56693755-dd-and-ignorance.doc
TRANSCRIPT
Jay Carlson May 13, 2011Deliberative Democracy and IgnorancePhil 735: Cont. Political PhilosophyProf. Justin Weinberg
The intuitive appeal of democratic decision mechanisms and procedures for choosing
policies is that the ultimate and decisive decision about which policies and leaders are put into
practice lies in the citizens who live under that democratic regime. The citizens—and neither
a dictator nor a relatively small group of elites—decide what policies they are to live under
based on their own preferences and opinions about what should be done. Yet, leaving the
decisions of public policy to the raw preferences of the populace is also part of the inherent
flaw of democratic decision mechanisms: are the individual citizens that make up the
electorate in a position to make adequate decisions about public policy? There are many
reasons to think that most of the citizens are not adequately equipped to make such decisions.
Chief among these reasons, as demonstrated by Illya Somin, is that huge swathes of the
electorate are demonstrably ignorant about many critical factors necessary for making an
informed decision about political matters.
This widespread ignorance threatens not only the legitimacy of generic democratic
mechanisms, but in particular the mechanisms of deliberative democracy, a species of
democratic theory that is quite prominent in contemporary political philosophy. Since
deliberative democracy locates the legitimacy of its decisions precisely in the citizens’ ability
to make informed and rational political decisions through the procedure of deliberating with
each other (Freeman 375), if the ignorance of the citizenry is wide spread and ineradicable,
then deliberative democracy is at best a naïve ideal. I intend to show that the ignorance
Somin claims is so debilitating for deliberative democracy can be overcome.
In what ways are many voting citizens ignorant? Somin notes that, at minimum,
voters should be aware of not only that a given issue exists and what each candidate’s position
on the issue is, but also of which position is most likely to promote the individual voter’s own
Carlson 2
interests (Somin 1998, 415). Voters also ought to be aware of the “ideological consistency”
between positions and the tradeoffs that each position requires: one cannot be an advocate for
both lower taxes and an expansion of the services the government provides (Somin 1998,
418). Finally, they must be able to discern which policies or policy leaders are deserving of
credit or blame for the outcomes that happen after they are put in place. By all of these
metrics, most citizens in Western democracies fail miserably, with many being unable to
answer even rudimentary questionnaires about government structure and candidate’s
positions, much less the higher-level questions of ideological consistency and blame of
criticism (Somin 443).
Some might say that these appalling statistics of is simply a matter of mass
misinformedness (Talisse 460). There are two problems with this view. First, this period of
mass ignorance is also a period of unprecedented amounts of high-quality information being
available, often free of charge on public television and radio stations (Somin 1998, 419). This
problem of mass ignorance does not seem solvable by a simple increase in information
availability or quality. Second, the ignorance that Somin describes is more than just a simple
matter of misinformedness or even of culpable “agent-ignorance” due to an individual’s
incompetence (Talisse 461). The critical form of ignorance at play here, as first outlined by
Anthony Downs, is ignorance as the “rational outcome of a collective action problem” (Somin
1998, 444). Acquiring sufficient knowledge to be adequately informed about political matters
is a costly, time-consuming ordeal that many citizens do not have the leisure to pursue
because occupational and familial responsibilities consume the bulk of their waking hours.
Furthermore, even if they were to commit large amounts of their resources to becoming
politically well informed, their well informed vote would likely have very little impact on the
Carlson 3
outcome of the election. In an election with an electorate in the hundreds of millions, the
likelihood of casting the deciding vote is infinitesimal. The well informedness of that vote
will not raise that probability at all. Thus, the miniscule utility gained by becoming informed
enough to cast a well informed ballot is almost always offset by the much greater costs
involved with becoming more politically informed. The conclusion Somin draws is that a
rational person—even one with relatively altruistic dispositions towards promoting the public
good of composing an informed electorate (Somin 2010, 260)—would not devote the time
necessary to become politically informed (Somin 1998, 437).
Standard democratic procedure states that decisions about public policy are made by
citizens registering their preferences by voting for one candidate or another (Freeman 373-4).
Insofar as these aggregations of raw preference accounts of democracy presuppose adequately
informed votes (Freeman 375), voter ignorance seems to question the viability of said
democratic procedures. But the fact of voter ignorance is even more troubling to deliberative
democracy. Deliberative democracy critiques raw preference accounts of democracy, saying
that they require too little of voters, and that only a more rigorous form of decision making
would be able to weed out unreasonable preferences and deliver truly acceptable public
policies. The procedure of “free deliberation among equal [citizens]” is the source of a
political decision’s legitimacy (Cohen 3).
What does such a procedure expect of its participants? The procedure is largely a
discussion over what constitutes the common good of all citizens—or at least as many citizens
as possible (Freeman 375). Effective deliberation requires participants to abstract from their
own personal preferences and consider a situation from the most impartial point of view
possible. Frequently this impartial point of view is cashed out in terms of the principles of
Carlson 4
civility and reciprocity, where one appeals only to reasons that are considered public and that
other deliberators might find acceptable (Freeman 398). Thus, this rigorous procedure is
more demanding on participants in terms of requiring them to be able to tease out which
reasons they have for their preferences are sufficiently public and acceptable to others. Somin
notes that deliberation might even include sophisticated moral and philosophical issues as
well as subtle empirical issues, all of which must be handled rationally (Somin 2010, 257). If
voters fail to meet even the basic benchmarks required of them in a relatively generic
democracy—indeed, if they fail to correctly identify basic factual information—then they are
even more inadequate for the higher standards required of them by deliberative democracy
(Somin 1998, 440).
If voter ignorance is a specific outcome of a collective action problem, then the
solution might come from two directions: either one could reduce the costs on individuals for
acquiring knowledge leading to sufficient informedness or increase the efficacy of a well
informed vote. The first avenue is usually approached by informational shortcuts that, in
theory, shift the burden of knowledge acquisition away from individual citizens and onto a
myriad of other entities—e.g. political parties and pundits—that have less of an opportunity
cost to acquire political knowledge than the individual citizen. Somin reviews many
variations on this shortcut theme, and his assessment is not optimistic: many of these
shortcuts are more prone to engendering myopic, unjustified bias than cultivating clarity and
full-informedness (Somin 1998, 431). Shortcuts are therefore often more harmful than they
are helpful. Furthermore, Somin notes that when individuals do engage in political debate it
is frequently done in a way that confirms their antecedent beliefs (Somin 2010, 254).1 At best,
1 Political programming is often advertised with phrases such as “reasoned” or “fair and balanced,” leading some to think that reasoned engagement remains an important selling point
Carlson 5
“effective use of shortcuts requires a pre-existing base of background knowledge that many
voters lack” (Somin 2010, 262). The other flank, of increasing the efficacy of well informed
votes, to solving this problem, has been less popular in the literature. John Stuart Mill’s
suggestion that more well informed votes should count for more votes stands as perhaps the
most prominent way of directly increasing the efficacy of well informed votes. Giving weight
directly to one set of voters, however, is blatantly undemocratic, and thus undercuts the very
aim of democracy that deliberative democrats wish to defend. Such a strategy would also
vindicate Somin’s worries that deliberative democracy would privilege certain people who
had the skills and training necessary for effective deliberation, turning an explicitly
democratic project into an essentially oligarchic setup (Somin 1998, 443).
Nevertheless, one approach that attempts to attack both flanks of the collective-action
problem of rational ignorance through the use of deliberation is Bruce Ackerman and James
Fishkin’s proposal of a deliberative holiday in their book Deliberation Day. On this holiday,
presidential candidates give an initial presentation to a cross-section sample of the population.
The sample population is also given independent information on the issues. Then participants
break down into small groups and deliberate about which questions should be asked about
each candidate’s platform. When the groups come to a consensus on which questions should
be asked, the questions are then presented to the candidates who will then be given time to
respond. There are several rounds of this discursive to-and-fro. At the conclusion of this
deliberative day, the sample population—having been given the chance to listen to sustained
presentation of candidate’s messages, reflect and deliberate with other citizens, pose questions
in political advertising (Talisse 464). Nevertheless, the advertisement’s indication that the producers of these programs cherish reasoned discussion frequently belies the actual content and procedures of these shows, leading one to conclude that reason is only used in advertisements to attract viewers, not to actually engage in its use.
Carlson 6
to the candidates and hear their responses—then votes on which candidate they think is the
superior one. This sample population, Ackerman and Fishkin claim, would represent how a
well informed populace might evaluate a set of candidates.
How does this holiday proposal solve the collective action problem of rational
ignorance? It does so by changing the incentive structure that makes ignorance otherwise
instrumentally rational (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 133). There are several ways that a
deliberative holiday reduces the costs and the efficacy of attaining knowledge about politics.
First, by taking place on a holiday when many businesses are closed anyway and by providing
a small financial stipend to participants (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 29), the opportunity and
financial costs of taking the time to deliberate on presidential candidates are either mitigated
or compensated for. Second, the efficacy of the participants’ opinions and reasons has the
potential to increase as well, though in the indirect manner of influencing other people’s
opinions and preferences. While in deliberation, each participant has the potential to persuade
other participants that certain difficult questions must be asked about a candidate’s otherwise
attractive proposal. Their voices are not lost in an endless sea of ballots, but all are given a
forum to speak in small groups, where they are engaging with other individuals face to face
(Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 134).
Furthermore, the individual participant’s efficacy extends not only to the other
participants, but even to non-participants as well. The participants’ contributions to the well
informed opinion of the holiday’s final results by be seen by non-participants as an opinion
they ought to take seriously in deciding how to cast their own ballot. What Ackerman and
Fishkin conclude is that even citizens who are normally rationally compelled to be ignorant
about politics “are more than capable of living up to the demands of deliberative democracy”
Carlson 7
provided that they are given good reasons to think that living up to that standard would be
efficacious (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 7).
While this deliberative holiday proposal might work toward mitigating the costs of
political knowledge acquisition and increasing the ceiling of efficacy of well informed votes,
there are still outstanding questions over whether this proposal can actually achieve, (1) the
very difficult standards that deliberative democracy sets out, and (2) achieve (1) in a way that
individual citizens could have rational incentive to participate.
First, What reason do we have to think that deliberation can sufficiently overcome the
antecedent ignorance of the participants? Ackerman and Fishkin note that there are a few
days of preparation where the participants are given reading and information to prepare them
for their deliberative exercises (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 70), but why should we think
that this would overcome the ignorance the participants already have? Somin notes, “if actual
voters tend to be close-minded and unwilling to accept opposing evidence, it seems unlikely
that many of them can engage in the sort of unbiased dialogue deliberative democrats
champion,” which leads Somin to predict that deliberation is likely to degenerate into just
repetitive talking points, if not something more hostile and confrontational (Somin 2010,
264). But Somin’s prediction that deliberation will almost certainly degenerate in such a
spectacular fashion does not fit the experimental findings. In many instances of deliberative
polling, a small-scale cousin to the deliberative holiday, Fishkin found that deliberation
changed the opinion on up to 2/3rds of the questions the participants answered before the
deliberation took place (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 52). There is also anecdotal evidence to
suggest that small deliberation groups can bring even deeply prejudiced people to a greater
degree of mutual understanding (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 141). We need not be
Carlson 8
completely quixotic that deliberation will suddenly transform intransigent devils into
conciliatory angels, but the evidence does not seem to fit with Somin’s rather dismal
prediction. Furthermore, the disinclination of the participants to look foolish or unprepared at
a very public event might have an “anticipation effect” which incentivizes private study by
individuals to equip themselves for the holiday (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 140).
A central part of Ackerman and Fishkin’s thesis that a deliberative holiday can be an
effective way to cultivate an engaged, well informed populace is that deliberation does appear
to have an effect on participants. Nevertheless, change in opinion does not necessarily entail
that the updated opinions would satisfy the lofty standards of deliberative democracy that
Somin described. A changed opinion can be just as ill informed as the original one. Yet it
seems that the requirements for deliberative democracy is less about cognitive possession than
Somin suggests. Somin seems to conflate where individual citizens begin the deliberation
with where the deliberation’s collective decision ends. Deliberation does not require ready-
made, fully informed deliberators at its outset: if that were the case, then deliberation would
be unnecessary. It seems more plausible to suggest that deliberative democracy desires that
whatever decision the deliberators reach, it should be one that is fully informed by all the
interests and preferences that are affected, not that any one person possesses knowledge of
that from the outset. The deliberative forum seems designed to be more of a hermeneutical
space in which a dialectic takes place among participants with less than perfect information.
What deliberative democracy generally does require over and above that of generic
democracy has less to do with the cognitive possessions of the participants, and more to do
with the attitudes they bring to the deliberative situation. Yes, all individuals would probably
have to learn to limit the scope of reasons they could utilize to persuade others. But it does
Carlson 9
not seem clear that accepting something like the principles of reciprocity and civility is such
an overly intense cognitive demand. If anything it encourages the exercise of a person’s non-
cognitive faculties such as imagination or moral sentiments (Freeman 383). And far from too
demanding, acceptance of these principles—or something like them—seems like a necessary
requirement, given the time constraints, that people pare down their reasons they have for
their viewpoints that they are willing to share and defend. There is even reason to believe that
the process of deliberation itself will effectively weed out arguments or viewpoints that
cannot “withstand deliberative scrutiny” or compromise the moral integrity or equality of the
fellow deliberators (Dryzek and List 14). In addition, deliberation also has an effect on
achieving proximity to single-peakedness, a sufficient condition for achieving a Condorcet
winner and frequently indicative of some level of meta-agreement among participants about
how to semantically conceptualize the available alternatives, even given substantial
disagreement about how to rank those alternatives (List et al. 6, 9). To the degree that
deliberation does seem to effect change in participants’ opinions, we have reason to think that
deliberation is doing the job it was intended to do.
A second question is whether the change in opinion might be due to what Somin calls
“agenda setting effects” where simply presenting new information—or perhaps even
presenting it in a new format—to uninformed people results in a change of opinion (Somin
1998, 442). The time constraints on this holiday entails that a certain selection from the vast
array of policy issues on the agenda must take place, and as a result could allow for
candidates or presenters to manipulate the deliberators (Somin 2010, 268). Yet there are
reasons to think the bias of presentations or the framing effects of what topics are discussed
are not serious problems for the deliberative holiday proposal. First, there is evidence to think
Carlson 10
that deliberation in general gives rational incentives to the presenters to give an honest
portrayal of their view. When people are held responsible for the claims they make by
recurrent interaction with others, there are serious long-term risks with being labeled as a liar
or manipulator (Dryzek and List 9). The proposed Deliberation Day gives two ways of
ensuring positive and negative incentives for speaking honestly and straightforwardly. The
equal time given to opposing candidates ensures that even well entreched incumbents can
receive a thorough vetting by their opponents (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 101). They will
not be able to get away with a blatant mischaracterization of their opponents’ position.
Second, even if an opposing candidate fails to examine a questionable position from their
opponent, the format of the small group deliberation allows for the individual participants to
ask pointed questions.2 The focus of these small groups is less about deliberating directly
about the merits of the candidate’s positions, but rather what is left out or unclear about a
candidate’s position. This second avenue is important, since though framing effects—even
non-malicious ones—will inevitably occur in the procedure, there is always the possibility for
the participants to challenge those effects and point out where elisions are manipulative or
misleading. Additional empirical studies have also demonstrated that where change of
preference does occur, it is not simply due to unreflective following of cues from moderators
and presenters, as subjects of deliberative polls increased significantly in knowledge of even
less prominent matters of deliberation (List et al 17). Ultimately, it does not seem that
agenda-setting effects are very serious worries.
2 It should be noted that the format also prevents the questions from being overly hostile or inflammatory, as the questions would need to be moderate enough that they would be agreed to by the rest of the small group (Ackerman and Fishkin 63-4).
Carlson 11
A third and final question that a deliberative holiday proposal raises is how the results
of Deliberation Day carry over to the wider population. Ackerman and Fishkin claim that the
final poll results signal to the wider population the final results of fellow citizens who have
reflected and deliberated about the presidential candidates’ platforms. Their results provide
the rest of the population with an approximation of what a “well informed vote” might look
like, which might sway non-participants to rethink their own position. But Ackerman and
Fishkin do not address two critical questions about the strength of that signal, and thus the
actual efficacy of it: how strongly would the poll results transmit the ideal of a well informed
vote, and how strongly would that signal be received by non-participants?
Why should we regard a deliberated preference as proximate to a well informed
preference? One strong reason to consider a thoroughly deliberated opinion as proximate to
the ideal of a well informed opinion is that it takes seriously the pluralism of race, gender,
class, and ideology that exist in modern societies. For each political decision, there are
always numerous kinds of people whose lives are in some way affected. A well informed
opinion is one that has considered as many different perspectives as possible to determine
which possibility is best when taking everything into consideration. On the other side, for
those who are affected, it seems only an extension of the fairness and freedom that traditional,
generic democracy champions that they be able to express their opinions and interests about a
decision to a wider audience.
Why should non-participants seriously regard the results of Deliberation Day? As
Fishkin’s research with Deliberative polling suggests, deliberation creates a surprising number
of “swing” voters, voters who begin the deliberation with one opinion and end with either a
different opinion or a heavily modified version of the original. The non-participant cannot
Carlson 12
discount out of hand the idea that if she were one of the deliberators, she might be one of
those “swing” voters who switched sides as well. It might be rational for them to consider if
their current position is somehow inadequate. Others might see the results as an informational
shortcut that is superior to the other available shortcuts to political information (e.g. political
parties, opinion leaders, common sense, etc.). Furthermore, Deliberation Day seems like the
only informational shortcut that goes to great lengths to remove any specter of myopia by
including a full representation of the pluralism present in western societies, with each equally
having the freedom and forum to voice their interests and their preferences. Conversely, if the
demographic composition of the event included too many of one class at the expense of others
who would have added more balance to the proceedings, then one has reason to not take the
results as seriously as one would otherwise.3
Also, for Ackerman and Fishkin, deliberation day is not just a one-off part of the
electoral season that is discretely separated from the rest of the year. In their eyes, the
anticipation of a day of sustained discussion could shape both candidate, participant, and even
non-participant behavior throughout the year. Politicians would no longer rely blindly on just
raw poll numbers of an unreflective population, but will form their opinions knowing that
they will have to answer to the reflective discourse of Deliberation Day. Deliberation Day
3 One should note that Ackerman and Fishkin are under no delusions that the results
from deliberation are infallible such that it removes the rationality of opposition (Ackerman
and Fishkin 2002, 145). It might be perfectly reasonable for some reasonably open-minded
citizens to stick with their opinions even if they do not coincide with the deliberators’ overall
conclusions. The option of ultimate dissent must remain open as a live, viable option.
Carlson 13
also gives a politician no comfort that some unpopular or unseemly action will go unnoticed:
before a deliberative audience, potentially every act is a high visibility act (Ackerman and
Fishkin 2004, 79). Participants would find it advantageous to become informed through their
own study, which would likely include at least some informal discussions with non-
participants.
For Somin, the pervasiveness and ineradicability of voter ignorance is in part due to
the massive scope of modern states (Somin 1998, 444). Modern governmental plays such a
wide variety of roles in society that it is impossible for individual voters to be informed about
more than a narrow sliver of the government’s overall functioning (Somin 1998, 431).
According to Somin, if the scope of government is inversely proportionate to voters’ ability to
be informed about governmental affairs, then the best way to solve the ignorance problem is
to reduce the scope of government that voters must be informed about. Narrowing the scope
of government, specifically transferring more power to more state and local government
where voters have a more manageable number of issues about which they can be informed.
Somin also notes that these more “localist” alternatives are even compatible with even some
measure of deliberative democracy (Somin 2010, 264), the chief difference being that it starts
and ends in the local setting. Such a local setting with a smaller population of participants
also increases the amount of individual opinion and vote efficacy, potentially resulting in a
decrease of rational ignorance—though its more intimate, personally-connected setting could
also lead to preference falsification, where people silence their dissenting viewpoints because
of social pressures (Somin 2010, 271).4
4 It should also be noted that Ackerman and Fishkin do not quibble with the necessity of localized operations in their proposal (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 147).
Carlson 14
There are several questions that need to be asked about this proposal, however.
Joshua Cohen points out that we should be skeptical that purely localized deliberative arenas,
with no feeder into a larger network of arenas. Such atomized arenas are unlikely to generate
the sustained, open-ended deliberation that deliberative democracy aims for, as a local area
usually includes only a narrow range of interests and opinions that would be affected by
policy (Cohen 10). Another question about Somin’s proposal is its vagueness in regards to
what should and should not be within the scope of government.5 Presumably attempting to
responsibly narrow government would require knowledge of what government can reasonably
do, as well as what the social consequences of such narrowing would be. If citizens are
generally ignorant about political matters, it seems hardly plausible to expect them to have the
kind of knowledge about what government can and cannot do. But even if we ignored the
knowledge required to effect the transition Somin suggests, it does not seem that a reduced
knowledge burden required of citizens follows from a more narrowly focused government.
Under this plan, whatever current government functions fall outside the new, streamlined
government would still need to be addressed by citizens. The knowledge these citizens would
need to effectively carry out these functions would not decrease by localizing government and
might even increase.
5 There is also the possibility that Somin’s suggestion is not as radical as narrowing the scope of government itself, so much as narrowing what voters have control over, namely from voter control over all public policy to simply voter control over the officials elected to office (Somin 1998, 445). It is, first, unclear how that is different from that current political situation, nor, second, how this overcomes the ignorance that is demonstrably at work in most citizens. If citizens cannot accurately assign blame or credit for current situations, then Somin’s argument leads one to the conclusion that citizens should have no vital role in selecting either individual policies or leaders. Third, limiting the voter control to the selection of leaders is consistent with parts of Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal (Ackerman and Fishkin, 157).
Carlson 15
Somin admits that the knowledge burden might not decrease, only to point out that in
this scenario, citizens have more informational feedbacks—namely prices—that could
increase their ability to make more informed decisions than they would have as citizen-voters.
It is relatively easy, Somin thinks, to connect performance to quality of a product based on its
price, but very difficult to “connect the social outcomes to public policy” (Somin 1998, 446).
Yet if decisions come down to prices and more local considerations, it seems that this would
encourage a myopia in the resulting decisions: the decisions that cost the least for an
individual are preferred, even if their cost on more distant—or future—people are much
greater (Ackerman and Fishkin 2002, 143). And while this localist, more consumerist,
alternative avoids the problem of a rationally ignorant electorate, with Somin’s proposal there
becomes an equally troubling prospect of a rationally myopic electorate who votes primarily
on what is in their immediate best interest. Somin’s advocacy for a local-only alternative also
runs afoul of Somin’s own very salient point against the use of daily experience as an
informational short cut: many problems are not immediately encountered on a daily basis
(Somin 1998, 420-421). Deliberation Day strives to resist the equally unattractive
possibilities of a rationally ignorant and a rationally myopic electorate by providing a context
in which engaging reflectively on the difficult and wide-ranging policy questions can be
considered a rational endeavor for many citizens.
In his concluding remarks on his survey of the literature of deliberative democracy,
Samuel Freeman notes that the most difficult obstacle for deliberative democracy—as is true
of perhaps all political ideals—is in making it a feasible enterprise for the imperfect rational
practitioners that humans are (Freeman 418). I hope to have shown that deliberative
democracy through the implementation of Deliberation Day makes great strides in
Carlson 16
overcoming the vexing problem of rational ignorance—and perhaps of even more general
ignorance—within the electorate. This is far from the final word, as Deliberation Day
remains simply a hypothetical construct at this point. Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposals and
inferences—as they themselves recognize—are exercises in “utopian realism” (Ackerman and
Fishkin 2002, 130) and thus are largely speculative in the ways that their deliberation day
proposal would operate. Yet they have given us reasons to be at least cautiously optimistic
about the ability of the electorate to deliberate effectively about political decisions and public
policy.
Works Cited
Ackerman, Bruce and James Fishkin. Deliberation Day. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 2004.
Carlson 17
---. “Deliberation Day.” The Journal of Political Philosophy. 10.2 (2002): 129-152.
Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Ed. Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit. New York: Blackwell, 1989.
Dryzek, John and Christian List. “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.” British Journal of Political Science. 33.1 (2003): 1-28.
Freeman, Samuel. “Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 29.4 (2000): 371-418.
List, Christian, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin and Iain McLean. “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls.” (April 25, 2006). PSPE Working Paper No. 1. Accessed Thursday May 12, 2011. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20069/
Somin, Ilya. “Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal.” Critical Review. 12. 4 (1998) : 413-458.
---. “Deliberative Democracy and Ignorance.” Critical Review, Vol. 22.2-3 (2010):253-279.
Talisse, Robert B. ‘‘Does Public Ignorance Defeat Deliberative Democracy?’’Critical Review 16.4. (2004): 455-64.
Research Paper help