38.social relations
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Altruism iscommon in otherspecies wheneverthere are geneticties with otherconspecifics.
The closer thelink, the morelikely altruisticbehavior will takeplace.
"I would lay down my life for two
brothers or eight cousins (J.B.S.
Haldane)
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Altruism is
commonly
observed insocial
animals.
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Current expla-
nations of altruism
stress the role
played by empathyin cooperation and
competition (de
Waal, 2008).
Empathy springsfrom our shared
emotional systems.
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When observing a
conspecific in
distress, we
undergo emotionalcontagion: we feel
their pain.
This activation of
the emotionalsystems motivate
us to act.
(Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2009)
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Consolation is thereassurance providedby bystanders tocombatants in an
aggressive incident. Research in
chimpanzees showsthat bystanders
contact victims ofaggression more thanthey contactaggressors.
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Warneken et al., 2009
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Warneken et al., 2009
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In 1964, K. Genovese was rapedand murdered while a numberof witnesses failed to act on herbehalf.
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In order to help out, we first need to be aware of
the incident, interpret it as an emergency and
assume responsibility.
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Given the number of bystanders who did
not take action to prevent Genoveses
murder, research was conducted to find out
why it was that the witnesses did not help
out.
When part of a large group of people, each
individual is less likely to help, assuming that
somebody else will (diffusion ofresponsibility).
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Bystanderhelpfulness isgreater whenpeople are alone orbelieve to be theonly one who canhelp.
As the number ofbystanders
increases, thepercentage ofpeople willing tohelp decreases.
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Sometimes peoplewill not actassuming that therest of the crowdknows somethingthey dont (forexample, that theevent in front of
them is lessimportant than itseems to be).
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We are more willing to help if
The person appears to need help and seems to
deserve it.
The person is somehow similar to us (ingroup)
We are not in a hurry
We are in a good mood.
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Two people need
to choose between
cooperation or
competition.Should you defect
or cooperate?
If both of you
confess,
punishment is
steeper.
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Even if you have a
deal with your
partner not to talk,
how can you be sure
he wont confess?
The only way to
make sure the other
side cooperates is tobe able to monitor
their behavior.
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If the game is playedbetween two peoplewho will never meet,the logical move is to
compete. Whichresults in both playersgaining zero dollars.
If the game is playeda number of times,
the two players havea chance toreciprocate.
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The most effective strategy in iterativeversions of the prisoners dilemma is tit fortat.
In tit for tat, the player makes a cooperative
move first and then simply mimics theresponse of the other player in subsequentiterations: if player 2 competes, player 1 willreciprocate by competing on the second
move. If player 2 cooperates, player 1 willcooperate as well.
Cooperation from both players ensurescontinued success in the long run.
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A B1- Each player gets 10 dollars
The players do not meet face to face
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A B1- Each player gets 10 dollars
2- Player A has the chance to
transfer all or part of his
money to player B
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A B1- Each player gets 10 dollars
2- Player A has the chance to
transfer all or part of his
money to player B
3- The amount transferred is
doubled for player B
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A B1- Each player gets 10 dollars
2- Player A has the chance to
transfer all or part of his
money to player B
3- The amount transferred is
doubled for player B
4- Player B has now the
chance of transferring up to
10 dollars back to player A
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A B1- Each player gets 10 dollars
2- Player A has the chance to
transfer all or part of his
money to player B
3- The amount transferred is
doubled for player B
4- Player B has now the
chance of transferring up to
10 dollars back to player A
5- That amount is doubled
for player A, so both players
end up with up to 20 dollars
each
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A BBut what happens if B, after
receiving the money transfer
and doubling that amount,
does not return any money
back?
Sucka!
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A BBut what happens if B, after
receiving the money transfer
and doubling that amount,
does not return any money
back?
Player A becomes more likely
to stop trusting other players
and decrease the amount
transferred either as player
one or player two.
Cheating spreads through the
population.
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Unlike the trust game, transactions in real
life are rarely anonymous.
People act cooperatively because a good
reputation fosters more and strongerrelationships.
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1- Four players are given20 dollars each
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1- Four players are
given
20 dollars each
2- They get to
contribute to a
common pool any
amount they wantwithout disclosing the
quantity
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1- Four players are
given
20 dollars each
2- They get to
contribute to a
common pool any
amount they wantwithout disclosing the
quantity
3- The common
pool amount is
increased by 60%
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1- Four players are
given
20 dollars each
2- They get to
contribute to a
common pool any
amount they want
3- The common
pool amount is
increased by 60%
4- Everybody gets
an equal share
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Under normal circumstances, people begin
contributing less and less to the common pool.
However, if the amount of the contributions is
disclosed and people are given the chance to
buy a way to punish other players, players willpay to punish the low contributors.
Under these circumstances cooperation is much
more likely.
Societies with the greatest amount of altruism
are also the ones with the greatest amounts of
altruistic punishment.
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Observation ofsuffering incompetitors doesnot recruit pain
pathways butreward networks!
The speed withwhich we break
into competinggroups is quitetroubling.
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Participants in an
experiment were
informed in pairs
that there weretwo studies, one
which sounded
interesting and
pleasant, theother difficult and
painful.
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One of theparticipants was thengiven a coin andasked to go into the
next room to flip itand decide who wouldtake part in each ofthe two studies.
The results showed
that 90% of thepeople who flippedthe coin, won thetoss.
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However, when given the chance to let the
experimenter flip the coin, most participants
preferred that option.
People will make sure that they are not putinto a position in which they may be tempted
to cheat.