document4

Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1992

Hirschman's Loyalty Construct

Jill W. Graham and Michael Keeley I

Of the three key words in Hirschman's (1970) widely cited exit, voice, and loyalty framework, loyalty is the least understood. Some portray it as a third behavioral response to dissatisfaction (after exit and voice). Others see loyalty as an affective moderating variable that influences the choice between exit and voice (and~or the levels of them). Further, of those who interpret loyalty as a moderator, some claim it reduces the incidence and volume of yoke, while others argue for the opposite effect. This article compares alternative conceptions of loyalty and identifies conditions under which one or another conception is most appropriate.

KEY WORDS: reformist loyalty; passive loyalty; antecedents and consequences of loyalty.

Loyalty is very popular. It has few opponents. Consider the alternative and the labels it evokes: disloyalty, treachery, betrayal, and treason. Loyalty, on the other hand, describes constancy, fidelity, and devotion. Talk about value-laden terms! Dis- passionate study of topics that are extremely high (or low) in terms of social de- sirability is always difficult because emotions and personal values are usually aroused. We need to look beyond subjective attitudes toward loyalty to assess the usefulness of the concept for organizational research. This is our objective here.

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY

A widely cited source for both theoretical and empirical studies of organizational loyalty is Albert O. Hirschman's 1970 work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. As shown by the book's subtitle, it offers a model of analysis that is intended to apply across disciplinary domains. Because Hirschman's interest in loyalty focuses on how loyalty influences exit and voice, a brief description of those concepts is a logical starting point.

Hirschman's major thesis is that there are essentially two forms of active response available to participants (e.g., customers, employees, citizens) when they

tDepartment of Management, Loyola University of Chicago, 820 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611.

191

0892-7545/92/0900-0191506.50/0 �9 1992 Plenum Publishing Corporation

192 Graham and Keeley

STAY

VOICE (effort to change the status quo)

Cell #i: Internal Change Effort

Cell #3: Passive Acceptance/ Endurance

Cell #2: Vociferous Exit

EXIT (effort to escape)

Cell #4 Quiet Exit

SILENCE

Fig. 1. Exit and voice 2 x 2: Potential responses to organizational decline.

perceive deteriorating conditions, one economic (exit) and the other political (voice). Simply put, exit means escaping a disagreeable condition while voice en- tails trying to change it. These potential responses can be mapped on a two-dimensional plane defined by exit and voice (see Fig. 1). Note that there is not just one decision to make, i.e., a choice between exit and voice, but two (Barry, 1974; Birch, 1975; Graham, 1986; Kolarska & Aldrich, 1980; Laver, 1976; Spencer, 1986): one for exit and one for voice. Exit and voice are conceptually distinct, but that does not make them mutually exclusive forms of behavior. Exit can be combined with voice, or both can be rejected, in addition to either one being chosen as a solitary response..

Hirschman's focus is on the recuperative impact of participants' action--exit and/or voice--in response to widening disagreement. With respect to exit, he reasons that when managers see an increase in turnover, they are alerted to the fact that something is amiss, and, if they know the reason, may take action to correct it. Participants' use of voice in response to discontent generally has more commu- nicative value than exit since reasons for disagreement can be made explicit by voice, while managers may be in the dark about the causes of increased turnover. As a result, voice is often superior to exit as a means of feedback to aid in organizational quality control.

A factor that has intrigued many students of Hirschman's work on exit and voice, but has so far eluded definitive understanding, is the third construct in his original title: loyalty. Nearly all agree that loyalty implies some sort of positive affective attachment that binds participants to an organization; i.e., loyalty discourages exit as a response to dissatisfaction even when attractive alternatives to the dete-

Hirschman's Loyalty Construct 193

Level of Voice Raised in Response to Progressive Deterioration XWL

No Total Disagreement Disagreement

Extent of Disagreement with Organizational Activities

FRD (First Recognition of Deterioration): Resistance to disconfirming evidence delays consciousness of organizational decline until a certain level of disagreement is reached.

OV (Onset of Voice): Beginning of efforts to reform an organization in response to increasing disagreement with its activities.

XAL (Exit in the Absence of Loyalty): After trying unsuccessfully to influence an organization to reform, some members will quit. Loyalty defers exit, however, and intensifies the use of voice by those who stay (note increase in slope of the line).

TX (Threatened Exit): Loyalists who, up to this point, have sradually intensified the pressure they put on their organization to change, eventually will threaten to leave it (note discontinuity in the slope of the line).

XWL (Exit with Loyalty): As disagreement grows and very intense pressure to reform an organization continues to be unsuccessful, even loyal members will quit. They may continue trying to reform the organization as outsiders, or give up on it altogether.

Fig. 2. Summary of Hirschman's position (labels slightly revised).

riorating organization are available. What is controversial about loyalty is its effect on the propensity to use voice. One position is that loyalty activates voice (Barry, 1974; Boroff, 1989; Evan, 1975; Graham, 1986; LaPonce, 1974; Leck, 1989; Spencer, 1986). The other view is that loyalty suppresses voice (Birch, 1975; Farrell, 1983; Fisher & Locke, 1992; Gorden, 1988; Mayes & Ganster, 1988; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988; Scott, 1986).

Since scholars in both camps routinely cite Hirschman (1970) as the source of their understanding of loyalty, clarification of Hirschman's position would seem helpful.


VARIETIES OF LOYALTY

Hirschman's published work on loyalty (Hirschman, 1970, 1974, 1976, 1986), plus a personal communication (Hirschman, 1990), reveal a fairly consistent position on the topic. The basic elements of Hirschman's position are found in "A Theory of Loyalty," Chapter 7 of his original book (1970). The theory is summarized in Fig. 2 (based on a figure in Hirschman, 1970, p. 87).

Although it is two-dimensional, four variables are represented in Fig. 2: exit, voice, loyalty, and disagreement. The horizontal axis measures the amount of disagreement a participant has with an organization. Because Hirschman views exit as a dichotomous variable, the exit response can be represented on the figure as a point somewhere along the "extent of disagreement" axis. When conditions become bad enough (variously defined), a participant will leave.

In contrast to exit, the voice response can vary in level, from relatively quiet murmurings to pointed questions or complaints, threats, and collective action. As such, it is measured on the vertical axis of Hirschman's figure; and a positively sloped relationship between disagreement and voice is anticipated: the greater the disagreement, the louder the voice.

In actuality, Fig. 2 does not show a simple linear relationship between disagreement and voice. The reason for this, according to Hirschman's theory, is loyalty. Several types of loyalty can be distinguished in the figure, and Hirschman has a clear favorite. Those who would cite him in support of their own interpretation of loyalty should take care to understand the distinctions Hirschman draws about different types of loyalty and, in particular, which one he finds most useful.

The first type of loyalty represented in Fig. 2 is the distance between the origin and FRD (First Recognition of Deterioration). Hirschman terms this area "unconscious loyal behavior," since the level of disagreement is not yet sufficiently large to be noticeable. Unconscious loyal behavior may be due to inattention, selective perception, or even total blindness. Hirschman notes that participants vary in terms of quality-consciousness. For the most quality-conscious, point FRD is very close to the origin. As quality-consciousness about organizational activities declines, point FRD moves to the right.

A second type of loyalty represented in Fig. 2 is the distance between FRD and OV (Onset of Voice). This area signifies "passive loyalty": how long participants wait passively for things to return to their prior (and more agreeable) state before taking action to press for reform and renewal. Some may wait longer than others, perhaps assuming that someone in the organization is already taking care of the matter or that the undesirable conditions are necessary for some compelling, but unknown, reason. (In either case, the distance between FRD and OV would expand.) Passive loyalty involves tolerance, patience, and faith.

Neither unconscious loyal behavior nor passive loyalty (resulting from, respec- tively, selective perception and unquestioning faith) is the type of loyalty of primary interest to Hirschman (1970). Because his purpose is to explore recuperative mechanisms for declining organizations, he puts a premium on early feedback from quality-conscious participants to alert managers of the need for change. That requires perception and action from participants, not inattention and passivity. In terms of


Fig. 2, Hirschman (1970, p. 88) advocates as a primary definition of loyalty the distance between XAL and XWL (Exit in the Absence of Loyalty and Exit With Loyalty). This definition denotes a type of "reformist loyalty"; it implies two things about loyal participants of deteriorating organizations: (a) they are willing to tolerate a higher level of disagreement with organizational activities before they quit than are less loyal participants, and (b) they become increasingly active in pressuring the organization to change its ways as conditions deteriorate. In Hirschman's words (1970, p. 78), loyalty "holds exit at bay and activates voice."

Hirschman's view is supported by Barry (1974, p. 98), among others, who describes loyalty as "a positive commitment to further [an organizations's] welfare by working for it, fighting for it and--where one thinks it has gone astray--seeking to change it. Thus, voice . . . is already built into this concept of loyalty." Birch (1975, p. 75), however, in a rejoinder to Barry (and Hirschman) sees the opposite: "Loyalty means a disposition to accept rather than a disposition to criticize." Farrell (1983, p. 598) departs from Hirschman even further by characterizing "suffer in silence" loyalty as "an independent course of action between exit and voice." For Hirschman and Barry, then, loyal employees are located in Cell 1 of Fig. 1; but for Birch and Farrelt, loyalists can be found in Cell 3. Withey and Cooper (1989) contribute to the debate by pointing out that a passive (Cell 3) conception of loyalty looks, empirically, little different from neglect.

How can loyalty be both universally praiseworthy as behavior and at the same time controversial in its meaning? One reason concerns the nature of an inter- preter's purpose. Hirschman (1970) focuses on recuperative mechanisms for deteriorating organizations. Many managers, and those studying loyalty exclusively from a managerial perspective, have different agendas. For example, managers intent on implementing their plans and instructions with a minimum of hassle from others understandably resent intrusions caused by the raised voices of those who see things differently. To them, voice appears as a threat to the orderly functioning of the organization. As a result, "loyal" participants are seen as those who tolerate less than ideal conditions without complaint (i.e., passive loyalists in Cell 3 of Fig. 1). Hirschman, on the other hand, is interested in how things get fixed, and so applauds participants who combine quality-consciousness, perseverance, and political activity to help achieve that end (i.e., those in Cell 1 of Fig. I).

Another reason for loyalty's controversial connection to voice concerns the lack of symmetry in the relationship. Loyalty is marked by high-intensity voice as conditions worsen, but high-intensity voice by itself does not denote loyalty. Partici- pants who are chronic complainers are very noisy all the time, always finding something they object to. Distinguishing between their noisiness and the voice of loyal participants who are genuinely concerned about real declines in organizational qual- it 3, is a nontrivial task. By failing to make an effort, however, managers lose the benefit of early and accurate feedback about organizational quality lapses. By la- beling all those who use voice as "troublemakers," and reserving the term "loyal" only for those who accept without question whatever happens (or don't even notice what's going on), managers unnecessarily sacrifice the long-term viability of their organizations for the goat of short-term peace and quiet.


RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ON LOYALTY

Under conditions of increasing discontent, at least three different interpreta- tions of loyalty occur: unconscious, passive, and reformist (Fig. 2). While those distinctions are important, it is not necessary to conclude that only one interpretation of loyalty is the "correct" version. Multiple loyalty constructs exist, and an overall model of the antecedents and consequences of each of them is conceivable.

Exit-inhibition is a likely consequence of any type of loyalty, owing to the affective attachment to an organization that loyalty implies. In Fig. 1, loyal responses to felt discontent are in cells ] and 3, rather than in cells 2 and 4. The effect of loyalty on voice, however, may be influenced by various factors such as organizational characteristics, situational features, and individual differences. These variables could be explored empirically to deepen our understanding of the conditions under which one or another type of loyalty is likely to exist. Suggested topics for investigation in

Underlvinu Assumotions:

Organizational benefit of primary interest

Nature of loyalty

Organizational Char@cteristics:

Cultural values

Governance

Situational Features:

Issue Importance

Location of Expertise

Breadth of harm

Individual Differences:

Distinctive competence

Time horizon

Reformist Loyalty

Restoration (and enhancement) of organizational quality (assuming occasional lapses are inevitable)

Affective attachment to an organization that inclines dissatisfied participants to forego available exit alternatives, and remain in the organization to work for change

Participation

Decentralized

Direct link

Participant

Wide

Critical analysis Innovative thinking Articulate communication

Long-term

Passive Loyalty

Maintenance of order and the existing distribution of power

Affective attachment to an organization that inclines dissatisfied participants to forego both exit and voice alternatives

Obedience

Centralized

Doesn't matter

Top level

Narrow

Patience Trust

Short-term

Fig. 3. Contingency analysis of underlying assumptions and variables associated with reformist loyalty and passive loyalty.


each category are described below. These are summarized in Fig. 3, together with the critical underlying assumptions of both reformist and passive loyalty.

Organizational Characteristics

Organizational cultures and governance systems that value and provide mechanisms for participatory decision making are likely to encourage reformist loyalty (Evan, 1974; Graham, 1986; Rokkan, 1974; Spencer, 1986). Under such conditions and in the face of rising disagreement, those with the strongest affection for an organization tend to use voice to help correct a deteriorating situation. In contrast, failure to use culturally valued voice mechanisms where they exist signifies apathy.

Cultures and governance systems that emphasize hierarchical authority and make a virtue of unquestioning obedience, on the other hand, encourage passive loyalty (Kolarska & Aldrich, 1980). In this case, when discontent increases, those with the strongest ties to the organization are likely to be quieter than those who have less affection for it.

An example of differing organizational environments is provided by a com- parison of official policy regarding how American and British civil servants are sup- posed to respond to perceived conflicts between government policy and the public interest. The Code of Ethics for United States Government Service (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1978, p. ix), reads as follows: "Any person in government service should: put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to person, party, or government department." The code goes on to enjoin government employees to "expose corruption wherever discovered." In contrast, Birch (1975, p. 76), citing Wright (1973), describes the official doctrine regarding British civil servants: " . . . they are expected to give 'undivided loyalty' to their minister, rather than to weigh this loyalty against considerations of 'the public interest.'" Thus, official American governmental policy encourages reformist loyalty, while British policy encourages passive loyalty.

Situational Characteristics

Vroom and Yetton's (1973) contingency analysis suggests that situational characteristics, such as issue importance and location of relevant information/expertise, affect the appropriateness of participatory decision making. Given the prominence of voice in participatory decision making, Vroom and Yetton's situational characteristics may also have influences on reformist and passive loyalty.

When an issue is trivial, loyal participants of all types are likely to be relatively quiet (at least, vis-a-vis chronic complainers who have little attachment to an organization). As issue importance increases, however, a divergence between reformist and passive types of loyalty is likely to appear. Reformist loyalty is shown by at- tempting to correct and reverse the process of organizatiofial deterioration, while passive loyalty implies remaining silent. For a reformist loyal participant, suspicion that important information known to the member may not be known to those in


charge is a further incentive to speak up, even to "speak out of turn," while a less loyal participant might not take the risk. Passive loyalists trust that those in charge are better informed and more able to guide the organization than those at lower job levels.

The pervasiveness of harm caused by organizational decline is another situational characteristic that is likely to influence the relationship between loyalty and voice. At one extreme, the harm may be limited to a single individual, i.e., the person who is contemplating voice. Alternatively, an organizational decline may (threaten to) harm large numbers of people. In both cases, the risk to the organization if it fails to recuperate is the loss (via exit) of those who are harmed (Laver, 1975). In the first case, a loyal participant may choose to suffer in silence knowing that she or he has total control over the threat to the organization (that is, his/her own departure). In the second case, however, a passively loyal participant's silence only helps to perpetuate the danger of mass defections by those who are being (or might be) harmed. Reformist loyalty, in this case, would imply warning the organization of the risk it is undertaking, and offering to help repair the damage caused by decline before it is too late.

Individual Differences

Individual differences relevant to the relationship between loyalty and voice include distinctive competence. The affective ties that bind loyal participants to their organizations and deter exit also motivate loyal participants to contribute their best effort to the organization, effort above and beyond the call of duty. The form of such supererogatory effort, moreover, is likely to vary because individuals vary in distinctive competence. Some are skilled in critical analysis, innovative thinking, and articulate (perhaps even courageous) communication of the results. Others' greatest strength is patient forbearance in the face of adversity, trust that those in charge are not only willing but most qualified to make whatever improvements are possible. In either case, it is because of their loyalty to the organization that loyal participants' "best efforts" are expended; in the first case this shows up as voice, in the second, as silence.

Preferred time horizon is another individual difference variable that may affect the likelihood of voice as a response to organizational decline. The longer a loyal participant's time horizon, the more he or she is likely (other things equal) to choose voice over silence. This assumes that, in the short-term, an organization may be able to avoid the full effects of its decline in performance (perhaps because of a shortage of competing organizations for discontented participants to flee to). In such a case, participants focused only on short-term results would feel little need to advocate re- forms that are unlikely to make much difference any time soon. Those focused on the long-term goals of the organization, on the other hand, are more likely to advocate changes necessary to assure their accomplishment, even at the cost of short-term dis- ruption.


CONCLUSION

Finally, it is important to recognize what empirical research can and cannot do. It can help flesh out the antecedents and consequences of each of the types of loyalty illustrated in Fig. 2. It can also compare the prevalence of each type of loyalty under varying conditions. But empirical research cannot determine whether one or another conceptual interpretation is correct. The concepts, while bearing the same name, are simply different, each interesting in its own right and useful for different purposes. Nevertheless, while Hirschman acknowledges multiple uses of the term, the kind of loyalty he finds most useful is that which "holds exit at bay and activates voice" (1970, p. 78). Those wishing to emphasize a different interpretation of loyalty should cite another source.

REFERENCES

Barry, B. (1974). Review article: "Exit, voice, and loyalty." British Journal of Political Science, 4, 79-107. Birch, A. H. (1975). Economic models in political science: The case of "Exit, voice, and loyalty." British

Journal of Political Science, 5, 69-82. Boroff, K. E. (1989). Loyalty--A correlate of exit, voice, or silence? In L F. Burton (Ed.), Industrial

Relations Research Association Series: Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting, 307-314. Industrial Relations Research Association. Madison, WI.

Evan, W. M. (1975). Power, conflict and constitutionalism in organizations. Social Science Information, 14(1), 53-80.

Farrell, D. (1983). Exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect as responses to job dissatisfaction: A multidimensional scaling study. Academy of Management Journal, 26(4), 596-607.

Fisher, C. D., & Locke, E. A. (1992). The new look in job satisfaction research and theory, in C. J. Cranny, P. C. Smith, and E. F. Stone (Eds.), Job Satisfaction, 165-194. New York: Lexington (Macmillan).

Gorden, W. I. (1988). Range of employee voice. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 1(4), 283-299.

Graham, J. W. (1986). Principled organizational dissent: A theoretical essay. In B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, 8, 1-52.

Hirschman, A. O. (1990). Personal communication at a paper session entitled "Theoretical Foundations: Exit/Voice" (for which Hirschman was the discussant), presented at the Second Annual International Conference on Socio-Economics, Washington, DC, March 1990.

Hirschman, A. 0. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hirschman, A. O. (1974). "Exit, voice, and loyalty": Further reflections and a survey of recent contributions. Social Science Information, 13(1), 7-26. [Also published as Chap. 9 in Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond, 213-235. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.]

Hirschman, A. 0. (1976). Exit and voice: Some further distinctions. American Economic Review, 66 (May), 386-389. [Also published as Chap. 10 in Hirschman, A. O. (1981). Essays in trespassing: Economics to polities and beyond, 236-245. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.]

Hirschman, A. O. (1986). Exit and voice: An expanding sphere of influence. In Hirschman, A. O. (1986). Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays. 77-101. New York: Viking.

Kolarska, L., & Aldrich, H. (1980). Exit, voice, and silence: Consumers' and managers' responses to organizational decline. Organizational Studies, 1(1), 41-58.

LaPonce, J. (1974). Hirschman's voice and exit model as spatial archetype. Social Science Information, 13(3), 67-81.

Laver, M. (1976). "Exit, voice, and loyalty" revisited: The strategic production and consumption of public and private goods. British Journal of Political Science, 6, 463-482.

Leck, J. (1989). A. O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: A review of the model and the factors that influence an individual's choice of response. Working paper, Faculty of Management, McGill University.


Mayes, B. T., & Ganster, D. C. (1988). Exit and voice: A test of hypotheses based on fight/flight responses to job stress. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 9, 199-216.

Rokkan, S. (1974). Politics between economy and culture: An international seminar on Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Social Science Information 13(1), 27-38.

Rusbult, C. E., Farrell, D., Rogers, G., & Mainous, A. G., III. (1988). Impact of exchange variables on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: An integrative model of responses to declining job satisfaction. Academy of Management Journa~ 31(3), 599-627.

Scott, R. J. (1986). Dismantling repressive systems: The abolition of slavery in Cuba as a case study. In A. Foxley, M. S. McPherson, & G. O'Donnell (Eds.), Development, Democracy, and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert O. Hirschman, 269-281. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Spencer, D. G. (1986). Employee voice and employee retention. Academy of Management Journal, 29(3), 488-502.

U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (1978). The Whistleblowers: A Report on Federal Employees Who Disclose Acts of Governmental Waste, Abuse, and Corruption. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Vroom, V. H., & Yetton, P. W. (1973). Leadership and Decision Making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Withey, M. J., & Cooper, W. H. (1989). Predicting exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, 521-539.

Wright, M. (1973). The professional conduct of civil servants. Public Administration, LI, 1-15.

document4

Documents