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The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for thecomponent process model

Klaus R. Scherer

Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Emotion is conceptualised as an emergent, dynamic process based on an

individuals subjective appraisal of significant events. It is argued that theoreticalmodels of emotion need to propose an architecture that reflects the essential nature

and functions of emotion as a psychobiological and cultural adaptation mechan-

ism. One proposal for such a model and its underlying dynamic architecture, thecomponent process model, is briefly sketched and compared with some of its major

competitors. Recent empirical evidence in support of the model is reviewed. Special

emphasis is given to the dynamic aspect of emotion processes, in particular thesequence of appraisal checks and the synchronisation of response systems, as well

as the capacity of the model to predict individual differences in emotionalresponding.

Keywords: Emotion theories; Component processes; Appraisal; Response

synchronization; Emotion categories and words.

Although there is now increasing consensus on a componential approach to

emotion and the need to consider appraisal as one of the central underlying

mechanisms (Frijda, 2007a, 2007b; Scherer, 2005b), four central design

features of emotions often receive little more than lip service and continue to

be seriously under researched: (i) the dynamic, recursive nature of emotional

processing; (ii) the central, and causal, role of multilevel cognitive processing

of both antecedent events and response options; (iii) the important

distinction between the emotion episode as a multicomponent process as a

whole and one of its components: subjective feeling or conscious emotional

experience; and (iv) the essential role of individual differences in both

Correspondence should be addressed to: Klaus R. Scherer, Swiss Centre for Affective

Sciences, University of Geneva, 7, Rue des Battoirs, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. E-mail:

[email protected]

Preparation of this paper was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation through

the National Center for Competence in Research in the Affective Sciences grant.

The author acknowledges precious comments and suggestions by Tatjana Aue, Geraldine

Coppin, Didier Grandjean, and Sylvia Kreibig.

COGNITION AND EMOTION

2009, 23 (7), 13071351

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cognitive event appraisal and response dispositions. In recent years, it has

been mostly the protagonists of appraisal theories (Ellsworth & Scherer,

2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999a; Schorr, 2001) who have

attempted to model these design features in a principled fashion. One of thetheoretical models in that tradition, the component process model (CPM) of

emotion, specifically focuses on the dynamic unfolding of emotion (Scherer,

1984a, 1984b, 1986, 2001, 2004). This contribution aims to demonstrate the

utility of this model for our understanding of individual differences in

emotion components and dynamics and to review the empirical evidence

that has accumulated over the years in support of the models predictions.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CPM

Figure 1 shows the architecture of the model, including the dynamic,

recursive emotion processes following an event that is highly pertinent to the

needs, goals, and values of an individual. An important feature of the model

is that it does not include overt instrumental behaviour. In line with the

dominant functional or adaptational approach pioneered by Darwin (1872/

1998), emotion is seen as a reaction to significant events that prepares action

readiness and different types of alternative, possibly conflicting, action

tendencies but not as a sufficient cause for their execution (see also Frijda,2007b). The assumption is that even highly emotional behaviours such as

aggression or flight are prepared by emotions such as anger or fear but that

their execution is multiply determined, with emotion being only one, albeit

potentially important, factor.

As shown in the flow diagram, the CPM suggests that the event and its

consequences are appraised with a set of criteria on multiple levels of

processing (the appraisal component). The result of the appraisal will

generally have a motivational effect, often changing or modifying the

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motivational state before the occurrence of the event. Based on the appraisal

results and the concomitant motivational changes, efferent effects will occur

in the autonomic nervous system (e.g., in the form of cardiovascular and

respiratory changes) and in the somatic nervous system (in the form ofmotor expression in face, voice, and body). All of these components,

appraisal results, action tendencies, somatovisceral changes, and motor

expressions are centrally represented and constantly fused in a multimodal

integration area (with continuous updating as events and appraisals change).

Parts of this central integrated representation may then become conscious

and subject to assignment to fuzzy emotion categories as well as being

labelled with emotion words, expressions, or metaphors.

As recent descriptions of the model can be found elsewhere (Scherer,

2001, 2004, 2005a), in the following section only those elements directlyrelevant to the focus on individual differences and dynamic unfolding of

emotion processes are discussed in detail. To aid the comprehension of the

reader and to allow interpretation of some of the figures, Table 1

synthetically recapitulates some of the central elements of the CPM. As

shown in the table, the model suggests that there are four major appraisal

objectives to adaptively react to a salient event: (a) How relevant is this event

for me? Does it directly affect me or my social reference group? (relevance);

(b) What are the implications or consequences of this event and how do they

affect my well-being and my immediate or long-term goals? (implications);(c) How well can I cope with or adjust to these consequences? (coping

potential); (d) What is the significance of this event for my self-concept and

for social norms and values? (normative significance). To attain these

objectives, the organism evaluates the event and its consequences on a

number ofcriteria or stimulus evaluation checks (SECs; shown in column 1 of

Table 1), with the results reflecting the organisms subjective assessment

(which may well be unrealistic or biased) of consequences and implications

on a background of personal needs, goals, and values (see Ellsworth &

Scherer, 2003; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005; Scherer, 2001, for further

details and references).

It is important to note that the appraisal process does not necessarily

require a complex cognitive calculus but often occurs in an automatic,

unconscious, and effortless fashion. A powerful example is the appraisal

process underlying emotional attention. Recent research using functional

brain imaging in human subjects has revealed low-level neural substrates by

which sensory processing and attention can be modulated by the affective

significance of stimuli. The amygdala plays a crucial role in providing both

direct and indirect top-down signals on auditory and visual sensory

pathways, which can influence the representation of emotional events,especially when related to threat (Grandjean et al., 2005; Pourtois, Grand-

DYNAMIC ARCHITECTURE OF EMOTION 1309

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TABLE 1

Synthetic recapitulation of central elements of the component proce

Stimulus Evaluation Checks

(SECs)

Organismic/Social

functions Component patterning

Relevance (A stimulus event is considered as requiring attention deployment, further information pr

Novelty (Abrupt onset,

familiarity, predictability)

Goal relevance (Does the

event have consequences for

my needs or goals?)

Novel and goal relevant:

Orienting, Focusing/

Alerting

Orienting response; EEG alpha ch

deceleration, vasomotor contractio

dilatation, local muscle tonus chang

interruption of speech and action,

subsequent effort investment given

increased cardiac contractility as in

Intrinsic pleasantness (Is theevent intrinsically pleasant or

unpleasant, independently of

my current motivational

state?)

Pleasant:Incorporation/

Recommending

Sensitisation; inhalation, heart rateopen mouth and nostrils, lips part a

pharyngeal expansion, vocal tract

voice*increase in low frequency e

centripetal hand and arm movemen

Unpleasant:

Rejection/Warning

Defence response, heart rate accele

salivation, pupillary constriction; s

tightening, eye closing, nose wrinkli

lip press, nostril compression, tong

constriction, vocal tract shortened a

frequency energy, F1 rising, F2 and

nasality, resonances raised); centrif

orifices, shrinking posture, avoidan

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TABLE 1 (Continued)


(SECs)

Organismic/Social


Implications (Following attention deployment, the pertinent characteristics of the stimulus event and

determined)

Outcome probability (How

likely is it that the

consequences will occur?)

Discrepancy from expectation

(How different is the situation

from what I expected it to be?)

Conduciveness (Is the event

conducive or obstructive toreaching my goals?)

Conducive: Relaxation/

Stability

Trophotropic shift, rest and recover

decrease, bronchial constriction, incsphincters; decrease in general mus

relaxation of vocal apparatus (rela

moderate amplitude, balanced reso

comfort and rest positions; plus ele

conduciveness appraisal is accompa

to be expected)

Obstructive: Activation/

Reactivity

Ergotropic shift, preparation for ac

adrenaline secretion; deeper and fas

volume, vasoconstriction in skin, ga

in heart and striped musculature, in

decreased gastrointestinal motility, tion of m. arrectores pilorum, decre

conductance level, pupillary dilatat

tighten, lips tighten, chin raising; gaz

voice*F0 and amplitude increase

energy, narrow F1 bandwidth, pron

task-dependent instrumental action

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TABLE 1 (Continued)


(SECs)

Organismic/Social


Urgency (How urgently do I

need to react?)Coping potential (Once nature of event and consequences are known sufficiently well, organism che

expected)

Agent and intention (Who was

responsible and what was the

reason?)

Control (Can the event or its

consequences be controlled

by human agents?)

No or low control:

Readjustment/Withdrawal

Trophotropic dominance; decrease

increase in glandular secretion, part

hypotonus of the musculature; lip c

drooping, inner brow raise and bro

apparatus (lax voice*low F0 andvery low high-frequency energy, spe

neutral setting, broad F1 bandwidt

Power (Do I have sufficient

power to exert control if

possible?)

High control/High power:

Assertion/Dominance

Shift toward ergotropictrophotrop

heart rate decrease, increase in systo

blood flow, increased flow to head,

temperature in upper torso), pupilla

increase in head and neck; eyebrow

narrowed, lips tight and parted, bar

dilation; stare; chest register phona

energy in entire frequency range); a

lean forward, approach locomotion

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TABLE 1 (Continued)


(SECs)

Organismic/Social


Control possible/Low power:

Protection/Submission

Extreme ergotropic dominance; fast

heart rate and heart stroke volume

pressure, increase in pulse volume a

skin temperature), gastrointestinal

striped musculature, decreased gast

bronchial relaxation, contraction of

secretion, secretion of sweat (increa

muscular hypertonus, particularly i

mouth stretch and corner retraction

register phonation (thin voice*ra

energy); protective hand/arm movem

Adjustment (If control is

impossible, how well can I

adjust to the consequences?)

Normative significance (Overall assessment of the event with respect to compatibility with self-conce

Compatibility with internal

and external standards (Does

the event or my behaviour

correspond to (a) my self-

concept or my values, is it

just given my entitlement; (b)

social norms, values, beliefsabout justice, or moral

principles

Requirements met or

surpassed:

Relaxation, Bolstering

self-esteem, Norm

confirmation

Ergotropic shift plus elements of pl

Incompatible: Activation,

Self-consciousness,

Highlighting norms

Ergotropic shift plus elements of un

blood flow to face, blushing; body m

contact)

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All of the appraisal criteria can be processed at different levels of

processing such as (a) a low-level neural circuit as described above, in which

the checking mechanisms are mostly genetically determined and the criteria

consist of appropriate templates for pattern matching and similar mechan-isms (cf. the notion of biological preparedness, e.g., for snakes, Ohman,

1986; or baby faces, Brosch, Sander, & Scherer, 2007); (b) a schematic level,

based on memory traces from social learning processes and occurring in a

fairly automatic, unconscious fashion; (c) an association level, involving

various cortical association areas, which may occur automatically and

unconsciously or in a deliberate, conscious fashion, and (d) the conceptual

level, involving propositional knowledge, and underlying cultural meaning

systems, requiring consciousness and effortful calculations in prefrontal

cortical areas. The different levels continuously interact, producing top-down and bottom-up effects (see Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Power &

Dalgleish, 1997; Scherer, 2005a; van Reekum & Scherer, 1997).

The appraisal mechanism requires interaction between many cognitive

functions and their underlying neural circuits to compare the features of

stimulus events to stored schemata, representations in memory and self-

concept, and expectations and motivational urges of high priority. In

addition, this process controls attention deployment and relies heavily on

implicit or explicit computation of probabilities of consequences, coping

potential, and action alternatives. As shown in Figure 2, the architectureassumes bidirectional influences between appraisal and various cognitive

functions. For example, minimal attention needs to be given for appraisal to

start, but a relevance outcome will immediately deploy further attention to

the stimulus. Stimulus features are compared with schemata in memory but

strongly relevant stimulus features will, following appropriate appraisal, be

stored as emotional schemata in memory. Event consequences are compared

with current motivational states, but particular appraisal outcomes will

change motivation and produce adaptive action tendencies. These bidirec-

tional effects between appraisal and other cognitive functions are illustrated

by the arrows in the upper part of Figure 2.

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the fundamental assumption of the CPM is

that the appraisal results drive the response patterning in other components

by triggering efferent outputs designed to produce adaptive reactions that

are in line with the current appraisal results (often mediated by motivational

changes). Thus, emotion differentiation is the result of the net effect of all

subsystem changes brought about by the outcome profile of the SEC

sequence. These subsystem changes are theoretically predicted on the basis

of a componential patterning model, which assumes that the different

organismic subsystems are highly interdependent and that changes in onesubsystem will tend to elicit related changes in other subsystems. As

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which is what one would expect from the neurophysiological evidence for

complex feedback and feedforward mechanisms between the subsystems (see

neural architecture discussion following). As shown in Figure 2, the result of

each consecutive check is expected to differentially and cumulatively affect

the state of all other subsystems.

The CPM makes specific predictions about the effects of the results of

certain appraisal checks on the autonomic and somatic nervous systems,

indicating which physiological changes and which motor expressionfeatures are expected. These predictions are shown in column 3 of Table

1 (see Scherer, 1987, for further details and justification). The predictions

are based on specific motivational and behavioural tendencies expected to

be activated in the motivation component in order to serve the specific

requirements for the adaptive response demanded by a particular SEC

result. In socially living species, adaptive responses are required not only

for the internal regulation of the organism and motor action for

instrumental purposes (organismic functions), but also for interaction

and communication with conspecifics (social functions). The assumedfunctions linked to specific appraisal outcomes are shown in column 2 of

Figure 2. Schematic summary of the component process model (reproduced with permission from

Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). To view this figure in colour, please visit the online version of

this issue.


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How does the CPM, via the mechanism described above, predict specific

emotions? Contrary to basic emotion theories (see Scherer, 2009; Scherer &

Ellgring, 2007, for reviews), the CPM does not assume the existence of a

limited set of discrete emotions or affect programmes, but considers the

possibility of an infinite number of different types of emotion episode. As

shown below, the beginning of an emotion episode is defined by the

synchronisation or coherence of organismic subsystems beyond a certain

threshold and its end by the coherence dropping below threshold. The

nature of the emotion episode is exclusively determined by the pattern of

appraisal results and the specific patterning over time driven by the

recursively generated appraisal results (see Scherer, 2004). This is why I

have suggested (ever since the first full presentation of the CPM; Scherer,

1984a, p. 311) that the kaleidoscopic arrangement of appraisal results can

generate many different kinds of emotion processes without clear categorical

boundaries. However, in that chapter I also suggested the existence of certain

modal outcomes that occur more frequently due to event contingencies and

psychobiological prewiring. Prime candidates for such frequent and

important contingencies are major patterns of adaptation in the life of

animate organisms that reflect frequently recurring patterns of environ-

mental evaluation and adaptation (see also Ortony & Turner, 1990; Plutchik,

1980). I have suggested using the term modal emotions for emotion episodes

resulting from predominant SEC outcomes that are due to general

conditions of life, constraints of social organisation, and similarity of innate

equipment (Scherer, 1984a, 1994). These modal emotions are predicted by

the CPM on the basis of prototypical appraisal profiles, e.g., modal anger

often occurring as a result of an appraisal profile that includes novelty, high

goal relevance, other agent and intent, high outcome probability, dissonant

expectations, goal obstructiveness, high urgency, high control and power, as

well as injustice or immorality. In contrast, the fear profile, while similar

with respect to relevance and obstructiveness, is characterised by low controland low power appraisals. The detailed CPM predictions are shown in Table

5.4 in Scherer (2001).

The elements of the model described so far are highly comparable to

other appraisal theories, although some of the labels for particular appraisal

criteria and details of the assumed mechanisms may vary (see Ellsworth &

Scherer, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001). However, the CPM differs from

other appraisal theories with respect to two aspects, which are of central

importance to our focus on individual differences and the temporal

dynamics of emotional processes*the sequence assumption and the notionof integration and synchronisation of components, including, in particular,

th i ti l f li t

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Sequential processing of appraisal checks

As shown in Figure 2, the CPM claims that the SECs are processed in

sequence, following a fixed order, consisting of four stages in the appraisalprocess that corresponds to the appraisal objectives described above. This

sequence assumption is justified in terms of systems economy and logical

dependencies*the results of the earlier SECs need to be processed before

later SECs can operate successfully, that is, yield a conclusive result.

Expensive information processing should occur for only those stimuli that

are considered relevant for the organism. In consequence, relevance

detection is considered to be a first selective filter that a stimulus or event

needs to pass to merit further processing. Extensive further processing and

preparation of behavioural reactions are indicated only if the event concernsa goal or need of major importance or when a salient discrepancy with an

expected state is detected, suggesting that the implications for the organism

are assessed next in the sequence. Further, the causes and implications of the

event need to be established before the organisms coping potential can be

conclusively determined, as the latter must be evaluated for a specific

situational demand structure.

I have suggested that the microgenetic unfolding of the emotion

antecedent appraisal processes parallels both phylogenetic and ontogenetic

development in the differentiation of emotions. The earlier SECs, particu-

larly the novelty and the intrinsic pleasantness checks, are present in most

animals, including newborn humans, and one can argue that these low-level

processing mechanisms take precedence as part of our hard-wired detection

capacities and occur rapidly after a stimulus event occurs. More complex

evaluation mechanisms are successively developed at more advanced levels

of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development: Natural selection operates

toward more sophisticated information processing ability in phylogenesis,

and maturation and learning increase the individuals cognitive capacity in

ontogenesis (see Scherer, 1984b, pp. 313314; Scherer, Zentner, & Stern,

2004b).

This sequence assumption is often criticised as being overly restrictive and

inconsistent with the idea that massively parallel processing of information

occurs in different systems. This criticism overlooks the CPMs postulate

that external or internal event changes maintain a recursive appraisal process

until the monitoring subsystem signals termination of or adjustment to the

stimulation that originally elicited the appraisal episode. Thus, the checking

process repeats the sequence continuously, constantly updating the appraisal

results that change rapidly with changing events and evolving evaluation.

The level of processing can be expected to move up during this sequentialcourse, given both the nature of the computation and the likelihood that


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of the event, that is its consequences for the self and its normative or moral

status, is expected to be appraised last, as it requires comprehensive

information about the event and comparison with high-level propositional

representation.The proposed mechanism is highly compatible with the assumption of

parallel processing as all SECs are expected to be processed simultaneously,

starting with relevance detection. It should be noted that the essential

criterion for the sequence assumption is not the occurrence of the event and

the start of the specific appraisal process but the time at which a particular

check achieves preliminary closure, that is yields a result that warrants

efferent commands to response modalities, as shown by the descending

arrows in Figure 2 (see Scherer, 2004, for details). In this way the assumption

of continuously parallel processing is entirely compatible with the notion ofa sequence of primary outcomes. The sequence theory postulates that, for the

reasons outlined earlier, the result of a prior processing step (or check) must

be in before the consecutive step (or check) can produce a conclusive result

with efferent consequences. It is indeed feasible to assume that the results of

parallel processes for different evaluation criteria will be available at different

times, given differential depth of processing.

Integration and central representation of components

The CPM assigns a special status to the feeling component in the emotion

process, which should not be confused with the complete componential

package of emotion (see Scherer, 2005b), as it monitors and regulates the

component process and enables the individual to communicate its emotional

experience to others. Subjective experience needs to integrate and centrally

represent all information about the continuous patterns of change and their

coherence in all other components, especially if it is to serve a monitoring

function. Thus, feeling is an extraordinarily complex conglomerate of

information from different systems. Scherer (2004) has presented a CPM

account of how feelings integrate the central representation of appraisal-

driven response organisation in emotion. This proposal is briefly summarised

in this section.

Psychologists generally assume that feelings are conscious phenomena

and that the only way to access and measure feelings is via verbal report (but

see Lacewing, 2007). However, this widespread assumption holds only for

the visible tip of a huge iceberg. The CPM (Scherer, 2004, 2005a)

conceptualises the problem, as shown in Figure 3, with a Venn diagram in

which a set of overlapping circles represents the different aspects of feeling.

The first circle (A) represents the sheer reflection or representation ofchanges in all synchronised components in some form of monitoring

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projections from both cortical and subcortical CNS structures (including

proprioceptive feedback from the periphery). To my knowledge, there is

currently neither an established technical term nor a precise definition for

this type of integrated unconscious representation. Clearly, to stand out

from the stream of booming, buzzing neural activation, an organising

principle must be at work. Given my emphasis on dynamic synchronisation,

I suggest that this principle might correspond to coherence spreading. This

mechanism has been described for sensory perception (Henkel, 2000) as a

highly nonlinear selection operation between independently operating

disparity units that is achieved quickly and reliably by neural hardware.

Coherence spreading is robust because only the data available within the

coherent cluster are fed forward to later processing stages, and only the tiny

coherent portion of the neural information streams is transmitted for further

analysis. Although several neural realisations of this process may be possible,

the simplest and most common would rely on the synchronisation properties

of pools of neural oscillators (for example, the phase at low frequencies in

subcortical regions may tune the rhythms of high-frequency bursts related to

cortical activities). If this mechanism works for exogenous perception, it may

very well do the job for endogenous interoception. In consequence, I suggest

that the content of circle A be called a neural coherence cluster.

The second circle (B), which only partially overlaps with the first,

represents that part of the integrated central representation that becomes

conscious. This circle corresponds most directly to what is more generallycalled feelings or qualia. I have suggested that the degree of synchronisa-

Figure 3. The reflection of component emotion processes in a monitor system, circle A, the

emergence of consciousness, circle B, and categorisation and verbalisation, circle C (reproduced with

permission from Scherer, 2004). To view this figure in colour, please visit the online version of this

issue.


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pertinence of the event as appraised by the organism) generates awareness

(Scherer, 2005a; see also Grandjean, Sander, & Scherer, 2008).

This suggested architecture depends in large part on the processes of

synchronisation and integration within and between components (Grand-jean et al., 2008). Within-component integration is required because

different structures and processes interact in a complex fashion during

emotion episodes. Thus, information integration within the cognitive

component is required, given the parallel and sequential processing for

different evaluation criteria on different levels. As shown in Figure 3, the

proprioceptive (both intero- and exteroceptive) feedback information from

different response components (such as vocal and facial expression or

psychophysiological changes) is integrated with the representation of the

appraisal results to yield a neural coherence cluster. I suggest that the veryprocess of multicomponent integration and synchronisation constitutes the

critical defining feature of emotion episodes. In trying to understand

integration at different points in the emotion episode and the rules likely

to underlie this process, the key issue concerns the relative weight given to

the different components*appraisal, physiological responses, motor expres-

sion, motivation, and action tendencies. Research to examine the nature of

this multimodal integration has hardly started. Although there is renewed

interest in interoception and its neural basis (Craig, 2002; Wiens, 2005), few

attempts have been made to examine how the peripheral representation isintegrated with the representation of other subsystems.

An important feature of emotion processes is that they are also

dynamically integrated over time. The term emotional state is misleading,

as it suggests a static, unitary phenomenon rather than a flow of

continuously changing component states that constitute emotion episodes.

Although humans can focus on micro-momentary changes of feeling, we

tend to become aware of our feelings in experiential chunks that provide

phenomenal unity to a particular feeling quality or quale. Temporal

integration, in the sense of experiential chunking, is most likely determinedby the period during which a certain level of component synchronisation

persists.

Contrary to discrete or basic emotion theories (Ekman, 1984, 1992; Izard,

1977, 1993; Tomkins, 1984), the CPM does not share the assumption of a

limited number of innate, hard-wired affect programmes*even for basic

emotions such as anger, fear, joy, sadness, and disgust. Rather, as shown

above, the emotion process is considered as a continuously fluctuating

pattern of change in several organismic subsystems that become integrated

into coherence clusters and thus yields an extraordinarily large number ofdifferent emotional qualities, virtually as many as there are different

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1984b, 2001). In consequence, there should be an almost unlimited number

of qualia.

Before proceeding, it may be useful to examine this concept in greater

detail, as it defines the content of circle B. Lewis (1929) pioneered the use ofthe term qualia in its generally agreed modern sense as follows:

There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in

different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these qualia. But

although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to

another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. . . .

The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error

because it is purely subjective. (p. 121; see also Metzinger, 2004)

Dennett (1988) has identified four properties that are commonly ascribedto qualia: (i) ineffable (cannot be communicated or apprehended by any

means other than direct experience); (ii) intrinsic (nonrelational properties,

which do not change depending on the experiences relation to other things);

(iii) private (interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically im-

possible); and (iv) directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness (to

experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale and to know all there

is to know about that quale). Although there is a lot of philosophical debate

about the concept, and despite Dennetts (2001) warning about the

functional use of the term qualia in neuroscience, I feel that its considereduse is preferable to the complete absence of an appropriate term for what

Tolman (1935) meant by immediate experience or raw feels (see also Kirk,

1996). I feel that it fits the conscious representation of an integrated

multimodal coherence cluster as personal, subjective experience of an

emotion episode rather well. It is particularly important to insist on Lewis

description of qualia as universals being stable over experiences of a similar

type and thus memorisable and recognisable.

In consequence, it is the qualia that constitute the core of affective

experience, the most fundamental, raw, untouched (in the sense of furtherprocessing) representation of the underlying appraisal and consequent

response processes. This is very different from Russells (2003, and 2009

this issue) notion ofcore affect, which is defined as a single point in a two-

dimensional valence)arousal space. Qualia, in contrast, are seen as central

representations of integrated multimodal coherence clusters and thus their

formation should in principle be predictable, observable, and explainable*

although researchers currently lack the required theoretical modelling tools

as well as the appropriate methodology. Qualia are reflections of complex

multidimensional feature spaces; which, like any other high-dimensionaldata set, can be projected into lower-dimensional space (see below; Scherer,


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Categorisation and verbalisation of feeling

Although a richly textured conscious feeling that fits the situation a person

experiences like a glove is highly functional for fine-tuned adaptation andregulation, it is less well suited for cognitive manipulation, memorisation, or

communication. Of course the same is true for all perception, which is why

categorisation plays such a major role in all of cognitive processing.

How can one envisage feeling categorisation on the basis of the

component process architecture? Rosch (1973) proposed two general

principles for the formation of categories that have been widely accepted:

(i) cognitive economy, reducing the infinite differences among stimuli to

behaviourally and cognitively manageable scope; and (ii) reflection of

perceived structures and regularities in the world. In addition, Roschproposed a distinction between vertical (inclusiveness of a category) and

horizontal (differentiation of categories at any one layer) levels of

categorisation. Finally, she proposed that the use of prototypes, containing

the most representative attributes inside a category, will increase the

flexibility and distinctiveness of categories along the horizontal dimension.

Shaver and his collaborators (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & OConnor, 1987)

have shown the utility of this approach for understanding the emotion

vocabulary, distinguishing between superordinate (positive, negative emo-

tions), basic (joy, anger, sadness), and subordinate (irritation, rage) category

levels. But categorisation clearly occurs before verbalisation, and numerous

preverbal categories for emotional feelings are to be expected. In fact, these

prelinguistic groupings form the basis for the acquisition of concepts and

words in very young children (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007;

Hirschfeld, 2001). In each of these cases, the perception of some regularity

in the differences between objects or actions seems to be involved. One

would imagine that the same is true for the formation of prelinguistic

emotion categories. Individuals would need to perceive some regularity in

the differential patterning of different emotional experiences in order to

form such preverbal qualia categories.

Not only on the ontogenetic level, but equally so at the microgenetic level,

prelinguistic categories must precede verbalisation (if only to reduce the

candidate sets of words for which the semantic features need to be checked

against felt experience), and one needs to pose the question of the processes

that have led to the formation of such preverbal emotion categories. Most

likely, the lowest level of inclusiveness is that of the preverbal qualia, as

they represent qualitative types of experiences that can be recognised and

remembered. This level can be expected to be idiosyncratic and fuzzy.

Using Roschs principles, one would expect that more inclusive categories areformed through a constraint satisfaction procedure between cognitive economy

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encountered during emotion episodes. It is thus of primary importance for an

understanding of qualia categorisation to identify these structures and

regularities. Even though the content of the qualia is likely to consist of an

integrated representation of the individual components, one might imaginethat some components, especially those that best differentiate types of qualia,

are more important than others in determining categorisation.

One candidate for determining category formation is somatovisceral

feedback, which adherents of a peripheralist tradition founded by James

and Lange (Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962) tend to emphasise

(Barrett, 2006, uses the term embodied categories). While somatovisceral

feedback is certainly one of the determinants of categorisation, an exagger-

ated emphasis on this factor, to the exclusion of other factors, may prove to be

an impediment in trying to understand the process. The reason is that certaintypes of physiological activation occur in a similar form in several emotions

(e.g., increase in heart rate and muscle tension) because sympathetic

activation serves urgent action preparation, a feature shared by several

emotions. In consequence, it seems unlikely that this modality is the only

determinant of category formation (as many critics of the James/Lange

position, have argued over the last century). The perception of bodily

changes may well add colour to the emotional experience (as James, 1890,

argued), for example, concerning the intensity and vividness of the feeling, but

it is unlikely to account for the bulk of differentiation and categorisation offeelings. One can reasonably argue that appraisal configurations (Scherer,

1997a, 2001), core relational themes (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993),

or action tendencies (Frijda, 1986, 1987) are more promising candidates.

Thus, I assume that qualia representing integrated appraisal configura-

tions and action tendencies (probably including the accompanying somato-

visceral response patterns as part of the integrated package), which occur

relatively frequently and are of central importance to the individuals well-

being, the modal emotions described earlier, will serve as the basis for

categorisation of qualia clusters into more inclusive categories on Roschs

vertical dimension. As suggested early on (Scherer, 1984a, p. 311), I believe

that it is those modal categories that are generally labelled with a single word

or a brief expression in most languages of the world and that the availability

of such linguistic labels imposes a large degree of separateness and

discreteness to particular types of experiences. I also think that these

categories correspond to both the subordinate and basic levels of categor-

isation in Shavers system.

I now turn to the issue of the labelling of ones preverbal feelings and their

communication. This process is one of the most neglected and least well

understood components of emotion research. Presumably, the same experi-ential chunks that form the coherence clusters described earlier serve as the


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indicates that the use of linguistic labels or expressions to describe the

conscious part of feeling rarely covers the complete conscious experience,

which may be due to the lack of appropriate verbal concepts or strategic

communication intentions. On the other hand, the implications of the chosenverbal description may go beyond the content of the emotional experience, as

the denotation and connotation of the concepts used in the verbalisation may

add surplus meaning (or even modify the meaning to some extent). In any

case, verbal report always relies on language and thus on the semantic fields of

emotion words or metaphors to express conscious experience. The extra-

ordinarily rich texture of the qualia concerned is likely to be expressed to only

a small degree. Apart from capacity constraints (the constantly changing

stream of conscious content cannot be appropriately represented by a discrete

utterance), the available words and expressions in a language constrain thepotential complexity of differentiation, despite the fact that most languages

offer a choice of several hundred emotion terms. Given strong individual

differences in category width and verbal ability (including alexithymia), this

indeterminacy may account for much of the variance in emotion reports. An

interesting question is whether the act of categorisation that is implied by

verbal labelling, which will undoubtedly affect the representation of the

emotional experience, may impoverish the rich qualia experience and mould it

into socioculturally determined schemata.

Another interesting question concerns the labelling mechanism. Does theintegrated central representation described earlier first activate a preverbal

category that can then be verbally labelled if so desired? Or does the

individual check the semantic features of emotion words and expressions

against the centrally represented experience if the need arises? Of course,

languages differ somewhat with respect to emotion vocabulary, and it is thus

imperative to better understand the nature and origin of the differences

between the semantic fields of emotion terms in different languages across

the world. Together with a large group of international collaborators, I have

started to examine this issue with the help of the GRID approach (asking

native speakers to evaluate a standard set of emotion terms on a feature

vector of 144 items representing all components of emotion; Scherer, 2005b).

Currently, data for about 30 languages have been collected. First results

suggest that four dimensions are necessary to define the affective space onto

which the meaning of major individual emotion terms can be projected*

valence, power/control, arousal, and unpredictability, in this order

(Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007).

Individual differences and regulationApart from its emphasis on components and dynamic unfolding of emotion,

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useful for the conceptualisation and prediction of individual differences in

emotional reactions*even in cases in which the eliciting event is objectively

the same. Take baggage loss in the airport, for example. One might think

that this event would produce the same emotion in all passengers concerned

by such a loss. But this is not the case. In a study of 109 airline passengers

waiting in vain for their baggage to materialise (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997), we

found that there were virtually no two passengers who reported feeling

exactly the same pure emotion. Rather, all of them reported various

mixtures or blends of several different emotions. When we systematically

questioned these passengers about their appraisals of the event (using

questions based on the CPM checks), we could show that specific appraisal

results and predicted response types clustered closely together in three-

dimensional space (see Figure 6 in Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In analysing the

videotaped interaction between the passengers and the airline agents

processing their claims, we could also show that certain types of appraisal

differentiate the occurrence of true (Duchenne) smiles or false smiles,

demonstrating that the predictive validity of appraisal goes beyond verbal

report (Scherer & Ceschi, 2000).

Similarly, in a series of experiments Kuppens and his collaborators have

demonstrated that anger can occur in combination with different patterns of

appraisals, varying as a function of situation but also person characteristics.

Thus, while for some individuals frustration is sufficient for becoming

angered, for others, the thwarting has to be appraised as norm violation as

well as unfair and deliberate in order for them to experience anger (Kuppens,

Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007).

TABLE 2

Voice type predictions for specific types of affect disorders (reproduced from

Scherer, 1987)

Vocal tract

Pharynx setting Tension Register

Euphoria Wide Medium tense Slightly full

Mania Wide Extremely tense Extremely full

Anhedonia Very narrow Slightly tense Neutral

Helplessness Narrow Lax Thin

Anxiety disorder Narrow Medium/high tense Thin

Agitated fear Narrow Extremely tense Very thin

Chronic frustration Narrow Medium tense Medium full

Indifference, apathy Neutral Slightly NeutralShame, guilt Narrow Slightly tense Thin


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These examples show the utility of appraisal theories, and thus of the

CPM, to model and predict individual differences. In particular, these

theories predict that emotions are elicited entirely on the basis of an

individuals subjective evaluations of the event and his or her role in it ratherthan its objective characteristics*given that the latter may be perceived

differently and evaluated on the basis of the individuals goals and values as

well as on his or her coping potential. In consequence, as the baggage-loss

example shows, if one knows the results of an individuals event appraisal on

the major checks, one can approximately predict (see Table 5.4 in Scherer,

2001) what kind of emotion he or she will most likely experience (or more

precisely, what label the person is likely to use to refer to the experience).

Furthermore, it can be predicted (based on the component patterning

model; see Table 1, Scherer, 1987, and Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in Scherer, 2001)what motor expressions, action tendencies, and physiological changes can be

expected to underlie this experience. Alternatively, again based on the

component patterning model, if one observes particular motor expressions

of an individual in a given situation, one can try to infer the results of the

persons specific appraisal of an event (and predict the likely emotion, or the

label used, on that basis; Scherer, 1988, 1992). To my knowledge, none of

competing emotion theories is structurally able to account for individual

differences in such a detailed fashion or to make concrete a priori

predictions.Apart from this general approach to individual differences in emotional

responses to given events or situations, our group has attempted to identify

dispositional factors that may lead to stable tendencies to appraise events in

a particular fashion. These tendencies or biases can systematically affect an

individuals evaluations and cause him or her to stray from a possible modal

response to a given event, to the point of pathological responding.

In consequence, Scherer (1987) suggested conceptualising different types

of emotional disorders on the basis of appraisal malfunctioning. The

underlying assumption is that although appraisal is subjective and may

vary from individual to individual, it must remain*within certain limits*

appropriate to the objective situation (e.g., through reality testing) and to the

coping potential that is commonly perceived to be within the individuals

means. Violation of these appraisal reality constraints, as one might call

them, will lead to the resulting emotion being considered as abnormal or

disordered, at least by an individuals social environment, if not by him- or

herself. For example, Scherer (1987) has suggested that one particular form

of depression, helplessness, might be partly due to a consistent under-

estimation of ones coping potential. An important distinction is that an

individual who truly lacks the means to deal with a particularly difficultsituation would be described as dejected, whereas someone described as

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or her coping potential, in an inappropriate or unrealistic fashion. Table 2

shows the predictions for vocal signatures of specific emotional disturbances

as based on the combination of the appraisal bias predictions and the

component patterning model. Kaiser and Scherer (1998) extended this

analysis and suggested four possible types of long-term malfunction and the

chronic emotionality disturbances that can result: (a) inappropriate or

inadequate appraisal of a situation and events; (b) inappropriate or

inadequate level of processing; (c) inappropriate or inadequate motor

expression or signalling; and (d) inappropriate or inadequate relationships

between aspects of feeling. Appraisal biases in the form of inappropriate or

inadequate appraisal of a situation and events in specific can be linked to the

TABLE 3Facial action units predicted as indicators of selected types of affect disorder

Affect disorders Inadequate appraisals

Related action units

(shorthand descriptions)

Euphoria Excessively positive

pleasantness and

conduciveness

evaluation

5 (lids up), 26 (open mouth),

38 (open nostrils); or 6 (crows feet

wrinkles), 12 (lip corners up),

25 (lips part)

Anhedonia Excessively negative

pleasantness evaluation

4 (brow lowering), 7 (lid tightening),

9 (nose wrinkling), 10 (upper lipraising), 15 (lip corners down &

chin raised), 24 (lip press),

39 (nostrils closed)

Chronic dissatisfaction,

frustration

Strong bias toward habitual

negative conduciveness

evaluation

4 (brow lowering), 7 (lid tightening),

17 (chin raised), 23 or 24

(lips tight or pressed together)

Indifference, apathy Malfunctioning of

conduciveness check

Hypotonus of facial musculature

Mania Overestimation of power

and control

4, 5 (eyebrows contracted, eyes

widened), or 7 (lids tight, eyes

narrowed); 23, 25 (lips tight &parted, bared teeth)

Hopelessness Underestimation of control 15 (lip corner depression), 25 or

26 (lips part or jaw drop), 41 or

43 (lids droop or eyes closed),

if tears 1'4 (inner brow raised &

contracted)

Helplessness Underestimation of power 1, 2, 5 (brows & upper lid raising),

20 (mouth stretch), 26 (jaw drop),

or 32 (lip bite)

Anxiety disorders Excessive concern about

adequacy of power

4 (eyebrows contracted), 1, 2,

5 (brows and upper lid raising),20 (mouth stretch), 23, 24 (lips tight

or pressed), 32, 37 (lip bite or wipe)


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TABLE 4

Potential sources of systematic individual differences (dispositions, biases) in event ap

emotion component and type of origin or proc

Individual

differences (IDs)

Hardwired / constitutional

Automatic Sensorimotor

Learned / dispositional

Schematic Unconscious

Appraisal process Genetic or cultural factors, brain

circuitry biases (chemosensory signal

sensitivity; speed and structure of

cognitive system, e.g., category width,

illusions; value systems)

Personal learning history (condition

perception and judgement tendenci

dispositional appraisal biases due to

thinking, stable personal or situatio

schemata)

Motivationalchange Reflexivity, impulsivity Dispositional reaction and copingtendencies, personality

Physiological

responses

Vagal tone, temperament, stablelabile

autonomic nervous system

Physiological response schemata

Motor expression Constitutional and cultural expressivity Motor attitudes, habitual expressio

Subjective feeling Temperamental affectivity Trait affectivity, nonverbal categori

schemata, contagion/information ef

others

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efferent expressions generated by specific appraisals, as predicted in the

component patterning model, which may give rise to inappropriate facial

expressions (see Table 3).

Van Reekum and Scherer (1997) further extended the analysis ofappraisal biases as stable dispositions and distinguished between (a)

appraisal biases with respect to the form or process of appraisal such as

speed, thoroughness or completeness, width of the categories used in

inference and classification, vigilance, or degree of top-down control of

lower-level processing (e.g., sensitisation or automatisation); and (b)

appraisal biases with respect to content such as agency or power attribution

bias, over sensitisation, valence appreciation, over- or underestimation of

relevance, conduciveness, control and coping potential, fairness, or moral

appropriateness (see Table 1 for greater detail on these SECs). Van Reekumand Scherer also reviewed the literature on potential sources for individual

differences in appraisal tendencies such as organismic predispositions,

cognitive styles, need for cognition, personality traits (e.g., extroversion,

repressionsensitisation, neuroticism, rigidity, dysphoria, worrying, sensa-

tion-seeking, openness), attitudinal structures, self-concept, or self-image.

The main origin of these interindividual differences are probably strongly

related to early differences (genetics and epigenetics) in the development of

the central nervous system, particularly in terms of executive functions or

perception biases. For example, Canli et al. (2006) found support for a modelby which life stress interacts with the effect of 5-HTTLPR genotype on

amygdala and hippocampal resting activation that may provoke a chronic

state of negative cognitive bias including increased vigilance, threat, or

rumination and may thus constitute a neural mechanism for epigenetic

vulnerability for depression.

These theoretical analyses are currently pursued and extended to other

components of emotion. Table 4 shows a preliminary attempt, produced for

the purposes of this article, to categorise the sources of individual differences

in emotional responding by the components and their potential origins.

There is not sufficient space to discuss these suggestions in detail. However,

there is now copious evidence for the powerful role of dispositional factors

(both constitutional and learned) for emotional reactions, in particular the

role of personality factors and trait affect for both appraisal and motiva-

tional aspects (Griner & Smith, 2000; Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000;

Reisenzein & Weber, in press; Revelle & Scherer, 2009). Kuppens and his

collaborators have illustrated these links for the case of anger. Thus, they

demonstrated that trait anger is negatively correlated with agreeableness and

perceived social esteem (especially for individuals who attach high impor-

tance to social relations; Kuppens, 2005) and showed situation-specificindividual differences in the appraisal of threatened self-esteem and other-


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(unstable self-esteem, neuroticism, and BIS sensitivity in unpleasant

evaluative situations vs. feeling lowly valued by others in non-evaluative

situations; Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007).

Based on this earlier work, Wranik and Scherer (2009) developed a model

of how such appraisal biases may systematically privilege the occurrence of

anger experiences, arguing that individuals differ in how they selectively

attend to specific elements of a situation or event, how these elements are

cognitively encoded, and how these encodings activate and interact with

other cognitions and affects in the overall personality system (Mischel &

Shoda, 1995). This may explain why some people experience anger more

frequently or intensely or why they generally experience certain types of

emotions under specific conditions. For example, a perfectionist may

chronically overestimate the importance of events, an impatient person

may overestimate the urgency of situations, or a person particularly sensitiveto injustice will evaluate many situations as unjust. Table 5 illustrates this

TABLE 5

Individual difference variables potentially biasing appraisal toward anger outcomes

Appraisal dimension Individual difference variables

Relevance detection

Novelty Speed of habituation, extent of inhibition

Intrinsic pleasantness Anhedonia (Germans & Kring, 2000)

Goal relevance Human motivation, achievement motivation, affiliation

motivation (McClelland, 1985)

Implication assessment

Causal attribution Explanatory style (Seligman et al., 1979)

Outcome probability

check

Optimismpessimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985)

Discrepancy from

expectation

Openness to experience/conservatism (Costa & McCrae, 1992)

Goal/need

conduciveness

Perfectionism (Stoeber & Otto, 2006)

Urgency Realism

Coping potential determination

Control Locus of control (Rotter, 1966); illusion of control

Power Self-esteem (Kuppens, 2005; Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007); self-

efficacy (Bandura, 1977)

Adjustment Openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992); flexibility, agree-

ableness (Kuppens, 2005)

Normative significance evaluation(a) Internal standards Individual human values (Schwartz, 1992)

(b) External standards Cultural values (Hofstede, 1984; Schwartz, 2006)

Note: Adapted from Wranik and Scherer (2009).

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could systematically influence specific appraisal dimensions as postulated by

the CPM (Scherer, 1984a, 1984b, 2001), including traditional personality

traits, social-cognitive and motivational dispositions (e.g., self-efficacy, self-

esteem, optimism), and differences in lower-level cognitive processing (e.g.,inhibition, processing speed). The underlying idea is that these individual

differences influence specific appraisal dimensions in a relatively stable

manner and thus help explain why some people are more likely to experience

certain types of emotions under specific conditions than other people do.

Recently, Scherer and Brosch (2009) have made a first effort to develop a

preliminary theoretical analysis of the effect of specific appraisal tendencies

or biases on emotion dispositions and trait affect such as trait anxiety, trait

anger, or trait positive/negative affect. Based on the theoretical suggestions

outlined above, we developed the compilation shown in Table 6, illustratingpossible links between certain appraisal tendencies or biases and specific

emotion dispositions or trait affects. In addition, we made an attempt to

illustrate how culture-based goal, belief, and value systems can produce

appraisal biases by affecting the perception of events and the criteria used in

their evaluation.

So far, only individual differences with respect to dispositions, biases, and

distortions in the use of the different appraisal check criteria have been

discussed. Of course, individual differences go way beyond this aspect of

emotion processing. Thus, individuals may differ with respect to the levels ofanalysis that are preferentially used in appraisal or in the rapidity of

switching between levels or the capacity to integrate levels. Furthermore,

individuals may differ as regards the rules underlying the integration of the

results produced by different appraisal checks. For example, Kuppens and

his collaborators showed that whereas some individuals react with approach

behaviour to anger, others prefer avoidance (often coupled with social

sharing; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004) and that the relation-

ships between appraisals and the resulting emotional experience can be very

different for different angry individuals (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Rijmen,

2008).

I have suggested using Andersons (1989) model ofintegration functions to

understand the process whereby subjective appraisal results are transformed

into an implicit response (Scherer, 2004). Individuals may develop, strongly

affected by their current goals, specific integration rules for the combina-

tions of specific appraisal criteria. For example, we found empirically (van

Reekum et al., 2004) that different levels of coping potential have very

different effects upon psychophysiological responses as a function of goal

conduciveness, reflecting the fact that coping ability is of less relevance when

things are going according to plan. In Andersons approach, this would bemodelled by a configuration rule, predicting that the importance of one of


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TABLE 6

Individual difference variables and cultural goal, belief, and value dimensions pote

trait affect (reproduced from Scherer & Brosch

Emotion disposition / Traitaffect (emotional disorder)

Appraisal tendencies or biases(motivational and cognitive)

Trait sadness:

Resignation, dejection,

acquiescence (depression)

Mot: Strong attachment to people and property

Cog: Low self-esteem, underestimation of

control, coping, and adjustment potential;

tendency to ruminate

Trait anger:

Irritation, irascibility, choleric

(hostility, psychoticism)

Mot: Strong goal orientation, high expectations

Cog: High self-esteem, external attribution,

blaming, overestimation of control, power,

coping, and adjustment potential; exaggerated

optimismTrait anxiety:

Worrier, apprehensiveness,

neuroticism (general

anxiety disorder)

Mot: Perfectionism

Cog: Exaggerated sensitivity for novelty,

uncertainty, and urgency (looming); low self-esteem,

underestimation of control, coping, and

adjustment potential; exaggerated pessimism

Trait shame/guilt:

Embarrassment, unworthiness,

disconcertment, abashment

(clinical shame/guilt syndromes)

Mot: High need for self-worth and social recognition

conformity; perfectionism

Cog: Internal attribution

Trait positive affect:

Joyfulness, buoyancy,cheerfulness, good spirits

(manic euphoria)

Mot: Hedonism, realistic aims

Cog: Optimism; high self-esteem, overestimationof control, coping, and adjustment potential

Note: Mot: motivational, Cog: cognitive; Goa: goal pursuit; Bel: beliefs about human nature

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differences in cognitive or motivational dispositions, as well as stable

sociocultural factors and the immediate social context, may have a very

powerful effect on the weighting of specific criteria and may, in and of itself,

bias the integration of the appraisal criteria toward configuration rules. To

model such individually different integration functions we may need to

adopt nonlinear dynamic system analysis (Scherer, 2000a) as a more

appropriate framework for emotion modelling than the classic assumption

of linear functions dominating our current statistics toolbox (e.g., regression

analysis).

Similarly, individuals may vary in the process of integration of the other

organismic subsystems involved in emotion, such as autonomic variability

and muscular expression. Individuals are likely to differ with respect to their

capacity for interoception and the use of proprioceptive cues in the different

response components of the emotion process, which will affect feedback and

integration mechanisms. The most important integration mechanism,

elicited and organised by the process of synchronisation that I have proposed

as the hallmark of the emotion phenomenon, is the integration of all the

synchronised components (see Figure 3), which probably occurs outside of

awareness. Anderson (1989, p. 147) suggested: What does attain conscious-

ness is often, perhaps always, a result integrated across different sense

modalities at preconscious stages. The nature of this integration process

has not yet been addressed: Are the widely varying types of representations

exchanged into a common currency? Or does even the final product of

integration still consist of a heterogeneous amalgam of representations

reflecting the specific nature of the various components? Individuals may

differ in how this process works and they will most likely differ as regards the

relative weights attributed to different components. Thus the qualia of an

emotion experience may be more strongly determined by appraisal results

whereas another gives greater importance to self-perceived action tendencies.

One individual may strongly weight internal physiological arousal whereasanother places more emphasis on proprioceptive motor cues. The old

distinction between internalisers vs. externalisers may well be relevant here

(see Cacioppo et al., 1992). Another source for individual differences may be

the threshold of synchronisation or coherence that is needed for an

emotional process to become conscious. Finally, we do know that there

are major individual differences with respect to linguistic labelling (circle C

in Figure 3) based on factors such as pathology (alexithymia), verbal

intelligence or experience (especially knowledge of vocabulary), socialisation

(e.g., verbal interaction with mothers; Dunn & Brown, 1994), or pastexperiences.


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COMPARISON WITH OTHER EMOTION THEORIES

As one might expect, the CPM is highly compatible with other appraisal

theories (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 1999a). Although not alltheorists subscribe to all aspects of the model, the issues concerned are fairly

minor and can be settled by empirical evidence. The CPM is continuously

updated on the basis of new findings. The CPM is also largely compatible

with theories that stress the importance of particular aspects of emotion

such as relationships to goals (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), causal

attribution (Weiner, 1985), or action tendencies (Frijda, 1987, 2007b). The

CPM also postulates a major role for these aspects, and adjustments can be

made once new evidence comes in. There seem to be major differences with

discrete or basic emotion theories in the tradition of Ekman (1992) andIzard (1993), especially about the small number of emotions addressed and

the rather rigid notion of affect programmes leading to prototypical

response patterns (see Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). However, these differences

are much less decisive than they appear at first sight, as these theorists have

stressed in their recent writings that they: (a) consider complex emotions in

addition to basic emotions; (b) postulate emotion families that allow for

many gradations within each family; (c) assume affect programmes to be

flexible; (d) postulate interactions between subsystems; and (e) consider both

automatic and elaborated appraisal as differentiating elicitors (see Scherer,

2009, for further detail).

In contrast, the CPM architecture is incompatible with recent constructi-

vist theories suggested by Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006). Implicitly,

Barrett (2006, p. 31) considers the CPM as a natural kinds model, like

most theories other than her own, and declares them as obsolete. It is to be

hoped that the preceding description of the model has convinced the reader

that it is anything but a natural kinds model, postulating fuzzy sets of

modal emotions (as a result of a categorisation of qualia) on the background

of an infinite variety of emotional processes and their qualia representations.

Barrett has made the issue of feeling categorisation the centrepiece of her

neo-constructivist theory claiming that emotions are exclusively constituted

by the individuals categorisation (through a conceptual act) of core

affect (valence)arousal), as determined by personal memories and

cultural concepts.

The CPM is in strong disaccord with several aspects of these claims, as is

evident from comparing the model described above with the two constructivist

approaches in this volume (Barrett, 2009 this issue; Russell, 2009 this issue).

First, both Russell and Barrett redefine the word emotion to refer

exclusively to categorised feeling, following William James, who alsotreated the terms emotion and feeling as synonyms (Scherer, 2005b, p. 699),

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CPM treats feeling as one of the components of the emotion process (albeit

an important one, as feeling monitors the emotion episode through

integration and representation of changes in the other components). Using

the words emotion and feeling interchangeably (as is sometimes done innave language) muddles the important conceptual distinction made by

defining these words differentially as technical terms. In the context of a

componential approach to emotion, such a semantic confusion is logically

problematical, as it implies treating a part or component as equivalent to the

whole (a pars pro toto problem).

Second, both Russell and Barrett claim that core affect, a point in a low

dimensional valence)arousal space, is the central psychological primitive

for affective feeling and the basis for all additional processing, i.e., the

construction of an emotion category. This claim is neither justifiedtheoretically nor demonstrated empirically. It is not clear in what sense

and why valence and arousal feelings are considered as more core,

primitive, or basic than other internal representations. The core affect

theorists may argue that people can reliably describe their feelings on these

dimensions. However, this is easily explained by a projection from a high-

dimensional qualia space to a lower dimensional space (see above),

especially if a person is invited to engage in such integration and projection

by being given valence and arousal scales. This does not mean that the low-

dimensional projection is core in the sense of being logically prior or moreraw or primitive in the sense of the extent of processing. On the contrary, a

low-dimensional projection is most likely a highly processed product. This

view is buttressed by findings showing that when one asks people what they

have felt during a certain emotional episode, they rarely spontaneously

answer in terms of valence and arousal gradation. We asked a representative

sample of the Swiss population what emotion they experienced on the

previous day. They described the situation and labelled their subjective

experience, their feelings, in their own words. Only a very small percentage of

the more that 1000 respondents used general or positive valence labels

(5.8%), and almost none used direct arousal terms (Scherer, Wranik,

Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004a). Obviously, if we had provided them

with scales for valence and activation of the experience, they would have

gladly complied. But the low-dimensional description does not sponta-

neously come to mind*which is what one would expect if it were a primitive.

Maybe Russell and Barrett mean the word core in the sense of the most

important dimensions in low-dimensional space (valence and arousal). Since

Wundt there have been many efforts to establish the set of dimensions that

most economically accounts for the similarities and differences in emotional

experience, and there has been considerable disagreement about the numberand nature of the dimensions (see Gehm & Scherer, 1988). While there is


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clear what kind of arousal or activation is meant*mental activation,

sympathetic arousal, parasympathetic arousal? These are all quite different.

The two-dimensional valence by arousal space seems to be considered basic

on the basis of countless factor analyses that show stability for only thesetwo dimensions. However, it is questionable whether this is not an artefact of

methodology (the choice of the objects for similarity ratings, especially

verbal labels; see Scherer, 2000b, pp. 184185). As mentioned above, recent

work, using a more adequate, theoretically anchored feature profile-based

similarity assessment yields four reliable factors for many different

languages, with arousal coming in only third, after a control/mastery/power

factor (Fontaine et al., 2007). It seems reasonable to assume that control/

mastery/power are very prominent criteria for adaptive responses and should

be part of a primitive or core feeling read-out. The same is true forunexpectedness or novelty, which weighs in as the fourth factor. Indeed,

there is an enormous amount of literature showing the basicness and

primitivity of novelty detection in all organisms. Why should this central

factor in perceiving and evaluating the world not be represented in core

affect? Particularly as it is one of the central determinants of emotional

attention (as a central aspect of relevance; Brosch & Scherer, 2009).

A central problem with the core affect notion as proposed by Russell

(2003, and 2009 this issue) and Barrett (2006, and 2009 this issue) is that

there is little attempt to describe the mechanisms whereby core affect isproduced. The authors provide a general list of factors involved in this

process, including appraisal. However, no hypotheses or mapping rules,

comparable to the appraisal predictions, are suggested that could be

empirically tested. It is thus not clear how core affect is differentiated.

This omission is particularly worrisome, as an enormous amount of

information needs to be compressed and integrated to yield a single point

in low-dimensional space, reflecting only evaluation (valence) and (arousal)

response information. How does this work? One also wonders what happens

to the large number of factors that are supposed to influence core affect. Are

they not represented in feeling space or do the representations get lost once

projection into low-dimensional space has occurred? And would those not

be important to fine tune the adaptive action?

It is equally unclear how, out of the constant flux of valence by arousal

variation, an attribution to an object (Russell, 2003) or the assignment of a

conceptual category (Barrett, 2006, and 2009 this issue) occur. As core affect

is supposedly primitive and primary, waxing and waning, there must be some

quality of core affect, a threshold or another criterion, that triggers the

attribution and categorisation processes. What are these? It cannot be the

evaluation of the objects or events, because if it were, it would not be clearhow the theories differ from appraisal theories, except for an under

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Third, regarding categorisation, Barrett (2006) essentially enumerates a

list of well-known categorisation mechanisms but refrains from making any

theoretical predictions that can be empirically tested. In her paper in this

issue she announces four specific hypotheses, namely: (1) there arepsychological primitives (e.g., core affect); (2) emotions are like books of

recipes (not mechanisms) with psychological primitives as elements in a well-

stocked pantry that can be used to make any number of different dishes; (3)

cognitions and perceptions are emotional in nature; and (4) emotion words

are powerful in affecting experience. While the latter can be taken for

granted, there are serious issues with the first three. Most importantly, it is

difficult to consider these as specific hypotheses. How can they be

falsified, especially as much seems to rest on definitional matters (and what

does it mean that cognitions are emotional)?Fourth, the constructivist approach, as exemplified by the papers in this

issue, adopts an outright ideographic approach by asserting that each

individual constructs the category felt to fit the core affect in a given

context on the basis of idiosyncratic input. Although it is certainly the case

that the categorisation of immensely variable qualia feeling involves many

idiosyncratic features that will be difficult to predict and examine

empirically, the complete abandonment of the nomothetic approach

threatens to lead to the abandonment of theory-guided empirical investiga-

tion, the hallmark of a scientific approach (Scherer, 1995). Barrett (2009 thisissue) uses the metaphor of a book of recipes for her theory. But recipes

generally imply rules for combining ingredients, not free construction. And

these rules can be investigated: The proof of the pudding lies in the testing.

REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Appraisal theories of emotion have stimulated numerous empirical studies

over the last 20 years and there is now substantial experimental evidence for

many of the predictions made. For an overview, the reader is referred to

reviews in separate chapters of a volume on appraisal theories (Scherer,

Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; in particular, chapters by Johnstone, van Reekum,

& Scherer; Kaiser & Wehrle; Pecchinenda, Roseman, & Smith; Scherer; Smith

& Kirby). The research reviewed in this volume demonstrates that appraisal

theorists have not only relied on self-report, but have also made extensive use

of objectively measured indicators of appraisal processes such as physiological

parameters and expressive behaviour. The use of self-report in this domain is

often prematurely dismissed with the claim that individuals are not aware of

rapid, implicit evaluation processes. Although this claim is true, it does notnecessarily mean that individuals cannot recover or reasonably infer some of


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schematic or propositional levels that are accessible to awareness. Even if, in

recall and report, participants rely in part on established schemata on

canonical appraisals of certain types of events, this does not mean that the

information is necessarily wrong, as social schemata contain a representationof regularities that often amounts to more than a kernel of truth. In any case,

when one needs to resort to self-report on cognitive processes, this usually

means no other method is available to gain access to the processes of interest.

Under such circumstances, an imperfect approximation to assessment that

will not produce proof but possibly plausibility is preferable to not studying

the phenomenon at all (see Locke, 2009).

In what follows, I review pertinent work from the Geneva Emotion

Research Group that has empirically examined the CPM prediction that the

different appraisal checks occur in a fixed sequence during a series ofrecursive cycles (the results for each check are continuously updated). In

concluding, I describe preliminary studies on the important role of

coherence or synchronisation in the emotion episode.

I limit the following review of the evidence for efferent effects of the

appraisal checks and the experimental investigation of the sequence

hypothesis of the CPM as described earlier. Because of the rapidity of

appraisal processing, often in the millisecond range, and the inaccessibility

of much of these processes to consciousness, let alone to verbal description,

appraisal markers other than verbal report have to be used. In consequence,the first part of the review of work in our laboratory concerns our attempt to

confirm the theoretical assumption that appraisals have reliable signatures in

the domains of brain electric activity, peripheral physiological changes, and

expressive signals.

The efferent effects of appraisal checks on somatovisceralchanges and motor expression as markers of appraisal results

We used a computer game to study the psychophysiological signatures of

appraisal outcomes by manipulating intrinsic pleasantness (pleasant vs.

unpleasant sounds accompanying central events) and goal conduciveness

(winning*reaching the next level in the game, or losing*the destruction of

ones spaceship) of game events in a factorial design (Johnstone, van Reekum,

Hird, Kirsner, & Scherer, 2005; van Reekum et al., 2004). Participants played

the game while cardiac activity, skin conductance, skin temperature, and

muscle activity, as well as emotion self-reports, were assessed. Self-reports

showed that game events altered levels of felt pride, joy, anger, and surprise.

Goal conduciveness had little effect on forearm muscle activity (extensor) but

was associated with significant autonomic effects, including changes tointerbeat interval, pulse transit time, skin conductance, and finger tempera-

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prediction of a higher level of sympathetic arousal related to obstructive

compared to conducive events (provided an assessment of high coping

potential). The manipulation of intrinsic pleasantness produced significant

changes in skin conductance activity only. The obvious explanation for thelack of effects of intrinsic pleasantness manipulations on autonomic nervous

system physiology is that intrinsic pleasantness rarely produces strong action

tendencies that require increased sympathetic arousal.

Speech following obstructive events was higher in energy and had a higher

level of fundamental frequency (f0, heard as pitch), as indicated by f0 floor

(lowest 5% of f0 values), than was speech following conducive events. These

results suggest that physiological arousal was higher following the destruc-

tion of a ship than it was following the completion of a game level. This

interpretation is supported by measurements of skin conductance (a measurethat reflects sympathetic autonomic nervous system arousal), taken in a

concurrent study, which were higher following obstructive events than they

were following conducive events (van Reekum et al., 2004). In summary, this

experiment revealed that variations in the intrinsic pleasantness of an event

cause changes to spectral energy distribution, but not to overall energy, f0, or

the measured temporal parameters and that changes to the conduciveness of

an event are associated with changes to the latter set of variables but not to

spectral energy distribution.

Aue, Flykt, and Scherer (2007) presented participants, in the context of amemory task, with pictures displaying biological and cultural threat stimuli

or neutral stimuli (stimulus relevance manipulation) with superimposed

symbols signalling monetary gains or losses (go

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