCHEDULE

Defendants and Intervenor-Defendant have already brought motions to dismiss

which seek orders that could be dispositive or partially dispositive of plaintiffs

instant claims.

Plaintiffs position: Plaintiffs anticipate moving for summary judgment or

partial summary adjudication shortly after the completion of discovery. Plaintiffs

propose a cutoff date for dispositive motions of March 1, 2013.


As Plaintiffs have indicated, there currently are four motions pending before

this Court: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 12; (2)


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Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 13; (3) BLAGs Motion to

Dismiss, ECF No. 36; and (4) Defendants Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 46.

Defendants suggest revisiting the motion schedule upon the Courts ruling on the

four pending motions.


Intervenor-Defendant believes the Court should not establish a motions

schedule at this time, but rather should revisit this issue, if necessary, after the Court

resolves the pending motions to dismiss filed by Intervenor-Defendant and the

Executive Branch defendants.

VI ADR

Pursuant to Local Rule 16-15,

Plaintiffs position: Plaintiffs select ADR Procedures Nos. 1 or 2 (The parties

shall appear before a neutral selected from the Court's Mediation Panel) as best

suited to the circumstances of the case. Plaintiffs contend the ADR session should

occur immediately.


Defendants do not believe that ADR would be beneficial or result in a

settlement of this matter at this time. If the Court determines that ADR is necessary,

Defendants select ADR Procedure No. 1 (The parties shall appear before the

magistrate judge assigned to the case for such settlement proceedings as the judge

may conduct or direct).



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As noted above, Intervenor-Defendant does not believe settlement in this case

is possible because the constitutionality of a federal statute is at issue. Accordingly,

Intervenor-Defendant requests relief from L.R. 16-15 inasmuch as the Alternative

Dispute Resolution process cannot result in resolution of this case.

VII TRIAL ESTIMATE

Plaintiffs Position: Plaintiffs believe this matter may be resolved by way of

dispositive motions and that no trial will be required. Should trial prove necessary,

plaintiffs preliminarily estimate needing three days to present their case in chief.


Defendants do not believe that a trial is necessary to resolve the questions of

law before this Court. Defendants believe that this case can be resolved through

motions practice. Accordingly, to the extent the Court determines a trial to be

necessary, Defendants suggest this issue should be addressed at a later date and have

proposed no dates for a pretrial conference, trial estimate, or trial date.


Given the early stage of the case and the fact that dispositive motions are

pending, Intervenor-Defendant is not in a position to estimate trial length or provide

a list of trial counsel at this time. Intervenor-Defendant will amend its position at an

appropriate time should it become necessary.


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VIII ADDITIONAL PARTIES

Plaintiffs Position: Depending on court rulings regarding standing,

numerosity, etc., plaintiffs may move to join additional persons as proposed class

representatives.


Defendants do not have a position on this issue at this time.


Intervenor-Defendant does not anticipate joining additional parties at this time.

IX EXPERT WITNESSES

Plaintiffs Position: Plaintiffs [or: The Parties] do not at this time anticipate

calling expert witnesses. Should that change, plaintiffs propose that the disclosures

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) occur 90 days prior to the date this matter is set for trial.


Defendants do not anticipate the need for expert discovery at this time.

However, Defendants reserve their right to call such experts as necessary and believe

this issue should be revisited if discovery moves forward.


At this early stage of this case, Intervenor has not determined whether it may

call any experts. It reserves its right to do so.

Dated: October 17, 2012. CENTER FORHUMAN RIGHTS ANDCONSTITUTIONAL LAWPeter A. ScheyCarlos R. Holgun


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PUBLIC LAW CENTERJulie Greenwald MarzoukMonica Ashiku

ASIAN LAW ALLIANCEBeatrice Ann M. Pangilinan

LAW OFFICES OF MANULKIN &BENNETTGary H. ManulkinReyna M. Tanner

/s/ Peter A. Schey ________________

/s/ Carlos R. Holgun _____________Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated: October 17, 2012 STUART F. DELERYActing Assistant Attorney GeneralCivil Division

AUGUST E. FLENTJEActing Deputy Assistant Attorney General

DAVID J. KLINEDirector, Office of Immigration Litigation

JEFFREY S. ROBINSAssistant Director

/s/ Jesi J. CarlsonJESI J. CARLSON (DC 975478)Senior Litigation CounselP.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin StationWashington, D.C. 20044Telephone: (202) 305-7037Facsimile: (202) 305-7000Email: [email protected]

TIMOTHY M. BELSANTrial Attorney

Attorneys for Defendants


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Dated: October 17, 2012 Paul D. [email protected]/s/ H. Christopher BartolomucciH. Christopher [email protected]

Nicholas J. [email protected] H. [email protected]

BANCROFT PLLC1919 M Street, N.W.Suite 470Washington, D.C. 20036202-234-0090 (telephone)

202-234-2806 (facsimile)

Of Counsel:Kerry W. Kircher, General [email protected] Pittard, Depy General [email protected] Davenport, Sr. Asst [email protected] B. Tatelman, Assistant Counsel

[email protected] Beth Walker, Assistant [email protected]

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,U.S. HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES219 Cannon House Office BuildingWashington, D.C. 20515202-225-9700 (telephone)

202-226-1360 (facsimile)

Counsel for Intervenor-Defendant theBipartisan Legal Advisory Group of theUnited States House of Representatives

/ / /


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SACV12-01137 CBM (AJWx)

I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2012, I electronically filed

the foregoing JOINT REPORT with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system,

which provided an electronic notice and electronic link of the same to all attorneys of

record through the Courts CM/ECF system.

Dated: October 17, 2012 /s/ ____________________Peter Schey

/ / /


8:12-cv-01137 #67

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