4 metrobank v tobias

6/26/2015 RepublicofthePhilippines

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/january2012/177780.html 1/16

RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourtManila

FIRSTDIVISION

METROPOLITANBANK&TRUSTCO.(METROBANK),representedbyROSELLAA.SANTIAGO,

Petitioner,

versus

ANTONINOO.TOBIASIII,

Respondent.

G.R.No.177780

Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,

LEONARDODECASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA,JR.,and*PERLASBERNABE,JJ.

Promulgated:

January25,2012

xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

ThisappealassailstheadversedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals(CA)1thatdismissedthepetitionforcertioraribroughtby thepetitioner tonullifyandsetaside theresolutionsissuedbytheSecretaryofJusticeonJuly20,20042andNovember18,20053directing



theCityProsecutorofMalabonCitytowithdrawtheinformationinCriminalCaseNo.27020entitledPeoplev.AntoninoO.TobiasIII.

WeaffirmtheCAinkeepingwiththeprincipleofnoninterferencewiththeprerogativeof the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in thelattersdeterminationof theexistenceofprobablecause, absent any showing that theSecretaryofJusticetherebycommitsgraveabuseofhisdiscretion.

Antecedents

In1997,RosellaA.Santiago,thentheOICBranchHeadofMetropolitanBank&TrustCompany(METROBANK)inValeroStreet,MakatiCity,wasintroducedtorespondentAntonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client ofMETROBANK.Subsequently,Tobiasopenedasavings/currentaccountforandinthename of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, TobiasappliedforaloanfromMETROBANK,whichinduecourseconductedtradeandcreditverificationofTobiasthatresultedinnegativefindings.METROBANKnextproceededtoappraisethepropertyTobiasofferedascollateralbyaskinghimforaphotocopyofthe title and other related documents.4 The property consisted of four parcels of landlocated inMalabonCity,MetroManilawith a total area of 6,080 squaremeters andcovered byTransferCertificate ofTitle (TCT)No.M16751.5 Based on the financialstatements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a credit line forP40,000,000.00.OnAugust15,1997, JoselitoBermeoMoreno,Lead InternalAffairsInvestigatorofMETROBANK,proceededtotheRegistryofDeedsofMalabontocausetheannotationofthedeedofrealestatemortgageonTCTNo.M16751.TheannotationwasEntryNo.26897.6

Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balancewithinsixmonths.7Hepaidtheinterestontheloanforaboutayearbeforedefaulting.Hisloanwasrestructuredto5yearsuponhisrequest.Yet,aftertwomonths,heagaindefaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold toMETROBANKasthelonebidder.8OnJune11,1999,thecertificateofsalewasissuedinfavorofMETROBANK.9



Whenthecertificateofsalewaspresentedforregistrationto theRegistryofDeedsofMalabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M16751 was found in theregistryvault.Atty.SarahPrincipeBido,DeputyRegisterofDeedsofMalabon,wentontoverifyTCTNo.M16751andlearnedthatSerialNo.4348590appearingthereinhadbeenissuedforTCTNo.M15363inthenameofoneAlbertoCruzwhileTCTNo.16751(nowTCTNo.390146)appearedtohavebeenissuedinthenameofEugenioS.CruzandCo.foraparceloflandlocatedinNavotas.10

Givensuchfindings,METROBANKrequestedthePresidentialAntiOrganizedCrimeTask Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.11 In its report datedMay 29, 2000,12 PAOCTFconcluded thatTCTNo.M16751and the taxdeclarations submittedbyTobiaswerefictitious.PAOCTFrecommendedthefilingagainstTobiasofacriminalcomplaintforestafathroughfalsificationofpublicdocumentsunderparagraph2(a)ofArticle315,inrelationtoArticles172(1)and171(7)oftheRevisedPenalCode.13

TheOffice of theCity Prosecutor ofMalabon ultimately charged Tobiaswith estafathroughfalsificationofpublicdocumentsthroughthefollowinginformation,14viz:

xxx

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in theMunicipality ofMalabon,Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of thisHonorableCourt, the abovenamedaccused,bymeansofdeceit, falsepretense, fraudulent acts andmisrepresentationexecuted prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud, represented toMETROBANK, as representedbyMS.ROSELLAS.SANTIAGO, that he is theregistered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M16751 which herepresented tobe true andgenuinewhenheknew theCertificateofTitleNo.M16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor ofMetrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan andRosella S. Santiagorelying on saidmisrepresentation gave to accused, the amount of P20,000,000.00andonceinpossessionoftheamount,withintenttodefraud,willfully,unlawfullyand feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious title andmisappropriate,misapplyandconverted the saidamountofP20,000,000.00 to hisown personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed andrefused and still fails and refuses to return the amount to complainantMETROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in the spurious title in theaforementionedamountofP20,000,000.00.

CONTRARYTOLAW.15



Tobiasfiledamotionforreinvestigation,16whichwasgranted.

In his counteraffidavit submitted during the reinvestigation,17 Tobias averred that hehadboughtthepropertyfromoneLeonardoFajardothroughrealestatebrokersAugustoMunsuyacandCarmelitoPilapilthatNatalioBartolome,hisfinancialconsultantfromCarwin International,hadconvincedhim topurchase thepropertydue to itsbeinganideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage business that the actualinspectionofthepropertyaswellastheverificationmadeintheRegistryofDeedsofMalabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT No. 106083 under the name ofLeonardo Fajardo that he had applied for the loan fromMETROBANK to pay thepurchase price by offering the property as collateral that in order for the finalapplication tobeprocessedand the loanproceeds tobe released,METROBANKhadadvisedhimtohavethetitlefirsttransferredtohisnamethathehadexecutedadeedofabsolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said instrument had beenproperlyregisteredintheRegistryofDeedsthatthetransferofthetitle,beingundertheaccountof theseller,hadbeenprocessedbysellerFajardoandhisbrokersMunsuyacand Pilapil that his title and the property had been inspected and verified byMETROBANKs personnel and that he did not have any intention to defraudMETROBANK.

Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still foundprobablecauseagainstTobias,andrecommendedhisbeingchargedwithestafathroughfalsificationofpublicdocument.18

TobiasappealedtotheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ).

OnJuly20,2004,thenActingSecretaryofJusticeMa.MerceditasN.GutierrezissuedaresolutiondirectingthewithdrawaloftheinformationfiledagainstTobias,19towit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE.TheCityProsecutorofMalabonCityisdirectedtocausethewithdrawalofthe Information inCrim.CaseNo. 27020 against respondentAntoninoO.TobiasIII,andreporttheactiontakenthereonwithinten(10)daysfromreceipthereof.

SOORDERED.



ActingSecretaryofJusticeGutierrezopinedthatTobiashadsufficientlyestablishedhisgoodfaithinpurchasingthepropertythathehadevenusedpartoftheproceedsoftheloantopaythesellerthatitwasMETROBANKthathadcausedtheannotationofthemortgageontheTCT,therebycreatinganimpressionthatthetitlehadbeenexistingintheRegistryofDeedsatthattimethat,accordingly,thepresumptionthatthepossessorofafalsifieddocumentwastheauthorofthefalsificationdidnotapplybecauseitwasalways subject to the qualification or reference as to the approximate time of thecommissionofthefalsification.

METROBANKmovedtoreconsider,20arguingthatTobiashademployeddeceitorfalsepretense in offering the property as collateral by using a fake title and that thepresumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the falsificationappliedbecausenootherpersoncouldhavefalsifiedtheTCTandwouldhavebenefittedtherefromexceptTobiashimself.

On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied

METROBANKsmotionforreconsideration.21

RulingoftheCA

METROBANKchallengedtheadverseresolutionsthroughcertiorari.

OnDecember29,2006,theCApromulgateditsdecision,22dismissingMETROBANKspetitionforcertioraribyholdingthatthepresumptionofauthorshipmightbedisputedthroughasatisfactoryexplanation,viz:

Wearenotunawareoftheestablishedpresumptionandrulethatwhenitisprovedthatapersonhasinhispossessionafalsifieddocumentandmakesuseofthesame,thepresumptionorinferenceisthatsuchpersonistheforger(Serranovs.CourtofAppeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192SCRA533,546547[1990]).Yet,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatintheabsenceofsatisfactoryexplanation,onewhoisfoundinpossessionofaforgeddocumentandwhouseditispresumedtobetheforger(citingPeoplevs.Sendaydiego,81SCRA



120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could renderineffectivethepresumptionwhich,afterall,ismerelyadisputableone.

ItisinthisscorethatWeaffirmtheresolutionoftheDepartmentofJusticefindingnoprobablecauseagainstprivaterespondentTobiasforestafathrufalsificationofpublicdocument.TherecordspeakswellofTobiasgoodfaithandlackofcriminalintentionandliability.Consider:

(a)Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith isalways presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove it(Prinsipio vs. TheHonorableOscar Barrientos,G.R. 167025,December19,2005).NosuchevidenceofbadfaithofTobiasappearsonrecord

(b)Tobiasactuationinsecuringtheloanbeliesanycriminalintentonhis part to deceive petitionerBank.Hewas not in a hurry to obtain theloan. He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm ormachineoftheBanknotonlyonthelocationandthephysicalappearanceof thepropertybut likewise theveracityof its title.Outof theapprovedP40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of P20,000,000.00, for his frozenmeatbusinesswhichuponinvestigationoftheBankfailedtogivenegativeresults

(c)Tobiaspaidthenecessaryinterestsforone(1)yearontheloanandtwo(2)installmentsontherestructuredloanand

(d)Moreimportantly, theloanwasnotreleasedtohimuntilafter themortgagewasdulyregisteredwiththeRegistryofDeedsofMalabonCityandevenpaidtheamountofP90,000.00fortheregistrationfeestherefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least intention todeceivetheBankinobtainingtheloan.ItmaynotbesurprisingtofindthatTobiascould evenbe avictimhimself by anotherperson inpurchasing thepropertiesheofferedassecurityfortheloan.23

The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executivefunctionwithinthediscretionofthepublicprosecutorand,ultimately,oftheSecretaryofJustice,and thecourtsof lawcouldnot interferewithsuchdetermination24 that theprivatecomplainant inacriminalactionwasonlyconcernedwith itscivilaspect thatshould theState choosenot to file the criminal action, theprivate complainantmightinitiateacivilactionbasedonArticle35oftheCivilCode,towit:



IntheeventualitythattheSecretaryofJusticerefusestofilethecriminalcomplaint,the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the case and not thecriminalaspectthereof,isnotleftwithoutaremedy.InVda.DeJacobvs.Puno,131SCRA144,149[1984],theSupremeCourthasthisforananswer:

TheremedyofcomplainantinacasewheretheMinisterofJusticewouldnotallowthefilingofacriminalcomplaintagainstanaccusedbecauseitishisopinionthattheevidenceisnotsufficienttosustainaninformationforthecomplaintwithwhichtherespondentsarechargedof,istofileacivilactionasindicatedinArticle35oftheCivilCode,whichprovides:

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminaloffense,chargesanotherwiththesame,forwhichnoindependentcivil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but thejusticeof thepeace findsno reasonablegrounds tobelieve that acrimehas been committed, or theprosecuting attorney refuses orfailstoinstitutecriminalproceedings,thecomplainantmaybringacivil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civilactionmaybesupportedbyapreponderanceofevidence.Uponthedefendants motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file abondtoindemnifythedefendantincasethecomplainantshouldbefoundtobemalicious.

Ifduring thependencyof thecivilaction,an informationshouldbepresentedby theprosecutingattorney, thecivil action shallbesuspendeduntiltheterminationofthecriminalproceedings.25

METROBANKsoughtreconsideration,buttheCAdenieditsmotionforthatpurpose,emphasizingthatthepresumptionthatMETROBANKfirmlyrelieduponwasovercomebyTobiassufficientlyestablishinghisgood faithand lackofcriminal intent.TheCArelevantlyheld:

Petitionershouldbemindedthatthesubjectpresumptionthatthepossessoranduserofaforgedorfalsifieddocumentispresumedtobethefalsifierorforgerisameredisputable presumption and not a conclusive one. Under the law on evidence,presumptionsaredividedintotwo(2)classes:conclusiveandrebuttable.Conclusiveorabsolutepresumptionsarerulesdeterminingthequantityofevidencerequisiteforthe support of any particular avermentwhich is not permitted to be overcomebyanyproof that thefact isotherwise, if thebasisfactsareestablished(1Greenleaf,Ev4429AmJur2d,Evidence1641JonesonEvidence6ed,page132).Upontheotherhand,adisputablepresumptionhasbeendefinedasspeciesofevidence thatmay be accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold thecontention forwhich it stands,oronewhichmaybeovercomebyother evidence



(31AC.J.S.,p.197Peoplev.deGuzman,G.R.No.106025,Feb.9,1994Herrera,RemedialLaw,Vol.VI, 1999Edition, pp. 4041). In fact, Section3ofRule 131provides that the disputable presumptions therein enumerated are satisfactory ifuncontradictedbutmaybecontradictedandovercomebyotherevidence.Thus,asdeclared in Our decision in this case, private respondent had shown evidence ofgood faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow thecontroversialdisputablepresumption.26

Issue

Inthisappeal,METROBANKraisestheloneissueof

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HASDECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORDWITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THISHONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR INRENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006,DISMISSING METROBANKS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ANDAFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND INDENYINGMETROBANKSMOTIONFORRECONSIDERATION.

METROBANKsubmits that thepresumptionofauthorshipwas sufficient toestablishprobablecause toholdTobias for trial that thepresumptionapplieswhenaperson isfoundinpossessionoftheforgedinstrument,makesuseofit,andbenefitsfromitthatcontrarytotherulingoftheCA,thereisnorequirementthatthelegalpresumptionshallonly apply in the absence of a valid explanation from the person found to havepossessed,usedandbenefitedfromtheforgeddocumentthattheCAerredindeclaringthatTobiaswasingoodfaith,becausegoodfaithwasmerelyevidentiaryandbestraisedinthetrialonthemeritsandthatTobiaswasheavilyinvolvedinamodusoperandiofusingfaketitlesbecausehewasalsobeingtriedforasimilarcrimeintheRTC,Branch133,inMakatiCity.

METROBANKmaintains thatwhat theSecretaryof Justicedidwas todetermine theinnocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminaryinvestigationandthattheCAdisregardedsuchlapse.

Ontheotherhand,TobiaspositsthatthecorefunctionoftheDepartmentofJusticeistoprosecutetheguiltyincriminalcases,nottopersecutethatalthoughtheprosecutorsaregiven latitude to determine the existence of probable cause, the review power of theSecretary of Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocentthat in reversing the resolution ofMalabonCityAssistant ProsecutorOjer Pacis, theSecretaryofJusticeonlyactedwithinhisauthoritythat,indeed,theSecretaryofJustice



wascorrectinfindingthattherewaslackofevidencetoprovethatthepurportedfaketitlewas theverycause thathad induced thepetitioner togrant the loanand that theSecretarylikewiseappropriatelyfoundthatTobiasdealtwiththepetitioneringoodfaithbecauseoflackofproofthathehademployedfraudanddeceitinsecuringtheloan.

Lastly,Tobiasarguesthat thepresumptionofforgerycouldnotbeappliedinhiscasebecause itwasMETROBANK, through a representative,who had annotated the realestatemortgagewith theRegistryofDeedsand thathehadnoaccess toandcontactwiththeRegistryofDeeds,andwhateverwentwrongaftertheannotationwasbeyondhiscontrol.

Ruling

Theappealhasnomerit.

Underthedoctrineofseparationofpowers,thecourtshavenorighttodirectlydecidematters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the ExecutiveBranch of the Government,27 or to substitute their own judgments for that of the

ExecutiveBranch,28 represented in this case by theDepartment of Justice.The settledpolicyisthatthecourtswillnotinterferewiththeexecutivedeterminationofprobablecause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse ofdiscretion.29 That abuse of discretionmust be so patent and gross as to amount to anevasionofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylawortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,suchaswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorhostility.30Forinstance,inBalangananv.CourtofAppeals,SpecialNineteenthDivision,CebuCity,31theCourtruledthattheSecretaryofJusticeexceededhisjurisdictionwhenherequiredhardfactsandsolidevidenceinorder to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirementshouldhavebeenlefttothecourtaftertheconductofatrial.

Inthisregard,westressthatapreliminaryinvestigationforthepurposeofdeterminingtheexistenceofprobablecauseisnotpartofatrial.32Atapreliminaryinvestigation,theinvestigatingprosecutorortheSecretaryofJusticeonlydetermineswhethertheactoromissioncomplainedofconstitutestheoffensecharged.33Probablecausereferstofacts



andcircumstancesthatengenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeencommittedand that the respondent isprobablyguilty thereof.34There isnodefinitive standardbywhich probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions theexistence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutorconductingtheexamination,whoiscalleduponnottodisregardthefactspresented,andtoensurethathisfindingshouldnotruncountertothecleardictatesofreason.35

Tobiaswaschargedwithestafathroughfalsificationofpublicdocumenttheelementsofwhichare:(a)theaccusedusesafictitiousname,orfalselypretendstopossesspower,influence,qualifications,property,credit,agency,businessorimaginarytransactions,oremploys other similar deceits (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulentmeansmustbemadeorexecutedpriortoorsimultaneouslywiththecommissionofthefraud (c) theoffendedpartymusthave reliedon the falsepretense, fraudulent act orfraudulentmeans,thatis,hewasinducedtopartwithhismoneyorpropertybecauseofthe falsepretense, fraudulent act or fraudulentmeans and (d) as a result thereof, theoffended party suffered damage.36 It is required that the false statement or fraudulentrepresentation constitutes the very cause or the only motive that induced thecomplainanttopartwiththething.37

METROBANKurges theapplicationof thepresumptionofauthorshipagainstTobiasbasedonhishavingofferedtheduplicatecopyofthespurioustitletosecuretheloanandpositsthatthereisnorequirementthatthepresumptionshallapplyonlywhenthereis absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used andbenefitedfromtheforgeddocument.

WecannotsustainMETROBANKsurging.

Firstly,apresumptionaffectstheburdenofproofthatisnormallylodgedintheState.38

Theeffectistocreatetheneedofpresentingevidencetoovercometheprimafaciecasethatshallprevailintheabsenceofprooftothecontrary.39Assuch,apresumptionoflawismaterialduringtheactualtrialofthecriminalcasewhereintheestablishmentthereofthe party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut thepresumption and demolish the prima facie case.40 This is not so in a preliminaryinvestigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of aprimafaciecasethatwarrantstheprosecutionofacriminalcaseincourt.41



Secondly,thepresumptionofauthorship,beingdisputable,maybeacceptedandacteduponwherenoevidenceupholdsthecontentionforwhichitstands.42Itisnotcorrecttosay,consequently,thattheinvestigatingprosecutorwilltrytodeterminetheexistenceofthe presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidenceoffered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during apreliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigatingprosecutorortheSecretaryofJusticefromdischargingthedutytoweightheevidencesubmittedbytheparties.Towardsthatend,theinvestigatingprosecutor,and,ultimately,theSecretary of Justice have ample discretion to determine the existence of probablecause,43 adiscretion thatmustbeused to fileonlyacriminalcharge that theevidenceandinferencescanproperlywarrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forgerappliesonlyintheabsenceofasatisfactoryexplanation.44Accordingly,wecannotholdthat the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of thecontroverting explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spuriousdocument.Much lesscanweconsider thedismissalasdonewithabuseofdiscretion,leastofallgrave.WeconcurwiththeeruditeexpositionoftheCAonthematter,towit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment apersonhasinhispossessionafalsifieddocumentandhasmadeuseofit,probablecause or prima facie is already established and that no amount of satisfactoryexplanationwillpreventthefilingofthecaseincourtbytheinvestigatingofficer,foranysuchgoodexplanationordefensecanonlybethreshedoutinthetrialonthemerit.We are not to be persuaded. To givemeaning to such argumentation willsurelydefeattheverypurposeforwhichpreliminaryinvestigationisrequiredinthisjurisdiction.

Apreliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved againsthasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is aninquirytodeterminewhether(a)acrimehasbeencommitted,and(b)whetherthereis probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs.SecretaryofJustice,480SCRA71[2006]).Itisameansofdiscoveringthepersonor persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred HomeSpecialties,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,478SCRA387,410[2005]).Prescindingly,under Section 3 of Rule 112 of theRules of Criminal Procedure, the respondentmustbeinformedoftheaccusationagainsthimandshallhavetherighttoexaminethe evidence against him and submit his counteraffidavit to disprove criminalliability.Byfar,respondentinacriminalpreliminaryinvestigationislegallyentitledtoexplainhissideoftheaccusation.



Wearenotunawareoftheestablishedpresumptionandrulethatwhenitisprovedthatapersonhasinhispossessionafalsifieddocumentandmakesuseofthesamethepresumptionorinferenceisthatsuchpersonistheforger(Serranovs.CourtofAppeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192SCRA533,546547[1990]).Yet,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatintheabsenceofsatisfactoryexplanation,onewhoisfoundinpossessionofaforgeddocumentandwhouseditispresumedtobetheforger(citingPeoplevs.Sendaydiego,81SCRA120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could renderineffectivethepresumptionwhich,afterall,ismerelyadisputableone.45

WedonotlosesightofthefactthatMETROBANK,acommercialbankdealinginrealproperty,hadthedutytoobserveduediligencetoascertaintheexistenceandconditionoftherealtyaswellasthevalidityandintegrityofthedocumentsbearingontherealty.46

Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experiencerepresentatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and ofinvestigatingwhowas its real owner.47 Yet, it is evident thatMETROBANK did notdiligentlyperforma thoroughcheckonTobiasand thecircumstancessurrounding therealtyhehadofferedas collateral.As such, it hadnoone toblamebut itself.Verily,banksareexpected toexercisegreatercareandprudence thanothers in theirdealingsbecause their business is impressed with public interest.48 Their failure to do soconstitutesnegligenceonitspart.49

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, andAFFIRMS thedecisionof theCourtofAppealspromulgatedonDecember29,2006.Thepetitionershallpaythecostsofsuit.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN

AssociateJustice



WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONA

ChiefJustice

Chairperson

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE

AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION



PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

RENATOC.CORONA

ChiefJustice

*ViceAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo,whotookpartintheproceedingsintheCourtofAppeals,perraffleofOctober19,2011.

1Rollo,pp.4051pennedbyAssociateJusticeConradoM.Vasquez,Jr.(laterPresidingJustice,butretired),withAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo(nowaMemberof theCourt)andAssociateJusticeRicardoR.Rosarioconcurring.

2Id.,pp.5457.

3Id.,p.58.

4Id.,p.79.

5Id.,p.6164.

6Id.,p.71.

7Id.,p.80.

8Id.,p.80.

9Id.,pp.6567.

10Id.,pp.7273.

11Id.,pp.7981.

12Id.,pp.6878.

13Id.,p.76.

14Id.,pp.8586.

15Id.,p.85.

16Id.,pp.8788.

17Id.,pp.8993.

18Id.,p.60.

19Id.,pp.5457.



20Id.,pp.106125.

21Id.,p.58.

22Id.,pp.4051.

23Id.,pp.4547.

24Id.,pp.4749.

25Id.,pp.5051.

26Id.,p.53.

27PublicUtilitiesDepartment,OlongapoCityv.Guingona,Jr.,G.R.No.130399,September20,2001,365SCRA467,474.

28Alcarazv.Gonzalez,G.R.No.164715,September20,2006,502SCRA518,529.

29Reyesv.PearlbankSecurities,Inc.,G.R.No.171435,July30,2008,560SCRA518,535InsularLifeAssuranceCompany,Limitedv.Serrano,G.R.No.163255,June22,2007,525SCRA400,410.

30Galariov.Officeof theOmbudsman(Mindanao),G.R.No.166797,July10,2007,527SCRA190,204,205FirstWomensCreditCorporationv.Perez,G.R.No.169026,June15,2006,490SCRA774,777778.

31G.R.No.174350,August13,2008,562SCRA184.

32MetropolitanBankandTrustCompanyv.Reynado,G.R.No.164538,August9,2010,627SCRA88.

33Id.,p.103also,Villanuevav.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.162187,November18,2005,475SCRA495,511.

34Osoriov.Desierto,G.R.No.156652,October13,2005,472SCRA559,573FiladamsPharma,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.132422,March30,2004,426SCRA460,470.

35Lastrillav.Granda,G.R.No.160257,January31,2006,481SCRA324,347.

36Ambitov.People,G.R.No.127327,February13,2009,579SCRA69,97Floresv.Layosa,G.R.No. 154714,August12,2004,436SCRA337,347.

37Reyes,TheRevisedPenalCode,BookII(2006),p.773.

38Waaconv.People,G.R.No.164575,December6,2006,510SCRA429,438.

39Lastrillav.Granda,G.R.No.160257,January31,2006,481SCRA324,342342Salongav.Pao,G.R.No.59524,February18,1985,134SCRA438,450.

40Waaconv.People,supra,note38.

41Alonzov.Concepcion,A.M.No.RTJ041879,January17,2005,448SCRA329,337.

42Sevillav.Cardenas,G.R.No.167684,July31,2006,497SCRA428,442443citingPeoplev.DeGuzman,G.R.No.106025,February9,1994,229SCRA795,798799.

43United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337, September 28, 2007 First Womens CreditCorporationv.Perez,G.R.No.169026,June15,2006,490SCRA774,777.

44Lastrilla v.Granda,G.R.No. 160257, January31, 2006, 481SCRA324, 342People v.Enfermo,G.R.Nos.14868285,November30,2005,476SCRA515,532.

45Rollo,pp.4445.

46Cruzv.Bancom,G.R.No.147788,March19,2002,379SCRA490,505.

47RuralBankofSiaton(NegrosOriental),Inc.v.Macajilos,G.R.No.152483,July14,2006,495SCRA127RuralBankofSta.Ignacia,Inc.v.Dimatulac,G.R.No.142015,April29,2003,401SCRA742.



48CaviteDevelopmentBankv.Sps.Lim,G.R.No.131679,February1,2000,324SCRA346,359RuralBankofSiaton(NegrosOriental),Inc.v.Macajilos,G.R.No.152483,July14,2006,495SCRA127,140.

49RuralBankofSta.Ignacia,Inc.v.Dimatulac,supra,note47,atp.752.

4 metrobank v tobias

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