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Consilience and Rigour: Commentary by Andr Green(Paris)Andr Greenaa 9 Avenue de L Observatoire, 75006 Paris, France, e-mail:Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Andr Green (1999) Consilience and Rigour: Commentary by Andr Green (Paris),Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 40-44, DOI:10.1080/15294145.1999.10773243

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Consilience and RigourCommentary by Andre Green (Paris)

A psychoanalyst, especially one who has advocatedexchanging views with neurobiologists, should rejoiceat reading a paper that recognizes the pertinence ofFreud's work in this field, that agrees on the centralityof the pleasure-unpleasure principle, and accepts theidea that affects are ingrained in unconscious pro-cesses. Moreover, it is a paper that adopts the funda-mental distinctions between inner and outer perceptualmodalities, admits the usefulness of the idea of bind-ing, and makes reference to id functions. It defendsthe long-term influence of affectivity, and is open toeven some of Freud's most speculative views on therelationship ofaffect to phylogenesis (though interpret-ed differently). Finally, the neurobiologist acknowl-edges Freud's courage in probing "into these darkerareas of the human psyche." But beyond these generalstatements almost everything Freud wrote seems infact very doubtful in the light of neuroscience.

The psychoanalyst may also find some reliefwhen reading the criticisms that the neurobiologist ad-dresses to his colleagues: They deliberately want tounderestimate the importance of affect, they arecaught in and proud of their ultrapositivistic ideology,they are deaf to higher integrative issues, they considerfeelings as epiphenomenal flotsam, they are victims oftheir own blinders, and finally they are ruled by someunspoken prohibition on being interested in under-standing the fundamental nature of affective experi-ence. Having given such tokens of good will, Pankseppexpects his psychoanalytic partners in the dialogue tomake parallel criticisms in their own field. Isn't it in-teresting that his call for' 'consilience" finds its sourcein E. O. Wilson, the same Wilson who is quoted (andalso criticized) for assuming that Freud's theory is"mostly wrong"? In fact Panksepp, Wilson, Grtin-baum, like many others, have demanded that contem-porary psychoanalysts test their own theories to fitthem with scientific evidence, even if they wouldn'tdream of making the same request to practitioners ofother human sciences. One can only be struck by thefact, obvious in reading Panksepp's paper, that al-though scientists spend most of their time listing facts,which obey the exigencies of scientific methodology,

Andre Green, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,Paris Psychoanalytic Society.

Andre Green

when they come to theory, there is as much disagree-ment, controversy, and room for divergent interpreta-tions, as between psychoanalysts. This is whatbecomes apparent to me reading not only Pankseppbut also LeDoux and Damasio.

Psychoanalysts and neurobiologists differ in thatthey use different methods to assemble facts, but whenthey come to theories they cannot avoid disagreementsbecause the building of theories requires other quali-ties and skills than the gathering of data.

On the other hand I cannot agree that there isone and only one method of collecting facts. To do sowould imply that facts submitted to investigations inboth fields were of the same level of complexity andreducible to common factors. Panksepp's suggestionof triangulating mammalian brain research, the studyof animal behavior, and the systematic analysis of hu-man subjective experience as a "sufficiently robuststrategy to sustain a credible level of scientific prog-ress" proposes a leveling down of knowledge aboutaffects. Why not the reverse? Starting from the humansubjective experience, and then seeing what can beinvestigated via the two other points of view? Andhow does robustness fit with falsifiability? The answeris not very difficult to find. For many scientists, thetruth, all the truth, lies in the scientific methodologyregardless of the fact that reality is shaped by themthrough the lenses of their epistemological machinery.Almost everything else is abstraction in the worstsense of the word.

Gerald Edelman (1992), considering the basichypotheses underlying the proposed theories aboutconsciousness from the point of view of biology, statesthree assumptions: the physics assumption, the evolu-tionary assumption, and a third one, the qualia as-sumption. Panksepp also refers to qualia, but only inthe evolutionary perspective (equalia). For Edelmanqualia are experienced only by single individuals. Inspite of the fact that they are entirely subjective andcannot be fully shared by an observer, and most ofthe time are distorted in many ways, he considers thatwe have to rely on them. "When for some reasonsqualia do affect interpretation, the experimental designis modified to exclude such effects, the mind is re-moved from nature" (1992, p. 115). Is this a dead endconfining us to paralysis? Surely not. "But no scien-

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tiflc theory of whatever kind can be presented withoutalready assuming that observers have sensations aswell as perceptions.... As a basis for a theory of con-sciousness, it is sensible to assume that just as in our-selves qualia exist in other human beings whether theyare considered as scientific observers or as sub-jects.... We can then take human beings to be thebest canonical referent for the study of conscious-ness" (1992, p. 115). Edelman suggests that humansubjective reports, including qualia, actions, brainstructures, and functions can be correlated. But dothese correlations include lower mammals? Needlessto say this applies to affects even more. To conclude:"The order of the experimental enterprise (what, ac-cording to the qualia assumption, must be based oncorrelations obtained mainly on human subjects) musttherefore be exactly opposite to that of the theoreticalone, which must begin with the evolutionary precur-sors to humans" (Edelman, 1992, p. 116).

It is none of my business to apply these ideasto scientists, but I feel comfortable enough about themethod of psychoanalysis, to not think in any way thatit is subordinate to the findings of experiments, which,from a psychoanalytic point of view, are always sec-ondary to what we learn from intersubjective relation-ships, because up until now no other method hasreached the same level of complexity. It is the resultof relying on observation in a setting involving twohuman beings under more or less constant conditionsfor a long period of time.

There are several ways to understand Freud'stexts, given that he has repeatedly asserted that thephenomena he dealt with did' 'not belong to psychol-ogy alone; they have an organic and biological sideas well" (1940, p. 195).

However, we should recall here that he opposedthe idea of psychophysical parallelism. This concep-tion rests on the idea that physical or somatic pro-cesses are concomitant with the psychical ones, andthat "we should necessarily have to recognize the[physical ones] as more complete than the psychicalsequences, since some of them would have consciousprocesses parallel to them but others would not"(Freud, 1940, p. 157). On the contrary, Freud defendsthe idea that psychoanalysis explains that the psycho-logical processes concomitant to the somatic ones are"what is truly psychical," disregarding the quality ofconsciousness. Therefore we can see what problemsarise for neurobiology, when it tries to assess psychicalphenomena for which there are no equivalents in con-sciousness.

It is impossible to conceive how the findings ofneurobiology could be applied to psychic processesthat do not belong to consciousness, having in mindthe distinctions between what is unconscious and whatis not conscious. This is just to say that there are limitsto these endeavors. This should lead us to an importantconclusion: the idea of the independence of the twodisciplines and the impossibility of reducing anyoneof the two to the other.

This does not mean that no dialogue is possible.But it should be based on the mutual communicationof information about data, conceptions, and modelsborn from different methodologies. It should bestrongly emphasized that such a mutual communica-tion is no trifle. It involves mutual education aboutthe constraints of each method, the way in which thepractitioners of each have their minds molded by them,and an awareness of the levels of complexity withwhich each side is confronted. In the end the confron-tation between different models of thinking, whichhave to be put in perspective, would in itself be animportant achievement. But the hope for an integratedknowledge has to be postponed for the time being.

There are many ways of using Freud's writings.The first one, adopted by Solms and Nersessian, is torecall the main lines of what he said, omitting for thecircumstances the many contradictions that we find inthem (all of which are testimonies of his difficultiesin discovering the appropriate answers to the ques-tions he confronted). The result is sometimes an ap-proximation of Freud's ideas. For instance Solms andNersessian say: "The mental apparatus as a wholeserves the biological purpose of meeting the impera-tive needs of the subject." There is a double confusionhere: The function of the apparatus-as Freud re-peated constantly-is to keep the tensions arising init at the lowest possible level (principle of constancy)or at a zero level (principle of inertia). The task ofmeeting the imperative internal needs is that of theego. Solms and Nersessian also say that "the generalfunctioning of the apparatus is governed by a regula-tory mechanism known as the pleasure principle." Afew lines below a quotation shows clearly that Freudis only speaking here of the internal excitations ofpleasure-unpleasure "which prove to be almost theonly quality attaching to transposition of the energy[in the] inside [of the] apparatus."

Another misrepresentation is to say that the"qualitative aspect describes representational pro-cesses," which is Solms and Nersessian's idea, notFreud's. Quality for Freud is always associated withperception, either related to senses, or to feelings or

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to speech, and it necessarily belongs to the conscioussystem. Unconscious representations are devoid ofany quality. Against this background, each time Solmsand Nersessian have an opportunity, they supplementthe text with references borrowed from neurobiology:conscious registration of affects are related to the lim-bic corticoid tissue or modality specific and modalitynonspecific qualities to brain systems. This is a uselessdistinction as modality specific refers to the sensorysystem from which affect is separated. Solms andNersessian take all possible opportunities to "com-plete" Freud by neuroscience. Freud's distinction be-tween quantitative and qualitative becomeshypothetically in their translation neural activationand neural connectivity. Likewise when Freud men-tions the possible role of hypothetical hormones, theyturn to neuromodulators.

This attitude is consistent with the purpose of thispaper: "to clarify ... the anatomical and physiologi-cal correlates of the basic ideas and most general con-cepts of psychoanalysis." How can that be done?Freud's text has its own consistency and it remains tobe proved that to stuff it with the material of neurobi-ology makes it better. One will observe that Pankseppon his side does not hesitate to make statements aboutdrive theory, a basic and general idea for Freud. Heis probably encouraged by current views expressed incontemporary analysis: "At present, the Freudiandrive concept obtains little value and in my estimationshould be put to rest." How can we match such advicewith Panksepp's enthusiastic usage of "id energies"?Let us notice first that this expression is forged for thecircumstance (it is absent from the index of the Stan-dard Edition). The id in Freudian theory is made upof drives. So what is the explanation? The explanationappears when Panksepp becomes more clear about hisassumption: "I believe the key issue in emotion re-search is the characterization of the instinctual id ener-gies or in my preferred terminology, affect generating'emotional command systems' that instigate and or-chestrate the diverse aspects ofemotionality within thebrain" (emphasis added).

Otherwise drive refers to "various brain statesthat arise directly from bodily need detectors" interms of generalized tension or arousal that accompan-ies all the various homeostatic imbalances. This leadshim to mention the actions of glutamate and GABAand then DA, NE, 5HT, and histamine circuits. Thereference to the quest for satisfaction is lost here. Arewe really talking of the same theory?

It remains to be proved that Freud's and Pank-sepp's terminologies are compatible. The basic dis-

Andre Green

agreement follows in the exposition: For Panksepp thedrive concept is relegated to those' 'specific regulatorymotivational factors such as hunger, thirst, and ther-moregulation where specific interoceptive detectorshave been identified in the medial strata of the dien-cephalon." Good will has limits. What is left of thereference to sexuality and destructiveness? Pankseppequates drives with purely self-preservative functions:half of the first theory of drives, the other half beingsexuality which is omitted here. Is this the way toanswer Solms and Nersessian's question: "Does theneuroscientific evidence suggest that affect and driveare intimately related?"

Panksepp shows us another way of using Freud'stext. Beyond some general laudatory comments, whenexamining in detail the findings of neurobiology asgranted by "causal evidence," he rejects in fact al-most the whole of psychoanalytic theory. We havealready shown the ambiguity of his adoption of idenergies. After he has agreed to the pertinence of thepleasure-unpleasure principle he questions his formeragreement; "we now have evidence for more distinctsystems in the brain than those that simply subservepositive and negative valence; or pleasure and un-pleasure. ' ,

Speaking of terminologies, the vocabulary ofneurobiologists who are supposed to be opposed tometaphors is full of problematic expressions. What isit to say of emotional dynamics that they "transpire"within neural tissues? What are neurodynamic "reso-nances"? What are biological "values"? (A recentterm which has proved indispensable after many re-ductionistic attempts on the part of behavioral neuro-biologists.) It compels us to understand that we needto refer not only to localization but also to a character-ization of a group of functions which includes (apartfrom hunger, thirst, and thermoregulation) sexual andconsumatory behavior connected to the endocrine andautonomic systems. "These systems evolved early totake care of bodily functions; they are systems of theinterior" (Edelman, 1992, p. 117). We then under-stand the relatively closed system of affects at its ba-sis. Is the expression "emotional and motivationalvalues could percolate through the neuroaxis" a sim-ple statement or a metaphor?

In fact if such values can be hypothesized, it isonly through what Edelman calls a secondary reper-toire referring to experience which intervenes withoutmodification of anatomical structure but is necessaryto grasp what these values refer to. The importance ofthis theorization is that it opposes the cerebral trunk(limbic system and hippocampus) as pertaining to the

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Commentary on Emotions: Neuro-Psychoanalytic Views 43

self to the nonself system based on thalamocortical cir-cuits.

What does a neurobiologist mean when he speaksof affects as an internally "generated" process? Ishe describing the neurobiological correspondent of apsychic state or does he mean that the cause of theaffect rises spontaneously in the inner body (and if so,under what influence)? And how do excitatory aminoacids construct "the skeletal form of every thoughtand emotion"?

Are there no points of agreement at all with Pank-sepp? Just a few. The idea that affects are internalprocesses, the opposition of free and bound energy(though interpreted here in relation to its applicationto neurobiology), the opposition between id and ego(which refers in Panksepp' s translation to subcorticaland cortical tissues). Beyond this, all the rest shouldbe evaluated empirically without even questioning thepossibility of doing so. But even on the points ofagreement ambiguities remain. Is there anything inFreud which supports the idea that unconscious pro-cesses could belong to subcortical layers? I am certainthat nothing of the kind could be sustained. Therefore,is there any room for unconscious processes whichwould not be part of the id system?

Let us turn now to Panksepp's original contribu-tions. He emphasizes the role of subcortical structureswhich he believes have undergone little change in evo-lution, differentiating them from higher (more recent)structures. Isn't there a contradiction thus to recognizethe importance of evolution and then to say that: "wehave the opportunity to validate many of these findingsand conclusions derived from animal behavioral brainresearch with subjective reports derived from humanresearch"? What about the situation where the latterhave no equivalents to the former? Another finding isthe characterization of SEEKING systems and thosethat elaborate PLAY. Given the importance of play incertain psychoanalytic theories (Winnicott), it is inter-esting to see it mentioned in this context. But can playbe reduced to its adaptational value without referringto its relation to pleasure?

Certainly the boldest hypothesis of Panksepp isthe idea of a virtual body. First because of its localiza-tion in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) which is widelyconnected with sensory cortices. The self is here de-fined by its capacity to interrelate external stimuli andinternal values with stable motor representations ofthe body. Again we ask ourselves in what way sucha SELF can characterize even the most basic and ele-mentary foundation of the human self. Isn't it only away of connecting it with its mammalian ancestors?

But what about "virtuality," which brings some so-phistication into the picture? Virtuality is also invokedby D. Stern (quoting S. Langer) on affects (1985). Ishall not miss the opportunity to recall here a quota-tion dating from 1900. "We can avoid any possibleabuse of this method of representation by recollectingthat ideas, thoughts and psychical structures in generalmust never be regarded as localized in organic ele-ments of the nervous system, but rather, as one mightsay, between them.... Everything that can be an ob-ject of our internal perception is virtual' , (Freud,1900, p. 611). This is extracted from Freud's The In-terpretation of Dreams. To come back to Panksepp,to defend the idea of the PAG/SELF system is a leapinto speculation which is exactly of the type of ab-straction for which he demands rigorous empiricalevaluation." Isn't Panksepp's theoretical developmentabout consciousness moving in the same direction thatwas followed in the fifties in the work of Moruzziand Magoun (1969) on the reticular formation? Hisconstant line of thinking is to emphasize the role ofthe lower brain organizations (PAG), which are moreimportant to him that the higher ones (amygdala, hip-pocampus, and the rest).

On one point I agree with Panksepp: when heemphasizes the long-term effects and modulatory in-fluences of affects. I also agree with his insistenceon the motor organization of the brain. He might besurprised to read here that this is probably the closestassessment of what Freud meant by the cardinal rolehe attributed to the drives (which, as he stated, arealways active).

Drives are internalized patterns of unsuccessfulattempts at motor discharge. Therefore I see no objec-tion to relating brain organization to motor patternsmore than to sensory ones. On the other hand, mydisagreement is almost total with Panksepp's inroadsin the fields of therapy. To consider that the efficiencyof psychoanalysis is based on domination/submissionrelationship is no more than saying that it rests onsuggestion, an old argument of the opponents of psy-choanalysis. If psychosurgery was so wonderful, whyhas it been abandoned?

Are psychiatrists so happy with their psycho-pharmaceutical results? One should notice that wehave used antidepressant drugs for a little less than40 years without any progress in the understandingof depressive affects. Finally, there is one statementof Panksepp with which I strongly agree: the lefthemisphere, expert at emotional repression, is "amaster of confabulation and deception in its ap-

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pointed role of verbally communicating with others."Where does that stop?

I shall now end by saying a few words on theway I think Freud should be read. Freud has no specialright to be considered as telling the truth more thanhis followers who may disagree with him. But in myopinion, Freud has considerable theoretical consis-tency, stronger than any other, even if this is now putto question. What I recommend is to study his workby trying to grasp this internal consistency more thanby considering the isolated facts to which he drewattention. This to me is true rigor, instead of hastilytrying to find impossible compromises between incom-patible methods. For instance, affects in his work aremainly considered first in relationship with represen-tations and then in connection with instinctual im-pulses and the unconscious ego. As far as I know, onlyDamasio seems to bother about the relationship of af-fects to representation.

What psychoanalysts expect from their dialoguewith neurobiologists is not an accumulation of refer-ences related to localization circuits or the effect ofchemical substances, but help in understanding thegeneral patterns of brain functioning. Not that it will

Psychoanalytic Theory: Clues from the BrainCommentary by Joseph LeDoux (New York)

Introduction

Psychoanalytic theory has influenced contemporaryWestern culture in innumerable ways. Although I havenever actually tested aspects of psychoanalytic theoryin my research on emotions and the brain, "psychoan-alytic-like" concepts (such as the unconscious, affect,and emotional memory) have been key to the way Ihave interpreted my research findings over the years(LeDoux, 1996). I refer to these as "psychoanalytic-like" because I don't have a deep understanding ofpsychoanalytic theory and have borrowed the conceptsmore from popular culture (films, novels, and justplain common knowledge) than from Freud's writings.

Acknowledgments: Supported by PHS Grants, MH46516, MH38773,and MH00956, and by a grant from the W.M. Keck Foundation toNYU.

Joseph LeDoux, Ph.D., is Professor, Center for Neural Science, NewYork University.

Joseph LeDoux

change so much their ways of working (i.e., analyzing)but it may broaden their views and satisfy their curios-ity, if they have any, on the topic that will alwaysremain of interest to them: the brain-mind problem.

References

Edelman, G. (1992), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. New York:Basic Books.

Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. StandardEdition, 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

--- (1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. StandardEdition, 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.

Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. (1969), Brain stem reticularformation and activation of the EEG. Electroenceph.Clin. Neurophysiol., 106:371-392.

Stern, D. (1985), The Interpersonal World of the HumanInfant. New York: Basic Books.

Andre Green9 Avenue de L'Observatoire75006 ParisFrancee-mail: andregreen@compuserve.com

From time to time, I've looked through books by Freudfor research inspiration, but I never found my experi-mental muse there. Lacking the training and contextin which to really understand Freud, I don't think Iever got beyond the surface notions that most collegeeducated people are familiar with. Consequently, thearticle by Solms and Nersessian has done me, andperhaps other neuroscientists, a great service. Al-though I have still not found experimental inspirationin psychoanalytic theory, I feel that I now understandthe theory of affect a little and am grateful for theirtranslation of the theory in terms that are intelligibleto those of us who are not trained in the area. Below,I am going to comment on several points made bySolms and Nersessian in order to do my own transla-tion of some of their notions in terms related to mod-ern work on the brain mechanisms of emotion andcognition. I'll also comment briefly on Panksepp'sdiscussion of their paper.

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