6.18.10quantitativeeasingdoesnotguaranteehigherstockprices

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  • 8/9/2019 6.18.10QuantitativeEasingDoesNotGuaranteeHigherStockPrices

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    Continental Capital Advisors, LLC June 18, 2010

    - 1 -

    Quantitative Easing Does Not Guarantee Higher Stock Prices

    The US economy and much of the global economy continues to be in a post-bubble, debt

    deleveraging process. M3, the broadest measure of money supply, demonstrates that deleveraging

    has re-emerged as a key threat to economic growth. As measured by Shadow Statistics, M3 declined5.9% this year versus last year for the month of May - the worst contraction since 1934 during the

    Great Depression. Despite the ominous trend in M3, many investors are holding risk assets, such as

    stocks and bonds, with the false hope of a self-sustaining economic recovery and/or the assumption

    that the Federal Reserve will bail them out (via quantitative easing) should equity markets fall.

    The investment mantra Dont Fight The Fed was echoed loudly on Wall Street from August 2007

    through February 2009. This was bad advice even though the Federal Reserve continually cut

    interest rates and launched numerous special lending facilities. Not surprisingly, faith in the Federal

    Reserve has since returned because of the 80% rally in the S&P 500 from March 2009 through April

    2010, which coincided with the start of the Federal Reserves quantitative easing program.However, quantitative easing may not have produced the massive rally in risk assets, but rather the

    rally resulted from severely oversold market conditions, much like the rally from November 1929

    through April 1930.

    Regardless of what generated the rally in risk assets, investors should not be comforted by the

    Federal Reserves ability to reinitiate quantitative easing. For one, if the Federal Reserve has to

    increase its asset purchases, the stock market and the economy will have already retreated

    meaningfully. Secondly, Figure 1 shows that even with significant asset purchases by the Bank of

    Japan from 1997 (earliest data available) through 2006 the Nikkei 225 index failed to respond

    (Figure 2). Japanese stocks instead followed the path of the global economy and global stockmarkets. Investors should note that the Japanese stock market is now 50% lower than it was in 1997

    despite a more than doubling of the Bank of Japans balance sheet.

    Figure 1. Bank Of Japans Assets (billions of yen; July 1997 June 2010)

    0

    20,000

    40,000

    60,000

    80,000

    100,000

    120,000

    140,000

    160,000

    180,000

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

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    2008

    2009

    2010

    Sources: Bank of Japan, Continental Capital Advisors

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    Continental Capital Advisors, LLC June 18, 2010

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    Figure 2. Nikkei 225 (July 1997-June 2010)

    0

    5,000

    10,000

    15,000

    20,000

    25,000

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    Sources: Yahoo! Finance, Continental Capital Advisors

    Figure 3. S&P 500 (July 1997-June 2010)

    0

    200

    400

    600

    800

    1000

    1200

    1400

    1600

    1800

    1997

    1998

    1999

    2000

    2001

    2002

    2003

    2004

    2005

    2006

    2007

    2008

    2009

    Sources: Yahoo! Finance, Continental Capital Advisors

    The only discernable difference between the performance of the Nikkei 225 and the S&P 500 is the

    period from 1997 through 1999 when the Japanese stock market fell while the S&P 500 rose.Despite significant quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan, the stock market was unable to

    overcome the negative forces of high equity valuations, economic weakness and deflation. This

    historical example of ineffective quantitative easing is being ignored by investors in US assets.

    Furthermore, the current deleveraging process is global in scope and impacts both the private and

    public sector. As a result, investing in risk assets on the basis that the Federal Reserve will print

    money is likely to be even more costly than it has been for investors buying Japanese equities.

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    Continental Capital Advisors, LLC June 18, 2010

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    Daniel Aaronson [email protected] Markowitz, CFA [email protected]

    http://www.continentalca.com

    Disclaimer: The above is a matter of opinion and is not intended as investment advice. Comments within the text

    should not be construed as specific recommendations to buy or sell securities. Individuals should consult with their

    broker and personal financial advisors before engaging in any trading activities. Certain statements included herein

    may constitute "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of certain securities legislative measures. Such

    forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the

    actual results, performance or achievements of the above mentioned companies, and / or industry results, to be

    materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking

    statements. Any action taken as a result of reading this is solely the responsibility of the reader.