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Today is Thursday, July 23, 2015 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L45466 June 30, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. LOPE HERMINO Y LIMOSA (alias LOPE GERMINO), defendantappellant. Ty Kong Tin for appellant. Office of the SolicitorGeneral Tuason for appellee. DIAZ, J.: Lope Hermino y Limosa (alias Lope Germino) was charged with theft and later sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila to suffer one month and one day of arresto mayor with them corresponding accessory penalties to indemnify the owner of the stolen articles in the sum of P15.17, and suffer also the additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, being a habitual delinquent. Not satisfied with the sentence imposed upon him, the accused appealed therefrom and, quoting from his brief, now contends in this instance that: I. The lower court erred in deciding that the defendant's spontaneous plea of guilty has been compensated by recidivism. II. The lower court erred in imposing upon the defendant an additional penalty not in accordance with allegation of the information. Apropos of the first question raised by the appellant, the SolicitorGeneral, in turn, raises this other one: Should the appellant's plea of guilty, entered in the Court of First Instance which tried the case on appeal, be taken into consideration in his favor, notwithstanding the fact that he had gone to trial in the municipal court, presenting his own evidence therein after the promotor fiscal had presented his? This is a case of an appellant which, after having been charged with the crime of theft by virtue of an information filed by the office of the city fiscal of Manila in the municipal court of said city, went to trial, thus requiring the presentation, in an ordinary trial, of evidence to substantiate his case. As a result, judgment was rendered against him, having been found guilty of theft by said court. From said judgment, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila which he was charged and sentenced him to the abovestated penalties, after having permitted him to substitute his former plea of not guilty for that of guilty. This appeal was interposed by him to set aside the foregoing sentence. The information, which gave rise to the case and was the one answered by the appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila, pleading guilty of the crime charged therein, reads as follows: That on or about the 26th day of December, 1936, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal carry away one leather pocketbook, valued at P1 containing cash in the amount of P14.17, belonging to Mrs. W. G. Schindler, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the total sum of P15.17, Philippine currency. That the said accused has previously been convicted three times of the crime of theft by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent court, as follows: Criminal case No. Date of commission of crime Date of conviction Date of release Penalty Municipal Court

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  • 7/23/2015 G.R.No.L45466

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/jun1937/gr_l45466_1937.html 1/3

    TodayisThursday,July23,2015

    RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

    Manila

    ENBANC

    G.R.No.L45466June30,1937

    THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,vs.LOPEHERMINOYLIMOSA(aliasLOPEGERMINO),defendantappellant.

    TyKongTinforappellant.OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralTuasonforappellee.

    DIAZ,J.:

    LopeHerminoyLimosa(aliasLopeGermino)waschargedwith theftand latersentencedby theCourtofFirstInstance of Manila to suffer one month and one day of arresto mayor with them corresponding accessorypenaltiestoindemnifytheownerofthestolenarticlesinthesumofP15.17,andsufferalsotheadditionalpenaltyofsixyearsandonedayofprisionmayor,beingahabitualdelinquent.Notsatisfiedwiththesentenceimposeduponhim,theaccusedappealedtherefromand,quotingfromhisbrief,nowcontendsinthisinstancethat:

    I.Thelowercourterredindecidingthatthedefendant'sspontaneouspleaofguiltyhasbeencompensatedbyrecidivism.

    II. The lower court erred in imposing upon the defendant an additional penalty not in accordance withallegationoftheinformation.

    Aproposofthefirstquestionraisedbytheappellant, theSolicitorGeneral, inturn,raisesthisotherone:Shouldtheappellant'spleaofguilty,enteredintheCourtofFirstInstancewhichtriedthecaseonappeal,betakenintoconsiderationinhisfavor,notwithstandingthefactthathehadgonetotrialinthemunicipalcourt,presentinghisownevidencethereinafterthepromotorfiscalhadpresentedhis?

    Thisisacaseofanappellantwhich,afterhavingbeenchargedwiththecrimeoftheftbyvirtueofaninformationfiledby theofficeof the city fiscal ofManila in themunicipal court of said city,went to trial, thus requiring thepresentation,inanordinarytrial,ofevidencetosubstantiatehiscase.Asaresult,judgmentwasrenderedagainsthim, having been found guilty of theft by said court. From said judgment, he appealed to the Court of FirstInstance of Manila which he was charged and sentenced him to the abovestated penalties, after havingpermittedhimtosubstitutehisformerpleaofnotguiltyforthatofguilty.Thisappealwasinterposedbyhimtosetasidetheforegoingsentence.

    The information,whichgave rise to thecaseandwas theoneansweredby theappellant in theCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,pleadingguiltyofthecrimechargedtherein,readsasfollows:

    That on or about the 26th day of December, 1936, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the saidaccuseddidthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,withintentofgainandwithouttheconsentofthe owner thereof, take, steal carry away one leather pocketbook, valued at P1 containing cash in theamountofP14.17,belongingtoMrs.W.G.Schindler,tothedamageandprejudiceofthesaidownerinthetotalsumofP15.17,Philippinecurrency.

    That the said accused has previously been convicted three times of the crime of theft by virtue of finaljudgmentsrenderedbycompetentcourt,asfollows:

    CriminalcaseNo.Dateof

    commissionofcrime

    Dateofconviction

    Dateofrelease Penalty

    MunicipalCourt

  • 7/23/2015 G.R.No.L45466

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/jun1937/gr_l45466_1937.html 2/3

    H5055 Jan.20,1934 Jan.20,1934 Apr.7,1934 2months,1day

    CourtofFirstInstanceofManilaD52639 June28,1936 July3,1936 Oct.1936 4months,1day

    MunicipalCourtH56458 June29,1936 July6,1936 Dec.20,1936 2months,1day

    andisthereforeahabitualdelinquentundertheprovisionsofarticle62,paragraph5,oftheRevisedPenalCode,thedateofhisreleasefromconfinementinconnectionwithhislastoffensebeingDecember20,1936.

    Itwill be seen that, although the information in question contains no express allegation that the appellant is arecidivist,itstatesinthesecondparagraphthereof(a)thathewasconvictedonceofthecrimeoftheftonJanuary20,1934,andsentencedthereforonsaiddatetotwomonthsandonedayofarrestomayorthatheextinguishedsaidpenaltyonApril7,1934and(b)thathewaslikewiseconvictedofothertwocrimesoftheftonJuly3and6,1936, respectively, longafterhehadservedhis firstsentence that insaid twocaseshewassentenced to thepenalties of four months and one day and two months and one day of arresto mayor, respectively that heextinguishedhis twosentencesonDecember201936.This fact is, in itselfequivalent toanallegation that theappellant is a recidivist, as no other thing can be inferred from said allegations than that had been previouslyconvictedbyfinal judgmentofcrimesembracedinthesametitleof theRevisedPenalCode.But,ofhowmanycrimeswasheconvictedby final judgment for thepurposesof rule5ofarticle62of theRevisedPenalCode,whichtreatsofhabitualdelinquency?

    Itshouldbenotedthatbetweentheappellant'scommissionofoneandhiscommissionoftheotherofhislasttwocrimes,andbetweenhisprosecutionfortheformerandhisprosecutionforthelatter,hardlyonedayhadelapsedin the first and three days in the last case. This shows that when he was prosecuted for his last crime, thejudgmentrenderedinthecaseinstitutedagainsthimforhisnextprecedingcrimehadnotyetbecomefinalandthisissobecausejudgmentsdonorbecomefinaluntilaftertheexpirationoftheperiodoffifteendaysallowedtheaccusedtointerposeanappeal.Underthelaw,therecanbenorecidivismexceptwhentheaccused,atthetimeofhistrialforonecrime,shallhavebeenpreviouslyconvictedbyfinaljudgmentofanothercrimeembracedinthesametitleoftheCode(art14,subsec.9,oftheRevisedPenalCode).Consequently,theanswertothequestionisthatwhentheappellantcommittedhislastcrime,hewasarecidivistonlyforthethirdtime.

    As to thequestionwhetherornotheappellant'spleaofguilty,entered in theCourtofFirst InstanceofManila,shouldbecompensatedbytheaggravatingcircumstancesofrecidivism,whichthiscourtdeclarestohavebeenproven, itshouldbeborne inmind that thespiritof the law iswhatmayreasonablybe inferred fromthe termsthereof.Theseventhmitigatingcircumstancereads:

    Thattheoffenderhadvoluntarilysurrenderedhimselftoapersoninauthorityorhisagent,orthathehadvoluntarilyconfessedhisguiltbeforethecourtpriortothepresentationoftheevidencefortheprosecution.

    In the case under consideration, the appellant confessed his crime after the prosecution had presented itsevidence,at least in themunicipalcourtwherethecaseoriginated. Itcannotbesatedthat theappeal takenbyhimtotheCourtofFirstInstancesagainrestoredthecasetoitsoriginaldenovo,thatis,thattherehadbeennopresentationofevidencebeforeheconfessedoradmittedhiscrime,becauseatrialdenovogivetheimpressionandnecessarilyimpliestheexistenceofaprevioustrial.Ontheotherhand,thetermsofthelawexpresslyrequirethattheconfession,inorderconstituteamitigatingcircumstace,mustnotonlybespontaneousbutalsobemadepriortothepresentationoftheevidencefortheprosecution(art.13,subsec.7RevisedPenalCode).

    As this court stated in the case ofPeople vs.De laCruz (63Phil., 874), the reason for the existence of saidmitigatingcircumstanceisthatitrevealstoacertainextentanactofrepentance,amoraldispositionfavorabletohis reformand submission to the law.This reason cannot be said to exist in the appellant's casebecausehewishedneither toacknowledgehis crimenor to repentwhenhis first opportunity came, that is, during the trialgrantedhim in themunicipalcourt.Consequently,aftereliminating themitigatingcircumstanceofconfessionofguilt the aggravating circumstance of recidivism remains uncompensated and, under the circumstances, thepenaltythatshouldbeimposeduponhimisarrestomayor initsmaximumperiod,orfromfourmonthsandonedaytosixmonths(arts.308and309,subsec.5,inconnectionwithart.64,rule3,oftherevisedPenalCode).

    FollowingthedoctrinelaiddowninthecaseofPeoplevs.Santiago(55Phil.,266)Peoplevs.DelaRama(G.R.No.43744,62Phil.,972)Peoplevs.Venus (63Phil.,435)andPeoplevs.Tapel (63Phil., 464), theappellantcannotbeahabitualdelinquentbyreasonofhishavingbeenarecidivistforthefourthtime,butonlyforthethirdtime,anddeserved,therefore,theleastadditionalpenaltyprescribedinarticle62,subsection5,paragraph(a),orprisioncorreccionalinitsmediumandmaximumperiods.

    For the foregoing reasons, theappealed judgment ismodifiedbysentencing theappellant to fourmonthsandonedayofarrestomayor,plus theadditionalpenaltyof twoyears, fourmonthsandoneday,affirming it inallotherrespects,withthecoststotheappellant.Soordered.

  • 7/23/2015 G.R.No.L45466

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/jun1937/gr_l45466_1937.html 3/3

    Avancea,C.J.,VillaReal,Imperial,LaurelandConcepcion,JJ.,concur.

    SeparateOpinions

    ABADSANTOS,J.,dissenting:

    ForthereasonstatedinmaydissentingopinioninPeoplevs.Bawasanta(G.R.No.45467,June30,1937,p.413post),IamoftheopinionthattheappellantisentitledtohaveconsideredinhisfavorthemitigatingcircumstanceofhavingpleadedguiltyintheCourtofFirstInstance.

    TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation