38509625 the elusive canadian housing bubble fall 2010 musings

8/8/2019 38509625 the Elusive Canadian Housing Bubble Fall 2010 Musings

1/23

The Elusive Canadian Housing Bubble

Fall 2010 Musings: Now and Then

THREE BEARS RESEARCH

SEPTEMBER 2010

Alexandre Pestov


2/23

Alexandre Pestov Three Bears Research September 2010

The Elusive Canadian Housing Bubble Fall 2010 Musings: Now and Then Page 1 of 22

BRIEFING

Growing uncertainty about the health of the Canadian housingmarket has finally managed to find its way to the Main Street.Rising public interest has led to mainstream media focus on theCanadian housing sector. In recent weeks, a number of think-tanks and pundits have added piles of paper and glib sound bites

to the national discussion of potentially unstable housing pricesand deteriorating personal finances. Various articles on housingcautiously evolved from shy appearances as page 16 stories inspecialized business periodicals to dominate front pages ofalmost all mainstream publication short of Canadian tabloidpublications.

Topics of high public interest always invoke heated debatesamong industry professionals, investors and academics. This isespecially true with regards to residential real-estate. The latestpublished discussions of the Canadian housing market are noexception: Within a month-span from July to August of 2010several new and splashy reports surfaced to either prove orrefute the existence of the Canadian housing bubble.

One of these recent reports deserves special attention. Thispaper by Jim MacGee of C.D. Howe Institute titled Not Here?Housing Market Policy and the Risk of a Housing Bust" assesses thelikelihood of a US-style housing market crash in Canada. Thisreport concludes that a US-style collapse of the housing marketis unlikely in Canada due to the structural differences in keyareas that were instrumental to the market implosion in the US.According to Jim:

Canadian housing policies, which avoided the sharp decline in

underwriting standards seen in the US, worked well in

reducing the possibility of a housing bust in Canada during

2008-2009, and continue to mitigate the risk of a massive

wave of defaults in the future.

Jims report is sound, well-presented and rests on a factual

framework. While the report itself is well-reasoned, we suggest

it should be discussed on the basis of significant

misinterpretations, inaccurate paraphrasing, erroneous

conclusions and the complacency it spawns. Shortly after the

reports release, Internet portals and mainstream print media

featured prominent headlines announcing a new study refutes the

notion Canada is on the verge of a housing bubble and no housingbubble in Canada, a new report finds.

Jims report bears special meaning in the current context, as it

accurately captures the opinion many Canadians have developed

about the Canadian housing market: The tsunami of foreclosures

in the US was largely driven by senseless sub-prime lending,

which simply never existed in Canada. Thus, the US-style

collapse is unlikely to happen here.

In This Edition

Briefing 1

1 Prices 4

1.1 Nominal Home Prices 41.2 Inflation-Adjusted Home Prices 5

1.3 New Home Prices 6

2 Supply and Demand 72.1 Immigration and Natural Growth 7

2.2 Construction 7

2.3 Construction to Population Ratios 8

2.4 Homeownership Rates 9

3 Employment and Income 103.1 Unemployment 10

3.2 Income 10

4 Fundamentals 124.1 Price-to-Income 12

4.2 Price-to-Rent 124.3 Accommodation Ratio 13

4.4 Affordability 13

5 Debt and Credit 145.1 Personal Debt 14

5.2 Consumer Credit 15

Debt Servicing 166.1 Interest Rates 16

6.2 Mortgage Carrying Cost 16

6.3 Insolvency 17

6.4 Mortgages in Arrears 17

7 Forecast 18

Data Sources 21

Acknowledgements 22

The conclusion that many erroneously infer from such analysis

including Jims report, is that no US-style problem means no

problem at all. The fallacy of such inference is quite apparent, as

it misses a crucial point: Canada doesnt need a US-style

problem to have a problem. A Canadian-style issue will do just

fine.

This paper is written as to address the paraphrasing ofhousing

market in Canada is not identical to that of the US" as no housing

bubble in Canada. Instead of dissecting the US housing marketcrash for answers, this report examines our current housing

bubble in Canada against the backdrop of the 1985-1989 housing

bubble in Canada. In fact, our specific Canadian situation wil

most likely be the force behind housing markets unwinding.

In modern times, Canada experienced several regional housing

boom-and-bust cycles (Exhibit 1.2.1). The nation-wide decline in

home prices on a scale comparable to a bursting bubble is

something that this country hasnt witness since recording

began. On the national level, the period of 1985 to 1989 bears


3/23



the closest resemblance to a housing bubble, and the period of

1990 to 2000 to a crash. However, unlike other crashes where

nominal prices plunged quickly to restore the upset balance with

underlying fundamentals, the post 1985-1989 period experienced

a gradual decline in real prices stretched over 10 years. This,

however, should not be mistaken for anything less than a break

down in slow-motion. Rather than the image of a bursting

balloon, consider the concept of a slow leak. It may take a longtime for all the hot air to escape, but the net result, over time, is

just as limp and lifeless.

Using the 1985-1989 period as a benchmark for measuring

housing bubbles, this report compares key housing market

metrics exhibited during the run-up in home prices of the 1985-

1989 (then) and 2000-2010 (now).

Bright Spots

Comparing the 1985-1989 housing bubble to the 2000-2010

period, employment and income stand out as the bright spots:

- During the 2000-2010 period unemployment remainedbelow the levels seen in 1985-1989 (Exhibit 3.1.1). This

should be taken with a caveat: The 2000-2010 period

ended with higher unemployment than the 1985-1985

did.

- Real income of typical families and unattachedindividuals is at all-time high (Exhibit 3.2.1 and 3.2.2).

Similarities

The following similarities in underlying conditions can be

observed during the 1985-1989 and 2000-2010 housing price

run-ups:

- Demand conditions during the 2000-2010 period wereat par with 1984-1985 (Exhibit 2.1.1).

- On the supply side, dwelling completions during 2000-2010 stayed above its long-term average and at par with

the numbers observed during the 1984-1989 bubble.

However, the period of above-average construction

between 2000 and 2010 lasted longer than that of 1984-

1989 (Exhibit 2.2.1).

- Completion of dwellings as proportion to totalpopulation and population changes (Exhibit 2.3.1) is in-

line with its long-term average.

Points of Concern

Despite the stronger supporting factors, including healthier

economy and modestly brighter income and employment

picture, the 2000-2010 run-up in prices does not look like it has

any steam left to continue further. Superior economic

performance only partially explains the observed appreciation of

home prices during this period. In fact, the bulk of the gains

were driven by an unprecedented expansion of consumer credit. The

following factors suggest that this debt-driven growth is unlikelyto continue:

- The number of residential units in pipeline (dwellingscurrently under constructions) during 2000-2010

approached the record-highs of the late 1970s, when

for every 9 people added to the Canadian population

each year 10 residential units were built. The number of

units under construction now is substantially above the

long-term average, and higher than it was at the peak o

the 1984-1989 bubble, signalling excessive supply lasting

into foreseeable future (Exhibit 2.2.1).

- The ratio of building under construction to totapopulation and population changes (Exhibit 2.3.2) is

above the long-term average and higher than the

number seen at the peak of 1984-1989 bubble.

- Price-to-Income measurement Canada-wide and in almajor markets remains 30-40 percent higher than the

long-term trend (Exhibit 4.1.1), which causes above-

average un-affordability (Exhibit 4.4.1), despite the rising

real income and historically-low interest rates (Exhibit

6.1.1).

- Price-to-Rent ratio stands at all-time high levels, whichis 60-90 percent above the long-term average (Exhibit

4.2.1).

- Accommodation ratio in most major markets (exceptVancouver) remains historically low, suggesting major

imbalances and relative attractiveness of renting vs

owning (Exhibit 4.3.1).

- Personal debt, including mortgage liabilities, isapproximately 100 percent above its long-term average

(Exhibit 5.1.1), which translates into above-averagemortgage carrying costs (Exhibit 6.2.1) despite the

historically-low interest rates (Exhibit 6.1.1).

- Debt as a percentage of net-worth and total assetselevated to unprecedented levels (Exhibit 5.1.3).

- Household credit adjusted for population and inflationchanges has expanded by approximately 250 percent

since 1990 to reach record-high levels (Exhibit 5.2.1).


4/23



- Between 2000 and 2008 mortgage lending expanded 3times faster than income growth (117 percent vs. 38

percent).

- Homeownership rates approached 70 percent, whichsignificantly above the long-term average and the peak

seen during the 1985-1989 bubble. The present home

ownership rates are at par with those at the US bubblepeak (Exhibit 2.4.1).

The 2000-2010 rally should not be mistaken for an organic price

appreciation warranted by the supply/demand relationship. The

rally has been a debt-driven price appreciation. Without further

credit expansion this rally cannot go on, and all signs suggest the

excessive leveraging is coming to an end. Under the current

historically low rates, consumers capacity for debt service is

curtailing noticeably (Exhibit 6.2.1). Should interest rates go up,

as they eventually must, consumers will face difficult choices:

Significantly reduce spending, de-leverage or default. In

aggregate, none of these alternatives bode well for the housingmarket and the Canadian economy in whole.

Presently, there is no sign of an impending price collapse. As

rightfully pointed by Jim MacGee and other observers, Canada

doesnt have the combination of factors that triggered a wave of

defaults and foreclosures seen in the US in the ongoing financial

crisis. As comforting as it may be, this is no reason for

complacency. The era of consumer credit expansion and

leveraging is coming to a close. The Canadian government is left

with a limited set of tools to support further home price

appreciation without imparting significant US-style risk to the

Canadian economy. This, and the uniform decoupling of home

prices from fundamentals across the nation, suggests that home

prices will decline, although as not as violently as the home

prices in the US did, and then stagnate until fundamentals catch

up, similar to the 1990-2000 period (Exhibit 1.2.1). The uniformprices appreciation around the country left no region that can

offset declines in other parts of the country, as it was the case in

the late 80s and mid 90s, and the odds of nation-wide

correction are high.

The upcoming price stagnation should be of the most concern

for those whose well-being directly correlates with appreciating

home prices. Property developers, real-estate agents, buy-and

flip investors and other market participants should take a note

and make necessary adjustments. The issue has a broader impact

than merely real-estate related sectors. Gluskin Sheffs research

found that every basis point of the Canadian economic recovery

was due to the boom in the housing sector. In the absence of

export resurgence, aside from commodities, it becomes quite

apparent that Canada doesnt need a US-style collapse for the

hangover from the elusive Canadian housing bubble to be painful

Thank you for reading.

Please direct all inquiries regarding this report [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


5/23



1 PRICES

1.1 Nominal Home Prices

Exhibit 1.1.1: Average Home PriceCanada

Source: CREA;

Then 99 percent home priceappreciation over 4.5years

Now 121 percent price increaseover 10 years

Exhibit 1.1.2: Home PricesMajor Markets

Source: CREA;

Then Price appreciation:Calgary38 percentMontreal71 percentToronto160 percentVancouver101 percentover 4.5 years

Now Price appreciation:Calgary138 percentMontreal100 percentToronto77 percentVancouver117 percentover 10 years

$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

Canada

$0

$100,000

$200,000

$300,000

$400,000

$500,000

$600,000

$700,000

Calgary Montreal Toronto Vancouver

Then Now

Then Now


6/23



1.2 Inflation-Adjusted Home Prices

Exhibit 1.2.1: Average Home PriceCanada (constant dollars)

Source: CREA; Statistics Canada;

Then 67 percent appreciationover 4.5 years

Now 76 percent rise over 10years

Exhibit 1.2.2: Home PricesMajor Markets (constant dollars)


Then Real price appreciation:Calgary16 percentMontreal44 percentToronto119 percentVancouver69 percentover 5 years

Now Real price appreciation:Calgary98 percentMontreal67 percentToronto48 percentVancouver81 percentover the 10-year period

$100,000

$120,000

$140,000

$160,000

$180,000

$200,000

$220,000

$240,000

$260,000

$280,000

$300,000

Canada

Then Now

$0

$100,000

$200,000

$300,000

$400,000

$500,000

$600,000

$700,000

Calgary Montreal Toronto Vancouver

Then Now


7/23



1.3 New Home Prices

Exhibit 1.3.1: New Home Prices (constant dollars)

Source: Statistics Canada;

Then New home price increase:Canada59 percentCalgary40 percent

Montreal44 percentToronto117 percentVancouver28 percentover 4.5 years

Now New home price increase:Canada54 percentCalgary106 percentMontreal63 percentToronto40 percentVancouver31 percentover 10 years

50

100

150

200

250

300

Index

Canada Calgary Montreal Toronto Vancouver

Then Now


8/23



2 SUPPLY AND DEMAND

2.1 Immigration and Natural Growth

Exhibit 2.1.1: Canada Population Growth

Source: Immigration Canada;

Then Canadian populationadded on average 300,400residents each year

Now Canadian populationincreased by 314,000residents annually

2.2 Construction

Exhibit 2.2.1: Dwelling Starts, Completions and Under Construction

Source: CMHC;

Then Nation-wide, Canadaaveraged:210,000 dwelling starts195,000 completions115,00 dwelling underconstruction

Now Nation-wide, Canadaaveraged:201,000 dwelling starts192,000 completions

149,00 dwelling underconstruction

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

450,000

Natural Growth Immigration Total

Then Now

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

Units

Dwelling Starts Dweling Completion Dwellings Under Construction

Then Now


9/23



2.3 Construction to Population Ratios

Exhibit 2.3.1: Dwelling Completions to Population and Change in Population Ratios

Source: CMHC; Immigration Canada;

Then Average of dwellingcompletions to populationratio was 0.0073, while

dwelling completions tochanges in populationration averaged 0.65

Now Average of dwellingcompletions to populationratio was 0.0060, whiledwelling completions tochanges in populationration averaged 0.60

Exhibit 2.3.2: Dwelling Under Construction to Population and Change in Population Ratios

Source: CMHC; Immigration Canada;

Then Dwellings underconstruction averaged0.38 per every personadded to the Canadianpopulation. The averageratio of dwellings underconstruction to populationremained at 0.0043.

Now Dwellings underconstruction averaged0.46 per every personadded to the Canadian

population. The averageratio of dwellings underconstruction to populationremained at 0.0046.

0.000

0.002

0.004

0.006

0.008

0.010

0.012

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

Dwelling Completion to Population Changes (left scale)

Dwelling Completion to Population (right scale)

Then Now

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.005

0.006

0.007

0.008

0.009

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Dwellings Under Construction to Population Changes (left scale)

Dwellings Under Construction to Population (right scale)

Then Now


10/23



2.4 Homeownership Rates

Exhibit 2.4.1: Homeownership Rates for All Households (1971 to 2006)


Then Homeownership ratereached 62.4 percent

Now Homeownership ratereached 68.4 percent

60%

61%

62%

63%

64%

65%

66%

67%

68%

69%

Natural Growth

Then Now


11/23



3 EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

3.1 Unemployment

Exhibit 3.1.1: Unemployment Rate


Then Unemployment rateaveraged 8.8 percent,reaching 7.5 percent at theend of the bubble period.

Now Unemployment rateaveraged 7.1 percent,reaching 8.1 percent at theend of the bubble period.

3.2 Income

Exhibit 3.2.1: Family Income (constant dollars)


Then Nation-wide, income inconstant dollars averaged$59,720 for a statisticalfamily, peaking at $61,500in 1989.

Now Nation-wide, income inconstant dollars averaged$69,000 for a statisticalfamily, peaking at $74,600in 2008.

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

12.00%

14.00%

16.00%

CAN AB QC ON BC

Then Now

$50,000

$55,000

$60,000

$65,000

$70,000

$75,000

$80,000

$85,000

$90,000

$95,000

$100,000


Then Now


12/23



Exhibit 3.2.2: Income of Unattached Individuals (constant dollars)


Then Real income of unattachedindividuals averaged$25,920, peaking at$26,700 1989.

Now Real income of unattached

individuals averaged$28,720, peaking at$31,000 in 2010.

$20,000

$25,000

$30,000

$35,000

$40,000

$45,000


Then Now


13/23



4 FUNDAMENTALS

4.1 Price-to-Income

Exhibit 4.1.1: Price-to-Income Ratio


Then Price-to-Income ratiosrose sharply during the1985-1989 period,reaching:Canada3.8Calgary2.9Montreal3.8Toronto5Vancouver5.4

Now Price-to-Income ratiosrose sharply during the2000-2010 period,

reaching:Canada4.5Calgary4.2Montreal3.6Toronto4.9Vancouver7.7

4.2 Price-to-Rent

Exhibit 4.2.1: Price-to-Rent Ratio


Then During the 1985-1989period, Price-to-Rentratios peaked at:Canada120Calgary108Montreal103Toronto210Vancouver176

Now During the 2000-2010period, Price-to-Rent

ratios peaked at:Canada196Calgary221Montreal145Toronto247Vancouver373

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

MajorMarkets

Canada


Then Now

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

50

70

90

110

130

150

170

190

M

ajorMarkets

Canada


Then Now


14/23



4.3 Accommodation Ratio

Exhibit 4.3.1: Accommodation Ratio


Then Average0.96Minimum0.92 reachedin 1989

Now Average0.93Minimum0.87 reachedin 2010

4.4 Affordability

Exhibit 4.4.1: Housing Affordability in Key Metro Markets (May 2010)

Calgary Montreal

Toronto Vancouver

Source: Royal Bank of Canada, May 2010;

ThenPeak:

Calgarylow 40sMontreallow 40sTorontomid 60sVancouverlow 50s

Average:Calgaryhigh 30sMontrealhigh 30sTorontohigh 50sVancouverhigh 40s

Now Peak:Calgarylow 50s

Montrealmid 40sTorontomid 50sVancouverlow 80s

Average:Calgarylow 40sMontrealhigh 30sTorontomid 50sVancouverhigh 60s

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

1.1

1.15

1.2

MajorMarkets

Canada


Then Now


15/23



5 DEBT AND CREDIT

5.1 Personal Debt

Exhibit 5.1.1: Personal Debt, GDP, Personal Disposable Income (PDI), Consumer Credit (CC) and Mortgage Liabilities (ML)


Then Peaked at the bubbleperiods end:Debt to GDP62%Debt to PDI91%CC and ML to PDI79%

Now Peaked at the bubbleperiods end:Debt to GDP94%Debt to PDI149%CC and ML to PDI136%

Exhibit 5.1.2: Owners Equity as a Percentage ofReal Estate


Then67.1% at the end of 1989

Now 67.8% in 2010

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140%

150%

Debt to GDP Debt to PDI CC and ML to PDI

Then Now

65%

66%

67%

68%

69%

70%

71%

72%

Owner's Equity as a Percentage of Real Estate

Then Now


16/23



Exhibit 5.1.3: Debt, Tangible Assets (TA), Net Worth (NW), Consumer Credit (CC) and Mortgage Liabilities (ML)


Then Debt to TA18.4%Debt to NW22.5%CC and ML to NW19.4

The trend: reduction in allthree ratios

Now Debt to TA19.6%Debt to NW24.4%CC and ML to NW22.2

The trend: uniform rise in three ratios

5.2 Consumer Credit

Exhibit 5.2.1: Consumer Credit Expansion (adjusted for inflation and population changes)


Now An increase of 226 to 273

percent between 1990 and2010.

15%

16%

17%

18%

19%

20%

21%

22%

23%

24%

25%

Debt to TA Debt to NW CC and ML to NW

Then Now

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

Total Household Credit Residential Mortgage Credit Consumer Credit

Then Now


17/23



DEBT SERVICING

6.1 Interest Rates

Exhibit 6.1.1: Canadian Bank Rate and 5-year Fixed Mortgage Rate (1975 to 2010)

Source: Bank of Canada;

Then Average:Bank Rate10.0%5-year Mortgage11.8%Periods End:Bank Rate12.4%5-year Mortgage12.2%

Future Rates - falling

Now Average:Bank Rate3.0%5-year Mortgage6.3%Periods End:

Bank Rate1.0%5-year Mortgage5.8%

Future Rates - rising

6.2 Mortgage Carrying Cost

Exhibit 6.2.1: Mortgage Carrying Costs in Key Metro Markets (May 2010)

Calgary Montreal

Toronto Vancouver

Source: Royal Bank of Canada, May 2010;

Then Peak:Calgarymid 30s

Montrealmid 30sTorontolow 60sVancouverhigh 40s

Average:Calgarylow 30sMontreallow 30sTorontohigh 40sVancouverlow 40s

Now Peak:Calgarylow 40sMontrealmid 30s

Torontohigh 40sVancouvermid 70s

Average:Calgarymid 40sMontreallow 30sTorontolow 40sVancouverlow 60s

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

Bank Rate 5-year Posted Fixed Rate

Then Now


18/23


19/23



7 FORECAST

The forecasts provided in this section of the report use an in-house real-estate pricing model, which is a function of interest rates

incomes, rents and other secondary factors. The model is market-specific and factors in historical price uniqueness of each market.

Exhibit 7.1: Canada (price gap of 28.6 percent)

Source: Three Bears Research;

Exhibit 7.2: Calgary (price gap of 35.0 percent)


$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

Canada - Actual Prices Canada - Forecast

$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

$400,000

$450,000

Calgary - Actual Prices Calgary - Forecast


20/23



Exhibit 7.3: Montreal (price gap of 18.3 percent)


Exhibit 7.4: Toronto (price gap of 25.6 percent)


$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

Montreal - Actual Prices Montreal - Forecast

$50,000

$100,000

$150,000

$200,000

$250,000

$300,000

$350,000

$400,000

$450,000

Toronto - Actual Prices Toronto - Forecast


21/23



Exhibit 7.5: Vancouver (price gap of 45.4 percent)


$100,000

$200,000

$300,000

$400,000

$500,000

$600,000

$700,000

Vancouver - Actual Prices Vancouver - Forecast


22/23



DATA SOURCES

Bank of Canada Statisticshttp://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.html

Citizenship and Immigration Canadahttp://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/10.asp

CREAhttp://www.crea.ca/public/news_stats/statistics.htm#

GMREBGreater Montreal Real Estate Boardhttp://www.cigm.qc.ca/indexen.aspx

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canadahttp://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01819.html

Statistics Canadahttp://www.statcan.gc.ca/

Royal Bank of Canada - RBC

http://www.rbc.com/economics/market/pdf/house.pdf
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.htmlhttp://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.htmlhttp://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/10.asphttp://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/10.asphttp://www.crea.ca/public/news_stats/statistics.htmhttp://www.cigm.qc.ca/indexen.aspxhttp://www.cigm.qc.ca/indexen.aspxhttp://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01819.htmlhttp://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01819.htmlhttp://www.statcan.gc.ca/http://www.statcan.gc.ca/http://www.rbc.com/economics/market/pdf/house.pdfhttp://www.rbc.com/economics/market/pdf/house.pdfhttp://www.rbc.com/economics/market/pdf/house.pdfhttp://www.statcan.gc.ca/http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br01819.htmlhttp://www.cigm.qc.ca/indexen.aspxhttp://www.crea.ca/public/news_stats/statistics.htmhttp://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2008/permanent/10.asphttp://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/rates/index.html


23/23

38509625 the elusive canadian housing bubble fall 2010 musings

Documents