7. suntay v. suntay, g.r. no. 183053, october 10, 2012 fulltext.docx

7/29/2019 7. Suntay v. Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012 fulltext.docx

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SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE

ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-

SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,Petitioner,

- versus -

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 183053Present:

CARPIO,J.,

Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andPEREZ,*JJ.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1]who, faced with the impasse between Spain andPortugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the

riches of the New World by issuing theInter Caetera,[2]we are confronted with the

difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a

decedent.[3]

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.

74949,[4]reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,

Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),

married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son,
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Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At

the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several

grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and

respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they

begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II,

all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was

subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock,

Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,

Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he wasa mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an

acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of

Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was

annulled.[6]Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II,

lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father

and paternal grandparents.

Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for

visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio

II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the

petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to

thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by

respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her

grandparents.

Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on

September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and

Nenita.[7]

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of

administration in her favor, containing the following allegations:
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[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of

Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real andpersonal properties, with a probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the

names, ages and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)

Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2)Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident ofx x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter

and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate

grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent] knew, thedecedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her death.

[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent

Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among

others, that:

[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate

and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the

mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference

in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated fromtheir grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in

the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,]

namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the

integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he wasalready the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of

the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels

allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings

amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his

adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in

the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of

administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to

Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his

Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his

grandfathers opposition, alleging thatFederico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was

better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the

decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that:


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[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the

decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio

Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her

grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the family group

are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the oppositor [Federico]after his graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and

Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]

In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.

After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on

their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on

November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of

decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and

the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed

administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shallenter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount

of P200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and completeinventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,

legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any

other time when required by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration beissued in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set

aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
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Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the

decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated

November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan inSPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters ofadministration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are

consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed

administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters ofadministration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of

Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals

by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT,

WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN

PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE

SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODEAPPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated,

thus:

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial

and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the

decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, beappointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondentsimmediate] family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root

cause of which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the

proper forum to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of theestate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.


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The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against

the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her homein Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the

surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as

administrator.

As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is

accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of

Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment ofthe petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted

child. Such nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be

imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico]

has passed away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated bylaw. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III]

appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants,

creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of the

position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear

to the court that when it comes to management of real estate and the processing

and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track recordas a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position to better handle the

preservation of the estate.[14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate

child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the

estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA

pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by Federico, and which

nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the decedents

estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the

following reasons:[15]

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive

condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the

surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before hisappointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of

Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate

offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being


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the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and

entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;

3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16]of the Civil

Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimatechildren and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from

inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the

administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and

4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as

Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of

the disqualifications specified in Section 1,[17]Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and

respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in

the administration of the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses

over several undisputed facts and circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to

give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid andeffective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron

curtain bar rule,[18]is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for

the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III,

on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her

husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the

decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the

subsistence of their marriage;
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5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled

with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership,

albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share inthe distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not

simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio

III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son,

Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the

interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under

the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of successionover a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in

the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a

strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive

condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly

inapplicable to the case at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the

appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6.When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no

executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refusethe trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be

granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of

kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving

husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and

willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next ofkin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the

husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death ofthe person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted

to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,

if competent and willing to serve;


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(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may

be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant

facts and circumstances of each case.[19]Jurisprudence has long held that theselection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.[20]In the

main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a

joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers,

Cristinas, estate.

In the case ofUy v. Court of Appeals,[21]we upheld the appointment by the

trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the decedents

brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, wedeclared inDelgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de

Damian[22]that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is theinterest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not

rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and

equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management

of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putativeheirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita

Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of

respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting

claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina

and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move

in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992

of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate

relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably

demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent,

was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from

infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
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decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of

administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in

the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code,beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted

only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code

prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the

legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code ofthe Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article

943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in

subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion ofthe illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate orillegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate

child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the

illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference beingindefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall

have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all

cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; orcontrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first

solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--

vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love,

it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the

law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals,always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the

assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last

will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent

by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his

property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute tothe welfare of humanity.

[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of

intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not


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distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her

husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an

illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of

this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal

presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity andantagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain

from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares

of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question

on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be

settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25]on the same issue remains good

law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the

evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estatehad hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the

stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is

liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoingadmonition:

Sec. 1.When order for distribution of residue is made.x x x. If there is a

controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased personor as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the

controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above

mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,

give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of saidobligations within such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of

Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to

both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
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upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,

Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial

Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination

and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the

actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legalinterest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of theCourts Division.


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ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate JusticeChairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division

Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision hadbeen reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza per Special Order No. 842 dated June 3,

2010.[1] Formerly Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia, before ascending to the religious title of Pope and assuming the name

Alexander VI.[2] The Papal Bull which drew a longitudinal line (one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape

Verde Islands) and bestowed all non-Christian lands west thereof to Spain, and east of the line to Portugal.[3] In The Family, a book with a factual core on the Borgia family of 15 th Century Rome, Mario Puzo

recounts that the ostensibly fair and just papal ruling actually favored Spainand placed Portugal at a disadvantage

because papal intervention and arbitration of the matter was made at the behest of King Ferdinand of Spain. More

importantly, Pope Alexander VI was originally a Catalan who, at the start of his career as a cleric in Italy,

conveniently changed his name from the Spanish Borja to the Italian Borgia to gain acceptance and credibility

as an authentic Roman clergy.[4] Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a

member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo,pp. 20-32.[5] Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga; rollo, pp. 35-60.[6] Rollo, p. 43.[7] Id. at 137-138.

[8] Id. at 35.[9] Id. at 21-22.

[10] Id. at 58.[11] Id. at 60.

[12] Id. at 31-32.[13] Memorandum of petitioner; id. at 195.[14] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
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[15] Id. at 25-31.[16] Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and

relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate

child.[17] Sec.1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.No person is competent to serve as

executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,

improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral

turpitude.[18] Called as such because the law does not recognize the natural tie of blood and is based on the presumed

intervening antagonism and incompatibility between the legitimate and illegitimate family of a deceased. See Diaz v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987, 150 SCRA 645.[19] See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16, 2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court

ofAppeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413; Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).[20] See Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gabriel v. Court ofAppeals, supra; Capistrano v. Nadurata, supra.[21] Supra note 19.[22] G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334, 360. (Citations omitted.)[23] Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,

First Quarter (1976), Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 40-41; cited in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66574,February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 427, 434; andDiaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 18, at 651.[24] Cited in BALANE, Jottings and Jurisprudence (1998), p. 368.

[25] Supra note at 19, at 728.
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7. suntay v. suntay, g.r. no. 183053, october 10, 2012 fulltext.docx

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