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The Co-Decision Procedure in the European UnionAuthor(s): Christophe CrombezSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 97-119Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/440293 .Accessed: 02/06/2014 18:17

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CHRISTOPHE CROMBEZKatholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

h e Co Decision Procedure

n th u r o p e a n n i o n

This paper presents a spatial model of the EU's co-decision procedure,introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The theory characterizes he set of policiesthat can be adopted and the equilibrium EU policy as a function of the ideal policiesof the member countries, the Commission, and the Parliament, and the location ofthe status quo. The paper examines whether the Parliament has become a legislatorof equal stature o the Council, and discusses the Commission's power and the extentof indecision under the co-decision procedure. A comparison with the EU's otherprincipal legislative procedures yields comparative tatements about EU policy andthe institutions' powers.

Introduction

The Treaty of Maastricht 1992) identifies enhancing thedemocratic unctioning f the nstitutions f the European nion EU)as one of its principal bjectives. For his purpose t introduces newlegislative rocedure, he co-decision rocedure. nder hisprocedurethe directly elected Parliament lays a more important ole than itdoes under he other egislative rocedures.' nparticular, legislativeproposal an become EU policy only with the approval f both theParliament nd the Council, he EU's principal egislative body. Ifeach nstitution pproves different ext, they can write ajoint text ina Conciliation Committee.

Nonetheless, he Parliament European arliament 992)claimsin its resolution on the Treaty of Maastricht hat the co-decisionprocedure ails to provide or real co-decision etween he Parliamentand he Council since he Council s allowed o act unilaterally n theabsence of an agreement ith the Parliament. or similar reasons,Curtin 1993) finds hat he co-decision rocedure isformally ne ofco-decision but with the effective balance of

power indisputablyweighed owards he Council.To assess this type of opinion, introduce spatial model of the

co-decision rocedure. ountries nd nstitutions reassumed o have

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXII, 1, February 1997 97

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The Model

I present a spatial model of the co-decision procedure and assumethat the policy space is unidimensional. In other words, alternativepolicies are represented by points on a segment of the real line, andEU policymaking is thought of as choosing one of those points. Thepoints could, for example, correspond o allowable noncocoa fat levelsin chocolate or lengths of daylight saving time. Even though policyissues often involve more than one dimension, unidimensionality ismore realistic in models of EU policymaking than in models of the

United States government. The EU does not adopt omnibus egislation,and its institutions use germaneness rules. Legislative proposals thusconcern specific policy areas and only related amendments areconsidered.5

I assume that each country has a most preferred alternative orideal policy, and that it prefers policies that are closer to, rather hanfarther away from, its ideal policy. In other words, countries haveEuclidean preferences over the EU policy p, with ideal policy

' forcountry i.6 I order the countries such that country 1 has the lowest

(most leftist), and country n the highest (most rightist) ideal policy:P < P2P 'Pn

The preferences of the Commissioners and Parliamentarians realso assumed to be Euclidean. The Commission and the Parliamentuse simple majority rule and there are no restrictions on amendments.As a result, the analysis can be simplified by focusing on the idealpolicies of the median Commissioner and the median Parliamentarian.Suppose the status quo q is to the right (left) of the medianCommissioner's ideal policy. The median Commissioner and allCommissioners to the left (right) of the median then want a move tothe left (right). There is thus a majority for such a move. As a result,any policy is defeated in the Commission by policies that are closer tothe median Commissioner's ideal policy, and the medianCommissioner's ideal policy defeats any other policy. Similarreasoning applies to voting in the Parliament. The Commission andthe Parliament can thus be treated as unitary actors with ideal policiesequal to their median voters' ideal policies, Pc and pp respectively.8

The Council is notrepresented

as a unitary actor because it usesqualified majority or unanimity rule. Nonetheless, the analysis can besimplified by focusing on the countries that are pivotal under thequalified majority and unanimity rules. To defeat the status quo andmove EU policy to the right, he support of the country with the medianvote (the 44th vote) and all countries o its right is not sufficient. Under

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European nion

FIGURE

A Configuration f Ideal Policies

A A A A A A

q=O P1 Pp Pa P Pb Pc Pn

qualified majority ule 62 out of a total of 87 votes are needed. Thepivotal country a thus has an ideal policy to the left of the countrywith the median vote. In particular, ountry is the country with the26th vote (from he left). Country and he countries o its right henhave 62 votes, and he countries o its right do not constitute qualifiedmajority without ountry . Similarly, he country that s pivotal ora move to the left has an ideal policy to the right of the country withthe median vote. It is the country with the 62d vote (from he left).9Under unanimity ule the support f all countries s needed o move

away rom he status quo. Country is thus pivotal or a move to theright and country is pivotal or a move to the left.

To illustrate EU policymaking nder he co-decision procedureI use the configuration f idealpolicies hown n Figure .All countries,the Parliament, nd he Commission ave deal policies o the right ofthe status quo. For simplicity, he status quo q is assumed o be equalto zero. The Parliament as an ideal policy to the left of countriesand b that are pivotal under he qualified majority ule, whereas heCommission s located more o the right. Suppose he countries, heParliament, nd he Commission recomparing policyp to the statusquo of zero. Country then prefers he status quo q as it is closer o itsideal policy. The Parliament, ountries and b, the Commission, ndcountry all prefer he policyp. Since country is pivotal or a moveto the right under hequalifiedmajority ule,a qualifiedmajority referspolicyp.

The configuration f ideal policies hown nFigure 1was chosenbecause t is not unlike he actual configuration n a left-right olicy

space.10n addition, t

clearlydemonstrates he differences

monghe

procedures. n the literature, he relevant policy dimension s oftenconsidered o be an ntergovernmental-supranational imension atherthan an economic eft-right imension Garrett 992;Tsebelis 1994).The Parliament and the Commission are then given a moresupranationalist deal policy than the countries. In Figure 1 the

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Parliament's deal policy would hen be located at the Commission'sideal

policy.also ookat EU

policymakingnder uch a

configurationof ideal policies.The simplified ersion of the co-decision procedure, s studied

in the model, s shown n Figure 2. In the first stage he Commissionproposes a policy. Only the Commission an initiate he procedure,but t must make a proposal f the Council or the Parliament equestsone. Thus, he Commission as monopoly proposal ower but t doesnot have gatekeeping ower. ignore he opinion he Parliament ssueson the proposal, ince it is not binding. n the second stage, in the

Council ountry can propose namendment. or implicity, assumehere that only country 1 can propose an amendment nd that it canpropose nly one amendment.1'

If country proposes namendment, n the hird tage heCouncilvotes whether or not to accept the amendment. The amendmentbecomes he common position f all countries ccept t. If no amend-ment is proposed r if the amendment s not accepted, he Councilvotes on the original Commission roposal n the fourth tage. Theproposal ecomes he common position f a qualified majority n the

Council supports t.12 If the proposal s not accepted, he status quoprevails.

In the fifth stage the Parliament an offer a joint text in theConciliation ommittee.13 f in the sixth stage he Council ccepts hejoint text by a qualified majority, he oint text becomes EU policy. Ifthe Parliament oes not propose a joint text or the Council ejects t,the Parliament otes on the common position n the seventh tage. Ifthe Parliament ccepts he common osition nd he Council onfirmsit by a qualified majority n the final stage, hen he common positionbecomes EU policy. Otherwise, he status quo prevails.

The model ncorporates omplete nformation. hecountries ndinstitutions now each other's preferences, he location of the statusquo, the impact of proposed olicies, and he sequential tructure fthe model. They have perfect nformation n the actions aken n priorstages of the model.

An equilibrium onsists of a strategy for each country andinstitution. trategies ell the countries nd nstitutions what actionsto choose in the relevant

tagesof the

procedure, iventhe actions

taken n prior stages. Thus, a strategy or the Commission ells theCommission what proposal o make n the first stage. A strategy orcountry says what amendment o propose n the second stage, andhow to vote on an amendment n the third tage, on a proposal n thefourth tage, on ajoint ext n the sixth tage,and on a common osition

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European Union 103

FIGURE 2

The Co-Decision Procedure

propose mendment

V

accept amendmentUN

accepQM

P

offer oint text

V

accept oint text / rejeQM

do not propose

p=q

accept ommon

p = proposal p = q

Key to Figure 2

C = Commission1 = country 1

v = vote in the CouncilP = ParliamentUN = unanimityQM = qualified majority


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in the eighth stage. Other countries' strategies ell them how to vote inthe third, fourth, sixth, and eighth stages. The Parliament's strategysays what joint text to propose in the fifth stage, and how to vote on acommon position in the seventh stage. The equilibrium concept issubgame perfect Nash. In a Nash equilibrium, no country or institutioncan increase its utility by choosing another strategy, given the othercountries' and institutions' strategies. In a subgame perfect Nashequilibrium, countries and institutions can do no better than stick totheir strategies in any stage of the procedure, even if a country orinstitution deviated from its strategy n a prior stage.

Equilibrium

In this section I characterize he equilibrium EU policy underthe co-decision procedure or any configuration of ideal policies andfor any location of the status quo.14 First, I go through the differentsteps of the procedure and illustrate hese steps using the configurationof ideal policies shown in Figure 1. Subsequently, formulate conclu-sions in terms of sets of policies that can be adopted, equilibrium EUpolicies, and minimal winning coalitions.15 Finally, I briefly look atanother configuration of ideal policies, and analyze equilibrium EUpolicy as a function of the location of the status quo.

The Commission starts the co-decision procedure by proposingan EU policy. It wants EU policy to be as close to its ideal policy aspossible. This does not imply, however, that the Commission proposesits ideal policy. The Commission understands he roles the Parliamentand the Council play in the subsequent stages of the procedure andtakes these into account when it makes its proposal. It thinks aheadand looks at the subsequent stages to find out which proposals caneventually be adopted and become EU policy. Similarly, the countriesand the Parliament think ahead when deciding on amendments,common positions, and joint texts. In equilibrium he countries' andinstitutions' actions at any but the last stage of the procedure are thusbased on their expectations of what will happen in the subsequentstages. Therefore, I first turn o the last two stages of the procedure, asshown in Figure 2.

The last two stages are reached f the Parliament and the Councilfail to

agreeon a

jointtext in the Conciliation Committee. The

Parliament and the Council then vote on the Council's commonposition. If the Parliament and a qualified majority in the Councilapprove the common position, it becomes EU policy. Thus, an EUpolicy can be approved even if the Conciliation Committee fails toagree on a joint text.

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European Union

FIGURE 3Policy-Making under he Co-Decision Procedure

AA A A A A

0 Pi Pp Pa Pb Pc Pn

Q------ ----- ---- ---- ---- ----4

EP|-------------- -----4

CC------- 4

CD Pcd PCP Pcs------- * 0

In the last stage the countries vote on the common position in theCouncil. They compare he common position to the status quo, and, ifa qualified majority prefers it to the status quo, the common positionis approved. In Figure 3 country a and thus a qualified majority prefera move to the right. The set Q of proposals that are preferred o thestatus quo by a qualified majority s then the set of policies country aprefers o the status quo. This set contains all policies that are closer tocountry a's ideal policy than is the status quo.

In the seventh stage the Parliament otes on the common positionand compares it to the status quo. The set of common positions theParliament approves is the set of policies it prefers to the status quo.In Figure 3 the Parliament wants to move to the right. The set EP ofpolicies the Parliament prefers to the status quo contains all policiesthat are closer to its ideal policy than is the status quo.

For approval n the last two stages of the procedure, he commonposition thus needs to be preferred o the status quo by a qualifiedmajority in the Council and by the Parliament. n Figure 3 country a

prefersa

policyto the

rightof the Parliament's deal

policy.It wants

to move farther away from the status quo than does the Parliament. Acommon position that is confirmed by the Parliament is then alsoconfirmed by a qualified majority n the Council. In Figure 3 the set ofcommon positions that become EU policy in the last two stages of theprocedure s thus the Parliament's acceptance set EP.

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Suppose now that both the Parliament and a qualified majorityin the Council

preferthe common

positionto the status

quo.Even

though such a common position would be approved in the last twostages of the procedure, t does not necessarily reach he last two stages.It is possible that in the fifth stage of the procedure, as shown in Figure2, the Parliament would propose ajoint text, which would become EUpolicy if approved by a qualified majority n the Council in the sixthstage. Since the countries hink ahead, in the sixth stage they comparethe joint text to the common position, and, f a qualified majority prefersit to the common position, it would then be adopted. The Parliament

can thus successfully propose a joint text in the fifth stage if there arepolicies a qualified majority prefers to the common position. TheParliament uses this opportunity f it can successfully propose a jointtext it prefers o the common position. As a result, if there are policiesthe Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council prefer to thecommon position, the common position would not reach the last twostages of the procedure. In general, a common position becomes EUpolicy in the last four stages of the procedure f the Parliament and aqualified majority n the Council prefer t to the status quo, and if both

the Parliament and a qualified majority n the Council prefer it to allother policies.In Figure 3 the Parliament successfully proposes a joint text if

the common position is to the left of its ideal policy. The Parliament,country a, and thus a qualified majority in the Council then prefer apolicy to the right of the common position. If the common position isto the right of country b's ideal policy, the Parliament lso successfullyproposes a joint text. The Parliament, country b, and thus a qualifiedmajority n the Council then prefer a policy to the left of the commonposition. If the common position is between the ideal policies of theParliament and country a, the Parliament annot successfully proposea joint text. The Parliament prefers policies to the left of the commonposition, whereas a qualified majority n the Council prefers policiesto the right. If the common position is between the ideal policies ofcountries a and b, the Parliament cannot successfully propose a jointtext either, since the Council cannot agree on a policy change by aqualified majority. The set CC is thus the set of policies that cannotsuccessfully be amended in the Conciliation Committee.'6

In the fourth stage of the procedure, as shown in Figure 2, theCouncil votes on the original Commission proposal. The proposalbecomes the common position if it is approved by a qualified majorityin the Council. If the proposal is defeated, the status quo prevails.Thus the countries compare he proposal o the status quo. A proposal

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TABLE 1Minimal

WinningCoalitions for EU

Legislation

Consultation Cooperation Co-Decision

C & QM C & QM & P QM & P

UN UN

C = CommissionQM = a qualified majority n the CouncilUN = unanimity n the CouncilP = Parliament

Conciliation Committee. For this configuration of ideal policies theequilibrium policy is the same under all three procedures. Under theconsultation and cooperation procedures the Commission cannotsuccessfully propose a policy that is closer to its ideal policy eventhough there is no Conciliation Committee, since it needs country a's

approval.In the subsequent paragraphs analyze the equilibrium EU policyas a function of the location of the status quo. Readers unfamiliar withformal work can proceed to the next section. Figure 5 shows theequilibrium policy as a function of the location of the status quo relativeto the ideal policies for the same configuration of ideal policies as inFigure 3. The horizontal axis represents he value of the status quo.The vertical axis represents he value of the equilibrium policy. Fiveintervals can be distinguished for the equilibrium.

Assume first that the status quo is located in interval IV, betweenthe ideal policies of countries a and b. Country a is pivotal for a moveto the right, but its ideal policy is to the left of the status quo. There isthus no qualified majority in the Council for a move to the right.Similarly, country b is pivotal for a move to the left, but prefers apolicy to the right of the status quo. There s thus no qualified majorityin the Council for a move to the left. Since there s no qualified majorityin the Council to move either to the left or to the right, the status quoprevails. The equilibrium policy in interval IV can thus be representedby a diagonal line: it is equal to the status quo.

Assume next that he status quo is located in interval III, betweenthe ideal policies of the Parliament and country a. In this interval thestatus quo prevails as well although for different reasons. Country aand thus a qualified majority n the Council want to move to the right.

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European Union

FIGURE 5

Equilibrium Policy under he Co-Decision Procedure

EquilibriumPolicy

PI | II | III IV V

A

Pc

A

Pb

A

pa

A A A A A A

P1 Pp Pa Pb P c PnStatus Quo

b's ideal policy and the Parliament's deal policy. In this interval theCommission exercises agenda-setting powers without, however,obtaining country b's ideal policy.20 The Parliament prefers he statusquo to country b's ideal policy, since the latter s further rom its idealpolicy. Nonetheless, the Commission can successfully propose a moveto the right, since country a and the Parliament both want such a move.In particular, the Commission proposes the policy that makes theParliament indifferent to the status quo. The equilibrium policy ininterval II can thus be represented by a diagonal line with negativeslope: as the status quo is closer to the Parliament's deal policy (moreto the right), the equilibrium policy is also closer to the Parliament'sideal policy (lower).21

Discussion

This section addresses hree controversial ssues: the Parliament'spower, the Commission's power, and indecision. Crombez (1996)discusses these issues under he other wo procedures. An institution's

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European Union

by a simple majority of its members, t can reject the common positionconfirmed by the Council. Rather than allowing the Council to actunilaterally, he Council's right to confirm its common position thusmerely provides a reversion policy in case the Conciliation Committeefails to produce a joint text. This reversion policy is preferred o thestatus quo by the Parliament and a qualified majority n the Council.In equilibrium t is actually chosen by the Commission rather han bythe Council, since the Commission proposes the policy it prefers mostamong the policies that are both preferred o the status quo by theParliament and a qualified majority in the Council, and preferred bythe Parliament and a

qualified majorityn the Council above all other

policies.Unlike the Council, he Parliament annot amend he Commission

proposal before it becomes the common position. Nonetheless, theCouncil's right to unanimously vote to amend the Commission'sproposal before it becomes the common position is unlikely to affectthe equilibrium EU policy. It is unlikely that the Parliament's idealpolicy will be to the left (right) of all countries' ideal policies. There-fore, it is unlikely that the Council can unanimously amend a proposal

if the Conciliation Committee cannot agree on ajoint text. Under theco-decision procedure, he Council and the Parliament hus genuinelyco-decide which policy to implement, even though in equilibrium heConciliation Committee is not convened.

The Commission's Power

The Commission has considerable power under he consultationand cooperation procedures. Under the consultation procedure, t canobtain any policy that is both preferred o the status quo by a qualifiedmajority, and preferred over all other policies by all countries. Underthe cooperation procedure he requirement hat the equilibrium policyalso be approved by either the Parliament or by all countries reduces,but does not eliminate, the Commission's power.

Under he co-decision procedure, he Commission has less powerthan under the cooperation procedure because the Parliament mustapprove the equilibrium policy even if all countries approve it, andthe Parliament and a qualified majority n the Council can agree on a

jointtext in the Conciliation Committee. The

required approval bythe

Parliament under he co-decision procedure s not likely to reduce theCommission's power, since it is unlikely that all countries approve apolicy the Parliament does not approve. The loss in the Commission'spower is thus due to the Conciliation Committee's right to agree on ajoint text.

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TABLE 2Indecision in the

EuropeanUnion

Ics S(ia, Pb, PcP) S(Pl,Pn)

Icd S(PaPb,c,sPp ( )

There is more indecision under the cooperation procedure hanunder the consultation procedure (i.e., Ics Icp). This additionalindecision s caused by the institutional equirement hat he Parliamentalso approve the equilibrium policy if some countries reject it.

The set Icd of status quos that cannot be changed through

equilibrium play of the co-decision procedure is the support of theideal policies of the Parliament and countries a and b, or,Icd = S(Pa,Pb,Pp)

Conclusions

The spatial heory of the co-decision procedure provides a frame-work for addressing some controversial issues regarding EUinstitutions.

Due to the Conciliation Committee's opportunity o agree on ajoint text, the Parliament, which is generally considered powerless,becomes a genuine co-legislator. Under the co-decision procedure tsrole is as important s the Council's role. A Commission proposal canonly be adopted if both the Parliament and a qualified majority n theCouncil prefer t to the status quo and if there is no policy preferred othe proposal by both the Parliament and a qualified majority in theCouncil.

As under he other procedures, he Commission has considerable

power.As

monopoly proposert can choose the

policyit

prefersmost

among the policies that can be adopted given the locations of the idealpolicies and the status quo. Nonetheless, the Commission, whichalready lost some power under he cooperation procedure, oses evenmore power under the co-decision procedure. This loss of power is aresult of the Conciliation Committee's right to agree to a joint text.

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Christophe Crombez

Indecision is an important characteristic of the co-decisionprocedure. t is caused by the requirement hat the equilibrium policybe adopted by both the Parliament and a qualified majority in theCouncil. There is less indecision under he co-decision procedure hanunder he cooperation procedure, due to the Conciliation Committee'sright to agree on a joint text. Whether here is more or less indecisionthan under he consultation procedure depends on the relative ocationsof the ideal policies and the status quo.

Christophe Crombez is Assistant Professor of BusinessEconomics and

Strategy,Katholieke Universiteit

Leuven,Naamsestraat

69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.

NOTES

I would like to thank David Baron, Brian Gaines, Geoffrey Garrett, Dirk-JanKraan, Keith Krehbiel, Susanne Lohmann, Peter Moser, and Robert Powell for helpfulcomments.

1. Three principal nstitutions are involved in the EU's legislative process: the

Parliament,he

Commission,and the Council. The 626 Parliamentarians re

directlyelected, the 20 Commissioners are appointed by common accord of the nationalgovernments, and in the Council each country s represented y a government minister.See, for example, Nugent (1994) for a detailed description of the institutions.

2. A country or institution has Euclidean preferences f it has an ideal policyand prefers policies that are closer to, rather han farther away from, its ideal policy.

3. The consultation procedure urrently accounts for about two-thirds of legis-lation (164 opinions in 1995), the cooperation procedure accounts for about 10% (26first readings n 1995), and the co-decision procedure or about 15 % (35 first readingsin 1995). The co-decision procedure pplies, or example, o most of the internal market

program. n some policy areas different procedures are used depending on the contentof the proposals. Environmental policy, for example, is subject to the consultationprocedure f it has fiscal implications. General environmental policy objectives areconsidered under the co-decision procedure. Most other pieces of environmentallegislation are subject to the cooperation procedure. It is up to the Commission todecide which procedure o use. The Council and he Parliament an challenge ts decisionin the Court of Justice.

4. In particular, France, Germany, taly, and the United Kingdom have 10 voteseach; Spain 8; Belgium, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands 5 each; Austria andSweden 4 each; Denmark, Finland and Ireland 3 each; and Luxembourg 2.

5. I recognize that vote trading over different policy issues is possible eventhough germaneness rules are used and no omnibus legislation is adopted. See Buenode Mesquita and Stokman 1994) for logrolling models of EU policy-making.

6. Country 's utility V/ can then be represented s: V = -(Pi - p)2 . The analysiscan be extended to other types of single-peaked preferences with different countriesbeing pivotal in the Council.

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118 Christophe Crombez

20. The seminal paper on agenda-setting behavior is Romer and Rosenthal

(1978).21.(1) Depending on the location of the Commission's ideal policy relative tothe pivotal countries and the Parliament, wo other situations are possible. (1.1) TheCommission's deal policy is located between he Parliament's deal policy and countryb's ideal policy. The Commission then has agenda-setting power in interval V,[Pb ,2pb - P ) . Country b, the Parliament and the Commission want to move to theleft, but the Commission cannot obtain its ideal policy because country b prefers thestatus quo. In intervals I and VI, (-oo,2,p - Pc) and [2pb - jc,oo) respectively, theCommission obtains ts ideal policy. (1.2) The Commission prefers a policy to the leftof the Parliament's deal policy. In that case it cannot successfully propose a policy

that s closer to its ideal policy than he Parliament's deal policy because such a policywill be amended in the Conciliation Committee. In intervals I and V, (-co, Ipp) and[2Pb - Pp,oo) respectively, the Parliament's deal policy is the equilibrium policy. Ininterval IV, [Pb 2Pb - pp) the Commission has agenda-setting powers. (2) Depend-ing on the location of the Parliament's deal policy relative o the pivotal countries andthe Commission, hree other situations are possible. (2.1) The Parliament's deal policyis located between country a's ideal policy and country b's ideal policy. TheCommission hen has agenda-setting owers n interval I, [2pa - Pb, a ), and obtainscountry b's ideal policy in interval I, (-oo,2a - Pb) . (2.2) The Parliament's dealpolicy is located between country b's ideal policy and the Commission's ideal policy.The Commission then obtains the Parliament's ideal policy in intervals I and V,(-0o,2pa - p) and [pp, O) respectively. (2.3) The Parliament's deal policy is tothe right of the Commission's ideal policy. The Commission then obtains its idealpolicy in intervals I and VI, (-oo,2ka - Pc) and [Pp - P, oo) . The Commission hasagenda-setting powers in interval V, [pp ,2pp - P ) . (3) The equilibrium policies forother configurations of ideal policies are analogous.

22. This conclusion is similar to the conclusion drawn by Krehbiel (1996) in astudy of gridlock in the United States government.

23. In particular, here is more indecision under the consultation procedure f

the Parliament's deal policy is closer to the support S(pa, Pb ) of the ideal policies ofcountries a and b than is the Commission's ideal policy.

REFERENCES

Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. London: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Frans N. Stokman. 1994. European CommunityDecision Making: Models, Applications and Comparisons. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.

Crombez, Christophe. 1996. Legislative Procedures n the European Community.British Journal of Political Science 26:199-228.

Curtin, Deirdre. 1993. The Constitutional Structure f the Union: A Europe of Bitsand Pieces. Common Market Law Review 30:17-69.


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European Parliament. 1992. Maastricht, the Treaty on European Union, Position ofthe European Parliament. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of theEuropean Communities.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1992. International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: TheEuropean Community's Internal Market. nternational Organization 46:533-60.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. Institutional nd Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory ofDivided and Unified Government. ournal of Theoretical Politics 8:7-40.

Laver, Michael, and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York:Routledge, Chapman, and Hall.

Nugent, Neil. 1994. The Government ndPolitics ofthe European Community. ondon:Macmillan.

Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political Resource Allocation,Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice 33:27-43.

Steunenberg, Bernard. 1994. Decision Making Under Different Institutional Arrange-ments: Legislation by the European Community. ournal of Institutional andTheoretical Economics 150/4:642-69.

Tsebelis, George. 1994. The Power of the European Parliament as a ConditionalAgenda Setter. American Political Science Review 88:128-42.

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