43

'llle post-SW1n soviet Union wi tnease4 a remarkable

change tn .tts for~ policy behaVi.OllC'. A greater d.egree

of flexibili~ an4 an element cf pragmatism wero 1nducte4

into 1'!be soviet strategic tll.!nk.lng. Hot'-le.ver. one cannot

dMy the feet. ~-~ certain changes in this direction .. minor

though, oo<t not .J.nsignif1c:ant - toward. ithe end of Stalin

regtme in41aatet1 tc'1e major possible overhaul 1n soviet foreign

poliey orientation. The process only got ceystalliaed with

the ex..i.t of Stalin fmm the political saene,.

soviet policy was a:~~ibu~etl mainly tc the fast changing

~eo-po1it.t.cai environment and 1u forei~ policy lmperat.ives.

fl:!i!• the· ~ent:ie intematlonel eit.u.atitm tdltch wes 1'1' then ' .

lntensif1e4 bY Stalin • a • exPena_ionlst.• policies bed to be

.a.efuoed .ena. care Ulktm not to entttgonlze the Western bloc.

In tbte reg_, the· Soviet Union sought co m1n1miee the con• ...

frontattonist. et.t1tu4e towardS the West. e.s well as to limit

the 4enqe~t of wet-. . !EetKl• the new. Soviet leaaerShl.p, fat .

ftom sattsfietl wJ.ilh the et.et:.e of ·soviet relatJ.ons .with the

narly liberatetl nations, etepped ·up its efforts to wlA the

confidence of these ·Cottntr.les.1

1 At. .ehe tlmG of Ste1ln's 4eath .• cwn~ct.s bet.ween the USSR and ~e n~ly 1n6apeftdent states of Asia anti Africa were "i11rt-ually non-.wsten~-t!~ ln epit.e of the fact. that e cotl'l'ROr; antat;JOI'Ilsm toward. the Western 1:mperia11st j;;lowtu:s would sem-

- · t.o beve provide$ a prom1s1ng basis for cooperative rela• t.ions. For details of Soviet polley in the ,Third wo.rld Q@

T • P • ThOJ!'Vtton (ed.) ., !,be 'fbird WQ£1A .I.Q, Sov&tt. ~IES;QiSS;US (P.r:.i.noeton. 1964) I IS.d". arQt

41'&borek.y •. Cgmr,mmJ.U R~F!f· of th . ir: wo (N.Y., 1973) 1 ~lv1n z.Rub-anst n ,f!d. •

· · _ . c· · ~s I · . . ·· (.NoY.,1t7S~

44

With the dtift of SOViet foreign policy in the post­

Stalin era towards aceept.ance off ftpeacef\ll ao-existertce• an4

"peaceful transitJ.on to socialism" • t.he Soviet Union re­

assesseS l~s earlier view abOUt India. The government, I.'VR

by 'the rep~esentatives of ._national bourgeois 1e" tn Iru:ll1a.

did not. prevent the new Soviet. leadership t.o explore fresh

contacts both 1n po11t.ioal end economic fields. They

believed that the goVernmeni: of India hatS. played a •p~gressi'ite

role* in the tnt:ernat.ional afff'Jirs by 1essenin9 t.enslons a.n4

pro~TCt.inq peace. and co-existence. Mo.reover., J.n their opJ.nJ.on,

this "naUonel bourgeoisie" was play.t.ng a pro91tesaive role

also wtth reger<l to int.e::nal ec:onom!o development.

The ebaft~e Ln soviet. eval\latton of the role ·Of India

en4 otber newly 1ndGPen4en~ aou.nt.r1es bec&"ne el·early d!scer•

nlble J.n Mai.enkav's 8 Auqust 19S3 speech to th~ supreme

soviet.. While .e6m1r1ng bit;~hly In.<ita•s J.ndependent. posture

durJ.n:g the Korean crisis, he tU~at.ed, "There are no 4lspu.ted

OJ!' outstanding issues today Which cannot be cettle<i peace­

fuUy by mt\Utl agreement between the parties conceme~.·2

In a .leudat~q oneracterieet1en off Indta•a fotelgn policy he

45

"Of grea~ importance for the ptOmOt.ion of peace in

the East is the attit.ude of so b1g a cOUfttry as

India. In<lla has made substantial conttibuUon to

the $fforts of peace-loving couatries to stop the

Korean war. OW: rela~1ons with lnd.ta era growing

firmer ana cult.ural and economte int.ereow:se with

her Le bee0l'n1ng wwer. we hope t.hai& relations

between lntlia and the Soviet. Union w!11 become

stronger and develop in a spirit. of fl:'iene.Uy

coopetatJ.on." 3

India, then, was v1eMed by the Soviet policy-makers

as pert of en ant1•lmperia.1J~st 0 peac& zone" elonq with the

c-.nu1es Of the communist worla. !'0\lr months after the

abOVe speecht t.he acceptance of Ind1$D neutrelism found e

clearer reflection 1n tbe conclusion of a first ever compte­

hensive trade agreement ~en In<liQ and the Soviet Union.

The torms of the protocol prwidetl lnd1a with eertaln

advantages,. not genel'a11y available under similar arrange­

ments wltb W·este;n counviea (e.g. payment 1n rupees, tbe

use ·Of In41an sbtpplng, trt.c. ) •4 This comm1 t'.rtleftt. to increase

3 XbS.d•

4 FoJf the t.ext. of trn4e a.grtaement of 2 Decenber 1953, Blma1 ~res.atl.' .!a«"T:mt,i.eS., it!l'JtiDih 1W~l2,f A R9SW2m1i:IU , sa!tV Bombay. 1973 . , PP• 1 J•BG.

46

significantly t:.he volume Of bilateral t.sade wer e five­

year periOd was coupled with ~e ~ans1on of colturel

contacts an4 e:cchenges of vist\tng delega~S.ons in a. variety

of fields.

In the meentime, lnd.ta•s &-ole in Geneva Conference5 in

Aprtl 1954 ani! its signing of 'Pancha St\Qela' agreement wi1m

China were hi-ghly aPpl"«:iatr.e4 by the soviet leaders. The

very fac~ ths:~ India was ewpointed es Chairmen to the

%ntem.a~iona1 Control ComnJ.ssioA w1~ Poland and Canac:la

as membeJrs, reflected independent. na.t.ure of lndie' s fore 19ft

policy. At t.he Geneva Conference, Molotov sppra.J.aea. India's

status ·•

... Who con 4eay that. a counvr like lncU.a wl'tb a

popula1tlon of mo:~te than 300 m1111on people was

ent.e~"ed in!f!o a new, b.:lstor J.c oten$.1 Not. long ago.

lnd1~ was a. colfmlal country.. au• now nobody <:en

deny that. lndk is occupying a vety important. place . . amonq the countries Wb1ch are consoli<:tating thelt

ne•tona1· uaapen4enc:e ana strlv!ng to secure_ ber

welgbt.y place to worltl af·fetzos. nG

S Tbe Geneva Confei"Gnce was QOfl\'ened by ~e Foreign M,intstero of! 3.9 ccunti!'J.CN!I,. tnclua1ng those of PRe. Ftance,, scv.tet Union.· utt,. us, for the purpose of •*. :tli.ng ~- )"."~1em . of lndo-Cb.tne (Cemboala, Laoa, Vietnam) in the aumme.l' of 195$. A polltice.l settlema1tt. aimed at preven.tt.ng en armed teke-over bY the forees of the Chln•min in lntio-Ch:.t.ne. was the basis of mtlt.iva'ti011 for Geneva Conference.

G .!EOX4&• 30 April 1956, P• 3.

47

The chaag.ed. soviet. atttltue cGtnai4e4 with the chsng·es

1A tha subcontlftental power balance which pose4 a set1ous

pi'Oblem t.o India's 9eaur1"Y as well as Soviet influence tn

the region. The American dec!aion -o elttend mili~acy

assistance ~ Pakistan in May Ul54, aJld subSequently. latter• s

accession bOt.h l.nto SEATO in S~mber 1954 and the Baghde4

Pact. (later CESTO) J.n July 1955 accentuated Netu:-u•s appteben­

st.on of co14 war ~etng "brou;b~ to India's ~oorsteps".

Nelu:U • s serious concern for this d.evelopmen~ and hls strang

crlt.J.e1sm against ~e us-Pa.k desi911 was aatefttlly watched

by the tsoviet Union end it pe14 cU.vidends 1:o its policy.

Barlier • India refused7 t.o join any allJ.ent:e sponsored by

the us .agaiase any power (part!eu1a.r:ly the sov:tet Union and

China). Nehru bit.tezrly oond.E!mlled the United St.ates• dec!i.slon

of arms o1d t.o Pakistan as a "reversal of history" • and use<l

i.ncreas1nqly erit.tcal GnPresstons denouncing t.he formet.Lon

of SSATO. The 4aY eft.eJr it& forme.t.icm, Nel'u:u. point-ing t.o

~be ndouble-tilS.nkJ.ng" end f14Quble t.alk0 by nat.tons, Said

th:at. the •treaty tn~eases tnsecus:lt.y in people's !flint!•·••·•

1 .Ofi 2& Febnery 1954. Presl.der&t. Eisenhower wrote t.0 tbe Xnttian ~:tme M&nist.er, 6e:wabarle1 Nehm, a pet~:aond letter assuring hlm the~ any request for m111t&~rY $9Sistence. would receive bis •most _ sympathetiC ccnsidet"<at.ion~ • Nebt:u 4ecl1ned the offer as tbe mda preoccmpatioft of the us poliCy 1ilBS Y cont:al1t ecml'iUniat. pow~ and :Influence in Mia;

48

Aaten •••• AS.laR pJ.>Oblems, Asian secur:l.i:.y and ASian peace

ste not. only cU.seldsed, but actions ere taken end treaties

are ma4e in goegardl t.o them chiefly by non-ASian countries ••••

I em just pointing wt the oddity of all tld.s ••• some

countries join tog:et.her to protect other countries W'h.lc'h

wtll not join them. It. 1s a r:at.hel:' ext.raordinary th.trt~h 08

The Soviet press gave an extra.ordlnar:ily extensive

coverage to the Indian reactions against. the United States •

etms aid to Pakistan. A Prmtsll article, Wh11e sharing the

concern with Xndia, said.l nThe Indian people cannot. but be \

al~d seeing t.he attempts t:o set up an aggressive bloa

r1ght. on India's coraer Which will invariably lead to i;he

building of fore1gn bases and airfi.el&:l on t.he countries

which it 1s attempting t:o maintain closer rolat.1ons • at

WhUe c:rit.ie1sJ.ng Peld.st.an for: her &lienee, Moscow news•

papers prominently displ.aye4 the trKtiat'l Prime M!nf.st.er•s

stat.emeat. &n Psrltament critio1s1ng the United St:.at.es• ems

aid ~o Pek1etan.. .Most. sa,-tm: press c=i~lcism of ~ekls1:an

at this Stege was usu:ally e.ceompanie<i by praise for ImU.a~10

a !J:!tr ~Hind!& <Madras}. 10 s~~etnber 1954.

9 IEWM• 27 Se~ 1954.

10- 1ft about. eight moatbs aftett St.alin•s 4eatb, P .. A publ~she4 es m~ as sllcteen turttcles an4 nt!J\fS terns. wJ.til lnd18ft r:eectlon t.o Artter:"l.r:en bases 1n Paktstan e.s tt'"te main themi!•

0

49

Thus, it was the c:ommonali~ of As!eta and Sovi~

1ntez:ests 1.e. theil!' stubborn resistance to us-sponsofl'04

military alliance. which brou<Jht. them closer.

Nehru •s <llemonstratlon of actively neutralist fotei4n

policy, eOD'!pO\lRdea with his aversion to sinfUl praettce of!

American tmper:ialism, had at.traet;e4 the attention of Chlftese

for:elgn pOlicy makers. At ~e same time, the failure of

BeijiniJ'& revolutionary policy and its gradual realisation

of J.ndependent. foreign policy being condueted ·by India ena

other newly independent. count.~:ies of ASia led China to

abandon its militant line~ Signs of Chinese intention of

peaceful co-e,:istence wit.l'l Indte beceme aPParent with the

c:onelus&on of the Sino-Indian Agreement. on T.J.het. on 29

April 1954. Under ·the agreement, lnd.ia acceptSS Chinese

soverel~t.y tNI!fZ Tibet and egreed. to r:elJ.nqUt.sh those

extre.terrttoriel. right& 1n Tibet whiCh .lt had inhertt.ed

from the Sr1t.!sh.11 An01Uler etc.1klng fea-t.urre of this

agreement. ves l:ndta•s formal recogrd.Uon of Tibet as the .

"1l1be .. 'ten. Re. ;!on .. ()f.· China"• ,..,_ . . .. t: ""'- ....... .. - """"· e . ·- · . ··· · · . · · . iU"". e.greemen WQS uQ~Q "'"'" 1iooU

11 Nehn' a sta~ement J.n LO'k Sabha on SO March 1959 wb¢re1n he 4eclerat • • .,,. we hatl to rec.ogn:Lee Chinese eoverC!ilgnty over f.lbet" • LOJs SJ$bm Qgbe,tea.• no.28, 19$0- co1.as1e. For the teat. of the' agr&ement; . · .!Q~.Po&l9L9f.·IQ41a ~• .lfm1t of Qoetm~· '942• At Delh£4. Publications Division Of the· n1stl:y ,of Xbform~:tlOtl M4 sro~asttng. Government of lnd1a. 1966), pp.t.93•203.

1. Ku.tual respect for eacb otbu's t.eJ:'ritorial i.ntegrlty

end sovereiqnt.y 1

2,. Mutuel noft•&qql:eSS lODI

3. MUtuel non-i.ftt.erierence in eeeb other•s 1nt:.ernal

affe.Us,

Equality an4 mutuel beneft t.l

Peaceful ~xlat.ence.

Subsequently- in a joint statement. issued bY Nebn and

Zhou EnlaJ. &~ Delhi in Jwae 1954, the Five Principles or

• -Pettehaheel.• • as t.hey wer:e !10Pl!1etly known, were reeffirmed.

While eomman~ing on the underlying philosophy of Panch

Sheela, one author observe4 that t.~e Five Pr!no1ples were

me~ "to soothe Cblna•s fears, allQ' tter economtc susp1c1ens

and convince her ~et .tn lndie sne baa a fN1end. On the other

hand, it might. dl"aw Chine out of her en))attled isolation, /

e.nd by ple&Jtwa he~: to AOJl•lni;er:fer~ce an4 ftOO•agqressJ.cn,

pin her down t.o a policy., on<i commit her, thl'cugh her own

sol·emtt undert.el<:tngs, to e~ing tJ1th ber own botmderies."12

· snai.a considered friendship wi.t.b Chtna necesseJ:Y fer ehe

et.eb11itr ·.ant,l peace of .Asia, ana Nebtu's assessment that.

8 J:x:>tb the USA and the UK, on. the otte bana. f~r ent.ltely

51

different. reasons. are not. anxious 1;hat lftaie end China

should be friendly t.owards each other:n13 possibly influenced

bis China policy. In September 1954. Nehn eX,plalned to the

Pa1:liament what. he nad hope4 to achieve frGR his mefting with

Zh0t1 Enlal and aJ4nin9 the e.p'eament. a

13

14

0 The best way is ul~Lmat.ely to ~elk•••• to eny

opponent of you.Jts and 1£ it. 1s in the interest. of

))oth parties. some agreement will be arrived at. •••

It is not. e qUeet.:S.on of believing the ~er party's

wordt it. J.s a qu.est.ion o£ creating eo.ndiU.on where

tme othec' p~ cennot break its woras end it. is

likely to fln<l itself in a nuch worse quandary.

These cond1t.1ons ere creat.eti by the joint statement

that. was made in India and in Rangoon end 1£ these

Five Pr:lneiples ~e repeated by the various, ao~·

ries of 't.he world .in their relations to eecb o'tber:.

1tbey do create an etmosphtu·e. That aoea not mean

the.t all the forces of aqgresston anti 1nterference

end mtscbief in •ar:lous countries be;ve been erde4.

Of cCUJ:se, notr they are there bu.t. 1t meens you

have ma4e 1t <more d.ifft.cu.l~ for them·~ functton.•·14

Extracts of eot'respon4ence between Neh.-u erd a,.N .• aeu dttrlng latter• a t:errn es In4lan &"epresen.tet.lve e~ tha securtty Cocnc~l .• 1'9SO•G1._ .tn .spt;umn .Weeldy (Na~ Delhl) ,a ·11 December 1965•

HIS .sabbl i!Cblfd (29 September 1954) , Part 2, vol. 7 1 no.31, coi:a&~.

52

M fer as China was aoncernea, it. confirmed (1n

joint statement.) the view that countries with different

social sys-tems end ways of life can co-exist peacefully.

ln an 1nt.entew with the newsmen 1n New Delhi. soon after

sig'nJ.ftfl the declwra-s.on, Zhou Enlei reiteratetu

"The rights of the people of each nation to

national independence and self-determination

must be respect.e4. The people of each nation

should have the right. t.o choose theiJ:' own state

syst.em end way of life, without int.erferenc:e

from other nations. Revolution cannot be

expor'tedl a~ the · same time. ou.t.side interference

with tale common td.ll expreesecl by the people of

any nat:.1on would not. be permJ.tted ... 15

'lhe S1no-lnd1a1'l accord on Tibet and China • s adherence

to the prlncipltlS of peacefUl ~tenc:e was on ~ ltfte

of .sovtet. tblilkin;. The soviets support.ed Panebsbeel front

~e Ume of its endorsement by' Cb.lna. EEAYda, 1n its fint.

ever e41tor:1a1 pert.otning te .Ifld!tit t.n Which it. pe14 hlqh '

eomp1J.mento to the leadership of Chlna and India £or

.S.nuoaue.tng principles of Panchsheo1, wrote• "There cannot

be any doubt that. the acceptance .of these important. prtnalples

15

53

J:iy Asian as well as other countries wou.ld diminish the

pos&D11J.t.y of walt's, serve to allevla~e tensions in the

WOZ"14 cOIIIDlUility and lmprcwe valuable cooperation between

CO\Ultr1es."16

soon after the signing of Panahsneel agreemen_t, Sino­

Ind.J.en relations entered a new phase. In OOi:ober 1954.

Nehi.U paid aA official visit to Ch.1na. Dunn; his visit.

Zbou Ertlai emphasised the tmport.ence of India and China in

the contex11 of promot.lng 1nteJ:nat1onal peace, and hopea

t.hat Sino-Indian rela1:ions would 'J:Je a model of co-existence

between eotmUies witb <iU.fferent social syst.ems end 14eolo•

qies. The trip bed an ef feet.# tbou.gh of a confirming

net\ure. on Neh.t!'U.'a essesallll'.i4nt. of Chinese comtmnism. •They

he.ve molved a political and ~ systen Which is panly

b$$ecl on thellr Merxlet ideas an4 pal"tly adapted t.o the

c:on41Uona in ·China. th~ all know that lt ls .not. fall-blooded.

eomriunlem", 17 he seid. His v.tsit had not 01\11' resulted in

.fieepar Wlder&ten:d!ng between I~:dia ana Chino, bUt prObably

helped tn e8$lft9 the 'tensions in Xa4C)ro>Ch1na and. Soviet Bas­

As1a.

iG &IAYaa, 1 Julr 1954t lbt1 U.mt! (LOnaon) ,, 19 July 1954.

11 hen Coaference. Rev Delld •• 13 Ncwember 1954, lt$1M't! SPUCW •• &ftiM9R (Delld ••. 1958). pp.214-18.

54

The Send.Wlg Conference of 1955 provJ.tled an opport.urd.ty

to t.he Chinese polJ..cy-mekers to interact w1tb other ASian

powus. At the c=oaference. India played an J.mpor1:ent. role

in 1n~oduc1ng china t.o t.his Committee of Afro-AS1en nations.

Bandtlng Conference t\U'fted a a1plomat1c triumph for the

Chinese,. By projecUng China as a 'friendly ccmnuy•, which

was read;y uo settle 1t.s differences wii;h all ewntries by

peaceful negot1ation,18 Zhou Enlai dsnonstr:ated that. it ha4

developed &.plomat.ic independence of -.he soviet. Vnlcm.

Besiaes, Zho\1 Enlai t.ook the advantage of Nehru •s gOOd

· offic:es at 1me 8en4U.ng Confez:enee and a~lm<Nle4ge4 lntU.a•s

r:ole as a spokesman for Cblna and pxrcrnoter of contae~ bet.weeD

himaelf en4 sever,at south Best Asian leaaers. However, t.he

aen&mg Conference had lu newat.tve J.mpltcatlons as fer as

Sino-Indian and S.tDO.Sov1et relations vete con~ern.ed.

!:&£!~• it was the Sandung Conference tfhi~h provi4e4

e plaUot:m !or the 1es4era of Cbina end. Pakistan to exchange

'tllelr views· on tbe 1at.1tea:' • a ,i."'lllu.slon £n~o the us-sponsored

mll.ttery alliance. Pakistan was able to convince the Chinese

lea4ers the~ her alliance w1th the us we.s not ag.ef.nst Chine.

At the &&'"l\0 tlme, the ChJ.nese P::emter. rthou EnleJ. assur:ea

his Peklstenl c.ounte;:part. that. Chine would not. comm1 t

55

aggr:essioa Gg"a1nst. it. Tb.e meeting between Pald.st.anl

Prime Minister MOhammed Ali and tho Chinese Premier ZhCN.

Enla1 a:t Sendung assumed wide signiflcance. MOhammed Ali's

clarification about. Pakis'ten•s entry into ime alliance

seemed to satisfy the Chinese Premier. Zhcu respon4ea

warmly saylngl nx am grateful to him for this explanation.,

because thr0Ugh these explanations we achieve a nutu.al

undE"->.rst.andin~h This creat~..s Q9rteement end harmony amongst.

us in understanding each other on collect..lve pe&G~e and

ccopero:tion'". 19

secona. stno-Pek paC"leys at, ~he conference and the

antA-Sovte~ af!t1m4l! of Pakistan mst. have irked the -Ind.t.an

leaders and the Soviet. Unton. P&J(:l~•a end.orHffl,ent of a

Ceylonese d.elega~•e tefos.-ence t.o BaV'iet.·"'imperie11sm020

was not: appreciated by IruUa. By then ·thO ulterior not!:ve

of Pakistan hc4 beecn\e ~leer to bCttb lncU.a end tl\e Soviet

V.nlcn. ~~ can be saia that ~e 861'14\lng. Confe=-ence he4

19 Ka'hllb op •. ctt., pp*56•11.

20 A cont.roversy arose oa the 1seue of! def1nlt1on of colonialiSm. A.t one poi'nt India an4 other co­sponsored wentQ4 a mll<! eonaetnnatioll of. the rematn!ng westeta cb10ftia1 presence 1ft Aata. and Afri~a. Cetlon

, em $GVeta1 other: pt:o-West~ regimes wentea to broacien this to include Soviet. ~1ell.sm in Ee.tn:.am Europe.. Ndln, who ergu~ tbet thex"e wee a. • distant. _ aru!i. great. dt£fe»:EJnce between· merel.Y cr1tie1slng tbe pollcy of govetn~t and ques~1ontng tho vet:'f basis of independent nat.tons • • worke4 agstnst the J.nc~ret:.&on of tb!.a cr:iticiem int:.o t,b(!J! final conference declatauon. M,s. ReJen, lo!Jj.e &D wo;&d..Mft&!i!& 125t:Si (Bombay. 1963), ~2M. .

56

within ltsel.f the seeas of fut.\Ut'e antagoatsm and mdmosltty

bet.weea India ana China on the one band, ancl be'tween fa1e

Sovie• Union an4 China, on ~ oi:bel'• To quei\e a. British

wr!ter, the Chinese had essuea the Psik:Lst.eni government,

soon aftett 'the Afro-ASian conference, J.n a. privaU! message

t:.hat "i&heJ:e was no ecnc;:eivsble clash of interests between

the t.wo c<Nrmrles, which could imperil their friendly

relations, mt 1!ma.<t tibia poa1Uon did not. apply to Xnao­

Chinese Jiili/ telat!.ons in which a definite conflic• of

interests COUl4 be expecte4 in the near futue.n2 l

ib.lti• Soviet Union, no doubt., took note of the Chinese

d'lplomad.c a,ct.!91'¥ .at ~ BMd'ti*J Conference whicb Wei

gatntng wi4espreatl ~ecagniUoJS in 'the Afto-Ml.an world.

11he li)$1.1.cy of pe•efu.l co-ex!Qt.Gnee and the Sand.Wlg pr1n• ' 4:iples "<:cmin!J frcm the Chinese and combine<! with the new

qu,lte t:~ranBptU'eDt ·eppeel, to tbe n~opeem. world to

comsee !ni:O a bloc cc.a14 not bave been wer:mtv greeted .1ft

MGscaw,. filwgb. on tbe 8\U'fde 'the policies oe the cc:rnt'1lUh1St.

super pow•e tt~e synctu:on1eei end the ausiMS bast.ened wlt;b ·

apptoY.al ol the Cbinese lnlUJ.at.ive they cou14 not. take kindly

~ their exolu~ioA ft~ the new oJ.Ub CJ£. aeveloplt'lgl nat1ons~•22

2l L•lf• RUh~k \iil1ltams. f.bt. St.a;tt d l?afsAJMI (LOndon; 1968) , P• UU;. .

21 A«~ Vl.~ ~~~ i.t!.A,.ca=Ea&s&casa (Len4ca. 1969) , P• 56l.. ·

57

19.1.1111• the Band\tnf Conference, ~CJb hlsto~ic etld

eventful fton many accounts. conceel.e4 the "clash of ego•

betw-een 'twG grea~ personal.l ties of the mos- populous nat.tono •

NGN'U end Zhou Enlai. It. was Zhou not. Hehz:u who shot into

pJ"omi.nence end. recaeivet:t the glal'e of pUbltc!ty. While Nebrtt

•·ant.ed Chi.Aa's involvement with Afro-Asian aspirations, be,

probably, na« ao desire to pass on t.l\$ mantle of leadership

t.o China. Although NehrU persis't.ently denied aftY claim to

Afro-Asian leadership, he wee well consciOWiJ of ln41a's

• ®pecial posi~oa • which made her preemiaently fitted ~o

play ~is role.21 •India 1s ~e cents.·al poin~ of ~e Asian

p1ctute" • he rem~ in 1!it49, "India's :-ole of leadet.(Jblp

·R'i$Y not be so •leoma w o'tber5. eltbOu~h lt may satJ.afy

our v&lU ti.Y• But it is someth11!!9 whlch we eennot. escaPe•

"-~ cannot. escape the varJ.maa J'esponaibilities tt.het. arise

out of our: g--&Phy anti bU~or:y,. .,24

23 Mi~bael 9techl!t. ~~ ! . A.,Po&&tiSoJ. ,J:tioAEDibY (L~Ol\• 1961)• P•221•

24 To the Overseas ~ress ·C1Ull in Nf!W York. BebN1 b!!!S! b~i£!.@• pp., 54•55,.

58

t.enitortel c1at.ms (Taiwan., 25 Goa26> dia no- really reflect

a closer relat.!onshlp between ln41a en4 China. In fac~,

~he pertoa ftol10ldn\t the &Sftd\lWJ conference witneasecS the I

1ooaea1ng of t.ies betWeen l:ndia and China. the reasons being

tme bol.'der questtca and mutual susptcJ.oa about. Tibet. on

t.ne cont.rary., tme same period saw Moscow • s high priortt.y to

good relations with India to be cetrasted by J.t.s growing

diffcences with China. IlllO&;e flexil::d.lit.y in soviet policy

toward India becQ.me &scern.ible 1ft May 1955 when an editorial

in the ~&f.!.• a theoretiee.l Ol"C'JElft of the CI?SU; &-efet'red to

t.be role of Mehatma Gandhi in the st.J:uggle egtd.nai:. i.mpcial:Ulm

ana crittcised ttbe Sovi~ orient:.ali.su for their hosdle

JI».MBII f ....

25 on 26 Oef!otter 1955, Beijing Radle c;uot.ed R •. x .. Nehl'u, IncU.e's Ambessado~esi~ate to Cbllne,. e.s hsvtncr said. t.n Hong Mng-a 0 .lt ,ls Cflll'te cleat to U$ that 'ratwan .and other of£t~hore :1~1anas ate part. of ChtnaCJ,. t?:!IIJ, &\ead!l• vo1.1. 22.•~8 Oetol>et 19$5., p.413. · NehrU el.so suppott.ed China• o claim to Formosa !.tt hi& Ptess Con:£Nence. .he,14 tn. New Delhi .on 1 September .1958. 1'J..ml! ,oa; ,JJlA&I• $ Sep&emb~ 1958. KtiGhna Menon eleo &upport:e<S f:be ehlnese claim to i'OJ:mosa in a tlebat.~ !n the. UN OenGt:al Aasembly on 7 October 1958, !&m.U .al !atl.G tBombay). 9 octO~ 1S5a.

26 aet.Jtng .Ret1J.o sa:14 on 26 october 1956 that. .. L1sb0n 1 s ettemP~t. to , continue her: eolORial n.J.e tn Goa. Deme~~ ana utu• cout.ttut.es ._ an Aat.cl.et&ble 1nsu.l t to Chines'! people, to lneU.en people end t.o dl Asil\l\ peopl.efl, M&IDw.flecol:§e£, vo&.l., 22•28 Octcber 1956, p.,a •. ,~geln. •pe•s.n; ·at. the Indlen Republice .oar .:-ec:ep't1on qiven bJ' the .X~el\ Am'bassactcn: ln China, a.K., Nehru, on 26 J~ta.ua:y l.tss •. Premier Zhou Bnlai ret terated eh~a •s suppoz::t for In& a •s cle.&m tO ·GOth ·M£M §l§fl.@&; vo1.1- 29 Januery..-Jebne.rr 19S8t p~646.

59

appraisals of Maha'tma Gandb1 during the S1lalin era. 21 The

reassessment. of Gandhi_. compounded with tme earlier sw.t.et.

call t.o Indian comnanJ.au for a polJ.cy of collaboration with

the Nebn GoverrlmQnt and support of Nehru' a foreign policy,

p~ved 'the W8¥ for better Indo-Soviet relations. 29 In June·

19SS, &iring his visit to Moscow, Nehru \i'a& given an Wlpre­

eedented lavish welcome • a reception "for wh.t.c::h th.ere has

been no parallel in Moscow before or since". 29 The visit

was significant ~ 1t was held against the backdrOp of

improved Sino-Indie.B relations. lt was preceded by the

conclu.sion of a substantial aid ac;p:~emant between India and

the Soviet. Union. 30 The joint ccrmm.mique# issued on 23 June

19SS by' Nehru and Sulganin expressed their adherence to the

FJ.ve Principles of peaceful eo-existence. It also reflect.e4

. a con:mon vi• on various int.errteti.cna.l issues.

At the end Of f?be same year, on their r~i'Rlm V1$1t. to

ln4ie, SCV'iet. l·e&ders offered reassurances to their hosts \

• - .. nt j • _._.i!l\44(tii:¥W;;

21 ~§A, no.s, 19Ss. pp .• 7~sa •.

28 Xa October 1954, t:he Comlnfot:m Jwr:nal, 19£ ·I bMt.l.mt faEe,. "1101. a~ Pti9Q.lft~! }lgqg;;:ac;z., publtshea an e.r~1cle suon.gly irrlplyl.ng S~iet. .supper~ to Nel'u:u 's for.eign pol ley!'

29 K.~>.s. Menon •. Do .. .nx&Ds..J'£9&lsil U.onaon, 1963), p.lo&.

30 Nehru wcula latex> s~at.~ that. "shtlat is E!'Obed4e4 in the nauonal consoicu.cne$s of t.he peopl-e of lnata ea the eymbol of a n• era0 , c1t.e4 bY Btmal Prasad, _ ~:!it Rtiat;iqni, -&9fZ:;12U (Bombay, 197 3) , P• S7 •

60

that suenqthened relations beo1e.en them must not be

hindered by the diffe.re;.noes in the two countries • politieal

systems.. in his speeches dult'ing and eft.er the visit

(.December 1955), !Quushchev offered India such tea:ms of

friendship as ne:U:her the West. nor China was ready to

conceae. To put them into the mouths of the soviet leaders 131

( 1) "Both we and our Indian friends would 11ke to

develop and strengthen cur f1'1endly relattons

in a w~ Which would not chan~e the frlendly

relations of tnd.ie or the Soviet. Union with

other stat.esfj. 32

t 2) "Cel'teln moce reasonable bOU.rgao1s leaders ere now

say1ng that it: ia necessetY ~o increase aid fx-an

cap!ta11e4: countries to un4et'O.areloped countries.

Thte ls not a bad thing • Let the capi.talist.

countries give such aid.• 33

<a) 11F1ve count:t~..s at:"e considered Gc-ea- Powers. But

!f one analyses this ol)jecttvely, one involuntarily

,

sa gea, vo1.a. no. 52, a FebNaey 1956.

33 lb1d.

61

tfonders why India i.s not considered a Great. Power.

we consider India a Great Power and believe that

she ehould occupy a pmud.nen11 place among the gr-eat

sta~s of the tt~or ld. ~ 34

(4) "'K~shm!r was an integral part of lndia end the Soviet

3$ Union would consider it to be so." ·

Besides, the. soviet lea.ders not only conceded the untque

nature of the ~xperienaes of each nation, they even a£-nit.ted

the fUtility of imposing such eY.per.tenees on one another •

"It is impossible to force the buffalo to eat meat.

I. t. 1S J.mposs ible for t.he tiger to eat grass • a 36

over. the next fet; years, there was a pro11£ eretl..on of

e.:Kchenges ~ween Int'l1e and. the ussR. The volume of economic

aontects Jroae st.ee.aily, E!M·by 1960s, India had become USSR •s

mo3t J.rnportant::. no~omrw.nist tratling partner.

The 20th Congtess of the CPSU, he14 in February 19SG.,

was en 1mportant. l&ndmar'k in the hlstDry o£ S1no-sov1st

· te.lations. The secret speech made by Khrushchev t.o the

34 ltd.d. • vol.e, no.so. 2'5. Januart 1956,.

3S lbt4.

36 lbtd., vol,a, no.4S, 11 January 1956.

62

Congress raisoo many theoretical questions, sueh as the

issue of war and peaos, the peaceful transition to socialism.

peaceful coexistence, and the importanee of the third world

in international revolutionary strategy.. On all these

issues the Chinese pereept.ion was <.iif.ferent from the Sov!et,

and Khrushchev• s harsh denunciation of dtalin irked the

Chinese leaders to a cons iderabl.e extent.. According to the

Chinese, Khrushchev's emphasis on 'peaceful co-existence•

and his advocacy of the thesis of peaceful transition to

socialism seriously distorts Marxtst-~eninist doctrine on

these questions.

"••.. the 20th Congress of the CPSU was the first. s·tep

&long the road of revisionism t.aken by the leadership of the

Ct?SU •.. In partieuler * the complete n.agat.i.on. of Sta.lin on

the pretext of •combatlnq the personality cult' and the

thesis of peaceful transition to socialism by • the parl!.a­

mentary r-oad' are gross errors of principle. The cr1t.1cism

of· Stalin at the 20th congress of tbe CP5U was wrong both 1n

principal and :1n ~ca.... otstorting Lenin • s correct

pr~tple of peaceful coex.t.stence between countries with

diffe.rent. soeia,l systems; Khrushchev dee.late4 that peaceful

coexistence was tlte general line of tile foreign policy of

the ussa. Tnis atnOtmted ·to excluding from ~e general line

of foreign policy .of the soe1a11st. countries t.heir nut.ual

assistance an4 cooperation as well as assistance by them to

63

t.o the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people.s

and nations or to subordinating all this to the :policy of

so-called "peaceful coexistence. n 31

The Chinese advocated. an aggressive communist bloc

foreign poliey, creating artificial crises and aggrava~ng

autonomously developing ones t.o extract the most from the

changed t4'0rld power balance where the ••sast wind was pre­

veiling over the W~?..st". The Ru.ss1ens considered it to be

a very rash thing t.o try. At the same time, China rejected

the sov.iet thesis of peaceful tr.ansit!on to conmunism anc.t

harped o.n the inevitability of war whieh t'.he latter felt.

was both cU.spensable and dangerous. The Sino-Soviet. dispute

had a strong bearing upon their policies towards ln,dJ.a .•

Aceordin.g to the Soviet Union, the newly liberated. countries

of Asia and .Africa (li'ke India) haVe a pos.lt.!ve role ~

play. These countries are not the lackeys of imper.ielism,

end. they are st.tll fighting: to consolidate t.hair freedom.

~he central point,. howev er, on which the soviet. aeoept.ence

of India seemed t.o rest. was that. Indi.a wa.s Qtmu1nely teyinq

to get out o£ the control of the nim,per1slist" to fight

u imperial!~" in tile international spbe.re. The Chinese, on

37 &ditor.tal Depert.ments of Fteele •s lffl&lx. and Bed FlAg, "The Orig:in ana Developmen.t of the D1fferences Bettfeen the .Leatler,ships of the CPSU cmd vurselves ... Comment on th:e Open Letter of the Central Cotrmittee of t.he C~tsun, Psmels',s PN~Y• 6 September 1963 tSei.jing., Fote!gn Lsnguaqe Press, 1963) •

64

the othe~ hand, had serious suspicions of the 'bourgeois•

governments of t."»ttl!!ee countries. E.'ven 1n 1963, China openly

r·eferred to the Government of! India as 0 t.he ruU.n9 groups of I

the Indian big bourgeois a.nd big l&.ndlord.sn and t.o India as

a neapitalist count.r:yn. 39 For them, unless e country was

led 'by the working class~ t.h.e leaders were found to vacillate,

compromise with the "imperialism", became ~ens1on1st.s. By

disput.ing the Soviet theory of peaceful transition to

socialism, and holding that. assistance should be given to

"the g-enuine z:evolut1onarr proletarian party", China was

also cs.llinq, indirectly though, for e communist revolu.tion

.ln India.39

The new policy, launched bf t-thrushchev in Februory

19S6_, was taken by the lndie:ne with a .sensa of appreciation,

and they viewed !t as pragmatic. In hi.s address to the Lok

S.a))ha, Nehl'u said·• 41 It is an .tl'fl.P()rtant matt.er not only for

the ussa, but for all count.ries 1n the wor 14 at large to

~8

,39i:;,

E41t.or1a1, £sQQAa•#J. R1J;aY. 9 March 1963.

,At the M::>seow Confe~:ooce of the Ccm\mWli:st. Part.ies ln .1957 • the Chinese submi'tt.ed a memorandum meintel.nlng t.hat. the concept of peaceful transition should be taotieal anti warned. against •cverem,phesS.s'' en tne possibllit.y of peaceful t:'a.nsltion.

65

\lnd.erst.and these great changes that ere taking place" •

These changes are "·taking the USSR mre and more towards

one kind of normalcy which 1s to be welcomed in every way,.n40

ln an elaborative wif'/, Nehru, on 20 March 1956, again t.old.

the Lok Sabhaa 0 Tnere can be no doubt that t.be CPSU C~mgress

has developed a new line and a netf' policy. •• This new line,

both 1a poll1!1cal thinking end in practical policy, aPPears

to be based on a more realistic: spp.rociation of the present

world si1ttlation and represents a significant. process of

adaptation and adjustment. According to our principles we

do not interfere in the internal affai.rs of other countries

just as we dO not welcome interference of others in our

country • But any important. development. .in any countey

whiCh appears to be a step towem the creation o.f conditions

fnV<?tlrable to the p&lrsult of a policy of peaceful co-eaistence

1s lmport,ant for U$ as well as others."41 V1c:e-Pt"esi<lent

Rsdha'krishnen, on the eve of bJ.s tO\U" cf the soviet Union.,

called the 20th congress decision "a nvision of Marxist

40 L,ol S§J?l}a leJ!GM• vo1.1., no.e~ 23 February 1956, col,.·S17.. TM.s st.at.ement was made when the Conqress of ithe CPSU was still :la seSoton.,

41 lb16. (20 March 1956), vo1.2, no.a7. c:ols. 304-48.

66

4octrine8• lie said. 8 It. required great courage on the part

of 'tiDe Soviet. leaders to bring about t.bis reor!ent.aUon .of

their own. policy. 'Tber.e J.s a new look, a new flexibility.,

far lds fear and an anxlety to avoid war and aahieve peace."42

Following the 20'tb Party Congress, soviet relations

with India further improved.. India's role durinq suez crisis

pleased the Soviet. Union ~o a qrea.t.er extcm~. An article in

PrAYili in 19$7 • while giving a laudatory note to India, said, -

8 1ndi.a has become a great power now playing an important role

in the international arena. Pursuing the.ir peace-loving

policy the great Indian people are str1v1nq for friendship

with all countries •••• During the troubled days of the

imperialist aggression against Egypt. India consistently

came out on the side' of the Egyptian people. ••43 Despite

minor irritation with India's position on Hungary early in

1951 • the Soviet. Vn1on c:ont1nue4 her eord1a1 ;estures toward

lftlU.a. 44

When the lndo....Soviet t·elation was taking an upward

swing 1n late Sos, stno-lndien telat.ion wee marred by their

border controversy arising out of the publiaetion of mep.

42

43

44

H.lndu (Me.(lras) ., 22 March 1956.

l?rpvda, 25 Jenuacy 1957.

ArthUr Stein, Intii, ~ond lttta SOX1it Rnio.o : Neb!!» J3ra (Chicago. 1969),, p.97.

•

67

s~sequentl.y, the Soviet Union got itself e.nt.angleci w1t.b

the border: dispute. The map controversy relating to 1:he

border dlspu:te can well be traced back to so-called .. honeymoon"

period in Singo-lndisn relations. When NehrU visited China

in October 1954. he brought to the not.ice of the Chinese

leaders some maps, which had been published in China showing

an lnccrre<:t boundary alignment. When the Indian leaders

rai.se<t an obj ectJ.on to it.; the Chinese Government replied

that. they were merely a reproduction of old maps published

during the Kuomint~ regime and that the People's government

had no time to ~evise tbem.45 This seemed to Indian leaders

as en 1m,p1J.cJ.t recognition of the tn41an posit10l'h .EleboraUng

the tbinktng behind t.b1e border policy, Nehru later told

the Raj'ye. Sabha, .,From the very fi.r.st. day • •• the qaesticm

was whether we sbOUl4 raise the border issue ••• we 4eeiile4

not to.,.. we declde<l that W·e muat meke clear in EN.ery possible

way what. our ftontier was ln ou.r ·opin:ion, clear in OUZ' map.s,

clear 1n OUC" statements. clear to the world .ana clear to

C~ina... and hold by· tt., . stick by it. Why shou.ltl we go

about es1d.n9 China to raise 1:h1s questlo.n when we felt sure

45 Tbie ex;plen.ati-O'ft was given by Zhou Enl.at to NehrU ~1ny their talks ~n D~j1ng in ~c:tober 1954, Nehru. s letter to ~l}ou Enlat, 14 December 1958. Jb!bd §!cper;-x., p.49 •. · .

68 about iti. •• we felt that we should hold by cur position

and that the lapse o£ time and events will confirm it,

end by 'the time perhaps, when t.he challenge t:o it. came, we

would. be in a much stronger position to face it. • .,46 In

December 1956, during his visit to New Delhi, Zhou Enlai

said thou.gh the McMahon line was "not legal", yet .in view

of t.he existing relations between India and China, be

recognized the l.'J!eMahon line. 47 J.toreover, as revealed by

the White Paeer-1, there were sometimes border clashes

between the Chinese and Indian patrols.48 At about the.

same time, the Chinese also started, as it came t.o be known

later, building a road. from Sinkieng to ~ibet. However,

Zhou Snld and Nehru apparently seemed to agree that minor

border problems should be settle6 by representatives of the

46 ~,g1ya SM))a Qed=§!., 9 December 1959, vo1.2.7, no.12, cols. 1983-5.

47 A minute was prepared by the Pr!.me Minister of India on the oonversetion between him and ti'le Prime Minister of China. lt. was stated in tJ"a.e minut.ea 0 Althou.gh he (Zhou En1a1) thought that this 11M (McMI!ibon line) established by- British imperialists was not faU', nevertheless. because tt was en accomp11shed fact end because of the fc-1endly ~elations Which existed· between India and the countrl.es concerned, ne.~ely • India ant! aur:ma, thG Chinese Government were of the opinion tbe:t. they should qive recogntt.1cm to this MeMehon L1ne·", !b&atl Pmumd, PP•4'9-so.

49 ·For details of the bOrder clashes during this periotl, a. Barracl.· cugh, j»Wmt gLipleemat&on§l Aff.g!£1!, . Ul§§­a (LondOJ?., 1,52 f. p. 335.

69

'two 9cwez:nments, a few incooolus1ve d1scuss1ons about the

ownership of Barhoti were alSo held and both sides agreetl

not to send troops t.o the QX'ee. au.• surprisingly, incidents

again oCattl'J:ed at Berhoti. thus violeU.ng the renewal of

the uadarst.end.lng as well es a9reement not t.o send armea

personnel t.o the area. ln July 1958,, the Government. of

India received. information about t.he intrusion 'by 1me

Chinese troops intQ t.he Ladakh regiOn of KashmJ.r and occu­

pation by them of India's Khurnak Fort. In 1959. the tempo

of the exchange of notes t.hrouqh diplomatic ehannels

quie'kened end pr:ompted ~~ehru to address a personal lettet:'

to ZhOO: Enlai., 49 Surprisingly, contrary to his earlier

statement Zhou Enlai in his reply said, "The Sino-Indian

bOundary has never been formally delimited"~ • ana. 1816,

formal elsirn to large areas of Indian territory • He fttrtber

said t.bc¢ t.he OoVetnment of China had not raised the issue

in 1954 because condit!ons were not. Y,et ripe fen' ·the

set:t1ementt .• 59

?ITJii"i_-- . -- 1t1Mn • ...-

49 Nehru wrote to Zbou Enlai dr:awinq cttent.ion t.o the publication, tn an off1,oJ~e1 Chiaese journal, of a map again d~.t-ctf.n:g wrongly the bounaaey between the 'tWO countries.

S'O :r..ettet' o£ Prime Mtnist.er of China to thG Prime M.lnist.er of lncU .. e, 23 January 1959, !lll\t .. i?Ee£-l:.t p •. 52.

70

Things changed dramatically in 1959 leading further

worsening in S.tn()olo.Indian relations. The Tibetan rebellion,

which b.r:oke out in March !SHit, e.d.ded one nnre irri11ant: to

existing border diep.tte. The oont.e.in:nent. of the rebellion

'by the Chinese authorities subsequently led t.o the flight

of the Dale! Lama to India where he was given asylwn.

Official Indian p.ronou.ncement. on 'the sit.uat.ion in Tibet,

compounded with the eonsequ.ent excitement of Indian public

opinion, angered the Chinese. l\t the t.lme of granting

political asylum to the Dalai Lema. the Government of India

had made it clear to Ch!na that it. h.ad, ln accordance with

the .interna:tional practice, instruc:ted t.he Dala.i Lama not.

to caJ:ry on any political activity aqeinst China from

Indian soil. 51 However, against -this ast:nttarlce, the Dalai

Lama meae two statemenu tn lndia "'"' one on iS Apr 11 and the

other on 22 Aprtl 1959 • ~ating the indepenaence of

Tibet and condemr.d.ng China .• 52 Th.ts made China openly accuse

Xadta of viol.actlng- i:he f.ADSbSbe&'&., A:gs:emne.o& end interfering

1n the int.etna.l &ffalrs o£ China. In tlue Spring of that

51 !fb&&l E'MC£.1 (New Delhi• 1959), p.69•

52 These statementS ~re maae respectively at Tezpur and Mt1Sl300rief V,G. A.-,bek.$r and V .o. lH.veker. eets. • QQQ11timUS .. 90 W!&Dt~ s ,.R,C&ot&Qns a!tb . SOJU:b., .·rm§ hiS M&D'' . 19i!:§2 (Bombay. 1964), pp.42'7•29.

71

year • China c:harqed 1:hat Indian • big bourgeois.1e• , in

unwitting collusion with the imperialism, incited end aided

a snort.-livea ~bellicm in Tibet.. 53 In the followint;~ mont.hs,

there were outbreaks of fighting along disputed areas of

Sino-Indian borier. In respense to t.he major border incident

that took place at Longju ( 1n the eastern sector) late in

A\lgust. 1959. and the second. at KOng'ka Pass in the Tflestern

e 54 sector in October 1 ~.,g • · Nehru released diplomatic notes

alluding to five years of borCier incursions. Zhou responded

by challenging India• s traditional boUndaries all along the

Ind:o-.T1bet.an bor<lers and asserted his claim to 3S, 000 SQUare

·miles o.f territory, claimed by India in the western sector

of fronti~r together with large areas in the eastern and

middle sectors.55 He also repeated that the Sino-Indian

bOUndary bad never been formally delimited. The nso-called

53 "The Revolut.lon in Tibet and. Nehru • s PhJ.losophy", ItQQRJ&!.s. DollY• 6 May 1959 .•

54 'nle sino-lndlan bOrder is <U.vtded into three sectors .• The western sec~ encompasses tba boundary between Aksd Chin and Ladalch 1ft Northern Kashmir end Chinese territory tn Sinkiang end Tibet.. The middle seator e~ends from Kashmir to Nepal. The· 2sstern sector stretehes from BhUtan to Surma in Assam,. Himalayas t.hJ:O:Ugb wh1t:h AM the McMahon Line. The erucial t.erritorial probletl\91n the Sino•lndien border con,flict were in the Western and Eastern Seet.Ors.

SS Letter to Nehru. 3 September 19S9, :to4&A:ill&Dei fil'!&~o P&e£::oii• PP•27-33. Chine took .as ntlCh as six n:onths t.o respond to Nehru • s letter of Ma.rch 1959•

72

McMahon line was a produ.cit of the British policy of

aggression against. the Tibet region of Chine" and, therefore,

it "cannot. be considered legalu • Saying that 0 Sino-Indian

boundary question is a czomplieat.ed question left. aver by

history"', 56 he shattereci Nehru.•s vision. of •friendly China'.

on 15 December 1959, ~ehru in a telev.tsicm interview with

vetez-an American journalist, A.J. Steele, gave a qrenk

explanation of the cause of the sudden crisis which had

c:ropped up along the northern frontier. He said, "The

revcl1: in Tib¢ brought a cer'tain speed 1n the events on

cur borders because the revo1 t in Tibet wes being crushed

by the Chinese forces and they naturally came t.o our borders

where t.he fi~htinq was en the other side. Ti~e~an refUgees

were coming ln. The Chinese wanted to stop them. So they

came to our border and a some)'Jhat new situation arose for

us in the lest fat nonths••• it was rather e succession of

events whteh brouqh:t thls eonflict about. • 57

'1'he n~ phase in Slno-Xndian relations relating to

border problem started with Zhou. Enlat•s visit t:o New nethi

J.n April 19GO. This summit. meeting betw.een Nehru end Zhou

56 Ibid.

S7 ~ited by ttarunnkar Gupt.a; De .!!&§~en ltiat;oa of t;h! s&n2e1Dd&u .f~l:r:<c:alW:tt.a~ 1974}, p.m..

73

had no substantive outcome except for tile appointment of

a joint comnittee of officials which did not succee4 in

agreeing l'lGt to agree. The failure of N'eh.ru-Zhou talk.

esn 'be att-ributed 1to Inelia•s hardening attitude-. Perhaps,

Nehru by that time could visualise the surfacinq of ecut.e

differences betwaera China end the Soviet Union over a number

of issues. including the question of India. Second, us's

growing i-nterest. in India and its favourable attitude

towardS the b3rder dispute possibly influenced India. Nehru

was. 1n fact.. quite optimistic ebwt the super: .PQ'irolers•

support to India ln case of Chinese attadt• Explaining

India•s 'fum• stanc.i 1\lelu:n told Parliament on 27 November

19SSh

"Th$ issue to my mind is b.i<J••·• 1t is not e small

border issue that we are 1W0ubled ribout. The

lssuea sutroundtng it. are huge, vague, deepseetea,

f~•ree.ehin91 en4 ifttet'twined. One has to t.hinlc

sbe>u1r. them with ell the clarity ana. strength at.

• .. ·sa one fll command••••

Smelt. localleai· border clashes c:ont1nued.. By mt.c!-1961•

Chinese for.ces he<! taken contr~l Of 20,000 sq. ml.lcs of

what New Delhi r:eg:anied ·o.s Indian ter.ritory. 1n41a demanaed

58

74

a return to the §.$:$! rmo wt.e as a condition for ftE',(JO.

tiaticms. The Chinese rt,lfused end began to concentrate in

'!'ibet well-organized logistics and communicat:ion system.

'

La Ridge 1n the Sastern Sector·, and en 20 October. they made

a. massive offensive at.t.eelt on both the Eastern and We.stem

sectors. A second offensive began on 16 NOV'ember. War

came to an end on 21 .November, with the Chinese announcement

of unilateral eeas.efire and tlithdrawal t.o t.he borders it

be.d always claimed.

The $ov1~ .reeetiGn to t11.e 'l'ibetM question and. the

Sino-lndian border crisis .of 19$9 csn be ealled neutral.

!"or the Tibeten up&"iS1n<a it. blsm~ the .. Tibetan react.ion-

eri a$"', end "W est.Qrn 1mperie11nm''. 59 The Smt!.et press,

1rhile aecepiftt~CJ :rt\0st aspeuts ¢)f the Chinese version of the

Tibetan rebellion, refused. :to take note o£ the charges of .

tndian int.erfere.nce.60 AS egains1:. thts,. !.n 19$0•51, the

soviets had been lft'i).t:e st.r14ent tb.en the Cbine$e ln

ilil a __ - 2 _ ii ____ .I ·_ ;g-·

59 ££-g<~a, ~o M~ ana $ April 1959. Fo:r e er.tttcel enalys1s of this potn~ Kerry Gelman, ·utthe CPI end ·the s.tno-sovtee Battleground" in A• Doek Bsrnet.t., ea.!J# S9.1PlMn&s,,StJ:ot!eg:z An MiA (New Yc:u:·k, 1963), p.tll.

75

crit.J.c.ising Indian "int.ervent.ionn in Tibet. 61 In 1959.

t.he Soviets appeared ~ have recognized a certain legitimacy

of 'the Indian interests in Tibet.. A couple of months later.

when the :tndia..Ch.lna border conf1ic:~ was brought. to 1 ts

notice, the Sovie't Union was put. into a dJ.lemma. The first

statement. of 1me Seviet. GoVerntnent.l on 9 Sept.el'l\ber. 1959,

that came two weeks after the Longju incident in the Eastern

62

"The inclden~ on the Chinese-Indian frontier 1s

certsinly deplorable •• •. The Chinese and Soviet.

peoples ere li.nked by tme unbreakable bonds of

fratern.al friendship based on the great principles

of socialist internationalism. Friendly cooperation

between the ussR and India is sueeessfu.lly develop..

ing 1n keep1ng with the ideas of peacGful coexist.enc:e. •.

Its inspirers are trylrYJ to dtscredit the idea of

peaceful coexistence bet.ween states with diffez:ent

social systems .end 1::0 preven- the strength&ning of

Asian pe~ple' s solJ.derit.y 1n tt\e. struggle. for: c:onso­

lida'tJ.on of national independenoe.n62

In 19SO, f:hey described Tibet. as an •tnalieneJ:>le part of Chinese territory" • While backing the Chinese· An October 19SOrt P.!i&JVdA announced that the PLA was c~.rying "free·dom, peace end dexmcracy«~ to the people o.f Tibet.. Fe!¥!• vo.1.11, 18 November, 1950, 91dt~e£ on July ttso., accused. Ittaia of . t1l0rk1ng with Britain and the us not only 1n Tlbe't but also in o\her Himalayan t.er"1tor1es. c.S.t.ed ):)y Sen<;Upta. op.eit., .P• 344.

76

Chin~ regar:ded Uhe Soviet Union • s "studied neutrality"

end latter's failure to cond.emn the NebN government SS

"betrayal of socialist cause" • Later, the Chinese revealed

that "one of the important. differences of prlneiples between

the Soviet leaders and. ourselves t.ums on t.he Sino-Indian

ooundary qttestion8• 63

It is interesting to know that. China took pains to

influence Moscow through personal contacts64 after the

disclosure of the Sino-Indian border dispute. lts immediate

objective was to prevent the pu.blication of a statement

declaring Soviet neutrality on the ;.p.~est1en.65 1&!i statement

favoul"ing neutralit.y on Sine-Indian borcSer dispute showed

Chinese J.nsbi.lit.y to influ.enee the Soviet unton. ScvJ.et

reaction to the <Uspute c:ould be well understood .against

the backdrop of 'Camp Dsv1d • ta1lts between the leaders o£

us and USSR en4· t.be cont.inu1nq Soviet support to lndta•s

foreign policy.. To put the view.s of an American analyst:

63 •n.rba truth abOUt how the leadet'a of -the CPSU have allied tb«DSelves with Inttia SJJeinst. Chinen, llJi!AJ.nq aev;ta, no • .ts, s Novenber 1963. p.t9 .•

64 Selj#.ng has 1:\ENealed that !t. scuejht., c!uring ·the perloc! of Sept.ember 6•9, 19S9f t.o explain its positLon in r:egata t.o t.h~ :bot'Clu,. to soviet officials.. Their version. of the "f.acts8 ab0\1~ Longju was given to the SoV1~t envor in Be1j lng on .6 September by 0 a C'hinese 1eaderQ • probably Zhou. Snl.ai or Foreign. Minister Chen 1'1. Moreover, the S_OVietS- t-1ere requested 11 1\0t to be taken in by Netu:un • who ti'SS accu~Je¢1 o£ attempt.1ng 'lt;o put. pressure on China bY ut.111~1ng the Sov.tet Vnlonn , M.s • Raj an and s. Ganguly, etls., (},£~,.£pcu; Ralat.ions, Wgg14 O.rder g4 tb§, Da£4.NQrJ4 :New Delhi, 1981), P•113.

65 lbid.

77

"The lest. 'thing the soviet leader would have wanted

was for a totally e:gtraneous factOr like the Sino­

Indian border dispu;te to undermine his American

tour. Yet, if Moscow issued a pro-Chinese statement.

h.e could ant.icipat.e eons.l4eral:>le _coolness from us

administrat.ion hostile to China; if l~'oaeow issued no

sta.t.emant, Klu·ushchev WO\lld haVe been intensively

~est.ioned at e!f'ery opportunity about his st.t.i tude

to the disput.e. Mence the need for a neutral

stat~t; with which he could hope to put the matter

1n~ a cold storage at least. for the parpose of hiS

us tour.n66

fflt was the Soviet. J.ntarvent.ion on Indian behalf

that immed.1a't.ely herdened ime <.!hineS.e positt.on on

the border dispute. vir1t1rag to Nehru on a Sept$mber

1959, Zhou Enlai vi.rt.ually withdrew the earlier offer

t:.o recognize the reality of t.he McMahon. Line. China

now elalmed. the entire area of the North East Frontier

Aqeney wbioh, as Zhou pointed out, was as large as

the Chekie.nv province .of Chine. ..HOW' could China

aqr;ee to· a.cc:epu under coercion audh an illegal line

78

that. would have it relinquish its right. and

disagree itself by selling out of its territory - and

such a large piece of territory of that1 .. (Zhou was

in feet replying to some. of the $ov1et argUments

against the aU.nese st-ance on the border) .u67

At a session of ~e Supreme soviet on 31 October 1959,

Khrushchev expressed his 0 regreu0 end "distrust." over the 68 ..., Konqka Pass incident.., on , November 1959, in an interview

with a correspondent of en Indian weekly, Nsm A9f!• he described

the :border disput.e as a "sad" and "stupid.., affair. 69 He cited

the settlement of t.he SOviet--Iranian boundary lssu.e, saying

"what are a few ld.lomet.ers for a eount.ry lil<:e the Soviet

Y11ionl 0 10 Although. his st.at.emant did not say whi-ch side

Should eonoede tta fa<J ld.lometers of territory .. , the Chinese

tnte~:pret.ed it 4\S beJ.ng px;-o-Indian. They beliaved that the I

Soviet-s were, tn fact,. "insinuating that China should cede

her.own territory in or4er to satisfy India's cleims."71

61

68

69

70

71

Shaban1 Sengupta, op.cit.., p.129 •

~,•S.• Ki'UNShdhe\1, l'!flli !fA:J;bM :AQDI• !!9£l4 .. ,iiit.bpu& 'te£1 (Moscow. 1959 ., p.399.

J!f!H.,r&Qil (Delhi.) • 16 November 1959o

lbl.d.

!tWns.Rnte.;. n.o.4S, s November t96l; pp.19, 21 ... 22. Also Joh·n· GJ.~!n.gs, ed •. ·, DQI!m~§ 99 .SI-mle§fi!\t&¢ Q.i.!i.Jli&Jc , l!U:l!il (Londcm, 1 · 4 • P• 36.

79

Soviet aid to India which showed a dramatic rise in

the late 1950s and early 60s coincided with a decline in

soviet. economic assistance t.o China. This was a major

reason for the esce.lat.ion of the Sino-In4ian border dispute

by China between 1959 end 1962.72 Between February and

June 1960, t.wo agreements regarding indUstrial projects

ln India involving £22 million of Soviet aid, and another

on Soviet technical collaborations in oil-explorat.ion in

India involving Soviet credit- amounting to £1S million,

were signed. 73 In October 1950, ar• In-do-Soviet trade

agreement was signedf wbieh provided for twice the 1959

turnout of £37 m1ll1on.,74 Another agreement. was signed

in February 1961 on further soviet. aid to India for six

industrial projects involvin<;, a total Soviet CJ;'edit. of

£45 million. 75

What displeased the Chinese wete a continued r:1se tn

Soviet a1d t.o India end a voluminous expana1on of Indo-,

'72 Je.ya.n.t.anjue Bandyop&dhye.ya. zoa MQ1s&ng of Xnd&e.-.s £9Q!.&smj Po~tcx !.,,Pfsm&DiD$94 tnst!t;ut&~cms • . Prasmuees 4d .f§£fJH!JDQlU~ New De.lhl• 1980) t P•101.

7 3 itd·e~mg (Calcutta) , . 9 Februuy 196o.

14 Ibid•• 25 October 1960_.

75 For details of the Soviet aid to India, M. Seo.bastian stanislaus., §R!;tet EJ;gnsml& .6&i\.IO !asio.' M AQa&vi1§: il!i .§!fi!qAJ&ign New Delhi, 1975) ,, C:hapter v.

80

o.f aid from Moscow was being redu.ce4.76 Whet was offensive,

from the Chinese peint. of view, was tha-t in 1962 the SOV'iet

Union. offered a substantial amount of military assistance

t.o India. It was ennounced 1n New Delhi ln May 1962, that

the Sovie-t Union had agreed to sell India two aque<lrons of

the latest. ~...t.O f.ighters, to supply some more helicopters,.

and tc assist the manufacture of the MiG planes in In4ia.77

Two months later, came the neWs that. t.he USSR had signed

an aqreement under Which it would supply enqines for lndie • er

Hi'•24 supersonic jei>;, fiqhters and collabora1le with India 1n

the manufacture of t.hase plan.es inside India. 78

soviet pol1cy towards India 1n parti<Nla.r: and the

third count;r1es in general became more pronouncerl when

Otto .Kuusinen, a ~ed soviet orien.talist., while speakinq

on 22 April 1960, at the Lenin anniversary meetinq in Moscow,

76 Chinese co~leined t.ha~ the Soviet Un1cm had given two-thirds of her economic a.1<i to India since the ~lme the Indian • reactionaries • had provoke4 the S!no-lnaian border conflict. The mili tery eqlliprr.ent. supplied 'by the SOViet Union was used 'by India aqainst Chl.na in the frontier war in October 1962. fMP].e 1.s DallY, !1 Atlgu.st 1963.

11 'ft;mn gg M!!3&i (Nes Delhi) • 6 May 1962 .•

18 Ibid •• 14 July 1962. For fw:ther 41scuss1on in the military aspect of Indo-Soviet. relations. P.a. Chari, 11 Xndo-Sovlet Military Coopera'td.on : A RavtewP , Mlmn ~· vol.19, no.!; MarCh 19'79.

79

81

11 AS for our relations with t.be countries of the socialist

ce.mp - these rela.tioM have been determined from the

very outset by the pr!.noiples of socialist. intern.ationa11sm.

But we have a broader understamU.ng of tbe international

dut.y of£ 0\:lr socialist country. ••• we und.erstant] it as

rendering assistance to these liberst.ed peoples* too.

who are not included in ~'he world syst.gn of soc:iaU.sm.

All rouna. this assistance in st.ranqthenJ.ng their political

and economic lnd.ependenoe 1a the fwnaat.ion of our rela­

tions with the newly created states.... The road to the

consolidation of the tndependence of the liberated

CO\lnt,ries is the road of developing their national

eeonomy, promt)ting ~he advance of their aultwre and.

tmproving the livinCkl standards of t.he people. Indus•

trlalization is t.he tremendous importance for sw:h

countriEU:'h It J.s precisely here that the young states

need support most of all. Uftderst.anding this, t.be

soviet. Union is accordingly developing :1. ts economic

cooper at ion wi~h t.nem. o. ·• The Soviet. Union • s pe,tticl­

patlon in bu1141ng the gtgantic st.eel works .at Shilai,

ln the e·onstrttetten of Jr.$wen High 'oam, e steel works .in

Indonesia and <lozen of ot.har ind.ust.l:'ial projects accorets

with the vital l.nt.erest.s of the peOple of the East. n 19

82

In contrast, Chinese assessment. of India and other

t.hlrd world countries where .governments were led by the

"national bour9eois.1e", was different.. Accord.ing to them,

the key t.o ensuring a raPid transition to socialist revo­

lution n is ~e firm. grasping of hegemony in democratic so revolution through the Cormm.tnist Party • n . Any other

strategy. under which nationalist parties would be permitted.

to lead the democratic revolution, would inevitably endanger

the revolutionary process, and could even lead these countries

t.o the western camp.. In fact, the Chinese challenged the

soviet thesis of peacefUl transition to socialism, and on

this very ground disfavoured any aid, economic or military,

to the governments being run by the "national boW:'g:ec1s ien •

'!'hey oharacter1zed Nehru. • s soeielism as "nothing but. e

modern version of reactionary socialism" and a •political

instrument• t.o "facil1tet.e the rule of bourgeois lendlo.tds" •

The .. state monopoly of comprador cl'utl:'acter" was net a

"soclal.ist faetr:ut• .end tbe deVelopment of st.ate sector was

not "promoting ea independent. economv«~• on the contrary, i11

bad nJeopu41ze4 the interes~s of the broed masses of lndia.•91

91

83

The Chinese aupicion abOut the Nehru Government

increased. when a c:cmmunist. government in Kerala was removed

from office, ana the s"'ate placed! \Ulder the rule of central

government. in mid-1959. Khrushchev's conspicuous silence

over ~ 41slo4g1ng of the Marxisu Government in Kerala ana .

the soviet Qffer of more aid to India's Thi.rd Five-Yeat' Plan

in sep'tember 1959 furthet aceentue.ted. the doubts J.:n Chinese

m1nd sbou.t the Soviet credibility to the socialist rEWolu-82 t.icn.

'the ptocess of airing <U.vergent! views on India became

SM:re prominent ln 'the Internet.l.onal Congress following the

bordet dispu-.e• At. the awnan:lQft .Party Conqresa, be14 ln

Bucbai"$St .in 1960, Mt.~hchev launehet.t his offensive; charging ' '

the Chinese ·~rely nationalieu.,. en theS..r: b0r4et' dlspute

wt~ ln&.a. \'then the C:htnes.e delegate, Peng Chen, raised

&2 I<hrtlshel'u!v•s visit. to x·ntu.e. on 11 februuy 19~0 c.:oinctttea with 'tbe· tenth ennivenery .Of the l9SO stno.SO\tt,~ tre&t.y • Slgnlfi.ceMly, the Soviets announced. tbek conu-tbut.:t.on to India's Thirf Five­Year Pl4Jl tn eept.~l' 1959,, 'the very month when the: world learned fo.r the 'first Ume of tb.e S.1no-lnd1aa dispute~•· .In August. 1960, New :Delhi z:evea1ed that. the ussa hail of£,ered en add,tt:Lonel as 60 orote for use· b:Y tile 'lhk4 five-Yea~: Plan. <:cming shott!ly eft.er tbe. BudtaJ"e·st Conference of June 1'960, this addit£ona1 Soviet aid to J:n41a had A~rtent pot! .. ticd. s1gt~J.f1cence. Am&ng other issues at Bucharest., Premier Khrushchev end Marshal Peng he.t! clashed sharply on the respactlve policies of tb~ ussa ana. Cbtna to\<tat4S India. The uss,p. answered the .Chinese oh~qe .that. thetr aid was being used to bOlst~ the ureactlol'h1l'Yei Ne.~N . government. by further increasing its developmentrel &id to India. S'te1n, !Di}.&o IRdt ,t!\A §e!Mt YJ!Lo:o (Chicago, 1969) • Jh181.

84

the Slno-1nd1an bor4ec- issue, it immediately drew from

Khrushchev a wrathful att.ack oa tbe Chinese handUng of

1:be Indian problem. •x lmow What wtar is'* , Khrushchevr

declal"ed• 0~U.nce Indiana were td.lled, this meant tbat Cb!.na

attacked India. we are comnntnists. For us it 1.s not

impertent •there the fronUer line ru.ns • .,83 SubSequently.,

.in the Moscow conference of wo~:la Communist Part.ies,. held

in Noveml3er: 1960., the attitude to ime national bourgeoisie

in countries Uke India was an t.ssu.e between the two. The

soviet. leadership resumed 'the offensive on quesUon o£

ideology and poliCy at Moscow. Aceoratn; ~ French Communist

leaaer., Maurice Thorerah Chinese delegate Deng Xiaoplng £"-sed

the question of the sino-Indian border dispute end its E"Gla­

tJ.onshtp with prole\tarian internationalism. He 1neist.ed on

CCP • s r.ight to call on the support of the Indian comrtl1n1sts

'*to expose the Neh.nl clique" and accmsed the sovie~ leaders

of helpinCi the "r.eactlonaey0 Nehru atwemment.. 84 But t:he

11\df._, delegate. Ghosh's rebUff to China was better l."ece1ved

by the, sovJ.a~. Best4es,, the conference revealea thelar

differences with the Russ!tm over fehe thl.rd wr14 pol ley •

The subsequent;; eomnunS.si> ccmfsenees only gradually unfolded.

tbe.s.r .!ncteaeln~,- ~U.fferences, thus leading to the final open

spli- in MatCh 1963. ...... u ·-

·••·· -.- ]'J f1 .......

es CJ.tea by . Hemen Ray, P.Uiog. an<l _i;he .. ImJ&sm cqmmuntets (i)elht. 1960), P• 71.

84 R.leha!:'d t.. Siet~el• "Chinese Effort.s to Influence Soviet Polley to India" 1 JJld&Q. Q!Ui.rt1}e£Mr (New Ilelhi) t vo1,.24, no.s, J'Uy....Sept~ 19ce,, p.224.

85

HO\feV'er, India continued to OCQU.py a major place in

t.he soviet thinking of "peacef\11 coexistence" which, in.

fact. was not liked by the Chinese. ::tt is here ~ recall

that, during f:he Wes~ Asian crisis of ttse. K.h.cushchev

eallad for a meet.iru;r of t.he big powers to end the ll'd.litaJ."Y

eonfl.ict and suggested ~e partnership of Intis eJ,ong with

the big £0\U' - France. the Soviet Union, us and the United

Kingdom. The Chinese resented. the Sov1~ pc.licy and ~his

was conveyed to Khrushchev wring his visit to Beijing .t.n

July•Au.guat. 19SS. On 3 Aug'\lst. 1958, Khrushchev withdrew

his request. for a five-power conferertct!. 85 In a way, it.

was e v.tctory for CQttU'IMnis~ China and. by lmplicetlon, $

defeat. for Khrushchcw• s policy t.o g'I."<XMn India as a Great

Power.e6

On the t:Ne of tbe -a.t.no.-Indian war of 1962. 1 t became

evident thai: t.h.ere was a cleat polariraatton o£ r:elat:Lonshlp

between lnata end the Soviet unton., There was a convergence

of thek coUook and interest.s. 'flUs, 1n f.act. had a majot

bearing on :tnao.sovte"t relattonship. On tho conuOJ!Y,

S1no-sov.tet tel~aUon was, ,mal:'red by the12:' ccnflicttng views

of . the world sitnat1<m whlcb J3aelcally stemmecl from thetr

assymetricel pow.er $1tue.tion wtthin the 1nt.ernat.iona.1 system.

86

To aaa., us perception of ana response to the crisis, too,

influenced the Soviet policy cowards stno.IndJ.an relations.

Before analysing tbe Soviet. role dUring the war period, it

is ~ta relevant here to reeall the role of western powers,

particularly the United States, dw:ing the Sino-Indian

confrontation.

us • s response to the border war of 1962 wes not; acc1•

Clent.al, rather it was cond1t.ione4 by cold ·war rivalry with

the comtmlnists. Prior t·o 1959, the Unlt.ed States was

indifferent i»werds the stno-Iooian. 41.sput.e. 87 Th!a was,

perhaps, because of close s 1no-In4ien relatJ.ons in early

50s, end the effo.z"ta made by them jo1nt.1y ·~ oppose us policies 1n Asia. The 1ncteas1ng 4.eterioretlon ·1n Sino­

Indian relations in late 50s ensblefi the United States,

for the first. time, t.o influence ~he reqlonal politics •

. As a result, there was an increase in us interest. in Xndif!h

'This was teflectea in Eisenhower•s statement in May 1959,.

In a news conference he stated a

8?

uFrom the beglMJ.ng; 1nd1a has been one of wr great

concerns. We have shown, J: th..tnk, a very sympathetic

ana unaerst.endinq attitude towartis her government ana

87

its repreaent.a't.ives in as:kin9 for help 1n both the

first and the second Five-Year Plans •• •. it is

certainly 'there,. one of 'the countries that we are •••

I • d put it. this way - massively interested in. 1a

order that the nest interests of the fs-ee world will

be served. .For the moment 1 merely say that I can

qat t.e uncierst.and Mr Nehru • s astonishment. .and may be

his sense of apparent. indignation that these

$hinesi/ attacks shouU be made upon a ne.Uon wh.toh

has tried so hard tO be peaceful and neutral • .,ea

Ei.senbower visited ln41a in December 1959 end promise<! Neblru

to provide e msj or share of United States development loans.

When J. F. Kennedy came to pot'ler • he held that it. was tn his

country's interest to maintain a st-rong and viable India

against CM.na in Asia. By then, t.be Sino-In4ian border

cr.test.ion had sssWRed the nature of a regional dispute. The

Un.ite4 States showed a marked pte-India tilt. v

When the war broke out in Oct.o):)er 1962, the Department

of Stete issued e. statement expr:esatncg a shock "et t;he violent

and egqresaive action .of the Chlnese cOtl)t(ftlnists•, a&Ung: ·t.hat

_. 0\Q: sympathy 1s with Indta as 1 t seek.s to meet th1& unpr1n-

ee

-At the same Ume.

imet&em ~'l~!ko PQl&u -! ,cw;:rept. ~e<mmmaJts, . ·196 (Washington. 1~63), p.lB9,.. .

!lW xer~- -rwe.~ 22 October 1962.

88

the sta•t9J'U9Rt. also indicated America • s willingness to

consider sympatnet!aa.lly India's request. for: arms. Nehru

did net show enough interest because he probably felt. e~

that time that his going for arms ~ the United States would

compromise lndia•s policy of nonalignment. He was also aware

of the Western presS'I.U'e on him to settle the Kashmir dispute

with Peld.stan as a precondition for receiving military aid.

But situation changed dramat.:Lcally when India sufferect a

massive setback. To add, India could not get. substantial

material help from the Soviet Union, though In<iia end the

soviet Union signed the MiG deal 1n May 1962. The cenewal

of the Chinese offensive led to lndia•s inc:reased military

dependence on the tiest. particularly the United States,.

Nebru. declared., at the height. of secon4 a,ffensive attack by

China, that he was asking for *'all the pose 1ble help we can

from friendly countries and t.here we.s no limi tat.J.on ebout that

of any l~ittd. a SO This was. followed by })1s request. to Kenneay

91 £or 0 air prot.ect1ont•. · M e follow-up, an American mission,

90 f,tpk !Naba l?e\lttU• 19 November 1962, vo1.11, co1 .• 223a:.

91 Nehru•s request, wbich vas kept strictly confidential, esked for .. full de.fens.tve, lflt.e~entJ.on" by the us Air :ro~ce, J.K. Gal.braitl'l_• Mb~SU?ffo£•s IQl!m¥ • A .P.emana& ~~ ... of tbAJS~Xli.PsEI t.onacn, 1969), p.4B6,. on :15 Mat:eb 1965, Su&\11: Ghosh. cU.eclose:i d\ir1ng a parli,amente:ry debate that Nehru haa specifieal.ly reques1teel sueb an aid .efld as e. r,esu1t Kennedy ha<l oriere4 tbe us 'ftb Fleet. to ~oceed 'tO the Bay of Bengal; Kultip Nayyar, aewrum ;t;hg Linu (Delhi, 1910) • p.2o9,

0

89

' headed ~ AVera! Katrimath Astl1s-tant secretsr:y t;or: Far Eastern

Affairs, ar-rtved in New Delhi em 22 November 1962. Also, a

BritiSh mtssion led by Commonwealth secretary, Dtancan Seftdya

came to New Delhi at til at time. However, a day before the

arrival of Hsr:riman in In41a., the Chinese had already declared

a "un11et.eral c:easefire". No doubt, India received on 22

November 1962, a squadron of C.13S Hercules heavy transport

plane.9 from us. The n~ day, J.t 9()t. eleVen mre transport

planes released direct.ly for the American fleet stet.ionet! in

F re.nkfurt., Germany. 92

'The us role durtng the war attd 1 ta lmmac:iiau response t.o

Nehru's appeal helped .ln strengtbenJ.ng tts J.nfluenae in ~e

su.bcontinent following the war.

Soviet. role during the war of U~62 can tm. well U11detatoo4 •

. in the light of existing Indo-Bov.tet relations and i~ ect1ve

imt01vernent ln ~ Cubab ~tt.Lssi1o cr.-isit;. 1!1\e war broke out

on 20 October 1962. Md l)fta five CleYs Of official eilenee,

the euv:Q cetM .CNt Wlth e. ~tat.ement oa 25 October whlch was

tn 'the line .c.f Chinese thlnldxsg. it .(ud.4•

IMiifiM -~ I ~~··- t. "tf -~ $1_--MWr-_b

90

ttThe problem of the Chinese-Indian border 1s a. legacy

from the days whttn India was under tile sway of the

British colonialists. ••• The notorious McMahon t.ine

was imposed on the Chinese end Indian peoples.# it:.

was never reeoQnJ.zed by China ••• The Soviet Government

and the Soviet people Canil all the peace-loving forces •••

will unquest1CDably wel-eome the new move of the Chinese

Government airneCi at peaceful settlement. of 'the <flispu.te

wi'th India •••• The Soviet people .•••• see the statement

of the Chinese GOvernment as ev1dence of sincere concern

ovor relations wi.th ln<!1a an4 eag,erness to bring the

conflict t.o a halt.. The proposals made by the Chinese

Gov~ent are in our opinion const.ruct.ive. Wit.hout

.impa.lrtnw the prestige of the parties,. they represent

an. accept.a'ble basis for: Opt?.ning negot.iations." 93

The soviet pro...Chinese •t-ilt.' during t.hf) fir.st phase of

war was qu.tu obvious es .lot was engsged 1n a showdown with

the United Stat.e$ over the Cuban missile CJ:'iS:ts. Soviet.. Union

noE.td«t th(\' support. of the whQl,e socialist camp including Chine

end. 61d net clare to antaq'Oniza Chine whioh would have resulted

93 ~ •. 21 Novemb. er . . 19.62• vo1.14,. p.11 . ., The· p. roposalG ceiie& for acceptance of the ., Une of ,ect.ue.1 control" on 24 OCt.Ol:>er &fi:er tl\e deep Cb!neae penetration into

. NEFA and Ladakb, the mutual w!.t.btlrawal cf forces 20 Jd.lomet.er:s benlnd that .ltne .ana. the holding of en lndie-Chlna swmntt meeting-.,

91

ln the di.sintegr:eticm in the comtmlni&t. camp. 94 'l'he SovietS

also coold. not .c-t.sk further damaging the already precarious

Sino-Soviet relations. 95 Its policy t.owards the Sino-Xndian

conflict was therefore one of calculated risk in Indo-Sovittt.

relations. As soon as the criSis de-escalated with the

Soviet withdrawal o£ the missiles from Cuba. China lost no

time in denouncing the Soviet Union of guilty of ttadVent.urismn

and "capitulationn.

Soviet. assessment. of the initial phase of Sino-Indian

war ,.,as a ma:t:ter of utt.u surprise to India which, however.

considered it to be a passing phenomenon., NehrU seemed t.o

realize the Soviet difficm1t1es on the qt.1estion. To quote bima

94 Tb.e til~ before· the Sov:S.ei: 1ead.ership was somewhat like this' fltf Kturilshchev abanOicme! lndie, he wouia lose h1s gains there and. meh elsewhere' 1f he abandoned China, on the verge of the Cuban c:risis and at a tJ.m& when the tntensifioa~ion o.f the Sin.o-SovJ.,et. dispute made him nore anxious than ever to influence wavetiq comxrentst pasties. he riek$1 lOt!iing influence within the international communist mo~ement as well es China's su.ppoct (lf needed) against Wasblngton• • · Wt1liam E~· Gr1ff1Vi. !be ;;i&np:SW{!fd; llif,& lCornblt'1dge. Mass, 1964), P• 38,

t 5 Whether thete wee any pressure on Khrushchev ~. ~ .. ttitbt.n the Ptestdtum· from the "prc-Peld.ng" t'l'CU.P not t.o favou. India. any more ls not 'known. The possib11tt.y of such e. p,~e$:sute cannot tJe cQmpletely ruled out ,since lOltuShChev • though oPI.tarently enjoying soll,4 eontt-o11n tho SQV~iet Un.ton t111 19Gi,, was, often ob1t~y challenged for his dc:mtest!c and foreign. po11c1e$ tty his • anti•per·ty1 P;t(UJ;161u.ftt co1leegtUl!S .• For Cleta1J.s S)lout. Kh:tUGhehev* s 1nt.•mal opposition in _early_ stxties, Carl A• Lade,..,., Dmllst&E ~ pa tpylet-&mdKEMJt I .19St-.1W (Baltimore, 1966; pp.14&.202. .

92

"The Soviet Un.ton has been. as t:he House knows,

consistently frienc:Uy to us. It has been ptlt in

e very 41ffieult position in this matter because

they (the aov.tete) have been anct are allies of

China end henca the embarrassment to 'them ea

between a cOWttu:y with tthicb ~ are ft!.endly

and a C:O\lnuy \ihieh is their ally. We have

reaUzed that and we do not expect them t.o ao anything which wcu.ld definitely mean a breach

over these. It !a not for us to sugqest to any

country. :aut. we have had theU' goodWill and goo4

<t.-.,1sh0s all along, even very recently, and that 1o

a consolat.J.on to us and we certainly hope to have

tha~ in future.n96

The ohQnge in ~OV.i$t attitude towards the crisis waa

noticeable aftEU:waro..s. A l?.tiJAVSA editorial on S November~

entitled "Negot.iat.ion Is th$ w ~q to Settle the Conflict",

failed to ment.lon either the Chinese proposals or the MeMabo:n

Line• lt. cautioned the concerned part.ies of the possible

tnterf~renee of the irrtPerialiEt powers taa,t the f.U·e of the

military oper~,tion,3° t.ek1.ng place on tbe border. "The sovie-t:

people cannot remain !nd1ff~ent when the bloc<! Of. our brothers

96

93

and friends .... ime Chinese and the Indian peoples - is belDg

shedn, it sa14~97

On 6 November 1962; the soviet. Deputy Premier • Alex!.

Kosygln celled for a ceasefire on the Sino-Indian bordm:s

and stated that. "there are no basic cont.racU.a1:1ons between

India and China ~;at c<Nl4 not. be solved in round-table

talk.s.o98 However. from the m14-November 'there was a consi-

derable shift J.n Soviet policy ~1hen it reaffirmed its promise

~o supply India with M1G•21 fight.ers. 99 At. the same time., it

cut. off its weapens supply, spereparts and aircrafts fuel to

China.100

W'ith the unilateral pronouncement of ceasefire by the

Chinese, the wu came to an end on 21 November 1962. The

first Soviet statement. crit.ieizing the nchinese aggression"

carne em 12 December 1962, when Khrushchev in his foreign policy

statement to the Supreme Soviet referred to the .. regrettable

events". no£ course, there might be some. • • • who WOlJ.ld say,

91 The English. uenslatlon of the ~ravp statement was reproduc:f!d. in fk>!gpw Ngflb 10 November 1962,.

98 &&mea (London) • 1 November 1962.

99

100

Earlier, on 29 October 1962, the soviet Union ha<!l unoffioielly lndicat~the MiG Agreement wJ.th India would be :shelved, W.Mhingt.QD .. ~os;i;, 30 October 1962. The reJ.t.eratlon of 'the Soviet promise t.o provJ.de m111ta:ry ass:J.stanc:e to· India was well taken not:.e of by ~e Chinese and reponed without. comment. by Zhw Baoju tn hiS· ert.icle., "Time for Ind1$ t:.o Change Course ... in 1-c&t&ns ~gv.tew, 30 November 1962, vol.S, no.41, p.21. Arthur St.etn., Infi& and thf ~qyietju!fl&29 I The NehQt !.£a (Chicago, 1969), P• $1.

Lt.hat

94

see ~ Chinese People's Republic is now w1i:hdrawift9 its

vcops in fact. t.o tm.e Une at. which tbls conflict. bJ!'Oke out.

Would 1~ not. have been bet.ter not t.o advance from the posiUons

whera these trGOps were at. that. t.ime1 Such reasoning is

underst.anda})le... It is ind!sput.able that the actions of

~e ~ernment. of Chinese People's Republic will be assessed

at their true velue by tbe peace-lGV.lng peoples. Indeed, why

wag-e wsr?nlOi

Chine 1n retura er1tic1zed the Soviet statement. rejected

the charges levelled a9ainst it, en4 aecu.setl the So'V'let Govern•

ment. of ttc:ensn.urlngft Chinese po11c:y. A fao'R)e's sPII:l:t editorial

Of 15 December 1963, capt.ioned nworlters of All Countl!"ies Unite

to Oppose· 0\i:' COJNttOn Enemy" , e&iC:U

,.some peOpl$ heve taken eli$ep\:1on to China • s cotrect

st.ana on the S1ao-1nd1SB bOlmdatY qu.est.lon e.s Lf Chtn,a

had. prectpl~ a cU.saster. But. whet. are the fac:~1

Th·e Chinese f~:ont!er fetces were compe11e4 t.o sttike

back in self .. efenGe ... ~ose whO accuse China of •

having ptUiJhed ~ Nehtu GCV'etament to the w eat are mS.stakJ;ng the vrn:y cause for: tbe eff«:t. 'fhrou;hout.

the s~no-Xft41an ~de~Y 41apst.e, itbey have •• ,. con£uaea

r:lght. for ~. pre~end1ng t.o be· "neutral" calling

China "broi:tu.u•n while aotual.ly regarding the Indian

95

teactlat'leay poop as tme1r ldnsmen. Snouldn • t

~ese peeple 40 well to oxamtne their own conscience

and ask themselves What bae become of their Marxism­

Lea1n1sm and tbeJ.t' proletarian 1nternat.t.ona11em.•102

In late DEKle'Rber, tme CCP sent: a ccmfi4ential memo.r:endW'n

tc eleven n11nq p.arties of the soctalis~ camp crie1c1sing tate

Soviet act.ion. 103 The mEmorendll.m said, 0• • • together with

the us an4 UK.• 1t (USSR) • •. • l.s supporting India w1 ~ guns . . /

and aeroplanes,. This pu1ts the ussa on the side of imperielism .. .-1041

Thus, the Chinese ,equated the Soviet Unton with other &mperialist

powers. Attacking the Soviet. profession of "peaceful co.

e:Kist.enc:e" wit.b nonal$4neci lnata. the memorandum steteCl tttnaia

ts net~ e ru!Ut.r:'el not e pseudc.socialts't .countq •. The

lndtan GOYernmertt tGJtos ordets from w esb1ngten antl London.

&oviet aid to India is equivalent to direc1:. mili<tery a1d to

J:n41a aqa1nst Chl.na ... 105

. 1'hu~h b1 tbe end of 1962. J.t became evident. tmat. soviet

UnJ,.on WOll14 no~ suppon the Chinese ~ mre . ., 'I'he beeted

po1em1cs, eKCb&nget\ between the two c~st. countries,

102 !st,U,u t:ta:&B• 21 »ec.etn))e .. 1962, n.o.st. p.?.

10.& The Chinese men\OJ"Gn4Um. was :ao~ .P'&bllshed in the CcmtnW'lLSt preP•

104 D.. Bloy4; op.clLt.' PP• .S3S.9.

105 lbtd.

96

4emonetrate<i ~o the Chinese that. the Soviet support w he~

c:OtJ.14 no longer be counted upon. On the other hand, tbe

Soviet UnioD having found India a willing per~ner to counter

the Cbin~qe influence 1n the region. extended its support to

restore the momeat:um in 1te bilateral relat:.tons wlt:h India.