62 county mtd

8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

1/21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel (State Bar No. 109654)County of San DiegoBy RICKY R. SANCHEZ, Senior Deputy (State Bar No. 107559)1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355San Diego, California 92101-2469Telephone: (619) 531-4874; Fax: (619) 531-6005E-mail:[email protected]

Attorneys for Defendant County of San Diego (also erroneously sued herein as SanDiego County Sheriffs Department), and William D. Gore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA COALITION FORFAMILIES AND CHILDREN, aDelaware Corporation, LEXEVIA, PC, aCalifornia Professional Corporation, andCOLBERN C. STUART, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BARASSOCIATION, a California Corporation;et al.,

Defendants.

))))))))))))))))

o. 13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANDAUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Date: January 24, 2014Time: 2:00 p.m.Ct rm: 4CHonorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:13-cv-01944-CAB-BLM Document 62-1 Filed 12/09/13 Page 1 of 21
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

2/21

- ii -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................ 1

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL ......................................................................................... 1

I. ALL STATE TORT AND SECTION 1983 AND 1985 CLAIMS ARE BARREDBY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ................................................................. 2

II. BECAUSE NO TIMELY GOVERNMENT DAMAGE CLAIM WAS FILED,ALL STATE TORT CLAIMS ARE BARRED ........................................................ 3

III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A RICO CLAIM ....................................... 4IV. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A LANHAM ACT FALSE

ADVERTISING CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS ....................... 5

V. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTIONS1985 AND 1986 ......................................................................................................... 6

VI. NO MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST THECOUNTY OF SAN DIEGO BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SHOWA FACTUALLY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM ................................................................... 7

VII. NO TORT CLAIM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION,CAN BE STATED BECAUSEIT IS NOT A COGNIZABLE THEORY OF RECOVERY UNDER THECALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT (CTCA) ........................................................ 9

VIII.NO CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST WILLIAM E. GORE WHO WASUNINVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT .................................................................... 10

IX. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ............................................. 10X. SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT IS NOT A PROPER

DEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION .......................................................................... 11

XI. CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (CCFC),AND LEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND CANNOT MAINTAIN THISACTION .................................................................................................................. 12


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

3/21

- iii -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TOPICAL INDEX(Continued)

Page

A. CCFC And Lexevia Are Corporations That Cannot Proceed WithoutCounsel. ......................................................................................................... 12

B. CCFC Does Not Have Standing to Sue. ........................................................ 13C. Lexevia Is A Suspended Corporation Lacking Capacity To Sue ................. 13

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

4/21

- iv -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988) .................... 5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ...................................................................... 2,5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................... 1, 2, 8

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) .................................... 1

Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................ 6

Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................................................ 4

Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2006 WL 3760276, *4(E.D.Cal. Dec.18,

2006) ...................................................................................................................... 12

CTCA. Datil v. City of L.A., 263 Cal. App. 2d 655 (1968) ............................................... 9

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ........................................................... 10

Cerrato v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994) ......................................... 7

Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1599 (1996) .............................................. 14

De Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238 (2007) ...................................... 9

Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27 (1987) .......................................... 3

Fall River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431 (1988) ....... 3

Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) ... 2

Harris v. RHH P'rs,LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *6(Del. Ch. Apr. 3 2009) ............ 12

ICR Graduate Sch. v. Honig, 758 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1991) ................................. 11

Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................. 2

Jay v. Med. Dept. of Fresno County Jail, 1:10-CV-00685-GBC PC, 2011 WL 3875523, at

*4(E.D. Cal. Sept. 1 2011) .................................................................................... 11

Jewett v. City of Sacramento Fire Dep't, No. CIV. 2:10-556 WBS KJN, 2010 WL

3212774, at *2 (E.D. Aug. 12, 2010) ..................................................................... 11

Jones v. Williams, 286 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................... 10

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................... 6, 7

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ...................................................................... 10


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

5/21

- v -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28


Page

Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991) ..... 4

Merco Constr.Engrs, Inc. v. Mun. Court, 21 Cal. 3d 724 (1978) ................................. 12

Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199 (1922) .............................................................................. 10

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................. 10

Monell v. N.Y. City Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ..................................... 7, 8

Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................. 5

Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) ..................................................... 3

Morris v. State Bar of Cal., No. Civ. 09-0026 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 966423 (E.D. Cal.

Mar. 11, 2010) ....................................................................................................... 12

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................... 2, 8

Navarro v. Block, 250 F. 3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................... 1

Nelson v. State, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72 (1982) ..................................................................... 3

Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal.

1989) ........................................................................................................................ 4

Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................... 4

Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) .......................................................... 10

Paradise Creations, Inc. v. U V Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................. 13

Pellum v. Fresno Police Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2,

2011) ................................................................................................................. 11, 12

Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) .................................................................... 7

Pers. Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) ...................................................... 6

Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993) ....................................... 6

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................. 6

Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................... 7

Robbins v. P'ship for Bank Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, at *2

(Del. Ch. Jul. 23 2010) .......................................................................................... 12


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

6/21

- vi -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28


Page

Sanders v. Aranas, No. 1:06-CV-1574 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 268972

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) ....................................................................................... 12

Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792 (1986) .................................... 9

Sekerke v. Kemp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *33 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013)

(Moskowitz, J.) (citing Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626) ........................................ 7

Smith v. City and County of San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 230 (1977) ................... 3

Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................... 6

Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) ............................................................... 5

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.) ............................................. 2

Sun Sav. & Loan Assn v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................. 4

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1989) .................................................................. 10

Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1993) ..................................... 2

United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................... 11

Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987) ......................................................... 2

Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ................................ 11

Wade v. Fresno Police Dept, No. Civ. 09-0588 AWI DLB, 2010 WL 2353525 (E.D. Cal

June 9, 2010) .......................................................................................................... 11

Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993) ................................................................... 3

Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834 (1976) ...................................................................... 9

RULES/STATUTES

Cal. Corp. Code

Section 2205 ........................................................................................................... 14California Civil Procedures Code

Section 335.1 ............................................................................................................ 2

Cal. Government CodeSection 810 .............................................................................................................. 9Section 814 ............................................................................................................... 9Section 815(a) ........................................................................................................... 9


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

7/21

- vii -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

RULES/STATUTES

(Continued)

Page

Cal. Government Code

Section 820.8 .......................................................................................................... 10Section 911.2 ............................................................................................................ 3Section 945.4 ............................................................................................................ 3Section 1962 ............................................................................................................. 5Section 1983 .............................................................................................. 8, 9, 11, 12Section 1985 ............................................................................................................. 7

California Revenue & Tax CodeSection 23301 ......................................................................................................... 14

Federal Rule of Civil ProcedureRule 8(a)(2) .............................................................................................................. 1Rule 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................................... 1

Rule 17(b)(2) ......................................................................................................... 12

15 U.S.C.Section 1125 ............................................................................................................. 6Section 1125(a) ......................................................................................................... 6Section 1125(a)(l)(B) ................................................................................................ 7

42 U.S.C.Section 1983 ................................................................................................... 4,7,12Sections 1983, 1985 .................................................................................... 2, 3,7,12Sections 1985(2) and (3) ...................................................................................... 4,7Section 1986 ............................................................................................................ 3

OTHER

Lanham Act, Section 43(a) ................................................................................................. 5


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

8/21

- 1 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

STATEMENT OF CASE

As can be garnered from the complaint, plaintiff Stuart is disgruntled with the

California family law dissolution process as administered by the State judiciary, family

law practitioners, counselors and others. On April 15, 2010, plaintiff Stuart alleges he

was attending a seminar at the San Diego County Bar Association facility in the City of

San Diego, when he was ejected from the seminar. (Cmpl. 114, 117, 118, 119, 128,

135.) He alleges two deputy sheriffs and two off duty officers asked him to leave, and

when he refused he was handcuffed, and escorted out of the building where he was

released. (Cmpl. 135.) Otherwise, the complaint does not contain any specific factual

allegations describing any conduct by the County of San Diego or Sheriff William Gore

that was directed against plaintiff Stuart or others. The complaint contains twenty-two

counts none of which state any claim against defendants County of San Diego

(erroneously sued herein as San Diego County Sheriffs Department) and William

Gore.

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a plaintiffs claims are legally sufficient. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal

is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege a cognizable legal theory or sufficient

facts to support such a theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1988). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain

a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,

and although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). [T]he tenet a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id.at 678. Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.Id. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. Id.at 679. Also, the court is not obliged to


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

9/21

- 2 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit or those which are merely conclusory, require unwarranted deductions or

unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th

Cir.) (citation omitted), amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001);see

alsoIleto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (court need not accept as

true unreasonable inferences or conclusions of law cast in the form of factual allegations)

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, which when taken as true, demonstrates the claim is

plausible on its face." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

A claim has facial plausibility, the Court explained, when the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Ashcroft v. Iqbal,129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)The plausibility standard is not akin to a'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that adefendant has acted unlawfully.Id.(quotingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merelyconsistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line betweenpossibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'Id.(quotingBell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

ARGUMENT

I

ALL STATE TORT AND SECTION 1983 AND 1985 CLAIMS ARE BARREDBY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Claims brought under Sections 1983 and 1985 must be filed within the time

specified by the states statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Usher v. Los

Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d

710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that same limitations period applies to both 1983

and 1985 claims). California law sets a two-year statute of limitations for personal

injury claims. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 335.1;Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of

Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Although state law determines the

length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

10/21

- 3 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accrues.Morales v. City of L.A., 214 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000). Under federal

law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of the action. Id. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,

15, and 16 of the complaint purport to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and

1986 based on the alleged assault of plaintiff Stuart on April 15, 2010. The statute of

limitations on these claims expired more than a year before this action was filed on

August 20, 2013. All said claims are therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

II

BECAUSE NO TIMELY GOVERNMENT DAMAGE CLAIM WAS FILED,ALL STATE TORT CLAIMS ARE BARRED

The submission of a claim to a government entity is a condition precedent to any

claim for money damages against the entity or its employees. (Cal. Gov't Code 945.4.)

Pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code 911.2, the claim must be presented within six months of

accrual of cause of action. Statutes for commencement of actions against public entities

"'are mandatory and must be strictly complied with...'[citations omitted.]" Smith v. City

and County of San Francisco, 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 230 (1977). "[F]ailure to file a claim

is fatal to a cause of action."Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27, 31

(1987). Each cause of action asserted in a complaint must correspond to the factual

circumstances reflected in the written government code claim. Watson v. State, 21 Cal.

App. 4th 836, 844 (1993);Nelson v. State, 139 Cal. App. 3d 72, 80 (1982). If a plaintiff

relies on more than one theory of recovery each must be reflected in a timely claim. Fall

River Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 431, 434 (1988).

Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, purport to state tort claims. The alleged event upon which

those counts are premised is the April 15, 2010, ejectment of plaintiff from a family law

seminar. In the present matter there is no allegation that plaintiff filed a government

damages claim within six months of that event. As a result, all state tort claims are

barred for failure to comply with the claims filing requirement.

/ / /


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

11/21

- 4 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A RICO CLAIM

The complaint contains thirteen Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(RICO) claims, the second of which is directed against all defendants, with the remaining

directed against various groups of defendants.

The complaint fails to state a RICO claim against the County of San Diego, (also

erroneously sued as San Diego County Sheriffs Department),because as a government

entity it is incapable of forming mens rea necessary to perform an act of racketeering, it is

not subject to vicarious liability for alleged RICO violations of natural persons, and is

immune to actions for treble damages which RICO provides. Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v.

Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991).

The complaint also fails to state a plausible RICO claim against Sheriff Gore.

"[T]he following are essential elements of any civil RICO action: (1) the existence of a

RICO 'enterprise'; (2) the existence of a 'pattern of racketeering activity'; (3) a nexus

between the defendant and either the pattern of racketeering activity or the RICO

'enterprise'; and (4) resulting injury to plaintiff, in his 'business or property."'

Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016, 1021

(E.D. Cal. 1989).

To establish the existence of ... an enterprise, a plaintiff must provide both

evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,and evidence that the various

associates function as a continuing unit. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 552

(9th Cir. 2007). To satisfy RICO's pattern requirement, a plaintiff must allege two or

more predicate acts of racketeering in furtherance of a criminal scheme. Sun Sav. &

Loan Assnv. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff must plead such

acts with specificity and identify the individual actions of each defendant sufficient to

constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th

Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied Rule 9(b )' s particularity requirements to

RICO claims under Section 1962.Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 541


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

12/21

- 5 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(9th Cir. 1989);see also Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388,

1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (default on RICO claim overturned because the allegations of

predicate acts in the complaint were entirely general, and no specifics of time, place,

or nature of the alleged communications are pleaded).

With respect to the enterpriseelement, the Complaint alleges the existence of

three enterprises purportedly involving these moving defendants: the Domestic Dispute

Industry Criminal Enterprise,the San Diego Family Law Community Domestic

Dispute Industry Criminal Enterprise,and the Domestic Dispute Industry Intervention

Advocate Criminal Enterprise.(Cmpl. 273-283.) Absent from the Complaint,

however, are any allegations concerning the participation of William Gore or the County

and its Sheriffs Departmentin these purported enterprises. And as concerns the

racketeering element, the complaint alleges no facts specifying conduct by William Gore,

let alone any patternof crime. Accordingly, the RICO claims should be dismissed.

IV

THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A LANHAM ACT FALSEADVERTISING CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Count 21 of the Complaint purports to assert a false advertising claim against

defendants under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125. According to the Complaint,

unspecified advertisements, promotions, sale and offer for sale of their legal

services are false and misleading. (Cmplt. 261, 265.) Section 43(a) of the Lanham

Act prohibits the use of false designations of origin and false descriptions or

representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. Smith v. Montoro, 648

F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2006). A false advertising claim

requires the plaintiff to allege commercial injury based upon a misrepresentation about a

product, and also that the injury was competitive,i.e., harmful to the plaintiff's ability to

compete with the defendant.Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995).1No

1 A false advertising claim under the Lanham Act has five elements: (1) a falsestatement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own oranother's product; (2) the statement is actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

13/21

- 6 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claim is stated because the County of San Diego and the Sheriff of the County of San

Diego do not engage in the advertisement or sale of goods or services; are not involved in

interstate commerce; and the County defendants do not compete with plaintiffs in any

commercial activity. And the complaint does not allege facts to the contrary. The

complaint therefore fails to state a Lanham Act claim against the County of San Diego

and Sheriff Gore.

V

THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS

UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTIONS 1985 AND 1986

Counts 12, 13, 14 and 15 are based on sections 1985(2) and (3), which prohibit

conspiracies to interfere with the civil rights of others. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police

Dept, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). An allegation of racial or class-based

discrimination is required to state a claim for relief under either subsection. SeeRK

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002);Portman v. Cnty. of

Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). Discriminatory purpose . . . implies

more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences . . . . It implies that

the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part

because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Pers. Admr of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Conclusory allegations are

insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 15 U.S.C. 1985 claim must allege

facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of

conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626.

To establish existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to produce concrete

evidence of an agreement or meeting of the minds between defendant and others to

substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely toinfluence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused the statement to enterinterstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result ofthe false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or bylessening of the goodwill associated with its products. Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi,673 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(l)(B).


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

14/21

- 7 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

deprive the plaintiff of one of plaintiffs constitutional rights. Radcliffe v. Rainbow

Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). The complaint alleges nothing more than

the defendants conspired together in committing the so-called Stuart Assault. (Cmplt.

203, 205, 207, 209), and fails to alleges with specificity facts showing a meeting of the

minds sufficient for conspiracy, or facts establishing racial or class-based discrimination.

The complaint fails to state any claim under section 1985.

Count 16 of the complaint alleges a violation of 1986, which authorizes a

remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to prevent a conspiracy that

would be actionable under 1985. Cerrato v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 971

n.7 (9th Cir. 1994). A conspiracy under 1985 is therefore a prerequisite to a valid claim

under 1986. Sekerke v. Kemp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35041, at *33 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

12, 2013) (Moskowitz, J.) (citingKarim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 626). Because the

complaint does not state a section 1985 claim, the section 1986 claim also fails.

VI

NO MUNICIPAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST THE COUNTYOF SAN DIEGO BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SHOW A

FACTUALLY PLAUSIBLE CLAIM

For a section a municipal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2006), facts

must be alleged showing one of the municipalitys policies or customs directed the

commission of a constitutional violation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dept of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). This official policy requirement was intended to distinguish

acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make

clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually

responsible. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). This is because

municipalities cannotbe held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory for

constitutional violations committed by any of its officers or employees. Monell, 436 U.S.

at 691, 694.

The complaintsgeneral and conclusory allegations that the County maintained

rules, policied, customs, procedures, traditions, practices and permitted behaviors by


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

15/21

- 8 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

policymakers themselves which perpetrated an intentional, reckless, and deliberate

indifference to the likelihood of constitutional injury are but conclusions without factual

support and thus insufficient to state a claim. (Cmplt. 173.) InAshcroft, 556 U.S. 662,

plaintiff sued both United States Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert

Mueller for holding plaintiff, a post-September-11th detainee in highly restrictive

conditions of confinement. Plaintiff alleged they "knew of, condoned, and willfully and

maliciously agreed to subject [him]" to harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter of

policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no

legitimate penological interest." Plaintiff also alleged that Ashcroft was the "principal

architect" of this invidious policy, and that Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and

executing it. The Court found the assertions to be nothing more than a "formulaic

recitation of the elements" of a constitutional discrimination claim and were conclusory

allegations not entitled to be assumed true. Id.at 681. InMoss v. United States Secret

Serv., plaintiffs alleged Secret Service agents violated their First Amendment rights when

they ordered the relocation of their demonstration against then President George W. Bush

at a hotel. The Secret Service maintained that the relocation was requested to put the

President out of weapons range. Plaintiffs alleged the demonstration was relocated

because of its anti-Bush message, and that the Agents acted in conformity with an

officially authorizedsub rosaSecret Service policy of suppressing speech critical of the

President. The complaint otherwise had no facts bolstering the allegations. The

allegations were found to be conclusory and therefore not entitled to an assumption of

truth and so the complaint failed to state a claim. Moss, 572 F.3d at 970.

The allegations in this matter are similarly conclusory, and without factual support

indicating existence of the alleged policies, or that there is a plausible claim therefor.

The sixth count of the complaint should therefore be dismissed.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

16/21

- 9 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VII

NO TORT CLAIM NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION,CAN BE STATED BECAUSEIT IS NOT A COGNIZABLE THEORY OF RECOVERY UNDER THE

CALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT (CTCA)

The CTCA provides the exclusive scope of tort liability for government entities

and employees. Cal. Gov't Code 810 et seq.; see also Legislative Committee Comment

to Cal. Gov't Code 814. [T]he intent of the [CTCA] is not to expand the rights of

plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental

liability to rigidly delineated circumstances. Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 838

(1976). Common law governmental tort liability was eliminated by the CTCA. Datil v.

City of L.A., 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 660 (1968). As a result, in California all

governmental tort liability against a public entity or its employees is dependent on the

existence of an authorizing statute. Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d

792, 802 (1986); Cal. Gov't Code 815(a).

The fifth count appears to allege a lack of supervision claim possibly on state law

and under Cal. Gov't Code 1983; to the extent the complaint purports to assert a state

law claim for negligent supervision, the complaint fails to do so because negligent hiring,

training, and supervision is not a cognizable statutory theory of recovery under the

California Tort Claims Act. De Villers v. Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238,

253, 256 (2007). [T]here is no statutory basis for declaring a governmental entity liable

for negligence in its hiring and supervision practices and, accordingly, plaintiffs' claim

against County based on that theory is barred. Id at 253. We conclude that a direct

claim against a governmental entity asserting negligent hiring and supervision, when not

grounded in the breach of a statutorily imposed duty owed by the entity to the injured

party, may not be maintained. Id.at 256.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

17/21

- 10 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VIII

NO CLAIM IS STATED AGAINST WILLIAM E. GORE

WHO WAS UNINVOLVED IN ANY INCIDENT

The complaint contains no allegations against William Gore upon which federal or

state tort liability can attach. Count 7 of the complaint purports to state a claim against

him based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Paragraphs 6 and 7 contain the only

specific allegations regarding William Gore, and in that regard only that he is the Sheriff

of the County of San Diego and in that office manages detention facilities and law

enforcement operations. The allegation is not so much as against him individually but

rather the office he occupies in his official capacity. A lawsuit against the Sheriff in his

official capacity is but a lawsuit against the County itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 167 n.14 (1985);Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Otherwise

no specific misconduct is alleged to have been committed by him on which any claim can

be premised. Under federal law he is not subject to vicarious. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989);Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993);

Jones v. Williams, 286 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). And likewise under state tort

law he is not subject to vicarious liability. Cal. Govt. Code 820.8. Also, the head of a

law enforcement department is not liable for the acts of subordinates or co-workers:

A public officer is not responsible for the acts or omissions ofsubordinates properly employed by or under him, if suchsubordinates are not in his private service, but are themselvesservants of the government, unless he has directed such acts tobe done or has personally co-operated therein.Michel v. Smith,188 Cal. 199, 201 (1922).

The complaint should be dismissed as to William Gore because it is devoid of any

allegation upon which personal liability can attach to him.

IX

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The complaint requests a restraining order and order enjoining defendants from

prospectively violating plaintiffs rights. (Cmplt. 386, 396.) The purpose of an


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

18/21

- 11 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

injunction is to prevent prospective harm to a plaintiff. To obtain an injunction, the

plaintiff must establish that a "real or immediate threat" exists that he will be wronged

again. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). The alleged threat cannot

be "conjectural" or "hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02

(1983). Where the activities sought to be enjoined have already occurred, and the Court

cannot undo what has already been done, and there is no prospective harm to the plaintiff,

the action is moot and no injunction can be granted. ICR Graduate Sch. v. Honig, 758 F.

Supp. 1350, 1354-55 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (citingFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576

F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1978)). Here, no conduct is alleged to be currently threatened

against plaintiff. Therefore the complaint fails to state a claim for injunctive relief.

X

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT IS NOT A PROPERDEFENDANT IN THIS ACTION

The complaint names San Diego County Sheriffs Department as a defendant;

however, it is not a proper defendant in this action. A department within a municipality,

is not considered a person within the meaning of 1983. Pellum v. Fresno Police

Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7] (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011)surveying cases

finding that departments within municipality are not persons subject to suit for

constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

The Fresno Police Department is a municipal department of the Cityof Fresno and is not considered a person within the meaning ofSection 1983. SeeUnited States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9thCir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that municipal policedepartments and bureaus are generally not considered personswithin the meaning of Section 1983); Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing sua sponte

Santa Clara Department of Corrections as improper defendant);Jewettv. City of Sacramento Fire Dep't, No. CIV. 2:10-556 WBS KJN, 2010WL 3212774, at *2 (E.D. Aug. 12, 2010) (finding fire department nota person under Section 1983 and dismissing suit against it); Wade v.Fresno Police Dept, No. Civ. 09-0588 AWI DLB, 2010 WL2353525, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (finding police department isnot a person under Section 1983);Morris v. State Bar of Cal., No.Civ. 09-0026 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 966423, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11,2010) (finding that a fire department is a municipal department andtherefore not a person under Section 1983); Sanders v. Aranas, No.1:06-CV-1574 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 268972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29,


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

19/21

- 12 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2008) (finding Fresno Police Department improper defendant becauseit is a sub-division of the City of Fresno);Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty.Sheriff's Dep't, 2006 WL 3760276, *4(E.D.Cal. Dec.18 2006)(dismissing Sheriff's Department as an improperly named defendantfor purposes of Section 1983). Thus, Plaintiff's claim against theFresno Police Department is not cognizable under Section 1983.

Pellum v. Fresno Police Dept., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10698, [6-7].

Because the San Diego County Sheriffs Department is neither a legal entity nor

a person, the complaint fails to state a claim against the San Diego County Sheriffs

Department.

XI

CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (CCFC), ANDLEXEVIA LACK CAPACITY AND CANNOT MAINTAIN THIS ACTION

A. CCFC And Lexevia Are Corporations That Cannot ProceedWithout Counsel.

A corporation's capacity to sue is determined by the law in which it was organized.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2). CCFC is a Delaware corporation that was incorporated in

August 2013, more than two years after the operative event alleged in the complaint.

(Cmplt. Caption; see also Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. C thereto, filed by Superior

Court defendants as doc. 16-2.) Under Delaware law, a corporation must appear in court

through counsel and cannot proceed in propria persona. Robbins v. P'ship for Bank

Capital, L.P., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, at *2(Del. Ch. Jul. 23 2010); Harris v. RHH

P'rs,LP, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *6(Del. Ch. Apr. 3 2009). In California, a

corporation also can only appear in an action through counsel. Merco Constr. Engrs,

Inc. v. Mun. Court, 21 Cal. 3d 724, 731 (1978); See also CivLR. 83.3(k) (requiring

corporations to appear in court only through an attorney permitted to practice law under

Civil local Rule 83.3.)

The Civil Local Rules for this Court require that the title page of every pleading

include the address and telephone number of the attorney appearing for a party or of an

individual appearing pro se. CivLR 5.1(j)(l). The title page of the Complaint in this

action identifies Stuart and Dean Browning Webb, a Washington attorney as plaintiffs


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

20/21

- 13 -13-cv-1944-CAB(BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

attorney. Neither Stuart nor Mr. Webb, however, are counsel for either CCFC or

Lexevia. The complaint alleges Stuart is an attorney licensed and admitted to practice in

California, Arizona, and Nevada and is an officer of the courts. (Cmplt. 3, 102, 103.)

As shown by exhibits D, E, F, G, and H attached to the Superior Court defendants

Request for Judicial Notice, filed as doc. 16-2, Stuart is reported to be disbarred in

California effective December 2012, and his licenses in Arizona and Nevada are both

suspended. Stuart therefore cannot serve as counsel for any party in this case. As for Mr

Webb, although the title page to the Complaint indicates a pro hac vice application is

pending, no such application is reflected on the Court's docket, and Mr. Webb also did

not sign the Complaint. Counsel for the Superior Court defendants, reports that she

received a voice mail from Mr. Webb stating that Stuart used his name on the complaint

without permission. (Kristine P. Nesthus Decl. 4, doc. 16-3.) Counsel for defendant

Fritz, also reports that he received an e-mail from Mr. Webb stating that he does not

represent any party in this action and that no pro hac vice application was filed in this

court in this matter. (Kyle Van Dyke Decl. 3, doc 48-2.) By these accounts, CCFC and

Lexevia are not represented by counsel and cannot proceed with this action; and therefore

the complaint should be dismissed as to those defendants.

B. CCFC Does Not Have Standing to Sue.A corporation must also have s standing to sue in federal court. Paradise

Creations, Inc. v. U V Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For standing,

the plaintiff must allege that it suffered an injury in factan invasion of a legally

protected interest. (Id.) CCFC cannot have standing for injury incurred because it did

not exist at the time of the event giving rise to the claim, that is on April 15, 2010.

C. Lexevia Is A Suspended Corporation Lacking Capacity To Sue.Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the capacity of a

corporation to sue or be sued is determined by the law under which the corporation was

organized. Lexevia is a California corporation. (Cmplt. caption.) Under California law,

a suspended corporation lacks capacity to sue. Color-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams, 44 Cal. App.


8/12/2019 62 County Mtd

21/21

- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4th 1599, 1604 (1996);see also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 23301; Cal. Corp. Code 2205.

As shown the Superior Court defendants Request for Judicial Notice,by exhibit I

thereof, filed as doc. 16-2, Lexevia is a suspended professional corporation. The

complaint as to Lexevia should be dismissed because it lacks capacity to sue.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the motion to dismiss by the County of San Diego and

William Gore should be granted.

DATED: December 9, 2013 THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel

By s:/ RICKY R. SANCHEZ, Senior DeputyAttorneys for Defendants County of San Diego(also erroneously sued as San Diego County

Sheriffs Department) and William GoreE-mail:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]

62 county mtd

Documents