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THE USE OF ANALOGY IN HISTORICAL METHOD

Is it possible to be both a critical historian and a Christian who in faith contends that Jesus rose from the dead ? Toward the end of the last century, Ernst Troeltsch began to argue that the principles necessary for scientific historiography are "at all points an absolute contrast" to the central beliefs of Christian theology.1 The problem is that the events upon which Chris­tendom seems to rest (e.g., miracles, the resurrection of Jesus, etc.) are unique. But the historian who employs the principle of analogy precludes such uniqueness at the outset, i.e., he must assume that the events of the past, like all events, are analogous to those he experiences in the present. Furthermore, it is just this assumption that permits our knowledge of any­thing in the past at all. Van A. Harvey poses the dilemma succinctly: "Without the principle of analogy, it seems impossible to understand the past ; if, however, one employs the principle of analogy, it seems impossible to do justice to the alleged uniqueness of Jesus Christ."2

It is just this dilemma which the German theologian, Wolf hart Pannen­berg, tries to resolve with his theology of history. However, it seems that he is wrongly interpreted if understood as having resolved the dilemma only at the cost of renouncing the principle of analogy entirely.3 A more careful reading will show that Pannenberg recognizes that it is the similarity or analogous character of events which is the condition for the possibility of knowing the past. He is concerned, however, to distinguish between the principle of analogy as a tool for modern historical research and an anti-theistic worldview or ontology, which often but unnecessarily accompanies it.

I

In investigating a past event, the principle of analogy submits that a comparison with what is already known provides a touchstone for evalu­ating the probability that the reported event actually occurred and for

1 "Historiography," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings (New York: Scribner's, 1914) vol. 6, p. 718.

2 The Historian and the Believer (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966) p. 32. 3 For example, see the review by Clark M. Williamson, "Hegel in Modern Dress,"

hit 26 (1972) 87.

475

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establishing its specific contours. Negatively put, if in the process of his­torical investigation one is confronted with, what the historian Marc Bloch terms, "an overly-pronounced deviation" from what is analogous to our own experience, then the gaining of historical knowledge becomes ipso facto impossible.4

This doctrine found an early and definitive formulation in David Hume's critique of miracles. "A wise man," according to Hume, "proportions as­sessing the evidence."5 In assessing the evidence in order to arrive at a judgment as to what is the most "probable" explanation of a given event, he appeals to common experience and observation. There are times and places, such as historical study for example, where we may examine things of which we have had no direct experience. In this case, Hume directs us to a principle of analogy:

The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations.6

What we have observed as the uniform laws of nature are common to our daily experience. And a miracle, by definition, is a "transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent."7 Thus, our common experience by nature counts against the existence of any miracle. If the probability that a miracle actually occurred requires that evidence be produced superior to the evi­dence produced against it, and if the final standard for evaluating evidence is one's own experience and observation which precludes the existence of miracles from the outset, then we may only conclude that there are no such things as miracles. This seems to be the logic of Hume's argument.

Ernst Troeltsch represents the same view, perhaps more developed. In his essay, "Über historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie/'8

4 Marc Bloch, The Historians Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954) p. 115. When it is said that our understanding of past events must be analogous to present experience, it does not mean that the historian is limited to analogies drawn from his own personal or immediate experience. F. H. Bradley makes it clear that the justification for accepting reports of the past must be an assessment based upon and consistent with, our present critically informed beliefs about the world. "The Pre­suppositions of Critical History," in Collected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935) I, 1-53. See also Van Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, pp. 90-91.

5 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section X, part 1. 6 Ibid., part 2. 7 Ibid., part 1. 8 Gesammelte Schriften (Tübingen: J. C. Β. Mohr, 1913) I I , 729-753.

1973] U S E OF ANALOGY I N HISTORICAL M E T H O D 477

he argued that critical historical method rests on three interrelated princi­ples: (1) the principle of criticism, which means that our judgments about the past are not classified as proofs, i.e., as either true or false, but rather they always claim a greater or lesser degree of probability, and as such are always open to revision; (2 ) the principle of analogy, which means that such judgments of probability can be made only if we presuppose that our present experience is analogous to that of past persons; and (3) the prin­ciple of universal correlation, which means that all historical phenomena are so interdependent and related, that no change can occur at one point in the historical nexus without effecting a change in all that immediately sur­rounds it. Historical explanation, therefore, necessarily takes the form of understanding an event in terms of its antecedents and consequences, in terms of its temporal and spatial place in the causal nexus.9

The theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg, finds no fundamental disagree­ment with Troeltsch's principles one and three; he himself recognizes the "probable" character of all historical knowledge, and his own doctrine of Traditionsgeschichte presupposes an equivalent to the correlation prin­ciple.10 But the principle of analogy as Troeltsch employs it is troublesome, he maintains, because it requires unnecessary assent to an ontological world-view which precludes the existence of God or his activity in history from the outset.

I I

According to Troeltsch, the principle of analogy requires that there be a "fundamental homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit) of all historical events."11

Pannenberg submits that Troeltsch has gone further than was necessary; he has translated a method of inquiry into a view of reality as a whole. Instead of pointing out analogies "from case to case," Troeltsch has postu­lated that all reality must be congruent with the current range of experience and research. Pannenberg quotes Troeltsch as having spoken of an "omni­potence of analogy."

. . . fundamental homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit) of all historical events, which, to be sure, does not amount to identity (Gleichheit), but rather allows all pos­sible room for distinctions, although in general (it) presupposes each time a core of homogeneity, from which the differences can be grasped and felt.12

9 Van Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, pp. 14-15. 10 Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (two volumes: Philadelphia: Fortress

Press, 1970-71) 1,39-53. 11 Gesammelte Schriften, II, 732. 12 Gesammelte Schriften, II, 732, cited in Basic Questions I, 45-46.

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If this sentence said no more than that one always expects to find this or that similarity between events in this world despite their recognized dissim­ilarity, Pannenberg argues, nothing could be said against it. However, he contends, Troeltsch's meaning is that "all differences should be compre­hended in a uniform, universal homogeneity. In this form, the postulate of the homogeneity of all events leads to a constriction (Verengung) of the historical question itself."13 All dissimilarities would be grounded in a "core of homogeneity" which can be possessed by the historian. This suggests that the universe as such and everything in it at any time can be understood without remainder by analogy.

Pannenberg criticizes Troeltsch's historical method on the grounds that it is unnecessarily anthropocentric.14 An analogy made from within history is always an analogy viewed from the standpoint of the observer, man. Of course, such a viewpoint is the only viewpoint a man can ever experience. But what is there to warrant the assertion that man's viewpoint is the only viewpoint, and that nothing can be real if not analogous to what is under­stood from that viewpoint ? It is the "without remainder" demand that leads Pannenberg to conclude that such a historical method is unnecessarily an­thropocentric. This anthropocentric presupposition of historicism precludes the realm of the transcendent before an examination of the historical evi­dence has even begun. I t is Pannenberg's contention that historical method need not be bound to such a world-view, and that freed from the constric­tions of historicism, it may serve theology without causing ideological friction.

I l l

As a methodological principle of historical research, analogy means that something difficult to understand, something comparatively opaque, is to be conceived and understood by the investigator in terms of what lies closer to him.

There is obviously an anthropocentric structure in the way in which analogizing deliberations proceed from what lies closest to the investigator's current state of knowledge. This structure is fundamental for the methodological value of analogy as a means of knowing. Only because something about the unknown can be concluded from what is already known can analogy prove its power of disclosure.15

This is essentially what is demonstrated by the hermeneutical circle.

33 Basic Questions, I, 46. 14 Ibid., pp. 39-50. 15 Basic Questions, I, 44.

1973] USE OF ANALOGY IN HISTORICAL METHOD 479

Knowledge and understanding can never be characterized as purely passive reception, as if the human mind were a tabula rasa upon which raw experi­ence inscribed its objective contents. Rather, human understanding is made possible only on the basis of pre-understanding, i.e., by comparing each new experience with what is already understood.16 The modern discipline of hermeneutics informs us that all understanding takes place in a circular movement. The answer to our query is determined to a large degree by the question which we pose, and the pre-understanding which provoked that question is in turn confirmed, extended or corrected by the answer. A new question then grows out of this understanding, so that the hermeneu-tical circle continues to develop in a never-ending spiral.17

Intrinsic to the movement of understanding, we are told by the Heidel­berg philosopher of hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer, is the principle of negation.18 To open oneself to new experience by asking questions recognizes implicitly that the answer is not yet determined. A rhetorical question, then, is only a pseudo question, because it presumes its own answer at the beginning and is consequently no longer open to the new. To truly ask a question is to recognize that one does not yet know what the answer will be.

Applied to historical method, it would be most "unscientific" to so pose questions to the historical materials under investigation as to have decided in advance which explanations will be accepted as answers. The principle of negation applied to one's pre-understanding implies that the historical inquirer must be truly open to receive answers which may negate, as well as confirm, what he already understands. For Pannenberg, this means that concentration upon the dissimilarities and particularities of historical occur­rences, not just the similarities, is equally a vital concern for the work­ing historian. The inquirer must be ready to encounter a piece of evidence that will itself draw a limit to the analogy with which he is working. "That a reported event bursts analogies with otherwise usual or repeatedly at­tested events is still no ground for disputing its facticity."19 To acquire the most probable explanation of a particular historical event requires an open­ness on the part of the inquirer which does not rule out "overly pronounced deviations" a priori.

1 6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) pp. 191 ff.

17 E. Schillebeeckx, "Towards a Catholic Use of Hermeneutics" in God the Future of Man (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968) pp. 7-8.

1 8 Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tübin­gen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960) pp. 344ff.

19 Basic Questions, I, 48f.

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IV

There is a distinction to be drawn between the positive and the negative use of analogy. A judgment could be rendered that a particular event is historical, i.e., it in fact took place, if it has a positive analogue to similar events known by the historian from other sources. For example, a judgment could be easily made to the effect that the crucifixion of Jesus probably did in fact occur in much the way that it is reported. The event is considered possible because the historian is aware of reports of other crucifixions and similar forms of death penalties past and present. The phenomenon of death is also part of his world-view. Consequently, positive analogies can be drawn between Jesus' death and other events subject to the experience of the historian. Although the probability of the event's having actually taken place is dependent upon further evidence, positive analogies at least render it possible.

The negative use of analogy works in the opposite direction. If there are no other events subject to the historian's experience which are analogous to the event under investigation, then it is believed that there is sufficient cause to judge that the event in question did not in fact happen. The main argument against the historicity of Jesus' resurrection from the dead, for example, rests upon this negative use of analogy. The logic goes this way: because the inquiring historian has no other experience of a man rising from the dead, he must conclude that Jesus did not rise from the dead. In his inquiry into the NT reports of this alleged event, the historian will assume that some factor other than an actual resurrection from the dead is required to explain the claims of the NT witnesses. That is to say, if there be no analogue conforming to something within "our present critically in­formed beliefs about the world," then the event in question is deemed not historical (historisch).

Pannenberg contends that rejection of the resurrection reports in the NT is based solely on the spurious use of negative analogy. It would be a dif­ferent matter, however, if we were to rely upon positive analogy alone. In doing that, we would ask, "to what do the resurrection reports compare that is part of the historian's experience?" The historian today is familiar with instances of myths, legends and delusions which, Pannenberg says, relate themselves to ". . . unreal objects, phenomena referring to states of consciousness."20 If a critical examination of the NT accounts showed that they correspond significantly with the categories of myth, legend or delu­sion, then one would be obligated to consider them as either myth, legend or delusion. Such a judgment would be rendered, however, not because the

20 Ibid., p. 49.

1973] USE OF ANALOGY IN HISTORICAL METHOD 481

event reported is an overly pronounced deviation without analogy, but rather because it exhibits a positive analogy to some form of consciousness which has no objective referent (Realgehalt). However, argues Pannen­berg, no significant positive analogies between Jesus' reported resurrection and myths, legends or delusions have been established. Perhaps there is something unique about Jesus' resurrection.

Pannenberg contends that comparative analogy can be used as much for establishing what is individual and distinctive about the phenomenon under investigation as it can be for locating its similarities with other phenomena. Therefore, such a comparison ought not be used to obscure that which is distinctive, by classifying it as just another instance of a given genre. One result of this corrective is that the lack of historical analogues, or the nega­tive use of analogy, loses its decisive role in determining whether or not an event is historical (historisch). The negative use of analogy necessarily presupposes that world-view in which everything actual must conform to a "core homogeneity," the knowledge of which is already in the possession of the historian. But once that world-view itself becomes only one option among others, i.e., when the answer to the question, "what is the proper world-view ?", remains open, then the basis for the negative use of analogy is removed. Positive analogy remains what it ought to be, namely, a meth­odological principle for inquiry instead of an ontological conclusion.21

With regard to the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, Pannenberg ad­mits there are no formal positive analogues. But this is double-sided. On the one hand, it is true that there are no formal analogies between the event as reported in the NT and a contemporary experience of dead men rising. But on the other hand, historical research has not produced any convincing evidence that the event of Jesus' resurrection fits the model of myth, pure legend or delusion. Consequently, the use of positive analogy alone is in­sufficient to render the event unhistorical. The historian, then, must simply examine the witnesses or sources, gather the evidence, and draw a conclu­sion as to the most probable explanation for the experiences reported in the NT documents. What Pannenberg has done is to make room for the his­torical credibility of the resurrection as an event without analogy.

2 1 "My criticism is not directed against the critical use of the principle of analogy, which is basic to the critical historical method. This use is merely restricted. The instrument of analogy gains precision, if judgments about the historicity or nonhistori-city of events asserted in the tradition are based only on positive analogies between the tradition which is being studied and situations known elsewhere, but not on the lack of such analogies." Pannenberg, "Response to the Discussion," in Theology as History, vol. I l l of New Frontiers in Theology, ed. by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr . (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) p. 264, n. 75.

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Historical inquiry always takes place from an already given context of meaning, out of a preunderstanding of the object of inquiry, which, however, is modified and corrected in the process of research on the basis of the phenomena examined. As long as historiography does not begin dogmatically with a narrow concept of reality according to which "dead men do not rise," it is not clear why his­toriography should not in principle be able to speak about Jesus' resurrection as the explanation that is best established of such events as the disciples' experi­ences of the appearances and the discovery of the empty tomb.22

The term Pannenberg uses to describe Jesus' resurrection from the dead is "metaphor." Dr. Johnson once said that metaphor "gives you two ideas for one." The understanding of metaphor with which Pannenberg is work­ing implies two ideas: one familiar to our experience and one strange to our experience. Rising from sleep is familiar to our experience but rising from death is not. In this metaphor the familiar experience is used to com­municate the strange one. In the same way that one is awakened from sleep and rises, so also the N T witnesses claim it happened to the dead Jesus. The metaphor presupposes the use of analogy, i.e., matching up the simi­larities between our awakening from sleep and the event of Jesus' resurrec­tion, but it also points us beyond the analogy to an as yet incomprehensible reality. The event of Jesus' resurrection can be pointed to, but it can not be fully explained in univocal language as most other historical events seem to be. That does not mean it did not happen.

T E D PETERS

Newberry College Newberry, S.C. 29108

22 Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968) p. 109.

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