5 10 13 0204 cr12-2025 motion for extension of time to file brief and to strike rjc's roa and quasi...

7/28/2019 5 10 13 0204 CR12-2025 Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief and to Strike RJC's ROA and Quasi Transcripts

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the more legible of the the two choices (between Exhibit 14 and 15) from which to draw his choicefor Exhibit 16. Further, King's Exhibit 12 and 13 were not admitted.

It is the duty of the clerk of the municipal court to file notice of appeal whether presented intime or not; the determination of the question whether the appeal was properly taken is the provinceof the Appellate Term on motion to dismiss. People ex rel. Trost v Bird, 184 App Div 779, 172 NYS

412. Footnote 24. Alexandria Naval Stores Co. v J. F. Ball Bro. Lumber Co., 128 La 632, 54 So1035. Footnote 25. Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237. Footnote 26.State v Gillette's Estate (Tex Com App) 10 SW2d 984 (use of words "at law").

24 Custody and care of records:It is the duty or function of a clerk of court to make and keep an

accurate record 27 of the proceedings in his court 28 and of what the court orders and adjudges. 29

In the performance of these duties the clerk acts ministerially 30 and under the exclusive jurisdiction

and direction of the court, 31 and has no power to pass on or contest the validity of any act of the

court which purports to have been done in the performance of its judicial function. 32 Where re-

quired by statute the clerk must make some record of the filing of a paper presented to him, 33 keep

a current general index of recorded instruments, 34 and keep a trial 35 or special proceeding docket

36 It is the clerk's duty to carefully preserve in h is office papers filed with him and not to permit their

withdrawal or removal, 37 except with leave of court. 38 A retiring clerk of court must turn over to

his successor in office all records, books, and property of his office. 39 While it is recognized that a

clerk of court may maintain mandamus proceedings to obtain from his predecessor in office books

and papers in the latter's possession belonging to the office, 40 it has been held that mandamus will

not lie against a private individual acquiring possession of the records sought to be recovered, though

possession was obtained under a pretended claim to the office of clerk, where no de jure or de facto

status was accorded to the claimant. 41 It is the ordinary duty of the clerk of a court of record to ex-

tend the records of the court from the processes and pleadings on file, and he cannot resort to extrin-sic evidence for that purpose. 42 He has the right to regard as correct, the entries made and the pro-

cesses issued by his predecessors, and if, from the inaccuracy of his predecessors, errors are found in

the records as extended by the incumbent clerk, the fault is not his. 43 He has only the powers inci-

dent to his duties as custodian of the records, and consequently he has no authority to make altera-

tions therein. 44 In fact, he cannot alter the record of h is own acts, since the making of the record

has exhausted his authority, and his only remaining powers are to keep and preserve the record safe-

ly. 45 It is the province of the court alone to correct clerical errors, to effect the restoration of papers

which have been improperly altered or defaced, and to provide for the substitution of new ones when

the originals are lost or stolen. 46 The clerk, as custodian of the records, is subject to the general rulesgoverning custodians of public records with respect to the rights of abstracters and members of the

public generally to inspect or copy. 47 Footnotes Footnote 27. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265,

451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Long v Sphaler, 89 Fla 499, 105

So 101; Brelsford v Community High School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; State v Furry, 252 Ind

486, 250 NE2d 590; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168; McKay v Coolidge, 218 Mass 65, 105

NE 455; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269, 217 SW 524; People ex rel. Harris v Lindsay


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21 App Div 2d 102, 248 NYS2d 691, affd 15 NY2d 751, 257 NYS2d 176, 205 NE2d 312; State ex

rel. Journal Co. v County Court for Racine County, 43 Wis 2d 297, 168 NW2d 836. The court will

take judicial notice that the clerk of court is the legal custodian of the records in his office. Maroon v

Immigration & Naturalization Service (CA8) 364 F2d 982, 2 ALR Fed 292. Footnote 28. State v

Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396 US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247;Robertson & Wilson Scale & Supply Co. v Richman, 212 Mich 334, 180 NW 470; State ex rel. Mor-

ris Bldg. & Inv. Co. v Brown, 228 Mo App 760, 72 SW2d 859; Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs

228, 143 NE2d 641. Footnote 29. State v Rockerfeller, 9 Ariz App 265, 451 P2d 623, cert den 396

US 920, 24 L Ed 2d 199, 90 S Ct 247; Henderson v Freeman, 205 Ark 856, 171 SW2d 66; Stanton v

Arkansas Democrat Co., 194 Ark 135, 106 SW2d 584; Bush v Bush, 158 Kan 760, 150 P2d 168;

Foglio v Alvis (CP) 75 Ohio L Abs 228, 143 NE2d 641; Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183

Pa Super 204, 130 A2d 226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124;

Humphrey v Mauzy, 155 W Va 89, 181 SE2d 329. A prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to

properly index all judgments and his failure to do so renders him liable on his bond. Commonwealthuse of Orris v Roberts, supra. Footnote 30. State ex rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905; People

ex rel. Pardridge v Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; State ex rel. Caldwell v Cockrell, 280 Mo 269,

217 SW 524; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 31. People ex rel. Pardridge v

Windes, 275 Ill 108, 113 NE 949; Barrett v Barrett, 207 Okla 234, 249 P2d 88. Footnote 32. State ex

rel. Druissi v Almand (Fla) 75 So 2d 905. Footnote 33. State v Brubaker, 352 Mo 414, 177 SW2d

623. Footnote 34. Land v Lewis, 299 Ky 866, 186 SW2d 803, 159 ALR 601 (clerk not required to go

back prior to his term of office and make up general index which should have been but was not kept

up currently). Footnote 35. Little v Employer's Casualty Co. 180 Okla 628, 71 P2d 687. Footnote 36.

State Trust Co. v Toms, 244 NC 645, 94 SE2d 806. Footnote 37. Brelsford v Community High

School Dist., 328 Ill 27, 159 NE 237; Ohio Farmers Co-op. Milk Ass'n v Davis, 59 Ohio App 329, 13

Ohio Ops 116, 25 Ohio L Abs 551, 17 NE2d 924. Footnote 38. All papers in a cause should be pre-

served by the clerk and should not be taken from the office except with leave of court. Brelsford v

Community High School Dist., supra. Footnote 39. Underwood v Watson, 223 NC 437, 27 SE2d 144

Footnote 40. See State ex rel. Wells v C line, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767 (by implication). Footnote 41.

State ex rel. Wells v Cline, 29 Okla 157, 116 P 767, where the relator alleged that ever since the or-

ganization of the court he had been the de jure and de facto clerk. Footnote 42. Frink v Frink, 43 NH

508. Footnote 43. Frink v Frink, supra. Footnote 44. Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508. The duties of a clerk

will vary with the nature of the court and its requirements; thus, in the Supreme Court of the United

States, which exercises an almost entirely appellate jurisdiction, the copies ofthe record of the case

are an essential part of the procedure, and the clerk is responsible to the court for the correct-

ness and proper indexing of the printed copies of the record, for their presentation to the jus-

tices in the form and size prescribed by the rules, and for their delivery to the parties entitled

thereto.Bean v Patterson, 110 US 401, 28 L Ed 190, 4 S Ct 23. Such a duty would rarely be per-

formed by the clerk of a trial court. Footnote 45. Elliott v Lessee of Peirsol, 26 US 328, 7 L Ed 164.


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Footnote 46. Lewis v Ross, 37 Me 230; Frink v Frink, 43 NH 508; Remick v Butterfield, 31 NH 70;

Chichester v Cande (NY) 3 Cow 39; Hollister v Judges of Dist. Court, 8 Ohio St 201. Even the court

cannot direct the alteration of a true record of what has been said or done, even though perjured tes-

timony is a part thereof. Coppock v Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 NW 382, 10 ALR 1407. Footnote 47.

See 1 Am Jur 2d, Abstracts of Title 8-11; 66 Am Jur 2d, Records and Recording Laws 19 etseq. Enforcement of right of inspection by mandamus, see 37, infra.

27 Effect of breach of duty on rights of litigants:

Those dealing with the clerk of a court concerning an action or matter then pending have a

right to expect that he will perform the ministerial duties connected with his office, and his neglect or

failure to do so should not prejudice their rights. 75 This principle has been frequently applied in

cases where a party seeks relief from a judgment rendered against him by reason of some mistake or

default of the clerk. 76 However, where no duty exists, 77 or where the negligence of the attorney

or suitor intervenes, 78 relief will be denied them, even where they relied on promises or statements

of the clerk, 79 or where the clerk failed to answer letters of inquiry about the status of the case and

judgment was rendered without their knowledge. 80 It may be noted here that the improvident exer-

cise of authority by the clerk, as where an order of sale is issued by him without the direction of the

party entitled thereto, may not prejudice the rights of innocent purchasers. 81 But where a writ of

assistance is granted by the clerk, without action of the court, to the holder of a sheriff's deed on a

mortgage foreclosure, the writ is void and should be vacated on direct attack. 82 A clerk of court is,

generally speaking, liable personally and on his official bond to a litigant injured as a result of his

negligence or misconduct. 83 Footnotes Footnote 75. Williams v Tyler, 14 Ala App 591, 71 So 51,

cert den 198 Ala 696, 73 So 1002; Hogs Back Consol. Mining Co. v New Basil Consol. Gravel Min-

ing Co. 65 Cal 22, 2 P 489; Silverman v Childs, 107 Ill App 522; May v Wolvington, 69 Md 117, 14

A 706; Thompson v Sharp, 17 Neb 69, 22 NW 78; Hopkins v Niggli (Tex) 6 SW 625; Black v

Hurlbut, 73 Wis 126, 40 NW 673. Footnote 76. Ivester v Mozeley, 89 Ga App 578, 80 SE2d 197.

Annotation: 164 ALR 552 et seq., III. Failure of the clerk to notify an appellant of completion of

the transcript is good cause for refusing to dismiss an appeal on the ground that a certified copy of

the judgment and the granting of the appeal was not filed in the appellate court by the clerk, in the

time required by statute, particularly where the clerk affirmatively stated that illness of a deputy and

rush of business had prevented him from completing the transcript in time to file it. Parks v Marshall,

322 Mo 218, 14 SW2d 590, 62 ALR 835. Footnote 77. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254

A2d 249; Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27 NE 113; Jackson v Jones (Ky) 336

SW2d 565; Valley Finance Co. v Campana, 112 Ohio App 405, 13 Ohio Ops 2d 472, 83 Ohio L Abs

577, 167 NE2d 654, motion overr. Footnote 78. Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, 1 Ind App 46, 27

NE 113. Footnote 79. Bernier v Schaefer, 11 Ill 2d 525, 144 NE2d 577; Libert v Turzynski, 129 Ill

App 2d 146, 262 NE2d 741 (deputy clerk); Western Union Tel. Co. v Griffin, supra. A clerk of court

is not liable, because a party relied upon his gratuitous advice on a matter having no relation to the

duties of his office. Trala v Melmar Industries, Inc. (Del) 254 A2d 249. Footnote 80. Williams v


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Wescott, 77 Iowa 332, 42 NW 314; First Nat. Bank v Wentworth, 28 Kan 183; Ganzer v Schiffbauer,

40 Neb 633, 59 NW 98; Pulaski Oil Co. v Conner, 62 Okla 211, 162 P 464. Footnote 81. Sowles v

Harvey, 20 Ind 217, plaintiff obtaining judgment in mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not set

aside sheriff's sale by reason of clerk's unauthorized issue of order of sale on judgment. Footnote 82.

Williams v Sherman, 35 Idaho 169, 205 P 259, 21 ALR 353, wherein a motion to vacate writ on theground that it was granted by the clerk without notice was held to be a direct, not a collateral, attack.

Footnote 83. 28 et seq., infra.

28 Negligence or misconduct:

The principle that a public officer should be held to a faithful performance of his official duties and

made to answer in damages to all persons who may have been injured through his malfeasance, omis-

sion, or neglect 84 applies to the negligence, carelessness, or misconduct of a clerk of court. 85 As

a public ministerial officer, the clerk is answerable for any act of negligence or misconduct in office

resulting in injury to the complaining party. 86 In order to render the clerk of court and the sureties

on his official bond liable for the clerk's misfeasance, both a breach of duty and consequent damagemust be shown. 87 Moreover, to warrant relief, the wrong and the resulting injury must concur; the

clerk's misconduct or negligence must be the direct and proximate cause of the injury. 88 If the injury

would have followed notwithstanding the misconduct, or if the injured party contributed to the result

in any degree by his own fault or neglect or that of his attorney, he has no legal ground of complaint

and the clerk cannot be held responsible. 89 Under applicable statutory provisions, a clerk of court

may be held liable on his bond for failure to issue a writ, citation, or process; 90 for the improper is-

suance of letters of guardianship whereby an unauthorized person was able legally to procure funds

of another and squander them; 91 for negligence or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest; 92 for

failure properly to docket a judgment; 93 for failure to properly index a judgment; 94 for failure to

enter an attachment within the time fixed by law; 95 for failure to tax costs; 96 for failure to include

a judgment on a mortgage certificate furnished in connection with a partition sale; 97 for failure to

reject a surety bond executed by a person ineligible to act as surety under the statute; 98 for not re-

quiring a surety to qualify upon a bond executed by him as such surety; 99 or for failure properly to

keep records of a case and for informing the court inaccurately of its status. 1 In those jurisdictions

where a clerk of court serves also as recorder of deeds and mortgages, breach of his duties as a re-

cording officer may give rise to an action on his official bond as clerk, 2 such as his failure to rec-

ord an instrument lodged with him for recording. 28 ----Negligence or misconduct Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of clerk of court under

state law, 34 ALR4th 1186. Case authorities: A county clerk of court did not have sovereign im-munity against an action for indemnity by a title insurance company where the an employee of theclerk's office improperly indexed a document which affected the title to a parcel of real estate becausethe clerk had a statutory duty to properly record and index documents in the public records and public

policy considerations favor accountability by the clerk for negligence. First American Title Ins. Co. vDixon (1992, Fla App D4) 603 So 2d 562, 17 FLW D 1708, review den (Fla) 613 So 2d 3. Sovereignimmunity did not protect state from liability for failure of county clerk to timely docket judgmentsince act of recording judgment was not discretionary. National Westminster Bank v State (1989, 1st


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Dept) 155 AD2d 261, 546 NYS2d 864, app gr 75 NY2d 706, 552 NYS2d 929, 552 NE2d 177 andaffd 76 NY2d 507, 561 NYS2d 541, 562 NE2d 866. A clerk of court is liable in a civil action for anegligent omission to perform a statutory duty which proximately causes injury to another, unless theinjured party was contributorily negligent. Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 OhioOps 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. The failure of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas to docket and in-

dex a certificate of judgment for several days after it is delivered and filed constitutes negligence.Maddox v Astro Invest., 45 Ohio App 2d 203, 74 Ohio Ops 2d 312, 343 NE2d 133. 752 SW2d 118.Footnotes Footnote 84. See 63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees 287 et seq. Footnote85. Lick v Madden, 36 Cal 208. Footnote 86. Eslava v Jones, 83 Ala 139, 3 So 317; Clerks of the Su-

perior Court are no less liable for the negligent performance of their official duties than for a failureto perform such duties. Touchton v Echols County, 211 Ga 85, 84 SE2d 81. Footnote 87. Neal-BlunCo. v Rogers, 141 Ga 808, 82 SE 280. Footnote 92. Stine v Shuttle, 134 Ind App 67, 186 NE2d 168,holding that the clerk of court was liable in damages for false arrest based on his negligence or mis-conduct in issuing a warrant of arrest. . Footnote 94. Shackelford v Staton, 117 NC 73, 23 SE 101. A

prothonotary has an absolute statutory duty to properly index all judgments and his failure to do sorenders him liable on his bond. Commonwealth use of Orris v Roberts, 183 Pa Super 204, 130 A2d

226, revd on other grounds 392 Pa 572, 141 A2d 393, 71 ALR2d 1124. Footnote 98. People v May,251 Ill 54, 95 NE 999, error dismd 232 US 720, 58 L Ed 814, 34 S Ct 602.See, Stephen v Drew(DC Va) 359 F Supp 746, involving an action against a clerk of court and others for wrongful com-mitment of the plaintiff for mental illness, wherein the court stated that, although some decisionshave articulated a "quasi-judicial" immunity of clerks of court, clerks of court enjoy no immunity atall. There is no immunity from suit for clerks of court in the performance of their ministerial duties,such as the filing of papers. McCray v Maryland (CA4 Md) 456 F2d 1.

As such, Bar Counsel 11/2/12 argument within his Ex Parte Emergency Motion to QuashCoughlin's subpoena on Clerk of Court Peters should not benefit from an SCR 106 application (norshould a subpoena on bar counsel, really, especially where Coughlin was repeatedly forced to testify,while acting as his own counsel in self representing, to the very sorts of matters to which Coughlinsought to question King and Peters, including whether they received this or that, what the envelopeon the 10/9/12 filed Notice of Intent To Take Default indicated (Coughlin witnessed downtownUSPS Clerk Tim make a handwritten notation thereon upon refusing to provide such certified mail-ing to Coughlin due to the insufficient postage the SBN had affixed to mailing, one for which theSBN sent to Coughlin by one, and only one method, a single certified mailing (in steadfastly refusingto acquiesce to Coughlin's requests that the OBC/Clerk of Court/NNDB/Panel copy Coughlin on eve-ry such filing or communication via fax or email or both (domestic violence victim issues, USPS Of-ficial Change of Address Issues, Coughlin essentially being to scared of local law enforcement forsome time to make his physical address public, etc.).

PETERS AND THE sbn violate whitman, sullivan, donoho, barnes and their progeny whererefusing to file coughlin's submission and NRCP 5(e).

SCR 105(2)(f) does note permit the SBN to fail to transmit the Respondnet the ROA's volume 3:

(f) Court reporter. All formal hearings shall be reported by a certified court reporter, whichcost may be assessed against the attorney pursuant to Rule 120. Any party desiring to have any otherdisciplinary proceedings reported must arrange in advance for a certified court reporter at the partysown expense.\


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leged manner in which he submitted for filing on 1/3/13 a Motion for New Trial, etc. and an amendedor supplemental version thereof (in compliance with NRCP 15) on 1/17/13 or thereabouts (and priorto any Opposition thereto being filed by the SBN or the expiration of the time period in which suchwas permitted). Even if Coughlin's allegedly submitting a filing by fax on 1/17/13 (and, to be clear,the SBN/Panel/NNDB/OBC had previously communicated to Coughlin that such was a permissible

method of submitting filings, and at no point was it ever communicated to Coughlin that such proce-dure had been altered or any permission to do so withdrawn...and the curious and unexplained ap-pearance of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters, and the shuffling of the positioning thereof in con-sidering its placement in the 11/8/12 delivered 3,200 page production to Coughlin of a sort of conso-lation for the the SBN violation SCR 105(2)(c) in forbidding Coughlin the access he was entitled to(allegedly, pursuant to Chair Echeverria's 10/31/12 Order), then in the first ROA filed herein on12/24/12, then, again, in a third different position in the second ROA filed on 2/13/12. That 10/9/12Affidavit of Laura Peters is an unique thing indeed. How it got in the file is unexplained. To whatfiling it belongs or was attached is never made clear, nor is the matter of why it lacks a caption orProof of Service on Coughlin.

Almost as troubling as Judge Gardner's failure to disclose that L. gardner is hsi sister incident to the2/2/12 hearing in the criminal trespass case upon Coughlin's prompting in 26405.http://www.law.indiana.edu/instruction/pmpurcel/vault/In_Re_Beckner.pdf778 ne 2d 806. motion for new trials, alter amend reconsider, etc. are accepted in disciplinary mat-ters.

SCR RULE 119. ADDITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE.... 3. OTHER RULES OF PROCEDURE.EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THESE RULES, THE NEVADA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREAND THE NEVADA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE APPLY IN DISCIPLINARY CASES.

COUGHLIN FILED SEVERAL TOLLING MOTIONS A ALANRCP 59(A)-(E) SUFFICINET TO AUGUERTOWARDS STRIKING THE 12/24/12 FILINGS ANDBRIEFING SCHEDULE IN62337. POST-JUDGMENTTOLL-

ING MOTIONSNRAP 4(A)(4) SHOULD APPLY TO SCR 105IDENTIFIES THE FOUR RECOGNIZED TYPES OFTOLLING MOTIONS: 1 . A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDERRULE50(B); 2. A MOTION UNDERRULE 52(B)TO AMEND OR MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 3. A MOTION UNDERRULE 59 TO ALTER OR AMENDTHE JUDGMENT;AND 4. A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDERRULE 59. ACCORDING TONRCP 50(B),52(B) AND 59, THESE TOLLING MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN10 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THE WRIT-TEN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER. ASIDE FROM TIMELY FILING A TOLLING MOTION,THE FILING PARTY MUST ALSO SERVE THE MOTION WITHIN THE 10-DAY PERIOD. 7 OTHERWISE, THETOLLING MOTION IS NOT TIMELY, AND THE TRIAL COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER ANUNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION. 8 TOLLING EFFECT OF SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS JUST BECAUSEPOST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE BEEN FILED DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE TIME TO APPEAL THE PRINCIPALJUDGMENT IS AUTOMATICALLY TOLLED. RATHER, ONLY SOME POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS HAVE A TOLL-ING EFFECT AND OTHER MOTIONS

,WHICH ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY TOLLING

,HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT

ONLY WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER PENDING TOLLING MOTIONS. FOR THE MOST PART, HOWEVER, THEONLY TOLLING MOTIONS ARE THE FOUR LISTED INNRAP 4(A)(4). MOTION FORRELIEF FROM JUDG-MENT AMOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED ACCORDING TONRCP 60(B) MUST BE FILED WITH-IN SIX MONTHS UNLESS SOME EXCEPTION TO THE RULE APPLIES , SUCH AS:(1) THE ACT COMPLAINED OFCONSTITUTES FRAUD UPON THE COURT, IN WHICH CASE THERE IS NO SIX-MONTH DEADLINE; 4 (2) THEJUDGMENT IS VOID; 5 OR(3) THE JUDGMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED, RELEASED,DISCHARGED OR A PRIORJUDGMENT UPON WHICH IT IS BASED HAS BEEN REVERSED OR OTHERWISE VACATED , OR IT IS NO LONGER


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EQUITABLE THAT AN INJUNCTION SHOULD HAVE PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION. 6 AS LONG AS A MOTIONUNDERNRCP 50(B), 52(B)OR59 HAS BEEN PROPERLY AND TIMELY FILED AND SERVED, IT HAS A TOLL-ING EFFECT UNDERNRCP 50(B), 52(B) AND 59. HOWEVER, AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION HAS NOTOLLING EFFECT UPON THE TIME TO APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ONWHETHER THE POSTJUDGMENT MOTION WILL HAVE A TOLLING EFFECT,IT IS BEST TO FILE A NOTICE OF

APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT SO AS TO NOT POTENTIALLY WAIVE APPEAL RIGHTS. MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION/REHEARING HISTORICALLY,MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION HAVE BEEN CATE-GORICALLY TREATED AS NOT HAVING A TOLLING EFFECT UPON A FINAL JUDGMENT. IN FACT, EDCR2.24(B), AND OTHER SIMILAR LOCAL RULES, STATE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DOES NOT TOLLTHE 30- DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT. HOWEVER,THENEVADA SUPREME COURT HAS RECENTLY TAKEN A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINEWHETHER A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING SHOULD BE TREATED AS TOLLING :[W]EHOLD THAT SO LONG AS A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS IN WRITING, TIMELYFILED, STATES ITS GROUNDS WITH PARTICULARITY,AND REQUEST[S] A SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATION OFTHE JUDGMENT,NOT MERELY THE CORRECTION OF A CLERICAL ERROR, OR RELIEF OF A TYPE WHOLLYCOLLATERAL TO THE JUDGMENT, ...THERE IS NO REASON TO DENY ITNRCP 59(E) STATUS,WITH TOLL-ING EFFECT UNDER

NRAP 4(A

)(4)(C). 12 AS LONG AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR REHEAR-

ING MEETS THESE CONDITIONS, IT DOES HAVE A OTION FORRECONSIDERATIONIN EARLIER CASE LAW,THENEVADA SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THERE CAN BE NO APPEAL FROM A POST-JUDGMENT ORDERDENYING RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE NO STATUTE OR COURT RULE EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED SUCH AN

APPEAL. 17 HOWEVER, MORE RECENT CASE LAW HOLDS THAT THENEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL RE-VIEW AN ORDER DENYING A POST-JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THE COURSE OF AN AP-PEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT WHEN (1) THE DISTRICT COURT ELECTS TO DECIDE THE MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION ON ITS MERITS;AND(2) THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT IS FILEDAFTER THE ORDER RESOLVING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 18 POST-JUDGMENTTOLLING MO-TIONS OF THE FOUR TOLLING MOTIONS LISTED INNRAP 4(A)(4),NOT ALL ARE INDEPENDENTLY AP-PEALABLE. AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FILED UNDERNRCP 50(B) IS NOT INDEPENDENTLY APPEAL-ABLE, BUT SINCE THE MOTION IS TOLLING, THENEVADA SUPREME COURT WILL CONSIDER THE 50(B)PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT. 20 THE SAME HOLDS TRUEFOR AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND FILED UNDERNRCP 59(E). 21 HOWEVER, ANORDER RESOLVING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS INDEPENDENTLY APPEALABLE, 22 BUT ONLY IF THEORDER IS ENTERED POST-JUDGMENT. 23 WHEN IN DOUBT OF WHICH ORDER TO NAME IN THE NOTICE OFAPPEAL,IT IS BEST TO NAME ADDITIONAL ORDERS THAT MAY NOT BE APPEALABLE INSTEAD OF FAILINGTO IDENTIFY THE PROPER ORDERS. AND IF A SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS REQUIRED BY THE RULES,IT SHOULD BE A NEW AND SEPARATE NOTICE OF APPEAL INSTEAD OF AN AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.24 IN CONCLUSION, FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES GOVERNING POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS CAN BEPOTENTIALLY FATAL TO A CASE. HOWEVER,A PROPER UNDERSTANDING OF THESE RULES WILL ENSURETHAT POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE TIMELY FILED, HAVE THE DESIRED TOLLING EFFECT AND AREPROPERLY PRESERVED FORNEVADA SUPREME COURT REVIEW IF AN APPEAL IS NECESSARY 1NRS18.110(1). 2 SEE EBERLE V. STATE EX REL. NELL J. REDFIELDTRUST, 108 NEV. 587, 836 P.2D67(1992). 3 WINSTON PRODS. CO.V. DEBOER, 122 NEV. 517, 134 P.3D 726 (2006). 4 NC-DSH,INC.V. GARNER,218P.3D853 (NEV. 2 009). 5 NRCP 60(B)(4). 6 NRCP 60(B)(5). 7MORRELL V. EDWARDS, 9 8 NEV. 91, 640 P.2D1322 (1982);SEE ALSO DRAFTERSNOTE FORNRCP 59,2004 AMENDMENT: SUBDIVISION (E)IS AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT A MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND AJUDGMENT MUST BE FILED,NOT JUST SERVED,WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD. (EMPHASIS ADDED)8 OELSNER V. CHARLES C. MEEKLUMBERCO., 92 NEV. 576, 555 P.2D217 (1976) (STATING


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THAT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AN UNTIMELY TOLLING MOTION

FILED UNDERNRCP 59(E) ) . 9 DEBOER, 1 2 2 NEV. AT526, 134 P.3D AT 732. 10 ID. 1 1 ID. 12 AAPRIMO BUILDERS,LLC V. WASHINGTON, 245 P.3D1190, 1195 (NEV. 2010) (CITATION OMITTED). 13

CONSUL. GENERATOR-NEVADA, INC.V. CUMMINS ENGINE CO., INC., 114 NEV. 1304, 1312,971 P.2D1251, 1256 (1998). 14 GUMM V. MAINOR, 1 1 8 NEV. 912, 59 P.3D1220 (2002). 15 SEE

DEBOER. 16 SEE THOMAS V. CITY OFN. LAS VEGAS, 1 2 2 NEV. 82, 90, 127 P.3D 1057, 1063 (2006);SEE ALSO LEE V.GNLVCORP. ,116NEV. 424, 426, 996 P.2D 416, 417 (2000) (HOLDING THAT A POST-JUDGMENT ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS MAY BE APPEALED AS A SPECIAL ORDER

MADE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT). 17 PHELPS V. STATE, 1 1 1 NEV. 1021, 900 P.2D344 (1995). 18 SEEARNOLD V. KIP,123NEV. 410, 168 P.3D 1050 (2007). 19 BRUNZELL CONSTR. CO., INC.,OF

NEVADA V. HARRAHS CLUB, 404 P.2D902, 81 NEV. 414 (1965), SUPERSEDED BY STATUTE ON OTHERGROUNDS BY, CASINO OPERATIONS, INC.V. GRAHAM, 86 NEV. 764, 476 P.2D 953 (1965). 20 KRAUSEINC.V. LITTLE, 1 1 7 NEV. 929, 34 P.3D 566 (2001). 21 SEE AA PRIMO BUILDERS, 245 P.3D AT1197. 22 NRAP 3A(B)(2). 23 RENO HILTON RESORT CORP.V. VERDERBER,121NEV. 1, 106P.3D 134 (2005). 24 WEDDELL V. STEWART, 261 P.3D 1080 (2011)

CONCLUSION

PLEASE GRANT THIS

MOTION TO

STRIKE THE DEFECTIVE AND DEFICIENT

,AND CURIOUSLY SO

,2/13/13 RECORD ON APPEAL IN 62337.

DATED THIS 3/19/13

__/s/ Zach Coughlin_____Zachary Barker Coughlin


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THEFOREGOINGMOTION TO STRIKE 2/13/13 RECORD ON APPEALWAS PLACED IN A SEALED EN-

VELOPE AND SENT BYU.S. REGULAR MAIL AND CERTIFIED MAIL, POSTAGE FULLY PREPAID THEREON,

TO:

Patrick O. King, Esq.

Nevada Bar No 5035

9456 Double R BLVDReno, NV 89421

Tel: 775 329 4100

[email protected]

and was electronically served through the Nevada Supreme Court's eflex system on:

David Clark, Esq., Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada, registered on this Court's eFlex systemHowever, pursuant to the 1/4/13 EPO issued to the SBN in SBN v Zach Coughlin by the Reno JusticeCourt in RJC RCP2012-000607, it is possible that Coughlin will again be arrested following havingReno PD Officers track unannounced into his back yard with guns drawn, soon to be pointed atCoughlin's head from four feet away, incident to some rather dubious allegation that such electronicservice through the Eflex system somehow amounts to a contact violative of the 1/4/13 EPO in607...Dated 4/25/13

____________ZACH COUGHLINAPPELLANT


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INDEX TOEXHIBITS:

1. EXHIBIT1: DECLARATION OFZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN

2. EXHIBIT2:VARIOUS OTHER RELEVANT MATERIALS


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DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN:

I, ZACHARYBARKERCOUGHLIN, SWEAR UNDERPENALTY OF PERJURY, NRS 53.045 THAT THE FOL-

LOWING IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE :

1. The ROA in 62337 has had a very troubled history. Now, the second version of the ROA, filestamped 2/13/13 (though the SBN has continued misaddressing the ROA is sends to Coughlin(which, this time,didinclude the Transcript from the formal hearing and Hearing Exhibits, unlikewhat the SBN mailed to Coughlin in connection with the ROA filed on 12/24/12...(page 1098 of the12/24/12 ROA contains a Certificate of Service By Mail wherein the SBN's Laura Peters wrote: Ihereby certify that I served a copy of the attached Record on Appeal, Vol. 1&2, by placing a copy inan envelope addressed to Zachary.... That 12/20/12 Certificate of Service By Mail contains nothingindicating that there existed a Vol. 3 in said ROA file stamped 12/24/12 upon all three volumes beingsubmitted to the Clerk of Court of the Nevada Supreme Court).

Now, in the 2/13/13 ROA, the order of presentation of the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters,and the 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence is

switchedfrom the order those filings appeared in in the 12/24/12 ROA, in an attempt by the SBNto ameliorate the impropriety apparent in the 12/24/12 ROA where the 10/9/12 Affidavit of LauraPeters appeared at bates stamp pages 33-34, immediately beforethe appearance, at pages 35-39 ofthe10/12/12Notice of Formal Hearing; Designation of Witnesses and Summary of Evidence by theSBN's King, where the bates stamping in that ROA and order of pleadings on file is chronologicallyarranged from earliest (beginning with the 8/23/12 Complaint) to most recent (ending, in contrast tothe 2/13/13 ROA, on page 1098 with a Certificate of Service By Mailing by Peters of only Vol 1&2of the ROA (ie, missing the Formal Hearing Transcript and Hearing Exhibits).

Obviously, the SBN finally figured out that it looks suspicious to suddenly departfrom the placement of the 10/9/12 AOLP as appearing in the 11/8/12 3,200 page bates stampe pro-duction as the last entry most recent filing in the chronologically arranged Formal Hearing Plead-

ings folder and the immediately preceeding entry being bates stamped 02797 being the Panel ChairEcheverria's 10/31/12 Order.. That is, the 10/9/12 AOLP appeared at bates stamp page 02795, andthe 10/12/12 Notice of Formal Hearing; DoWSoE appeared at 02716, with a multitude of filings in

between, including Coughlin's 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss at 02911, which the SBN had yet to put afile stamp on at that point (where the file was sent to the printers on 11/1/12 according to Petersand King's email of 11/1/12 informing Coughlin that he would not be permitted his rights to inspectthe file up to within 3 days of the hearing as required by SCR 105(2)(c). In the 12/24/12 ROA,however, that 10/15/12 Motion to Dismiss is finally file stamped, appearing at bates stamp page 40.Couglin's 10/15/12 Motion for Order To Show Cause in 0204 remains without a file stamp in bothversion so fthe ROA, despite it being ruled on in the 10/31/12 Order by Chair Echverria? King's fail-ure to oppose Coughlin's argument that the 8/23/12 Complaint should be dismissed along lines simi-

lar to those Couglin's wrongful termination Complaint against WLS was dismissed under a NRCP12(b)(3)-(5) line of argument given how blurry and illegible the Complaint and Exhibits thereto actu-ally are(versus in 60302 and 60317 (a case featuring Judge Elliott failing to disqualify himself ordisclose his Board Presidency for one of Hearing Witness Elcano's co-defendants (Judge Elliott wasthen assigned Coughlin's criminal appeal in of the matter underlying 60838, in CR11-2064, andthereafter was assigned numerous other competency evaluation and or criminal appeal matters where-in Coughlin is a party (with the transcripts from teh 4/19/12 and 4/26/12 competency hearings being

particularly relevant to the NRS 178.405 stay violations (and effect thereof upon Coughlin's ability to


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avoid a DCR 13(3) application in connection with Hill's 4/19/12 post-judgment Motion to For Attor-ney Fee sanctions (especially where NRCP 11's safe harbor procedural requisites had not been fol-lowed...to say nothing of Bar Counsel possessing the 8/28/12 Order by Judge Flanagan in that matterthat conclusively proves the 6/25/12 attorney fee award the subject of Hearing Exhibit 2 was not asanction, but rather an application of DCR 13(3), thereby evincing some RPC violations of his own

by King...NRCP 11 was not followed incident to the closing argument Motion for Sanctions bySpringgate in DV08-01168, leading to the 4/13/09 Order (subsequently subsumed by a 6/19/09 FinalDecree that vitiates any suggestion that Coughlin's contentions therein lacked merit where alimonywas, in fact, awarded...and where that Hearing Exhibit 3 applies NRS 7.085 where it would seem theJudge would have rather made a contempt finding, but didn't, as such, the lack therof is conclusive

proof that Coughlin's conduct therein was not misconduct) the opposing side, CAAW's ExcecutiveBoard, then going on to sanction Coughlin under NRS 7.085 and or 18.010(2)(b) despite a 12(b)(5)dismissal necessarily meaning the Court never got to the merits of the Complaint, no 21 day safe har-

bor motion being served, and no actual hearing ever being held to satisfy the requirement for one inNRS 18.010(2)(b), oh, and Judge Elliot managed to get all of Couglhin's criminal appeals (5!) wherethe actual process Couglin had served the defendnats was exponentially more legible than the fiddle

with the scanner dpi settings and other contrast, obfuscation settings in Acrobat or other scanning ap-plication approach taken by Gonsalves, Garin, et al....(it really is remarkable how scandalous theapproach was there when viewing the actual 9 page per page printed on a 1200 dpi laser printer ver-sion of the attached Exhibit in those cases compared to the completely illegible and blurry doctoredversions attached as Exhibits to the various Motions to Dismiss...an approach absolutely implemented

by the SBN in fraudulently making as many of Couglin's filings in the representations thereof in theROA's in 62337 be similarly doctored up to be so blurry as to lack an utility whatsoever). Judge El-liott's 1/9/13 Order granting Coughlin IFP status in CR12-2025 and for the preparation of the Tran-script of the matter, RJC RCR2011-063341 mentioned in King's 8/23/12 Complaint and so connectedto this matter given the extreme proximity of that 11/19/12 trial date therein, the questionable in theextreme 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing involving the Reno City Attorney the day before the formalhearing in this matter, and the cumulative prejudice to Coughlin and SCR 102.5 mitigation supportattendant to the arrest therein, on 8/20/11, which was the first of 15 incarcerations of Coughlin since,along with approximately 11 different No-Causeevictions of rather dubious jurisdictional prerequi-sites, with all the attendant conflicts of interest and basis for disqualification one might expect to arisetherein (see King's 11/2/12 Motion to Quash Coughlin's RMC Subpoenas, RCA Christensen's letter,the 11/13/12 objection by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial, etc., etc.. An extension of time to file Coughlin'sOpening Brief would allow for the transcript in CR12-2025 (RJC RCR11-063341) to be finished, andsuch is necessary to this matter.

Specifically, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters (a very material document that goesto whether the SBN Clerk of Court/OBC/NNDB/Panel provided Coughlin an indication that he was

permitted to submit filings via fax (considering NNDB Chairman Susich's 7/27/12 written instruction

to Coughlin (see below) and King's numerous instances of directing Coughlin to communicate withSBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (including an instruction to Coughlin by King to do so made dur-ing the 3/26/12 appearance by Coughlin at the SBN Double R Office where Coughlin presented totake King up on his offer to allow Coughlin to review the grievances and materials submitted in con-nection therewith...at which time King refused to allow Coughlin to review any such materials andonly briefly allowed Coughlin to read the two page 2/14/12 written grievance letter to the SBN re-garding Coughlin by RMC Judge Nash Holmes. At that time, King indicated that Coughlin shouldhave that 2/14/12 Nash Holmes letter, to which Coughlin protested that he had not received any such


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letter (to be expected considering the well documented problems Coughlin was experiencing during

that period of time in accessing mail addressed to him at the 1422 E. 9th St. #2 address). Peters ex-press indications to Coughlin on 9/11/12 were expression of the policies and procedures in play inlight of SCR 105(4) and Susich and King's representations to Coughlin (combined with Peters ownexpress representations that she was the SBN Clerk of Court and entitled to make the calls on mat-

ters such as when and under what circumstances a Default would be taken (she indicated severalthings in this respect to Coughlin). To whatever extent Peters 9/11/12 express indications to Cough-lin that she would file stamp in an filings he faxed to the SBN are considered tonotbe expressions ofthe rules and policies in play under SCR 105(4), Coughlin entitled to rely upon such indications, andreasonably did so, considering the totality of the circumstances. Especially w ith respect to the12/14/12 FOFCOL's express recommendation that as a matter of default the alleged violation may

be deemed admitted... with respect to numerous alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct,even those for which the FOFCOL found the SBN put on no evidence whatsoever or or those

So, the 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters becomes a very important filing. Suchfiling (it is file stamped 10/9/12, and notarized no less, with a date of 10/9/12) was never sent toCoughlin until it was included in the 3,200 page box of documents provided on 11/8/12 as a consola-

tion by the SBN for refusing to follow SCR 105(2)(c). That 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Petersappearaed within the bates stamped 3,200 page document production by the SBN within a sectionlabeled Formal Hearing Pleadings, and appeared numerically afterKing's 10/24/12 Opposition andbeforeNNDB Chairman Susich's 10/30/12 Order Appointing Formal Hearing Panel. This indicatesthat either Peters and the SBN back dated the file stamping on some Affidavit of Laura Peters toindicate it was filed in on 10/9/12, or, that Peters and or the SBN file stamped such an Affidavit ofLaura Peters on 10/9/12, but did not place it in the Formal Pleadings File at that time. Regardless,there is no indication that such 10/9/12 Affidavit of Laura Peters was ever mailed to Coughlin, asthere exists no dedicated Certificate of Service for it, nor is said 10/9/12 AOLP identified in any In-dex to Exhibits or otherwise referenced in any other filing by the SBN. The fact that that 10/9/12AOLP contains numerous easily disproven misstatements in more troubling, particularly where such

misstatements relate to just when and how the SBN and or Peters had one of Coughlin's Motions toDismiss submitted for filing. Coughlin had digitally verifiable proof confirming he submitted for fil-ing to the SBN his initial Motion to Dismiss the 8/23/12 file stamped Complaint on 9/17/12 by bothfax and email.

Peters absolutely indicated to Couglin that he was permitted to file be fax in a 9/11/12 com-munication with Coughlin, and that she would file stamp any filings that Coughlin submitted via fax.Both Peters and King have been dancing around this fact. This is especially clear where the 10/9/12AOLP only

SUBJECT: RE: MOTION TO DISMISS SBN V. COUGHLIN FROM: LAURA PETERS([email protected]) SENT: WED 9/26/12 11:54 AM TO: 'ZACH COUGHLIN'

([email protected]) INEVER SAID THAT YOU COULD FILE ITEMS VIA E-MAIL...

THE 10/9/12 AOLPREADS:

CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS


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LAURA PETERS,UNDERPENALTYOF PERJURY, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, DEPOSES ANDSAYS AS FOLLOWS:

That Affiant is employed as a paralegal for the discipline department of the State Barof Nevada andin such capacity is the custodian of records for the State Bar of Nevada;

That on September 11, 2012, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Zachary Coughlin called Af-

fiant to confirm that a hearing was still scheduled to take place on September 25, 2012. Affiant ex-plained that the hearing would not take place on September 25th and that date had been scheduledprior to the filing of a formal Complaint.

Mr. Coughlinreacted as if he had no knowledge of a Complaint. Affiant then ex-plained that, in fact, a copy of the Complaint, sent via certified mail on August 23,2012, from the Re-no office of the State Bar, had been returned and marked "unclaimed".

Affiant further explained that since service had not been affected, a new certified copy wouldgo out the next day. Affiant requested that when Mr. Coughlin received said copy, he should returnthe postcard attached to the mailing and his twenty (20) day period in which to answer the Com-

plaint would start running at that point.However, in speaking to Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, it was determined that

personal service should be affected upon Mr. Coughlin. Reno Carson messenger service was engagedto attempt personal service despite Mr. Coughlin not providing the State Bar with a physical address.

On September 25, 2012, Mr. Coughlin arrived at the Reno office of the State Bar al-legedly expecting a hearing to take place. At that t ime, Mr. Coughlin was again told, both by Affiantand Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King, that no hearing would be taking p lace that day and that ananswer to the State Bar's Complaint had not been received.

Affiant personally served Mr. Coughlin with a copy of the Complaint on his visit tothe Bar office on September 25th as witnessed by Paula Campbell, an employee of the State Bar. Mr.Coughlin insisted that the hearing which had been previously scheduled for that day should be taking

place because he needed to be removed from temporary suspension.Mr. Coughlin has also been instructed by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King that he

cannot file p leadings with the State Bar via e-mail, which he continues to attempt. The Motion toDismiss, which Mr. Coughlin now insists should be granted as it has gone unopposed by the StateBar, was never presented to Affiant for filing but was rather emailed prior to Affiant's conversationwith Mr. Coughlin on September 11th when Mr. Coughlin under no uncertain terms told Affiant thathe had not yet received the Complaint.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.Dated this 9th day of October, 2012: Laura Peters, Paralegal, Office of

Bar Counsel (notarized as SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 9THDAY OF OCTOBER, 2012 by Notary Public Angeline A. Radley and af-

fixed with her Notary Seal).In consideration of the representations and indications made to Coughlin by NNDB Chairman

Susich (especially his 7/27/12 email to Coughlin and his assistant Sherri Hornsbey's indications toCoughlin), Asst. Bar Counsel King, and SBN Clerk of Court Laura Peters (a title that both Petersand King had referred to Peters as being bestowed with on numerous occasions, including by Petersduring a 9/11/12 telephone conversation with Coughlin and by King on 9/25/12 in person, uponCoughlin appearing at the SBN's Double R Office on 9/25/12 at 9 am for the hearing Peters had con-firmed in writing to Coughlin and to which Susich's 7/27/12 email to Couglin indicated the SBN wasin charge of scheduling.


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KING CURIOUSLY FAILED TO OFFER INTO EVIDENCE THAT 3/16/12LETTER BY KING TOCOUGHLIN (TO WHICH WAS ATTACHED,AS INDICATED BY A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN FROM SBNCLERK OF COURT LAURA PETERS,WHICH COUGHLIN ONLY FOUND IN HIS J UNK EMAIL FOLDER AFTERKING INDICATED DURING THE3/26/12 INTERACTION WITH COUGHLIN AT THE SBN DOUBLE R OFFICEWAS PROVIDED TO COUGHLIN BY EMAIL AS WELL...LEADING TO AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN KING AND

COUGHLIN WHEREIN KING ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT EMAIL COUGHLIN A COPY OF THE 3/16/12MAILING (DESPITE HIS3/16/12LETTER INDICATING HE WAS SO COPYING COUGLIN ON VIA EMAIL, BUT,STRANGELY,NOT FAX), BUT, RATHER, KING INDICATED HE HAD LAURA PETERS EMAIL COUGLIN ACOPY OF THAT MAILING. DURING THE 3/26/12IN PERSON INTERACTION WITH KING COUGHLIN WASSURPRISED TO HEAR THAT THE SBN HAD SENT COUGHLIN ANYTHING RELATING TO ANY GRIEVANCESOTHER THAN THE2/14/12 MAILING TO COUGHLIN BY KING(WHICH INCLUDED KING'S ONE PAGE LET-TER TO COUGHLIN AND HILL'S FIVE PAGE1/14/12 GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN),WHICH COUGHLINONLY RECIEVED ON3/16/12 DUE TO NO FAULT OF COUGHLIN'S OWN, BUT RATHER, TO MALFEASANCEBY COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AND PERHAPS, THEUSPS, AND OR THEUSPS'S RESPONSE TO THE MAL-FEASANCE OF COUGHLIN'S HOUSEMATES, AS CONFIRMED BY THE YELLOW STICKERS AFFIXED TO ENVE-LOPES MAILED TO COUGLHIN (SUCH AS THOSE BY THE SBN ON 2/14/12 AND 3/16/12AND NUMEROUSMAILINGS BY THE

RMCTO

COUGLHIN BETWEEN

FEBRUARY

-APRIL

2012). COUGHLIN WAS FURTHER

SURPRISED TO HEAR FROM KING THAT THE SBN HAD COPIED COUGLHIN ON A 3/16/12MAILING TOCOUGHLIN OF AN ADDITIONAL GRIEVANCEBY A JUDGEBY ALSO SENDING IT TO COUGHLIN VIA EMAIL.COUGHLIN QUERRIED KING AS TO WHAT EMAIL ACCOUNT SUCH AN EMAIL WOULD HAVE EMANATEDFROM. KING,LACKING AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EMAILS ARE SENT FROM ACCOUNTS RATHER THANFROM THE STATEBAR'S WEBSITE,ULTIMATELY INDICATED TO COUGHLIN THAT HE DELEGATED THECOPYING TO COUGLIN BY EMAIL OF THE 3/16/12MAILING TO LAURA PETERS. FROM THAT COUGHLINDEDUCED SUCH AN EMAIL WAS LIKELY SENT FROM PETER'S EMAIL ACCOUNT, AND, SURE ENOUGH,INCOUGHLIN'S JUNK MAIL FOLDER, CHECKED SUBSEQUENT TO THE 3/26/12 IN PERSON INTERACTION WITHKING,WAS A 3/19/12 EMAIL TO COUGHLIN CONTAINING A17 PAGE PDF (KING'S ONE PAGE3/16/12LETTER, HOLME'S TWO PAGE3/14/12LETTER,ANDL. GARDNER'S 14 PAGE OAT OF 4/13/09).

That 3/16/12 mailing to Coughlin by the SBN included a one page letter to Coughlin fromKing of 3/16/12, to which was attached Judge Nash Holmes 3/14/12 two page grievance againstCoughlin, and the 4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge Linda Gardner from 01168. In that mailing,the Judge Nash Holmes letter is stamped by the SBN as received on 3/14/12, and, curiously, the4/13/09 Order After Trial by Judge L. Gardner is stamped as received by the SBN on 3/15/12, withthe 5 in the 15 being drawn in by hand...which is even more curious given King's repeated ob-structionist and evasive, even misleading, attempts to avoid admitting that Judge Nash Holmes andthe RMC included that 4/13/09 Judge L. Gardner Order After Trial in the materials submitted on3/14/12 along with Holmes' 3/14/12 letter to the SBN).

HOLMES ADMITTED TO SO INCLUDING IN THE OAT IN HER3/14/12 SUBMISSION TO THE SBNDURING THE FORMAL HEARING ON11/14/12. ON THE CERTIFIED AUDIO TRANSCRIPT OF A 4/10/12 TRI-AL DATE IN THE CRIMINAL TRESPASS TRIAL AGAINST COUGHLIN STEMMING FROM HILL'S FRAUDULENT11/13/12 CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, L . GARDNER'SBROTHER, JUDGENASH HOLMES' FELLOW RMCJUDGE, RMC ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WILLIAM GARDNER, ADMITTED TO HAVING RECEIVED THAT4/13/09 ORDERAFTERTRIAL BYHIS SISTER, FROM H I S SI STER, AND THEN HAVING PASSED THAT OR-DERAFTERTRIAL RECEIVED FROMHIS SISTERAROUND TO HIS FELLOW RMC JUDGES, THOUGH THETIMING OF W. GARDNER'S RECEIPT OF THE4/13/09 OAT FROM HISSISTERWAS SOMETHING W.GARDNER OFFERED PARTICULARLY STRANGE AND EVASIVE COMMENTARY TO ON THAT4/10/12 AUDIOTRANSCRIPT,AS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF HIS PASSING ON THAT 4/13/09


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OAT TO HIS FELLOW RMC JUDGES)AT THE11/14/12 HEARING,UNLIKE HIS 2/14/12LETTER TOCOUGHLIN (FOR WHICH KING FAILED TO INCLUDED THE5 PAGE1/14/12 WRITTEN EMAILED GRIEVANCEAGAINST COUGHLIN BY HILL,WHEREIN HILL PURPORTS TO BE SATISFYING HIS AND HIS ASSOCIATESRPC 8.3 DUTY IN ACCUSING COUGLIN OF GHOSTWRITING FORJOHN GESSIN,WHOM HILL WAS STILLLISTED AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR IN AT LEAST ONE MATTER AT THE TIME,DESPITE HILL DISPAR-

AGING GESSIN AND BETRAYING ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES, APPARENTLY, WITH RESPECT TOGESSIN,IN HIS 1/14/12GRIEVANCE AGAINST COUGHLIN, MORE ON THAT LATER).

Subject: RE: referral to Northern Nevada Disciplinary Board From: TomSusich ([email protected]) Sent: Fri 7/27/12 8:58 AM To: 'Zach Coughlin'([email protected]) Cc: '[email protected]'([email protected])

Dear M. Coughlin: I am in receipt of your request for a hearing before theNorthern Nevada Disciplinary Board. I have forwarded your request to the Ne-vada State Bar's Northern Office for processing. Please communicate directlywith the State Bar concerning your case. They are the ones who will processyour request and set up any appropriate hearings. If you have questions youcan contact Pat King, the Northern Nevada Bar Counsel. Sincerely, J. ThomasSusich, Esq.

ALSO, CONSIDER:

[email protected]: [email protected]:[email protected]:RE:DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCEDATE: FRI, 23 MAR2012 17:57:26 +0000

DEARMR. COUGHLIN,

PLEASE COME TO SEE ME AND IWILL SHOW YOU THE LETTER AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE COURT.PATRICKKING

FROM: ZACH COUGHLIN [MAILTO:[email protected]]SENT: FRIDAY, MARCH23, 2012 10:39 AMTO: PATRICKKINGSUBJECT:RE:DOES RICHARD HILL HAVE STANDING TO FILE A GRIEVANCE

MR. KING,

THIS IS THE VERY FIRST TIME YOU ALLEGE ANYONE OTHER THANMR.KING FILED OR ALLEGED A GRIEVANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE ANY DOCUMEN-TATION OR PROOF RELATED TO THESE APPARENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM

JUDGES THAT YOU ARE ONLY NOW BRINGING UP. SINCERELY, ZACHCOUGHLIN, ESQ., PO BOX 60952, RENO, NV, 89506, TEL: 775 3388118, FAX: 949 667 7402; [email protected] NEVADABARNO: 9473


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Please don't put words in my mouth, Zach. You are the one that indicated that you had not re-ceived the Complaint when we talked on the phone.Why, then, would I file in a Motion toDismiss? I am responsible for my own actions.- Laura (aka Clerk Peters)

-----

From: Zach Coughlin [[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, October 10,2012 11:51 AMTo: [email protected]; Laura Peters; David Clark; Patrick King;[email protected]

Subject: FW: pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings....language SCR 111(7) versusSCR 111(8) and the June 7th, 2012 Order of the NV. S. Ct.

Dear Chairman Susich and Clerk Peters, Bar Counsel King sees himself as a the Director of thismovie, placing you two in the scenes where he sees fit. Chairman Susich, it is your responsibility tocomply with the Court's Order and the Supreme Court Rules, and at this point, you need to send aclear message to Bar Counsel that "the kid stays in the picture", and inform Mr. King that he is not

to attempt to take your job or duties from you. Same goes for Clerk Peters, especially vis a vis heradmission that King told her not to file Coughlin's Motion to Dismiss in SBN v Coughlin on Sep-tember 17th, 2012, which has now gone unopposed, and therefore, shall be granted. Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin PO BOX 3961...

By subverting this Court's 6/7/11 Order and the express dictates in SCR 111(8) and

SCR 102(4)(a) by effectively extending the temporary suspension in 60838 (killing Coughlin's

law practice for the time being and making it overly difficult for Coughlin to earn a living whilealso defending against an inordinately overbroad SCR 105 Complaint and impresive, if not ra-ther questionable displays ofteamworkbetween the SBN, RJC, WCDA, RPD, WCSO, RMC,

and Reno City Attorney's Office...(including two more recent arrests of Coughlin, bringing the

total since 8/20/11 to 13, with an arrest on 2/2/13 for an alleged violation of his Dept. of Alterna-tive Sentencing probation requirement to check in by 3 pm on Wednesdays, where Coughlin

presented at 2:54pm but was detained by security (pursuant to an RJC Administrative Order

12-01) sufficiently long enough to result in the DAS office closing prior to Coughlin being per-

mitted to access it for a check in (also, DAS Officer Brown, in an email the next day, excusedsuch circumstances, and it was not until a 2/1/13 email to WCDA ADA Helzer seemed towrankle, that, suddenly, DAS arrested Coughlin has his residenceafter7 pm, in violation of

NRS 171.136. A week later, on 2/8/12, Coughlin was treated to have a gun pointed at his head

by the RPD upon Offficer Waddle departing from procedure and entering the back yard ofCoughlin's residence, failing to announce themselves as law enforcement (a voice called to

Coughlin while he was walking in his back yard, saying only Zach Coughlin? to which

Coughlin did not turn around or respond but rather walked to the corner of the back yard andstood behind a shed...only to have Officer Waddle jump out moments later from behind theshed's wall pointing a 45 a Coughlin's head, his partner, Officer Wilson asking, are you Zach

Coughlin to which Coughlin said something, and Waddle, who had called out to the back of

Coughlin's head moments before, was only then able to announce that's him upon hearing

Coughlin's voice and recognizing it from a previous conversation with Coughlin on the tele-phone, thereby indicating the RPD lacked probable cause to pull their guns and inch around


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back yard sheds without so much as announcing the presence of law enforcement and or issu-

ing a single lawful order.

Now, the RMC has picked up the EPO/TPO SBN violation prosecution where the

WCDA's Office chose not to....Coughlin was charged with violating a TPO granted to, appar-

ently, and entire County, Washoe County for his email to his DAS Officer explaining the de-tention by security on 1/23/13 in a 1/24/13 email to his DAS probation officer (and, apparently,

the institutional TPO application and subsequent TPO are being read by the RPD to apply to

any employe off Washoe County, not just those in the WC Public Defenders Office, much less

just to Jim Leslie, Esq., whom did not s eem all that fearful of Coughlin on the numerous occa-sions when he smugly, and purposefully, an callow callous manner sought to deprive Coughlin

of each and every inviolable right of a criminal defendant, and also refused to providee 911 au-

dio cd discovery discs...Also, Coughlin moved for a TPO against Leslie on 9/5/12, well before

the application on Leslie's behalf by WCDA DDA Watts-Vial (whose 11/13/12 4:41 pm last mi-nute fax to Coughlin represented an apparent attempt to Object to the SCR 110 subpoenas

Coughlin had served by an appropriate non-party on 10/30/12 upon 2JDC Judges, Administra-

tors, and the Custodian of Records, none of which appeared or propounded for the 11/14/12formal hearing, to which Panel Chair Echeverria failed to hold them in contempt or grant acontinuance despite Coughlin's express request that he do so, and despite the fact that it is the

Board Chair, Susich, not the Panel Chair, Echeverria, whom has jurisdiction to rule on Mo-

tions to Quash Subpoenas (even, one would think, the impermissible sua sponte one's that Pane

Chair Echeverria made on 11/14/12, in yet another in a exceedingly long line of examples ofEcheverria displaying evident and marked impartiality against Coughlin, and particularly, in

favor of WLS's Elcano and local law enforcement entitites). resulting from a petty theft convic-

tion of $14.00 worth of a candy bar and some cough drops into what has now become and 8

month suspension (particularly curious given the lack of even a temporary suspension in In ReStephen R. Harris, Esq. 57507, and the eventual three month suspension Ordered therein,

where Harris was actually suspending from late February 2012 to November 8th, 2012, around9 months. Coughlin's temporary suspension for 0.0000018543% the amount of money Harrisadmittedto misappropriating from acli entversus where Coughlin disputes the legitimacy of his

conviction of a de minimis amoutn offoodfromWal-M art. To punish Coughlin for defending

himself or failing to provide a false coerced confession just seems wrong.SCR 102(4)Temporary suspension by the supreme court: (a) On the petitionof a disciplinary board,signed by its chair or vice chair , supported by an af-fidavitalleging factspersonally knownto the affiant, which shows that an at-torney appears to be posing asubstantial threat of serious harm to the pub-lic,the supreme court may order, with notice as the court may prescribe, theattorneys immediate temporary suspension or may impose other conditions

upon the attorneys practice. If a petition is filed under subsection 3 of this rule,a separate petition under this subsection must be filed with the supreme court assoon thereafter as possible...

(d) The attorney may request dissolution or amendment of the tempo-rary order of suspension by petition filed with the supreme court, a copy ofwhich shall be served on bar counsel. The petition may be set for immediatehearing before a hearing panel, to hear the petition and submit its report andrecommendation to the court within 7 days of the conclusion of the hearing .


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will not revisit those decisions here, particularly when Coughlin alleges nothingthat would satisfy the requirements of NRCP 59 or NRCP 60.

It is not at all clear how Coughlin could be said to be attempting to re-litigate substantive is-sues when the 6/25/12 Order itself notes that Coughlin did not file an Opposition to Hill's 4/19/12

Motion for Attorney Fees. Particularly where substantive issues would, necessarily be intimatelyintertwined with any attempt to have any the legitimacy of such an outrageous $42,050 attorney feeaward for just theappeal (ie, not tedious trial court fact finding sorts of attorney work involved, butthe mere filing of a legal brief speaking to rather dry legal issues only...so, just who is attempting tore-ligitate(or re-adjudicate, rather) things here?

Would that not be Hill and Baker seeking to relitigate their humiliating defeat in the trialcourt in 1708 where, at first, Baker sought a ridiculous $18,060 in attorney fees for representing thelandlord in a No Cause Summaryeviction Proceeding(awhoopsieposture, Casey D. Baker, Esq.,sheepishly had to adopt upon being forced to admit that there exists no basis for awarding attorney'sfees (certainly not the statute Baker cited to allow such fees where no such manufacture of con-trolled substances exception had been alleged or broached in any way whatsoever by the landlord at

any point in this matter, though Hill did manage to cook up an particularly suspect allegation of hav-ing found a crack pipe and bag of weed...large quantity of pills and a vial of something shortlyafter Coughlin merely restated, verbatim, what RPD Officer Carter had said to Coughlin shortly afterarresting him in response to Coughlin asking him if he was on Richard G. Hill's payroll) under Ne-vada law incident to a summaryeviction proceeding (NRS 69.030, in light of JCRCP 2 (which char-acterizes landlord tenant matters as outside the purview of those civil actions to which such feeawards may issued).

So, to recap, Baker moved for $18,050 in attorney's fees for the summaryeviction...whichJudge Sferrazza downsized to a mere $1,500, until, ultimately, Baker and Hill were forced to admitthat Coughlin was absolutely correct in asserting that there moving for any attorney's fees at all was,itself, a fine example of a violation of RPC 3.1's Meritorious Claims requirement...and that fee awardwas set aside (though, of course, Coughlin, as a practical matter, was treated to being ordered, byJudge Flanagan, to pay a fee award, a relevant portion of which was well in excess of that amount inconsideration of the fees Hill and Baker racked up indefendingagainst Coughlin pointing out theRPC 3.1 violation they themselves ultimately were forced to admit in joiningCoughlin in seeking tohave that $1,500 attorney fee award set aside (how fees related to such matters could reasonably besaid to relate to theappealin 03628, is not clear, nor is how such does not present yet another RPC3.1 violation by these two lycans (ie, not lichens as Chair Echeverria incorrectly noted, a distinc-tion which would have been clear to him had he bothered to read any of the materials Coughlin pro-vided in his filings and Exhibits attached thereto before plunging headlong into a particularly odiousattempt to take away one's law license under the most illegitimate of circumstances.)

Its really not at all clear just how Judge Flanagn could find an assertion that $42,050 in attor-ney's fees were reasonably incurred in relation to theappealof this summaryeviction. Regardless,

Nevada law does not seem to hold that JCRCP 73(b) is applicable to an appeal of such an informalsummary proceeding, but rather, is only applicable to a formal eviction (ie, a p lenary unlawful de-tainer civil action, particularly given the explicit language of JCRCP Rule 2).

NEVADAJCRCP RULE 2: THREE FORMS OF ACTIONS THERESHALL BE THREE FORMS OF ACTION IN JUSTICE COURTS TO BE KNOWN AS

CIVIL ACTIONS, SMALL CLAIMS ACTIONSAND SUMMARY EVICTION AC-


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TIONS. RULES3 THROUGH87 GOVERN CIVIL ACTIONS. RULES GOVERNING SMALLCLAIMS ACTIONS BEGIN WITH RULE 88 AND END WITH RULE 100. RULES GOVERN-ING SUMMARYEVICTIONS COMMENCE WITH RULE101.

II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS,

PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND ORDERS

RULE 3. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION Acivil actionis commencedby filing a complaintwith the court.

It was Hill's associate Baker, whom Hill alternately alleges to have spent an inordinateamount of time reviewing, only to then seek to allege that he wasn't there for the trial court pro-ceedings, so he can't be held accountable for his repeated baseless, sworn assertions that Coughlinfailed to raise the matter of his being a commercial tenancy (home law office, and or mattress busi-ness) impermissibly subject to a No Cause Summaryeviction where the non-payment of rent wasneither pled nor alleged, in violation of the explicit prohibition against the utlization of such a NoCause summary proceeding against a commercial tenant under NRS 40.253. Further, JCRCP 73 has

no application to the appeal of a summaryeviction. Rather, as the Two Roads v. Venetian case andtrial court transcript therein makes clear (or at least makes ridiculous any claim that the positionCoughlin took at various points, including on 12/22/12, as Hill, asserted, in his testimony was some-how, demonstrative of violations of various RPC's or indicative of a lack of candor or fairness to op-

posing counsel by Coughlin), the supersedeas bondi, particularly where the rent is under $1,000,

is statutorily set at $250, and the RJC's threes times the rent approach is not permissible.Nor is characterizing the 10/25/11 court date as a Trial, only to assert that JCRCP 19 (requir-ing 20 days to respond to a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in such a plenary matter) is in-applicable to a summary eviction).

Further, it is not at all clear why Coughlin should pick up the tab for the confusion and falloutinevitable given the then state of the law in Nevada and the consequences of Judge Sferrazza's

10/13/11 Order requiring the rent escrow deposit and Judge Clifton's response to Coughlin's10/17/11 filing seeking a stay, continuance, and or relief therefrom:

RJC Judge Clifton's 10/17/11 Order in 1708 reads:

ORDER This matter has come before the Court upon De-fendant's Emergency Motion to Stay, Set Aside, Vacateeviction Hearing Order filed on today's date. An Opposition byPlaintiff was also filed today. These pleadings follow a Sum-maryeviction hearing held October 13, 2011, before JudgeSferrazza. The court's minutes indicate that Defendant's evictionfrom the premises would only occur on today's date if he failed

to post the rental amount of $2,275.00 by October 17, 2011 withthe court. A trial date was then set for October 25, 2011. De-fendant has tendered $2,275.00 to the court on loday's date.Therefore, the instant motion is now moot and the trial date ofOctober 25,2011 stands. Is it therefore HEREBY ORDEREDthat Defendant's Emergency Motion, Stay, Set Aside, Vacate


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eviction Hearing Order is DENIED. DATED this 17th day ofOctober, 2011.

Alongside the numerousprocedural violationsCoughlin has committedin filing his pa-pers (ignoring page limits, missing deadlines, etc.), Merliss contends Coughlin's litigation tactics-

including Coughlin's instant attempt to set aside the attorney's fees award-have been employednot to pursue arguments in good faith but to delay and harass him. Merliss contends Coughlin's be-havior has been not only abusive but costly,requiring Merliss to contest each an every allegationCoughlin makes no matter how meritless. page 2 of 8/28/12 Order in 03628.

Speaking of following rules, how about the 21 day safe harbor in NRCP 11? Hill never didserve Coughlin a filing ready sanction motion. Coughlin, however, did serve Hill at least one such21 day safe harbor motion. Hill and Flanagan seem to run the ol' frivolous fee sanction pick and rollwith at least an equal elan as that demonstrated by Judge L. Gardner and opposing counsel Springgate(also, not a fan of 21 day safe harbor filing ready sanction Motions, even where invoking NRS7.085, which itself invokes NRCP 11, which so requires service of just such a 21 day safe harbor mo-tion...) in the Joshi Divorce Trial in 01168.

Further, neither Judge Flanagan, his then law clerk Zelalem Bogale, Esq., Hill, nor Bakermanaged to ever cite to any authority supporting the apparent sua sponte (contrary to the 4/19/12 Or-der in Carpentier by Flanagan speaking to the adjudicatory boundaries limitations placed upon courtsrespecting the arguments put forward and citations in support thereto by the parties) contention thatCoughlins' alleged failure to file a timely Opposition to Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees isaprocedural violation. Further, there is not procedural rule setting page limits in the 2JDC.Sure, there was an Order setting a page limit of 5 pages (which Baker h imself exceeded), butCouglhin did not ignore such Order. Rather, Coughlin addressed the fact that his Brief was in ex-cess of said page limitation ordered, and argued a basis showing good cause for why is ought be per-missible to exceed it. Certainly, no citation has ever been provided by Baker, H ill, or Judge Flanaganto support a finding that Coughlin somehow was able to manufacture a set of circumstances requir-

ing Merliss to contest each an every allegation Coughlin makes no matter how meritless. Cer-tainly, a more conservative approach could have been taken by Hill or Baker, such as filing a 5

page Answering Brief addressing the main points at issue, with a request for leave to later ex-

ceed any such page limitation, which is essentially what they did anyways...so where is all this

$42,050 in attorney's fees being rung up, if not in impermissible areas no the appropriate sub-ject matter of such an attorney fee award motion...ie, filings related to the supersedeas

bond/stay on appeal issue arguably do not come within the purview of NRS 69.050, nor do those

(and the associated court time and preparation) related to the 11/7/11 hearing on Couglin's Mo-

tion to Set Aside, etc., in 1708, or the 12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/16/12 Motion to Con-test Personal Property Lien.

Certainly, Baker and Hill never presented any citation to support a contention that such

matters fall within the language of NRS 69.050. Further, with respect to all fees incurred in re-lation to the personal property lien issue, Judge Flanagan's Order denying Coughlin's appeal of3/30/12 makes clear that such matters (including the Order ResolvingDefendant's Motion to

Contest Personal Property Lien by Judge Sferrazza of 12/21/11...which was definitely not a

'consent Order' and which the transcript and record make clear Coughlin in no way consent-

ed to) were not included in the appeal in 03628. As such, the voluminous attorney fee billingentries related thereto (impermissibly obscured somewhat by the excessive redacting of entries

in the allegedely detailed bills, where no legitimate privilege was ever asserted or proved to


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justify such obstructionist tactics...which now become of material relevance to the extent that

Baker, in his sworn testimony on 6/18/12 admitted to interactions with the WCSO Civil Divi-sion on 10/28/11, and that Hill's law office definitely r eli edupon the Reno Justice Court to

transmit the various eviction Orders to the Sheriff's Office for processing. The specter of both

the 10/25/11 and 10/27/11 eviction Orders here being void or stale where violative of the statu-

tory dictate that such an Order included language (and neither Order herein did) ordering theSheriff to remove from the premises within 24 hours or receipt (apparently theSheri ff' s

receipt of such Order...though several counties in Nevada apparently view the relevant language inNRS 40.253 as applying to thetenant'sreceipt, and, accordingly, have policies which require theSheriff or constable to post to a tenant's door such an Order, then allow at least 24 hours to pass

before conducting any such lockout.

One thing that certainly is interesting is that the eviction Order the WCSO posted to the

door of Coughlin's former home law office on 11/1/11 lacked any fax header (in contrast to all

other such eviction orders Coughlin had seen posted and Baker's testimony on 6/18/12 that theRJC was responsible for transmitting such an eviction Order, though its not clear that Baker

did not first fax the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE that the RJC faxed to him (as shown in the attach-

ments to Hill's TPO application of 1/12/12 against Coughlin) at 4:41pm to the WCSO alongwith the Order of 10/27/11 granting Baker's unnoticed Emergency Motion to Inspect Cough-lin's former home law office during the weekend during which, apparently, Coughlin was ex-

pected to recover for a grueling six weeks of litigating, and hire movers and rent trucks to move

both a home and a law office, even where the RJC was still retaining the $2,275 in rent es-

crow that it demanded from Coughlin in the 10/13/11 Order in violation of Nevada law? Post-ed with the 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE on 11/1/11 by WCSO Deputy Machen was just that 10/27/11

Order allowing such an inspection, though that Order, curiously, did have two fax headers atop

it (one indicating the RJC faxed Hill's law office that inspection Order at 4:39 pm on

10/27/11), and a second header indicating the WCSO Civil Division received a fax nearly im-mediately thereafter from Hill's office that transmitted the inspection Order (with RJC fax

header freshly printed thereon) to the WCSO Civil Division....What it not clear is why the RJC,WCDA, WCSO Civil Division, Hill, and Baker are so reticient, and, some might say obstruction-

istabout responding to Coughlin's various requests (including NRS 239 Open Records Requests)seeking documentation related to and copies of the fax logs of the RJC for the relevant time periodinvolved here, especially considering Baker's sworn testimony at the criminal trespass trial of Cough-lin on 6/18/12 relative to just how sucheviction Orders were received by the WCSO Civil Divi-sion, and just what means of transmitting those Orders was utilized.

The law is unclear in Nevada and this is a matter of legitimate public concern involving boththe safety of law enforcement and tenants, but also the enormous social costs of ill advisedly carriedout summaryeviction lockouts that are bound to resultin consequential damages far exceeded the rel-atively small sum of money landlord's would save by having such lockouts done even one day earlierthan current usual custom and practices (to quote Hill's statement of the state of the law therein) ofthe Washoe County Sheriff's Office. The judiciary has an obligation here as well as nearly a ll judi-cial campaigns in Washoe County (particulary those at the Justice Court level) openly tout the en-dorsement of a myriad of local law enforcement organizations (though, never, any that espouse ten-ants rights or civil rights in general). Is there a Lawyer's Protection Association to mirror the Po-lice Protective Association that nearly all successful judicial candidates in Washoe County so openlyflaunt having the endorsement of? Does that encourage the rampant Soldal v. Cook Co., style depri-vation of 42 USC Sec. 1983 rights that is evinced in the 15 or so wrongful summaryeviction Cough-


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lin has been subjected to since the initial wrongful 8/20/11 arrest and seven day incarceration occur-ring while aneviction notice was placed on his former home law office's door just two months afterhis domestic partner of four years absconded with two months of his rental contributions, secretely,failed to pay one month of her own (though she did obtain, arguably, assent from the landlord to anarrangement whereby any joint obligation thereto of Coughlin's was absolved with respect to one to

two months Ulloa's rental shares...), where Coughlin then could not afford his anti-depressants orADHD medications starting on or about August 2nd, 2011 (an also where an appointment with hispyschiatrist, Dr. Yasar, had to be cancelled due to his not being able to afford the office visit, andwhere NNAHMS indicated it would never cover ADHD medications, and that Coughlin would not be

permitted to have MDD medications covered where taking such ADHD medications, upon Coughlinconfidentially inquiring as to such matters with NNAHMS).

In contrast to allegedly billing up $42,050 in addressing Coughlin's allegations (its notclear that the misconduct of Hill and Baker and their damage self interested damage control in-

stincts are an appropriate basis for racking of billable hours to charge Merliss or to later seek(in a procedural violation of their own, given the dictates against seeking post-judgment at-

torney fee sanctions, particularly where no attempt to comply with the 21 day safe harbor re-

quirements in NRCP 11 where ever made by Hill or Baker) an award of such attorney's fees

What is most striking is the utter lack of specifics from either B aker, Hill, or Judge

Flanagan as to just which positions taken or arguments made by Coughlin evince any sort of

frivolity or why...Further, Hill and Baker themselves clearly conducted no novel legal research

in this matter, aside from citing to Anvui and the then recent CG Wallace case, and theydemonstrate any utter paucity of insight into landlord tenant law and summary evictions in

particular, which are, as the CG Wallace case points out, truly rare species in the law, having

unto themselves and entirely unique set of considerations and procedures.DD) RPC 3.4(c) states "A lawyer shall not:(k)nowinglydisobey an obligation under the

rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation

exists."The certified audio transcript Coughlin purchased from the RMC of the Trial reveals Cough-lin openly declaring to Judge Howard, following the Court issuing Coughlin a contempt warning ascant five minutes into the trial, just such an open refusal where Coughlin is heard addressing the

Court as follows: I am not going to be bullied out of my rights. 7:24 mark.ii

(EE) Therecord clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin has a clear

and continuing pattern of knowingly ignoring and disobeying instructionsfrom the

Court. Instructions or suggestions like those made on 3/12/09 by Judge L. Gardner are different

thanobligations. Further, Coughlin's former supervisor at WLS, Elcano, admitted to having instilledCoughlin with the teaching that when you walk into that courtroom, its not the judges courtroom, itsnot opposing counsel's courtroom, its YOUR courtroom.iii T115:22

(FF) IN HIS ORDER OF CONTEMPT, JUDGE HOWARD FOUND THAT COUGHLIN REFUSED TO OBEYDIRECTIVES OF THE JUDGE AND CONTINUED LINES OF QUESTIONING AFTER BEING INSTRUCTED TO RE-FRAIN FROM DOING SO. SUPRA4 THERE IS A MATERIAL MISSTATEMENT OF HOWARD'S ORDER IN THE

FOFCOL WHERE IT READS: THE JUDGE FOUNDCOUGHLIN 'S CONDUCT TO BE DISORDERLY AND

WAS EITHER CONTEMPTUOUS OR BEHAVIOR INSOLENT TOWARD THE JUDGE IN THAT

COUGHLIN REFUSED:"... to obey directives of the Judge, continuing lines of inquiry after beingadvised by the Court to refrain from doing so; demeaning the Court with


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5 10 13 0204 cr12-2025 motion for extension of time to file brief and to strike rjc's roa and quasi...

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