4663836 consti2digests for cases after midterms

7/29/2019 4663836 Consti2Digests for Cases After Midterms

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Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and Stateshall be inviolable.

Art III sec 5. No law shall be made respecting anestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoymentof religious profession and worship, withoutdiscrimination or preference, shall forever beallowed. No religious test shall be required for theexercise of civil or political rights.

Art VI sec 29(2).No public money or property

shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, orsupport of any sect, church, denomination,sectarian institution, or system of religion, or ofany priest, preacher, minister, other religiousteacher, or dignitary as such, except when suchpriest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assignedto the armed forces, or to any penal institution, orgovernment orphanage or leprosarium.

Establishment Clause

Justice Laurel1937

FACTS:

On May 1936, respondent announced inthe newspapers that he would order ofpostage stamps commemorating the 33rd

International Eucharistic Congress underAct No. 4052 (cited below)

Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay,Supreme Head of the Phil. IndependentChurch (Aglipayan), seeks a writ of

prohibition to prevent respondent Directorof Posts from issuing and selling postagestamps commemorative of the saidCongress.

o Petitioner alleges that respondentin issuing and selling the postagestamps violated the Constitutionalprovision on the principle ofseparation of church and state,specifically section 13, subsection3, Art. VI which says: No publicmoney or property shall everbe appropriated, applied, orused, directly or indirectly, forthe use, benefit, or support ofany sect, church,denomination or system ofreligion

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitutionin issuing and selling the postage stamps.

HELD: No constitutional infraction.

History of Separation of Church and State: our history, not to speak of the history

of mankind, has taught us that the union of

church and state is prejudicial to both, fooccasions might arise when the state will usethe church, and the church the state, as aweapon in the furtherance of their respectiveends and aims.

This principle was recognized in the MalolosConstitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, inthe instructions of McKinley to the PhilCommission and finally embodied in theConstitution as the supreme expression of theFilipino people.

Filipinos enjoy both civil and religious freedom guaranteed in the Consti

o What is guaranteed by our Constitutionis religious liberty, not merely religioustoleration.

Religious Freedom: Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate

is not inhibition of profound reverence foreligion and is not a denial of its influence inhuman affairs.

o Imploring the aid of DivineProvidence, in order to establish agovt that shall embody their idealsin the preamble of the Constitution.

General Concessions indiscriminately accordedto religious sects:

o Tax exemptions properties devotedexclusively to religious purposes

o Sectarian aid is not prohibited when apriest, preacher, etc. is assigned to thearmed forces, penal institutionorphanage or leprosarium.

o Optional religious instruction in publicschools is allowed by constitutionamandate, etc.

PRESENT CASE:

Act No. 4052, from which draws authority toissue and sell the stamps contemplates noreligious purpose, but gives the Director of thePosts the discretionary power to determinewhen the issuance of special postage stampswould be advantageous to the Government.

The present case was not inspired by anysectarian feeling to favor a particular religiousdenomination.

o The stamps were not issued for thebenefit of the Roman Catholic Churchnor were money derived from the saleof the stamps given to the church.

o Purpose of the stamps was to

advertise the Philippines and attractmore tourists to the country officials took advantage of aninternationally important event to givepublicity to the Philippines and itspeople.

The stamp as actually printedinstead of showing a CatholicChurch chalice as originallyplanned, contains a map of thePhilippines and the location othe City of Manila with the

Batch 2008A. 1

AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ


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inscription Seat XXXIIIInternational EucharisticCongress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.

What isemphasized is notthe Congress butManila, the capitalof the Philippines,as the seat of thatcongress.

o The propaganda resulting from the

issuance and sale of the staff mightredound to the benefit of theRoman Catholic Church but thiswas not the intention and is onlyincidental to the original purpose.

We are of the opinion thatthe Government should notbe embarrassed in itsactivities simply because ofincidental results, more orless religious in character,if the purpose had in viewis one which couldlegitimately be undertakenby appropriate legislation.

o There may have peen poorjudgment in issuing and selling thestamp but a gap still existsbetween that and theunconstitutionality of the issuanceand sale which was not filled by thepetitioner.

FACTS:

1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay counciladopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditionalsocio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April"of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, thepatron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) theacquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and(2) the construction of a waiting shed as thebarangay's projects. Funds for the two projectswould be obtained through the selling of ticketsand cash donations "

2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passedResolution No. 6 which specified that, inaccordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte,Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or

hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be thecaretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer andthat the image would remain in his residence forone year and until the election of his successor aschairman of the next feast day. It was furtherprovided in the resolution that the image would bemade available to the Catholic parish churchduring the celebration of the saint's feast day. Itwas ratified in a plebiscite.

3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations andcash donations of the barangay residents and

those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With thosefunds, the waiting shed was constructed and thewooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired inCebu City by the barangay council for four hundredpesos

4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placedin the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valenciaso that the devotees could worship the saint during themass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the masswhen the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea

refused to return that image to the barangay councion the pretext that it was the property of the churchbecause church funds were used for its acquisition.

5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, onthe occasion of his sermon during a mass, FatheOsmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks againstthe barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently inconnection with the disputed image. That incidentprovoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in thecity court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oradefamation.

6. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative

complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's officeand the Department of Local Government andCommunity Development on the grounds ofimmorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecominga public official and ignorance of the law.

7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferreremained in the Catholic church of Valencia. BecauseFather Osmea did not accede to the request oCabatingan to have custody of the image and"maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevincase against Father Osmea for the recovery of the

image

8. The replevin case was filed in the city court oOrmoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop CiprianoUrgel. After the barangay council had posted a cashbond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turnedover the image to the council ln his answer to thecomplaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionalityof the said resolutions.

9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, amember of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholiclaymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filedagainst the barangay council and its members(excluding two members) a complaint in the Court ofFirst Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulmentof the said resolutions (Their main argument was itprejudiced members of the Catholic Church becausethey could see the image in the church only once ayear or during the fiesta. )

10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints.

ISSUES

1) WON that the barangay council was not dulyconstituted because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the

Batch 2008A. 2

GARCES vs. ESTENZO


3/84

chairman of the kabataang barangay, wasnot allowed to participate in its sessions?NO

RATIO

In this case, Maago, the barangay youthchairman, was notified of the sessions of thebarangay council to be held on March 23 and 26,1976 but he was not able to attend those sessionsbecause he was working with a constructioncompany based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Maago'sabsence from the sessions of the barangay councildid not render the said resolutions void. There wasa quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

2) WON the resolutions contravene theconstitutional provisions that "no law shallbe made respecting an establishment ofreligion" and that "no public money orproperty shall ever be appropriated,applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly,for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,church, denomination, sectarian institution,or system of religion, or for the use,benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,

minister, or other religious teacher ordignitary as such. except when such priest,preacher, minister, or dignitary is assignedto the armed forces, or to any penalinstitution, or government orphanage orleprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO

Ratio

The wooden image was purchased in connectionwith the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoringthe patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not forthe purpose of favoring any religion nor interferingwith religious matters or the religious beliefs of the

barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiestawas the mass. Consequently, the image of thepatron saint had to be placed in the church whenthe mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal inholding a fiesta and having a patron saint for thebarrio, then any activity intended to facilitate theworship of the patron saint (such as the acquisitionand display of his image) cannot be branded asillegal.

The barangay council designated a layman as thecustodian of the wooden image in order to forestall

any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholicchurch. A more practical reason for thatarrangement would be that the image, if placed ina layman's custody, could easily be made availableto any family desiring to borrow the image inconnection with prayers and novenas.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of asaint's image. lt would never have arisen if theparties had been more diplomatic and tactful and ifFather Osmea had taken the trouble of causingcontributions to be solicited from his own

parishioners for the purchase ofanother image of SanVicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in questionbelongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claimthat it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangaycouncil, as owner of the image, has the right todetermine who should have custody thereof.

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give theimage to the Catholic church, that action would not

violate the Constitution because the image wasacquired withprivate funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recovepossession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves theexpenditure of public funds and which has somereligious tint is violative of the constitutional provisionsregarding separation of church and state, freedom ofworship and banning the use of public money oproperty.

(Lower Courts decision affirmed)

(1971)

This case was heard concurrently with two othersEarly v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso(1971). The cases involved controversies over laws inPennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, astatute provided financial support for teacher salariestextbooks, and instructional materials for secula

subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Islandstatute provided direct supplemental salary paymentsto teachers in non-public elementary schools. Eachstatute made aid available to "church-relatededucational institutions."

Question Presented

Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutesviolate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause bymaking state financial aid available to "church-relatededucational institutions"?

Conclusion

Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burgerarticulated a three-part test for laws dealing withreligious establishment. To be constitutional, a statutemust have "a secular legislative purpose," it must haveprincipal effects which neither advance nor inhibireligion, and it must not foster "an excessivegovernment entanglement with religion." The Courfound that the subsidization of parochial schoolsfurthered a process of religious inculcation, and thatthe "continuing state surveillance" necessary toenforce the specific provisions of the laws wouldinevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The

Batch 2008A. 3

LEMON vs. KURTZMAN


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Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy"divisive political potential" concerning legislationwhich appropriates support to religious schools.

FACTS:

This case is actually 2 cases involving two States,Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, lawswere enacted to provide aid for non-public schoolsand teachers. In both cases, the statutes werechallenged for being violitive of the firstamendment for creating an entanglement betweenchurch and state.

RHODE ISLAND STATUTE:

Purpose: Keeping the quality of nonpublicelementary schools.

Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salaryto nonpublic school teachers.

Qualifications: Teaching in a nonpublic schoolwhere average per-pupil expenditure on seculareducation is less than the average in the public

schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjectsand must not teach religion else lose the benefitsaccorded by the statute.

Background of schools:Nonpublic schools: 25% of the States

pupils. 95% went to RC schools.Teachers who applied: all come from these

RC schools.

PENNSYLVANIA:

Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due torising costs.

Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools onexpenditures for teachers salaries, textbooks andinstructional materials.

Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught inpublic schools. Also limited to secular subjects.Textbooks must be approved.

Background of schools:Nonpublic schools: 20% of States pupils.

96% attended RC schools.

ISSUE:WON the statutes enacted violated the firstamendment re: separation of Church and State,and are therefore unconstitutional.

HELD:Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode IslandStatute struck down, Pennsylvania caseremanded).

RATIO:

What is held to have been violated is the ReligionClauses of the First Amendment. In this, the courtstated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was toprotect against:

1) sponsorship2) financial support3) active involvement

It also stated 3 tests:

1) Statute must have a secular legislativepurpose

2) Principal or primary effect neitheadvances nor inhibits religion

3) Statute must not foster an excessivegovernment entanglement with religion

Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passedas the legislative intent/purpose is most definitelysecular. However, the court states that the cumulativeimpact of the entire relationship arising under thestatutes in each State involves excessiveentanglement between government and religion.

As the schools taken into are church schools, they are

seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholicfaith. As such, this substantial religious character givesrise to entangling church-state relationships. Alsoadding to the danger is the particular type of aid(though the case doesnt really say why). Also takeninto consideration is the teachers means of teachingThere is no way of ascertaining if the teachers wilinject a religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly isthe fact that the schools and their teachers are subjectto religious authority, and teachers are even told (inthe Handbook of School Regulations) to stimulateinterest in religious vocations and missionary work.

Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actuaentanglement that will be caused through theimplementation of the laws. Due to the need fosurveillance and controlling measures (as the Statemust run through applications to see who qualifies)there is created the entanglement that the Clauseprotects against. ...the very restrictions andsurveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play astrictly nonideological role gives rise toentanglements...

The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as itprovides direct financial aid to these schools.

Another consideration is the divisive political potentiaof the statutes. The court here stated that state

assistance will entail considerable political activity. Thisrefers to the division that will occur between those foand against state aid, thereby making it a politicastruggle. Here the state says that while political debateand division are normal, those predicated on religiouslines are what the First Amendment sought to protectthe country from.

The court ends by saying that while the tax exemptionchallenge fell to over 200 years of universal practicestate aid has no such support. Also, these statutescreate a direct entanglement, which was sought to beavoided. The constitution deems religion to be a

Batch 2008A. 4


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private matter, so the government must excludeitself from such an area.

(1968)Justice White

FACTS:

1.A law (701 of the Education Law) of New Yorkrequires local public school boards to purchasetextbooks and lend those textbooks free ofcharge to all students in grades seven through12; students attending private schools areincluded. The books loaned are "text-bookswhich are designated for use in any public,elementary or secondary schools of the state orare approved by any boards of education," andwhich "a pupil is required to use as a text for asemester or more in a particular class in theschool he legally attends."

2.Board of Education of Central School District No.

1 brought suit in the New York courts againstJames Allen because Allen would remove themembers of the Board from office if they fail tolend books to parochial school students. Themembers of the Board contend that the law wasinvalid.

3.The trial court held the law unconstitutional. TheNY Court of Appeals held that 701 was not inviolation of either the State or the FederalConstitution. The CA said that the law's purposewas to benefit all school children, regardless ofthe type of school they attended, and that onlytextbooks approved by public school authoritiescould be loaned. It considered 701 "completely

neutral with respect to religion, merely makingavailable secular textbooks at the request of theindividual student and asking no question aboutwhat school he attends." Board of Educationbrought the case to the US SC.

ISSUE:WoN the statute is a "law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1 st

and 14th Amendments to the Constitution,because it authorizes the loan of textbooks tostudents attending parochial schools.

DECISION:

The law is not in violation of theConstitution.

RATIO:

1. The language of 701 does not authorize theloan of religious books, and the State claimsno right to distribute religious literature.Although the books loaned are thoserequired by the parochial school for use inspecific courses, each book loaned must be

approved by the public school authorities; onlysecular books may receive approval.

2. The express purpose of 701 was stated by theNew York Legislature to be furtherance of theeducational opportunities available to the youngAppellants have shown us nothing about thenecessary effects of the statute that is contraryto its stated purpose. The law merely makesavailable to all children the benefits of a generaprogram to lend school books free of chargeBooks are furnished at the request of the pupiand ownership remains, at least technically, inthe State. Thus no funds or books are furnishedto parochial schools, and the financial benefit isto parents and children, not to schools.

3. The record contains no suggestion that religiousbooks have been loaned. Absent evidence, theSC cannot assume that school authorities areunable to distinguish between secular andreligious books or that they will not honestlydischarge their duties under the law. In judgingthe validity of the statute on this record theCourt must proceed on the assumption thabooks loaned to students are books that are not

unsuitable for use in the public schools becauseof religious content.

4. Everson v. Board of Education. The test fodistinguishing between forbidden involvementsof the state with religion: what are the purposeand the primary effect of the enactment? Ieither is the advancement or inhibition of religionthen the enactment exceeds the scope olegislative power as circumscribed by theConstitution. To withstand the strictures of theEstablishment Clause there must be a seculalegislative purpose and a primary effect thatneither advances nor inhibits religion.

5. The Court has long recognized that religiousschools pursue two goals, religious instructionand secular education. The State's interest ineducation would be served sufficiently byreliance on the secular teaching thataccompanied religious training in the schoolsmaintained by a religious order (Pierce v Societyof Siters). A substantial body of case law hasconfirmed the power of the States to insist that ifthe State must satisfy its interest in seculaeducation through the instrument of privateschools, it has a proper interest in the manner inwhich those schools perform their seculaeducational function.

Batch 2008A. 5

BOARD of EDUCATION vs. ALLEN

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU

& LYNCH vs. DONELLY


6/84

FACTS:

This concerns the constitutionality of 2 recurringholiday displays located on public property indowntown Pittsburgh.

The first, a crche depicting the ChristianNativity scene, was placed on the GrandStaircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/cis the main, most beautiful, and mostpublic part of the courthouse. The crchewas donated by the Holy Name Society, a

Roman Catholic group, and bore a signto that effect.

The second was an 18-foot Chanukahmenorah or candelabrum, w/c was placedjust outside the City County building nextto the citys 45-foot Christmas tree. At thefoot of the tree was a sign bearing themayors name & containing text declaringthe citys salute to liberty. The menorah isowned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but isstored, erected, and removed each year bythe city.

Respondents (the Greater PittsburghChapter of the American Civil LibertiesUnion & 7 local residents) filed suit seekingpermanently to enjoin the county fromdisplaying the menorah on the ground thatthe displays violated the EstablishmentClause of the 1st Amendment.

The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that eachdisplay violates the Establishment Clausebecause each has the impermissible effectof endorsing religion.

ISSUE:1. WON display of crche violates

Establishment clause. YES2. WON display of menorah violates

Establishment clause. NO

RATIO:

The Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause: Congress shallmake no law respecting an establishmentof religion, or prohibiting the free exercisethereof..

Lemon v Kurtzman provides 3 tests fordetermining whether a govt practiceviolates the Clause. A statute or practicew/c touches upon religion, if it is to bepermissible under the Clause must 1) havea secular purpose; 2) neither advance nor

inhibit religion in its principal or primaryeffect; 3) not foster an excessiveentanglement with religion.

The essence of the Clause: It prohibitsgovt from appearing to take a positionon questions of religious belief orfrom making adherence to a religionrelevant in any way to a personsstanding in the political community.

LYNCH V DONNELLY

ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had violatedthe Establishment Clause by including a crechein its annual Christmas display, located in aprivate park w/n downtown shopping district.

By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of thecrche in the display, holding that it didnhave the effect of advancing or promotingreligion.

J. OCONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c providesframework for evaluating govtl use of religioussymbols: 1) OConnor recognizes any

endorsement of religion as invalid because itsends a message to nonadherents that theyare outsiders, not full members of the politicacommunity, and an accompanying message toadherents that they are insiders, favoredmembers of the political community; 2) Sheprovides a method for determining whether thegovts use of an object with religious meaninghas the effect of endorsing religion. The effectof the display depends upon the message thatthe govts practice communicates: the questionis what viewers may fairly understand to bethe purpose of the display. That inquiry turnsupon the context in which the contestedobject appears.

The concurrence concluded that both becausethe crche is a traditional symbol oChristmas, a holiday with strong seculaelements, and because the crche wasdisplayed along with purely secular symbols(i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santadistributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner wSeasons Greetings, etc), the crechessetting changes what viewers may fairlyunderstand to be the purpose of the displayand negates any message f endorsement othe Christian beliefs represented by the crche

The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agreethat: 1) govts use of religious symbolism

is unconstitutional if it has the effect ofendorsing religious beliefs; 2) effect ofthe govts use of religious symbolismdepends upon its context.

1. ON CRECHE There is no doubt that the crche itself is

capable of communicating a religious messageThe angel in the crche endorses a patentlyChristian message: Glory to God in theHighest

Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crchedisplay depends on its setting. Here, unlike inLynch, nothing in the context of the display

detracts from the creches religious messageThe Lynch display comprised a series of figuresand objects, each group of which had its ownfocal point. Here, in contrast, the crchestands alone: it is the single element of thedisplay on the Grand Staircase.

Further, by permitting the display of the crchein the main & most beautiful part of thebuilding, the county sends an unmistakablemessage that it supports and promotes theChristian praise to God.

The fact that the crche bears a sign disclosingits ownership by a Roman Catholic group

Batch 2008A. 6


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demonstrates that the govt is endorsingthe religious message of that organization,rather than communicating a message ofits own. The Clause prohibits what occurredhere: the govts lending its support to thecommunication of a religiousorganizations religious message.

Govt may acknowledge Christmas as acultural phenomenon, but under the 1st

Amendment, it may not observe it as aChristian holy day by suggesting that

people praise God for the birth of Jesus. Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate

Xmas in some manner and form, but not ina way that endorses Christian doctrine asthe Allegheny County did in displaying thecrche.

On Justice Kennedys opinion upholding thedisplay of the crche as permissible under theClause

Kennedy says the display of the crche isconsistent with the Establishment Clause.He argues that this follows from the Marshv Chambers decision, which sustained theconstitutionality of a legislative prayer. Healso asserts that the crche, even in thissetting, poses no realistic risk ofrepresenting an effort to proselytize,having repudiated the Courtsendorsement inquiry in favor of aproselytization approach. Courtsanalysis of the crche reflects anunjustified hostility toward religion.

Court answered that history cannotlegitimate practices like the crche displaythat demonstrate the govts allegiance to aparticular sect or creed.

The proselytization test preferred byKennedy is much the same as the

endorsement inquiry except to the extentthat the former requires an obviousallegiance between the government andthe favored sect.

*Endorsement inquiry: WON the practicedemonstrates the govts support,promotion or endorsement of the particularcreed of a particular sect

*Proselytization test: WON the practicewould place the govts weight behind anobvious effort to proselytize for a particularreligion

Court said that Kennedy misperceived arespect for religious pluralism as hostility

or indifference to religion. The Constitution mandates that the

government remain secular, rather thanaffiliating itself with religious beliefs orinstitutions, precisely in order to avoiddiscriminating against citizens on the basisof their religious faiths. Thus, the claim thatprohibiting government from celebratingChristmas as a religious holidaydiscriminates against Christians in favor ofnonadherents must fail, since it contradictsthe fundamental premise of theEstablishment Clause itself. In contrast,

confining the government's own Christmascelebration to the holiday's secular aspectsdoes not favor the religious beliefs of nonChristians over those of Christians, but simplypermits the government to acknowledge theholiday without expressing an impermissibleallegiance to Christian beliefs.

2. ON MENORAH The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol

But its message is not exclusively religious. It is

the primary visual symbol for a holiday thatlike Christmas, has both religious and seculardimensions.

Its display doesnt have the prohibited effect ofendorsing religion given its particularphysical setting. Its combined display with aChristmas tree & a sign saluting liberty doesnot impermissibly endorse both the Christianand Jewish faiths (which is no lessconstitutionally infirm than the endorsement ofChristianity alone), but simply recognizes thatboth Christmas and Chanukah are part of thesame winter-holiday season, which hasattained a secular status in our society. Thewidely accepted view of the Christmas tree as

the preeminent secular symbol of theChristmas season emphasizes this point.

The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominantelement in the citys display by virtue of its sizeand central position. The placement of themenorah beside it is readily understood as arecognition that Christmas is not the onlytraditional way of celebrating the season.

Similarly, the presence of the mayors signconfirms that in the particular context thegovts association with a religious symbol doesnot represent sponsorship of religious beliefsbut simply a recognition of cultural diversity.

LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY

FACTS:

The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmasdisplay in a park owned by a nonprofit organizationand located in the heart of the city's shopping districtThe display includes, in addition to such objects as aSanta Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner thatreads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativityscene, which has been part of this annual display for40 years or more. Respondents brought an action inFederal District Court, challenging the inclusion of the

creche in the display on the ground that it violated theEstablishment Clause of the First Amendment, as madeapplicable to the states by the Fourteenth AmendmentThe District Court upheld the challenge andpermanently enjoined the city from including thecreche in the display. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:WON display of crche violates Establishment Clause.HELD:

Batch 2008A. 7


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Notwithstanding the religious significance of thecreche, Pawtucket has not violated theEstablishment Clause

RATIO: The concept of a "wall" of separation

between church and state is a usefulmetaphor but is not an accuratedescription of the practical aspects of therelationship that in fact exists. TheConstitution does not require complete

separation of church and state; itaffirmatively mandates accommodation,not merely tolerance, of all religions, andforbids hostility toward any.

This Court's interpretation of theEstablishment Clause comports with thecontemporaneous understanding of theFramers' intent. That neither the draftsmenof the Constitution, nor the First Congressitself, saw any establishment problem inemploying Chaplains to offer daily prayersin the Congress is a striking example of theaccommodation of religious beliefsintended by the Framers.

Our history is pervaded by official

acknowledgment of the role of religion inAmerican life, and equally pervasive isevidence of accommodation of all faithsand all forms of religious expression andhostility toward none.

Rather than taking an absolutist approachin applying the Establishment Clause andmechanically invalidating all governmentalconduct or statutes that confer benefits orgive special recognition to religion ingeneral or to one faith, this Court hasscrutinized challenged conduct orlegislation to determine whether, in reality,it establishes a religion or religious faith or

tends to do so. In the line-drawing processcalled for in each case, it has often beenfound useful to inquire whether thechallenged law or conduct has a secularpurpose, whether its principal or primaryeffect is to advance or inhibit religion, andwhether it creates an excessiveentanglement of government with religion.But this Court has been unwilling to beconfined to any single test or criterion inthis sensitive area.

Here, the focus of the inquiry must be onthe creche in the context of the Christmasseason. Focus exclusively on the religiouscomponent of any activity would inevitablylead to its invalidation under theEstablishment Clause.

Based on the record in this case, the cityhas a secular purpose for includingthe creche in its Christmas display andhas not impermissibly advancedreligion or created an excessiveentanglement between religion andgovernment. The display is sponsored bythe city to celebrate the Holiday recognizedby Congress and national tradition and todepict the origins of that Holiday; these are

legitimate secular purposes. Whatever benefitto one faith or religion or to all religionsinclusion of the creche in the display effects, isindirect, remote, and incidental, and is no morean advancement or endorsement of religionthan the congressional and executiverecognition of the origins of Christmas, or theexhibition of religious paintings ingovernmentally supported museums.

As to administrative entanglement, there is noevidence of contact with church authorities

concerning the content or design of theexhibition prior to or since the city's purchaseof the creche. No expenditures fomaintenance of the creche have beennecessary, and, since the city owns the crche(worth $200), the tangible material itcontributes is de minimis. Political divisivenessalone cannot serve to invalidate otherwisepermissible conduct, and, in any event, apartfrom the instant litigation, there is no evidenceof political friction or divisiveness over thecreche in the 40-year history of the city'sChristmas celebration.

It would be ironic if the inclusion of the crechein the display, as part of a celebration of an

event acknowledged in the Western World for20 centuries, and in this country by the peoplethe Executive Branch, Congress, and the courtsfor 2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibitionas to render it violative of the EstablishmentClause. To forbid the use of this one passivesymbol while hymns and carols are sung andplayed in public places including schools, andwhile Congress and state legislatures openpublic sessions with prayers, would be anoverreaction contrary to this Nation's historyand this Court's holdings.

J.Fortas

FACTS:

Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rockschool system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th gradebiology at Central High School. Until 1964 the officiatextbook furnished for the high school biology coursedid not have a section on the Darwinian Theory. Thenfor the academic year 1965--1966, the schooadministration, on recommendation of the teachers o

biology in the school system, adopted and prescribed atextbook which contained a chapter setting forth 'thetheory about the origin * * * of man from a lower formof animal.'

The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher inany state-supported school or university 'to teach thetheory or doctrine that mankind ascended odescended from a lower order of animals,' or 'to adoptor use in any such institution a textbook that teachesthis theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjectsthe violator to dismissal from his position. The

Batch 2008A. 8

EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS


9/84

Arkansas statute was an adaption of the famousTennessee 'monkey law' which that State adoptedin 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee lawwas upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in thecelebrated Scopes case in 1927.

Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma becauseshe was supposed to use the new textbook forclassroom instruction and presumably to teach thestatutorily condemned chapter; but to do so wouldbe a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal.

Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the'anti-evolution' statute which the State of Arkansasadopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in itspublic schools and universities of the theory thatman evolved from other species of life.

ISSUE/HELD:

W/O Not the statute violates the constitutionalprovisions respecting an establishment of religionor prohibiting its free exercise (1st Amendment),and free speech ( 14th Amendment) . YES

RATIO:

Government in our democracy, state and national,must be neutral in matters of religious theory,doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to anyreligion or to the advocacy of no religion; and itmay not aid, foster, or promote one religion orreligious theory against another or even againstthe militant opposite. The First Amendmentmandates governmental neutrality betweenreligion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.

There is and can be no doubt that the FirstAmendment does not permit the State to requirethat teaching and learning must be tailored to theprinciples or prohibitions of any religious sect ordogma. The State's undoubted right to prescribethe curriculum for its public schools does not carrywith it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminalpenalty, the teaching of a scientific theory ordoctrine where that prohibition is based uponreasons that violate the First Amendment.

In the present case, there can be no doubt thatArkansas has sought to prevent its teachers fromdiscussing the theory of evolution because it iscontrary to the belief of some that the Book ofGenesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine

as to the origin of man. No suggestion has beenmade that Arkansas' law may be justified byconsiderations of state policy other than thereligious views of some of its citizens. It is clearthat fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and isthe law's reason for existence.

Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act ofreligious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excisefrom the curricula of its schools and universities alldiscussion of the origin of man. The law's effortwas confined to an attempt to blot out a particular

theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblicaaccount, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary tothe mandate of the First, and in violation of theFourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.

Justice CLARK

FACTS:

Applicable Amendments:1. First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment oreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

- No. 142 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvaniarequires that at least ten verses from the HolyBible shall be read without comment, at theopening of each Public school on each schooday. Any child shall be excused from such Biblereading, or attending such Bible reading, uponthe request of his parent or guardian. Theexercises are broadcast into each room in thebuilding through an intercom system. This is

followed by the recitation of the Lords PrayerParticipation in the open exercises wasconsidered voluntary. The student reading thebible must select the passages and read anyform or version he chases. (King James versionDouay or the Revised Standard versions as welas the Jewish Holy Scriptures)

- The constitutionality of the said statute wasassailed by Edward Schempp, a member of theUnitarian faith who, along with his wife andchildren, questioned the validity of the statutecontending that his rights have been violatedunder the 14th of table and to the Constitutionof the United States.

- The children study in Abington Senior HighSchool

- Schempp testified that he at first refused toexercise his prerogative of excusing hischildren from the morning exercises upon feathat his children would be labeled as odd ballsTheir classmates would be liable for lumpingreligious differences and objections as atheismwith immoral and un-patriotic overtones.

- Doctor Solomon Grayzel (witness for theappellees): The reading of such verseswithout explanation may be psychologicallyharmful to the children and may cause adivisive force in the social media of the school.

- Doctor Luther A. Weigle (witness for thedefense):The Bible is a non-sectarian piece ofliterature within among the Christian faithsThe exclusion of the New Testament would bein itself a sectarian practice.

- The trial court struck down the practices andthe statute requiring them after making thespecific findings of fact that attendance toAbington and undergoing the practices werecompulsory. The court further found that thereading of the verses without comment wouldconstitute in effect a religious observance.

Batch 2008A. 9

SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP


10/84

- The court rejected the defenses argument thatthe children were allowed to excuse themselvesvia their parents request, saying that it did notmitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony.This was still in violation of the establishmentclause in that it threatens religious liberty byputting a premium upon belief as opposed tonon-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspectthe beliefs, ideals, and even morality of thepetitioners.

ISSUE:WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania is unconstitutional under the violationof the Establishment Clause under the FourteenthAmendment.

HELD:Yes.

RATIO:

I. It is true that religion has been closely identifiedwith American history and government. Thisbackground is evidence today in our public lifethrough the continuance in our oaths of officefrom the Presidency to the Alderman of the final

supplication, So held me God. Indeed, only lastyear, an official survey of the country indicatedthat 64% of our people have church membershipwhile 3% profess no faith at all. This is not to say,however that religion has been so identified withour history and government that religiousfreedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded inout public and private life. Nothing but the mosttelling of personal experiences in religiouspersecution could have implanted such belief.

II. Minor v. Board of Educationof Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the courthas decisively settled the First Amendmentsmandate that Congress shall make no lawrespecting an establishment of religion, orprohibiting the free exercise thereof has beenmade wholly applicable to the States under the14th amendment. Second, this Court has rejectedunequivocally the contention that theEstablishment Clause forbids only governmentalpreference of one religion over the other.

Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson andBurton: The First Amendmentspurpose was to create acomplete and permanentseparation of the spheres ofreligious activity and civil

authority by comprehensivelyforbidding any form of publicaid or support for religion.

III. Interrelationship between theEstablishment and Free Exercise Clauses:The former forestalls compulsion by law of theacceptance of any form of worship. Freedom tochoose a belief cannot be restricted by Law.The latter protects the freedom to exercise thechosen form of religion. This it embraces twoconcepts: Freedom to believe and Freedomto Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut)

- Public Schools are organized on the premisethat secular education can be isolated fromall religious teaching so that the school caninculcate all needed temporal knowledge andalso maintain strict and lofty neutrality as toreligion.

- McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendmentdid not simply bar a congressional enactmentestablishing a church; it forbade all lawsrespecting an establishment of religion.

- Engel v. Vitale: The establishment and freeexercise clauses in certain instances overlapThe former does not depend upon anyshowing of direct governmental compulsionand is violated by the enactment of lawswhich establish an official religion whethethose laws directly operate to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. The formeworks also on the belief that a union ogovernment and religion tends to destroygovernment and degrade religion.

IV. The neutrality of which the Courts cases speakthus stem from the recognition from history ofthe tendency of religious sects to fusegovernmental and religious functions or cause a

concert of dependence of one upon the otheplacing State support behind the tenets of one orall orthodoxies.

Test for Establishment Clause:1.Existence of a secular legislative purpose2.The primary effect that neither advances nor

inhibits religion.

Test for Free Exercise Clause:1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactmentas it operates against anyone in the practice ofreligion.

- We agree with the trial court finding as tothe religious character of the exercises andare thus in violation of the establishmentclause.

- It is also insisted that unless religiousexercises are permitted a religion osecularism is established in schools. Weagree that a religion of secularism cannot beestablished in the sense of affirmativelyopposing or showing hostility to religion, thuspreferring belief over non-belief.

- While the Free Exercise clause clearlyprohibits the use of state action to deny therights of free exercise to anyone, it has never

meant that a majority could use themachinery of the state to practice beliefs.

04/03/62Black, J.

Batch 2008A. 10

ENGEL vs. VITALE


11/84

FACTS:Repondent Board of Education of Union Free SchoolDistrict 9, acting under New York State law,composed a prayer that was to be recited at thestart of each class that went: "Almighty God, weacknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and webeg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, ourteachers and our Country."The program was supported by the NY State Boardof Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought thisaction in a New York State Court insisting that useof this official prayer in the public schools wascontrary to the beliefs, religions, or religiouspractices of both themselves and their children. NYCA sustained an order of the lower state courtswhich had upheld the power of New York to use theRegents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures ofits public schools so long as the schools did notcompel any pupil to join in the prayer over his orhis parents' objection. petitioners appealed.

petitoners: prayer violates the non-establishmentof religion clause in the 1st Amendment (theState's use of the Regents' prayer in its publicschool system breaches the constitutional wall ofseparation between Church and State.)

respondents: prayer is "non-denominational"; theprogram, as modified and approved by statecourts, does not require all pupils to recite theprayer but permits those who wish to do so toremain silent or be excused from the room; toapply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibitstate laws respecting an establishment of religiousservices in public schools is to indicate a hostilitytoward religion or toward prayer.

ISSUE:WON the prayer is a religious exercise, theestablishment of which is prohibited by the 1stamendment

HELD:YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is areligious exercise; the State of New York hasadopted a practice wholly inconsistent with theNon-Establishment Clause. the constitutionalprohibition against laws respecting anestablishment of religion must at least mean thatin this country it is no part of the business ofgovernment to compose official prayers for anygroup of the American people to recite as a part ofa religious program carried on by government. Inan effort to explain the clause, the court looked atthe history of the separation of church and state

saying that " it is a matter of history that this verypractice of establishing governmentally composedprayers for religious services was one of thereasons which caused many of our early coloniststo leave England and seek religious freedom inAmerica" In England where there was a statereligion, many people who held contrary beliefswere unable to exercise such. By the time of theadoption of the Constitution, our history shows thatthere was a widespread awareness among manyAmericans of the dangers of a union of Church andState. These people knew, some of them frombitter personal experience, that one of the greatest

dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship inhis own way lay in the Government's placing its officiastamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer orone particular form of religious services.The Constitution was intended to avert a part of thisdanger by leaving the government of this country inthe hands of the people rather than in the hands of anymonarch. But this safeguard was not enough. OuFounders were no more willing to let the content oftheir prayers and their privilege of praying whenevethey pleased be influenced by the ballot box than theywere to let these vital matters of personal consciencedepend upon the succession of monarchs. The FirstAmendment was added to the Constitution to stand asa guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige ofthe Federal Government would be used to controlsupport or influence the kinds of prayer the Americanpeople can say -- that the people's religions must notbe subjected to the pressures of government fochange each time a new political administration iselected to office. Under that Amendment's prohibitionagainst governmental establishment of religion, asreinforced by the provisions of the FourteenthAmendment, government in this country, be it state orfederal, is without power to prescribe by law anyparticular form of prayer which is to be used as an

official prayer in carrying on any program ogovernmentally sponsored religious activity. Thehistory of governmentally established religion, both inEngland and in this country, showed that whenevegovernment had allied itself with one particular form ofreligion, the inevitable result had been that it hadincurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt ofthose who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose othe Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness ofthe historical fact that governmentally establishedreligions and religious persecutions go hand in hand.re: respondents first argumentNeither the fact that the prayer may bedenominationally neutral nor the fact that itsobservance on the part of the students is voluntary canserve to free it from the limitations of theEstablishment Clause, as it might from the FreeExercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of whichare operative against the States by virtue of theFourteenth Amendment.re: respondents second argumentIt is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say thateach separate government in this country should stayout of the business of writing or sanctioning officiaprayers and leave that purely religious function to thepeople themselves and to those the people choose tolook to for religious guidance.

Reversed and remanded.

FACTS:

Batch 2008A. 11

ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS


12/84

Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program giveseducational choices to families in any Ohio schooldistrict that is under state control pursuant to afederal-court order. The program provides tuitionaid for certain students in the Cleveland CitySchool District, the only covered district, to attendparticipating public or private schools of theirparent's choosing and tutorial aid for students whochoose to remain enrolled in public school. Bothreligious and nonreligious schools in the districtmay participate, as may public schools in adjacentschool districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parentsaccording to financial need, and where the aid isspent depends solely upon where parents chooseto enroll their children. The number of tutorialassistance grants provided to students remainingin public school must equal the number of tuitionaid scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year,82% of the participating private schools had areligious affiliation, none of the adjacent publicschools participated, and 96% of the studentsparticipating in the scholarship program wereenrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixtypercent of the students were from families at orbelow the poverty line. Cleveland schoolchildrenalso have the option of enrolling in community

schools, which are funded under state law but runby their own school boards and receive twice theper-student funding as participating privateschools, or magnet schools, which are publicschools emphasizing a particular subject area,teaching method, or service, and for which theschool district receives the same amount perstudent as it does for a student enrolled at atraditional public school. Respondents, Ohiotaxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on theground that it violated the Establishment Clause.The Federal District Court granted them summaryjudgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the program offends theEstablishment Clause. NO.

RATIO:

(a) A government aid program is not readilysubject to challenge under the EstablishmentClause if it is neutral with respect to religion andprovides assistance directly to a broad class ofcitizens who, in turn, direct government aid toreligious schools wholly as a result of their owngenuine and independent private choice. Undersuch a program, government aid reaches religiousinstitutions only by way of the deliberate choices of

numerous individual recipients. The incidentaladvancement of a religious mission, or theperceived endorsement of a religious message, isreasonably attributable to the individual aidrecipients not the government, whose role endswith the disbursement of benefits.

(b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, andis part of Ohio's general and multifacetedundertaking to provide educational opportunities tochildren in a failed school district. It conferseducational assistance directly to a broad class of

individuals defined without reference to religion andpermits participation of all district schools--religious ornonreligious--and adjacent public schools. The onlypreference in the program is for low-income families,who receive greater assistance and have priority foadmission. Rather than creating financial incentivesthat skew it towards religious schools, the programcreates financial disincentives: Private schools receiveonly half the government assistance given tocommunity schools and one-third that given to magnetschools, and adjacent public schools would receive twoto three times that given to private schools. Familiestoo have a financial disincentive, for they have tocopay a portion of private school tuition, but paynothing at a community, magnet, or traditional publicschool. No reasonable observer would think that such aneutral private choice program carries with it theimprimatur of government endorsement. Nor is thereevidence that the program fails to provide genuineopportunities for Cleveland parents to select seculaeducational options: Their children may remain inpublic school as before, remain in public school withfunded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose toattend a religious school, obtain a scholarship andchoose to attend a nonreligious private school, enroll ina community school, or enroll in a magnet school. The

Establishment Clause question whether Ohio iscoercing parents into sending their children to religiousschools must be answered by evaluating all optionsOhio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one owhich is to obtain a scholarship and then choose areligious school. Cleveland's preponderance oreligiously affiliated schools did not result from theprogram, but is a phenomenon common to manyAmerican cities. Eighty-two percent of Cleveland'sprivate schools are religious, as are 81% of Ohio'sprivate schools. To attribute constitutional significanceto the 82% figure would lead to the absurd result that aneutral school-choice program might be permissible inparts of Ohio where the percentage is lower, but not inCleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programsmost sorely needed. Likewise, an identical privatechoice program might be constitutional only in Stateswith a lower percentage of religious private schools.

FACTS:

The Higher Education Facilities Act was passedin 1963 in response to a strong nationwidedemand for the expansion of college and

university facilities to meet the sharply risingnumber of young people demanding higheeducation. The Act authorizes federal grantsand loans to "institutions of higher education"for the construction of a wide variety o"academic facilities." But expressly excludes

"any facility used or to be used for sectarianinstruction or as a place for religious worshipor . . . any facility which . . . is used or to beused primarily in connection with any part of

Batch 2008A. 12

TILTON vs. RICHARDSON
http://searchmiracle.com/text/search.php?qq=Educationhttp://searchmiracle.com/text/search.php?qq=Education


13/84

the program of a school or department ofdivinity . . . ."

no part of the project may be used forsectarian instruction, religious worship, orthe programs of a divinity school.

If, during this period (a period of 20 years),the recipient violates the statutoryconditions, the United States is entitled torecover an amount equal to the proportionof its present value that the federal grantbore to the original cost of the facility.

Four church-related colleges anduniversities in Connecticut receivingfederal construction grants under Title Iwere named as defendants. Federal fundswere used for five projects at these fourinstitutions: (1) a library building at SacredHeart University; (2) a music, drama, andarts building at Annhurst College; (3) ascience building at Fairfield University; (4)a library building at Fairfield; and (5) alanguage laboratory at Albertus MagnusCollege.

Appellants attempted to show that the four

recipient institutions were "sectarian" byintroducing evidence of their relations withreligious authorities, the content of theircurricula, and other indicia of their religiouscharacter.

Appellee colleges introduced testimonythat they had fully complied with thestatutory conditions and that their religiousaffiliation in no way interfered with theperformance of their secular educationalfunctions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. WON Act authorized grants to church-

related schools yes2. WON religion clauses of the consti have

been impaired in part, yes but the entireact is not unconsti

* Vacated and remanded.

RATIO:

1. We are satisfied that Congress intendedthe Act to include all colleges and

universities regardless of any affiliationwith or sponsorship by a religious body.The Act makes no reference to religiousaffiliation or nonaffiliation. Under thesecircumstances "institutions of highereducation" must be taken to includechurch-related colleges and universities.

2. Court have noted the internal tension inthe First Amendment between theEstablishment Clause and the FreeExercise Clause. the Establishment Clausesought to protect: "sponsorship, financial

support, and active involvement of thesovereign in religious activity." Every analysismust begin with the candid acknowledgmentthat there is no single constitutional caliperthat can be used to measure the precisedegree to which these three factors arepresent or absent. There is only a cumulativecriteria which is this:

Against this background we consider four questions:

a) does the Act reflect a seculalegislative purpose? Yes

~> United States require that the youth be assuredample opportunity for the fullest development of theiintellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimatesecular objective entirely appropriate for governmentaaction. The crucial question is not whether somebenefit accrues to a religious institution as aconsequence of the legislative program, but whetherits principal or primary effect advances religion. TheAct itself was carefully drafted to ensure that thefederally subsidized facilities would be devoted to thesecular and not the religious function of the recipient

institutions. It authorizes grants and loans only foacademic facilities that will be used for defined secularpurposes and expressly prohibits their use for religiousinstruction, training, or worship. None of the fouchurch-related institutions in this case has violated thestatutory restrictions. There had been no religiousservices or worship in the federally financed facilitiesno religious symbols or plaques in or on them; usedsolely for nonreligious purposes. There is no evidencethat religion seeps into the use of any of thesefacilities. Schools were characterized by anatmosphere of academic freedom rather than religiousindoctrination.

b) is the primary effect of the Act toadvance or inhibit religion? Yes, ineffect will help advance religion. Thispart held unconstitutional.

~> We note that an institution applying for a federagrant is only required to provide assurances that thefacility will not be used for sectarian instruction oreligious worship "during at least the period of theFederal interest therein(20 years). This obviouslyopens the facility to use for any purpose at the end ofthat period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building isfor example, converted into a chapel or otherwise usedto promote religious interests, the original federagrant will in part have the effect of advancing religion.So this part was held unconstitutional.

c) does the administration of the Actfoster an excessive governmenentanglement with religion? No. theentanglement is very much lessenedfor three reasons. (application of strictscrutiny)

~> these four schools subscribe to a well-establishedset of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in

Batch 2008A. 13


14/84

this record shows that these principles are not infact followed. In short, the evidence showsinstitutions with admittedly religious functions butwhose predominant higher education mission is toprovide their students with a secular education.Their purpose is not religious indoctrination sothere is less likelihood than in primary andsecondary schools that religion will permeate thearea of secular education. This reduces the riskthat government aid will in fact serve to supportreligious activities.

~> The entanglement between church and state isalso lessened here by the nonideological characterof the aid that the Government provides. Neutral,or non-ideological services, facilities, or materialsare supplied to all students regardless of theaffiliation of the school that they attend. Facilitiesare religiously neutral.

~> Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpose construction grant. There are nocontinuing financial relationships or dependencies.

*these three taken together shape a narrow and

limited relationship bet church and govt to becomein danger of realizing the substantive evils againstwhich the Religion Clauses were intended toprotect.

d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibitthe free exercise of religion in violation of the 1 st

amendment? No. except of course that part of 20-year limitation

~> Appellants, however, are unable to identify anycoercion directed at the practice or exercise oftheir religious beliefs.

J. PANGANIBAN

FACTS: A case was brought by respondent Social Justice

Society (SJS) against petitioner Mike Velarde,together with Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin,Erano Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva & Eli Sorianoin the Regional Trial Court of Manila for therresolution of "whether or not the act of a

religious leader like any of herein respondents, inendorsing the candidacy of a candidate forelective office or in urging or requiring themembers of his flock to vote for a specifiedcandidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of theconstitutional provisions.

The trial court opined that the "endorsement ofspecific candidates in an election to any publicoffice is a clear violation of the separationclause."

However, the trial court failed to include a dispositiveportion in its assailed Decision after its essay on thelegal issue.

Thus, petitioners filed separate Motions foReconsideration on the assailed decision questioningwhether or not the decision of the lower court wasproper & valid in lieu of procedural deficiencies &substantive issues

ISSUES:

1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise ajusticiable controversy? Did it state a cause of action?Did respondent have any legal standing to file thePetition for Declaratory Relief?2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and

substance required by the Constitution, the law andthe Rules of Court?

3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. MikeVelarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates forpublic office? Corollarily, may they be banned fromcampaigning against said candidates?"

HELD & RATIO:

1. NO. SJS miserably failed to allege an existingcontroversy or dispute between the petitioner and therespondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficientlystate what specific legal right of the SJS was violatedby the petitioners & what particular act or acts of thelatter were in breach of its rights, the law or theConstitution. There was no concise & direct statementof the ultimate facts on which it relies on its pleadingfor its claim. SJS merely speculated or anticipatedwithout factual moorings that, as religious leaders, thepetitioners below had endorsed or threatened toendorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices;and that such actual or threatened endorsement "wilenable them to elect men to public office who would in

turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enablingthem to control the government" & "posing a clear andpresent danger of serious erosion of the peoples faithin the electoral process; & reinforcing their belief thatreligious leaders determine the ultimate result oelections," which would then be violative of theseparation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merelytheoretical. The Petition does not even allege anyindication or manifest intent on the part of any of thepetitioners to champion an electoral candidate, or tourge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote fora particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule thatsheer speculation does not give rise to an actionableright.

There is no factual allegation that SJS rights are beingsubjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitableviolation that should be prevented by the declaratoryrelief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courtsto settle actual controversies involving rights that arelegally demandable and enforceable cannot beexercised when there is no actual or threatenedviolation of a legal right.

Batch 2008A. 14

VELARDE vs. SOCIETY for SOCIAL JUSTICE


15/84

Even if the court relaxed the requirements of locusstandi in view of its transcendental importance,counsels for the parties -- particularly forRespondent SJS -- made no satisfactoryallegations or clarifications that would supplythe deficiencies discussed. Hence, even if the Courtwould exempt this case from the stringent locusstandi requirement, such heroic effort would befutile because the transcendental issue cannot beresolved anyway.

2. NO. The Constitution commands that "nodecision shall be rendered by any court withoutexpressing therein clearly and distinctly the factsand the law on which it is based. No petition forreview or motion for reconsideration of a decisionof the court shall be refused due course or deniedwithout stating the basis therefor." Elementary dueprocess demands that the parties to a litigation begiven information on how the case was decided, aswell as an explanation of the factual and legalreasons that led to the conclusions of the court.The significance of factual finding lies in the valueof the decision as a precedent. Such is intended toinform the parties of the reason or reasons for thedecision so that if any of them appeals, he can

point out to the appellate court the finding of factsor the rulings on points of law with which hedisagrees. More than that, the requirement is anassurance to the parties that, in reachingjudgment, the judge did so through the processesof legal reasoning.

Essential Parts of a Good decision:

1. Statement of the case2. Statement of the facts3. Issues4. Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a

rule, separately considered and resolved5. Dispositive portion

The assailed decision did not include a resolutoryor dispositive portion. It is merely an answer to ahypothetical legal question and just a part of theopinion of the trial court. It does not conclusivelydeclare the rights (or obligations) of the parties tothe Petition. Failure to comply with theconstitutional injunction is a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in carelessdisregard of the constitutional mandate are apatent nullity and must be struck down as void.

3. Religious Leaders Endorsement ofCandidates for Public Office

The Court deems this constitutional issue to be ofparamount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for itconcerns the governance of our country and itspeople. Thus, despite the obvious proceduraltransgressions by both SJS and the trial court, thisCourt still called for Oral Argument, so as not toleave any doubt that there might be room toentertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on themerits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convincethe Court that there are enough factual and legal basesto resolve the paramount issue. It failed to statedirectly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for itsclaim. Neither were there factual findings in theassailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the triacourt to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, itmerely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition owhich was beyond the courts constitutional mandateand jurisdiction.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in cleaviolation of the Constitution, because it made nofindings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is voidand deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there isnothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or evenjust modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court totake up, on the merits, the paramount questioninvolving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honoredrule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] wilbe passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it isdirectly and necessarily involved in a justiciablecontroversy and is essential to the protection of the

rights of the parties concerned."

FACTS:o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit

religious, missionary corporation dulyregistered and doing business in thePhilippines through its Philippines agencyestablished in November of 1898

o the defendant appellee is a municipacorporation with powers that are to beexcercised in conformity with the provisions oR.A No. 409, known as the revised charter ofthe city of manila

o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing andselling bibles and gospel porionms thereofthroughout the Philippines

o the acting city treasurer nformed plaintiff thatit was conducting business of generamerchandise, without providing itself with thenecessary mayors permit and municipalicense, in violation of various ordinances, andasked the plaintiff to secure within 3 days, thecorresponding license and fees, together withcompromise covering the period from the 4 t

quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 inthe sum of Php 5,821

o plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the licensefees but at the same time filed a complaint tothe courts

Batch 2008A. 15

MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA


16/84

o plaintiff was able to show that they wereexempt from real estate taxes; and that itwas never required to pay any municipallicence or atx fee before the war, nor doesthe American bible society in the U.S paylicense fee or sales tax for the sale of thebible.

o however a witness for the appellees wasable to prove that the American biblersociety in fact does profit from the sale ofthe Bible.

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City ofManila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!!

(2) whether said ordinances are inapplicable,invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the allegedbusiness of distribution and sale of bibles to thepeople of the Philippines by a religious corporationlike the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YESinvalid!

HELD:*The only essential difference that We find

between these two provisions that may have anybearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection(m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of anydealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated undersubsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing inone or all of the articles mentioned therein, shallnot be in excess of P500 per annum, thecorresponding section 18, subsection (o) ofRepublic Act No. 409, does not contain anylimitation as to the amount of tax or license feethat the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence,and in accordance with the weight of theauthorities above referred to that maintain that "allrights and liabilities which have accrued under theoriginal statute are preserved and may beenforced, since the reenactment neutralizes therepeal, therefore continuing the law in forcewithout interruption", We hold that the questionedordinances of the City of Manila are still in forceand effect.

*The constitutional guaranty of the freeexercise and enjoyment of religious profession andworship carries with it the right to disseminatereligious information. Any restraint of such rightcan only be justified like other restraints offreedom of expression on the grounds that there isa clear and present danger of any substantive evilwhich the State has the right to prevent". (Taada

and Fernando on the Constitution of thePhilippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case atbar the license fee herein involved is imposed uponappellant for its distribution and sale of bibles andother religious literature.

*The constitutional guaranty of the freeexercise and enjoyment of religious profession andworship carries with it the right to disseminatereligious information. Any restraint of such rightcan only be justified like other restraints offreedom of expression on the grounds that there is

a clear and present danger of any substantive eviwhich the State has the right to prevent". (Taada andFernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I,4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license feeherein involved is imposed upon appellant for itsdistribution and sale of bibles and other religiousliterature.

*(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is onething to impose a tax on the income or property of apreacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax fromhim for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The taximposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license taxpayment of which is a condition of the exercise ofthese constitutional privileges. The power to tax theexercise of a privilege is the power to control osuppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax theexercise of this religious practice can make its exerciseso costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary forits maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege ofengaging in this form of missionary evangelism canclose all its doors to all 'those who do not have a fulpurse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient andhonorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . .

*It may be true that in the case at bar the price

asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets wasin some instances a little bit higher than the actual costof the same, but this cannot mean that appellant wasengaged in the business or occupation of selling said"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believethat the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, foin doing so it would impair its free exercise andenjoyment of its religious profession and worship aswell as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

*Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be consideredunconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. Butas Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, asamended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant anddefendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax thebusiness of plaintiff Society involved herein for, asstated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to thefree exercise and enjoyment of its religious professionand worship, as well as its rights of dissemination ofreligious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, asamended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade oroccupation of the plaintiff.

Reversed and Remanded

(1959)Montemayor J

FACTS:

RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremonycompulsory for schools. The implementing rules(Department Order 8)says that the anthem must beplayed while the flag is raised. It also says thaeveryone must salute the flag and no one is to doanything while the ceremony is being held. After the

Batch 2008A. 16

GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION


17/84

flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge(panatang makabayan).

Petitioners children attending the BuenavistaCommunity School in Uson, Masbate refused tosalute the flag, sing the anthem and recite thepledge. They did not do so out of religious belief.They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They followedExodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not make unto thee agraven image, or any likeness of anything that is inheaven above, or that is in earth beneath or that isin the water under the earth. They consider theflag to be an image in this context. Because of thisthey were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.

Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that theirchildren be exempt from the law and just beallowed to remain silent and stand at attention.SecEd denied petition. Writ of preliminaryinjunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE:

WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep ordernon-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional

RATIONALE:

The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless butit's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with lawthen the former must yield.

What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintainthat it is an image but that is not so. It is thesymbol of Republic of the Philippines. It is not areligious symbol. Saluting it is not therefore areligious ceremony. The determination whether aceremony is religious or not is left to the courts notto any religious group.

Petitioners are willing to remain silent and standduring flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flagduring boy scout activities. Their objection thenrests on the singing of anthem and recitation ofpledge. The pledge is judged to be completelysecular. It does not even pledge allegiance to theflag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular.It talks about patriotism. It does not speak ofresorting to force, military service, or duty to

defend the country.

There was no compulsion involved in theenforcement of the flag salute. They were notcriminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. Ifthey chose not to obey the salute regulation theymerely lost the benefits of public education. Take itor leave it.

Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants weremembers of Methodist Episcopal Church whobelieved that war and preparations for war aregainst God's wishes. They did not take required

military service training which was requirement tograduate. Court said that they were not being draftedto attend university. University did not violate dueprocess when it required the mil service.

Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two JehovahsWitness children were expelled from school for refusingto salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupilsin flag ceremony did not infringe due process. WestVirginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnettereversed the former decision at a divided court.

This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Speciacircumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled thestudents although attendance in schools is mandatoryturnimg them all into truants headed for reformatoriesFortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollmenthere in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions andexemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn'tattend school. There is no penal sanction for failing toattend school.

Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society andcommunity life he becomes a member and must giveup some of his rights for the general welfare just likeeverybody else. The practice of religion is subject to

reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by thestate.

Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: SarahPrince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted undethe Child Labor law because her hiece distributedreligious pamphlets. Court said that state can limitcontrol of parent/guardian. The right of practicereligion freelydoes not include liberty to expose child toill health. This case was decided after Barnette, supra.

SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flagsalute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatoryregulation applicable to members of all religions. Statecarried out duty to supervise educational institutionsand teach civic duty.

Petitioners do not question the right of the school toconduct the flag Salute ceremony but question theattempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting thepetioners is that it would disrupt school discipline anddemoralize the greater student population.

There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief likean understanding that anti-war religious believers wilnot be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide,not the courts.

DISPOSITION:

decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminaryinjunction dissolved. No costs.

March 1, 1993Ponente: Grio-Aquino, J:

Batch 2008A. 17

ERBALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT


18/84

FACTS:All the petitioners in these two cases are

school children who are members of JehovahsWitnesses who were expelled from their classes bythe public school authorities in Cebu for refusing tosalute the flag, sing the national anthem and recitethe patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265(July 11, 1955) and by DECS Department Order No.8 (July 21, 1955) which makes the flag ceremonycompulsory in all educational institutions.

ISSUE:Whether or not school children who are

members of a religious sect known as JehovahsWitnesses may be expelled from school (bothpublic and private) for refusing, on account of theirreligious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony.

RATIO:It has been held previously in the case of

Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959)Under a system of complete separation betweenchurch and state, the flag is utterly devoid of anyreligious significance and therefore saluting it isnot a religious ceremony. The requirement of the

flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverencefor the flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable tostudents and teachers regardless of their religion.

While the necessity to develop suchrespect for the flag and respect for the country stillpersists until today, there is recognition thatreligious freedom is a fundamental right which isentitled to the highest priority and the amplestprotection among human rights (Fernandoseparate opinion in German vs. Barangan)

Two-fold aspect of religious profession:

Freedom to believe absolute as long asconfined to the realm of thought

Freedom to act on ones belief subject toregulation where the belief is translatedinto external acts affecting the publicwelfare

Petitioners contend that while they did notparticipate in the flag ceremony, they did notengage in any disruptive behavior that wouldoffend those who choose to participate but ratherthey just quietly stood at attention during the flagceremony to show respect to their countrymen.Therefore, in the absence of a grave andpresent danger which is the sole justificationfor a prior restraint on the exercise of

religious freedom, according to Teehankee inhis dissent in German vs. Barangan, there is nowarrant to justify their expulsion.

What petitioners seek is only exemptionfrom the flag ceremony and therefore the virtues(e.g. patriotism, respect for human rights, love ofcountry, etc.) they are supposed to imbibe fromtheir participation in the flag ceremony, they canget in their study of the Constitution, thedemocaratic way of life and form of government,the history and culture of the Philippines, the life ofour heroes, etc.

To force a small religious group through theiron hand

4663836 consti2digests for cases after midterms

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