5 competitive strategy and pricing

6
MKT 558: PRICING STRATEGIES Professor Baojun Jiang Competitive Strategy and Pricing Positivesum vs. negativesum games Strategic foresight and backward induction Costeffective responses to competitor’s price cut Direct (nonstrategic) effect vs. strategic effect POSITIVESUM VS. NEGATIVESUM GAMES Positivesum, zerosum, or negativesum games Price war is often a negativesum game reducing industry profits in long run o Undercutting price results in no gain if immediately retaliated by competitors o Cutting prices rarely drives competitors out of business o Consumer reference prices become lower o Consumers become more pricesensitive and less qualitysensitive 2

Upload: shreeraj-pawar

Post on 20-Nov-2015

5 views

Category:

Documents


2 download

DESCRIPTION

Competitive Strategy and Pricing

TRANSCRIPT

  • MKT558:PRICING STRATEGIESProfessorBaojunJiang

    CompetitiveStrategyandPricing Positivesumvs.negativesumgames Strategicforesightandbackwardinduction Costeffectiveresponsestocompetitorspricecut Direct(nonstrategic)effectvs.strategiceffect

    POSITIVESUM VS.NEGATIVESUM GAMES

    Positivesum,zerosum,ornegativesumgames

    Pricewarisoftenanegativesumgamereducingindustryprofitsinlongruno Undercuttingpriceresultsinnogainifimmediatelyretaliatedby

    competitorso Cuttingpricesrarelydrivescompetitorsoutofbusinesso Consumerreferencepricesbecomelowero Consumersbecomemorepricesensitiveandlessqualitysensitive

    2

  • 3STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND BACKWARD INDUCTION

    Shrinkingpiebargaininggame Thisbargainingtaskinvolvessplitting$100betweenplayers. Johncanproposeanysplitof$100betweenMaryandhimself. Marycanacceptorrejecttheoffer.Ifsherejectsit,thepie(thetotalamountofmoneyavailable)shrinksby50%,butshecanproposeanysplitof$50betweenJohnandher.

    IfJohnrejectsMarysoffer,thepieshrinksbyanother50%(i.e.,only$25remains).Johnthenhasthelastchancetoproposeanysplitof$25. IfMaryrejectsJohnsofferagain,bothofthemwillwalkawayemptyhanded.

    IfyouwereJohn,whatwouldyouproposewhenyousplitthe$100?

    4

  • AWINNERTAKEALL CONTEST Everyplayersimultaneouslychoosesanumberfrom0to100(i.e.,withoutseeingothersnumbers)

    Computetheaverageofallparticipants Definetargetnumber:0.7xtheaverage Thewinneristheplayerwhosenumberistheclosesttothetargetnumber

    Thewinnersprizeis$10.

    5

    GAME RESULTS FROM STUDENTS

    6

    Caltech UCLA Wharton Germany SingaporeMean 21.9 42.3 37.9 36.7 46.1Target 15.3 29.6 26.5 25.7 32.2Standard Deviation 10.4 18.0 18.8 20.2 28.0Sample Size 27 28 35 67 98

    Lesson: Know yourself and your opponents Your optimal choice depends on others actions Actions of your competitors vary across cultures, backgrounds,

    education levels, their self-assessments, etc., but may be predicted

  • ONETIME MARKET ENTRY Anincumbentmonopolist(e.g.,SFO LAXismonopolizedbyUnited)

    SouthwestAirline(SWA)istheonlypotentialentrant SWAmustdecidewhetherornottoenterthemarket

    7

    SWA Enter United

    DontEnter

    Fight

    Share

    (0, 2)

    (1,1)

    (-1,-1)

    SWAs Payoff UnitedsPayoff

    REPEATED MARKET ENTRY

    Anincumbentmonopolist(United) Manypotentialentrants,eachwishestoentersequentiallyeitherinthiscityorothercitiesUnitedserves

    8

    Entrant Enter United

    DontEnter

    Fight

    Share

    (0, 2)

    (1,1)

    (-1,-1)

    Entrants Payoff UnitedsPayoff

  • LESSON FROM MARKET ENTRY GAME

    Differentiatebetweenonetimeandrepeatedstrategicinteractions Inonetimemarketentrygame,Unitedshouldshare Inrepeatedsetting,Unitedshouldfight,whichhelpsUnitedtoestablishareputationofbeingtoughsoastoscareofffuturepotentialentrants

    Unitedshouldsacrificeimmediatelossforfuturegain(totheextentpotentialentrantsaredeterredinthisorothermarkets)

    9

    COSTEFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO COMPETITORS PRICE CUT1. Proctor&Gamblesrevenuedrops18%becauseofcheaperstore

    brandcleaningproductspromotedbysupermarkets.Whatcan/shouldProctor&Gambledo?

    2. AsmallindependentTVnetworkcutsitsadrates.Whatcan/shouldbignetworksdo?

    3. Youareamarketshareleader inUS.Aninternationalcompanyentersyourmarketwithapricecut.Whatshouldyoudo?

    4. Yourcompetitor(inB2Bmarkets)isofferingdiscountstonewcustomerstoattractcustomersawayfromyou.Whatshouldyoudo?

    5. NewsmallairlineofferscheaperfaresinaUnitedAirlinesmainroute.WhatshouldUAdo?

    10

  • DIRECT EFFECT VERSUS STRATEGIC EFFECT

    Willreducedcostintheindustrybenefitallfirms?o Direct(nonstrategic)effectversusstrategiceffect

    Willafirmmakehigherprofitsbyadvertisingthehiddenbenefitsofitsproductstothecompetitorscustomers?o Direct(nonstrategic)effectversusstrategiceffect

    11

    TAKEAWAY FROM THIS LECTURE

    Pricewarislikelyanegativesumgamehurtingindustryprofitabilityinthelongrun.

    Usestrategicforesightwhenreactingtocompetitiono Knowyourcompetitorsandyourselfo Weighthecostsandbenefitsofyouractiono Differentiatebetweenonetimeandrepeatedinteractions

    Costeffectiveresponsestoprice/competitivethreato Focusyourreactivepricecutononlythecustomersattractedbythe

    competitorsoffero Focusyourreactivepricecutononlyincrementalvolumeatrisko Focusyourreactivepricecutonaparticulargeographicareaorproduce

    linewherethecompetitorhasthemosttolose,relativetoyou,fromcuttingtheprice.

    o Raisethecompetitorscostforitsdiscountingo Leverageanycompetitiveadvantagestoincreasethevalueofyourofferas

    analternativetomatchingtheprice.

    12