7th review meeting of the - comrsin.pt · presentation outline –national program under cns...

7th ReviewMeetingoftheConventiononNuclear

SafetyCountryGroup2PresentationbyPortugalMarch28th 2017

PresentationOutline

– NationalProgramunderCNS– Changessincethe6th ReviewMeeting– Safetyimprovementsandplannedmeasures– Responsetochallengesandsuggestionsofthe6th ReviewMeeting

– Internationalpeerreviewresults– ViennaDeclaration– ActionsinlightoftheFukushimaDaiichiaccident– Currentandfuturechallenges– QuestionsraisedfrompeerreviewoftheNationalReport– Conclusions

PresentationbyPORTUGAL:[email protected]

Summaryofbasicinformationonthenationalprogram

¡ Portugal became a Contracting Party of CNS in August1998 and has submitted national reports since then;

¡ There are no NPP’s in Portugal and there are no plans toeven consider such possibility;

¡ Public sentiment against NPP’s continues to be strong;

¡ An independent regulatory body (COMRSIN) was createdin 2012 under Decree-Law 30/2012 of February 9th, butrelies on Secretaria Geral Educação e Ciência (SGEC) foradministrative, financial and legal support;


¡ Since 1961 there is a single Research Reactor, the Portuguese ResearchReactor (RPI), which is a 1 MW open pool type reactor;

¡ The RPI was previously converted from HEU to LEU in 2006 to improveproliferation resistance. All HEU has been returned to the United Statesand, at present, there is no spent fuel stored at the facility;

¡ Since 2012, the Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) is the operator of the RPI;

¡ In 2016, the RPI underwent an Integrated Safety Assessment of ResearchReactors mission by the IAEA, at the request of COMRSIN;

Summaryofbasicinformationonthenationalprogram

¡ Exploration for uranium was terminated in 2000;


ChangesinthenationalprogramsincethelastReviewMeeting

• Under Decree-Law 30/2012 of February 9th ,which transposesthe Directive 71/2009/EURATOM, the “Comissão Reguladorapara a Segurança das Instalações Nucleares” (COMRSIN) wascreated as a nuclear regulatory body responsible for licensing,inspecting and regulating the safety of nuclear installations;

• Decree-Law 262/2012 of December 17th proposed byCOMRSIN sets up the obligations that license holders for theoperation of nuclear installations have to comply tocontinuously improve their safety under the supervision of theregulatory authority;



• With these developments Portugal became in full compliancewith the EU Directive 71/2009/EURATOM of June 25th;

• With the publication of Decree-Law 156/2013 of November 5th, COMRSINbecame also responsible for regulating and licensing installations that storeand manage radioactive waste or spent fuel in line with the requirementsof the Joint Convention and Directive 70/2011/EURATOM.

• COMRSIN was also responsible for proposing to the Government theNational Program for the safe management of spent fuel and radioactivewaste as required by Directive 70/2011/EURATOM. The National Programwas finalized in the summer of 2016 after undergoing StrategicEnvironmental Evaluation;



• In December 2013, IST submitted to COMRSIN a number of documents,including a revised version of the Safety Analyses Report (SAR) thatfollows the requirements under Decree-Law 262/2012. All documentswere independently evaluated by COMRSIN;

• COMRSIN made a few recommendations among which the immediateimplementation of the External Emergency Plan that was missing.COMRSIN also recommended greater segregation of responsibilitiesbetween the reactor supervisor and the reactor manager who was alsodirector of the Sacavém campus, as well as more transparency vis-à-visthe information provided to the public;

• In July 2014 the RPI was certified to operate in accordance with Decree-Law 262/2012, provided it complied with the recommendations;



• Since the RPI runs ¼ of the time below maximum power, and hasexperienced no significant operational problems, it has enough fuel torun until 2026 at the same burn up rate;

• In late 2014 the operator communicated to COMRSIN that they wereconsidering continuing the operation of the RPI beyond May 12th 2016;

• May 12th 2016 was the deadline to stop using the present fuel in order toreturn it to the USA by May 12th 2019, under the “receive back program”sponsored by the US Department of Energy;

• Missing such deadline means changing the paradigm for the treatmentof spent fuel in Portugal, and delaying decommissioning well beyond2019.



• The National Program for the safe management of radioactive wasteand spent fuel already foresees two pathways for the spent fuel of theRPI:

a) Return to the USA prior to May 12th 2019 under the “receiveback program” managed by the US DOE;

b) Reprocess abroad and return to Portugal in the form of vitrifiedILW, stored in appropriate casks to be stored at a surface facility;

• This National Program is yet to be approved by Government;


SafetyimprovementsandplannedmeasuresfortheResearchReactor

• Given that the RPI had been operating since 1961, and the last safetyreview of the infrastructure took place more than 20 years ago, COMRSINdecided to ask the IAEA for a full INSARR mission focused on the ageingmanagement of systems, structures and components;

• The INSARR mission took place in February 2016. The report by theexpert panel pointed out a number of important safetyrecommendations and suggestions to be accomplished by the operatorIST;

• Based on the INSARR report, COMRSIN issued, on April 4th 2016, aregulatory decision compelling IST to find the necessary financial andhuman resources to implement the INSARR mission report;



• COMRSIN and IST also agreed that the operation of the RPI should bestopped prior to May 12th 2016, in order to start the implementation ofthe INSARR mission recommendations, and at the same time leave alloptions opened vis-à-vis the management of the spent fuel, until theGovernment approves the National Program for the safe managementof radioactive waste and spent fuel, and decides about the future of thefacility;

• Although, under Decree-Law 29/2012, IST is responsible for the operationof the RPI, the cost of eliminating the spent fuel and implementingdecommissioning pertains to the Government;


• The RPI stopped operation on May 9th 2016 and is undergoingmajor maintenance, including a non destructive inspection of thereactor core, the lining in the pool and cooling pipes;

• The operator is also implementing the INSARR missionrecommendations. The expert report may be seen at:http://www.comrsin.pt/pt/seg-nuclear-pt/rpi-missao

• IST and COMRSIN have agreed on an international advisorycommittee to overlook the implementation of therecommendations;



Planned Measures are:

Ø Organizational aspects;Ø Ageing of the facility;Ø Water leakage from the reactor pool;Ø I&C system and its replacement;Ø Operational radioactive waste management;Ø Water leakage detection in the pump room;Ø Seismic detection;Ø Operational radiation detection;Ø Safety analyses and safety documents;Ø Emergency preparedness;Ø Experiments.



Responsetothechallengesandsuggestionsofthe6th ReviewMission

• From the legal point of view Portugal has a regulatory structure thatis in line with both the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the JointConvention, and Directive 71/2009/EURATOM;

• Nevertheless there has been almost no progress in providingCOMRSIN with the human resources required to respond to thework that needs to be done or become independent from SGEC;

• Commissioners are appointed without pay and technical staff ishired on a yearly bases;


Internationalpeerreviewmissionresults

• The main conclusions of the INSARR mission report have beenposted on COMRSIN website;

• The full INSARR mission report remains confidential at the requestof the Minister of Science Technology and Higher Education(MSTHE);

• COMRSIN expects IST to fully implement the INSARR missionrecommendations by the end of 2018 at the cost of about 1-2 M€.Until then the reactor is shut down;

• Portugal has not yet requested an IRRS mission, although COMRSINhas informed MSTHE of the need to complete one by 2019;


ViennaDeclaration

• Portugal has no NPP’s;

• The 1 MW research reactor is undergoing a safety upgrade as a result ofthe INSARR mission recommendations, which includes a full nondestructive review of systems, structures and components;

• Given that the RPI is a 1 MW power reactor, even in the case of the mostserious event, such as the loss of water in the pool, there is no fueldamage, regardless of the status of the power supply. Thereforeradiation exposure and contamination beyond the perimeter of theinstallation is limited to a few hundred meters from the reactor core;

• Portugal is transposing Directive 87/2014/EURATOM to its national law toinforce further regulatory guidance.


ViennaDeclaration

• Although Portugal is using the graded approach to implement thetransposition of the amended Nuclear Safety Directive along the lines ofrecital 25th, the “Achilles heel” remains the robustness of the regulatorybody in terms of administrative, financial, legal, and human resources andits effective independence;

• This problem may be consolidated once the Directive 59/2013/EURATOMgets transposed and, eventually, a single regulatory body emerges that isresponsible for nuclear and radiologic safety.


• The RPI was constructed taking into account the historical seismicityof the region of Lisbon.

ActionstakeninthelightoftheFukushimaDaiichiaccident

• In the 2007 update of the safety studies of the RPI, an earthquakewas taken as an initiating event for a Beyond Design Basis Accident.

• Since the power of the RPI is only 1 MW, there is no fuel damageeven in the case of complete loss of water from the pool, regardlessof the status of the power supplies.


ActionstakeninthelightoftheFukushimaDaiichiaccident

• As reported during the 6th Review Meeting, recent literature showsthat tsunami waves following the 1755 earthquake are less than 1mhigh in the Tagus river at a point close to the RPI;

• As the reactor is located 30m above the sea level, this is not asignificant issue for the safety of the installation;

• Thus, it is possible to conclude that additional measures to adjustthe conditions of the installation in case of earthquake followed bytsunami is not be required. The same applies to other extremeevents.

• Nevertheless, after the INSARR mission this is again under review.PresentationbyPORTUGAL:A.C.Fonseca

[email protected]

• The future of the RPI requires:a) Human and financial resources to implement the INSARR mission

recommendations;b) A consolidated proposal that recognizes the importance of the

reactor for education & training, research, and services, both for Portugaland other countries as well, namely Portuguese speaking countries.

• Staffing the regulatory body with minimal human resources that arecompetent, independent from the nuclear operator, and not so old interms of age;

• In matters that pose no conflict of interest, COMRSIN uses IST as aTechnical Support Organization (TSO);

CurrentandfutureChallenges


• We cannot identify good practices or areas of good performance, asdefined in CNS;

• At the present time, for a country like Portugal, “good practices” mean tobe very realistic about the problems and shortcomings we face, take thenecessary actions that improve the safety of nuclear installations andradioactive storage facilities, develop a safety culture and a regulatoryframework that is self sustained and withstands time;

• If we achieve this in the next three-years, it will be “our own goodpractice”.

GoodPracticesandAreasofGoodPerformance


Ø The National Report was peer reviewed by 6 countries who asked 23questions we hope to have answered to your satisfaction:

a) Sweden 15 b) France 2c) Spain 2 d) United States 2e) Belgium 1 f) Slovakia 1

Ø http://www.comrsin.pt/index.php/pt/p-r-convention-on-nuclear-safety-7th-meeting

Ø Most asked questions are:a) Implementation of the INSARR recommendations by the operator,

the future of the RPI and the destination of the present fuel;b) The independence and robustness of the regulatory body in terms

of staff and financial adequacy;c) The lack of an IRRS mission;

QuestionsraisedfrompeerreviewoftheNationalReport


Ø Much was accomplished to review the safety of the research reactor andmake sure the operator implements the INSARR recommendations;

Ø This task may be terminated by the end of 2018 at the cost of 1-2€;Ø COMRSIN has been able to accomplish its obligations as a nuclear

regulatory body using the technical support and guidance of the IAEA. Weare deeply grateful to the Agency;

Ø We cannot make any predictions on when and how the regulatory bodywill be restructured in order to be effectively independent fromGovernment or SGEC (public body the gives administrative, financial andlegal support to COMRSIN);

Ø This may happen after the transposition of Directive 59/2013/EURATOM;Ø We are transposing Directive 87/2014/EURATOM using the graded

approach as stated in recital 25th.

Conclusions


Thankyouforyourconsideration!

CountryGroup2PresentationbyPortugalMarch28th 2017

7th review meeting of the - comrsin.pt · presentation outline –national program under cns...

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