37942610 international business
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Philips versus Matsushita:
A New Century, a New Round
Introduction
Royal Philips NV and Matsushita (owner of the Panasonic brand among others) are two of
the worlds biggest electronics multinationals. After successfully building their global
empires in the early twentieth century, they have both suffered financially in recent
decades. It is therefore interesting to look at why this has happened and what their future
prospects are.
1. The Rise of Philips.
Philips was established in 1892 by Gerard Philips and his father in Eindhoven, Holland
(Hill, 2005). They were later joined by Gerards brother Anton, who brought with him
sales and management expertise (Hill). It soon went from being small-scale lightbulb
manufacturers to leaders in its field (Hill). How did Philips, therefore, become more
successful than its rivals during its formative years?
One of the main reasons for Philips early success is arguably because of its focus on
manufacturing lightbulbs. Other electronics organisations were keen to diversify (Hill),
whereas Philips concentrated solely on producing lightbulbs and developing new
technology for this product. It was, thus, able to build a competitive advantage based on
technology, and subsequently, became a market leader in this field.
In addition to its technological development, Philips overseas expansion was also a
formidable reason for its growth and success. According to Hill, the small size of Holland
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forced Philips to look beyond its borders. It appeared to successfully pursue an
international strategy as there was little pressure for local responsiveness with a simple
product such as a lightbulb and it was able to benefit from greater economies of scale.
The other aspect of its success could be attributed to Philips care for its workers. According
to Hill, the company built houses, bolstered education, and paid its employees so well that
other employers complained (p.518). This could be argued as building a resource-based
advantage. Barney et al (2001) believe that sustained competitive advantage derives from
the resources and capabilities a firm controls that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable
and not substitutable (p.625). This unique care for its workforce arguably fostered a
culture that helped create such a competitive advantage. Porter (1980) would argue
otherwise as he feels the only way to create a sustainable competitive advantage is through
overall cost leadership, diversification or focus. It could be seen that Philips did the latter,
as they were diversifying by developing new lightbulb technology. However, its workforce
was involved in this development and consequently should be considered as a reason for
Philips success.
2. How Matsushita was able to overtake Philips.
Matsushitas success in the consumer electronics market is just one of many from a hugely
successful Japanese electronics industry. Japanese enterprises share many similar elements
in their success, particularly their revolutionary working practices such as the use of
Just-in-time or Kanban. Consequently, Matsushitas success in overtaking Philips can be
attributed to the success of the Japanese consumer electronics industry as a whole. There
are a whole set of interrelated industries and clusters (Porter, 1990), both domestic and
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international, that aided this companys transformation from a lamp socket factory in rural
Osaka, Japan to an international electronics giant.
One of the main reasons for the success of Japanese enterprises has been their exporting
efficiency. Porter (1990) discovered several distinct factors about Japanese exports. Firstly,
the high export rate of Japanese companies, and secondly, he found that many of Japans
successful industries, from transportation equipment and related machinery to
entertainment and leisure (notably consumer electronics), are often integrated. Thus, from
Porters (1990) analysis, it would appear that Japans comprehensive machinery industry
offers the domestic companies the resources (from manufacturing to distribution and
opportunities) to compete in the world market.
Porter (1990) further highlights how various studies looking at the success of the Japanese
economy mentioned the importance of government intervention, especially when it came
to helping organisations find capital investment. It became traditional for many
corporations to have their own government agencies. Matsushita managed to build its
leadership through the VCR in the 1980s, after the bitter videotape format war
(Videotape Format War, www.wikipedia.com, 27/04/2006). However, before the war
started in early 1980s, Matsushita adopted the VHS standard under the pressure of
Japanese International Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) and gave up its own standard
in late 1970s. In 1974, Sony released Betamax, and as expected the other Japanese
manufactures followed this format. However, JVC refused to adopt it and in 1976 released
the VHS format. Sony appealed to MITI in the hope that it would force JVC to use Sonys
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Betamax format, however their appeal was rejected. Therefore, although Sony may have
viewed MITI as a hindrance, MITIs interventions helped to create an environment that
fostered fierce competition and cooperation between organisations. This arguably
stimulated the development of the video recording industry as a whole. Matsushita was,
thus, able to benefit from the competitive nature of the industry.
Phillips attempted to capture its share of the market when it launched its format, Video
2000, in 1979 (Hill). This was seen as being the most technically advanced with its
Dynamic Track Following (DTF) system (Video 2000, www.wikipedia.com, 27/04/2006).
However, its late entry meant it was incompatible with machines and its unreliability
seemingly left it destined to fail. Philips withdrew Video 2000 in 1988, deciding to adopt
the VHS format of its rivals instead (Hill). This left Philips considerably far behind
Matsushita in the VCR market.
Although Matsushita was forced to give up its format and accept VHS, along with Philips,
Matsushita had increased capacity 33-fold between 1977 and1985 (Hill). VCRs accounted
for 30 percent of Matsushitas total sales, over 40 percent of overseas revenues, and
provided 40 percent of its profits (Hill). This was seen to be because Matsushita shifted its
role from a developer to a manufacturer or a service provider. Consequently, Matsushita
was having considerably more success in the VCR market than Philips. Matsushitas
success in this market can, therefore, be seen as one of the main reasons it was able to
overtake Philips.
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A further reason for Matsushita overtaking Philips is arguably because of its structure. Its
division structure whereby each product division manufactured one product only could be
seen as one of its core competences, as it helped focus the attention and resources of each
department. Furthermore, the individual, self-funded research laboratories within each
product division potentially made Matsushita more aware of their profits and the value of
instant marketing. Thus, it meant they were able to go from manufacturing something that
was not only technologically advanced, but was something the people would actually buy
(Hill).Moreover, whilst Matsushita was dominating the VHS market in the 1980s, Philips
was still suffering from the long-running power dispute between its National Organisations
and its Product Divisions. Therefore, its highly competitive-internal environment and
flexible organisational structure along with government support and the competitive nature
of the Japanese consumer electronics industry as a whole, meant that it was perhaps
inevitable that Matsushita eventually overtook Philips in the consumer electronics market.
3. The difficulties both companies are having in building the capabilities they bothrecognize as missing.
Philips
Philips decline of success over the last thirty years has been mainly down to the lack of
consistency and the lack of ability to deal with a changing competitive international
environment. In terms of structure, the company has had to change many times and in very
different ways by successive CEOs. Similarly, it has not had a clear strategy or focus since
they started to run into difficulties in the 1960s. Whether strategy follows structure of vice
versa is a matter of great debate which we will look at in depth later.
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A problematic area for Philips has been the struggle to balance the respective roles and
power of the National Organisations (NOs) and the Product Divisions (PDs). This matrix,
which was finally eliminated in the 1990s, did not seem to be hugely successful as there
always existed conflict in terms of power and responsibilities. The power that the NOs
enjoyed seemed detrimental to the PDs, as they often found it difficult to get their voices
heard. The PDs have been restructured on various occasions into separate divisions, and
were finally replaced at the same time as the NOs were. The lack of clarity with respect to
the two meant that Philips was unable to function efficently, and thus has been unable to
build either into a capability.
In terms of structure, Philips used to have a dual management system, which historically
worked for the Philips brothers. This desire to recreate the past as opposed to changing and
looking to the future shows a weakness in Philips culture. This was however eventually
replaced by a more orthodox single management set-up at both corporate and NO level.
Nowadays, the PDNO matrix no longer exists, as the PDs have been replaced by 7
divisions, and day to day responsibility has been passed onto 100 business units (Hill). This
change was a very successful one for Boonstra, who managed to change the fortunes of
Philips in just a few years. This outdated management system, however, held Philips back
at a time when they needed to be looking to the future.
A strategy which has been employed by many of Philips CEOs has been to reduce the
number of products in order to concentrate on making the more basic ones perform to their
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full potential. Defining certain products as core for instance, which was basically those
with strategic importance, was one way of focusing on certain areas and attaining
specialisation. This seems to be a very negative strategy as instead of trying to make this
work, they have historically cut their losses and given up on various products. The closure
of the least efficient plants has also been undertaken by a number of CEOs, meaning the
loss of a large number of jobs on many occasions. In this sense it is clear that it did not treat
its staff in the generous way that Matsushita did, and thus falied to build manpower into a
capability.
Since the consumer electronics industry is ever-changing, firms need to be able to envisage
the future demands of consumers, be able to produce high-quality, high-tech products and
be able to do it at a low price. Philips has failed to manage these three elements effectively,
and thus is suffering the consequences. It has also failed to adapt to the changing demands
and the strengths of the competition, partly due to its confused strategies and its
ever-changing structure.
Matsushita
Matsushita on the other hand has faced quite different problems. As Matsushita has never
been an innovative company, its main capabilities have always been the ability to mass
produce and at low price, due to its production techniques and the fact that it produces in a
low cost area of the world. It has also been quick to market, so that when a competitor
brings out a new and potentially successful product, Matsushita is usually fast in producing
a similar product. This strategy is somewhat risky, as it is dangerous to rely on other
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companies innovation and Research and Development to produce new products.
Historically, the high level of centralisation and the tall structure have hindered
Matsushitas innovation attempts. The presidents in recent years have tried to make
innovation a capability of Matsushita. The hierarchy has been flattened, and restructuring
has finally taken place. After the collapse of the Japanese economy left Matsushita with
excess capacity and evaporating profits, restructuring was certainly necessary, but took
many years until anything was done to correct the situation. This shows that Matsushita
was also slow to manage the changes in the external environment, which we will now
discuss further.
4. The effectiveness of Matsushitas change agenda during the 1980s and 1990s.
In 1982, Matsushitas President, Toshihiko Yamashita, implemented a change programme
known as Operation Localization (Hill, p.527). This was as an attempt to give its overseas
subsidiaries more autonomy in the hope of improving their innovative capacity, and also to
help to develop firm specific advantages (Birkinshaw et al., 1998). By the end of this
period Matsushita was struggling after the Japanese economic recession of the early 1990s.
Therefore, was Matsushita able to manage change effectively throughout the 1980s and
1990s?
Under Operation Localization, however, attempts to give its overseas subsidiaries more
autonomy were to prove challenging, as one of the main problems during this period for
Matsushita was the apparent inability of its overseas operations to become less dependent
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on the Japan-based product divisions. This could be because implementing any change is
not always simple, as there are often various barriers obstructing the process. Johnson
(1992) highlights two main reasons for this: resistance to change and strategic drift
(p.33). In terms of culture there is often a resistance to change, for instance at Matsushita
during Yamashitas Operation Localization the problem of change initially seemed to
rest not with the overseas subsidiaries, but the product divisions as Hill cites: despite his
(Yamashitas) four localizations, overseas companies continued to act primarily as the
implementation arms of central product divisions (p.528). This potentially indicates that
the product divisions found it difficult to limit their interfering in the affairs of overseas
subsidiaries. Whether the product divisions were actually opposed to change remains to be
seen, it could however be argued that the product divisions had been used to one system for
so long it was proving a challenge for them to change. Thus, it appears Matsushita failed to
realisethe potential obstacles when attempting to change.
Furthermore, Yamashitas successor, Akio Tanii, failed to respond adequately to his
predecessors inability to make the overseas subsidiaries more innovative. As Hill states:
he relocated major regional headquarters functions from Japan to North America, Europe,
and Southeast Asia (p.528). Nevertheless, the overseas subsidiaries continued to follow
orders from the product divisions (Hill, p.528). This could be owed to the fact that only
250 of the companys 3000 R&D (Research and Development) scientists and engineers
were located outside Japan (Hill, p.529). If Matsushita wanted its overseas subsidiaries to
be more innovative they perhaps should have located more key R&D staff overseas in
addition to the responsibility delegated. Matsushita may have delegated responsibility to
its overseas subsidiaries to develop more products, but if the subsidiary does not actually
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have the expertise to do so then it is likely to be unsuccessful. Thus, the strategy pursued by
Matsushita appeared to be inconsistent with its overall objective of achieving greater
innovative capacity in its overseas subsidiaries.
With the majority of the organization based in Japan, Matsushita undoubtedly suffered
when the Japanese economy went into recession in 1992 (Hill). Tanii failed to cut costs
sufficiently and was forced to resign (Hill). His successor, Yoichi Morishita, had the task
of restructuring. He began by decentralising more responsibility, but according to Hill the
management seemed unwilling to radically restructure its increasingly inefficient portfolio
of production facilities (p.528) in Japan. This could be seen as an example of resistance to
change, as the management were unwilling to drastically decrease production in Japan.
Moreover, it is also an example of strategic drift as the strategy pursued is not coherent
with its environment (Johnson). This inability to change has prohibited Matsushita
sufficiently recuperating from the economic crash in Japan.
It also seemed that Morishita had lost faith in the overseas subsidiaries to innovate and
develop new technology as he entered into partnership with the Chinese Academy of
Sciences and established the Panasonic Digital Concepts Centre in Silicon Valley (Hill).
Having appeared to be unwilling to invest in research and development at Matsushitas
own overseas subsidiaries, he at least seemed to have acknowledged the need to invest in
new technology. Therefore, although Morishita looked unable to change the situation in
Japan, he was attempting to move the organisation forward.
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Overall, it appears that Matsushita has failed to manage change effectively during the
1980s and 1990s. Although delegating responsibility, successive presidents did not
realise that if they wanted their overseas subsidiaries to be more innovative they needed to
invest in the expertise. Had they done this, the subsidiaries may have developed their own
products, which they could be responsible for selling and not have to be at the mercy of the
Japan-based product divisions. It was only Morishita, in the late 1990s that realised this.
However, he did not restructure the Japan-based production facilities after the recession in
the Japanese economy and, thus the company was unable to reach the levels of profitability
it was used to prior to the recession.
5. Recommendations for Philips.
It is clear to see that Philips quest to build efficiency into its global operations has failed
(Hill). The most recent CEOs, Boonstra and Kleisterlee, have therefore been outsourcing
various products and have turned their attentions to looking for other ways in which Philips
can return to compete with the industry leaders. It possesses capabilities that some of its
competitors does not, and should therefore try to exploit these further. Its ability to
innovate and develop technology is what brought Philips to the forefront of their field
many years ago, and it seems that further investment in R&D and marketing may be the
only way in which its can match the low-cost Japanese advantage of efficiency. However,
if Philips is unsuccessful in becoming a technology developer and global marketer (Hill,
p.524), the fact that it is no longer producing many of its basic products may leave it with
nothing but a bleak looking future. Therefore it should either retain some of its production
to fall back on in case of failure, or invest heavily in its new strategy and encourage
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participation of everyone in order to ensure that it is not another failed strategic change.
Philips also needs to find the correct structure to suit its operations and its strategy. As
Mintzberg (1990) says, structure follows strategy as the left foot follows the right (p.183).
Bearing this in mind, Philips need to find a structure and strategy which are compatible, as
oppose to changing one and trying to make the other one fit. The relationship between
structure and strategy will be further discussed in part 6.B below.
6. Recommendations for Matsushita.
A. Change Management
As has been shown, Matsushita has struggled to restructure its organisation. This can be
seen when analysing Matsushitas attempts to make its overseas subsidiaries more
innovative. The problem with their method seems could be that its programme for change
was too prescriptive, such as the approach favoured by Lewin (in Burnes [1996]). He views
change as a three-step process whereby current attitudes are first unfrozen then moved to
the new level that is desired and finally the new attitudes are refrozen (Burnes, p.11).
This top down, planned approach is seems similar to how Matsushita implemented its
change programme. It appears that the management thought that by giving its overseas
subsidiaries more autonomy it would instantly make them more innovative. However, this
did not happen because as has been highlighted change is not always such a
straightforward process.
Dawson and Wilson (in Burnes) argue that such a prescriptive approach ignores the
dynamic nature of environmental and change processes, and does not address crucial issues
such as the continuous need for employee flexibility and structural adaptation (p.13). Thus,
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although managers at Matsushita attempted to implement a change programme they
perhaps should have considered other factors before deciding on how to embark on a
change programme. If they had used a more bottom up approach, employees may have
been able to warn the management of potential problems that may be in store. For instance,
they may have told their managers that such change programmes could only happen if the
product divisions stopped interfering or that they were given more resources to invest in
research and development.
The emergent approach does have its drawbacks. For instance, it views change as a
long-term process, but if an organisation does not have time on its side then it may find it
difficult to assess all areas of this process. Furthermore, a bottom up approach may be
impractical in an organisation as vast as Matsushita as it would struggle to involve all its
employees. Nevertheless, a compromise could be reached, as Matsushita bosses would not
necessarily have to involve all their employees, but could take a sample and still receive
important feedback.
Burnes even suggests a contingency approach to change management, as in certain
situations a planned and prescriptive approach may be the best option, whereas others may
require an emergent approach. However, he does highlight the difficulty involved in
knowing which approach to change is best for the situation. Nevertheless, it appears a
useful way of looking at change management because at Matsushita there may be
occasions where the changes proposed are relatively simple and do not require consultation.
However, for their current major restructuring process it would be beneficial if Matsushita
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consulted some of its workforce. Had it done this originally it may have had more success
when trying to make its overseas subsidiaries more innovative.
B. Structure and Strategy
There has been much debate around whether a firms strategy is formulated before its
structure (Chandler, 1962 from Miller, 1986) or vice-versa (Hall and Saias, 1980). Miller
(1986), however, argues for a configuration between strategy and structure, whereby
certain structures are appropriate for certain strategies. This is what Matsushita should
focus on, as the important issue for them is not what to formulate first but, that there is a
match between their strategy and their structure.
Miller would suggest that for a conglomerate such as Matsushita it should pursue a
conglomeration and diversification strategy, and should have a divisionalised structure.
Miller believes that the complexity involved in running a diversification strategy would
require a divisionalised structure whereby individual subsidiary managers run their own
operations. This is seemingly what Matsushita has been trying to achieve, as they have
long employed a divisionalised structure and it has been attempting to give its subsidiary
managers more autonomy to run their own operations. However, the subsidiary managers
were unable to achieve this autonomy, as the product divisions kept interfering.
Matsushitas President Nakamura has now integrated the product division structure into
multiproduct production centres. This may reduce costs, but it is difficult to see how this
will stop them interfering overly with their overseas subsidiaries. If these production
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centres do allow their overseas subsidiaries more freedom then this may help to create an
environment of innovation. This, along with Matsushitas new marketing initiative may
help the company to be more locally responsive and although this may come at a
significant cost to Matsushita, its management should be prepared to sacrifice short-term
profits for long-term success.
Finally, Matsushita must recognise that restructuring is more dynamic than the relationship
between strategy and structure. As has been shown, change is not a simple process and has
many potential barriers. If Matsushita fails to realise this then it will struggle with its
restructuring programme.
7. Conclusion
Overall, it is relatively apparent that both organisations have seen better days. We believe
that both companies should focus on their own capabilities instead of trying to match each
others. Also, they should use different approaches to change, as their previous attempts
have proved unsuccessful. Philips needs to see this latest change as a genuine one, and
needs to avoid considering it as just another new strategic direction. If it does this, and
everyone is involved and committed, then we feel that they can return to the success they
enjoyed last century. The prognosis is similar for Matsushita, as if its management engage
in consultation with its workforce when undergoing its large-scale restructuring
programme and carefully analyse the dynamic relationship between strategy and structure
when doing so, its restructuring programme has every chance of succeeding. Thus,
Matsushita may once again be able to return to the levels of success it was once used to.
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WORDS 3,832
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