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Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America

Author(s): Terry Lynn KarlSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Oct., 1990), pp. 1-21Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422302.

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Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin AmericaTerryLynnKarl

The demise of authoritarian ule in Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,Peru, andUruguay,when combined with efforts at political liberalization n Mexico and the recentelection of civilian presidents in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua,representsa politicalwatershed n Latin America. This wave of regime changesin the 1980splaces a numberof questionson the intellectualandpoliticalagendafor the continent.Willthese newly emergent and fragile democracies in South America be able to survive,especially in the context of the worst economic recession since the 1930s? Can theliberalizationof authoritarian ule in CentralAmerica and the possible prospectof honestcompetitiveelections in Mexico be transformed nto genuine democratic transitions?Willpreviouslyconsolidatedpoliticaldemocracies such as Venezuela andCosta Rica be able toextend the basic principlesof citizenshipinto economic and social realms, or will they be"deconsolidated"by this challengeand revert to a sole preoccupationwith survivability?'Behind such questionslies a central concernexpressed by DankwartA. Rustow almosttwenty years ago: "Whatconditions makedemocracypossible and what conditionsmake itthrive?"2This article addressesRustow's query by arguingthe following. First, the mannerin which theorists of comparative politics have sought to understanddemocracy indeveloping countries has changed as the once-dominant search for prerequisites ofdemocracyhas given way to a moreprocess-oriented mphasison contingentchoice. Havingundergonethis evolution, theoristsshould now develop an interactiveapproach hat seeksexplicitlyto relatestructural onstraints o the shapingof contingentchoice. Second, it is nolongeradequate o examine regimetransitionswrit large, thatis, from the generalcategoryof authoritarianule to that of democracy.Suchbroad-gauged ffortsmust be complementedby the identificationof differenttypes of democracythatemerge from distinctivemodes ofregime transitionas well as an analysis of their potentialpolitical, economic, and socialconsequences.Before these issues and theirimplicationsfor the studyof LatinAmerica canbe addressed, however, a definitionof democracymustbe established.Defining DemocracyDefining democracyis no simple task because the resolution of a numberof disputesoverboth its prospects and evaluation rests on how the term itself is operationalized.If, forexample,democracy s defined in a Schumpeterianmanneras a politythatpermits he choicebetween elites by citizens voting in regular and competitive elections, the militarizedcountriesof CentralAmericacould be classified as politicaldemocraciesby many scholars,just as they are (with the exceptionof SandinistaNicaragua)by U.S. policymakers.3But ifthe definition is expandedto include a wider range of political conditions-from lack of

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ComparativePolitics October1990restrictionson citizenexpression,to the absence of discrimination gainstparticular oliticalparties,to freedomof associationfor all interests,to civilian controlover themilitary thesesame countries(with the exception of Costa Rica) could scarcely be classified underthisrubric.The problem is compoundedwhen a number of substantiveproperties-such as thepredominance f institutions hatfaithfullytranslate ndividualpreferences ntopublicpolicythrough majoritarianrule, the incorporationof an ever-increasing proportion of thepopulation into the process of decision making, and the continuous improvementofeconomic equity through the actions of governing institutions--are included either ascomponents or empirical correlates of democratic rule.4 Approaches that stipulatesocioeconomic advances for the majority of the population and active involvement bysubordinate classes united in autonomouspopular organizations as defining conditionsintrinsic o democracyarehard-pressedo find "actual"democraticregimesto study.Oftenthey areincapableof identifyingsignificant,if incomplete,changestowardsdemocratizationin the political realm. Moreover, they are cut off from investigating empirically thehypothetical relationshipbetween competitive political forms and progressive economicoutcomes because this important ssue is assumed away by the very definition of regimetype. While these substantivepropertiesare ethically desirable to most democrats, suchconceptualbreadthrendersthe definition of democracy virtually meaningless for practicalapplication.5Forthese reasons,I will settle for a middle-range pecificationof democracy.It is definedas "a set of institutions hatpermitsthe entireadultpopulation o act as citizensby choosingtheirleading decision makersin competitive, fair, and regularlyscheduledelections whichare held in the context of the rule of law, guaranteesfor political freedom, and limitedmilitaryprerogatives."Specified in this manner,democracy s a politicalconcept involvingseveral dimensions: (1) contestation over policy and political competition for office; (2)participationof the citizenry throughpartisan,associational, and other forms of collectiveaction;(3) accountabilityof rulers o theruledthroughmechanismsof representation nd theruleof law; and(4) civilian control over the military.It is this latterdimension,so importantin the Latin Americancontext, which sets my definition apartfrom RobertDahl's classicnotionof a "proceduralminimum."6A middle-rangedefinitionof this sort avoids the Scyllaof an overly narrowrelianceon the merepresenceof elections withoutconcomitantchangesin civil-militaryrelations and the Charybdisof an overly broad assumptionof social andeconomic equality.While perhaps ess thanfully satisfactory roma normativeperspective,it has the advantageof permittinga systematicandobjective investigationof the relationshipbetween democraticpolitical forms and the long-range pursuitof equity.

The Futile Search for Democratic PreconditionsIf the questionsraised by democratization emainrelatively unchangedfrom the past, theanswers that are offered today come from a different direction. This becomes evidentthrougha briefcomparisonof the divergent heories about the originsof democraticregimesthat have dominated the study of Latin America. The scholarshipthat precededthe new2


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TerryLynnKarlwave of democratizationn the 1980s arguedthata numberof preconditionswere necessaryfor the emergenceof a stable democraticpolity.

First, a certain degree of wealth or, better said, level of capitalist development wasconsidereda prerequisiteof democracy.Marketeconomies in themselveswere not enough;a countryhad to cross (andremainbeyond)a minimumthresholdof economic performancebefore political competition could be institutionalized. "The more well-to-do a nation,"SeymourMartinLipsetclaimed, "thegreater he chancesthat it will sustaindemocracy."7'wealthyeconomy madepossiblehigherlevels of literacy,education, urbanization,andmassmediaexposure,or so the logic went, while also providingresourcesto mitigatethe tensionsproducedby political conflict.8A second set of preconditionsthat underlaytraditionalapproachesto democracy wasderived from the concept of political culture, that is, the system of beliefs and values inwhichpoliticalaction is embeddedandgiven meaning.The prevalenceof certainvalues andbeliefs over others was said to be more conducive to the emergenceof democracy.Thus, forexample, Protestantismallegedly enhancedthe prospects for democracy in EuropewhileCatholicism,with its traditionof hierarchyandintolerance,was positedto have the oppositeeffect in Latin America.9 Although argumentsbased only on the link between differentreligious systems and experienceswith democracyhave been dismissed by most scholars,moresophisticatedclaims soughtto identifypoliticalcultures characterized y a high degreeof mutual rustamongmembersof society, a willingness to toleratediversity,and a traditionof accommodationor compromisebecause such cultures were considerednecessaryfor thesubsequentdevelopment of democratic institutions. That a "civic culture" of this sortnecessarilyrested on a widely differentiatedand articulated ocial structurewith relativelyautonomous social classes, occupationalsectors, and ethnic, religious, or regional groupswas an unspokenassumption.In otherwords, a prodemocratic onsensus and set of valueswas consideredthe mainprerequisiteof political democracy.'0Third, specific domestic historical conditions and configurations were said to beprerequisitesof democracy.Theorists of "crises and sequences" argued that the order inwhich various crises of modernizationappeared and were settled determined whethereconomic and social transformationswere conducive to the development of democracy.Democratic regimes were more likely to emerge if problems of national identity wereresolved prior to the establishmentof a central governmentand if both of these eventsprecededthe formationof mass parties."

In a different,yet still historically groundedvein, BarringtonMoore, Jr. contended thatdemocracieswere morelikely to appearwherethe social and economic powerof the landedaristocracywas in decline relative to that of the bourgeoisie and where labor-repressiveagriculturewas not the dominantmode of production.When this occurredas a resultof thecommercializationof agriculture hat transformed traditionalpeasantry nto either a classof small farmersor a ruralproletariat, he prognosisfor democracywas strongindeed.'2Aversion of Moore's approachhas been used to explain the differentpolitical trajectories nCentralAmerica. Specifically, democracyis said to have emergedin Costa Rica due to thecreation of a yeoman farmerclass, while the persistenceof authoritarian ule in GuatemalaandEl Salvador is attributedo the continued dominance of the landedaristocracy.13Finally, some scholars treatedexternalinfluences as another set of preconditionson thegroundsthat these could be decisive in determiningwhether a polity became democraticor

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ComparativePolitics October 1990authoritarian.Dependencytheoristsin Latin America and the United States contended thatthe continent's particularinsertion into the internationalmarket made democratizationespecially problematicat more advancedstagesof import-substitutingapitalistdevelopmentand even enhanced the necessity for authoritarian ule under specific circumstances.In alogic that ran counter to Lipset's "optimisticequation," both Guillermo O'Donnell andFernandoHenriqueCardosoarguedthat, as dependenteconomies became more complex,more penetratedby foreign capital and technology, and more reliant upon low wages tomaintain heircompetitive advantage n the international conomy, professionalmilitaries,technocrats,and state managersmoved to the forefrontof the decision-making process,forcibly replacing unruly, "populist" parties and trade unions in order to establish asupposedlymore efficient form of rule.14Inversely, using an argumentbasedon external nfluencesof a qualitativelydifferentsort,proponentsof an aggressiveU.S. foreignpolicy towards heregiondeclaredthatthe rise anddecline of democracywas directlyrelated to the rise and decline of the global power of theUnited States rather than to market mechanisms or accumulationprocesses. In SamuelHuntington'sview, the dramatic ncrease in authoritarian ule duringthe 1960s and 1970swas a direct reflection of the waning of U.S. influence. Specifically, it was due to thedecreased effectiveness of efforts by U.S. officials to promotedemocracyas a successfulmodel of development.Concomitantly,he argued,the spateof democratic ransitions n the1980s could be creditedto the Reaganadministration's enewed effort to "restoreAmericanpower" throughthe rollback of revolutions and the promotionof electoral reforms. Thisposition, so ideologically convenient for policymakers, located the roots of democracyoutside LatinAmerica. 5

The experience of Latin American countries in the 1980s challenged all of thesepresumptions about preconditions. The hypothetical association between wealth anddemocracy might be called upon to "explain"the transition o democracyin Brazil after aprotracted conomicboom, butit couldhardlyaccountfor the case of Peru,whose transitionwas characterizedby stagnantgrowth rates, extreme foreign debt, persistentbalance ofpayments problems, and a regressive distribution of income. Nor could it explain theanomaly of Argentina, where relatively high levels of per capita GDP were persistentlyaccompaniedby authoritarian ule. If the political cultures of Argentina, Uruguay, andBrazil all tolerated,admittedlyto varyingdegrees, the practiceof official state terrorandwidespread violations of human rights, how could they suddenly become sufficiently"civic" and "tolerant" o supporta democraticoutcome? As the Catholic church took anincreasinglyactive role in opposing authoritarian ule, especially in Brazil, Chile, Peru,CentralAmerica, and Panama,the argumentaboutthe so-called "anti-democratic ias" ofCatholicismbecame increasingly mplausible.16The predictabilityof approachesemphasizingthe influence of the international ystemfared little better. While the manner of a country's insertion into the world capitalisteconomy is now considered essential in explaining its subsequent political and economicdevelopment, as dependency theorists claimed, criticisms of other scholars plus thedemocratic ransitions n Braziland Chile demonstrated hatthere was no direct or inevitablecorrelationbetween capital deepening and authoritarianule.17The general trendstowardsrecessionin export earnings,debtcrises, diminishingU.S. support or humanrights,and thefrequentresortto military nstrumentsunderthe foreignpolicy of the Reaganadministration4


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TerryLynnKarlboded ill for the emergenceof democraciesin the 1980s, yet emerge they did. The patternof their appearancepresented an undeniable challenge to Huntington's thesis linkingdemocratizationwith the rise of U.S. power. In the southerncone, where influence from thenorth is not especially high, militaryrulersgenerally made way for civilian authority.InCentralAmerica, Panama, and Haiti, where the overridinghistoricalrole of the U.S. isindisputable, militaries either permitted elections to occur without limiting their ownprerogatives,or they refused to leave power altogether.Indeed, where the decline in U.S.hegemony was greatest, democracyseemed to appeareven though dictatorship"should"have been the more appropriate esponseThese anomaliessuggest the pressingneed for important evisions, even reversals, in theway democratizationn contemporaryLatin Americais understood.First, there may be nosingle preconditionthat is sufficient to producesuch an outcome. The search for causesrootedin economic, social, cultural/psychological,or internationalactors has not yielded ageneral law of democratization,nor is it likely to do so in the near future despite theproliferationof new cases.' Thus, the search for a set of identical conditions that canaccountfor the presenceor absence of democraticregimes should probablybe abandonedandreplacedby more modest efforts to derivea contextuallyboundedapproach o the studyof democratization.

Second, what the literature has considered in the past to be the preconditions ofdemocracymay be betterconceived in the future as the outcomes of democracy.Patternsofgreatereconomic growth and more equitableincome distribution,higher levels of literacyand education, and increases in social communicationand media exposure may be bettertreatedas the productsof stable democraticprocesses rather han as the prerequisitesof itsexistence. A "civic" political culture characterizedby high levels of mutual trust, awillingness to tolerate diversity of opinion, and a propensity for accommodation andcompromisecould be the result of the protracted unctioningof democratic nstitutions hatgenerate appropriate alues and beliefs ratherthan a set of culturalobstacles that must beinitiallyovercome. There is evidence for this contention n the fact that most democracies nEurope and Latin America's oldest democracy in Costa Rica have emerged from quite"uncivic"warfare.In otherwords, what have been emphasizedas independentvariables nthe past might be morefruitfullyconceived as dependentvariablesin the future.

From Contingent Choice to Structured ContingencyThe failure to identify clear prerequisites,plus the hunch that much of what had beenthoughtto producedemocracyshould be consideredas its product,has caused theoristsofcomparativepolitics to shift their attention o the strategiccalculations,unfolding processes,and sequential patternsthat are involved in moving from one type of political regime toanother,especially underconditionsof nonviolence, gradualism,and social continuity.ForGuillermoO'Donnell and PhilippeSchmitter,democratizations understoodas a historicalprocess with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of transition,consolidation,persistence,andeventualdeconsolidation.'9A varietyof actors with differentfollowings, preferences,calculations, resources,and time horizonscome to the fore duringthese successive stages. Forexample, elite factions and social movements seem to play the

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ComparativePolitics October1990

key roles in bringingabout the demise of authoritarianule;political partiesmove to centerstage duringthe transition tself; and businessassociations, tradeunions, and stateagenciesbecome majordeterminants f the type of democracythatis eventuallyconsolidated.20What differentiates hese stages above all, as Adam Przeworskipoints out, is the degreeof uncertaintywhich prevails at each moment. During regime transitions, all politicalcalculations and interactionsarehighly uncertain.Actorsfind it difficult to know whattheirinterests are, who their supporterswill be, and which groups will be their allies oropponents. The armed forces and the civilian supportersof the incumbent authoritarianregime arecharacteristically ivided between "hard-line"and "soft-line" factions. Politicalpartiesemerge as privileged in this context because, despite their divisions over strategiesand their uncertaintiesaboutpartisan dentities, the logic of electoral competitionfocusespublic attentionon them and compels them to appealto the widest possible clientele. Theonly certainty is that "founding elections" will eliminate those who make importantmiscalculations.The absence of predictable"rules of the game" duringa regime transitionexpands theboundaries of contingent choice. Indeed, the dynamics of the transition revolve aroundstrategic interactions and tentative arrangementsbetween actors with uncertain powerresources aimed at defining who will legitimatelybe entitled to play in the political game,what criteria will determine the winners and losers, and what limits will be placed on theissues at stake. From this perspective, regime consolidationoccurs when contendingsocialclasses and political groups come to accept some set of formal rules or informalunderstandingshat determine"who gets what, where, when, and how" frompolitics. In sodoing, they settle intopredictablepositionsandlegitimatebehaviorsby competing accordingto mutuallyacceptablerules. Electoraloutcomesmay still be uncertainwithregard o personor party,butin consolidateddemocracies hey arefirmlysurrounded y normative imits andestablishedpatternsof power distribution.The notion of contingency(meaningthat outcomes depend less on objective conditionsthan subjectiverules surrounding trategicchoice) has the advantageof stressingcollectivedecisions andpolitical interactions hat have largely been underemphasizedn the search forpreconditions. But this understandingof democracy has the danger of descending intoexcessive voluntarismf it is notexplicitly placedwithina frameworkof structural-historicalconstraints. Even in the midst of the tremendous uncertainty provoked by a regimetransition,whereconstraintsappear o be most relaxed and where a wide rangeof outcomesappears o be possible, the decisions madeby various actorsrespondto and areconditionedby the typesof socioeconomic structures ndpolitical institutionsalreadypresent.These canbe decisive in that they may either restrictor enhance the options available to differentpolitical actorsattempting o constructdemocracy.Forexample, certainsocial structures eem to maketheemergenceof politicaldemocracyhighly improbable; nversely, it is reasonable to presume that their absence may makeaccommodativestrategies more viable and reinforce the position of democratic actors.Political democracies have lasted only in countries where the landed class, generally themost recalcitrantof interests, has played a secondary role in the export economy, forexampleVenezuelaandChile, or where non-labor-repressivegriculturehas predominated,for example Costa Rica, Argentina, and Uruguay. Thus the survivability of politicaldemocracydoes seem to depend on a structural pace defined in partby the absence of a6


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Terry LynnKarl

strong landowner elite engaged in labor-repressive agricultureor its subordinationtointereststied to othereconomic activities.21The cases of Venezuela and Chile better make the point. In Venezuela, dependenceuponpetroleumas the leadingsource of foreignexchangehad the (unintended) ffect of hasteningthe decline of thatcountry'salreadystagnantagricultureand, with it, the landowningelite.Facedwith overvaluedexchange rates that hurtagro-exportsand abundant oreignreservesfor importing cheap foodstuffs, landowners sold their property to oil companies andconverted themselves into a commercial and financial urban bourgeoisie. This largelyvoluntaryself-liquidationremoved the incentive for them to commercializeruralareas, tosubordinatehe peasantry hroughrepressivemeans,andeventuallyto maintainauthoritarianrule. It also removed the social base for an antisystemparty of the right. Thus, actorsdesigning pact-makingstrategies n Venezueladuringthe regime transition n 1958 did not

face powerfully organizedantidemocratic uralelites.22 Social dynamics in Chile, thoughdifferent,had the same effect. Conservativeelements based in a system of labor-repressiveagriculture ventuallysupported he expansionof the suffragein the nineteenthcenturyas ameans of combatingthe rising power of industrialistsand capas medias, who were tied tothe state and supportedby revenues from copper.23In effect, the social impact of thedominantpresence of mineralexports meantthat, when comparedto the cases of CentralAmerica,both Venezuela andChilewere able to institutionalizedemocraticagreementswithrelative ease.These cases illustrate he limits, as well as the opportunities, hat social structuresplaceupon contingentchoice. If the focus in explainingthe emergenceof democracyhad beensolely on the forgingof institutional ompromises,thatis, conceptualizing heestablishmentof democracy as only the product of strategic interactions, the pact-making thatcharacterized he Venezuelan transitionand the gradualexpansionof the suffragein Chilewould appearto be simply the result of skilful bargainingby astute political leaders.24Instead,by focusing on the internalsocial dynamicsproducedby a mineral-basednsertioninto the international conomy, it becomes evident how oil- or copper-inducedstructuralchangemakessuch "statecraft"possible. This is not to arguethatindividualdecisions madeatparticular ointsin time or all observablepoliticaloutcomes can be specificallyandneatlylinked to preexistingstructures,but it is claimed thathistoricallycreatedstructures,whilenot determiningwhich one of a limited set of alternativespolitical actorsmay choose, are"confiningconditions"that restrictor in some cases enhancethe choices available to them.In other words, structural and institutional constraints determine the range of optionsavailable to decision makersand may even predisposethem to choose a specific option.What is called for, then, is a path-dependent approach which clarifies how broadstructuralchanges shape particular regime transitions in ways that may be especiallyconducive to (or especiallyobstructiveof) democratization.This needs to be combined withan analysis of how such structural hanges become embodied in political institutionsandrules which subsequentlymold the preferencesandcapacitiesof individualsduringandafterregime changes. In this way, it shouldbe possible to demonstratehow the rangeof optionsavailableto decision makers at a given point in time is a function of structuresput in placein an earlierperiodand, concomitantly,how such decisions are conditionedby institutionsestablishedin the past. The advantagesof this method are evident when comparedto astructuralapproachalone, which leads to excessively deterministicconclusions about the

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origins and prospects of democracy, or to a sole focus on contingency, which producesoverly voluntaristic nterpretations.25

Modes of Transition to DemocracyOnce the links between structures,institutions, and contingent choice are articulated,itbecomes apparentthat the arrangementsmade by key political actors during a regimetransition stablish new rules, roles, and behavioralpatternswhich mayor maynotrepresentan importantrupturewith the past. These, in turn, eventually become the institutionsshapingthe prospectsfor regime consolidationin the future.Electorallaws, once adopted,encouragesome intereststo enter the political arena and discourageothers. Certainmodelsof economicdevelopment,once initiated hroughsome form of compromisebetweencapitalandlabor, systematically avor some groupsover othersin patterns hatbecome difficult tochange. Accords betweenpolitical partiesand the armedforces set out the initialparametersof civilian and military spheres. Thus, what at the time may appear to be temporaryagreementsoften become persistentbarriers o change, barriers hat can even scar a newregime with a permanent"birthdefect."These observationshave important mplications or studyingdemocracy n LatinAmerica.Rather hanengage in what may be a futile search for new preconditions,they suggest thatscholars would do well to concentrate on several tasks: (1) clarifying how the mode ofregimetransition itself conditionedby the breakdownof authoritarianule) sets the contextwithin which strategicinteractionscan take place; (2) examininghow these interactions, nturn, help to determine whether political democracy will emerge and survive; and (3)analyzingwhat type of democracywill eventuallybe institutionalized.Thus, it is importantto begin to distinguish between possible modes of transitiontodemocracy. First, we can differentiatecases in which democracies are the outcome of astrategy based primarily on overt force from those in which democracies arise fromcompromise.This has been displayed on the horizontal axis in Figure 1. Second, we candistinguishbetween transitions n which incumbentrulinggroups,no matterhow weakened,are still ascendant n relation to mass actorsandthose in which mass actors have gainedtheupper hand, even temporarily,vis-a-vis those dominant elites. This can be seen on theverticalaxis in Figure 1. The cross tabulationof these distinctionsproducesfour ideal typesof democratictransition: eform, revolution, imposition, and pact.LatinAmerica, at one time or another,has experiencedall four modes of transition.Todate, however, no stablepolitical democracyhas resulted from regime transitions n whichmassactorshavegainedcontrol,even momentarily,over traditional ulingclasses. Efforts atreform from below, which have been characterized by unrestrictedcontestation andparticipation,have met with subversiveoppositionfrom unsuppressed raditionalelites, asthe cases of Argentina (1946-1951), Guatemala (1946-1954), and Chile (1970-1973)demonstrate.26Revolutions generally produce stable forms of governance (Bolivia is anobvious exception), but such forms have not yet evolved into democraticpatternsof faircompetition, unrestrictedcontestation, rotation in power, and free associability, althoughdevelopments n Nicaraguaand Mexico may soon challenge this assertion.27Thus far, the most frequentlyencountered ypes of transition,and the ones which have8


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TerryLynnKarlFigure 1 Modesof Transitiono Democracy

STRATEGIES OF TRANSITION

Compromise Force

Elite Ascendant PACT IMPOSITIONRELATIVEACTORSTRENGTH

Mass Ascendant REFORM REVOLUTION

most often resulted in the implantationof a political democracy, are "transitions fromabove." Here traditionalrulers remain in control, even if pressured from below, andsuccessfullyuse strategiesof eithercompromiseor force or some mix of thetwo--to retainat least partof theirpower.Of these two modesof transition,democratization y pure imposition s the least commonin Latin America-unless we incorporatecases in which force or the threat of force isappliedby foreignas well as domestic actors. This is not the case for bothEuropeandAsia,where democratization hrough mpositionoften followed in the wake of World WarII. InFigure2, the cell labeledimposition ncludes Brazil andEcuador,where the militaryused itsdominantposition to establish unilaterally he rules for civilian governance. Cases on themargin include Costa Rica (where in 1948 an opposition party militarily defeated thegoverning party but then participatedin pact-makingto lay the foundation for stabledemocraticrule), Venezuela (1945-48) and Peru (where the military's control over thetiming and shapeof the transitionwas stronglyinfluencedby a mass popularmovement),28andChile (wherethe military'sunilateralismwas curbedsomewhatby its defeat in the 1988plebiscite).29Where democraciesthat have endured or a respectable engthof time appear o cluster isin the cell defined by relatively strongelite actors who engage in strategiesof compromise,as Figure 2 demonstrates.This cell includes the cases of Venezuela (1958-), Colombia(1958-), the recentredemocratizationn Uruguay(1984-), and Chile (1932-1970).30 Whatunites all of these diversecases, except Chile, is the presenceof foundationalpacts, thatis,explicit (thoughnot always public) agreementsbetweencontendingactors, which define therules of governance on the basis of mutual guaranteesfor the "vital interests"of thoseinvolved. Chile appears o be an exceptionbecausethere was no explicit pact or agreementamong elites in 1932, when the democraticregime was simply "restored"on the basis ofpreexistingconstitutionalrules left over from the first democratic ransition n 1874. While

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ComparativePolitics October1990Figure2 Modesof Transitiono Democracyn LatinAmerica

Compromise - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Force

PACT IMPOSITIONVenezuela (1958-) Costa Rica (1948-) Brazil (1974-)Colombia (1958-) Ecuador (1976-)Uruguay (1984-) Mexico (1988-)*

Guatemala (1984-)*Chile (1932-1970) El Salvador (1982)*Chile (1988-)Peru (1978-)Venezuela (1945-48)Argentina (1983-)

REFORM REVOLUTIONArgentina (1946-1951), Mexico (1910-1929)*Guatemala (1946-1954) Bolivia (1952-)Chile (1970-1973)** Nicaragua (1979-)*

These cases cannot be considered democracies in thedefinition used here. They are included because they arein periods of transformation and thus illustrate possiblemodes of transition in the future.** See footnote 26.

the Chilean case suggests thatelite-based democraciescan be establishedin the absenceoffoundationalpacts, this may be more difficult in the contemporaryperiod, which ischaracterized y moredeveloped organized nterests,the presenceof mass politics, strongermilitary capabilities, and a tighter integrationinto the internationalmarket. Under suchconditions,pactismo may prove to be essential.31Foundationalpacts are well exemplified by the case of Venezuela. Here a series ofagreements negotiated by the military, economic, and party leaders rested on explicit10


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TerryLynnKarlinstitutionalarrangements.32he militaryagreedto leave power and to accepta new role asan "apolitical,obedient, and nondeliberativebody" in exchange for an amnestyfor abusescommittedduringauthoritarianule anda guaranteedmprovementof the economicsituationof officers. Political parties agreed to respect the electoral process and share power in amanner commensuratewith the voting results. They also accepted a "prolonged politicaltruce" aimed at depersonalizing debate and facilitating consultation and coalitions.Capitalists agreed to accept legal trade unions and collective bargainingin exchange forsignificant state subsidies, guaranteesagainst expropriationor socializing property, andpromises of labor peace from workers' representatives.This arrangement hanged whatcould have become potentially explosive issues of national debate into establishedparametersby removingthem from the electoral arena.The foundational pacts underlying some new democracies have several essentialcomponents. First, they are necessarily comprehensive and inclusive of virtually allpolitically significant actors. Indeed, because pacts are negotiated compromises in whichcontending orces agreeto forego theircapacityto harmeach otherby extending guaranteesnot to threateneach other's vital interests, they are successful only when they include allsignificantlythreateningnterests.Thus, the typical foundationalpact is actuallya series ofagreements hat are interlockingand dependentuponeach other;it necessarily includes anagreementbetween the militaryand civilians over the conditions for establishingcivilianrule, an agreementbetweenpoliticalpartiesto competeunder the new rules of governance,and a "social contract"between state agencies, business associations, and trade unionsregardingpropertyrights, marketarrangements, nd the distributionof benefits.Second, while such pacts are both substantive(about the main tenets of policy) andprocedural aboutthe rules of policymaking), they initially emphasizerulemakingbecause"bargainingabout bargaining"is the first and most important stage in the process ofcompromise. Only afterall contendingforces have agreedto bargainover theirdifferencescan the power-sharingwhich leads to consensualgovernanceresult. This initialbargaincanbegin to lay the basis for mutualtrust f only by building up reserves of familiaritybetweenopposing groups. Subsequently,the very decision to enter into a pact can create a habitofpact makingand an accommodativepolitical style based on a "pactto make pacts."Such foundationalpacts must be differentiated rom smaller, more partial "managerial"accords.33 These include the neofunctional arrangementsfrequently found in socialdemocratic polities in Europe, for example, the annual corporatist negotiations amongcapital, labor,andthe statein postwarAustriafor setting wages andsocial policy, as well asthe frequentmini-accords hammered out between political opponents in Latin America.Unlike foundational pacts, managerial accords are partial rather than comprehensive,exclusionaryrather haninclusionary,and substantivelyorientedrather han rule makingincontent.These characteristics f comprehensiveness, nclusion, and rule makingare criticalin identifying the presence of a foundationalpact. They help distinguishbetween basicagreements, ike thosepresent n Venezuelain 1958, andmoretransitorypoliticaldeals, likethe Pact of Apaneca which was forged in El Salvador in 1983 between the ChristianDemocraticPartyand ARENA.34Finally, these pacts serve to ensuresurvivabilitybecause, althoughthey are inclusionary,they are simultaneouslyaimed at restricting he scope of representationn order to reassuretraditionaldominantclasses that theirvital interestswill be respected. In essence, they are

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ComparativePolitics October1990antidemocratic mechanisms, bargained by elites, which seek to create a deliberatesocioeconomic and political contract that demobilizes emerging mass actors whiledelineatingthe extent to which all actorscan participateor wield power in the future.Theymay accomplishthis task by restrictingcontestation(as Colombianpartiesdid in 1958 byagreeing to alternate n power regardlessof the outcome of elections), by restrictingthepolicy agendaitself (as Venezuelanpartiesdid in 1958 by agreeingto implementthe sameeconomic program),or by restricting he franchise(as Chilean elites did beginningwith theelectoral law of 1874). Regardlessof which strategicoptionis chosen, the neteffect of theseoptions is the same: the nature and parametersof the initial democracy that results ismarkedlycircumscribed.

Types of Democracies and Their Prospects in the Contemporary PeriodWhat are the implicationsof this excursus into preconditionsandmodesof transition or theprospectsof democratizationn contemporaryLatin America? To begin with, the notion ofunfolding processesandsequencesfromregimebreakdown o transition o consolidationandpersistence s fundamental n understandinghe two concurrent ealities of democratizationin LatinAmericatoday.Onthe one hand,most of the newly emergentcivilian or militarizedcivilian regimes-Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala,Honduras,El Salvador,andNicaragua-face the overwhelming problem of sheer survivability.What threatenstheirsurvival is the omnipresentspecterof a military coup, a coup which may be provokedbyintense partisanpolitical disagreements, by the inabilityof political partiesto managethecurrentprofoundeconomic crisis of theregion, by the actions of antisystemelites, by a massmobilization of labor, peasants, or the urbanpoor that escapes the control of traditionaldominantclasses, by the actions of a foreign power, or by threats to the vital corporateinterestsof the military tself. Significant uncertainty ver the rulesof the game still prevailin these fragile democracies.Whatbecomes importantn maintainingcivilian rule is to find mechanismss-otherthanrigged or unpredictableelections-that can limit this uncertainty,especially by reducingincentives for civilianson the losing end to appealto the military or salvation.This suggeststhat there are two critical tasksinitially facing Latin Americandemocratizers:irst, to arriveat a sufficiently strong consensus about the rules of the game (including institutionalformalities guaranteeingrespect for certain crucial but minoritarian oncerns) so that nomajorelite is temptedto call upon the militaryto protectits vital interestsand, second, tobegin to design conscious strategies or the establishmentof qualitativelynew civil-militaryrelationsappropriateo futurestable civilian rule. This is probablyeasier to accomplishinthe more developed regions of the continent, where the armed forces have learned theimportanceof cooperatingwith capitalistand managerialelites, than in the less developedones (Bolivia, Central America, and the Caribbean), where the military still retainsrelativelyconfidentnotionsof its abilityto managethe economy andpolity or is simply toocorrupt o worryabout such matters.35On the other hand, other types of democracies in the region- Venezuela, Costa Rica,and, morerecently,Brazil andUruguay- arerelativelyconsolidated n that actors are not sopreoccupied by the overriding concern with survivability. Rather, the challenge that12


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TerryLynnKarlconfronts most of these polities (and that will certainly confront newer democracies aspreoccupationwith mere survivabilityrecedes) is providingsome new and betterresolutionto the ancient question of cui bono. This issue of "who benefits" from democracy issingularly problematic in Latin America, where the pattern of dependent capitalistdevelopment has been especially ruthless in its historic patternsof exploitation.36Thismeans thatthe extension of citizenshipandequal politicalrightsmust takeplace in a contextof extremeinequality,which is unparalleled ven in Africa or Asia.3"It must also takeplaceduring la decada perdida, that is to say, in the midst of the most severe and prolongedeconomic crisis since the Depression.38The relationshipbetween the problematics of survivability and cui bono may wellrepresentthe centraldilemma of democratizationn Latin America. The choices taken bykey politicalactors to ensurethe survivabilityof a fragiledemocracy--the compromises heymake, the agreementsthey enter into-will necessarily and even irrevocablyaffect whogains and who loses during the consolidation of a new regime. Subsequent "populist"decisions to redistributegains without regardfor losses may affect the durabilityof theregime itself, regardless of how consolidated it may appear to be. At the same time,decisions not to redistributeor inactionon this front may also influence regime durabilitybecause the commitment to democracy in part rests on the widely held (if sometimesinaccurate)conviction that economic benefits will be more fairly distributedor the welfareof the generalpopulation mprovedunderthis type of polity. Hence the currentconcern withboth survivabilityand "who benefits" merely underlinesthe significance of choices madeduringthe founding moments of democracies and highlights some potential relationshipsbetween political democracyand economic outcomes for future research. It also producessome not-so-promising cenariosfor the emergenceof differenttypes of democracies.First, politicaldemocracy n Latin Americamay be rootedin a fundamentalparadox: hevery modes of transition that appear to enhance initial survivability by limitingunpredictabilitymay precludethe future democraticself-transformation f the economy orpolity furtherdown the road. Ironically,the conditions thatpermitdemocracies o persistinthe shortrunmay constraintheirpotentialfor resolving the enormousproblemsof povertyand inequality that continue to characterize the continent. Indeed, it is reasonable tohypothesizethat what occurs in the phaseof transitionor early consolidationmay involve asignificanttrade-offbetweensome formof politicaldemocracy,on the one hand, andequity,on the other.Thus, even as these democraciesguaranteea greaterrespectfor law andhumandignitywhen compared o theirauthoritarian redecessors,they may be unable to carryoutsubstantive reforms that address the lot of their poorest citizens. If this scenario shouldoccur, they would become the victims of their successful consolidation,and the democratictransitions of the 1980s that survive could prove to be the "frozen" democracies of the1990s.

Second, while this may be the central dilemma of elite-ascendant processes ofdemocratization,there may be importantdifferences between countries like Uruguay, apacted transition, and Brazil, a unilaterally imposed transition. Pacted democracies,whatevertheirdefects, have been honedthroughcompromisebetween at least two powerfulcontending elites. Thus, their institutions should reflect some flexibility for futurebargainingandrevision over existing rules. In Uruguay,for example, while the agreed-uponrules made it very difficult to challenge agreementsbetween the militaryand the partieson

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ComparativePolitics October 1990the issue of amnesty for crimes committed duringauthoritarian ule, the left opposition,excludedfrom this agreement,was neverthelessable to force the convocation of a plebisciteon this major ssue, which it subsequentlyost. It is difficultto imaginethatanythingsimilarcould occur in Brazil. Because the military exerted almost complete control over thetransition, t nevercurtailed ts own prerogativesnorfully agreedto the principleof civiliancontrol, and it has not been compelled to adopt institutionalrules reflecting the need forcompromise.The contrastbetween the cases of Uruguayand Brazil raises a hypothesis that meritsinvestigation: o the extentthat transitionsare unilaterally mposed by armed orces who arenot compelledto enterinto compromises,they threaten o evolve into civilian governmentscontrolled by authoritarian lements who are unlikely to push for greater participation,accountability,or equityfor the majorityof theircitizens. Paradoxically,n otherwords, theheritage left by "successful" authoritarian xperiences, that is, those characterizedbyrelatively moderate levels of repressionand economic success which has left the militaryestablishmentrelatively intact, may prove to be the major obstacle to future democraticself-transformation.39This danger exists, albeit to a lesser extent, in civilian-directedunilateral ransitions,for example, Mexico, becausethe institutionalrules that are imposedare likely to favor incumbentsand permitless scope for contestation.Third,the attempt o assess possible consequencesof variousmodes of transition s mostproblematic where strong elements of imposition, compromise, and reform aresimultaneouslypresent, that is to say, where neither incumbentelites nor newly ascendantpowercontendersareclearlyin controlandwherethe armed orces arerelativelyintact.Thisis currently he case in ArgentinaandPeru,as Figure2 demonstrates.GiventheArgentineanmilitary'sdefeat in the Falklands/Malvinaswar, the high level of mass mobilizationduringthe transition,and the absence of pacts between civilian authorityand the armedforces, onthe one hand, and tradeunions and employers, on the other, Argentinacombines elementsof several modes of transition.Such a mixedscenario,while perhapsholdingout the greatesthope for political democracyand economic equity, may rendera consistentstrategyof anytype ineffectual and thus lead to the repetitionof Argentina'spersistent ailure to consolidateany type of regime. The prospectsfor failure are even greater n Peru.Given the absenceofexplicit agreements between the leading political parties, the possibility of massmobilizationsin the midst of economic depression, the presence of an armedinsurgency,and a unified military,Peruis currently he most fragile democracyin South America.

Fourth, because political democracies generally arise from a compromise betweencontendingorganizedelites thatare unableto impose theirwill unilaterallyor the unilateralaction of one dominant group, usually the armed forces, this does not bode well fordemocratizationn situations n which the armedforces are inextricably ied to the interestsof a dominant and antidemocratic) grarian lass. Guatemalaand El Salvador n particularare characterized by a landowning elite whose privileged position is based onlabor-repressiveagricultureand on a virtual partnershipwith the armed forces, therebymakingit unlikelythattheir militaries(as currentlyconstituted)will toleratecomprehensivepolitical competitiveness, civil liberties, or accountability. Regardless of the profounddifferences between these two CentralAmericancountries, the extraordinarypressureofU.S. interventionas well as internationaldiffusion means that, at minimum, they can beexpected to adhereto "electoralism,"meaningthe regularizedholdingof elections, even as14


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TerryLynnKarl

they continue to restrict the other political rights and opportunitiesof their citizens. Thishybridmix of electoral forms and authoritarianism,which has been dubbed "electocraticrule"by one observer,4"s likely to emergein otherdevelopingareas wherever he spreadofelections underforeign inspirationeitherprecedes or is intended to coopt strong domesticpressuresfor democratization.These observationscan be distilledintotypes of democracies,which, at least initially, arelargely shaped by the mode of transition n Latin America, as Figure 3 illustrates.Theysuggest thatdemocratizationby impositionis likely to yield conservativedemocraciesthatcan not or will not addressequity issues. To the extent that imposition originates fromoutside, however, the result is likely to be some form of electoral authoritarianule, whichcan not be considereddemocracyat all. Pactedtransitionsarelikely to producecorporatist rconsociational democracies in which party competition is regulated to varying degreesdetermined,in part, by the nature of foundationalbargains.Transitionthroughreform islikely to bringaboutcompetitivedemocracies,whose political fragilitypaves the way for aneventual return to authoritarianism.Finally, revolutionarytransitions tend to result inone-partydominant democracies, where competition is also regulated. These types arecharacterized y differentmixes andvaryingdegreesof the chief dimensionsof democracy:contestation,participation,accountability,andcivilian control over the military.Such predictionsare discouraging,but they may be offset by more hopefulobservationsthat affect the contingentchoices of contemporary emocratizers.On the one hand, the ColdWar features of the international ystem have changedremarkably,and this may offer newopportunitiesor the reformistmode of transition n LatinAmerica. The failureof two of thethree cases cited in this category, Guatemala(1946-1954) and Chile (1970-1973), wasprofoundly affected by U.S. intervention, motivated in large part by the ideologicalidentification of mass-based reforms with the spread of Soviet influence in the westernFigure3 Modesof TransitionndTypesof Democracy

IMPOSITION CONSERVATIVEExternal Multi-Party (Fictitious)Internal Multi-Party (Restrictive)

CONDTIONS PACT CRPORATIST VARATIONSOF Multi-Party (Collusive) INDEMISE POLICY,OF QUTCOMESAUTHORITARIANRULE REFORM COMPETITIVEMulti-Party (Competitive)

REVOLUTION One-Party Dominant

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ComparativePolitics October 1990

hemisphere.U.S. interventionagainst peasant-basedmovements in Central America hasbeen justified in the same manner. To the extent that the global state system loses its"bipolarity,"the credibilityof such accusationsbecomes increasinglydifficult to sustain,thus potentiallycreatingmore space for mass ascendantpolitical movements. The fact thatthis mode of transition ailed in the past in Latin America does not mean that it will notsucceed in the future.41On the other hand, this discussion of modes of transitionand varying probabilitiesforsurvival has not presumed that democracies will benefit from superior economicperformance,which is fortunategiven the stateof contemporaryLatinAmericaneconomies.Most observersassumethatcrises in growth, employment, foreign exchangeearnings,anddebtrepaymentsnecessarilybode ill for the consolidationof democraticrule, and few wouldquestionthe long-runvalue of an increasingresource base for stability. But austeritymayhave some perverseadvantages,at least for initialsurvivability.In the context of the terribleeconomic conditions of the 1980s, the exhaustionof utopian ideologies and even of rivalpolicy prescriptionshas becomepainfullyevident. Neither the extremerightnor the extremeleft has a plausiblealternativesystem to offer-to themselves or to mass publics. Thoughpopulism, driven by diffuse popular expectations and desencanto with the rewards ofcompromiseddemocracy, is always a possibility witness the experienceof Peru and therecent elections in Argentina-it can not deliver the immediate rewards that have been itssustenance in the past.To the extent that this situationdiminishes both the expected benefits and rewards fromantisystemactivity, it enhances the likelihood of democracies to endure. This suggests apossible hypothesis for futureexploration.The relationshipbetween democratizationandeconomicperformance, ather hanrisingor falling in tandem,may be parabolic.Conditionsto strikebargainsmaybe most favorable n the midst of protracted usterity,as well as in themidst of sustained plenty. They may be worse when the economy is going throughstop-and-go cycles or being hit with suddenwindfalls or scarcities. If true, this providesaray of hope for the otherwiseunpromisingdecade ahead.Finally, there is no a priorireason why one type of democracycan not be transformedintoanother,that is to say, why electoral authoritarianegimes, for example, can not evolveinto conservative or competitive democracies, or corporatist democracies into morecompetitiveones. Given the frequencyof pactismo andthe gravityof the equityprobleminLatinAmerica,the latterscenario s especially important.While pactedtransitions stablishan improvisationalnstitutional rameworkof governance hatmay becomea semipermanentbarrierto change, this frameworkis subject to further modification in the future. Suchmodification may be brought about preemptively when some ruling groups, havingexperiencedthe advantagesof democraticrule, become more inclined over time to seek toaccommodatepotentialpressuresfrom below ratherthan suppressthem, or it may occurthrough he directpressureof organizedsocial groups.42 n eithercase, democratization anprove to be an ongoing process of renewal.The notion thatone type of democracymay graduallyevolve into a qualitativelydifferenttype suggests that the dynamicsof democraticconsolidation must differ in importantwaysfrom the transitionif "freezing" is to be avoided. Because the overriding goal of thetransition is to reach some broad social consensus about the goals of society and theacceptablemeans to achieve them, successful transitionsare necessarily characterizedby16


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Terry LynnKarlaccommodationand compromise. But if this emphasison caution becomes an overridingpolitical norm duringconsolidation, democraciesmay find it difficult to demonstrate hatthey are better than their predecessors at resolving fundamental social and economicproblems. Thus, consolidation, if it is to be successful, should require skills andcommitments from leading actors which are qualitativelydifferent from those exhibitedduring the transition. In this latter phase, these actors must demonstrate the ability todifferentiatepolitical forces rather hanto draw themall into a grandcoalition, the capacityto define and channel competing political projects rather than seek to keep potentiallydivisive reforms off the agenda, and the willingness to tackle incremental reforms,especially in the domains of the economy andcivil-militaryrelations,rather handeferthemto some later date. If the cycle of regime change that has plaguedLatin America is to bebroken and replacedby an era of protracteddemocraticrule, democratizersmust learn todivide as well as to unite and to raise hopes as well as to dampen expectations.

NOTESThis article was originally presentedat the Conference on Latin America at the Thresholdof the 1990s, sponsoredby the Instituteof Latin America of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Ford Foundationand held inBeijing on June 8-16, 1988. The author wishes to thank Ken Erickson, RichardFagen, Samuel Valenzuela, ananonymousreviewer, and, most especially, PhilippeSchmitter.1. These questions underlie a number of new studies on democracy. See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell,PhilippeSchmitter,and LaurenceWhitehead,eds., Transitionsrom AuthoritarianRule, 4 vols. (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1986); Paul W. Drake and EduardoSilva, eds., Elections and Democratization n Latin

America, 1980-1985 (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California, 1986);EnriqueA. Baloyra, ComparingNew Democracies: Transitionand Consolidation n MediterraneanEurope and theSouthernCone (Boulder:Westview Press, 1987); Carlos Huneeus, Para Vivir La Democracia (Santiago:EditorialAndante, 1987); and LarryDiamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour MartinLipset, eds., Democracy in DevelopingCountries,4 vols. (Boulder:Lynne RiennerPublishers, 1988-90).2. See DankwartA. Rustow, "Transitions o Democracy:Towards a Dynamic Model," ComparativePolitics, 2(April 1970).3. This statement requires some qualification. J. A. Schumpeter defines democracy as "that institutionalarrangement or arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of acompetitive strugglefor thepeople's vote" in Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy(London:Geo. Allen andUnwin,1943), p. 269. Underthis definition the competitionfor leadership hrough ree elections is the distinctivefeatureofdemocracy. But Schumpeter,unlike Jeane Kirkpatrickand other U.S. policymakersin the 1980s, considered civilliberties a necessarycondition for the operationof democracy.Thus, it can not be assumedthat he would have sharedthe currentemphasison the mere presenceof elections, which I have elsewherereferred o as "electoralism,"thatis,"the faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites and accordpublic legitimacy to the winners in these contests." See Terry Lynn Karl, "ImposingConsent? ElectoralismversusDemocratization n El Salvador," in Drake and Silva, eds. p. 34.4. For an example of this approach, see Suzanne Jonas, "Elections and Transitions: The Guatemalan andNicaraguanCase," in John Booth andMitchell Seligson, eds., Elections and Democracy in Central America(ChapelHill: University of North CarolinaPress, 1989). Jonas and Stein argue against separatingpolitical democracyfromsocioeconomic equity and support"a broaderview thatmeaningful 'transitions' o democracy' [in CentralAmerica]involve more sweeping social change on the scale of the major bourgeoisand socialist revolutionshistorically." SeeSuzanneJonas andNancy Stein, "Democracy n Nicaragua," n SuzanneJonas andNancy Stein, eds., DemocracyinLatin America(New York:Bergin andGarveyPublishers, 1990), p. 43.5. In examiningthe problemof constructing nstitutions hat can translate he preferencesof majorities nto publicpolicy, for example, social choice theoristshave demonstrated he difficulty of designingdecision-makingproceduresthat give equal weight to the preferencesof all citizens and that permit the aggregationof these preferences into

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ComparativePolitics October 1990governmentalpolicies withoutviolating any of the other basic tenets of democratic heory.See, for example, WilliamH. Riker, Liberalism versus Populism:A Confrontationbetween the Theoryof Democracyand the Theoryof SocialChoice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982), and the review by Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn,"Democracyand Social Choice," Ethics, 97 (October 1986). Theorists of democracyhave long grappledwith otherdilemmasinvolving notionsof socialjustice andequity. See, for example, PeterBachrach,TheTheoryof DemocraticElitism:A Critique (Washington,D.C.: UniversityPress of America, 1980); and CarolePateman,ParticipationandDemocratic Theory(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1970).6. I have drawn the first two dimensions and, to some extent, the third from Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy:Participationand Opposition(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). But Dahl, like other democratictheorists,does not emphasize the establishment of civilian control over the military through the limitation of militaryprerogatives. ndeed,this dimensionoften appears o be anassumedcondition or even anunstatedprerequisiten otherdefinitions of democracy. Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitary Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988), is an important orrective n this regard.Stepandefines the military's institutionalprerogativesas "those areaswhere, whetherchallenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have anacquired ightor privilege, formalor informal,to exercise effective control over its internalgovernance,to play a rolewithinextra-military reaswithinthe stateapparatus,or even to structure elationshipsbetween the state andpoliticalor civil society" (p. 93). The clear determination nd limitationof these areas are a measureof civilian controland, inmy view, are also a measure of democratization.7. This formulationoriginally appeared in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy:Economic Developmentand PoliticalLegitimacy,"American Political Science Review, 53 (March 1959).8. Some proponentsof this view often measured he prospects or democracyby per capita gross domesticproduct,leadingthe occasional political observer to await the moment when a particular ountrywould cross "the threshold"into democracy.This supposedthresholdhas varied fromcountryto country. Spain's Lopez Redo once predicted hathis country would not become democratic until it reached a per capita income of $2,000. More recently, MitchellSeligson has arguedthat Central America needs to approacha per capita income of $250 (in 1957 dollars) and aliteracyrateof over 50 percentas a necessary precondition or democratization.See James M. Malloy and Mitchell A.Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University ofPittsburghPress, 1987), pp. 7-9.9. For example, HowardWiarda, "Toward a Framework or the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-LatinTradition:The CorporativeModel," in HowardWiarda,ed., Corporatism nd NationalDevelopment n LatinAmerica(Boulder:Westview, 1981), arguedthatLatin Americapossessed "a political culture and a sociopolitical orderthat atits core is essentially two-class, authoritarian, raditional,elitist, patrimonial,Catholic, stratified, hierarchicalandcorporate."A similar argumentcan be found in Richard N. Morse, "The Heritageof Latin America," in HowardWiarda,ed., Politics and Social Change in LatinAmerica(Amherst:University of MassachusettsPress, 1974).10. The notion of "civic culture," first introducedby Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1963), sought to analyze the relationshipbetween the political attitudesof apopulationand the natureof its political system. It was the forerunner f the works on Latin America cited above.11. This was the basic argumentput forwardby LeonardBinder et al., eds., Crises and Sequences in PoliticalDevelopment(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1971), and by Eric Nordlinger, "PoliticalDevelopment, TimeSequences and Rates of Change," in Jason L. Finkle and RobertW. Gable, eds., Political Developmentand SocialChange, 2nd ed. (New York: JohnWiley, 1971).12. See BarringtonMoore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorshipand Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).13. See John Weeks, "An Interpretation f the Central American Past," Latin AmericanResearch Review, 21(1986); EnriqueBaloyra-Herp,"ReactionaryDespotism in CentralAmerica," Journal of LatinAmericanStudies, 15(1983); and Jeffrey Paige, "Coffee and Politics in Central America," in Richard Tardanico, ed., Crisis in theCaribbean Basin (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987). In a more recent work, Paige seeks to differentiate hisargument rom that of Moore. He correctlycontends that there is no collision betweenan industrialbourgeoisieand alanded class in either Costa Rica, El Salvador, or Nicaragua and that the agrarian aristocracyhas successfullytransformed tself into a modern capitalist class, both conditions that belie Moore's argument. Nonetheless, inGuatemalaandEl Salvadora landedclass continues to exercise domination,andthe commercializationof agriculturehas not replaceda labor-repressivemode of production,thus providingsome important onfirmationof Moore. SeeJeffrey Paige, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracyand Socialist Revolution in CentralAmerica," paperpresentedat the AnnualMeeting of the AmericanSociological Association, San Francisco, August 8, 1989.14. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Berkeley: University of

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TerryLynnKarlCalifornia, Institute for InternationalStudies, 1973), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-DependentDevelopment:TheoreticalandPracticalImplications," n Alfred Stepan,ed., AuthoritarianBrazil (New Haven: YaleUniversityPress, 1973), pp. 142-178.15. See SamuelP. Huntington,"Will MoreCountriesBecome Democratic?,"Political ScienceQuarterly,99 (1984).16. Furthermore, hrough the church's active promotion of "base communities," it could even be argued thatcontemporaryCatholicism contributes o the creation of a uniquely democratic cultureby encouragingparticipationamong previouslyunorganizedgroupsof the urbanand ruralpoor. See Philip Oxhorn, "Bringingthe Base Back In:The Democratizationof Civil Society underthe Chilean AuthoritarianRegime" (Ph.D. diss., HarvardUniversity,1989).17. Forcriticism of the O'Donnell hypothesis linking capital deepeningto authoritarianule, see David Collier, ed.,The New Authoritarianism n Latin America(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1979), and Karen Remmer andGilbertMerkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianismevisited," Latin AmericanResearch Review, 17 (1982).18. Albert Hirschman has even claimed that this search can be pernicious. In his view, to lay down strictpreconditions ordemocracy--"dynamicgrowthmust be resumed, incomedistributionmustbe improved, . . politicalpartiesmust show a cooperativespirit . . ."-may actually encouragethe deconsolidation of existing democracies.Hirschmanarguesthatthis will almost certainlyobstructconstructivethinkingabout the ways in which democraciesmay be formed, survive, and even become stronger n the face of and in spite of continuing adversity. See AlbertHirschman,"Dilemmasof DemocraticConsolidation n LatinAmerica," unpublishednotes for the Sao PauloMeetingon DemocraticConsolidation n Latin America andSouthernEurope, 1986.19. See especially Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about UncertainTransitions Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1986), AdamPrzeworski,"Some Problems n the Studyof the Transitionto Democracy," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., vol. 3, and Adam Przeworski,"Democracyas a ContingentOutcome of Conflicts," in Rune Slagsted and Jon Elster, eds., ConstitutionalismandDemocracy(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989).20. See PhilippeSchmitter, "DemocraticConsolidationof SouthernEurope," unpublishedmanuscript.21. Evelyne HuberStephensmakes a similar observation n "EconomicDevelopment, Social Change and PoliticalContestationand Inclusion in South America," paper preparedfor the Latin American Studies Association, NewOrleans, 1988.22. See Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, forthcoming),and "Petroleumand Political Pacts: The Transition o Democracy n Venezuela," LatinAmericanResearchReview, 22 (1986).23. See ArturoValenzuela and SamuelValenzuela, "Los Originesde la Democracia:Reflexiones Teoricassobre elCaso de Chile," EstudiosPublicos, 12 (Spring 1983).24. This is the general thrust of Daniel Levine's analysis of Venezuela, which attributes the emergence of ademocratic regime primarilyto statecraft and the ability of political actors to compromise. See Daniel Levine,"Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., TheBreakdownof DemocraticRegimes:Latin America(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1978).25. An approachof this sorttreatsregimechangesas critical uncturesand carriesan implicitassumptionof patternsof political changecharacterized y gradualismpunctuatedby sharpdiscontinuities.It has a long tradition n the studyof politics, but it is especially importantn recent workon the "new institutionalism."See, for example, J. G. Marchand J. P. Olson, "The New Institutionalism:OrganizationalFactors in Political Life," American Political ScienceReview, 78 (September 1984), 734-749, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An InstitutionalPerspective,"ComparativePolitical Studies, 21 (April 1988), 66-94. Krasner, houghemphasizingpolitical institutionsalone ratherthan the combinationof social structuresand institutions,also arguesthatinstitutionsestablished n the past constrainpresentchoices, thatthe preferencesof individualactors are conditionedby institutional tructures,andthathistoricaltrajectoriesare path-dependent.The most recent comparativeanalysis of patternsof South American and Mexicandevelopmentadoptsa similarframework.Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shapingthe Political Arena: CriticalJunctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton:Princeton University Press,forthcoming), s the most ambitiouseffort to utilizethis sortof path-dependent pproach.Intheircomparativeanalysis,they examine the differenttrajectories hat result fromthe initialpatternsof incorporation f the labor movementintopolitical life.26. Strictly speaking,the case of Chile from 1970 to 1973 is not aneffort of regimetransition romauthoritarian ulein the sense consideredhere. Rather, it is betterunderstoodas an attemptto move from one type of democracytoanother, hat s, a move downthe vertical scale of theclassification schemein Figure 1 towardsa reformistdemocracy.

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ComparativePolitics October199027. There are interestingmoves in this direction in the processes taking place in both Nicaragua and Mexico.

Nicaragua s the first revolutionary egime on the continent to hold national elections in which a numberof politicalpartieshave been able to compete. In 1984, the traditionalLiberal and Conservativepartiesand several small leftistpartiescompeted with the FSLN and won almost 35 percentof the vote. In 1990, the UNO, a coalition of fourteenanti-Sandinista arties,defeated the Sandinistas,who promised o respectthe mandateof the electorate.InMexico, thePRI has begun to permit greater contestation at the municipal and regional level, but these elections are stillcharacterizedby numerousrestrictions,fraud,and localized violence.28. There s little information n the dynamicsof regimetransition n Costa Rica. See JacoboSchifter,Lafase ocultade la guerra civil en Costa Rica (San Jose: EDUCA, 1979), and Fabrice EdouardLehoucq, "Explaining he Originsof DemocraticRegimes: Costa Rica in TheoreticalPerspective"(Ph.D. diss., Duke University, forthcoming),whichapplies the notion of democracyas a contingentinstitutionalcompromiseto this case. On the transition n Peru, seeCynthia Sanborn, "Social Democracy and the Persistence of Populism in Peru" (Ph.D. diss., HarvardUniversity,forthcoming).29. Even wherethe militaryretainedcontrolover the transition,however, it systematically engaged in a process ofconsultationwith civilian parties. See Anita Isaacs, "TheObstacles to Democratic Consolidation n Ecuador,"paperpresented to the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21-23, 1989; FrancisHagopianand Scott Mainwaring, "Democracyin Brazil: Origins, Problems and Prospects," WorldPolicy Journal(Summer 1987), 485-514; and Manuel Antonio Garreton,"El Plebiscito de 1988 y la transicion a la democracia"(Santiago:FLACSO, 1988).30. On these cases, see CharlesG. Gillespie, "Uruguay'sTransition romCollegial Military-Technocratic ule," inO'Donnell, Schmitter,andWhitehead,eds.; JonathanHartlyn,"Democracy n Colombia:The Politics of Violence andAccommodation," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., vol. 4; Alexander W. Wilde, "Conversations amongGentlemen:OligarchicalDemocracy n Colombia," in Linz andStepan,eds., The Breakdownof DemocraticRegimes;Karl, "Petroleumand Political Pacts."31. I am gratefulto Samuel Valenzuela for this point. See Samuel Valenzuela, Democratizacionvia Reforma:LaExpansiondel Sufragioen Chile (Buenos Aires: Ediciones IDES, 1985).32. The roots of these arrangements an be found in the Pacto de Punto Fijo and the Declaracion de Principios yProgramaMinimode Gobierno,which were signed priorto the country'sfirstelections by all contending presidentialcandidates.These agreementsboundall signatories o the same basic political andeconomic program egardlessof theelectoral outcome. These pacts are described more fully in Karl, "Petroleumand Political Pacts."33. This distinction was originally drawn by Philippe Schmitter in a conference on "Micro-FoundationsofDemocracy," Universityof Chicago, March 1988.34. This agreementserved primarilyas a mechanism for partitioning tate offices and establishingothertemporaryforms of power-sharing.Because it excluded powerful, well-organized forces on the left and was never aimed atestablishingpermanent ules of the game, it does not meet the criteriafor a foundationalpact.35. I am gratefulto an anonymousreviewer for this observation.36. Most observers ocate the roots of this exploitation n colonial andpostcolonial landholdingpatterns hat, slowlyor abruptly,concentratedpropertyownershipanddispossessedthe majority.Specific social processesnot conducive todemocratization ccompanied hese landholdingpatterns.Forexample, unlike the reciprocal ormsof feudalismwhichdevelopedin Europeand whichmay have eventuallycontributed o widespreadnorms of reciprocityandcommunityatthe local level, the penetrationof capitalismalteredtraditional lientelist relationsbetween landlordsand peasantsinLatin Americafroma two-way to a one-way affair. As PaulHarrison, nside the ThirdWorld:TheAnatomyof Poverty(London:Penguin Books, 1979), p. 105, remarks, "in Latin America the peasanthas only duties, the landownerrights." Such social relationshave left little residueof notionsof mutualobligationor reciprocitybetweenthe richandthe poor.37. I am referring o indicatorsof inequalityhere, not absolutepoverty.While most of southernAsia and Africa isfar poorer than Latin America, their colonial past, patternsof land tenure, and relations of productionare quitedifferent. Parts of Asia that have experienced capitalist commercializationof agricultureare now beginning toapproximate hese same indicatorsof inequality,but Asia in generalhas not reached the regional scale of inequalitythatmarks Latin America.38. One statistic eloquently demonstratesthe depth of the crisis. By 1987, Latin America's debt represented46percentof theregion's GNPand morethan fourtimes the value of its exports.See IDB, Economicand Social Progressin Latin America:1988 Report(Washington: nter-AmericanDevelopmentBank, 1988), p. 541.39. The notion that especially "successful" authoritarianegimes paradoxicallymay pose importantobstacles for

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TerryLynnKarldemocratization an be found in Anita Isaacs, "Dancing with the People: The Politics of MilitaryRule in Ecuador,1972-1979" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1986), and GuillermoO'Donnell, "Challengesto Democratization nBrazil," WorldPolicy Journal, 5 (Spring 1988), 281-300.40. I am gratefulto Charles Call for this label.41. There are importantdifferences here, however, between South America and the Caribbean basin. Militaryinterventions,which have been confined to this latter region in the past, predatedthe Cold War and are likely tocontinueafter its demise. As the case of Panamashows, the rationalemay simply change.42. Paul Cammackhas arguedthat a rulingcoalition might make strategicconcessions in its own long-term nterestto help sustaindemocracy,especially afterhaving experienced he failureof militaries o act as reliable allies. See PaulCammack,"Democratization:A Review of the Issues," Bulletinof Latin AmericanResearch, 4 (1985), 39-46. Thereseems to be little evidence for this predictedbehavior in the currentperiod, however, and furtherdemocratizationthroughmass pressureseems to be more likely.

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