4th batch criminal review cases

8/12/2019 4th Batch Criminal Review Cases

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200030 : April 18, 2012]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NELSONBAYOT Y SATINA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.R E S O L U T I O N

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification theDecision[2] dated 31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofKabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, inCriminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committedagainst AAA,[3] thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion

perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity fromP40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moraldamages in the amount of P50,000.00.cralaw

Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in anInformation[4] dated 29 December 1997, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality ofXXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named [appellant], by means of force, violenceand intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously havecarnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old,against her will.[5]On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trialon the merits ensued thereafter.

In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rapeand sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay AAAthe amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant,the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal was simpleand straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appearedto be no inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAAs declaration that she

was raped by appellant was corroborated by a medical certificate showingcontusion on her vagina at 6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice, which wasexplained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginalintrusion. The RTC negates the sweet heart defense offered by appellant.It stated that appellants claim of being AAAs lover was a mere devise toextricate himself from the consequence of his dastardly lust. AAAsimmediate response of reporting the rape incident carries the stamp of truth.Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between appellant and

AAA, the latter would not have pursued this case. It bears stressing thatdespite appellants repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA remainedsteadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood.[6]

Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court byfiling a Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.[7] In light, however, of this

Courts pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8]the case was transferred to theCourt of Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution[9] dated 4 October2004.

In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellantsconviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity fromP40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of

AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed thatthe prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellantcommitted the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other than theself-serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; noother evidence was ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even thetestimony of appellants daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA aremaintaining an illicit relationship, could not be given any considerable

weight. Aside from the fact that appellants daughter could not point to anyother circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident when sheallegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance attheir barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped of bias andpartiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same way,her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexualintercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the timeof the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in aposition to state with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of AAA.Hence, her testimony regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of fact.[10]

However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,[11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, PenalSuperintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appealsthat appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004.

Attached in his letter is the original copy of appellants Certificate of Death.

[12]

Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf ofappellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Noticeof Appeal[13] dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Courtof Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appealsalso directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entirerecords of the case to this Court.

Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine itseffect to this present appeal.

Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appealbefore the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the

crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arisingfrom or based on said crime.[15]

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically providesthe effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. Itreads thus:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liabilityis totally extinguished:

By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as topecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when thedeath of the offender occurs before final judgment; [Emphasissupplied].

1.

Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,[16] which


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was cited in a catena of cases,[17] had laid down the following guidelines:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguisheshis criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of theaccused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability andonly the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on theoffense committed,i.e., civil liability ex delictoin senso strictiore.

1.

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding thedeath of [the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on asource of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Codeenumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civilliability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Lawb) Contractsc) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x xe) Quasi-delicts

2.

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, anaction for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filinga separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985

Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil actionmay be enforced either against the executor/administrator or theestate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation uponwhich the same is based as explained above.

3.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of hisright to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases whereduring the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to itsextinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith thecivil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liabilityis deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privationof right by prescription.[18]

4.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appealof his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civilliability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action isextinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as theaccused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability exdelictois ipso factoextinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.[19]Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olacoand People v.Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal.

Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had beenrendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellantwas guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because evenassuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto,these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People v.Bayotas.In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant guilty of the

crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to payAAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages hadbecome ineffectual.cralaw

WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, theDecision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C.No. 00269 is SET ASIDEand Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC ofKabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.


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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 141718 January 21, 2005

BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs.

HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, as the Presiding Judge, Regional TrialCourt of Angeles City, Branch 56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, asthe City Jail Warden of Angeles City,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on January 31, 2000.1

The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simpleseduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of

Angeles City, Branch 3.

During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner,submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to thepetitioners constant absence at hearings.

On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense chargedand was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arrestomayor.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in totothedecision of the Municipal Trial Court.

On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision inthe court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did notappear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that heno longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed toappear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an orderdirecting the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court andan order of arrest against the petitioner.2

Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner wasapprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24,2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RegionalTrial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief ofPolice of Mabalacat, Pampanga.3Petitioner contended that his arrest wasillegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayorprescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised PenalCode, and

(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence foralmost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totallyextinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code.4

After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000,

petitioner filed an Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleadingherein respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City,as respondent.5

In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners detention was pursuantto the order of commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk ofCourt III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January25, 2000.6

On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the

subject of this present appeal, which pronounced:The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that thepenalty imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had alreadyprescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the RevisedPenal Code:

"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the datewhen the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall beinterrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go tosome foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, orshould commit another crime before the expiration of the period ofprescription.

The elements of prescription are:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;

2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escapingduring the term of his sentence;

3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not givenhimself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with whichwe have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime;

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from thedate of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the

service of sentence is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not servedthe penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the service of thesentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No.85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the dateset for the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed toappear and remained at large.1a\^/phi1.net

"There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, becausesuch evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentenceconsisting in deprivation of liberty." (Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92Phil. 310).

Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliancewith the Order of Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for

"A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting andsentencing the defendant in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the


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legality of his detention, unless it appears that the court which pronouncedthe judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it." (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil90, 24 J.F. 94, Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).

WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for awrit of habeas corpus is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles City, January 31, 2000.7

From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for reviewon a question purely of law and raised the following issue:

HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE "SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THEDATE WHEN THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OFSENTENCE" IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THECOMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BECONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?8

Petitioner claims that:

xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of theRevised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of

conviction becomes final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, anddodges arrest for him to serve sentence.9

Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:

The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 rulingrendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitionermost respectfully submits, not good case law. It imposes upon the convict acondition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit, nature or essence ofprescription of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the lawto abuse by government.

THE INFANTE RULINGIMPOSES A CONDITION NOT STATED IN THELAW.

It appears that the Infante rulingimposes that, as an essential element, theconvict must serve at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years ofhis jail sentence and then escapes before the computation of prescription ofpenalties begins to run. This, petitioner respectfully submits is not a conditionstated in Article 93, which states that, the prescription of penalties "shallcommence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service ofsentence."

There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service ofsentence sets in when the judgment of conviction becomes final.

The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase "should evade theservice of sentence."When does the period of prescription of penalties beginto run? The Infante ruling construes this to mean that the convict must

escape from jail "because such evasion presupposes escaping during theservice of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty."

Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention ofthe law, then the phrase "should evade the service of sentence" in Article 93would have read: "should escape during the service of the sentenceconsisting in deprivation of liberty." The legislature could have very easilywritten Article 93 to read this way

"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the datewhen the culprit should escape during the service of the sentenceconsisting in deprivation of liberty,and it shall be interrupted if thedefendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign

country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or shouldcommit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription."

But they did not.

The legislature wrote "should evade the service of sentence" to cover orinclude convicts like him who, although convicted by final judgment, werenever arrested or apprehended by government for the service of theirsentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner wasable to successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence forat least nine (9) years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This isapproximately 3 years and 5 months longer than the 5-year prescriptiveperiod of the penalty imposed on him.

That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial

at the Municipal Trial Court and the promulgation of his judgment ofconviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His bond for provisionalrelease was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issuedagainst petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgmentof conviction was promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioners arrestwas issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III.

The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him toserve his sentence began on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive periodof his arresto mayorpenalty also began to run on that day considering thatno relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]orwas [he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of hissentence nor did he flee to some foreign country with which [our] governmenthas no extradition treaty, that 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty rancontinuously from August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was

promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.

For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, foralmost nine (9) years, to arrest petitioner for the service of his arrestomayor sentence [which] should not be taken against petitioner. He was ableto successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to totalextinction of his criminal liability.

To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penaltynever began to run in favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jailduring the service of his sentence imposes a condition not written in the law.It also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are construedliberally in favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spiritbehind or essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminalcases.10


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The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v.Warden11. In said case, Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder andwas sentenced to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusiontemporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he wasgranted a conditional pardon. The condition was that "he shall not againviolate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Ten years after his releaseon conditional pardon, Infante was found guilty by a Municipal Court fordriving without a license. Infante was immediately ordered rearrested forbreach of the condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante inhis petition,

xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had beenrecommitted to jail one year and 11 days had prescribed. xxx 12

The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:

The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised PenalCode the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the datewhen the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident fromthis provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element ofprescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there hadbeen one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be theevasion of the unserved sentence, and computation could not have startedearlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.13

A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Wardenreveals that it is not on all fourswith the present case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon whenhe was re-arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the Statereleased him. In the present case, the convict evaded service of sentencefrom the start, and was arrested eight years later.

The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicabledecisions of this Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93of the Revised Penal Code14has been interpreted several times by theCourt.

The case of Tanega v. Masakayan15falls squarely within the issues of thepresent case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on theday of the execution of her sentence.1awphi1.nt On the same day,respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested.

More than a year later, petitioner through counsel moved to quash thewarrant of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitionerclaimed that she was convicted for a light offense and since light offensesprescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The Courtdisagreed, thus:

xxx The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93provides "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit shouldevade the service of his sentence". What then is the concept of evasion ofservice of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes theready answer. Says Article 157:

"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty ofprisioncorreccionalin its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon anyconvict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the termof his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convictby final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists indeprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escapingduring the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express termsof the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping duringthe term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escapeshould take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions ofthe second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such"evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, bybreaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks,false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivancewith other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasionof sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

xxx

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposedby final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during theterm of such imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentencedto imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never placed inconfinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.16

In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo17, the Court cited and reiterated Tanega.

Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the1978 Election Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyondreasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence ofimprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal theCourt of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During theexecution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. Thepresiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond.Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed a motionto quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed uponhim had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. DelCastillo, on a petition for certiorarito the Court of Appeals, questioned thedenial by the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lackof merit. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raisedthe matter to this Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo and afterquoting the ratio decidendiof the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:

The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the rulingof this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al.,where we declared that, forprescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, theculprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.1a\^/phi1.net

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compellingreason to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in theTanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription ofpenalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence torun from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to

Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be

committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment byescaping during the term of his sentence.


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As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlanceand for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawfuldeparture of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has notbeen committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, evenbefore the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already inhiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he hasceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in courtfor the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become

a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving.Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused toanswer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewardedtherefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settledjurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation butcorrectly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placedin confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.18l^vvphi1.net

Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that theprescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code,applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are servingsentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescriptionof penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by

escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffereddeprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as aconsequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of hisservice, the period for prescription never began.

Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two monthsand one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he isbeing detained for another offense or charge.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,Branch 56 is AFFIRMED, but petitioner is ordered released effectiveimmediately for having fully served his sentence unless he is detained foranother offense or charge.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143380. April 11, 2005]

OLIMPIO PANGONOROM and METRO MANILA TRANSITCORPORATION,petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1]to annul the Decision[2]dated 29November 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764, as wellas its Resolution[3]dated 5 May 2000 denying the motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed in totothe 5 February 1993Decision[4]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 in CriminalCase No. Q-90-11397.

The Charge

On 21 March 1990, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosario U. Barias filed anInformation charging Olimpio Pangonorom (Olimpio) with recklessimprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple slight physicalinjuries, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,being then the driver and person in charge of a motor vehicle (MMTC-passenger bus) with plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89, did, then and thereunlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same along E. delos Santos Ave., Quezon Avenue this City, in a careless, reckless andimprudent manner, by then and there driving the same without due regard to

traffic laws and regulations and without taking the necessary precautions toprevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such

carelessness, recklessness and imprudence said motor vehicle so driven byhim to strike and collide with an [I]suzu [G]emini car with plate No. NAR-865L Pil. 89, belonging to Mary Berba and driven by Carlos Berba y Remulla,thereby causing damages in the total amount of P42,600.00, PhilippineCurrency; as a consequence thereof said Carlos Berba sustained physicalinjuries for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him fromperforming his customary labor for the same period of time and also hispassengers namely: Mary Berba y Matti and Amelia Berba y Mendozasustained physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9) days andincapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the sameperiod of time, thereafter, abandoned said offended parties without aidingthem, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in suchamount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Arraignment and Plea

When arraigned on 26 June 1990, Olimpio, with the assistance ofcounsel, entered a plea of not guilty.[6]

The Trial

The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Carlos R. Berba; (2) MaryM. Berba; (3) Amelia Berba; (4) Edward Campos; and (5) Enrico B.Estupigan.

On the other hand, the defense presented three witnesses: (1) Olimpiohimself; (2) Milagros Garbo; and (3) Nenita Amado.

The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:

The evidence of the prosecution shows that on July 10, 1989 at around 9:00P.M. Carlos R. Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car bearing Plate No.NAR-865 L Pil. 89 belonging to his mother Mary Berba. With him inside thecar were his mother Mary Berba who was seated in front beside him and hisauntie Amelia Berba who was at the back seat. They were cruising alongEDSA coming from the direction of Makati and headed towards theintersection of EDSA and Quezon Boulevard but upon nearing 680

Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car was bumped from behind byMMTC Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89 driven byherein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their carwhich was estimated at P42,600.00 (Exhs. F, F-1). The front and rearportions of their car incurred damages because by reason of the strong

impact at the rear portion of their car, it was pushed forward and bumped thecar in front of it, then it rested near the island. The bus driven by the accused


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still travelled a distance of 20 meters from the point of impact. The accusedleft his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio Pangonorom. Theircar was a total wreck as shown in its photographs (Exhs. B and C).

Carlos Berba noticed this bus following them closely at Nepa Q-Mart up tothe point of collision. His car was running along the second lane of EDSAfrom the island. The MMTC bus driven by the accused was running veryfast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the second lane andbumped his car. Carlos Berba sustained cuts on his shoulder and backbecause of broken glasses and was treated at East Avenue Medical Center.He incurred P1,000.00 for medication (Exhs. G to G-3). Mary Berbasustained contusion, hematoma and abrasion (Exh. H). Amelia Berbasustained abrasion on his right elbow (Exh. K). Both were also treated atEast Avenue Medical Center.

Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, passengers of MMTC Busdriven by the accused explained that their bus was running at 70-80 kphwhen it swerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side ofthe island but in the process it hit and bumped an Isuzu Gemini car in front ofit. The rear portion of the Isuzu Gemini car was smashed and the front partwas also damaged as it hit the Lancer car running ahead. The bus driver,herein accused, fled from the scene.

It was a rainy day, road was slippery, the rain had just stopped but was stilldrizzling.

The defense on the other hand presented accused Olimpio Pangonorom,Milagros Garbo, Nenita Amado and documents marked as Exhs. 1 to 15 withsub-markings.

Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a driver since 1976,having worked as a truck driver in Mindanao, then employed as driver ofSilangan Transit up to 1981 and from 1981 up to the present is a driver ofMetro Manila Transit. He is a holder of professional drivers license with ORNo. 15160307 (Exhs. 1, 1-A). On July 10, 1989 he drove MMTC bus fromMonumento to Baclaran and vice-versa. He was driving MMTC bus between7:00 8:00 P.M. along EDSA headed towards Monumento when uponreaching infront of 680 Appliances his bus was involved in a vehicularaccident. It was drizzling, his bus was running at a speed of 70 kph alongthe third lane of EDSA going to Monumento and an Isuzu Gemini car ahead

of him was on his left side running along the second lane of EDSA at adistance of 30 meters away. When the car was at a distance of 20 metersaway and before reaching the stalled vehicle, it swerved to the right withoutsignal light, so he blew his horn, stepped on his brakes, but since the streetwas downgrade, it was raining and slippery, his brakes failed to control hisbus, thus hit and bumped the Isuzu Gemini car. He identified the IsuzuGemini car and damages sustained by the car in the photograph marked asExh. C. His bus slided after he applied his brakes because the street wasslippery. He reported at their garage after the accident, left his vehicle andwent back at the scene with a wrecker. The passengers of the Isuzu carwere brought to the hospital.

The training officer of MMTC, Milagros Garbo, testified on the procedure ofthe company in hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to besubmitted by the applicant. An applicant for a driver of MMTC as what hadbeen done to the accused before he was admitted as company driver ofMMTC must pass an interview, seminars, written examination, actual driving

test, psycho-physical test, road test, line familiarization test, defensive drivingseminar, drivers familiarization seminar, and traffic rules and environmentseminar. Documents they required to be submitted by an applicant driverwere NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional Drivers License,and Official Receipts of payment of required fees for drivers license (Exhs. 1to 15).

The internal control relative to the supervision of their drivers was explainedby witness Nenita Amado, a transport supervisor of MMTC. She supervisesand gives instructions and recommendations on bus rules and regulations totheir drivers. They have ten (10) comptrollers, thirty-six (36) dispatchers,seven (7) field supervisors, sixty (60) inspectors and four (4) servicewreckers who helped in the supervision of the drivers and conductors ofMMTC. They have centralized radio that monitor the activities of their driversduring their travel. Her instructions to the drivers were to avoid accident,obey traffic rules and regulations and to be courteous to passengers.[7]

On 5 February 1993, the trial court rendered its Decision with thefollowing dispositive portion:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Olimpio Pangonoromguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resultingin multiple slight physical injuries and sentences him to suffer animprisonment of thirty (30) days of arrestomenor, to indemnify the offendedparties of the damages incurred by their Isuzu Gemini car in the sum

of P42,600.00 and to reimburse the medical expenses of Carlos R. Berba inthe sum of P182.50, Amelia Berba in the sum of P217.50 and Mary Berba inthe sum of P45.00.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.[9]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that the finding that Olimpio drove thepassenger bus in a negligent manner, considering the circumstances ofweather and road condition, is a finding of fact of the trial court that is entitledto respect. The Court of Appeals stated that it is a settled rule that factualfindings of trial courts are accorded great respect unless it can be shown thatthey overlooked some circumstances of substance which, if considered, willprobably alter the result. The Court of Appeals held that no suchcircumstance was overlooked in this case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that even if it were true, as Olimpio claimed,that the car Carlos Berba (Carlos) was then driving occupied Olimpios lanewhile the car was 20 meters away, it is a safe distance for a vehicle to switchlanes. The Court of Appeals held that if only Olimpio did not drive very fastand considered that the street was downgrade and slippery, he could haveeasily avoided the accident by applying his brakes.


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The Court of Appeals also ruled that the testimonies of Edward Campos(Edward) and Enrico Bantigue, who were passengers of the MMTC bus,are worthy of credence. The Court of Appeals stated that they are neutralwitnesses who had no motive to testify against Olimpio. They testified that:(1) the MMTC bus was running at 70-80 kilometers per hour; (2) the busswerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side of theisland; and (3) in the process, the bus hit and bumped the Gemini car aheadof it. Edward further testified that Olimpio earlier overtook another bus.Edward stated that it was for this reason that the MMTC bus went into thelane where the stalled van was located. The Court of Appeals held that theMMTC bus was the one switching lanes.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED intoto.

SO ORDERED.[10]

On 28 December 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals amotion for reconsideration of the assailed decision. Petitioners asserted thatthe Court of Appeals erred in finding Olimpio negligent in driving the subjectbus. Petitioners also asserted that Carlos was the one switching lanes andwas therefore the one negligent in driving his car. Petitioners stated that the

Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the MMTC was not subsidiarilyliable for Olimpios civil liability in the instant case. Petitioners stated that thetestimonies of witnesses Milagros Garbo and Nenita Amado, as well asExhibits 1 to 15, proved that the MMTC exercised due diligence in theselection and supervision of its drivers.[11]

On 5 May 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[12]denyingthe motion for reconsideration. With the assailed decision having amplydiscussed, considered and ruled upon the issues that petitioners raised intheir motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held that there was nocogent reason for it to reverse the assailed decision. The Court of Appealsalso held that the MMTC was already estopped in assailing the trial courtsdecision considering that the MMTC never appealed the decision within thereglementary period.

The Issues

Petitioners have presented the following for our consideration:

1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustainingthe trial courts findings of facts instead of considering certainfacts and circumstance raised by petitioners that properly castan element of reasonable doubt.

2. Whether Estoppel applies to MMTC.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for reviewand the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in theappealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based ongrounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[14]

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for having sustained the trialcourts findings of fact. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals failed toconsider certain circumstances that would warrant a reversal of the factualfindings of the trial court.

Petitioners claim that Carlos negligence in switching lanes to avoidhitting a stranded van caused the collision. Petitioners assert that Carloswas negligent because he transferred to the lane where Olimpio was thendriving along without first blinking his signal light and with his car only 20meters away from the bus. This being so, petitioners assert that they shouldnot be held responsible for Carlos negligence.

Petitioners assertions have no merit. The issue of whether a person isnegligent is a question of fact.[15]Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,when they affirm the findings of fact of the trial court, are binding on thisCourt, unless the findings of the trial and appellate courts are palpablyunsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is basedon misapprehension of facts.[16]We hold that the Court of Appeals committedno reversible error in upholding the factual findings of the trial court.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudenceconsists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act fromwhich material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking intoconsideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree ofintelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regardingpersons, time and place.

Olimpio is a professional driver who has been in the employ of theMMTC since 1984.[17]As a public utility driver, Olimpio should have as hisprimary concern the safety not only of himself or of his passengers, but, alsothe safety of his fellow motorists. Considering that it had just rained, it wasstill drizzling and the road was slippery when the subject incident took place,[18]Olimpio should have been more cautious and prudent in driving hispassenger bus.

Based on Olimpios testimonial admission, he was driving at 70kilometers per hour. He testified he was familiar with the road.[19]Therefore,he ought to have known the downhill slope coming from the Nepa-Q Mart.[20]As the bus was moving downhill, Olimpio should have slowed down since

a downhill drive would naturally cause his vehicle to accelerate. However,instead of slowing down, Olimpio admitted he was running very fast. Thus,


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Olimpio testified:

Atty. ANTONIO:

Q It was nighttime Mr. Witness, will you tell us whether youwere able to see this vehicle you were following?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell us how did you notice this vehicle?

A Because I saw its tail light, sir.

Q Before this vehicle you were following reached the placewhere this stalled vehicle was, do you know where was thisvehicle proceeded?

FISCAL:

I think he is incompetent, Your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.

Atty. ANTONIO:

Q Before your vehicle reached the place where this stalledvehicle was, what did you notice if any?

A I noticed that the vehicle I was following Isuzu Gemini beforereaching the stalled vehicle suddenly swerved to the rightand I was already approaching, sir.

Q Before this Isuzu Gemini car you were following suddenlyswerved to the right, how far were you?

A About twenty (20) meters, sir. It suddenly swerved to the rightand I was running very fastbecause it was downward.

Q And when you noticed this Isuzu Gemini suddenly swerved tothe right, what if any did you do?

A I blew my horn and stepped on my brakes, sir. Consideringthat it was raining and slippery I cannot control.

Q And after your were not able to control your vehicle despitethe precaution you made, what happened?

A I bumped him, sir.[21](Emphasis supplied)

The only conclusion that we can draw from the factual circumstances isthat Olimpio was negligent. He was hurrying to his destination and driving

faster than he should have. The fact that after Olimpio stepped on the brake,the bus still traveled a distance of 20 meters before it finally stopped, and the

car, after it was hit, was thrown 10 to 15 meters away, [22]only prove thatOlimpios bus was running very fast.

Olimpios claim that Carlos suddenly transferred to his lane to avoidhitting a van stranded at the left side of the island could hardly carry the dayfor him. Olimpio says that the distance between the car and the bus beforethe car allegedly swerved to the bus lane was 20 meters. Therefore, at thatpoint, Olimpio still had the opportunity to avoid the collision by slowing downor by stepping on the brake. However, what Olimpio did was to continuerunning very fast.

Another telling proof of Olimpios negligence is the testimony of Edward,a passenger of the MMTC bus who was seated at the right front seat nearestto the door of the bus.[23] Edward recounted the incident, thus:

Q You said that there was a van parked which the MetroManila Transit tried to avoid. Where was that van parked?

A It was stranded above the middle island of the road, sir.

COURT:

Q When you said of the road you are referring to EDSA?

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL:

Q So when it swerved to avoid hitting the parked van, what happened?

A It was too late, sir, when he noticed that there was a carslowly cruising EDSA so when he swerved he was veryfast so it was too late to avoid the car. He just braked, theroad was slippery so he could not swerve because the busmight turn over.

x x x

Q Mr. Witness, did you notice this stalled vehicle before youreached the place where it was stalled?

A No, sir.

Q Even when the lights of the Metro Manila Transit were on,you did not notice it?

A Actually, sir, he was overtaking another bus so thats whyhe did not notice this stalled van.

Q Who was overtaking another bus?

A MMTC bus, sir, because it stopped at the MMC office nearTimog and then it overtook another moving bus. He went tothe left side overtaking that bus.


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x x x

Atty. ANTONIO:

Q Are you a driver?

A Yes, sir.

Q And if circumstances similar to that incident that happened, itwould be prudent for you to swerve also, is it not?

A At that condition, sir, Id rather brake than swerve, it is slippery.

Q Mr. Witness, will you tell how far was this MMTC bus when itswerved in relation to the place where the stalled vehiclewas?

A I guess, sir, it was a few seconds before too late becausewhen it swerved the bus was already tilting, so it is amatter of seconds.

Atty. ANTONIO:

Q It was a matter of seconds?

A Yes, sir.

Q So if you were in this position stopping would not be sufficientprecautionary measure, was it not?

A Before that, sir, he overtook that bus so if he did notovertake that bus he would have seen the parked van.Being a driver myself the way he overtook wasdangerous, it was so close that you could not see theother lane.

x x x

Q Will you please explain Mr. Witness, how this MMTC bus hitthe car when you claimed that the car was running ahead of

the bus?A There was this stalled van and there was this bus, now this

was the Gemini car, this slowed down to avoid also the stalledvan, it swerved so the bus was here running very fastandthen noticed the van so it swerved also and the Gemini herewas of course slowed down to avoid that van, the bus wasstill running fastthen after swerving it was too late for him tonotice that there was this car running slowly by the bus, hestepped on the brake.

Q Do you mean to say Mr. Witness, that both the Isuzu vehicleand the MMTC bus were running on the same course?

A Yes, sir.[24](Emphasis supplied).

Edwards declarations that the bus was running very fast and that

Olimpio did not see the stranded van because he earlier overtook anotherbus are clear and categorical. There is no evidence of any ill or impropermotive on Edwards part that would discredit his testimony. He was not inany way related to the complainants. Neither was the defense able to showthat some form of consideration induced Edward to testify for theprosecution. The defense did not even try to rebut Edwards testimony.

When there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated byimproper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witnessstand under solemn oath deserve full faith and credit.[25]

Petitioners likewise fault the Court of Appeals for having ruled that theMMTC is already estopped from assailing the trial courts decisionconsidering that the MMTC never appealed the same within thereglementary period.

We have carefully gone over the records of this case and found thatwhen petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 8 March1993, the MMTC already appealed the civil aspect of this case. We quotepetitioners Notice of Appeal:

The ACCUSED and his employer, Metro Manila Transit Corporation, by theirundersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully givenotice that they are appealing, as they hereby appeal, the Decision datedFebruary 5, 1993, which was received on February 23, 1993, to the Court of

Appeals on the ground that the Decision is contrary to the facts, law andsettled jurisprudence.

Metro Manila Transit Corporation likewise interposes an appeal with respectto the civil aspect of this case because of its subsidiary liability as employerof the accused under the Revised Penal Code.[26]

It is therefore not correct for the Court of Appeals to state in itsResolution[27]dated 5 May 2000 that the MMTC failed to appeal seasonablythe issue of its alleged non-subsidiary liability[28]as Olimpios employer.

However, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is

not a defense in the present case. The law involved in the present case isArticle 103 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100[29]and102[30]of the same Code, which reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liabilityestablished in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry forfelonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, oremployees in the discharge of their duties.

Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for theemployees civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidenceestablishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2)that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committedthe offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution againstthe employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[31]


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The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases towhich they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, thetrial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of theemployer.[32]

The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of theemployee in the criminal action.[33]In the present case, there exists anemployer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engagedin the transportation industry,[34]and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a

wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of hisduties.[35]However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. Thejudgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This beingso, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Onlyafter proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liabilityof his employer be enforced.[36]

In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing theemployers subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied becauseof insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time after the verdict ofconviction shall have become final. And even if it appearsprima faciethatexecution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against theemployer will not issue as a matter of course.[37]The procedure for the

enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment ofconviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ ofexecution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of hisinsolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against theMMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to holdthe MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee considering thatthere is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision dated 29November 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764 findingpetitioner Olimpio Pangonorom GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of recklessimprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries, as well as itsResolution dated 5 May 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, are

AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA,petitioner, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking thereversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,dated July 5, 2001,1as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the followingInformation against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as anumber of his men for Arbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometimesubsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram,

Samar, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons, whoare herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were armedwith firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENREmployees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave theplace, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and deprivingthem of their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three(3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8,

Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conductintelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with thegovernments campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed ofForester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest RangerRenato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon,Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team leader.The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 RufoCapoquian.3

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m.,where they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting withthe local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to acertain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at thetime, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.4

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two moreboats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar,


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between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus,Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boatand proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor

Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat forthe purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga.5

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of theirmission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor

Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha

Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamomakauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make youswim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont youknow that I can declare this a misencounter?)6Mayor Astorga then orderedsomeone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, orbetween 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of themdressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles,and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members.7At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission.8He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going tocontact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the teamswhereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simons radio,saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina konhain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig." (Its better if you have no radioso that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannotask for help).9Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon,adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay dirikamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it toSamar because I will not tolerate it here.)10Simon then asked Mayor

Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted thatthey would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead bebrought to Daram.11Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Konmagdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mgadagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop anakon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. Ifyou confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrendermine.)12Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave,which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, "Diri kamo

maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uroistorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We willhave many things to discuss there.)13

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would beserved dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others ata long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14After dinner,Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from thehouse, but not to leave the barangay.15On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco andthe rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finallyallowed to leave.161awphi1.nt

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against MayorAstorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he

pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.17At the trial, the prosecutionpresented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well astheir Joint Affidavit.18However, the presentation of Simons testimony wasnot completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to testify.Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint

Affidavit of Desistance.19

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing ofthe case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered findingaccused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, andin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonmentof four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)months of prision correctional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 200121whichwas denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28,2001.22A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123wasalso filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error forreview:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of ArbitraryDetention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised PenalCode, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse,notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5)complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitionersinnocence of the crime charged.25

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the requiredquantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused,26especially in light ofthe fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit ofDesistance.27Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case isthere any competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that

restraint was employed upon the persons of the team members.28Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the scenedoes not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilledin the minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feelcompelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,without legal grounds, detains a person.30The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was thenMayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary


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Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniablypresent.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that hisacts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted thathis acts were motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and the feelingthat he was being "singled out."32The detention was thus without legalgrounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actuallydetained.

In the case of People v. Acosta,33which involved the illegal detention of achild, we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite thelack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon thevictim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he waswarned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, hadreturned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leavebecause of his fear to violate such instruction.34

In the case of People v. Cortez,35we held that, in establishing the intent todeprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party bekept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time ofher rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to theowner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did

not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would makegood their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fearwas not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they hadearlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill himon sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render peopleimmobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats tokill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that thecurtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint uponthe victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can producesuch fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to theextent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements inaccordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intentsand purposes, detained against his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of theirpleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner togo home.37This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival ofalmost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, whoproceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants andthe witnesses.38Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1Capoquians statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgasorders.39It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evidenteffect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fearwas indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent thatthey felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent thedeparture of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private

complainants, suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of suchinstruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in

People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely anadditional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the soleconsideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstanceswhich, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as tothe truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted bythe judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.40Indeed, the belatedclaims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations thatthe incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team accededto Mayor Astorgas orders "out of respect," are belied by petitioners ownadmissions to the contrary.41The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the privatecomplainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material pointsalleged in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression ofthe lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case.1awphi1.nt This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs,which reads:

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity andimproving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other official ofDaram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be effectivelyimplemented through the support of the local officials for the betterment ofthe residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are muchdependent on government support.42

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence,pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1

Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one ofthe private complainants in the case.43He also makes much of the fact thatprosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to,and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused andthe DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their allegedconfrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2September 1997."44

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings areconclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some facts orcircumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,misapprehended or misinterpreted.45Nothing in the case at bar prompts usto deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is notone of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal lawnor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively

supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention.Furthermore, Mayor Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactlyprivy" to what transpired between Simon and himself is belied by theevidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when thelatter went to talk to petitioner.46He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threateningremarks.47He was with Simon when they were encircled by the men dressedin fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.48In sum, SPO1 Capoquianwitnessed all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of theteam at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact preventedfrom leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "whileaway the time" and take advantage of the purported hospitality of theaccused.49On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied thatthey were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor

Astorga and their departure early the following morning.50SPO1 Capoquiangave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the time between their


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dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning to"enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home.51

Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartialjudge", because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both asmagistrate and advocate when he propounded "very extensive clarificatoryquestions" on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, isnot an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions towitnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannotbe assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions were asked during thetrial.52

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of theRevised Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not exceededthree days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4)months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term to betaken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimumand medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day tofour (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing theindeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, toone (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto inhis concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunityenjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, andcalled for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed bygovernment officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of

American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effectduring the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule;continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japaneseregime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statutebooks of the free and sovereign Republic of the Philippines. Thisnotwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of saidprovisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have beeninstituted due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the

same government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time thatevery one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecutingofficers should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders thecomplaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 ofthe Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum suchwanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. Theresponsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detaineesright to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustifiedviolation of their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. TheDecision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5,2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer theindeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to

one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, isAFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC


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[G.R. NO. 137182. April 24, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDILA SILONGAN YLINANDANG, MACAPAGAL SILONGAN Y LINANDANG, AKMADAWAL Y LAGASI, TEDDY SILONGAN, ROLLY LAMALAN YSAMPOLNAK, SACARIA ALON Y PAMAALOY, JUMBRAHMANAP Y BANTOLINAY, RAMON PASAWILAN Y EDO,

MAYANGKANG SAGUILE, HADJI KUTANG OMAR, BASCOSILONGAN, MONGA ALON, OTENG SIILONGAN, BEDDOLAXAMANA, and FIFTY-FOUR (54)OTHERS KNOWN ONLY BYTHEIR ALIASES, AND OTHER JOHN DOES, accused,

ABDILA SILONGAN Y LINANDANG, MACAPAGAL SILONGAN YLINANDANG, AKMAD AWAL Y LAGASI, ROLLY LAMALAN YSAMPOLNAK, SACARIA ALON Y PAMAALOY, JUMBRAHMANAP Y BANTOLINAY, and RAMON PASAWILAN YEDO, appellants.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

For automatic review is the decision[1]dated January 18, 1999, of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.98-75208 convicting appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad

Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon Pasawilanof the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention[2]andsentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. The appellants were alsoordered to pay jointly and severally, Alexander Saldaa[3]and AmericoRejuso, Jr., indemnification damages of P50,000 each and moral damages ofP100,000 and P50,000, respectively.

The amended information,[4]under which the appellants have beentried and convicted, reads as follows:

That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of March 16, 1996, at SitioKamangga, Barangay Laguilayan, Municipality of Isulan, Province of SultanKudarat, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, thesaid accused, in the company with other unidentified persons, conspiring,confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there, willfully,unlawfully and feloniously kidnap ALEXANDER SALDANA, AMERICOREJUSO, JR., ERVIN TORMIS and VICTOR CINCO for the purpose ofdemanding ransom in the amount of Twelve Million Pesos (P 12,000,000.00),detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty up toSeptember 24, 1996.

CONTRARY TO LAW....

xxx

Upon arraignment,[5]all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.Subsequently, this Court issued a Resolution[6]on December 9, 1997,granting the request of the Secretary of Justice for a change of venue fromthe RTC, Branch 19, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, to any of the special crimescourt of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was raffled to the RTC, Branch103, Quezon City, and trial ensued.

The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to BarangayLaguilayan, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat with Americo[7]Rejuso,[8]Jr., ErvinTormis, and Victor Cinco to meet with a certain Macapagal Silongan aliasCommander Lambada.[9]They arrived in the morning and were able to talkto Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that were purportedly being soldby the latter.[10]During the meeting Macapagal told them that someone inhis family has just died and that he has to pick up an elder brother inCotabato City, hence, they had better transact business in the afternoon.[11]

In the afternoon, Alexanders group and Macapagal, with a certainTeddy Silongan and another person named Oteng[12]Silongan, traveled to

Cotabato City to fetch Macapagals brother.[13]Afterwards, the groupreturned to Isulan on Macapagals orders. At Isulan, Macapagal gaveadditional instructions to wait until dark allegedly because the funeralarrangements for his relative were not yet finished.[14]When the groupfinally got on their way, Macapagal ordered the driver to drive slowly towardsthe highway.[15]Oteng Silongan and his bodyguards alighted somewherealong the way.

Then around 7:30 p.m., as they headed to the highway, AlexanderSaldaa noticed that Macapagal Silongan was busy talking over his hand-held radio with someone. But because the conversation was in theMaguindanaoan dialect, he did not understand what was being said. At 8:30p.m., they neared the highway. Macapagal ordered the driver to stop.

Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his threecompanions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, tied up, and blindfolded.Macapagal and Teddy were also tied up and blindfolded, but nothing morewas done to them.[16]Alexander identified the appellants Oteng Silongan,

Akmad Awal,[17]Abdila Silongan alias Long Silongan,[18]and RollyLamalan as belonging to the group that abducted them.[19]He also pointedto an elder brother of Macapagal, alias Keddy, alias Wet, and an alias Ngunibas also belonging to the group.[20]

The four victims were taken to a mountain hideout in Maganoy,Maguindanao, where a certain Salik Karem, Hadji Kutang Omar aliasCommander Palito, and Jumbrah Manap met them.[21]Initially, the three

demanded fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000) from Alexander Saldaa forhis release, but the amount was eventually reduced to twelve million pesos


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after much haggling.[22]They made Alexander write a letter to his wife topay the ransom. The letter was hand-carried by a certain Armand Jafar, aliasDante, and two of the victims, Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco, who both latermanaged to escape.[23]No ransom was obtained so Commander Palito andJumbrah Manap sent other persons and one of the victims, Americo Rejuso,Jr., to renegotiate with Alexanders wife. No agreement was likewise reached.

Seven days later, Alexander Saldaa and Americo Rejuso, Jr., weretransferred to the town proper of Maganoy. Commander Palito, Jumbrah

Manap, Sacaria[24]

Alon alias Jack Moro,[25]Ramon Pasawilan,[26]guarded them. When the kidnappers learned that the military waslooking for Alexander, they returned to the mountain hideout and stayed therefor two weeks.[27]

At one time, Alexander Saldaa was made to stay at a river hideoutwhere a certain Commander Kugta held him and sheltered his abductors forat least a week.[28]There, Alexander saw Macapagal Silongan withJumbrah Manap and other armed men. These men brought Alexander toTalayan where he met Mayangkang Saguile. From Talayan, Mayangkang andhis men brought Alexander to Maitum, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, whereMayangkangs lair is located. Mayangkang made Alexander write moreletters[29]to the latters family. On several occasions, Mayangkang himselfwould write letters

[30]to Alexanders wife. Alexander personally was

detained in Kabuntalan for a total period of five (5)months and was keptconstantly guarded by armed men. Among his guards were the appellantsMacapagal Silongan, Abdila Silongan, Akmad Awal, and a certain BascoSilongan.[31]

On September 24, 1996, Mayangkang released Alexander Saldaa tothe military in exchange for a relative who was caught delivering a ransomnote to Alexanders family. However, only eight of the accused were broughtto trial, namely, Abdila, Macapagal, and Teddy, all surnamed Silongan,

Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and RamonPasawilan.

The prosecution presented Alexander Saldana; his wife, Carmelita

Saldaa, and a certain Major Parallag who was responsible for Alexandersrelease. Carmelita testified as to matters relayed to her by Americo Rejuso,Jr., and identified the ransom notes sent to her. Major Parallag, for his part,testified as to the operations undertaken by the military to effect the rescue of

Alexander.

In their defense, all the accused, except Macapagal and TeddySilongan, denied ever having met Alexander Saldaa and his three (3)companions much less having kidnapped them.[32]Additionally, all eight ofthe accused established that they came under the control of the governmentmilitary authorities when they surrendered as Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebels.[33]They claimthey voluntarily surrendered when a certain Perry Gonzales convinced themthat the government would grant them amnesty, pay for their guns, and give

them the items listed in their lists of demands.[34]

On the witness stand, appellant Macapagal Silongan admitted beingwith Alexanders group in the van when they were waylaid. But he deniesinvolvement in the kidnapping.[35]In fact he said when Alexander Saldaasaw him in the mountains, he was there specifically to beg MayangkangSaguile to release Alexander. He further claimed that he was also hogtied bythe armed men who blocked the van that evening of March 16, 1996. Hetestified that he was separated from Teddy Silongan and did not know whathappened to Teddy.[36]He admitted knowing Alexander Saldaa for fourmonths prior to March 16, 1996 because the latter asked for his help inlocating a plane that crashed in the mountains.[37]According to him,

Alexander Saldaa hired him to act as a guide in treasure hunting. Whenasked to give more information about the plane, Macapagal Silongan statedthat he saw it before he met Alexander, and that when he saw said plane ithad no more sidewalls. He added that many people have already seen theplane and that vines and mosses have grown about the plane because it hadbeen quite some time since it crashed.[38]

Appellant Teddy Silongan, for his part, testified that his cousinMacapagal Silongan contacted him so he could act as interpreter forMacapagal because Alexander could not speak Maguindanaoan andMacapagal does not understand any other language. He added that after thevan stopped, one of those who stopped the van opened its rear door andthen someone hit him with the butt of a gun rendering him unconscious.When he regained consciousness he found himself hogtied like Macapagal

but could not find Alexanders group or the van.[39]

All eight of the accused, except Akmad Awal, admitted having signedseparate extra-judicial confessions[40]admitting to their complicity in thekidnapping of Alexander Saldaa and his companions, but they asserted thatthey did not understand what they were signing.[41]Additionally, they assertthat they did not know or hire Atty. Plaridel Bohol III, the lawyer who appearsto have assisted them in making their confessions.[42]

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment[43]on January 18, 1999, thedecretal portion of which reads as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused:

1. ABDILA SILONGAN y Linandang;

2. MACAPAGAL SILONGAN y Linandang;

3. AKMAD AWAL y Lagasi;

4. ROLLY LAMALAN y Sampolnak;

5. SACARIA ALON y Pamaaloy;

6. JUMBRAH MANAP y Bantolinay; and

7. RAMON PASAWILAN y Edo


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GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime, hereincharged, of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined by law, and the said seven (7)accused are hereby sentenced to DEATH as provided for in Article 267 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.

On the civil aspect, the above-named seven (7) accused are hereby orderedjointly and severally to pay Alexander Saldana the sum of Fifty ThousandPesos (P50,000.00) as indemnification damages and One HundredThousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages; and to pay AmericoRejuso, Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnificationdamages