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Alan Palmer

Independent scholar

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism

It is only shallow people who do notjudge by appearances. The true mystery

ofthe world is the isible! not the inisible." #scar $ilde

In Charles %ic&ens'Little Dorrit, the illain! (landois! arries one eening at a

French inn. As he wal&s in! the narrator remar&s! )there had been that

momentary

interruption of the tal& about the stoe! and that temporary inattention to and

distraction from one another! which is usually inseparable in such a company

from

the arrial of a stranger) *+,-,/0. 1ater in the same noel! Mr. Meagles admits

toArthur Clennam! )we do! in families! magnify our troubles and ma&e mountains

of our molehills in a way that is calculated to be rather trying to people who

loo&

on"to mere outsiders) *2-30. Mr. Meagles also e4plains! )there is one of those

odd

impressions in my house! which do mysteriously get into houses sometimes!

which

nobody seems to hae pic&ed up in a distinct form from anybody! and yet which

eerybody seems to hae got hold of loosely from somebody and let go again!

that

she 5Miss $ade6 lies! or was liing 5near Par& 1ane6) *2-20.

These three statements are e4amples of the wor&ings ofsocial minds in the

noel. They become isible through an externalist perspective on narratie

fiction.

Specifically! they describe intermental thought, which is joint! group! shared!

or collectie thought! as opposed to intramental! or priate! indiidual thought.

*Some theoretical bac&ground on these concepts is gien in a later section of

this

essay.0 The minds of the group of people in the inn share a sense of intrusion.And! as the narrator points out! this shared sense of discomfort at the arrial of a

stranger is common in such situations. Mr. Meagles ma&es a general point about

how families typically behae *ma&ing mountains out of molehills0 that is also

true of his family. Mr. Meagles! again! describes the intermental functioning of

his

family *a shared &nowledge of Miss $ade's whereabouts but with no &nowledge

of how this information was ac7uired0 and points out that this sort of thought is

typical of families. In all three cases! minds are wor&ing in the same way! and

the+8, Style: 9olume :;!

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Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism +8-

thought being described here is! to some e4tent! collectie. There is one

important

difference between the remar& about the French inn and the two statements

aboutthe Meagles family. The first is a description of a social mind by a

heterodiegetic *or

thirdperson0 narrator. The other! a claim by an indiidual character! Mr.

Meagles!

about the group mind of which he is a part.

The relationship between intra and intermental actiity! between social minds

and indiidual minds! between the internalist and the e4ternalist perspecties! is

a

comple4 and fascinating one. It is central to narratie fiction! and it is thesubject

of this essay. My purpose is to put statements such as those discussed aboe at

the

heart of narratie theory. Fictional social minds are not of marginal interest>

they

are central to our understanding of fictional story worlds. This is because real

social

minds are central to our understanding of! and ability to operate in! the actual

world.

My thesis is that social minds are possible because much of our thought is

visible,,

which is why #scar $ilde said that )it is only shallow people who do not judge

by

appearances) and that )the true mystery of the world is the isible! not the

inisible.)

It is a clich? of literary studies that! whereas noels can gie us direct access

to the minds of characters! by contrast! in reality! we can neer really &now what

other people are thin&ing. This is the sort ofthing that sounds true while it is

beingsaid within that conte4t! but! in other conte4ts! can sound li&e complete

nonsense.

To beliee it re7uires a considerable degree of cognitie dissonance in order to

contradict the weight of eidence of our eeryday e4perience. All of us! eery

day!

&now for a lot of the time what other people are thin&ing. This is especially true

of our loed ones! close friends! family! and wor& colleagues. It is also true of

our

encounters with total strangers. @ow could it be possible for two people to holda coherent conersation without at least some &nowledge of the other person's

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thought processes I am not saying that we always &now all of what other

people

are thin&ing. That would be as silly as the clich? that we can never really &now.

Sometimes we &now what other people are thin&ing without them haing to say

anything> at other times we do not &now what they are thin&ing een thoughthey

are trying to tell us. Sometimes we hae secret thoughts that no one else will

eer

&now about> at other times! other people! especially those close to us! will &now

better than we do what we are thin&ing.

A fierce debate too& place within the nineteenthcentury noel in particular

on the nature of social minds. It had two sides. #ne was epistemolBgicaD To

what

e4tent is it possible to hae &nowledge of the wor&ings of other minds Theother

side of the debate was ethicalD To what purposes should our &nowledge of other

minds be put The epistemological dispute was surprisingly e4plicit> narrators

and

characters fre7uently refer to it. The ethical side was also eer present> there are

+8/ Alan Palmer

many occasions on which sharp and painful moral dilemmas arise from the

control

that characters try to e4ercise oer other minds. In literary studies! it is usually

unwise to specify the precise point at which a historical phenomenon begins.

Eour

readers will then feel challenged to find earlier e4amples and you are left

loo&ing

rather underread.

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what we are all thin&ing of) *2,20. Hmma ignores the warning! ploughs on

with

her conceit! inadertently humiliates Miss (ates! and later incurs Mr.

Gnightley's

stinging rebu&e. She is made to feel painfully aware of the emotionalconse7uences

of the pursuit of &nowledge about other minds.

First! though! before going into more detail about social minds! I would li&e to

say a little about the conte4t within which this essay is written. This is the

cognitie

turn in the humanities! or! more specifically! what has come to be &nown as

cognitive

approaches to literature.

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my fieldD cognitive narr"tology, cognitive approaches to literature, and

cognitive

poetics. At one point! there seemed to be a danger that a researcher in one of

these

areas might not be aware of similar wor& being done by people in the others.@oweer! than&s to the inaluable efforts of scholars such as Moni&a Fludemi&!

%aid @erman! and 1isa Lunshine! this danger has been aerted. Many lines of

communication are now open. The barriers are now brea&ing down to the e4tent

that

the boundaries between the three areas are becoming rather blurred.

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the role of metaphor. @oweer! it differs from cognitie narratie and cognatie

approaches to literature in its use of specifically linguistic tools for the analysis

of te4ts. 1eading wor&s in this field include Catherine Hmmott'sarrative

=33 Alan Palmer

-omprehension, Hlena Semino'sMetaphor in Discourse, and Peter Stoc&well's-ognitive %oetics.

All three of these approaches hae made a number of important contributions to

our understanding of the reading process. In particular! their illuminating

research

findings hae great heuristic and pedagogical alue. Although I am not a teacher

myself! I hae noticed that this wor& is gradually filtering down into teaching

courses

at both the graduate and undergraduate leels. Cognitie approaches can

initiallysound intimidating to students! but it is perfectly possible to ma&e the subject

highly accessible to! and surprisingly enjoyable for! those who are new to it. #f

particular benefit is the potential ersatility of this new subject area. To tal& of a

cognitie approach to literature can be rather misleading if it gies the

impression

that it is simply one alternatie among a range of othersD historical and cultural!

Mar4ist! feminist! rhetorical and ethical criticism! and so on. I do not see it li&e

that.

In my iew! the cognitie approach is the basis o! all the others. It does not

stand

alongside them> it sits underneath them. It is the means by which critics gather

the

eidence that allows them to ma&e their arious judgments. It follows! then! that

the cognitie approach is not necessarily an end in itself and so its analyses will

naturally tend to drift into these other fields. Significantly! a recent collection of

essays edited by 1isa Lunshine! entitled Introduction to -ognitive -ultural

Studies,

applies cognitie insights to a range of historical! social! and cultural concerns.

As my interest is in the fictional minds of characters in noels! it ma&es senseto e4plore the arious cognitie sciences concerned with the study of real minds

such as the philosophy of mind! social! cognitie! and discursie psychology!

neuroscience! and psycholinguistics. My cognitie approach is a pragmatic!

nondogmatic!

and nonideological one. If these realmind disciplines can assist our

study of fictional minds! then that is fine> if they cannot! then there is no reason

to

use them. @oweer! it has been my e4perience that we understand fictional

mindsmuch better when we apply to them some of the wor& done on real minds by

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psychologists! philosophers! and cognitie scientists. In fact! I would go further

and

argue that! fiom my perspectie! all serious students of literature are

cognitiists!

whether they li&e it or not. $e all study the wor&ings of fictional minds andthin&

of noels in terms of the mental functioning of characters. So the diide is not

between cognitiists and noncognitiists> it is between those who explicitly see

themseles as cognitiists and ma&e use of realmind discourses to study

literary

te4ts! and those who do not. I can understand the concerns of what may be

termed

implicit cognitiists who are s&eptical about the alue of e4plicitly cognitie

approaches to literature. They may suspect! for e4ample! that these approacheserect a huge and unwieldy conceptual apparatus with disappointing results! that

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =3+

they are unconincing! that they simply tell us what we already &now! and that

they

tell us only a small part ofthe story because they diorce mental functioning

from .

its social and physical conte4t.

+ hope that this essay may help a little to allay these concerns by showing

that! with the minimum of theoretical scaffolding! original! illuminating! and

conincing results can be obtained. The cognitie conceptual apparatus in this

essay

is intended both to call attention to oerloo&ed phenomena in noels and to

offer

some new ways of tal&ing about them. I am interested! in particular! in the last

of

the concerns listed in the preious paragraph *that the social conte4t is left out

of

account0 because it is also felt by many psychologists! philosophers! and

scientistsin relation to the study of real minds. I want to stress emphatically that an

interest

in the mind does not necessarily entail a lac* o( interest in the social mind. My

own

e4perience has been the precise oppositeD Fictional mental functioning should

not

be diorced from the social and physical conte4t ofthe story world within which

it occurs. In the iew ofthe philosopher (rian Cantwell Smith! the classical *or

internalist0 iew ofthe mind sees it as indiidual! abstract! detached! andgeneral!

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while the new *or e4ternalist0 iew sees it as social! embodied! engaged! and

specific

*-,80. It is this new cognitie perspectie that underpins this essay. I hae found

it

disappointing that! although many literary theorists hae made good use of whatmay

be termed the )hard'N cognitie sciences! such as neuroscience! much less use

has

been made ofthe )soft) sciences! such as social psychology! discursie

psychology!

sociolinguistics! and anthropology. Some scholars hae studied the wor&ings of

fictional minds within their social and physical conte4t by ma&ing illuminating

use

of these soft sciences! for e4ample %aid @erman *)Storytelling)0 and theliterary

critic ohn 9. Gnapp! but there is still much more to do.

Fictional Minds

There has always been a good deal of interest within traditional narratology in

the presentation of consciousness in the noel. See especially #ransparent

Minds

by %orrit Cohn! and also the e4cellent studies by Mie&e (al! Seymour Chatman!

Moni&a Fluderni&! %aid 1odge! and Shlomith immonGenan. My first boo&.

ictional Minds *=33:0! was! in part! a criti7ue of this tradition. In it! I argued

that these writers proide only a partial and misleading picture of fictional

minds

because they tended to limit the scope of their analyses to the part of the mind

&nown as )inner speech.)I therefore proposed a much fuller! more holistic! and

more informatie iew ofthe subject. ictional Minds was based on the

following

fie basic argumentsD

=3= Alan Palmer

+. Classical methodologies such as the speech category approach*the

discourse analysis of thought presentation that employs such conceptsas free indirect discourse! stream of consciousness! interior monologue!

and so on0! story analysis*the study of characters as actants! functions!

et cetera0! the concept of focaliation or point of iew! and the study of

characteriationdo not add up to a complete and coherent study of all

aspects of the minds of characters in noels.

=. Traditional narratology neglected the whole minds of fictional characters

in action by giing undue emphasis to priate! passie! solitary! and highly

erbalied inner thought at the e4pense of all the other types of mental

functioning.2. In studying fictional minds! we should ma&e use of what I called the

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parallel discourses on real minds! such as neuroscience *Antonio %amasio0!

psycholinguistics *Steen Pin&er0! psychology *Hdwin @utchins and

ames $ertsch0! and the philosophy of mind *%aniel %ennett and ohn

Searle0! to study the whole of the social mind in actionin the noel. They

are parallel discourses because they contain a different &ind of picture ofconsciousness from the one that is characteristic of classical narratology

and so can proide e4planations that are fuller than those that are currently

aailable as to how readers are able to reassemble fictional minds from

narratie te4ts.

:. The constructions of the minds of fictional characters by narrators and

readers are central to our understanding of how noels wor&! because

readers enter storyworlds primarily by attempting to follow the wor&ings

of the fictional minds contained in them. Fictional narratie is! in essence!

the presentation of mental functioning.The irm plot is generally definedas a chain of causally connected eents in a story.' (ut what are these

causal connections in practice Jenerally! eents in the storyworld are

of little importance unless they become the experiencesof characters.

Hents can occur independently of characters! but they will! on the whole!

only hae a significance for the narratie because of their effect on those

characters' minds. %escriptions of noels by actual readers tend to focus

less on eents themseles than on characters'reactions to those eents! what

they were thin&ing and feeling! their beliefs and desires! and so on. These

descriptions will usually include actions but! typically! will also refer to

the mental networ& behind them"the intentions! purposes! moties! and

reasons for the actions. A plot summary is often of the formD character A

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =32

performed action ( because oOtheir belief C and their desire %. This is a

causal networ& because action ( was caused by the mental eents C and

%. $e follow the plot by following the wor&ings of fictional minds. These

beliefs! desires! and other thoughtprocesses to a great e4tent comprise the

plot. To put the point another way! a description of a plot is an e4ercise in

attribution.There is more on this in the later section on attribution theory.

To say this is not to conflate thought and action! or to priilege thought oeraction. It is simply to say that the concept of action necessarily re7uires the

presence of thought.

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points on the thoughtOaction spectrum! but my point is simply that it is

a spectrum. There is no unbridgeable dichotomy between eentsOactions

and thoughtsOfeelings.

;. $hen the traditional narratological approaches referred to in point one

aboe are brought together within a new theoretical perspectie! the studyof fictional minds can then be established as a clearly defined and discrete

subject area in its own right within the discipline of narratology.ictional

Minds was intended to gie an indication of what this new subject area

might loo& li&e.

eaders are able to follow the wor&ings of characters' minds by applying what I

call the continuing consciousness (rame: the ability to ta&e a reference to a

character

in the te4t and attach to it a presumed consciousness that e4ists continuously

within the storyworld between the arious! more or less intermittent! referencesto that character. To ma&e sense of a te4t! the reader has to collect together all of

the isolated references to a specific proper name and construct a consciousness

that continues in the spaces between all of the mentions of the character with

that

name. The reader strategy is to join up the dots. In particular! the reading

process

is creatie in constructing coherent and continuous fictional consciousnesses

from

what is often a bare minimum of information. $e fre7uently finish noels with

a strong sense of the indiidual personality of a particular character. If! howeer.

=3: Alan Palmer

we were to ta&e the trouble to count up the specific references to that character!

we might be surprised at how little there is in the te4t from which we derie our

iid impressions. $hen I reread Jeorge Hliot's Middlemarch a while ago! I

was

surprised to find that the famous scene in which 1ydgate finds himself

une4pectedly

engaged to osamond occupies less than one page *=3/0 in the

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continuing consciousness frame are re7uired to supply the defaults that fill the

gaps in the storyworld and proide the presuppositions that enable the reader to

construct continually conscious minds from the te4t. #ne &ey default setting is

the

assumption that a consciousness will continue throughout the te4t untilinterrupted!

as in life! by death or absence. Another is that characters will thin& and act in

certain

fundamental respects li&e real people. A number of narratie theorists hae

referred

to aspects ofthe continuing consciousness frame from within their own

theoretical

framewor&s. Moni&a Fludemi&'s #owards a $atural1arratology cuts the

notiono( experientiality at the center of her perspectie on narratie. Mie&e (al

e4plains

the difference between the two editions of her boo&arratology in terms of a

new and growing emphasis on subjectiityD)This attention paid to subjectiity

is!

indeed! the basic tenet ofthe theory presented in this boo&) *++0.

Analyses of concepts such as identity, sel(, andsub2ectivity sometimes

focus in restrictie and unhelpful ways on indiiduals diorced from their social

conte4t. I use the term situated identity, by contrast! to coney a balance

between

the perceptions of indiiduals regarding themseles and the perceptions of

others

regarding those indiiduals. If an aspect of our identity is under consideration!

how

is it to be determined $hich is more reliableD our own firstperson attribution

of

arious 7ualities to ourseles! or the thirdperson attributions of others $here

is

our identity situated If you want to find out about an aspect of someone's mindand

ma&e an attribution to them of a particular disposition! say selfishness! who do

you

as& Certainly not just them because you &now that you cannot be sure that you

will

get a complete answer. Selfish people may not admit to being selfish. For

reasons

of this sort! we are all reluctant to ta&e somebody's word for the wor&ings of

their

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own mind! and this seems to me to be a tacit admission that there is a strong

sense

in which our mind is distributed among those other people who hae an image

of

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =3;us in their minds. @ow else can we say that someone is selfish when there is no

representation of selfishness in their mind This image is contained in the minds

of others but we are attributing it to this particular mind. Surely! then! our

identity

is situated among the minds of others. Furthermore! we behae in different ways

with different people. Someone seeing you in an unfamiliar conte4t might easily

sayD )Eou'e become a different person) As $alt $hitman said! we )contain

multitudes.) And the situating of identity between indiiduals and others

re7uiresendless negotiation. As a wife says to her husband in oneew 3or*er cartoon as

they go into a dinner partyD )emember"just don1tbe yourself)

I hae been as&ed whether fictional minds form part of the story leel *the

content plane! the narrated! the )what!) the(abula4 or the discourse leel *the

e4pression plane! the narrating! the )how!) the s2u5het4. The answer inoles

two

separate but related issuesD #ne is the storyleel issue of the nature of the

fictional

minds constructed by the te4ts! the what that is the content of those minds> the

other

is the discourseleel issue of the techni7ues used to represent consciousness in

narratie! how minds are presented in the discourse. It 7uic&ly becomes

apparent!

howeer! that it is difficult in practice to maintain a distinction between the two.

I focus primarily on the first issue! the what,but it is impossible to tal& about

the

fOjai without detailed consideration of the how. To describe the contents of

fictional

minds is to focus on how those minds are presented in the te4t. Also! thetechni7ues

that are used for fictional mind presentations will determine! to a certain e4tent!

what thoughts are described. The wor&ings of minds in nineteenthcentury

noels!

for e4ample! are shaped! colored! and limited by the heterodiegetic narration in

which many of them are presented.

Another 7uestion that has been as&ed is this oneD Am I saying that the process

of following characters' fictional mental functioning is both a necessary and a

sufficient condition for narratie comprehension This is not an easy 7uestionto answer in those terms. My preferred formulation would be to say that it is the

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fundamental and principal way by which we understand narratie. In the terms

of

the 7uestion! my feeling is that it is too wea& to say that it is necessary and

certainly

too strong to say that it is sufficient because there are seeral other features thatare

also necessary for narratie comprehension. These include a good

understanding

of the physical ma&eup of a storyworld and the eents that occur in it and a

sensitie appreciation of the thematic component of narratie. #n the other

hand!

I do not wish to compromise on the claim that the ability to follow fictional

mental

functioning is always necessary for narratie comprehension. I would concedetoo

much by saying! for e4ample! that it is only typically necessary. As I said earlier!

an understanding of characters' thought processes is as necessary for #om /ones

=3, Alan Palmer

as it is for 0lysses. I cannot find any way of retreating from the uniersality of

my

claim. H7ually! I do not see any way in which this claim is a refusal to

ac&nowledge

the astonishing and endless ariety of narratie. To say so would be li&e

suggesting

that I am trying to fiatten out fictional ariation by pointing out that 0lysses and

%an (rown's #he Da 6inci -ode use e4actly the same =, letters ofthe alphabet

. Am I tal&ing about how readers in fact read noels! or am I attempting to

adance a radically new way of reading The answer is the former + aim to

show

how readers ma&e sense of fiction! to e4plain the processes that we all

engage in! to

ma&e e4plicit what we all intuitiely do in practice. In addition!though! I hope to

offer a radically new way o( studying noels. These two aims are not ascontradictory

as may at first appear. The reason why they are consistent with each other is

that!

in my iew! narratie theory has in this respect ta&en insufficient account of the

practice of actual readers.

#ne 7uestion that I as& myself occasionally! and I am surprised that no one else

has! is this oneD Can my approach be described as behaviorist$7 Theunsurprising and

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rather dull answer isD It depends on what you mean. If you mean what may be

called

strong behaviorism"the discredited doctrine of early behaiorist psychologists

such as (. F. S&inner who appeared to argue that there are no mental processes!

there is no consciousness! there are only dispositions to behae in certain ways"

the answer isD #f course not. If! howeer! you are referring to what may be

termed

wea* behaviorism"the argument that a surprisingly large number of statements

about minds are! in fact! statements about dispositions and behaior"the

answer

isD Ees. *Incidentally! this discussion is an illustration of a widespread problem

with

)isms) such as behaiorism and poststructuralism. They often ta&e two formsD astrong form that is heaily counterintuitie and unsustainable! and a wea& form

that is simply a restatement ofthe obious. Confusion reigns when proponents

and

opponents argue oer different forms without realiing it. This fre7uently

happens

because proponents start with the strong form and then retreat to the wea& one

under

pressure! but without telling their opponents that they hae done so.0

The ne4t 7uestion *)Am I saying that fictional minds are the same as real

minds)0is so important that I am going to put my answer to it in italicsD O am

not

saying that (ictional minds are the same as real minds. I am saying that (ictional

minds are similar to real minds in some ways and di((erent (rom them in other

ways.

&e will not understand (ictional minds unless we understand both o( these

aspects: .

both their similarities to, and their di((erences (rom, real minds.

My first boo& focused on the similarities for two reasonsD#ne was that they had

been neglected by traditional narratie theory> the other was that I amparticularly

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =3-

interested in them. This emphasis may hae gien the unfortunate impression

that

I was arguing that fictional minds are the same as real minds. I emphatically do

not

beliee this. Indeed! + beliee that to say so ma&es no sense. It seems obious to

me

that fictional minds are similar to real minds in some ways but profoundlydifferent

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from them in other ways. H7ually! though! to go to the other e4treme and argue

that

fictional minds are semiotic constructs and arc therefore utterly and

unbridgeably

different from real minds does not wor&either. Fictional minds are certainlysemiotic

constructs! but many of the sem iotic operations that are necessary to

recoer meaning

from them inole their similarity to real minds. Some of theseoperations are the

subject ofthis essay. It is! howeer! true to say that! when e4amining chai

lenging and

e4perimental postmodern noels *as well as other )unnatural narraties!) as

(rianichardson's 0nnatural 6oices: Extreme arration in Modern and

-omtemporary

iction, an Alber's )Impossible Storyworlds"And what to do with

them!) and

others term them0! the emphasis will change. The stress will probably

then be more

on the differences. I welcome the challenge proided by te4ts thatdefamiliarie!7uestion! modify! complicate! distort! subert! contradict! or een dispense with

our

default assumptions about the similarities between fictional minds and real

minds.

$e find out more about the semiotics of fictional minds by ta&ing up! rather

than

aoiding! this challenge. These narraties derie their power to shoc& precisely

from their attempts to withhold what we ta&e for granted in the presentation of

consciousness in fiction. (ut the norms hae to e4ist! and they hae to apply tothe

majority of noels! and they hae to be well studied and well understood for the

transgressions to hae any impact.

Attribution Theory

A &ey tool for analying the process of recoering and reassembling fictional

storyworlds is the application of attribution theory: the study of how we ascribe

states of mind to others and also to ourseles *see @eider! Gelley! and $ilson0.

In relation to real minds! when we are coming to a iew on why someone acted

as they did in a particular situation! we as& ourseles such 7uestions asD $ouldother people hae acted in the same way in this situation %id this indiidual act

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in the way that they would normally do in similar situations $ould this person

hae acted in the same way if some of the circumstances had been different

Attribution theory can be used to formulate tentatie answers to 7uestions such

as

theseD @ow do readers attribute states of mind such as emotions! dispositions!and

reasons for action to characters $hat! in precise terms! do readers do with the

e4plicit eidence that is made aailable to them in te4ts! together with any

implicit

or inferential eidence that they might hae on characters' patterns of behaior

=3/ Alan Palmer

@ow do heterodiegetic narrators attribute states of mind to their characters (y

what means do homodiegetic *or firstperson0 narrators attribute states of mind

tothemseles and also to other characters @ow do characters attribute mental

states

to themseles and to other characters $ith regard to the issue of

characteriation!

how does an attribution of a mental state help to build up in the reader a sense

of

the whole personality of that character And! finally! a 7uestion which forms the

subject matter of this essayD @ow do readers! narrators! and indiidual

charactersattribute mental functioning to groupsAttribution theory rests on the concept o! theory o( mind, the term used by

philosophers and psychologists to describe our awareness of the e4istence of

other

minds! our &nowledge of how to interpret our own and other people's thought

processes! our ability to ma&e sense of other people's actions by understanding

the reasons for those actions. *Philosophers and psychologists also use the terms

(ol* psychology and intersub2ectivity to refer to this ability.0 $e are able to

ma&eattributions of states of mind to others because we hae a theory of mind.

eaders

of noels hae to use their theory of mind in order to try to follow the wor&ings

of

characters' minds by attributing states of minds to them. In particular! readers

hae

to follow the attempts that characters ma&e to read other characters' minds.

Anyone

who has a condition such as autism or Asperger's Syndrome! and who therefore

suffers from what is called mind blindness, will find it difficult to understand a

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noel.

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ability to understand others *theorytheory and simulation theory0 are! he thin&s!

misconceied. @utto argues that our capacity to understand the actions of others

in

terms of their reasons has a sociocultural basis. (ecause many ofthe social roles

and rules goerning our routine encounters are wellestablished in standardnarratie

patterns of human behaior! fol& psychology! theory of mind! and mind reading

are

usually unnecessary. $e hae many other! more basic and embodied means than

mentalistic predictions or e4planations. $e generally do not need to speculate

on

the innermost thoughts of others because their behaior is immediately

e4plicable

by means ofthe e4pectations and scripts that are proided by cultural practices.@utto is unusual in drawing attention to the importance of what people say as

a source of information about what they thin&. @e stresses that thesesecond8

person

e4planations are at least as common as the thirdperson &ind and may be more

reliable.

In Anthony Trollope's #he &arden, Mr. @arding 7uotes an old proerbD )Hery

one

&nows where his own shoe pinches) *+-;0. This is an internalist motto because

it

is a iid way of e4pressing the apparent truth that we cannot &now what

another

person is e4periencing. (ut suppose that you are out wal&ing with someone and

you

notice that they are hobbling. They stop! ta&e their shoe off and inspect it! rub

their

foot in a particular place! put a plaster on it! and so on. That is fairly close to

&nowing

where their shoe is pinching! is it not In addition! as @utto says! information

canbe obtained directly from the other person. Eour companion might simply tell

you

where their shoe is pinching. This perspectie on mental functioning raises

issues

of authority and reliability that go to the heart of our e4perience of reading

noels.

Eou may say that people lie! just as characters do. $ell! they do! sometimes. #r

that they are unreliable! just as narrators can be. $ell! they are! sometimes. (ut

how li&ely is that! in this case #biously! you can ma&e up scenarios based on

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pretence! perhaps caused by a reluctance to wal& any farther! but would you not

be

=+3 Alan Palmer

li&ely to spot subterfuges ofthat sort People often tell the truth about what they

are thin&ing! just as characters do! and it is often perfectly possible to &nowwhen

they are not doing so. $e should not apply standards to second and third

person

&nowledge about mental states that are unreasonably and inconsistently higher

than

the standards that we re7uire for other areas of &nowledge.

Although I find @utto's approach completely conincing! I thin& that we

should continue to use the term theory o( mind for three reasons.First! it is here

to stay! especially now in literary studies! and to aoid it would causeunnecessary

confusion.

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theory of mind to try to interpret the opa7ue intentions and moties of another.

Characteriation

It seems to me that the characteriation process has been interpreted up until

now in a rather constrained and limiting way. In particular! it has been generally

assumed that the character frames that are used by readers to construct fictionalbeings consist only of the cultural and literary stereotypes that relate to

individual

types such as the ra&e! the fallen woman! and the braggart. It is possible to

e4tend

in some new and possibly une4pected directions our understanding of character

theory by e4amining some of the different sorts of cognitie frames that are also

used by the reader in the construction of character. This can be done by ma&ing

use

of the insights relating to thesocial nature of cognition that hae emerged fromthe

soft cognitie sciences of social and discursie psychology! philosophy of mind!

and theoretical anthropology.

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =++

The aim of deepening and widening characteriation theory in order to

proide a richer and fuller account of how readers actually construct characters

can be achieed by recogniing that the minds belonging to characters in noels

do not function in a acuum. As with real minds! fictional minds are only

partially

understood if only an internalist perspectie is applied to them. Characteriation

theory will always be incomplete until it also ta&es account ofthe e4ternalist

aspects

ofthe character construction process. Fictional minds! li&e real minds! form part

of e4tended cognitie networ&s. $e will neer understand how indiidual

minds

wor& if we cut them off from the larger! collectie units to which they

belong. To

adapt the title of Hdwin @utchins' important boo& -ognition in the &ild 9;;

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dichotomy! but the distinction is! in general! a alid oneD

"An internalist perspectie on the mind stresses those aspects that are inner!

introspectie!

priate! solitary! indiidual! psychological! mysterious! and detached.

" An e4ternalist perspectie on the mind stresses those aspects that are outer!actie!

public! social! behaioral! eident! embodied! and engaged.

I use the termsocial mind to describe those aspects ofthe whole mind that are

reealed through the e4ternalist perspectie.

It seems to me that the traditional approach within literary theory towards

the representation of fictional character is an internalist one that stresses those

aspects that are inner! passie! introspectie! and indiidual. This undue

emphasis

on priate! solitary! and highly erbalied thought at the e4pense of all the othertypes of mental functioning has resulted in a preoccupation with such concepts

as free indirect discourse! stream of consciousness! and interior monologue. As

a

result! thesocial nature of fictional thought has been neglected. (ut! as Antonio

%amasio suggests! )the study of human consciousness re7uires both internal and

e4ternal iews) */=0 and so an e4ternalist perspectie is re7uired as well! one

that

stresses the public! social! concrete! and located aspects of mental life in the

noel.

=+= Alan Palmer

As the following table shows! a number of the concepts that are used to analye

the wor&ings of fictional minds tend to fit easily into one or other of these

perspecties.

Internalist perspective Externalist perspective

priate minds social minds

intramental thought intermental thought

personal identity situated identity

firstperson attribution thirdperson attribution

subjectiity of self subjectiity of othersfocal iation aspectual ity

introspection theory of mind

stream of consciousness continuing consciousness

interior monologue (a&htinian dialogicality

Some of these pairs oppose each other precisely> other pairings are much looser.

The

types of relationships within the pairings include opposition! complementarity!

and

intersection *as! for e4ample! when an interior monologue may show eidenceof

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(a&htinian dialogicality0. The term aspectuality refers to the fact that

storyworlds

are always e4perienced under some aspects and not others by the

characters who

inhabit them.As ohn Searle e4plains! )$heneer we perceie anything orthin&

about anything! we always do it under some aspects and not others)

9+ediscovering

+;,;-0. People e4perience the same eents in different ways. $ithin the

internalistO

e4ternalist framewor&! I see focaliation and aspectuality as complementing

each

other. Focaliation occurs when the reader is presented with the aspect of the

storyworld that is being e4perienced by the focalier at that moment. In thisconte4t!

the concept of aspectuality seres as a reminder that! meanwhile! the storyworld

is also being e4perienced differently! under other aspects! by all of the

characters

who are not currently being focalied in the te4t. Any of those other characters

could hae been focalied if the author had chosen to do so. The idea of

continuing

consciousnesses lin&s nicely with the concepts of aspectuality and focaliation.

#ther characters' consciousnesses are continuing while! at any single point inthe

narratie! only one consciousness is being focalied.

The internalistOe4ternalist framewor& is also helpful in e4panding our awareness

of the implications of the concept of subjectiity. As the list suggests! the term

can

be used in both a firstperson way *subjectiity of self0 and a thirdperson way

*subjectiity of others0. The termsituated identity locates selfhood and identity

between the two. Aspectuality acts as a reminder here! too! this time of the

e4istenceof the subjectiity of others! as aailable to us through the use of our theory of

mind. The concept of aspectuality is a way of bringing to centre stage

preiously

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =+2

marginalied characters whose oices may not often be heard. ohn 9. Gnapp

has

applied the techni7ues of family systems therapy to %. @. 1awrence's Sons and

Lovers in order to reinterpret the emotional landscape ofthat storyworld from

the

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point of iew of Paul's father. This is an unusual perspectie because the

focaliation

in the noel *through Paul! who bas a difficult relationship with his father and

tends

to side with his mother0 does not encourage it.An important part of the social mind is our capacity for intermental thought.

As I said earlier! such thin&ing is joint! group! shared! or collectie! as opposed

to

intramental! or indiidual or priate thought. It is also &nown as socially

distributed,

situated, or extended cognition, and also as intersub2ectivity. Intermental

thought is

a crucially important component of fictional narratie because! just as in real

life!where much of our thin&ing is done in groups! much of the mental functioning

that

occurs in noels is done by large organiations! small groups! wor& colleagues!

friends! families! couples! and other intermental units.

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this essay.

A good deal of tbe significance of the thought that occurs in noels is lost if

only the internalist perspectie is employed. (oth perspecties are re7uired!

because

a major preoccupation of noels is precisely this balance between public andpriate

thought! intermental and intramental functioning! and social and indiidual

minds.

$ithin this balance! I hae emphasied social minds because of their past

neglect.

+ aim to show that it is not possible to understand noels without an awareness

=+: Alan Palmer

of these minds as they operate within their storyworlds. They are one ofthe chief

means by which plots are adanced. So! gien the importance of this subject tothe study of the noel! it seems to me that it is necessary to find room for it at

the

center of narratie theory.

$ithin the realmind disciplines of psychology and philosophy there is a good

deal of interest in the mind beyond the s*in*as opposed to the mind inside the

s*ull4:

the realiation that mental functioning cannot be understood merely by

analying

what goes on within the s&ull but can only be fully comprehended once it has

been

seen in its social and physical conte4t. Alison Case and @arry Shaw put the

point

nicely when they speculate about $alter Scott's wish to )reeal human nature!

not

from the s&in in! but from the s&in out) *2-0. Social psychologists routinely use

the

terms mind and mental action not only about indiiduals! but also about groups

of

people wor&ing as intermental units. So! it is appropriate to say of these groupsthat they thin& or that they remember. ames $ertsch e4plains that )the notion

of mental function can properly be applied to social as well as indiidual forms

of actiity) *=-0. As he puts it! a dyad ?that is! two people wor&ing as a

cognitie

system0 can carry out such functions as problem soling on an intermental

plane.

It is significant that cognitie scientists are now beginning to share the interest

of

social psychologists in the mind beyond the s&in.'Eou may be as&ing what is achieed by tal&ing in this way! instead of simply

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referring to indiiduals pooling their resources and wor&ing in cooperation

together.

The adocates of the concept of distributed cognition! such as the theoretical

anthropologists Jregory (ateson and Clifford Jeert! the philosophers Andy

Clar&and%aid Chalmers and %aniel %ennett! and the psychologists Hdwin @utchins

and

ames $ertsch! all stress that the purpose ofthe concept is increased e4planatory

power. They argue that the way to delineate a cognitie system is to draw the

limiting line so that you do not cut out anything which leaes things

ine4plicable

*(ateson :,;0. To illustrate! $ertsch tells the story of how his daughter lost her

shoes and he helped her to remember where she had left them. $ertsch as&sD

$hois doing the remembering here @e is not! because he had no prior &nowledge

of

where they were! and she is not! because she had forgotten where they were and

was only able to remember by means of her father's promptings. It was therefore

the intermental unit formed by the two of them that remembered *Sperber and

@irschfeld c44i0. If you draw the line narrowly around single persons and

maintain

that cognition can only be indiidual! then things remain ine4plicable.

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together ma&es green.) Something similar happened when the poet ohn

Ashbery

wrote a noel with ames Schuyler in the +8;3s! each contributing a line or two

at

a time. In the diary section of the Times 1iterary Supplement *;Q %ecember=33/0!

the diarist wondered which of the two wrote the line )$hy don't you admit that

you enjoy my unhappiness) The following response from Ashbery was

published

on +8)' %ecemberD )In regard to the line in 7uestion! I can't remember. Schuyler

and I were often unable to remember who had written what! as our lines seemed

to emerge from an inisible third person.) There are musical e4amples! too.

Geith

owe! a member of the free improisation group AMM! once told me that!while

the group was playing! he would sometimes not &now whether it was he or

another

member of the group who was producing the sounds that he could hear.

@oweer! in considering the wideranging nature of intermental functioning

*problemsoling! decisionma&ing! coming to ethical judgments! and so on0! it

should be borne in mind that analyses of this sort of thought should inole no

preconceptions about its 7uality. Intermental thought is as beautiful and ugly!

destructie and creatie! e4ceptional and commonplace as intramental thought.

The communal creatiity described in the preious paragraph should be

balanced

against! for e4ample! the scapegoating tendencies of many groups! and also

against

Pentagon )groupthin&.)

An emphasis on social minds will ineitably 7uestion these twin assumptionsD

first! that the wor&ings of our own minds are neer accessible to others> and!

second!

that the wor&ings of our own minds are always and unproblematically

accessibleto ourseles. This essay will! in the main! 7uestion the first assumption and will

ma&e much less reference to the e7ually 7uestionable second. @oweer! I must

stress that I am certainly not saying that fictional minds arc always easily

readable.

Sometimes! they are> sometimes! they are not. In nineteenthcentury noels!

they

=+, Alan Palmer

fre7uently are. In other noels! especially those of the twentieth and twentyfirst

centuries! howeer! different leels of readability and unreadability will apply.)In an illuminating article entitled )%iagramming

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uses diagrams as a semiotic tool for the understanding of narratie in relation to

three

aspects of plot"time! space! and mind. #n the 7uestion of mind! she refers to

the

subject matter of narratie as the )eolution of a networ& of interpersonalrelations)

*=80 and conincingly shows how diagrammatic representations of these

networ&s

can add a good deal to our understanding ofthe narratie process. She illustrates

this approach with two highly technical analyses! one of a minimal! two

sentence

narratie and the other ofthe fable )The Fo4 and the Crow) *which was also

used

in yan's %ossible &orlds4. It seems to me that a modified and necessarilygreatly

simplified ariant of this sort of approach could be used to analye the wor&ings

of social minds in whole noels. For e4ample! the comple4 interrelations

between

different intermental units can be thought of as resembling the patterns made by

9enn diagrams! in which oerlapping circles are used to e4press the

relationships

between classes of objects. Such a diagram would show that the memberships

of

some groups are completely included within larger ones! some might hae no

oerlap

of membership with any others! others would hae partial membership oerlaps!

and

so on. $ith at least some noels! it would be possible! though difficult! to

constiiict

9enn diagrams that could iidly illustrate this comple4ity in isual terms.

1ittle narratological wor& has been done on social minds in the noel.

H4ceptions include studies of aspects of distributed cognition by ohn

9. Gnappand also by the postclassical narratie theorists %aid @erman and

Kri Margolin.The e4ploration of )we) narratives *that is! narraties written predominantly in

the firstperson plural0 that was initiated by Margolin and continued by (rian

ichardson 90nnatural 6oices4 has produced rewarding results *see! for

e4ample!

Marcus0. A welcome and related deelopment has been the important wor& done

by the literary critic Susan Sniader 1anser inictions o( 'uthority, in which she

focuses on the concept of communal voice. @er use of the term voice shows that

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she is concerned with the relationship between )we) narration and )I) narration

in

which one spea&er represents others. That is to say! she e4plores the telling! the

mode

of narration! the discursie practices ofthe noels that she discusses. 1anserwrites

persuasiely about some ofthe important issues raised by the notion of

communal

thought such as the problematic erasure of differences between indiiduals and

the

need to ma&e speculatie and potentially mista&en assumptions about the

thoughts

of others. I want to ta&e a more inclusie approach! howeer! and set these

issuesas well as some ofthe more positie ones arising from intermentality into a

wider

conte4t. Most ofthe nineteenthcentury noels that feature plentiful eidence of

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =+-

shared thought hae heterodiegetic narrators and are not! therefore! e4amples of

a

communal voice. The studies mentioned aboe are pioneering! but they hae

focused

in the main only on the relatiely small number of narraties written in the we

fonn>

my point is that little attention has been gien to the much larger group of what!

in

response! I would call they narratives: that is! narraties that feature social

minds.

Eou may be feeling some doubt about this claim regarding the neglect of

intermental thought. Surely we hae always &nown about the importance of

groups

right from the beginning of $estern literature. $hat about the role of the chortis

inJree& tragedy $ell! yes! undoubtedly! but my claim is that this &nowledge has

not

been reflected in the theory on mental functioning in narratie. #biously! we

all

&now about the proerbial voxpopuli, both in literature *especially in drama0

and

also in our daily lies! but the purpose of the present essay is to e4amine the

socially

situated or intermental cognition lying at its basis and the arious ways in which

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it is represented in narratie. $hat about Mena&hem Perry's masterly analysis

of

$illiam Faul&ner's short story )A ose for Hmily!) in which the townspeople as

a

group play such an important role Perry's article is a groundbrea&ingcontribution

to our &nowledge of the role of cognitie frames in the reading process! but I do

not thin& that it was part of his intention e4plicitly to recognie the status of the

town as an intertnental unit. That is the purpose ofthis essay.

A Typology

#biously the e4tent! duration! and success of intermental actiity will ary

greatly

from occasion to occasion. (ecause this is such a wide! relatiely uncharted

areain the conte4t of literary studies! the following! rather basic typology may be of

some alue.

+.Intermental encounters. At the minimal leel! this consists of the group

thought that is necessary for conersations between indiiduals to ta&e

place. It is not possible to hae a coherent dialogue without at least some

intermental communication. A minimal leel of mind reading and theory of

mind is re7uired for characters to understand each other and thereby ma&e

eeryday life possible. It is made easier or more difficult by a ariety of

factors such as solipsistic ersus emotionally intelligent indiiduals! easily

readable ersus impenetrable minds! familiar ersus unfamiliar conte4ts!

similar ersus different sorts of social bac&ground! and so on. )A heightened

awareness of the mental functioning of another! or what 1isa Lunshine

refers to as moments of embodied transparency *=33/0! can occur within

random encounters between people who do not &now each other particularly

well or een between complete strangers.) I am sure that most readers

=+/ Alan Palmer

of this essay will hae had the e4perience of meeting somebody for the

first time and instantly feeling that you are both on the same waelength.

A focus on the wor&ings of longterm! stable intermental units! such ascouples and families as itemied below! can gie a misleading impression

if it suggests that intermental thought can only occur within such units.

As we &now from our reallife e4perience! mind reading can occur in a

ariety of situations. Sometimes! it is what might be called reciprocal:

there is a conscious and fully intended sharing of thought and so people

will &now that others &now what they are thin&ing. At other times! it is

inadvertent: someone may reeal their thoughts without meaning to. In

these cases! that person may not &now that their mind has been read by

another person! or they may notice that it has been! for e4ample! by theother's facial e4pression.

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In addition to our arious encounters with countless strangers and

ac7uaintances oer the course of our lies! we all belong to intermental

units. I would define these as stable! fairly longlasting groups that regularly

employ intermental thin&ing. They ary greatly in sie and I will adopt

the rather simplistic approach of referring to them as small! medium! andlarge units. #biously! many other! rather more sophisticated typologies are

possible. ohn 9. Gnapp *personal communication0 has suggested one that

would measure group membership along a scale of interpersonal intensity.

For e4ample! someone may feel an intense inolement in the unit formed

by their wor& colleagues but may hae a much more distant relationship

with their own family. 1aurence M. Porter *personal communication0 has

proposed such categories as tas&oriented situations! groupings that arise

out of personal tastes and preferences! and potential affinities created by

past e4periences that are actiated by chance meetings.=. Small intermental units. Characters tend to form intermental pairs and small

groups of arious sorts such as marriages! close friendships! and nuclear

families. It is li&ely that! oer time! the people in these units will get to

&now 7uite well what the others are thin&ing. @oweer! these small groups

will obiously ary greatly in the 7uality of their intermental thought and

readers' e4pectations may not be met. Many fictional marriages hae much

less intermental thought than one might thin& *depending on the leel of

one's e4pectations in this matter! of course0. For an e4cellent analysis of

the small intermental unit of a marriage! see Hlena Semino's )(lending

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism =+8

and Characters' Mental Functioning in 9irginia $oolf's '1appin and

1apinoa.)'

2.Medium8si5ed intermental units. The intermentality that occurs between

the indiiduals in mediumsied units! such as wor& colleagues! networ&s

of friendships! and neighborhoods! is rather different from the one that

arises in random encounters and small units. @ere! the emphasis is less

on indiiduals &nowing what another person is thin&ing! and more on

people thin&ing the same way *whether or not they &now that others are

also thin&ing that way0. H4amples include some ofthe subgroups oftheMiddlemarch mind! the Circumlocution #ffice inLittle Dorrit, and the

party to which Anne Hlliot belongs in%ersuasion.

:.Large intermental units. Indiidualsarealsoli&ely tobelongto largergroups

that will also hae a tendency to thin& together on certain issues and so

produce a collectie opinion or consensus iew on a particular topic. To

pursue this point in greater depth would be to ta&e us into concepts such

as ideology that are well beyond the scope of this essay. The dynamics

inoled in large groups are similar to those that goern mediumsied

units. H4amples include the town o( Middlemarch *see the ne4t section0and the role of (ath society in%ersuasion.

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by these means! the wor& may eentually! oer time! become progressiely less

industrial heayduty in nature and rather more craftsmanli&e.

As with all other aspects of the reading process! we bring our realworld

cognitie

frames to bear when we encounter fictional intermental units. These frames willentail the default assumption that our theory of mind wor&s better with spouses!

close friends! and immediate family than it does with total strangers. $e assume

that the attributional success rate will be higher than aerage in such

relationships.

$ithin the e4ternalist perspectie! it is not surprising that we often &now what

other

people are thin&ing. It is not a 7uestion of occasional sudden flashes of insight!

but of a steady pattern of shared thought processes resulting in fairly accurate

prediction rates. This pattern is! of course! regularly disrupted by intermentalbrea&downs! sometimes serious! and my intention is certainly not to minimie

the

importance of these brea&downs. It is a balance. Sometimes! the default slots

are

filled> sometimes! when our assumptions are wrong! they are not. $hen there

arc

fre7uent misunderstandings ora fundamental lac& of communication! the reader

has

to reconsider the nature of the relationship and amend the frame. In e4treme

cases!

such as Anne Hlliot's relationship with her father and older sister in%ersuasion,

and Clennam's with his mother inLittle Dorrit, major reconstruction! such as

the

use of a new! dysfunctionalfamily frame! is 7uic&ly re7uired.

I hae found that some literary scholars tend to react with initial s&epticism

and een hostility to the idea of intermental thought. @oweer! it is my

e4perience

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism ==+

that this hostility tends to wear off with time! to be replaced by curiosity andeen

enthusiasm. #thers are interested from the beginning in the concept of

intermental

thought,but resist the concept of an intermental mind. It is a step too far. (ut

there is

really little difference between what I hae in mind for the concept of an

intermental

mind and what these s&eptics are prepared to accept. Intermental minds consist

simply of indiidual minds pooling their resources and producing differentresults.

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@ae a loo& again at the definition of an intermental mind that I gae aboe and

as& yourself whether you disagree that couples can get to &now each so well

that

they are fre7uently )of one mind) and can sole problems together ery

efficiently.I doubt that you do. So what we are really tal&ing about is whether or not the

use

of the term mind is appropriate for this mutual cooperation.

$hile considering this 7uestion! it is worth bearing in mind the (unctionalist

perspectie on mental life which is characteristic of a good deal of the cognitie

sciences and which as&s what thin&ing does, what it is (or. In 7uestioning what

constitutes a mind and what does not! this perspectie has an e4tremely

liberating

effect because it leads you to 7uestion what is meant by a mind. Artificialntelligence

*AI0 researchers loo& at the mind in term of outputs! or what the brain does.

They

therefore inestigate whether these outputs can only be produced by wetware

*that

is! the physical composition of the brain0 or whether the same results can also

be

obtained from computer hardware. And once your concept of mind is fle4ible

enough for you to 7uestion the common sense assumption that the physical

brain

is necessary to the production of a mind! you are then free to wonder whether a

mind can also consist of more than one brain.

In his famous )Chinese oom) thought e4periment! ohn Searle as&s us to

imagine someone who cannot understand Chinese but who is put into a room

containing some Chinese writing together with instructions for handling this

writing. The instructions say what writing should be passed out of the room as

answers to particular 7uestions. Ksing these instructions! the person is able to

)answer) 7uestions written in Chinese een though he or she does not

understandthat language. From the outside! the room loo&s li&e a thin&ing mind because!

when 7uestions are submitted to it! they are correctly answered. *I can cite a

similar

sort of case from my day job. I am able to produce perfectly ade7uate minutes

of

meetings despite haing had ery little understanding of what was being

discussed.

I am being serious.0 Searle's point is that computers ftanction in the same way

asthe Chinese room. They appear to wor& as minds do! but in fact they do not. @e

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wishes to undermine the claim of the )strong AI) argument that computers can

hae minds. ohn Searle's Chinese oom e4periment is controersial! and

people

=== Alan Palmer

disagree ehemently oer its significance. Can you regard the *nonChinesespea&ing0

indiidualplusthewritingplustheinstrtictions as a )mind) Most people

would

not. (ut if you are one of those! how do you e4plain the fact that the brain is

also

made up of e7ually blind! un&nowing elements $ithin the brain! consciousness

is distributed across constituent modules that are just as incapable of

independent

cognition as the arious elements that go to ma&e up the Chinese room. $hynot

just tal& of these indiidual modules pooling their resources to produce better

results $ell! we do! e4cept that we hae a single word for this process"the

mind.

Some of the philosophers and psychologists who subscribe to the notion of

socially distributed cognition are also interested in another aspect of the mind

which is called physically distributed cognition: )our habit of offloading as

much

as possible of our cognitie tas&s into the enironment itself *%ennett!>inds o(

Minds +2:0. Andy Clar& calls this process Supersi5ing the Mind. It is achieed

mainly through tools such as pen and paper and computers. @oweer! in a less

obious sense! we also ma&e use of our whole enironment as a cognitie aid.

In

her seminal study. #he 'rt o( Memory, the historian Frances Eates describes how

ancient orators used parts of the auditorium as memorial reference points for

sections

of their oratory. #n a more mundane leel! when we are in our own homes! we

&now where eerything is and our cognitie functioning runs smoothly> when

weare put into an alien enironment! the 7uality of our thin&ing can suffer. %ennett

conincingly illustrates the importance of physically distributed cognition to old

people when he describes how they tend to become disoriented when ta&en out

of

their own homes and put into the unfamiliar enironment of a nursing home. As

%ennett says! )Ta&ing them out of their homes is literally separating them from

large parts of their minds) * +=/0. $ithin the conte4t of the present discussion! it

may

be regarded as the argument that a mind can correspond to a brain plusinanimate

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objects. Eet another opportunity for fle4ibility in one's conception of the mind is

the doctrine of behaiorism! which can be interpreted! in a certain sense! as the

argument that! when we tal& of the mind! we are tal&ing of *the behaior of0 the

body.

The more you read of philosophical and psychological debates such as these!the more fle4ible your concept of mind becomes! whether by brea&ing it down

into its constituent elements! or by building it up *that is! distributing it0 to

include

e4ternal elements. To summarie! there are at least four different ways in which

the cognitie sciences can open up our thin&ing about the mind and! in

particular!

loosen the rigid correspondence of one mind to one brain. These areD

" A mind can be realied by machineryD one mind corresponding to no

*wetware0 brain>" A mind can be interpreted in terms of behaiorD one mind corresponding! in a

certain

sense! to one body>

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism ==2

" A mind can be physically distributedD one mind corresponding to one brain

plus inanimate

objects> and

" A mind can be socially distributedD one mind corresponding to more than one

brain.

$ithin this conte4t! I hope that the use of the term mind to refer to a group may

not

seem so surprising. To put the point simplyD the mind is a fuy concept.

Hen so! you may be wondering how intermental units are able to surie

#c&ham's raor! the principle that entities should not be multiplied beyond

necessity. $hy create a new entity of an intermental unit instead of simply

tal&ing of indiiduals I would turn the 7uestion around and point out that the

adocates of socially distributed cognition are postulating one theoretical entity

*the intermental unit! made up of two or more different elements0 to e4plain a

jointmental operation! whereas the traditional iew posits at least two *the sum of the

indiiduals inoled0. So #c&ham's raor should apply to the internalist rather

than

to the e4ternalist position.

Some s&eptics argue that cognitiists put old wine into new bottles. +

ac&nowledge that there are points in this essay where an analysis in the non

cognitie

language of mainstream literary theory would produce similar results. @oweer!

I would argue that the cognitie orientation displayed in this study lin&stogether

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disparate! preiously only partially isible aspects of the noel and combines

them

into a complete cognitie theory of social fictional minds. $ithin this

theoretical

framewor&! new insights into these arious elements! een those that arecapable

of noncognitie e4planations! will! I thin&! emerge.

It may be helpful if I conclude this section by specifying how much + want to

claim for the significance of the topic of social minds in the noel. I argue that

this

issue looms large as a techni7ue and as a subject matter in all of the noels that I

discuss! but techni7ues and subject matters are parts of noels! not purposes of

them.

They are means rather than ends. $hat matters! ultimately! is the purpose towhich

a particular sort of consciousness representation is put. So my concern is with

the

purposes of presentations of social minds. Analyses of social minds are

opportunities

to e4pand on the relationship between analyses of collectie consciousness and

our

larger understanding of the whole noel. Put in general terms! I would

summarie

the purposes of fictional presentations of social minds as followsD

+. Social minds e4ist in storyworlds because they e4ist in real life. #ur lies

consist of a balance between publically aailable thought processes and

secret and priate thoughts. For noels to be worth reading! they hae to

reflect that balance. 9illages and towns tend to behae in reality in the way

==: Alan Palmer

that Middlemarch behaes *as described in the ne4t section0. An important

part ofthe pleasure that the opening passage ofthat noel gies its readers

is the recognition of this fact.

=. The study of social minds sheds a good deal of light on the wor&ings ofindiidual minds. Characters can only be fully understood as elements

in comple4 social networ&s. A character's relationships first with the

intermental units to which they belong play a &ey role in their situated

identity. People may hae many different sorts of relationships with

intermental unitsD fully assimilated into them> within them! but in conflict

with other parts ofthe unit> outside! and in opposition to them> acting as

a public mouthpiece for them> and so on.

2.

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of &nowledge of! and understanding of! the storyworld that they inhabit.

The narratie theorist 1ubomir %oleiel refers to the storyworld &nowledge

that characters possess as their encyclopedias. These encyclopedias are

basic plot motors. Storylines tend to reole around the conse7uences of

some characters &nowing more than others. Characters hae an interest in&eeping secrets in order to &eep the balance of &nowledge! and therefore

power! in their faor. @oweer! the tendency of social minds is towards

the sharing of &nowledge. Many nineteenthcentury noels are concerned

with the practical problems that arise when characters attempt to practice

secrecy within distributed cognitie networ&s in which people can see

ery easily what other people are thin&ing.

:. As I said at the beginning of this essay! a fierce debate too& place within the

nineteenthcentury noel on the nature of social m inds. The epistemological

aspect related to the e4tent to which it is possible to hae &nowledge ofthe wor&ings of other minds. The ethical aspect 7uestioned the purposes

to which our &nowledge of other minds should be put. Social minds raise

comple4 and difficult ethical issuesD Characters face sharp and painful

dilemmas relating to attempts to e4ercise control oer other minds and

the moties in trying to doing so. Should %orothea bend to the will of

the Middlemarch mind Should Anne Hlliot in%ersuasion hae been so

persuadable $hat are the moral purposes behind the gaining of information

about other characters' thoughts *For e4ample! inLittle Dorrit, @enry

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism ==;

Jowan uses this &nowledge to manipulate others.0 $hat are the moral

purposes behind trying to conceal one's own The reasons for the latter can

be immoral *Jowan again0 or moral *Anne Hlliot concealing her continued

feelings for $entworth0. Anne prefers openness e4cept where it would

harm herself or others. She &nows that Mr. Hlliot prefers secrecy because

he can ma&e use of the resulting control of information and &nowledge

for his own purposes.

The Construction of the Middlemarch Mind

#ne of the most important characters in Middlemarch is the town of

Middlemarchitself I call the intermental functioning of the inhabitants of the town the

Middlemarch

mind. I go much further than simply suggesting that the town proides a social

conte4t

within which indiidual characters operate and argue that the town literally and

not just metaphorically has a mind of its own. The Middlemarch mind is

comple4!

interesting! clearly isible to a close reader of the te4t! and itally important to

an understanding of the noel because it e4plains a good deal of the motiationbehind the actions of the other main characters. In discussing the construction of

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the Middlemarch mind in the opening few pages of the noel! I aim to show that

these pages are saturated with this group mind! and that the initial descriptions

by

the narrator of the three indiidual minds of %orothea! Celia! and Mr. (roo&e

arefocalied through it.

@ere is an edited ersion of the opening section of the noelD

5%orothea (roo&e6 was usually spoken of" as being remar&ably cleer! but

with the

addition that her sister Celia had more common sense. and it was only to close observers '' that her dress differed

from her

sister's! and had a shade of co7uetry in its arrangements> for Miss (roo&e's plaindressing

was due to mi4ed conditions! in most of which her sister shared. The pride of

being

ladies had something to do with itD the (roo&e connections! though not e4actly

aristocratic!

were unuestionably '' )good)D if you 'R) in7uired bac&ward for a generation

or two! you

would not find any yardmeasuring or parceltying forefathers"anything lower

than an

admiral or clergyman . . . . Eoung women of such birth! liing in a 7uiet

countryhouse!

and attending a illage church hardly larger than a parlour! naturally ') regarded

frippery

as the ambition of a huc&ster's daughter. Then there was wellbred economy!

which in

those days )R made show in dress the first item to be deducted from! when any

margin

was re7uired for e4penses more distinctie of ran& . . . .

5%orothea's6 mind was theoretic! and yearned by its nature after some loftyconception

of the world which might fran&ly include the parish of Tipton and her own

rule of

conduct there Certainly such elements in the character of a marriageable girl

tended

to interfere with her lot! and hinder it from being decided accordin! to custom

)! by

good loo&s! anity! and merely canine affection . . . .

It was hardly a year since 5%orothea and Celia6 had come to lie at TiptonJrange with their

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iher bewitching when she was on horsebac& . . . .

These peculiarities of %orothea's character caused Mr. (roo&e to be all the more

blamed

in nei!hbourin! families ')Q for not securing some middleaged lady as guide

and companionto his nieces. (ut he himself dreaded so much the sort of superior woman li&ely

to be aailable for such a position! that he allowed himself to be dissuaded by

%orothea's

objections! and was in this case brae enough to defy the world'that is to say*

Mrs

Cadwallader the ,ectors wife* and the small !roup of !entry with whom

he visited

in the north-east corner of .oamshire ')'. So Miss (roo&e presided in her

uncle's household!and did not at all disli&e her new authority! with the homage that belonged to it.

* I :0

1et us loo& at this passage first from an internalistperspectie. I would guess

that

it would stri&e most casual readers simply as a description of the intramental

minds

of three characters"%orothea! her sister Celia! and her uncle Mr. (roo&e"in a

straightforward piece of omniscient characteriation. So! within this

perspectie!

is there much here for the classical narratie approaches to get their teeth into

I will start with the representation of consciousness in the te4t. First! there

is no intramental free indirect thought. *+ put it li&e this because! as I mention

below! the passage contains some intermental free indirect thotight! but you

hae

to hae ac7uired the concept of intermental thought in order to be able to see it.0

#biously! gien the time of writing! there is no stream of consciousness or

interior

monologue either. In fact! there is no directly 7uoted thought at all. The passage

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism ==-consists almost entirely of authorial thought report of general descriptions of

consciousness. So that does not tell us much. Is characteriation theory any

more

informatie The in itial cognitie frames that can be put in place immediately

reeal

7uite a lot about the characters of %orothea! Celia! and Mr. (roo&e. As there are

two sisters! one studious and the other *relatiely0 flighty! loo&ed after by a

ague!

dilettante bachelor uncle! there is certainly potential there for analysis in termsof cultural and literary stereotypes. And we learn a lot about initial instabilities

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within the storyworld! especially the one resulting from %orothea's yearning for

a lofty conception of the world! despite her current condition. Focaliation can

be

reealing! too. The internal focaliation from %orothea's perspectie highlights

theinstabilities just referred to. The same is true of Mr. (roo&e's mindD )he himself

dreaded!) et cetera. Finally! will story analysis help

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now discuss in more detail how the Middlemarch mind has been constrticted by

as&ing these 7uestions in turnD $ho @ow $hat And $hy

The first 7uestion then isD $ho $ho are the indiiduals who ma&e up the

intermental Middlemarch mind At this stage! in the first few pages of a long

noel!the narrator is not able to reflect the comple4ities of the arious intermental

minds in

==/ Alan Palmer

the town that are e4amined in great detail in Social Minds in the ovel?ior

e4ample!

the landed gentry! the middle classes including the professionals! and the

wor&ing

classes0. The emphasis in the passage is almost e4clusiely on the first of these

groups! the landed gentry. This group is e4plicitly named in e4amples *80 and*==0!

while the clearest reference to it is in the final e4ample *=-0D )the world"that is

to

say! Mrs. Cadwallader the ector's wife! and the small group of gentry with

whom

5Mr. (roo&e6 isited in the northeast comer of 1oamshire.) $ith a few

e4ceptions!

all of the numbered references are to this powerful! normestablishing core

group.

H4ceptions include some neutral or nonspecific groups *)close obserers) 5=6

and

)those who approached %orothea) 5=260. The only transgressie or norm

threatening

group! apart from the hypothetical lunatics constructed by the Middlemarch

mind

*=30! is the group of men who find %orothea attractie on horsebac& despite

being

told not to *=;0. This is an e4ample! indicated early in the noel! of the &ind of

se4ual energy that is traditionally seen as a threat to wellestablished socialnorms

and which often results in the sort of normdisrupting eents that are so

common in

nineteenthcentury noelsD elopements! secret engagements! unintended

pregnancies!

and so on.

The second 7uestion isD @ow @ow are the iews of this group coneyed

In particular! it may not be apparent in all cases precisely how the bold passages

indicate the presence of intermental thought. Eou may be puled as to whysuch

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items as )un7uestionably) *20 and )naturally) *;0 hae been included as

e4amples

of references to the Middlemarch mind. So! a small typology is re7uired. + hae

identified four types of the means of e4pression of the iews of tbe

Middlemarchmind! and I will list them now in order of degree of directness.

Tbe first is e4plicit reference to the main landed gentry group. This group

is referred to either in geographical terms *)the parish of Tipton) 5-6 and )part

of this county) 5860> or in social terms *)proincial families) 5+260> or in both

geographical and social terms *)neighbouring families) 5=,6! )rural opinion)

including the cottagers 5==6! )the world!) et cetera 5=-60. In fact! the two

categories

of geographical and social arc closely interrelated and difficult to disentangle!

andso are best thought of as a spectrum. @oweer! een the areas referred to in

simply

geographical terms *such as the parish of Tipton 5-60 hae to be included in this

surey because the social implications of naming them! albeit implicit! are

potent.

The second means of e4pression is reference to a hypothetical group in order to

ma&e a particular rhetorical point. For e4ample! )close obserers) *=0> )those

who

approached %orothea) *=20> )men) *+;0 and *+,0> and sane people! neighbours!

lunatics! and )one) *+/0 to *=+0. Apart from the lunatics! these hypothetical

groups

Social Minds in Fiction and Criticism ==8

tend to be normreinforcingD the )close obserers) *=0 feel li&e landedgentry

close

obserers> the men who might be reluctant to marry %orothea if she continues

to

be willful must also belong to the gentry.

The third is the use of the passie oice. There are fie e4amplesD )was

spo&en o f *+0> )being decided) */0> )was held) *++0> )was regarded) *+=0> and)were e4pected) *+-0. In eery case! it is the Middlemarch mind that is doing

the

spea&ing! deciding! holding! regarding! and e4pecting. The fourth and final

means

of e4pression is also the most obli7ue. It is the use of presupposition. Again!

there

are fie e4amplesD )un7uestionably) *20> )naturally) *;0> )in those days) *,0>

)And

how should %orothea not marry) * +:0> and )hearsay) *=:0. The use of thesephrases

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by the narrator presupposes some person or group who holds these iews! who

thin&s that the statements are un7uestionably or naturally so! and who would

as&

such a loaded 7uestion asD )And how should %orothea not marry) In

(a&htinianterms! they are e4amples of doubleoiced discourse. More specifically! *20! *;0

and

*+:0 feature intermental free indirect thought. The narrator e4presses a iew

that!

as soon becomes apparent from the conte4t! is the iew of the townspeople. The

important point is that! with a few e4ceptions! the last three means of e4pression

*hypothetical groups! the passie oice! and presupposition0 are all different

sorts

of rhetorical deices for referring! howeer indirectly! to the controlling socialgroup that e4presses the Middlem