7/10/1973:Syria

captures southern

Golan Heights

8/10/1973: Israel

launches first counterattac

k

28/10/1973:12/10/1973:U.S. sends additional arms to Israel

16/10/1973:First Israeli troops cross

the Suez Canal

17/10/1973:Ten Arab

nations cut oil production until Israel withdraws

22/10/1973:Immediate ceasefire

called by the UN

23/10/1973:Fighting continues despite

ceasefire

The Arab Slide of Things: Pre-War IdeologySadat knew Egyptian military could not defeat

Israel’s, but wanted to cause just enough conflict to make Israelis withdraw from Suez Canal so that peace talks could begin.

Sadat wanted to promote his image and gain the popularity Nasser had by reclaiming the Suez Canal and Sinai Desert for Egypt (which Nasser lost during the 1967 War).

Sadat also wanted to prove Egypt could hold its own and “break the defeatist attitude of the population.”

The Arab Slide of Things: Post-WarDuring the war, Arabs used the “oil weapon,”

halting oil exports to the U.S. to punish them for their support of Israel.

War restored confidence in Palestinian troops and people, and reminded the world of Palestinian distresses.

Egyptian and Syrian armies had proven Israeli military was not invincible.

The large number of human losses (8,500 Egyptian and Syrian soldiers killed, almost 20,000 wounded) made finding a peace agreement all the more sought after.

The Israel Slide of ThingsPart IBefore the Yom Kippur War, Israel still had

control of the Suez Canal and other lands. They believed that the boundaries gained after

1967 were vital for its national security.As tension between Israel and Arab Countries

rose, The USA advised Israel to not make the first strike.

Due to their past victories, Israeli leaders were convinced that any Arab attack would be suicidal.

The Israel Slide of ThingsPart II� The Defense Minister Dayan Claimed several

days after the initial attack on Yom Kippur that he had information about it but decided against a preemptive strike.

� Do to the attack, Israeli felt like they needed to protect their land now more then ever.

� Despite their victory, their confidence had been shaken and resulted in public anger at Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Key PlayersIsrael:

United StatesArab:

EgyptSyriaIraqJordanSoviet Union

Key Battles South:

In Sinai, Egypt’s major military force crossed the Suez Canal and captured Israeli positions on the Eastern front sending Israel’s defenders back toward the desert. Egyptians overran Bar Lev line (the famous Israel defense system) with heavy air and artillery assaults.

By the end of the first week Egypt installed almost 100,000 men on the East Bank of the Suez Canal.

During the second week Israeli troops entered the West Bank of the Suez Canal on Egyptian territory. Their aim was to surround the Egyptian troops in the East Bank of Sinai and block their retreat across the Suez Canal back to Egypt. The Israelis closed the Egyptians in two small areas in Sinai; the Israeli troops had also gained control over the Third Army’s supply of food and water.

North: Syria attacked the Golan Heights to gain advantage over Israeli

settlements in valleys below. Equipped with 800 tanks Syrians crossed the ceasefire line at four different points.

By the end of the first week Iraq and Jordan supplied troops for Syrian front.

During the second week of war with fierce tank battles in Golan Heights Israel drove back Syrians and moved towards Damascus.

� Israel gained land in the Golan Heights and on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

� Syria and Egypt held to their early victories and felt they deserved the land lost to Israel both from the 1967 war and the October War.

Outcome of the Conflict

� UN was used as a last-minute rescue operation with rapid ceasefires instead of real, preventative diplomacy

� Kissinger’s step-by-step plan was induced

Works Cited

Fraser, T. G. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Basingstoke, Hampshire [England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Print.

Schulze, Kirsten E. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Longman,

1999. Print.

Stoessinger, John George. Why Nations Go to War. New York: St.

Martin's, 1974. Print.