6.floyd texto sobre human security

8/3/2019 6.Floyd Texto Sobre Human Security

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HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL Volume 5, Winter 2007

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Human Security and the CopenhagenSchools Securitization Approach:Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move1

D

oes the human security approach

offer an alternative to the CopenhagenSchools securitization approach?

And, connected to this, what, if any,relationship exists between the two approaches?This article seeks to answer both of these criticalquestions. Such a comparative analysis betweenthe human security agenda and the CopenhagenSchools securitization approach may at rst seem

somewhat nonsensical. After all, one is a policy-making agenda whilst the other is a theoreticaltool for the analysis of security policies. In short,the two concepts occupy different positions inthe logic of security. It can be argued, however,

that precisely because the two approaches occupyopposite ends of a spectrum, a comparative studyhelps to reveal the diverse nature of criticalsecurity studies. In this article, the human securityapproachalthough a policymaking agendaistaken to be an approach within critical security

studies simply by virtue of being critical ofthe mainstream, state-centric security studies.Moreover, any comparative analysis carries with

it the added benet of showing the limitations ofthat which is compared. This article is no exceptionand comparing the securitization approach withthe human security approach in terms of bothanalytical utility and normative utility sheds lighton the shortcomings and merits of each approach;it does not seek to bring about competition betweenthe two approaches, nor does it even suggest thatsuch competition exists.

For purposes of structure this article is dividedinto two parts. The rst part examines whether the

human security approach offers an alternative tothe securitization approach in terms of analyticalutility. The second part engages with a differentinterpretation of "alternative." Thus, instead ofreading "alternative" from within the "narrow"constraints of a concepts analytical utility (or put

Rita Floyd

Rita Floyd has recently been awarded her PhD from the University of Warwick, where she will commence an ESRC post-doctoral fellowship in early 2008. She has previously published in the "Review of International Studies" and the "Journalof International Relations and Development."

The Copenhagen School

The article compares the Copenhagen Schools securitization approach to

the human security approach, both in terms of analytical utility and norma-tive utility. It states that human security lacks any analytical utility, whilehaving the upper hand on the securitization approach in terms of normativeutility. The Copenhagen School is indeed unable to make recommendationsaimed at improving the lives of the most disadvantaged.


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differently from the Copenhagen Schools pointof view) the article enquires into the normativeutility of the human security approach and also thatof the securitization approach. Normative utilityhereby refers to the security analysts ability toinuence the securitization process in a deliberate

and thought-out fashion to a desired effect.The article finds that the human security

approach offers an alternative to the securitizationapproach in terms of normative utility only. This isbecause it offers an approach whereby the objectivewhen writing about security is not to perform theprocesses tracing of who can securitize, what issues,under what conditions and with what effects. Thatis security analysis for the Copenhagen School.2Rather, the objective is to highlight persistinginsecurities of individuals or groups of individuals.

In other words, human security offers an alternativeto security analysis per se. As such it offers anoutlet for those interested in working towardsachieving security. On the basis of this, the articleconcludes that both approaches are valuable inand of themselves and that neither can nor shouldreplace the other.

HumansecurityversustHesecuritization

approacH: analyticalutility

Unlike other critical (or non state centric) approachesto security, the human security approach, as withthe 1994 Human Development Report, Japans"social safety nets" approach and Canadas and Norways Human Security Program, originatedfrom within the policymaking world.3 Arguablybecause of this, proponents have struggled to put atheoretical edge to the concept. While some claimthat this does not diminish the concept in any way,others appear to be feverishly on the lookout for

this theoretical leverage, suggesting that, to some,not only practice but also theory matters.4 The maincontention in this theoretical debate centers uponwhether (and, if so, how) to narrow the conceptof human security into a workable denition. For

the most part, this debate has coalesced aroundtwo rival denitions: rst, there are those who

dene human security broadly as "freedom from

want", understanding the concept as "more than

safety from violent threats [] such as poverty,disease and environmental disasters."5 And second,there are those who dene human security more

narrowly as "freedom from fear", whereby humansecurity is understood as "freedom from violentthreats" only.6 For a avour of this internal debateit is useful to cite proponents of both the wide andthe narrow denitions. The rst quote is taken

from Lloyd Axworthys contribution to SecurityDialogues 2004 symposium on human security.7Axworthy is a popular proponent of the wideconception of human security, who in his formerrole as Canadian foreign minister (1995-2000) wasan instrumental gure in bringing about Canadas

Human Security Program.8 The second quote istaken from the eminent security analyst KeithKrause, who participated in the same symposium.

Like Axworthys explanation of the wide approach,Krauses view is fairly representative of the narrowapproach to human security.

"Although conflict, particularly civil war,continues to harm, the impact of environmentaldisasters, communicable disease, and povertyare often far greater. The urgency of these manythreats, coupled with a policy vacuum, creates acritical need for the development of human securityscience and governance solutions."9

"Human security ought to be about freedom

from fear not about freedom from want [] fortwo reasons. The rst is a negative one: the broad

vision of human security is ultimately nothingmore than a shopping list; it involves slapping thelabel human security on a wide range of issues thathave no necessary link. At a certain point, humansecurity becomes a loose synonym for bad thingsthat can happen, and it then loses all utility topolicymakersand incidentally to analysts. [Secondand] more important, it is not clear that anything

is gained by linking human security to issuessuch as education, fair trade practices and publichealth."10

In addition, for a third view, consider thisstatement by anthropologists Donna Winslow &Thomas Hylland Eriksen, also taken from the abovementioned symposium: "The term itself [human

security] is fuzzy and needs to be problematized,but in fact its appeal lies in its very vagueness.

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As anthropologists, we do not limit ourselves tothe traditional denition of human security as

freedom from fear and freedom from want. Rather,we examine how security is dened in different

social and cultural contexts, through symbolic andsocial processes, and how security and insecurityare dealt with through social institutions."11

These quotes on how, and whether, to makehuman security theoretically more viable highlighta further obstacle on the way to achieving thisgoal, namely the inherently interdisciplinary natureof the concept. Although that is not a bad thing,(indeed in the social sciences the trend seems tobe the more interdisciplinary the better) it couldbe argued that with regard to theoretical viability,this complicates matters signicantly. Consider the

examples above. Here we have voices from three

different "disciplines": a (former) policymaker, apolitical scientist and two anthropologists. As isquite evident from the quotes, all of these come tohuman security with a different background andwith different needs. In this case, the policymakerand the anthropologist are happy with what worksin practice more than the theoretical viability, whilstfor the political scientistespecially a theorist likeKrausea theoretical leverto the concept appears vital.Possibly, however, as long

as proponents campaign fordifferent denitions, and have

a completely different take ontheory, the concept is boundto remainhere using Roland Paris expression"slippery by design",with "human security[seemingly] capable of supporting virtually anyhypothesisalong with its oppositedependingon the prejudices and interests of the particularresearcher."12

It is fair to say therefore, that due to itspopularity, it is rather difcult to provide an exactdenition of what is even meant by human security.

Generally speaking, however, human securityis the idea that the individual is at the receivingend of all security concerns, whereby security isunderstood as freedom from want and/or freedomfrom fear. Whilst making the individual the objectof security sounds straightforward, the difculty

begins when considering the denition of security.

Hence, security threats now potentially lurk in alldomains of life and, unsurprisingly, human securityencompasses some seven different domains ofsecurity: economic, food, health, environmental,

personal, community, and political.13 Conceptuallymore difcult yet than the sheer endlessness of

the threat spectrum is the provision of humansecurity. Who is to provide human security?Surely the individual himself is in no positionto provide for his own security, for how shouldan individual claim/legitimize his own right tosurvival? Thus, logically, the provision of humansecurity can only be guaranteed by a larger entitysuch as society, the state, or some global institution,with as the Copenhagen School puts it "securityaction [] usually taken on behalf of, and with

reference to, a collectivity."14

Consequently, asthe Copenhagen School member Barry Buzanputs it: "If the referent object of human security

is collectives, then the job it is trying to do isbetter done by societal or identity security. []Reductionism in security thinking eliminates thedistinctiveness of international security being aboutinteraction among social collectivities. While a

moral case for making individualsthe ultimate referent object can beconstructed, the cost to be paid

is loss of analytical purchase oncollective actors both as the mainagents of security provision and aspossessors of a claim to survival

in their own right."15Once this shift takes place, however, what

then sets human security apart from existingconcepts of security such as the CopenhagenSchools framework for analysis? The answerto this question is complicated, and at rst even

contradictory. The rst part of the answer to thisquestion is that nothing sets human security apartfrom other critical concepts of security. Thus, forexample, under the Copenhagen School frameworkindividuals can be both securitizing actors and/or referent objects of security. While this may beobvious to the securitization/Copenhagen Schoolenthusiast, it requires some further explanation.The Copenhagen Schools 1998 book Security:

" human security is the

idea that the individualis at the receiving end oall security concerns."



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A New Framework for Analysis quite clearlystates that, "in principle, securitizing actorscan attempt to construct anything as a referentobject."16 Critics of the School time and againargue that the Copenhagen School in general, andthe securitization approach in particular, operatewith a state centric reading of security that is littledifferent from mainstream approaches to securitysuch as realism.17 There are two likely reasons whycritics might come to this conclusion. The rst is

that there is some discrepancy in Ole Wvers(the originator of the securitization approach)numerous writings regarding the role of the statein security analysis, and by extension, therefore,in the securitization approach. Notably in 1995,for example, Wver forcefully argues that "theconcept of security belongs to the state"18 whereas

only three years later in the above mentioned 1998book he (or rather they) argues for the incorporationof other referent objects of security, including theindividual. Although this might seem like a ratherbold contradiction in Wvers argument, it is infact consistent with the securitization approachsown logic. To recognize why this is the case, it isimperative to understand two fundamentals aboutthe securitization approach. First, securitizationtheory is aimed at studying securitization anddesecuritization19 as they occur in practice. And,

second, for securitization to work, a securitizingactor needs capabilities (by Wver sometimesalso referred to as "means"), because otherwise thesecuritization will amount to nothing more thana securitizing move. A securitizing move wouldbe the expression of existential fear only, with noresonance with the audience and, importantly, noconsequent security practice.

The rst of these premises explains the changed

view of the role of the state in security analysis

in Wvers writing. What changed was not (rstand foremost at least) his opinion, but rather the practice of security. Thus, whereas during theCold War the state was more or less universallyaccepted as the referent object of security, in thedecade following the end of the Cold War the roleof the state had become increasingly challengedby the recently emerged "New World Order" ofthe 1990s. Meanwhile, the concept of the state

became simultaneously problematized in theacademic world of International Relations theory.This new attitude towards the state led many both policymakers and academicsto postulatereferent objects other than the state at the centreof a particular security dynamic. The CopenhagenSchool was very much at the forefront of thistrend, and other referent objects became swiftlyincorporated into the securitization approach.Because they happened in practice, they neededto be accounted for in the theoretical framework,particularly if the securitization approach was tohave longevity beyond these changes.

The other reason why critics might nonethelessview Wver et al as state centric is tied to thesecond premise of the securitization approach.Although as just argued under the securitization

approach anything can potentially become areferent object of security, much of the CopenhagenSchools analysis still concerns itself with the roleof the state in security analysis. Noteworthy here isthe 2003 bookRegions and Powers where, despiteall that was said in the earlier published Security: ANew Framework for Analysis, the state once againtakes centre stage in the Schools analysis. Whilecritics will no doubt interpret this as realist statecentricism they are mistaken. The reason for thefocus on the state is that most securitizations are still

performed by state actors, as these unlike mostother securitizing actors have the capabilities tomake securitizations happen. This leaves, in thewords of the Copenhagen School, the securitizationapproach "not dogmatically state centric in itspremises, but [...] often somewhat state-centric inits ndings."20 A statement that conrms the rst

premise of the securitization approach, wherebythe securitization analyst is interested in studyingsecuritizations and desecuritizations as they occur

in practice. In other words, if then the majority ofsecuritizations and desecuritizations take placein the state centric domain this is not because ofthe personal preferences of Buzan and Wver (inRegions and Powers the securitization analysts),but rather refers to what is going on in practice.That the Copenhagen School does not pick securityissues in accordance with personal preferences,but rather with a view to what happens in practice,

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is also highlighted by the fact that, although bothBuzan and Wver are very sceptical of "theindividual" as a referent object of security,21 theCopenhagen Schools framework for analysisallows for the individual as both referent as wellas provider of security.

If the security relations emphasized under thehuman security approach are already catered toin other critical security literature such as theCopenhagen Schools securitization approach,what is the added value of human security? Here theanswer becomes somewhat convoluted and initiallyeven contradictory. By taking an even closer lookat human security it seems that everything sets theconcept apart from the securitization approach.Unlike, for example, securitization theorys threestep process of tracing that which constitutes an

incident of securitization(1) identification ofexistential threats (also known as securitizingmoves) (2) emergency action and (3) effects oninter-unit relations by breaking free of ruleshumansecurity offers no such thing.22 Indeed, apart fromthe idea that security should be about individuals,human security entirely lacks a framework ofanalysis; this is truly the crux of the criticism ofhuman securitys analytical ability. It can be argued(somewhat harshly perhaps)that because of this, from a

human security perspectivealone, it is impossible toperform any kind of securityanalysis.

That being said, however,two questions immediatelyarise. First, is security analysisreally what proponents ofhuman security set out to perform? And, inconnection with this, is analytical utility really

the best and the fairest way by which to ascertainwhether the human security approach offersan alternative to the securitization approach?Considering all that was said above it seems thatinstead of security analysis, what proponents ofhuman security really do (and are interested indoing) is identify existential threats to individualsand/or groups of individuals. Therefore, rather thanwishing to draw a clearer picture of who did what

and when in any given security policy, they wishto achieve the securitization of individual humanbeings. Put into the language of the CopenhagenSchool, instead of performing security analysis,those who work within the human security traditionperform securitizing moves themselves, the rst

step in the three step process that is securitization.Going one step further than this, it can be argued,not only that human security is bereft of any kind ofanalytical utility, but also that it opens a further eld

of analysis, whereby it is conceivable to analyse thesecuritizing moves of human security proponentsusing the processes tracing tools offered by thesecuritization approach. Human security, in otherwords, is positioned at the explanadum end (thatwhich is to be explained) of security studies, whilstthe processes tracing tool that is the securitization

approach can be used to analyse and explain whodoes what, and with what effects in the humansecurity literature.

humansecurityversusthesecuritization

approach: normativeutility

Considering, however, that security analysis clearlyis not the goal of the human security agenda, it

seems unjust to measure the validityof the approach in these terms only.

The better and fairer question to ask isinstead: what is the normative utility

of human security? And in connectionwith this, what is the normative utilityof the securitization approach? Asthe following aims to show, it is byanswering these questions that thehuman security approach emerges as

a genuine alternative to the securitization approach.For purposes of structure, however, let us begin

with the second question rst.As this article has shown, the securitizationapproach is rst and foremost a processes tracing

tool that helps the security analyst determinewhen there is/was a process of securitization and/or desecuritization, how this came about. andwho were the actors involved. The securitizationapproach is an important tool for the analysisof security and one that has been amply used in

"Te reason orthe ocus on thestate is that mostsecuritizations arestill perormed bystate actors."



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the existing literature.23 This said, however, thestrengths of the securitization approachpuresecurity analysisare also its limits, becausewith the securitization approach all that canbe performed is security analysis and nothingabove and beyond.24 In a time when boundaries between the role of the security analyst andsecuritizing actors are more often than not eithercriticised or simply disregarded, many nd this

a considerable limitation.25 Others even chooseto ignore this limitation altogether and discuss atlength the ethical and moral implications of thesecuritization approach.26 Be that as it may, thefact remains that under the Copenhagen Schoolssecuritization approach the security analyst andthe securitizing actor are both functionally andconceptually distinct entities: "The designation

of what constitutes a security issue comes frompolitical actors, not analysts, but analysts interpretpolitical actors actions and sort out when theseactions full the security criteria. It is, further, the

analyst who judges whether the actor is effectivein mobilizing support around the security reference(i.e., the attempted securitizers are "judged" rst

by other social actors and citizens, and the degreeof their following is then interpreted and measured by us). Finally, to assess the signicance of an

instance of securitization, analysts study its effects

on other units. The actor commands at only onevery crucial step: the performance of a political

act in a security mode."27

In recent t imes the at tentiveness andsubsequently the criticism of the limitation of pure security analysis has grown particularlyacute. The reasons for this are two-fold. First,there has been an increased awareness that theconstructivist security analystas well as thesecuritization analystinvoluntarily co-constitutes

social and political reality by virtue of his or herown written text, and/or spoken word.28 Thatis to say, this so-called "normative dilemma ofspeaking and writing security"29 is believed torender the boundaries between security analysisand performing securitizing moves less rigid, asthe securitization analyst alone, by selecting a casestudy, is said to reinforce existing dichotomies ofsecurity and insecurity.

Second, there exist an increasing number oftexts that seek to build bridges, or at least identifycommonalities, between two or more of theEuropean critical schools of security.30 Evidently,part of this "bridge building" always includesanalysis of the merits of the chosen approaches

and, of course,a compar isonbetween them.A comparison b e t w e e n t h eWelsh and theC o p e n h a g e nS c h o o l s

approaches to security, for example, quite clearlyreveals that unlike the securitization analyst theWelsh School analyst is not tied to pure security

analysis alone, but rather can enter the securityequation with the purpose of informing securitizingactors of their "false consciousness" in theirendorsing a particular securitization. This is anadvantage the securitization analystdistinct fromthe securitizing actor he or she isdoes not have.31Of course the securitization approach, in turn, hasconsiderable advantages over aspects of the WelshSchools approach. What these are, however, is notof interest for this argument. Rather, what is ofinterest is that such "bridge building" sheds light

on the limitations of the respective approaches.In the case of the securitization approach, onelimitation quite clearly lies in the inability of thesecuritization analyst to enter the security equationhim/herself.32 The existence of the normativedilemma of speaking and writing security makesthis inability even more troubling, as it leavesthe securitization analyst without any means torectify what s/he her/himself has co-constituted,simply by virtue of performing security analysis.

Wver and the Copenhagen School have sought tocounter this limitation by expressing a preferenceforall things being equaldesecuritization.33This is based on the erroneous belief that alldesecuritizations will lead to politicization, therealm where issues can be dealt with by normaland, more often than not, democratic means.Given, however, that not all desecuritizations leadto politicization and also that not all securitizations

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"Security analysisclearly is not thegoal o the humansecurity agenda."


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have negative consequences, the Copenhagenschools preference for desecuritization is one-sided and ultimately limited. This, consideredtogether with Wvers (to some extent justied)

qualms against moving an issue out of thedemocratic realm and into a heightened state ofaffairs, suggests that securitizations can be bothpositive and negative.34

It is important to note here that the adjectives"positive" and "negative"do not refer to the relativesuccess of securitization.Ins tead, pos i t ive andnegat ive refer to theconsequences of onesecurity policy comparedto either another or to

politicisation. Under sucha consequentialist approach to the evaluation ofsecurity, a securitization is positive when it can be judged according to an agent-neutral value.Agent-neutrality is the property of those valuesthat "can be articulated without reference backto the valuer."35 A good example of an agent-neutral value is anything "that would reduce theamount of wretchedness in the world."36 Humansecurity constitutes just such an agent-neutralvalue, and the various elements of the human

security agendawhen successful beyond theinitial securitizing moveare thus valid examplesof positive securitizations.

Given all that has been said here, it appears thatalthough the securitization approach is extremelyuseful and, within critical security studies, practically unrivalled in terms of its analyticalutility, the securitization approach is limited in termsof its normative utility. Normative utility hereby isunderstood in terms of the security analysts ability

to inuence the securitization process in a deliberateand thought-out fashion andthough this ultimatelydepends on capabilitiesto a desired effect. It doesnot refer to the involuntary co-constitution of socialand political reality performed by all constructivistsecurity analysts.

Moving now to the human security literature,and given all that has been said so far, it should beclear that the human security approach does not

have these kinds of limitations. Thus, unlike thesecuritization approach, from a human securityperspective, proponents can highlight insecuritieson behalf of other individuals, especially thoseindividuals who are in no position to speak forthemselves. This, as Gunhild Hoogensen et al. callit, is the "enabling" capacity of human security,37which clearly can have positive connotations,including positive securitizations. Examples of such

positive securitizations arethe high prole ban on land

mines and the establishmentof the International CriminalCourt (ICC). Both anti- personnel landmines andthose actors subject to theICC pose existential threats

to human security. To quotethe ofcial Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer ofAnti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction: "Anti-

personnel mines [] kill or maim hundreds ofpeople every week, mostly innocent and defencelesscivilians and especially children, obstruct economicdevelopment and reconstruction, inhibit therepatriation of refugees and internally displacedpersons, and have other severe consequences foryears after emplacement."38

While the ICC "may exercise jurisdictionover genocide, crimes against humanity and warcrimes,"39 including, among others, genocideby killing, genocide by deliberately inflictingconditions of life calculated to bring about physicaldestruction, genocide by causing serious bodilyor mental harm, crimes against humanity ofmurder, crimes against humanity of extermination,crimes against humanity of enslavement, warcrimes of willful killing, war crimes of inhuman

treatment, and war crimes of willfully causing greatsuffering.40 It is important to notice that althoughthe referent object of security in both theseinstances is clearly the individual, the provision of(human) security to a very large extent depends onstates. This is because both of the above are treaty-based agreements that depend on the signatures,ratication, and subsequent implementation by

their memberstates.41 Moreover, the ICC is only

"Te human security approach,though inadequate with regardto analytical utility, has muchto ofer in terms o normativeutility."



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"complimentary" to national criminal courts, withconsiderable restrictions pertaining to its powersof jurisdiction.

"The International Criminal Court willcomplement national courts so that they retain jurisdiction to try genocide, crimes againsthumanity and war crimes. If a case is beingconsidered by a country with jurisdiction overit, then the ICC cannot act unless the country isunwilling or unable genuinely to investigate orprosecute. A country may be determined to beunwilling if it is clearly shielding someone fromresponsibility for ICC crimes. A country may beunable when its legal system has collapsed."42

Given that even these exemplars of humansecurity to a large extent rely on the cooperation ofstates, it appears that states just as the Copenhagen

School asserts continue to matter empirically. Or,put differently, capabilities and means matter forsecuritization.

Regardless of the role of the state, however,the establishment of the ICC and the ban onlandmines are proof that successful securitizationsof human security are possible andimportantlyfor the argument of this articleboth of these werefuelled by an ongoing discourse in all spheres oflife, including academia. Given these positiveexamples, human security as an approach to

security from which individuals can performsecuritizing moves therefore has much worth inand of itself. It enables individuals to (at leastto some small extent) initiate securitizations,including those who are otherwise not in a positionof extraordinary decision making power in termsof security policy making, such as academics. Ittherefore seems that the human security approach,though inadequate with regard to analytical utility,has much to offer in terms of normative utility. With

the "security analyst" (though it is doubtful whetherwe can satisfactorily use this word concerning thehuman security approach) and the securitizingactor being one and the same person, the humansecurity proponent canoccasionallyinuence

select securitization processes in a deliberate andthought-out fashion, to a desired effect. Clearly, forthose more interested in achieving securitizationsas opposed to simply performing security analysis,

this is a valuable alternative to the securitizationapproach and, indeed, to all security analysis.

conclusion

It was the aim of this article to analyse therelationship between the Copenhagen Schoolssecuritization approach and the human securityapproach. A second key objective was to ascertainwhether the latter poses a viable alternative to theformer. When alternative is dened in terms of

analytical utility then the human security approachcannot possibly offer an alternative to the threestep processes tracing tool that is securitizationtheory. Indeed, bereft of an analytical framework,the human security approach has no analyticalutility. Moreover, from the perspective of the

Copenhagen School, it can be argued that writerswithin the human security literature performsecuritizing moves themselves, leaving the entirehuman security literature as ultimately somethingthat can be analysed by the securitization approach.However, if "alternative" is understood morebroadly in terms of normative utility, the humansecurity approach does offer an alternative to thesecuritization approach, and indeed to all securityanalysis. With its focus on identifying existentialthreats to individuals (securitizing moves), humansecurity offers an outlet to all those dissatisedwith security analysis, who are more interested inachieving securitization than simply analysing it.The Copenhagen Schools securitization approach,in turn, is fundamentally limited in terms ofits normative utility. Here the security analystand the securitizing actor are two functionallydistinct entities, with the securitization analyst inno position to enter the security equation at anypoint.

While the human security approach offers analternative to the securitization approach, this isnot the same as saying that human security canpossibly, or indeed should, replace the securitizationapproach, or for that matter security analysis as awhole. Nor is this to say that security analysis can,or should, replace the human security approach.Rather, each is important in its own unique way:

one contributing to our understanding of how

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security is practiced, the other on occasion andif successful to its practice.



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Notes

1 I would like to thank the organizers and the participants of the International Politics/Security Studies workshop at the University of Troms inDecember 2005. Without these ve days of lively debate I would not have had the idea for this article. An earlier version of this article was presented

at the 2007International Relations and Security Theories: Impacts and Infuences conference organized by the CERI Program for Peace and Securityin collaboration with the University of Troms at Sciences Po, Paris. Thanks to all those who participated, in particular, Gunhild Hoogensen, KirstiStuvy and Stephan Davidshofer. Above all, I am grateful to Stuart Croft and Jonathan Floyd, whose many valuable comments have greatly improvedthis article.2 Ole Wver. Concepts of Security PhD Dissertation University of Copenhagen (1997):14.3 S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuan Foong Khong.Human security and the UN: A critical History (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2006).4 Don Hubert. An idea that works in practice Security Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 351; Paul Evans. A concept still on the margins, but evolving from itsAsian roots Security Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 363-364; Keith Krause. The key to a powerful agenda, if properly delimited Security Dialogue, 35 (3)(2004): 367-368; Andrew Mack. A signier of shared values Security Dialogue, 35, (3) (2004): 366-367; S. Neil MacFarlane. A useful concept that

risks losing its political salience Security Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 368-269.5 Taylor Owen. Human security Conict, critique and consensus: colloquium Remarks and a proposal for a threshold-based denition Security

Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 375.

6 Ibid. 375.7 Special Section: What is Human Security? Security Dialogue 35(3): 345-371.8 Astri Suhrke. Human security and the interests of states Security Dialogue 30(3) (1990): 265-276.9 Lloyd Axworthy. A new scientic eld and policy Lens Security Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 348.10 Keith Krause (2004). op cit. 367-368.11 Donna Winslow and Thomas Hylland Eriksen. A broad concept that encourages interdisciplinary thinking Security Dialogue 35 (3) (2004): 361.12 Roland Paris. Human Security Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? International Security 26(2) (2001): 88; 93. (emphases added).13 UNDP report cited in ibid. 90.14 Barry Buzan, Ole Wver and Jaap deWilde. Security -A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner 1998): 36.15 Barry Buzan. A reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value Security Dialogue, 35 (3) (2004): 370.16 Ibid. 36 (emphasis added).17 See for instance, Steve Smith. The Contested Concept of Security in Ken Booth (ed) Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder: LynneRienner, 2005): 37.18 Ole Waever. Securitization and Desecuritization In Lipschutz R. D. On Security (New York: Columbia University Press 1995): 49.19 Desecuritization is the reverse of securitization, whereby issues are being moved out of the exceptional status, back into the normal policy makingrealm.20 Barry Buzan and Ole Wver.Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 71.21 For Buzans view on the matter, see also the quote by Buzan above.22 Barry Buzan and Ole Wver (1998). op. cit. 6.23 See for instance, Lene Hansen. The little Mermaids Silent Security Dilemma Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (2) (2000): 285-306; Jef Huysmans. Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in EuropeEuropean Journal of International

Relations 4(4) (1998): 479-506; Bill McSweeney. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen SchoolReview of International Studies 22(1)(1996): 81-94; Thierry Balzacq. The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and ContextEuropean Journal of International

Relations 11(2) (2005): 171-201.24 Rita Taureck. Securitization theory and securitization studiesJournal of International Relations and Development9 (1) (2006): 53 -61.25 Chris Browning and Matt McDonald. Securitization and Emancipation. Paper presented at the 48th ISA annual convention Chicago February/March 2007; Mark B. Salter. On Exactitude in Disciplinary Science: A Response to the Networked Manifesto Security Dialogue 38 (1) (2007): 113-

122; Jef Huysmans. Language and the Mobilization of Security Expectations: The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security. Paper for

the ECPR Joint Sessions , Mannheim 26-31 March 1999; Jef Huysmans. Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues in

Miles R. and Thraenhart D. (eds) Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion (London: Pinter, 1995): 53-72.26 Claudia Aradau. Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipationJournal of International Relations and Development(7)(2004): 388-413; for a critique see Rita Taureck (2006). op.cit.27 Barry Buzan and.al (1998). op. cit. 33-34.28 Stefano Guzzini. A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International RelationsEuropean Journal of International Relations 6(2) (2000): 147-182; Michel C. Williams. Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Ole Wver.Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson Cooperation and Confict34(3) (1999): 334-340.29 Jef Huysmans. Dening social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing securityAlternatives 27 supplement (2002):

41-62.30 Ole Wver. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery 2004 (unpublishedmanuscript); Rita Floyd. Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: Bringing together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security

StudiesReview of International Studies 33(2) (2007): 327-350; c.a.s.e. collective. Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A NetworkedManifesto. Security Dialogue 37(4) (2006): 443-487; Chris Browning and Matt McDonald (2007). op cit.31 Barry Buzan and. al (1998). op.cit. 35; Rita Floyd. (2007). op. cit. 336; Ole Wver. Securitization: Taking stock of a research programme in

Security Studies unpublished Manuscript (2003): 23.32 Barry Buzan and al (1998). op.cit. 206.



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33 Ibid, p 29.34 Rita Floyd (2007). op. cit.35 Philip Pettit. Introduction in Pettit P. (ed) Consequentialism (Aldershot, Dartmouth Press 1993): 14-15.36 Thomas Nagel. Autonomy and Deontology In Schefer S. (ed.) Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988 [1986]):

143 fn2.37 Gunhild Hoogensen and Svein Vigeland Rottem. Gender Identity and the Subject of Security Security Dialogue 35 (2) (2004): 155-171.38 Preamble of the Convention on the Prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destructionRetrieved on 28th March 2007 from http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english39 Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the International Criminal Court page on ofcial web site, emphasis added. Retrieved 28th March 2007 from

http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/jurisdiction_admissibility.html40 For a complete list of the Elements of Crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC seehttp://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/ofcialjournal/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf41 As of January 2007 104 countries have ratied the Rome Statute the treaty upon which the ICC is based, notably, however, many countries with large

Armed forces, and/or large populations, and/or those in conict prone regions have not signed the treaty including, for example, the United States,China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Israel and Russia.42 FAQ section on the Ofcial International Criminal Court website Retrieved on 28th March 2007 from http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/faq.

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