50(n)div intsum no18

8/3/2019 50(N)Div IntSum No18

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S E C R E T

59 (N) DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 18

Based on information received up to 2100 hrs 29 June 44.

(This Summary must be destroyed within 24 hrs of receipt)

PART I

A. General

It is now possible to give a fairly accurate idea of the enemy's situation.

Up to now the enemy has had to cope with a double problem: how to reinforce NORMANDY

with an effective containing and counter-attack force, and at the same time remain

strong in the other areas liable to Allied assault. As a result, he has been forced to

compromise. Appreciating not only that the main actual threat lay on his right flank,

but also that a strong potential threat lay in the PAS DE CALAIS, he has brought his

Panzer divisions to break the Allied thrust between ST LO and the ORNE, while

attempting to hold the COTENTIN by reinforcing it with the bulk of the garrison from

BRITTANY. The armour has failed to achieve a breakthrough, the infantry to prevent

one.

With the loss of CHERBOURG the enemy's problem in NORMANDY remains the same. The

Allied bridgehead has still to be contained, if not reduced. Moreover, the new

situation underlines again the urgent need for infantry, required now not only to

bolster the left of Seventh Army against renewed assault, but also to take over at

least a portion of the Army's right, if the armour pinned there is to be used in a

major blow. The fact that infantry from NORTH of the SEINE has not yet been tapped

would suggest that the second problem, too, remains the same, and that the threat to

the PAS DE CALAIS is still very real. The present evidence of movements shows that the

enemy may be forced to compromise again. The BISCAY and MEDITERRANEAN coasts are being

stripped, while divisions are edging SOUTH from HOLLAND, DENMARK and NORWAY. The

result is a gradual thinning out of the flanks, while he maintains a solid front from

BELGIUM to BREST. If infantry reinforcements are to go to NORMANDY it is clearly not

yet to be at the expense of the PAS DE CALAIS.

In the battle area, at least six infantry divisions (77, 91, 243, 3, 709, 716) have

now been reduced to skeletons; at least two Panzer Divisions (Panzer Lehr Division and

12 SS Panzer Division) have suffered such heavy casualties that they may have to be

withdrawn from the line shortly. To compensate for these losses, two panzer divisions

(1 and 2 SS Panzer divisions) have now been at least partly committed against our

bridgehead SOUTH of the ODON. One or two heavy tank battalions from the training areas

are also expected to enter the action shortly

For infantry reinforcements, the whole of Seventh Army area has now been sucked dry, 5

Parachute Division has remained in the COTES DU NORD, but 265 and 275 Infantry

Division have each contributed a battle group, probably between a battalion and a

regiment in size, and the whole of 353 Infantry Division is believed to have come up,

leaving something of a hole in WEST BRITTANY.

Fifteenth Army is also now making its contribution of infantry, but is getting inreturn replacements from NORWAY, DENMARK, and GERMANY, showing that the threat to the

PAS DE CALAIS and FLANDERS is still not discounted. 16 German Air Force Division has

left HOLLAND for the battle area, without being replaced; but 363 Infantry Division

from NORWAY has detrained in FLANDERS in place of 48 Infantry Division (not yet

identified in the

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battle area), and 89 Infantry Division moving from NORWAY may well be used to replace

some other infantry division from the PAS DE CALAIS. Similarly, extensive new arrivals

of parachute troops in the AMIENS area suggest, as does observed train movement, that

85 or 326 Infantry Divisions may have left for the battle and been relieved.

Even Army Group G in the SOUTH of FRANCE has had to yeild some of its infantry.

Movement reported in the areas of 276 and 277 Infantry Divisions is sufficient to show

that each is sending at least a battle group and there is evidence that 276 Div has


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already arrived EAST of the ORNE. But the two panzer divisions in the SOUTH (9 and 11)

though active, are probably still preoccupied with the MAQUIS.

(Source: SHAEF Weekly Intelligence summaries)

B. Situation - Army Front.

News received during the day clarifies enemy dispositions to the EAST of the Div front

to a certain extent.

It now appears that the boundary between 3 and 4 SS PGRs runs roughly SW - NE along

the line of the railway between NOYERS and GRAINVILLE-SUR-ODON. 4 SS PGR is on the

right, SOUTH of the railway, and 3 SS PGR on the left, NORTH of the railway.

The axis of attack, as shown by reports of the counter attack in process at the time of

writing, appears to be NE towards CHEUX for 3 SS PGR, and ENE up the line of the

railway for 4 SS PGR. Tank support is probably provided by 1 Bn 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div).

In the ESQUAY-EVECY area, both 1 and 11 Bns of 1 SS PGR (l SS Pz Div ADOLF HITLER)

have been identified and there is little doubt that the Div will shortly be fully

committed against the tip of our bridgehead over the ODON, in conjunction with 2 SS Pz

Div against the right flank.

So far neither the artillery of 2 SS Pz Div nor that of 1 SS have been used. Most ofit has probably yet to be brought up. Identifications however show the presence of 83

Werfer Regt, probably equipped with 15 cm Nebelwerfers, and of its probable higher

formation, 7 Werfer Bde. Such units are GHQ units, generally sub allotted to Corps.

Large scale movement NORTH from the line CONDE-SUR-NOIREAU - FALAISE, and NE through

VILLERS-BOCAGE today shows that the concentration of 1 SS and 2,SS Pz Divs is by no

means complete and that it has been proceeding rapidly throughout the day although

hampered by our continuous air attacks,

The following is an estimate, necessarily rough, of enemy tank strengths and casualties

on the Second Army front in the recent fighting.

UNITS RECENTLY INVOLVED ESTIMATED RUNNERS

am 25 June am 28 June

100 Pz Regt 50 40

12 SS Pz Regt 60 )

I Bn 3 Pz Regt

(ex 2 Pz Div)

50 )

)

combined strength

90

130 Pz Regt

(elts helping 12 SS)

70 )

)

now operating

between 82 and 97

101 Hy Pz Bn

(elts helping 12 SS)

30 )

)

grids

UNITS NOT INVOLVED

2 Bn, 3 Pz Regt 50 50

2 SS Pz Regt ? 100 ? 100

1 SS Pz Regt ? 120 ? 120

Total 530 400

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Tank losses for 28 and 29 June have not been taken into account,

NB: (i) It is estimated that on 25, 26, 27 Jun this and the neighbouring Corps KO'd

60 German tanks. 60 more have therefore been arbitrarily struck off as

workshop hulks. Since the heaviest engagement took place 27 Jun, it is

likely that the latter will not be fit for several days.


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(ii) 100 tanks for 2 SS Pz Div is the number recently reported by a ground source

when they were passing through the MIDI. They may not have yet reached

NORMANDY, let alone the battle area.

(iii) 120 tanks are arbitrarily allotted to 1 SS Pz Div since that appears to be

the quantity which all the Pz fmns so far started off with.

(Information on enemy tank losses from GSI 30 Corps)

C. Operations and Enemy Dispositions on the Divisional Front.

There has been little change in dispositions on our front today,

Last night at last light, a certain amount of enemy movement was observed; enemy

troops were seen moving about in full equipment and it is thought that the expected

relief of I Bn 902 PGR by II Bn 902 PGR has taken place, although so far there is no

conclusive evidence to that effect.

A PW taken at 820665 during a clash between one of our patrols and an enemy tank

(described at Appendix A) did not provide the necessary information as he belonged

to I Bn 130 Tank Regt.

Similarly two deserters from 3 Coy 902 PGR, who gave themselves up at 813665 failed to

give a clue to the mystery, as they stated that they had been on outpost duties duringthe night and had been forced to shelter from our artillery and mortar fire. When they

looked around in the morning they found the rest of the outpost gone and decided to

give themselves up. The only interesting point is the fact that 3 Coy 902 PGR appears

to have been responsible for the whole of the Chateau de CORDILLON area.

500 yards SOUTH of the JUVIGNY cross roads, a PW from 1 Coy 192 PGR (21 PZ Div) was

taken last night. This appears again to be the case of a single Coy being employed on

its own to fill a gap. It is quite possible that, after its heavy casualties at

TILLY, II Bn, 901 PGR has been taken out of the line to be reinforces in the same

was as 902 PGR some days ago.


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Part II

A. Enemy organisation

(a) 12 SS Pz Div.

(i) Documents have been found in a Tiger at FONTENAY LE PESNEL apparently

belonging to one of the crew and identifying him as of 4/12 SS Pz Regt.

Earlier reports from PW from this Div deny the existence of Tigers in the

Regt, but on balance it would appear they form part of I Bn.

(ii) PW interrogation indicates that a IV (Werfer) Bn exists in 12 SS Arty Regt

equipped with 5 cm mortars mounted eight at a time on half tracked vehicles.

(b) 2 SS Pz Div DAS REICH.

Unit Identified Place

3 SS PGR Area BRETEVILLETTE

DEUTSCHLAND 8864

3 SS PGR DER FUEHRER 8964

12 SS Pz Div

12 SS Pz Engr Bn 8865

(HQ coy)

2 Pz Div

HQ Coy 3 Pz Regt Area RAURAY

4 PGR DER FUEHRER

According to PW's statement I Bn DER FUEHRER arrived in area ST LO about 12 Jun.

He believed that the remaining two bns of DER FUEHRER were also there, but is not

certain. They were to go into the line in this area but this was postponed owing

to the non-arrival of the tk regt. It was believed to be travelling up by train

from the SOUTH of FRANCE, and PW heard on 12 Jun that it was on its way. He does

not believe that it has arrived yet. On the evening of 26 Jun the fmn left ST LO

area for the present sector.

PW knew that part of PGR DBUTSCHLAND was also in this area, and asserts that the

two regts were to counter attack on the evening of the 27th Jun to push us back

about 4 kms. Having learned through intercept sources that we meant to put in an

attack supported by hy arty and tanks on the same evening, the Germans decided to

postpone their counter attack.

On the morning of 28 Jun PW understood that his div DAS REICH was to relieve 12

SS Pz Div HITLER JUGEND, and he saw a considerable amoumt of 12 SS Pz Div traffic

withdrawing. But he agreed that it was possible that they were retiring to

reorganise. Stories of hy losses in 12 SS Pz Div are current in PWs unit, one bn

was said to have been reduced in the course of fighting from 900 to 150 strong.

PW stated that of the three bns of his regt the first two were carried in LKWs

(lt personnel carriers) and the third in SPWs (armd tracks) now apparently

known as PGWs (Pz Gren Wagen).

PGR "DER FUEHRER".../

[Remainder of IntSum missing]