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nternational Phenomenological Society

Axiology, Realism, and the Problem of EvilAuthor(s): Thomas L. CarsonSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Sep., 2007), pp. 349-368Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041112.

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Axiology, ealism, nd the

Problem

f Evil*

THOMAS

L. CARSON

Loyola

Universityf

Chicago

Philosophy

nd

Phenomenological

esearch

Vol. LXXV No.

2,

September

007

2007

International

henomenological ociety

Discussionsof theproblem f evilpresuppose nd appeal to axiological nd meta-

ethical

assumptions,

ut seldom

pay adequate

attention o

those

assumptions.

I

argue

that certain heories f value are consistentwith theistic nswersto

the

argument

rom vil and that severalotherwell-known heories f

value,

such as

hedonism,

re

difficult,

f

not

mpossible,

o

reconcilewith heism.

Although

moral

realism

s the

subject

f

lively

ebate n

contemporaryhilosophy,

lmost ll stan-

dard discussionsof

the

problem

of

evil

presuppose

the truth f moral realism.

I

explain

the

mplications

f severalnonrealist heories f value for he

problem

f

evil and

argue

that,

f nonrealisms

true,

henwe need to rethink nd

re-framehe

entire iscussion bout the

problem

f evil.

1.

Introduction

The traditional

roblem

of evil asks whether he existence f a

God

who is

omniscient,

mnipotent,

nd

perfectly ood

is

compatible

with

(or

is

probable given)

the existence

f so much evil and

suffering

n

the world.

Any

answers we

give

to this

question

presuppose

some

particular heory

of value.

The

plausibility

f

proposed

answers to

the

problem

of evil

depends

on the

plausibility

f the standards of

value

they

presuppose

or

employ.

This is an

obvious

point,

but it

hasn't been sufficientlyoted or appreciated n the literature n the

problem

of evil.

I

sketch some standard theistic

eplies

to the

argu-

ment from evil

and

argue

that all of

these

replies

are inconsistent

with he hedonistic

heory

f

value

(HTV).

The

HTV

cannot be

recon-

ciled

with

any plausible

solutions o the

problem

of

evil.

I

also

argue

that Moore's

theory

of value and

certain versions of

perfectionism

are inconsistent

with standard theistic

eplies

to the

argument

rom

*

I

am

very

ndebted

o

the

ate Phil

Quinn

forhis

helpful

omments nd

correspon-

dence on this

paper;

he

will

be

greatly

missed.Thanks also to Charles

Taliaferro,

Ken

Thompson,

Jason

Kawall,

Joe

Mendola,

Paul

Moser,

and

Bill

Tolhurstfor

helpful

riticismsnd

suggestions

n earlier ersions

f

this

paper.

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

349

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3/21

evil.

W.

D.

Ross,

by

contrast,

has a

theory

f

value that makes it

very easy, arguably

too

easy,

to reconcile he existence f evil

with

the

existence f a

perfect

God.

Almost all discussions f theproblemof evil presupposethe truth

of moral

realism,

.e.,

the view that value

judgments

moral

judg-

ments)

are

objectively

rue or

false

(correct

or

incorrect)

ndepen-

dently

of

what rational

beings

believe or desire

(and

independently

of what

rational

beings

would believe or desire under ideal condi-

tions).

Since

many philosophersreject

moral realism

(and

because

the truth f

moral realism s

open

to serious

question),

t is

impor-

tant to

consider the

implications

f

nonrealistmoral theoriesfor the

problem

of evil. I

consider three such theories the rational desire-

satisfaction

heory

of

value, emotivism,

nd the divine

preference

theory

f

value. The

problem

of

evil

appears

verydifferently

n

light

of these

theories.The rational desire-satisfaction

heory

f value and

emotivism commit us to

relativism about the

problem

of

evil

(by

this

I

mean

that these theories ommit us to the view that the

statement the existenceof

a God

who

is

omniscient,

mnipotent,

and

perfectly ood

is

(in)compatible

with the existenceof so much

evil

and

suffering

n

the world is

neither

bjectively

rue nor

false).

I

also

argue

that emotivism ommitsus

to a kind of

voluntarism

about the

problem

of evil.

(If

emotivism

s

true,

then it is rational

to

accept

standards of value that make it

possible

to

justify

the

actions of an

omnipotent

God who

chose to create a world with so

much

suffering

nd evil. Emotivism lso

implies

that

t

is

rational to

accept

standardsof value that make it difficult r

impossible

o

jus-

tify

he actions of an

omnipotent

God who chose to

create a world

with so much

suffering

nd

evil).

I

examine

three versions

of the

divine

preference heory

f value. Given the first

wo versions f

the

divine

preference

heory,

t is

impossible

o raise the

problem

of evil

and the

problem disappears.According

to these

theories,

God's

will

is the ultimate

tandard of

good

and

bad,

and no conceivable

facts

about the extentof

suffering

n this world could

count as evidence

against

God's

goodness.

I take this to

be a reductio d

absurdum

f

those two theories.

The thirdversionof

the

divine-preference

heory

avoids this

objection.

2. The

Argument

rom

Evil

Some

versionsof the

argument

rom

evil

attempt

o show

that the

existenceof any evil anywhere n the universe s incompatiblewith

the existence

f a

perfect

God.

These are

not the

strongest

ersions

350

THOMAS

L.

CARSON


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

4/21

of the

argument.

he existence f a

perfect

God

might

be

compatible

with the existenceof some

evil,

but

still

be

incompatible

with the

amount nd distribution f

suffering

nd evil

in

the world.

Many peo-

ple claim that much of thesufferinghat exists s gratuitous r point-

less.

A

stronger

ersion of the

argument

romevil can

be stated as

follows:

1. If God were omniscient nd

perfectly ood,

then

God would

try

to

prevent

or eliminate ll of the

gratuitous

r

pointless

evil that exists

n

the universe.

Gratuitous

vil is evil

whose

badness is not

outweighed

or counterbalanced

by

the

good-

ness of the

other

things

for

which

its existence s somehow

necessary.]1

2. If

God

were

omnipotent,

od could do

anything

hatGod tried

to do.

Therefore,

3.

If

there were an

omniscient,

mnipotent

nd

perfectly ood

God,

therewould not be

any

gratuitous

vil n

the universe.

But,

4.

Gratuitous vil exists.Some of the

great

evils

that existare not

necessary

or the

existence

ny

of

greater

oods

(or

counterbal-

ancinggoods).

Therefore,

5.

There

does not exist an

omniscient,mnipotent,nd perfectly

good

God.

1

Cf. Nelson

Pike,

Hume on

Evil,

in

The Problem

of

Evil,

Marilyn

Adams

and

RobertAdams,eds. (Oxford:OxfordUniversityress,1990),pp. 38-52. Pike claims

that

n

order

o

solve the

problem

f evil we need to be able to

ustify

he

claim that

God has

morally

ufficient easons for

llowing

he evils thatexist. take it that

a

necessary

ondition f X's

being morally

ufficienteason forevil E is

that the

goodness

of X

outweighs

r

counterbalances he badnessof E.

AXIOLOGY, REALISM,

AND THE PROBLEM

OF

EVIL

3M


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Those standard

replies

o the

argument

rom vil which

attempt

o

explain why

God allows so much evil

to exist2 nvolve

making

one or

more of the

following rguments:

A.

Evil

does not exist.What we call evil

is

merely

n absence

of

good.

B. The

free

will

defense.

The existence f evil is a

consequence

of

God's

having given

human

beings

free

will. Free

will

and

human

autonomy

re such

great

goods

that a

world with both

free

will

and evil s better han a world

withneither.

C. The existenceof evil is necessaryfor the existenceof moral

goodness

and moral virtues

in humans).

Moral virtues uch as

benevolence, elf-sacrifice,

ourage,

nd

honesty

nd

integrity

n

the face of

temptation

ll

require

he existence f

suffering

nd

other evils. Moral

goodness

and moral virtues re

so valuable

that

a worldwithboth evil and moral

goodness

s better han a

worldwith

neither.

D.

The existence f evil is

necessary

orcertain

greater oods

that

humanbeings njoy n the afterlife.

Let me offer ome observations bout

these

four

replies.

Each

of these

replies

ttacks

premise

of the

foregoing

rgument.Reply

A is

quite

implausible.

ntense

uffering

s not

merely

n absence

of

goodness.

A

person

who

is

being

tortured

uffers rom

something

more

than a

dearth of

goodness.

Neither

B

nor C alone constitutes

plausible

answer

to

the

argument

rom vil. The view that free

will is a

great

2

Not

every

heistic

esponse

o the

argument

rom vil

attempts

o

give specific

ea-

sons

why

God

permits

or

might ermit)

o much evil to exist.

Not

every

heistic

response

o

the

argument

rom vil

attempts

o

explain

which

oods

the existence

f

so muchevil and

suffering

s

necessary

or.)

One

very

mportant

heistic

esponse

o

the

argument

rom vil is

that,

given

the

limitations f human

knowledge

nd

the

circumstances

f human

ife,

we wouldn'tbe in a

position

to understand

why

God

allows so muchevil and

suffering

o

exist,

ven

f

God

had

good

reasonsfor llow-

ing

so much vil to exist.See Steven

Wykstra,

The

Humean

Obstacle

to Evidential

Arguments

rom

uffering:

n

Avoiding

he Evils of

Appearance',

n The Problem

of

Evil,

Marilyn

Adams and Robert

Adams,

eds.

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1990),

pp.

138-160,

nd Daniel

Howard-Snyder,

The

Argument

rom

nscrutable

Evil,

in

The Evidential

rgument

rom

Evil,

Daniel

Howard-Snyder,

d.

(Blooming-

ton, Indiana: Indiana Universityress, 1996),pp. 286-310.Also see the book of

Job.

Howard-Snyder

nd

Wykstra

rgue

that our

inability

o

give

any plausible

account of

why

God allows so much

suffering

nd evil to exist

does not make

it

improbable

r

unlikely

hat there re

good

reasons

why

n

omnipotent,

mniscient

and

perfectly

ood

God allows there o be so much

uffering

nd evil.

352 THOMAS L. CARSON


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good

does not

(by

itself)

olve the

problem

of evil.

Many

natural

evils,

e.g.,

the

suffering

aused

by earthquakes,

loods,

nd

volcanoes,

do not result rom he exercise f freewill. t is also

questionable

hat

B (alone) providesan adequate explanationof evils that resultfrom

human ction.

Many

of the evils

thatresult romwar and crime

would

not existwere t not for

the

extreme

ulnerability

f

human

beings

to

injury

nd

suffering.

od could have

given

us

free

will,

without

making

us

so

very

iable to

injury

nd

suffering

t the hands

of our fellow rea-

tures.

Instead

of

creating

human

beings,

God could

have created

humanoid

uper-Heroes

with rmor

plating

nd made the earth

Gar-

den

of

Eden withoutmaterial

carcity.

Reply

C

is

also

unsatisfactory

taken

by

itself. God could have created

humanoid creatures

who

innately ossessexcellences f character r moralvirtues uch as hon-

esty

and

courage.3By

so

doing

God

would have createda

world that

containsfarmorevirtue nd far ess

pain

than

our own world.

Reply

B is

unconvincing y

itself nd so is

C.

However,

taken

together,

and

C

mightprovide

n

adequate

solution

to the

problem

of evil.

For

it is

possible

that excellences f

character

moral

virtues)

possess

far

more value when

they

resultfrom

he exercise f

free

will

than when

they

are

innately

mplantedby

God. It is

possible

that

moral

goodness

that results rom ree

ctions s such a

greatgood

that

it outweighs he badness of all the evils that God permitsn orderfor

it to

develop.

However,

here re two

serious

problems

with

his ine of

argument.

. It's not

clear that the existence

f so much

ntense uffer-

ing

s

necessary

orthe

development

nd

exercise f moral

goodness.

t

seems that a world withfar ess

suffering

ould allow

adequate

scope

forthe

development

nd

exercise f moral virtues. . If

moral

goodness

thatresults rom reewill

s a

verygreat

good,

it

would seem to

follow

that moral badness that resultsfromfreewill is

a

great

evil. It's

not

clear that the total value of all the

moral

goodness

n

the world

out-

weighs

he

total badness

of

all the moral

badness, uffering,

nd

other

evils thatGod

permits

n

order o

promote

moral

goodness.

If the

goods

that

people enjoy

in

the

afterlifenclude or

require

moral

goodness

that results rom he

exercise f free

will,

then

reply

D

involves an extensionof

replies

B

and C.

Reply

D

claims that in

looking

for

reasons

why

God

permits

uffering

nd evil we

should not

3

I am

construing

moral virtues s

desirable traitsof

character hat involve

pro-

nouncedbehavioral nd affective

ispositions.

ourage

and

honesty

re

clear exam-

ples

of moral virtues. do not take t to be a

conceptual

ruth hat

virtues

evelop

as theresult f freewill.Since this laim s open to debate, would like to stipulate

it for the

purposes

of the

present aper.

This makes salient he

genuine

distinction

between

having

trait

f

character uch as

honesty

which nvolves

having omplex

dispositions

o act and feel n

certain

ways

and

being responsible

nd thus

praise-

worthy

r

blameworthy

or

having

hat haracter rait.

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

353


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confine urselves o reasons and

purposes

that are fulfilled

uring

ur

earthly

ives. This

reply

merits

pecial

comment. 1. There are

many

possible

afterlives hat an omniscient nd

omnipotent

od

could

pro-

videforhumanbeings;we can't evenbeginto imagine ll of thepossi-

bilities.

n

light

of

this,

the

argument

rom evil assumes an almost

impossible

urdenof

proof

the

argument

eeds to show that there

s

no

possible

fterlifeuch that

i)

it includes

goods

forwhich he evils of

our

earthly

ives are

necessary

nd

(ii)

the value of those

goods

out-

weighs

or counterbalances he disvalue

of

the evils of in

question.

2. Since it is

possible

that those who are

morally

bad

in

their

arthly

lives become

morally

good

in the

afterlife,4

eply

D

greatly

iminishes

the

problem

of

moral badness noted above. 3.

I

am inclined o

think

that

D

mustbe partofanyadequate answer o theargument rom vil.

Many

great

vils

that we observedo not seem to

promote ny

compa-

rable

goods

in

thisworld.

Often,

uffering

mbitters

eople

rather han

ennobles them.

Sometimes vil and

suffering

ause

people

to become

morally

depraved.

Some

people

have

(earthly)

ives

that,

on

balance,

are not

worth

iving,

ivesthat re not a benefit

o thosewho live

them.

There are

many

ost souls whose

earthly

ives seem

to

be

bad,

on

bal-

ance,

and

many

such

people

aren't

guilty

of

any

moral

failings

hat

make them

deserving

f such bad lives.

Nothing

we

see in this life

seems

dequate

to

ustify

ll the evil and

suffering

hat xist.

I

won't

venture

ny

furtherssessment f these

proposed

solutions

to the

problem

f

evil.

Whether uccessful r

unsuccessful,

eplies

A-D

are all inconsistent ith the HTV

and

several otherwell-known heo-

ries

of

value.

3. The

HTV

and the

Argument

rom

vil

Replies

A, B,

and C are all inconsistent ith the

hedonistic

heory

f

value.

According

o the

HTV,

pain

is

a

positive

evil

(bad).

Reply

A

denies this nd, therefore,s inconsistent ith he HTV. BothB and C

commit

one

to the view that

things

other than

pleasure

(free

will

and/or moral

goodness)

are

intrinsically

ood.

Although

this is less

obvious,

reply

D is also inconsistent

ith the HTV.

According

o the

HTV,

the

only good

that

anyone

can

enjoy

n

the

afterlifes

pleasure.

A

hedonistwho

wants to endorse

D

needs

to

say something

ike the

following

suffering

n

our

earthly

ives s

necessary

n orderfor

us to

enjoy

the

greatest ossible pleasure

n

our

afterlives. ut this

couldn't

be

true f

God

were

omnipotent.

onsider

ny

kind of

pleasure

hat

we

might njoy n an afterlifeollowingn earthly xistence hat nvolves

4

Cf. JohnHick's

soulmaking

heodicy

n Evil and theGod

of

Love,

RevisedEdition

(New

York:

Harper

&

Row,

1978).

354

THOMAS L.

CARSON


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suffering.

n

omnipotent

God could have so constituted s

that we

enjoy

that same

pleasure

without

rior

uffering.

t

won't do to claim

that reflection

n one's

past suffering

ill

enhance the

pleasure

one

enjoys n heaven;God could givepeople in heavenfalse memories f

past suffering.

n

purely

hedonistic

rounds,

his

would be

preferable

to our

experiencing uffering

n

our

earthly

ives.5To

my knowledge,

there s no

plausible reply

to the

problem

of evil that

attempts

o

explain

which

oods

make it

necessary

or

God to allow the

existence

of so much

suffering

nd evil that is consistentwith

the HTV. The

HTV

cannot

be reconciledwith he

existence f an

omniscient,

mnipo-

tent,

nd

perfectlyood

God.6

One

might bject

that

my argument

ommits he

fallacy

f

argumen-

tum d ignorantiam.or all that have shown, heremight e a plausi-

ble solution to the

problem

of evil

that s

compatible

with

the HTV.

This is

possible,

but it is

very unlikely.

From

a hedonistic

point

of

view,

our world eems so

obviously

mperfect,

nd

so fullof

gratuitous

suffering

for

a

hedonist,

any suffering

hat

doesn't contribute o

greater

pleasure

is

gratuitous),

hat it is

difficulto

imagine

that

it

could have been created

by

an

omnipotent,

mniscient

eing

whose

aim was to maximize he

pleasure

and

minimize he

pain

of

sentient

creatures.

An

omnipotent

God

could

easily

make human

life

more

pleasant by making

he

following hanges

n our world

mylist could

be extended

reatly):

5

Here,

I

am

assuming

hat the

pleasantness

r

unpleasantness

f an

experience

s

simply

function f its mmediate

ntrospectableualities

or

one's

preferences

ith

respect

o those

qualities).

6

Othershave remarked n the

apparent

onflict etween

he

HTV

and

attempts

o

answer he

argument

rom vil. Terrence

enelhum,

writes he

following:

Christianitybviously

ejects

he thesis hat

pleasure

s

the

only good...

It

even

more

obviously rejects

he thesis that

pain

is the

only,

or even the

greatest

evil...

( Divine

Goodness and theProblem of Evil, in The Problem

f

Evil,

Robert and

Marilyn

Adams,

eds.

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1990),

p.

79).

A. C.

Ewing

writes:

It also seems obvious to me that the

problem the problem

of

evil]

is

quite

insoluble f hedonismbe true...

Value

and

Reality

London:

George

Allen &

Unwin,

1973),

p.

228.)

Also see JohnHick

Philosophy f Religion,

ourth dition

Englewood

Cliffs,

N.J.:

PrenticeHall, 1990),pp. 45-6 and Evil and the God of Love, revised dition New

York:

Harper,

1978),

p.

259 and

Marilyn

Adams,

HorrendousEvils and the Good-

ness of

God,

in The Problem

of

Evil,

Marilyn

Adams and Robert

Adams,

eds.

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1990),

p.

210.

None

of the these four

philoso-

pherspresents

sustained

rgument

or his laim.

AXIOLOGY, REALISM,

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good;

its

goodness

does not counterbalance he evil of

great uffering.9

Thus,

the

problem

of evil cannot be solved

by showing

hat the exis-

tence of evil

is

necessary

or the existence f

moral

goodness.

Moore

concedes that t ispossiblethatevil contributes o the value of a larger

organic

whole.

But he claims thatwe have no

reason to

think

hat this

is

the

case:

Accordingly

e have

no reason to

maintain he

paradox

that an ideal

world

would be one

in

which vice and

suffering

ust exist n

order

that

t

may

contain the

goods consisting

n the

appropriate

motion

toward them.

t is

not

a

positivegood

that

suffering

hould

exist,

n

orderthatwe

may

compassionate

t;

or

wickedness,

hat we

may

hate

it. There s no reason to think hat

any

actual evil whatsoeverwould

be contained n the Ideal. It follows hat we cannot admit the actual

validity

f

any

of the

arguments ommonly

used in

Theodicies;

no

such

argument

ucceeds

n

ustifying

he fact hatthere oes exist ven

the smallest f the

many

evils

which this

world contains.

t

might

e

the case that the

existenceof evil was

necessary,

not

merely

s

a

means,

but

analytically,

o the existenceof the

greatestgood.

But

we have no reason

to think that this is the

case

in

any

instance

whatever.10

Some

perfectionist

r Aristotelian heories f

value hold

that

the

devel-

opment

nd exercise f intellectual nd/or

rtistic

bilities

s the

great-

est

good

that human

beings

can

enjoy.

On some

readings,

Aristotle

himself olds

such a

theory.

uch theories re

very

difficulto reconcile

with

ny plausible

nswers

o the

argument

rom vil. Given that these

are the

greatest oods

thathuman

beings

an

enjoy,

t is difficulto

see

how God

could be

justified

n

failing

o make the human condition

more conducive o the

development

nd exercise f intellectual nd/or

artistic bilities.

God could have

given

us

greater

ntellectual nd artis-

tic abilities

nd created n environment

n which

veryone

as

the ei-

sure and

opportunity

o

fully

develop

and utilize these abilities.

(To

date,

very

few human

beings

have

enjoyedenough

eisure o

fully

9

Principia

thica,

p.

221. Thomas Hurka holds

very

similar iew about the

value

of moral

goodness

and the moral virtues.He classifies

hem

as second-order

goods

(they

re

goods

that consist

n

having appropriate

ttitudes oward

good

and

bad

things).

Hurka holds

roughly

hat virtue s the love of the

good

(and

hatred f

the

bad).

He thinks hatmoral virtues

re

intrinsicallyood,

but substan-

tially

ess valuable than

the

first-order

oods

of

pleasure,knowledge

nd achieve-

ment.

Since

virtue

s a second-order

ood,

the value of virtuous cts

normally

doesn't counterbalance

r

outweigh

he badness of the first-order

vil

of

pain

and

suffering.)

urka's

theory

f value is

very uncongenial

o

theistic

eplies

to the

problem

f evil.

See,

ThomasHurka,Virtue, ice, nd Value Oxford:OxfordUni-

versity

ress,

001),

especially, p.

156-161.)

Hurka's

powerful

efense f his

theory

of value

is a serious

hallenge

o conventional heism.

10

Principia

thica,

p.

220.

AXIOLOGY, REALISM,

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develop

and utilize heir ntellectual nd artistic

bilities.)According

o

the kind of

perfectionist

heory

n

question,

here re no other

greater

goods

that God

promotesby failing

o make our circumstancesmore

conducive to thedevelopmentnd exerciseof intellectual nd artistic

abilities.

Here,

it

might

be

objected

that there are

important erfectionist

goods

that

require

the

existenceof

suffering

nd evil. For

example,

some artists an't

perfect

heir alents

unless

theyportray

he human

condition

n

all its

variety,

ncluding

moral

depravity, uffering,

nd

responses

to

suffering.

rtists an't

portray

hese

things

well unless

they

vividly magine

them nd

they

an't

vividly

magine

themunless

they

experience

nd/or observe actual instancesof them.

Hence,

the

existence f

moral

depravity

nd intense

uffering

s

logically

neces-

sary

for some artists

o

develop

their alents.11 ven

if

we

grant

that

the

existenceof some moral evil and

suffering

s

logically

necessary

for certain rtists o

develop

their

alents,

his does

nothing

o

gain-

say

the claim

that,

given

the truthof

perfectionism/Aristotelianism,

there s a

great

deal of

gratuitous

vil and

suffering.

here seems to

be much

more moral evil and

suffering

n the

world

than is needed

for

artists o observe and

experience.

God could so order the

world

that a

relatively

mall number of

morally depraved

and/or

very

unhappy people

serve as

exemplars

for artists

to observe.

If

great

artistsneed

to suffer

irsthand,

od

could still

greatly

educe the suf-

fering

f those of us

who are not

great

artists.Great art can take

as

its

subject

and

inspiration ositive

goods

such as human love

and

desire,

he

beauty

of

the natural

world,

nd the vision of God.

(I

sus-

pect

that the

present bjectionrequires

s to overvalue dark artistic

visions such as that

of

Edvard

Munch.)

I

also

question

whether

directly

xperiencing

r

directly bserving omplex

bad

phenomena

s

necessary

for

creatinggreat

artistic

portrayals

f those

phenomena.

StevenCrane wroteone of the most

compelling

ccounts of the

expe-

riencesof soldiers

n

combat

without

directly xperiencing

r observ-

ing

combat.

Morally good people

are

capable

of

understanding

nd

depicting

moral evil.

In

contrast to hedonism

and

perfectionism/Aristotelianism,

oss

defends a

theory

of value that

makes it much

easier,

arguably

too

easy,

to answer the

argument

from

evil. Ross holds

that the

only

things

hat are

intrinsicallyood

are:

1.

morally

virtuous ctions

and

dispositions,

.

knowledge

and,

to

a lesser

extent,

rue

opinion),

and

3.

pleasures

that are not

undeserved

not

the

pleasures

of

morally

11

I owe this

objection

o

Phil

Quinn

in

correspondence

nd have

freely

sed

his for-

mulation f the

objection.

358 THOMAS

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bad

people)

and not

the result f

bad

dispositions,

.g.,

malice.12 oss

claims that

moral virtuehas

incomparably reater

ntrinsic alue than

either

pleasure

or

knowledge

the

value of

any

amount of

moral

vir-

tue (however mall) exceeds the value of any amount of pleasureor

knowledge

however

great).13Assuming

that the

disvalue of

pain

is

comparable

to value of

pleasure,

Ross is

committed o the view that

the value of

any

amount of moral virtue

outweighs

he badness of

any

amount of

pain,

i.e.,

any

universewith moral

goodness

however

little)

nd

pain

(however

much)

is better

han no universe t all

and

betterthan

any

universe hat has

pleasure

(however much)

and

no

moral

goodness.

On

Ross's

view,

the

intrinsic adness of all the

pain

and

suffering

n

the world

s

quite insignificant

rom he

point

of view

of the universe.God is justifiedn permittingny amount of suffering

if it is

necessary

for the existenceof the

slightest

mount of moral

goodness.

A

theistwho

adopted

Ross's

theory

of value would still

face the

objection

to

reply

C noted

earlier,

namely,

that,

in

our

world,

he value of

moral

goodness

s

counterbalanced

y

the disvalue

of moral badness. We can avoid this

problem

f

moral

goodness

is

a

greatgood

and moral badness s a much

smaller

vil,

but

such a view

seems

mplausible

n its face.

5. Moral Nonrealism nd theProblem fEvil

Almost all discussions f

the

problem

of evil

presuppose

the

truth f

moral realism. Moral realism s the view

that normative

udgments

are

objectively

rue or false

independently

f

what rational

beings

believe or desire and

independently

f

what rational

beings

would

believe or desire under deal

conditions.Moral realism

nd non-real-

ism are

not first-orderheories f

value,

rather,

hey

are

metaethical

views

about

the

status of normative

udgments.

Note

that,

according

to this definition f moral

realism,

the divine command

theory

of

right nd wrong)and the divinepreferenceheoryof value) are non-

realist theories.

f

we

modify

he definition f

moral

realism to

say

that

moral realism s the view that

normative

udgments

re

objec-

tively

true

or

false

independently

f what

human

beings

believe or

desire and

independently

f what

human

beings

would believe or

desire under ideal

conditions,

hen the divine

command

theory

nd

the divine

preference heory

both count as realist

theories.]

Many

contemporary

hilosophers

eject

moral

realism,

nd

I

believe that it

12

W. D.

Ross,

The

Right

nd the

Good

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1930),

Chapter

5.

13

The

Right

nd the

Good,

Chapter

.

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

359


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is an

open question

whethermoral realism

s true.14

will

briefly

describe hree

mportant

onrealist heories nd their

mplications

or

the

problem

of

evil. Standard

discussions f the

problem

of evil

don't

make any sense giventhe truth f moral nonrealism. f moral/axio-

logical

nonrealism s true

and,

for

my

part,

I

think hat

it is

true),

then

we need to

completely

ethink he

problem

of evil.

Discussions

of

the

problem

of evil need to be sensitive o the controversial

meta-

ethical

ssumptions

n which

they

rest.

Most theistic

eplies

to the

argument

rom vil make claims of

the

following

ort:

I.

God

permits

he

many

vils we see in the world

n

order

o

bring

about or allowX, Y, and Z.

II. An

omnipotent

mniscient

od could

not have

brought

bout

or allowed

X, Y,

and

Z

without ither:

i) allowing

he existence

of the evils that exist or

(ii) allowing

some alternative

et of

evils

El,

E2,

and

E3)

to exist.

III. The evil of

El,

E2,

and E3

(taken

together)

s

as

great

as or

greater

han the actual

evils of the world.

IV.

God is

ustified

n

allowing

o much evil and

suffering

o

exist,

because the

goodness

of

X, Y,

and Z

outweighs

r counterbal-

ances the badness of all

the evil that exists

nd God couldn't

have

brought

bout or allowed

X, Y,

and

Z without ither:

i)

allowing

for the

evils that

actually

exist or

(ii)

allowing

some

equally great

or

greater

et

of evils to exist.

Theistswho

attempt

o answer

he

argument

rom

vil often

o

to

very

great engths

o defend

tatements

f

type

I.

Questions

bout

the

nat-

ure

of

omnipotence

nd

what kinds

of worlds

an

omnipotent

God

could or

could not

create oom

large

n discussions

bout

the

problem

of evil.

Philosophers

eed to

do much

more to defend

he standards

f

value and

the metaethical

ssumptions

o

which

hey ppeal

when

they

defend r attack

tatements

uch

as III and

IV.

The rational

desire-satisfaction

heory

f

value is a

prominent

nd

widely accepted

nonrealist

heory

f value.

It has

been defended

by

such

philosophers

s

Brandt,Hare,

Rawls,

and Gauthier.

This

theory

says roughly

he

following:

14

For the

record,

think

hatmoral

realism s false.

See

my

book Value

nd

theGood

Life

Notre

Dame,

Indiana: Notre

Dame

University

ress,

000),

Chapter

7.

360

THOMAS

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Something

s

intrinsicallyood provided

hat t is rational or

peo-

ple

to

desire

r

prefer

hat t exist

or

occur)

for ts own

sake;

something

s

intrinsically

ad

provided

hat t is rational or

people

to desire

or

prefer

hat t not exist

or

not

occur)

for ts own

sake.15

Moral realists

hold that there are

objective

standards of value

and

that statements

uch as III and IV are true or false

ndependently

f

what rational

beings

believe or desire

(and

independently

f

what

they

would believe or desire under ideal

conditions).

However,

according

to the rational desire-satisfaction

heory

of

value,

there s

no

independent

act of

the

matter hat the

goodness

of

X,

Y,

and

Z

does or does not

outweigh

he

badness

of

all the evil in the

world.

Whether r not thegoodnessof X, Y, and Z outweighs he badness

of all the evil and

suffering

n

the

world,

depends

on

whether

rational and informed

people

would

prefer

the world

as it is to

worlds without

ny

evil and

without

X, Y,

and

Z.

It is

possible

that

different

eople

would

have

conflicting

references

bout

such mat-

ters

if

they

were

fully

nformed nd

rational.

If

people's

rational

informed

references

bout the

evils of the world and

X, Y,

and Z

could

conflict,

hen

the rational desire-satisfaction

heory

of

value

does not allow us to

say

that statements f

types

III

and IV

are

objectivelyrue or false.

Whether t is

possible

for

rational

people

to have

conflictingrefer-

ences about such matters

depends largely

on what we

mean

by

rational

preferences.

anonical versions f

the rational

desire-satis-

faction

heory,

ncluding

Brandt's,

ppeal

to

very

thin

concepts

of

rationalityccording

o which

desire s rational

provided

hat

s ade-

quately

nformed nd consistent. hese

theories

mploy procedural

theories f

rationality

ccording

to which the

rationality

f

a desire

depends

on how

it

was formed. uch

theories

lace

no

explicit

imits

on the contents r objectsof rationaldesires.Since it is a nonrealist

theory,

he rational

desire-satisfaction

heory

annot be

combinedwith

a moral realist

heory

f

rationality

ccording

o which

moral facts

are

logicallyprior

to facts about what is

rational and

irrational,

nd

determine,

t least

partly,

what s

rational nd

irrational.

Moral realist

theories f

rationality

old that

standardsof

rationality

nclude

such

principles

s the

following:

t is

prima acie

irrational o

prefer

he bad

15

Note that

I

state this as a

theory

f intrinsic alue as

opposed

to a

theory

f

humanwelfare.

On

this

distinction,

ee

my

Value and theGood

Life

Notre

Dame,

Indiana:

University

f

Notre Dame

Press,

2000),

Chapter

3.)

AXIOLOGY, REALISM,

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PROBLEM OF EVIL

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to the

good

(where

what is

good

or bad is

independent

f what is

rational r

irrational).16

Suppose

that

there

xists

n

omnipotent,

mniscient od who

per-

mits he evils and sufferingf the worldfor he sake ofX, Y, and Z. Is

promoting

, Y,

and

Z

a

morally

ufficienteason for God

to

permit

so

much evil to exist?

According

o the rationaldesire-satisfaction

he-

ory

of

value,

the

answer to

this

question depends

on the

following:

knowing

verything

here s to know about God's reasons for

llowing

so much evil to exist

and

knowing

bout

all

of

the alternativeworlds

God

might

have

created,

would we

prefer

hat God have

created this

world nstead f some otherworldwith ess evil and

suffering?

t

is

pos-

sible that

knowledge

f

God's reasons

for

permitting

o much

suffering

and evil to exist would reconcile veryone o the evil and sufferingf

thisworld.

God's reasons

might

eem

very ompelling

n

examination,

but we can't know for certain hat this s the case.

Given

nonrealism,

there s no

independent

act f thematter hat he

goodness

of

X, Y,

and

Z

outweighs

he

badnessof all

the

uffering

n theworld.

Given

nonreal-

ism,

God's reasons for

allowing

o much evil to existcan't includethe

independent

act

independent

f what t s rational orus to

desire)

hat

the

goodness

of

X,

Y,

and Z

outweighs

he badness of all the

suffering

and evil

n

theworld.The rational

esire-satisfaction

heory

mplies

hat

whether he

goodness

of

X, Y,

and

Z

outweighs

he badness

of all the

suffering

nd

evil

that xist

depends

on the

preferences

e would

have

f

we

were

fully

nformed,

nd there s no reason to think hat he

rational

preferences

f different

eople

couldn't onflict.

There s a

great

deal

of

evidence

hat,

ven when

fully

nformed r

corrected

by

adequate

information

nd

requirements

or

consistency,

16

BernardGert holds such a

view. He defines

ationality

nd

irrationality

n

terms f

lists of

goods

and evils:

People act irrationallywhen theyact in ways that theyknow (justifiably

believe),

r should

know,

will

significantly

ncrease

he

probability

hat

hey,

r

those forwhom

they

re

concerned,

will suffer

ny

of the tems n the follow-

ing

list:

death,

pain (including

mental

uffering),isability,

oss

of

freedom,

r

loss of

pleasure,

nd

they

o

not have an

adequate

reason for o

acting.

A

rea-

son for

cting

s a consciousbelief hatone's action

or

the

rule or

policy

that

requires

he

action)

will

significantly

ncrease he

probability

hat either ome-

one

will

avoid

suffering

ny

of the tems n the

previous

ist

or

they

will

gain

greater bility,

freedom,

r

pleasure

( Rationality

and

Lists, Ethics, 100,

1990,

p.

280).

The

things

hat make for rrational

cts,

e.g.,

death and

pain,

are all evils

bads);

thethingswhichmake forrational ctions, .g.,freedom nd pleasure, re all goods

(pp.

281, 283,

and

285).

Therefore,

ert's

theory

efines

cting

rationally

n terms

of

choosing

what s

good

and

avoiding

what

s

bad.

In what

follows,

will be talk-

ing

about standardversions f the rationaldesire-satisfaction

heory

f value that

employprocedural

nformed-desireheories

f

rationality.

362

THOMAS

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our

desires

depend

on

idiosyncratic

auses,

so that

people

who

are

fully

informed nd consistent an have

deeply conflicting

ntrinsic

refer-

ences about a

great many

matters.

ome

people

have

desiresthat are

consistentwiththe hedonistic heory fvalue,othershave desires hat

are

not consistentwith he

HTV, i.e.,

they

have

strong

ntrinsic esires

and aversions

or

hings

ther han

pleasure

or

pain.

Such desires

ould

persist

n

light

f relevant nformation

nd the

satisfaction f the other

requirements

f

procedural

heories f

rationality.

hat, alone,

would

be

enough

to create

disagreements

etween he nformed

references

f

different

eople concerning

ssues relevant o the

problem

of

evil,

e.g.,

preferences

etweenvarious

possible

worlds that do or

do

not

include

X, Y,

and

Z

and

El, E2,

and E3. There

is

a tremendous mount of

fundamental ormative isagreementetweenpeoplewho agreeabout

all relevant

acts,

.g., disagreements

bout such

things

s

the

permissi-

bility

f

lies that don't cause harm to

others,

he

permissibility

f the

institution

f

capital punishment,

he

permissibility

f

assassinating

tyrant

o

prevent

war thatwill

kill

millions f

people,

and the ntrin-

sic value of malicious

pleasure.

Since

many

of the

parties

o thesedis-

agreements

ave

preferences

hat

closely

track theirnormative

eliefs,

it is

likely

hat the rational

preferences

f different

eople

about issues

relevant o

the

problem

f evil could

sharply

onflict.

ccording

o the

rationaldesire-satisfactionheory f value, there are no independent

axiological

facts to which our

preferences

must conform n

pain

of

error. f

people's

informed ational

preferences

bout the evils of

the

world and the

goods

for whichthose

evils

are

necessary

ould conflict

in

the

way

that have

suggested,

hen the rational

desire-satisfaction

theory

f value does not allow us to

say

that statements f

types

II

and

IV are

objectively

rue or false. n that

case,

the

theory

eems to

commitus relativism bout

the

problem

of evil.

It

commitsus to the

view

that t is true for some

people

that the

goodness

of

X, Y,

and

Z

outweighs

he badness

of all the evils in

the world and true for

others

hatthe

goodness

of

X, Y,

and Z does not

outweigh

he badness

of all the evils that xist.

Talk

of relativism an be

misleading

here. An

omnipotent,

mni-

scient

deity

exists or does not exist

quite independently

f what we

believe

or desire. The statement hat an

omniscient,

mnipotent

God

exists

s

objectively

rue or false.

However,

given

the

rational desire-

satisfaction

heory

f

value,

there s no

independent

act of

the matter

that uch

a

God

is or is not

perfectlyood.

Emotivism s another

prominent

onrealistmoral

theory.According

to

Ayer's

version f

emotivism,

oral

udgments

re not statementshat

are

true or

false,

rather

hey

re

expressions

f attitudes

uch as

yea

Cubs

or boo Hitler. Moral

judgments

iffer rommere

expressions

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 363


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

17/21

of

attitudes

n

that

they

re

intended

o influence he attitudes

f oth-

ers.17

ccording

o

emotivism,

V is not a statementhat s true

r false.

Rather,

t is

an

expression

f

approval

forGod's decisionto

permit

o

much evil in orderto bring boutX, Y, and Z. The judgment hat the

goodness

of

X, Y,

and

Z

does

not

outweigh

he badnessof all the

uffer-

ing

n the

worldmeans

roughly:

Boo God or

anyone

who would

permit

the evils of

the

world n orderto

bring

bout

X, Y,

and Z.

Ayer ays

that

the attitudes

we

express

n

our moral

udgments

an be

rationally

criticized

nly

f

they

re inconsistent ithother ttitudes

we hold or if

they

est n falsebeliefs r

incomplete

nformation.18asic attitudes

nd

basic

moral

principles

hat re

consistently

eld

n

light

f

knowledge

f

relevant

actual nformationannot be

rationally

riticized.

yer's

view

also seems o commit s to a kindof relativismbout udgments ftype

IV,

inasmuch s some

people might

e

perfectly

ational

n

holding

tti-

tudesof

the sort

expressed y

IV

and other

people might

e rational

n

holding contrary

ttitudes attitudes hat would be

expressed

by

the

judgment

hatGod

is not

ustified

n

allowing

o much vil and

suffering

to

exist,

n

order o

bring

bout

X, Y,

and

Z.

Given

the truth f emotiv-

ism,

there s no

independent

actof the matter hat

the

goodness

of

X,

Y,

and Z

does

or

does

not

outweigh

he badness of the

suffering

nd

other vils of the world.

According

o

Ayer,

we have a

rationally

nder-

determined hoice

between different

asic

standards of value.

It is

rational o

accept

standards

f

value thatmake

t

possible

to

ustify

he

actionsof an

omnipotent

od who chose to create world

with o much

suffering

nd

evil;

it is also rational to

accept

standards f value that

make

it

difficultr

impossible

o

justify

he actions of an

omnipotent

God who chose to create world

with o much

uffering

nd

evil.

Ayer's

theory mplies

hat

here s no

objectively

orrect nswer

o the

problem

of evil.

Rather,

his

theory mplies

hat our

rationally

nderdetermined

choice

of basic standardsof value is consistent

with either heistic

r

atheistic

esponses

o the

problem

f evil.

According

o

Ayer's

emotiv-

ism,

there s no

single

orrect nswerto

the

problem

f

evil,

rather,

s

long

as we are consistent

nd clear about the

mplications

f

the theo-

ries of value

we

accept,

we can choose

between theistic

nd atheist

answers o the

problem

f

evil.

Thus,

emotivism eems

to commit

s to

a

qualified

voluntarism

bout

the

problem

f evil.

I

now

turn

o

a less well-known

onrealist

heory,

he divine

prefer-

ence

theory

f value. Two

versions f the divine

preference

heory

re

as follows:

17

A. J.

Ayer,

Language,

Truth,

nd

Logic,

Second

edition

New

York:

Dover,

1952),

pp.

107-108.

Language,

Truth and

Logic, pp.

110-112.

364 THOMAS L. CARSON


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

18/21

DPTV1. If thereexists an

omniscient,

mnipotent

God who

created the

universe,

hen God's

will

is the ultimate

standard of

value.

Something

s

intrinsically

ood

providedthat God prefers hat it exist rather han

not

exist,

other

things eing equal.

(Alternatively,

e

could

say

that

something

s

intrinsicallyood

if

God

has an

intrinsic

reference

hat it exist rather

than

not

exist.)

It also

follows that whateverworld God

chose to create

s as

good

as or better

han

any

other

worlds

God

could have created

instead.

If

such a

God does not

exist,

henthe

goodness

or badness

of

things

s determined

n some other

way.

DPTV2.

If

there

xists a

deity

who created the universe nd

who is

much more

knowledgeable

nd

powerful

han

any

rational

being

in the

universe,

hen that

deity's

will

is the

ultimate tandardof value.

(Something

s

intrinsically

ood provided

that God

prefers

hat it

exist

rather han not

exist,

other

thingsbeing

equal.

It

also

follows hatwhateverworld

God chose to cre-

ate

is as

good

as or better han

any

otherworldsGod

could have created nstead.) f such a God does not

exist,

henthe

goodness

or badness of

things

s deter-

mined

n some other

way.

Given either

f these

theories,

t

is

impossible

o raise the

problem

of

evil.

f God's

will s the ultimate tandard f

good

and

bad,

thennoth-

ing

God

does

(including

is

having

reated his

world,

nsteadof some

other

world)

can

possibly

count

as evidence

against

God's

goodness.

No conceivable

facts bout

the extent f

suffering

n this world could

count

as evidence

gainst

God's

goodness.

f

God's

preferences

re the

ultimate

tandards f

value,

thenwhateverworld God chose to create

must be at least

as

good

as

any

alternativeworld

that he could have

created

nstead.God cannot

be faulted or

having

reated

hisworld s

opposed

to some other

world that was

within

God's

power

to create.

The

problem

of evil seems

to

disappear given

DPT VI

and

DPTV2.

This strikesme as a reductio

d absurdum f

DPTV1 and DPTV2. The

problem

f evil is a

genuineproblem.

t is a serious

question

whether

the

existence f

so much evil

in

the

world counts as evidence

gainst

the existence

f a

good

God.

Anytheory

hatdenies that

the

argument

from

vil

points

o

a

genuine

uestion/issue

s

ipso acto

unacceptable.

We can avoid this

problem

f

we

modify

he

divinewill

theory long

the

ines of RobertAdams'

second modified ivine ommand

heory

f

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND THE

PROBLEM

OF EVIL 365


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

19/21

moral

wrongness.19

his modifieddivine

preference

heory

reads as

follows:

DPTV3. If there xists n omniscient,mnipotent,nd loving

deity,

hen hat

deity's

will s the ultimate tandard

f

value.

(Something

s

intrinsicallyood provided

that

God

prefers

hat t exist rather han not

exist,

other

things being equal.

It also follows that whatever

world

God chose to create s as

good

as or

better han

any

otherworldsGod could have created

nstead.)

f

such a

God does not

exist,

hen he

goodness

or bad-

ness

of

things

s determined

n

some

other

way.20

DPTV3 allows us to

regard

he

problem

f evil as a

genuine

problem.

Given

DPTV3,

the existenceof so much

suffering

and ostensibly

pointless

uffering)

ould be taken

to

be

prima

facie

evidence

gainst

the

existence f a God who is

omniscient,

mnipotent,

nd

loving.21

Given

DPTV3,

there s no

independent

act of the matter

no

fact

independent

f

God's

will)

that

the

goodness

of the ends that God

achieves

by

allowing

o much

suffering

nd evil to

exist,

does or

does

19

Robert

Adams,

Divine

Command Metaethics ModifiedAgain.

In Robert

Adams,

The Virtue

f

Faith

Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1987),

pp.

128-143.

20

I want

to

briefly

ote a

possibleproblem

withDPTV3.

Many

hold that he

concept

of love

presupposes

n

independentoncept

f

good

and bad.

On this

view,

o love

someone s to

desire her/his

ood

or welfare

or ts

own

sake. If this view about

the nature f love

is

correct,

hen

DPTV3 is

viciously

ircular. t is

viciously

ircu-

lar to

say

that

what s

good

and bad is determined

y

what a

loving

God

desires

and then

go

on to

explicate

what it is for God to be

loving

n terms f what is

good

and bad forhumans

independently

f what God

prefers).

or

my

own

part,

I

agree

that

any

plausible

definition f love

presupposes

n

independent

tandard

of

good

and bad

(or welfare)

nd I have formulated

n

alternative

ersion f the

divine

preferenceheory

hat

ttempts

o avoid this

problem;

ee

my

Value and the

GoodLife,pp. 242-256.These issues arerelevant o assessing heplausibilityf the

divine

preferenceheory

f

value,

but

they

needn't oncern s here.

21

For more on this ee

my

Value

and the Good

Life, p.

254. Linda

Zagzebski

makes

very

similar laims about the

implications

f her divine motivation

heory

f

value for he

problem

f

evil. There s a sense

n which he

problem

f evil

disap-

pears

on

her view.On her

view,

God's motives

re the ultimate tandards

f value

and standards f

morality.Nothing

s

good

or bad

independently

f

God's

being

motivated o

bring

t about or

prevent

t.

Her

theory learly

ounts

s a nonrealist

theory,

iven

my

definition f moral

realism.)

ince

God is

omnipotent

e is able

to

do whatever e is motivated o do.

Any

world that God

brings

bout mustbe

good.

There is no

independent

tandardof value

by

which we can

say

that

the

things hat a loving omnipotent

mniscientGod

has created are bad.

However,

given

her

theory,

e can still

regard

heexistence f so much

uffering

n the world

as evidence

gainst

the existence

f

an

omnipotent

nd

perfectly

ood

God

who

is motivated

by

love,

Linda

Zagzebski

Divine

Motivation

Theory

Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity

ress,

004),

p.

325.

366 THOMAS

L.

CARSON


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

20/21

not

outweigh

he

badness of that

suffering

nd evil. For

DPTV3 the

crucial

question

raised

by

the

problem

of evil is whether

he existence

of so

much

evil and

suffering

akes it

implausible

o think

that an

omniscient,mnipotent reator of the universe ould also be loving.

Our

ignorance

f

God's actual reasons

if

any)

for

permitting

o much

suffering

nd evil to

exist,

nd

the fact

that

we don't know all the

pos-

sible reasons God

might

have,

make it

extremely

ifficulto

udge

this

question.

Suppose

that we knew that an

omnipotent,

mniscientGod

created he universe.

uppose

also thatwe knew

why

God

chose to cre-

ate

thisuniverse

nsteadof some other

possible

universewith

much ess

suffering.

ven

if

we had

knowledge

f all

God's

reasons,

t

might

be

ambiguous

r

open

to debate whether

od's actions re

consistent ith

God's being oving.Even with thisknowledge f God's reasons,rea-

sonable

people

who

accept

DPTV3

might isagree

bout whether

uch

a God should be called

loving.Again,

t

is

possible

thatfull

knowledge

of God's reasons for

permitting

vil

would reconcile

veryone

o the

evil and

suffering

f

thisworld.God's

reasons

might

eem

very

ompel-

ling

to us.

However,

t would

take

great

deal of

independent rgument

to show that this s the

case

and,

in

the

absence of such

arguments,

t

is an

open question

whether

easonable nformed

eople

(reasonable

people

who have relevant

nformationbout God's

reasonsfor

reating

this world as opposed to otherworlds he could have created nstead)

could

disagree

bout

whethert makes

sense to call

God

loving.

Of

course,

our

actual situation s

very

different.We

don't know

God's reasonsfor

having

hosen to create world

with o

much uffer-

ing;

we

can't even

magine

ll

of the reasons

why

God

might

have cho-

sen to create a world

such as ours. In

light

of

this,

think

that it

would be

very

unreasonable or

omeonewho

accepts

DPTV3 to

claim

thatthe

argument

rom vil

shows that n

omniscient,

mnipotent,

nd

loving

God does not

exist. Our

inability

o divine

why

uch a

God

would

allow there o be so

much

uffering

oesn't

show that

there an't

be

reasons that are

compatible

with God's

being

omniscient,

mnipo-

tent,

nd

loving.

Still,

one

mightpress

the evidential

rgument

rom

evil and claim

that,

ince we can't

imagine ny

reason

why

a

loving,

omniscient,

nd

omnipotent

od would

allow so much evil

to

exist,

t

is

unlikely

r

improbable

hat such

a God

exists. can't

begin

to do

justice

to

this

argument

n the

present

paper,

but

permit

me a brief

conjecture.

Probabilistic

rguments

nvolve inductive

nferences,

ut

such inferencesnd

reasoning

re,

in

principle,

llegitimate

n the

pres-

ent case. We don't have

any

inductive asis

for

determining

hat

sorts

of universes

mniscient,

mnipotent,

nd

loving

deities re

likely

o cre-

ate and what sorts

of universes re

likely

o

exist

f

such

deitiesdon't

exist.We

are familiarwith

only

one universe

nd,

for the

purposes

of

AXIOLOGY,

REALISM,

AND THE

PROBLEM OF EVIL

367


8/10/2019 40041112.pdf

21/21

the

present

debate,

we can't make

assumptions

bout what

kind of

God

(if

any)

created he universe.

6. Conclusions

Implicitly

r

explicitly,

hilosophers

who venture ssessments

f the

argument

from evil almost

always

appeal

to first-orderheories

of

value. The

plausibility

f these assessments

epends,

argely,

n the

plausibility

f the theories f value

they

presuppose.

ome theories

f

value

are consistentwith theistic

eplies

to the

argument

romevil.

Other theories f

value are

difficult,

f not

impossible,

o

square

with

these

replies.

Those

who discussthe

argument

rom vil need to devote

much more

attention o

ustifying

he standards

f value to which

hey

appeal. Almost all discussionsof the argument rom vil presuppose

the truthof moral realism.

f

nonrealism s

true,

then we need

to

rethink nd reframe he entirediscussionabout

the

problem

of evil.

(All

nonrealistnormative heories

gree

that statements f

types

II

and

IV

are not

objectively

rue

ndependently

f what

rational

beings

believe or

desire.22)

ontemporary

iscussionsof the

problem

of evil

are

incredibly

ubtle and

sophisticated

n their discussionsof

meta-

physical

ssues

concerning

mnipotence

nd

what kinds of worlds an

omnipotent

od could create.

However,

hesediscussions re

often

ery

naive and dogmatic n theirtreatment f normative nd metaethical

questions.

22

Oddly enough,

J. L.

Mackie,

one of the most

mportant

ritics

f moral

realism,

seemsto assume the

truth f moral realism

n his discussion f the

problem

f evil.

He

appeals

to

statements o the effect

hat

pain

and

suffering

re bad

(evil)

and

statements o the effect hatcertain

kindsof universes

hat nclude

no

suffering

r

evil are better han the actual

universe.

He treats uch statements

s true

ndepen-

dently

f what

anyone

thinks. ee

Mackie's Evil and

Omnipotence,

n The

Prob-

lem

of

Evil,

Marilyn

Adams

and Robert

Adams,

eds.

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Presss,1990),pp. 25-37 and

his

The

Miracle

of

Theism

Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1982),

Chapter

9. Mackie's

discussionof

the

problem

of

evil is

arguably

inconsistent ith

his

rejection

f moral

realism nd

objective

values

in Ethics:

Inventing ight

nd

Wrong

London: Penguin,

1977).

I owe

this observation

o

Linda

Zagzebski.

368 THOMAS

L.

CARSON

40041112.pdf

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