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1 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP

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Page 1: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

1

5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS:Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker

Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP

Page 2: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

2AGENDA

• Introductions

• 5 Things Learned

• The Common Sense ¾

• Wrap-up

• Questions

Page 3: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

3POLL 1: HEARD OF BROKERS?

• What level of exposure do you have to Cloud Brokers?

• Text and your message to 22333

Page 5: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

5INTRODUCTIONS

5 years in Enterprise automation; 2 years in brokering

– Booz Allen (23K employees – 1.5K broker users)

– Government (280K employees – 2K+ users)

– Commercial

• Health Care

• Oil & Gas

• Pharmaceuticals

Page 6: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

6POLL 2: OPEN SOURCE

• Do you use open source software?

– Yes, love it and would even contribute (if only I knew how to code)!

• 202259

– Depends on the situation, maybe Linux for a server...

• 202262

– Unfortunately, legal and compliance won't allow it.

• 202267

– No way man, I want someone's throat to choke!

• 202268

• Text a CODE to 22333

Page 8: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

8#5 - OPEN IS MORE CLOSED THAN YOU THINK

• Modularity, Openness & Reusability

• Impressive open source technologies from Red Hat and others for enterprise automation

– CloudFormation/CloudForms

– AWS Integration

– Containerization/PaaS offerings

– Lacking the self-service and ease of use

✓ Limited sample scripts only

• Dependencies on other open source projects create limitations

– Staggered rollouts require custom code

• Implementer on the hook for updates

– New features released that overwrite custom code

Page 9: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

9INTRODUCING THE OPEN CLOUD BROKER

User Portal or

Marketplace

IaaS

Broker

PaaS

Broker

SaaS

Broker

Data

Broker

Administrator

Portal

TaaS

Broker

Cloud

Orchestration

EngineXaaS

Broker

Capabilities• Mult IaaS integration• Sticky PaaS config• SaaS offerings

Benefits• Modular/Flexible• Open Source• Business Process

Integration• Marketplace

http://www.boozallen.com/consulting/management-consulting/operational-efficiency/cloud-service-brokering

Page 10: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

10#4 MANAGE CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS

Control Scope Creep

– Brokerage solutions are relatively new; expect a lot of PoC’s, customer demos and pilots.

– Create a well-defined Statement of Work/Contract

– Repeatable, tested, well-documented, packaged solution

Results

– Avoid cost overruns

– Prevent delivery delays

– Provides self-service capabilities

Page 11: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

11#3 – STICKINESS KILLS!

Tempting, built-in services (PaaS)

– Price advantages (free?)

– Performance/Resiliency advantages

• Master/Slave databases

• Web sites

• Underlying core services (DNS, DHCP, NTP)

– Corresponding services w/ other CSPs?

DevOps/Orchestration

– Allows reuse of systems & services across multiple vendors

• Puppet, Chef, Juju, etc..

– Major broker advantage anyway!

Page 12: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

12

Sizing Models Price Arbitrage

#2 - BROKER’S ALGORITHMS DEAL ALL THE CARDS

Cost Algorithms

EfficientArchitecture

& Design

Rebates & Discounts

Page 13: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

13PRICING

Commoditization already in play

– Differentiable/Niche markets notas aggressive • Secure, Bring your own hardware,

VMware/Microsoft/OpenSource based

Price wars already started for IaaS

– Google, Azure and AWS price cuts• AWS already regularly discounted

services as new offerings brought online• Google aggressively pricing GCE• Microsoft working to match

Page 14: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

14BROKER ALGORITHM CONSIDERATIONS

FOR CSP (AZURE, AWS, RACKSPACE, VCHS, ONPREM, CUSTOM) [

TIERS (WEB, DB, APP, DMZ, OOB, ETC);

NATIVESTICKY (YES, NO);

SECURITYLEVEL (PII, H, M, L);

LICENSE COSTS (OS, DB, HA, SEC, BYOL);

SPACEAVAIL (YES, NO);

RESILIENCY (#9’S);

ELASTIC (NONE, SLOW, AVG, AGGRESSIVE, CUSTOM);

SERVERS=RESILIENCY*ELASTIC(TIERS - NATIVESTICKY + COUNT (SECURITYLEVEL));

COST = SPACEAVAIL * NATIVESTICKY * ELASTIC * RESILIENCY

(LICENSE + TIERS* SECURITY * PRICE);

OPTIONS = BUDGET < COST;

]

BROKERDISPLAY (OPTIONS);

Page 15: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

15ARBITRAGE: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

CAPACITY PLANNING

Page 16: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

16ARBITRAGE: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

AZURE SIZING AND PRICING

Page 17: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

17ARBITRAGE: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

AMAZON WEB SERVICES SIZING AND PRICING

Page 18: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

18SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISONS

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

t2s,

t2

m, m

3M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2M

, -m

3l,

-, -

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Mm

3M

, m3

M, -

m3

L, t

2M

, -m

3X

L, -

, -

t2S,

m3

L, m

3M

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Sm

3L,

t2

M, -

m3

XL,

-, -

t2S,

t2

S, m

3M

t2S,

t2

M, t

2M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2S,

-

Web DB App Auth

CPU Memory Capacity(in AWS m3.2XL units)

Peak (<2)

Incremental (8hr)

Persistent (24hr)0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,S,M

S,M,S

M,S,S

M,M,-

Web DB App Auth

CPU Capacity(in Azure XL units)

Peak

Incremental

Persistent

AMAZON WEB SERVICES SIZING AND PRICING

Page 19: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

19SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISONS

05

10152025303540

t2s,

t2

m, m

3M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2M

, -m

3l,

-, -

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Mm

3M

, m3

M, -

m3

L, t

2M

, -m

3X

L, -

, -

t2S,

m3

L, m

3M

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Sm

3L,

t2

M, -

m3

XL,

-, -

t2S,

t2

S, m

3M

t2S,

t2

M, t

2M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2S,

-

Web DB App Auth

Memory Capacity(in AWS m3.2XL units)

Peak

Incremental

Persistent0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,S,M

S,M,S

M,S,S

M,M,-

Web DB App Auth

Memory Capacity(in Azure XL units)

Peak

Incremental

Persistent

AMAZON WEB SERVICES SIZING AND PRICING

Page 20: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

20SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISONS

$-

$5.00

$10.00

$15.00

$20.00

$25.00

t2s,

t2

m, m

3M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2M

, -m

3l,

-, -

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Mm

3M

, m3

M, -

m3

L, t

2M

, -m

3X

L, -

, -

t2S,

m3

L, m

3M

m3

M, t

2M

, t2

Sm

3L,

t2

M, -

m3

XL,

-, -

t2S,

t2

S, m

3M

t2S,

t2

M, t

2M

t2M

, t2

M, t

2S

m3

M, t

2S,

-

Web DB App Auth

AWS Price per day

Peak

Incremental

Persistent

$-

$10.00

$20.00

$30.00

$40.00

$50.00

$60.00

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,M,L

M,M,S

L,M,-

XL,S,-

S,S,M

S,M,S

M,S,S

M,M,-

Web DB App Auth

Azure Cost per Day

Peak

Incremental

Persistent

AMAZON WEB SERVICES SIZING AND PRICING

Page 21: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

21ARBITRAGE ISSUES

Notice any problems with this example?Based on the relative CSP processing capabilities

• Is an Azure XL equal to an AWS m3.2XL?

– There are larger and more specialized units within all of the environments – IOPS, SSD, Memory, etc

• Does the computing/memory capability of an Azure instance offset the price differential

• AWS offers an ECU – elastic computing unit

• Azure bases their pricing on a similar set of statistics

– i.e. Database Throughput Unit,

Scrutinizing the broker’s algorithms with this level of detail difficult

Might include company sensitive information• At least ask the question

Forbes article

Gigaom

Page 22: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

22GIGAOM: COMPARING CSP PERFORMANCE

http://research.gigaom.com/report/comparing-major-cloud-service-providers-virtual-processor-performance/

Again - Results Open to Interpretation

VIRTUAL PROCESSOR SCORING & DERIVATION:AWS, AZURE, RACKSPACE

Page 23: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

23FORBES: COMPARE AWS/VCHS/AZURE

http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2014/08/15/vmware-stick-the-boot-into-amazon-pricing-but-are-they-telling-the-whole-story/

NO SMOOTH COMPARISON, TESTING ON AN APP BY APP BASIS

Page 24: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

24#1 - SECURITY’S AN OPPORTUNITY

Know the CSPs and use their mitigations

• (Also know they may be sticky!)

• CloudHSM – root of trust w/ SafeNet Luna

• FedRAMP of Azure

Qualitative Assessments

• Gartner Magic Quadrant

• Broker Analysis of Alternatives

• FedRAMP

Quantitative Assessments

• CSA STAR

• SOC I/II Audits

Provenance & Pedigree

• aka Pre & Post Configuration

Page 25: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

25QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS

IAAS GARTNER MAGIC QUADRANT

*Gartner, Magic Quadrant for Cloud Infrastructure as a Service, Lydia Leong et al., published: 28 May 2014

Page 26: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

26RISK MITIGATION - CHOOSING CSPS

*Results based on Booz Allen Cloud Service Provider AoA – 2014.05.30

PROVIDE A QUICK STARTING POINT

Brokers need to start the discussion• Identify most important customer risks• Combine with industry knowledge

and experienceBCP/DR

• All Microsoft shop—does it make sense to retrain to another provider?

Provisioning• Processes and procedures in place—retool from

enterprise VMware? Automation

• Linux scripts transfer over directly—DevOpsmakes easy to port anywhere?

Governance, Risk & Compliance• Which providers offer SOC/IaaS underlying

certifications to pass PCI/HIPAA/FISMA audits?

Page 27: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

27POLL: SOFTWARE SOURCES

• How do you handle software installations within your enterprise environment?

• We have gold disks that provide our baseline image– 189504

• We download the executable from the vendor– 189511

• We check the hash on all files before rollout– 199643

• We download the source and compile it ourselves whenever possible– 199648

• We test every patch within a lab environment– 199649

• We automate rollout– 199650

• We automate rollback– 199653

• Text a CODE to 22333

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29PROVENANCE & PEDIGREE

Beyond Configuration Management– On-premise Enterprise: Utilize an ISO, test downloaded patches

from “vendor” • How many people here actually check the hashes?

• Vendor infected distribution

– Sony/BMG rootkit, Dell firmware, Stuxnet anyone?

– Even bigger issue in the cloud? snapshots, most software from linked locations, ISOs difficult to load/use

Provenance– Provide contextual evidence for its original production or

discovery, by establishing the sequences of its formal ownership, custody, and places of storage

Pedigree– A document to record ancestry

Known “good” software/updates/distributions– Trusted Broker service

• Define your repositories for Linux updates

– i.e. spacewalk.redhat.com; www.pulpproject.org

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30# ¾ - TRUST

Not looking for a Boy Scout

– Do need transparency:

• Cost savings?Pass a portion on to customer

• Sticky services?Advise on implications ahead of time

• Unmitigated security risks? Come to terms and offer alternatives,even if another vendor

– Most of us are in business

– It is your reputation

Value the relationship for the long run

– Quick sale/qualifier might damage reputation if not executed successfully

Page 31: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

31QUESTIONS

Jon-Michael C. [email protected]

@jonmichaelbrookwww.linkedin.com/in/jonmichaelcbrook

Page 32: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

32HOW TO CREATE A NEW POLL

Page 33: 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS · 5 ¾ THINGS WE LEARNED BROKERING CLOUDS: Why you should trust your Broker more than your Banker Jon-Michael C. Brook, CISSP. AGENDA 2 •

33HOW TO CREATE A NEW POLL