5g security enhancement...• operator’s public key is stored in sim card. • the security of sim...
TRANSCRIPT
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5G Security EnhancementSay Goodbye to IMSI Catcher
Leader of 360 Radio Security Research Institute
HUANG Lin
Nov. 2 2018
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360 Radio Security Research Institute
Wireless connection is widely
used in Internet of Things. We
focus on the security issues in
the wireless pipelines.
• WiFi
• 2G~5G cellular network
• RFID/NFC
• Bluetooth & ZigBee
• LoRa/NB-IoT
• Satellite communication: GPS/Beidou
• Others: ADS-B
360 Technology is the only Chinese
security company in 3GPP
standardization organization.
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Case of GSM SMS Sniffing
Source: Nandu Big Data Research Institute
A case in Aug. 2018
In Guangdong
province, someone’s
cellphone received
more than 100 SMS
verification messages
during one night and
the attacker stole
around 10,000 RMB
through many APPs.
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GSM Attacks Public Reported
Level 0 – Spam SMS Level 1 – SMS Sniffing
Level 2 – Man-in-the-middle attack Level 3 – Downgrade attack
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Attack Surface in Cellular Network
• Protocol vulnerability
• GSM one-way authentication, IMSI Catcher, redirection attack, etc.
• Implementation
• Baseband chipset vulnerabilities
• TMSI overflow case (Intel)
• AUTN overflow case (Qualcomm)
• SMS PDU overflow
• Base station vulnerabilities
• Deployment and configuration faults• ‘Ghost Telephonist’, CSFB vulnerability
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Attack to Network Side
• 2G network• Low confidentiality and one-way authentication
• Sniffing
• Man-in-the-middle
• DoS attacks• RACH flood
• IMSI attach flood, IMSI detach
• Paging response
• 4G network• DoS attacks
• RACH, attach flood
• Relay• Position spoofing
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Attack to Terminal Side
• 2G network
• Low confidentiality and one-way authentication
• Sniffing
• Man-in-the-middle
• Silent SMS
• Spam SMS
• 4G network• MITM: ‘aLTEr’ vulnerability
• DoS attack: attach reject, TAU reject
• Downgrade attack: redirection
• IMSI Catcher to all 2G/3G/4G
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5G Security Technologies (March 2018, Release 15)
• Primary authentication: enhance home network control
• Secondary authentication: authentication for outside the mobile operator
• Inter-operator security: Solve some issues in SS7 and Diameter
• Privacy: Encrypt subscriber permanent identity
• Service based architecture: security about Service Based Architecture
• Central Unit – Distributed Unit: connection security
• Key hierarchy: integrity protection of user data channel
• Mobility: separate mobility anchor and security anchor
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Why Enhance Home Network Control
4G AKA 5G AKA
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Integrity Protection in User Plane
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Example: ‘aLTEr’ Attack – DNS Spoofing
https://alter-attack.net/ by David Rupprecht, Katharina Kohls, Thorsten Holz, and Christina Pöpper
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Permanent Identity Privacy
IMSI Catcher
Once a cellphone goes through
the fake network coverage area,
its IMSI will be reported to the
fake network.
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Similar Weakness in WiFi
• WiFi MAC scanner
• It passively listens surrounding WiFi devices’ signal and captures the MAC addresses.
• Some underground industry has the leaked data which has the mapping information from MAC address to other info, such as cellphone number, IMEI, list of installed APPs, financial credit information etc.
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Status of WiFi MAC Address Randomization
• iOS and Android
• Random MAC address during connection setup (in scanning)
• Use permanent MAC address after connection setup, to facilitate access control
• Can be bypassed when the attack emulates an known AP
• Windows 10
• Fully randomization
• Can manually disable
• Depends on WIFI adapter type
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IMSI Encryption
• New terminology is 3GPP’s tradition
• SUPI: Subscription Permanent Identifier
• SUCI: Subscription Concealed Identifier
Encrypted & Randomizing
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How to Send SUCI and SUPI in 5G
Cellphone gNB SEAF AUSF UDM/ARPF/SIDF
1.Decrypt SUCI to SUPI2.Do authentication
Registration Request
Registration Request
Authentication Request
Authentication Request
SUCI or GUTI
SUCI or GUTI
SUCI or SUPI+ SN-Name
SUCI or SUPI+ SN-Name
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How to Encrypt SUPI ?
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How to Init & Store Public Key
• Different from common certification and public key infrastructure
• Operator’s public key is stored in SIM card.
• The security of SIM card guarantees the public key is true and cannot be manipulated.
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BUT, No Encryption is Permitted
• Operator has right to decide whether it uses SUPI encryption. It can use null-scheme, i.e. no encryption.
• This is because SUPI encryption needs change subscribers’ SIM card. Operators may not force all its customers to replace 4G card by 5G one. So 4G card may exist for a long time.
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Fake 5G Base Station may still Exist
DoS attack examples:
✓ You are an illegal cellphone!
✓ Here is NO network available. You
could shut down your modem.
The root cause is the initial
broadcasting message from network
can not be proved to be trustable.
NO PKI infrastructure solution
reaches agreement in 3GPP.
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Fake 4G Base Station Sends Fake Alert Message
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We could continue in 6G …