3.5 - misgeld, dieter - modernity, democracy and social engineering (en)

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Modernity, Democracy and Social Engineering

Modernity, Democracy and Social Engineering

by Dieter Misgeld

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1987, pages: 268-285, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=0a3d3f96-8ad3-4089-b110-89e4753b2d5chttp://www.ceeol.com/


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MODERNITY, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALENGINEERING

Dieter MisgeldTwenty years ago Juergen Habermas initiated a debate between hermeneutics and critical social theory which many judge to have come to an end.Those who make this judgment either argue that Hans-Georg Gadamer'smetacritical objections to Habermas' critique of his position are conclusive orat least carry enough force to regard the outcome as open-ended; others

believe that Habermas has clearly identified the limits of the hermeneuticalclaim to universality and that he has shown, for the area of social theory, thathermeneutics cannot have the last word. 1 Recently, however, Richard Rortyand Richard Bernstein have entered the debate introducing American pragmatism as a participant in it.2 Thus it becomes once again worthwhile toexamine this influential debate, by taking account of the changed constellationof arguments.Rorty's and Bernstein's interventions have picked out features of the debatebetween hermeneutics and critical social theory, which played a less significant role in its earlier phase. In this paper I shall address some of these newconsiderations and reinterpret the debate with reference to them.(1) Cultural Pessimism, the Iron Cage and Modernity

It is often forgotten that critical social theory and hermeneutics share somecommon cultural background. From the Lukacs of Soul and Form to theDialectic ofEnlightenment Frankfurt school social thought has been influencedby German 'Kulturkritik' since Nietzsche, and the skepticism about modernity characteristic of it. 3 And since the Heidegger ofBeing and Time twentiethcentury hermeneutics as it developed in Germany can hardly be understoodwithout some reference to this cultural milieu. Both traditions also have madephilosophy the centerpiece of their diagnosis of the times and of the crisis ofmodernity.In a variety of ways Kulturkritik saw modern society as a decline ofEuropean civilization. For it, the 'West' (i.e. Western Europe) had succumbed to mechanistic thought, materialism and individualism. 4 A general stateof uprootedness, of the diremtion of cultural and spiritual roots and connections, was seen as the consequence of massive and accelerated industrialization, democratization and urbanization. The development of natural scienceand technology were placed into this socio-cultural context. The Frankfurtschool has had a highly critical relation to Kulturkritik, but it has alsoincorporated some of its features into its critique of twentieth century masssocieties. 5But apart from any specific links between his earlier philosophy and thePraxis International 7:3/4 Winter 1987/8 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 269themes of Kulturkritik it matters more to recognize, in Heidegger's case, thathis preference for poetry over technical philosophy, his partially criticalinterpretation of 'das Man' in Sein und Zeit and his general neglect of socialand political philosophy, as well as of the social sciences reflect the perspectiveof Kulturkritik, which rested upon the separation, in Germany, of thehumanistic and historical disciplines from the new social disciplines andscientific and technological education.6 It is the strength of Heidegger'sphilosophy to have given coherent expression to the entire amalgam ofthoughts and intuitions attempting to break out of the iron cage of occidentalrationalisation (Weber) as it developed in Germany since Nietzsche and tohave rethought it in the face of the classical tradition of philosophy. WithHorkheimer/Adorno he has the view in common, that Greek metaphysics (itssense of the ideal), Cartesian epistemology and Kantian idealism have beenformative in occidental history. This holds, even if Horkheimer/Adorno (inthe Dialectic of Enlightenment) attempt to undermine the dominance of thesetraditions by sidestepping them, while Heidegger makes them encompass allof Western history. But in either case the history in question is a history ofreason confronted with unreason or reason's other.7 The subversion of reasontypical ofGerman critiques ofmodern culture since romanticism is somethinglike the background story to the philosophical drama in question.Hans-Georg Gadamer takes a more moderate view of these matters. Buteven he is deeply formed by a culture of academic learning which looks forsatisfactions beyond the profane daily realities ofmodern life. Culture largelyconsists in the knowledge of those educated in the humanistic disciplines,classical learning and in the arts. The favoured model of communication is oneof cultured and leisurely conversation, securely grounded in a sense of thecontinuity of cultural traditions. It is on the background of this experiencethat the 'problems of men' (John Dewey) in modernity are seen. Pessimismcomes in from the edges, so to speak. That is: Wherever we can perceivecultured conversation to no longer be a force or possibility. This is wheretechnological and scientific manipulation prevail or the tyranny of socialengineering experts unschooled in the modes of liberal discourse and tolerantand open-minded communication available to those initiated into a longhistory of philosophical, literary and artistic erudition.Juergen Habermas begins from a very different position. He responds tothe other side of German social and cultural thought since the 1920's. In theGerman-produced split between culture and civilization he takes the side ofcivilization, where the others primarily took the side of culture. He respondsto the interest in 'Realwissenschaft', first introduced by Max Weber into socialthought.8 Realwissenschaft is, after all, something like the sociologicalresponse to the unromantic side of Hegel. It has found philosophicalexpression in Nietzsche,9 just as much as the aesthetic/romantic side of 19thcentury German intellectual culture. And it is part and parcel of Heidegger'sthought on technology, influenced by Ernst Juenger. The essense of this'realistic' approach to culture and society can be assembled in one phrase:Mastery of technology as a moraVpolitical necessity ofmodern civilization, nomatter what the moral and political price. 10

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270 Praxis I ntemationalHabermas responds to the immoralism and 'antihumanism' implicit in thewill to mastery first expressed by Max Weber, and since Max Weberaccompanied by fatalism or pessimism. It is on this background, that oneneeds to reappraise the debate between hermeneutics, critical theory and

neopragmatism.Largely, the interpretive moves suggested by Bernstein and Rorty liberatethe debate from the constraints of the German cultural situation in the early20th century and, beside various specific concerns regarding the contemporary philosophy of science, they transport it into a new environment:American pragmatism. Two features of it surface in the debate:(a) American pragmatism at its core is a theory of democracy. Its veryraison d'etre is the furtherance of democracy, John Dewey is its centralfigure. Despite his frequent criticisms of twentieth century American societyJohn Dewey had an unbroken confidence in the potential of this society tobecome increasingly democratic. By developing the employment of humanintelligence in action it was expected to constantly extend the range of socialcommunication. Deweyan pragmatism represents the belief that commonsense, the development of science and the realization of aesthetic values can bemade to converge, in the organization of a richly diverse, yet efficient civicculture capable of mastering the problems of modernity. Democracy consistsin the building of a culture which can fruitfully combine these elements. Assuch it becomes social democracy. 11 Neither Rorty nor Bernstein repudiatethis Deweyan vision so antithetical to German neomarxist or conservativecultural theory emerging during the very decades in which Dewey wrote.They also regard themselves as Deweyan social democrats. 12(b) The world of pragmatism or neopragmatism is a world in whichtechnology is not feared. Rather, technology is often seen as a plausible meansfor solving or redressing human and social problems, even when it takes theform of a controlled regulation of social practices. It is this controlledregulation which we call social engineering, itself deriving from thedominance of problem-solving as an attitude to life.Rorty regards both aspects ofNorth-American pragmatic culture as equallyimportant. Bernstein primarily emphasises democratic culture, and interpretstwo Germans (Gadamer, Habermas) and one German Jewish emigre (Arendt)to have made clearer for us, how the concerns of social engineering are noteasily integrated with those of civic democratic culture. 13Bernstein separates democracy from technology and social engineering. Acommunity of interests in Dewey's sense cannot be engineered or created inadministrative action. If democracy is to create 'a freer and more humaneexperience in which all share and to which all can contribute', this formulationofDewey's quoted by Bernstein points in the direction of 'furthering the typeof solidarity, participation and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogicalcommunities'.14

By building on Gadamer, Habermas and Arendt, Bernstein introduces theclassical distinction between praxis and techne into the discussion of therelation between science, technology and democracy in the contemporaryworld.


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Praxis International 271Rorty is not interested in the praxis and techne distinction nor the idea ofthe polis. While he favours conversation just as much as the three philosophers who for Bernstein champion these ideas more than anyone else, he doesnot regard conversation as exclusive of technology or science. The nature of

conversation depends on the issues at hand, processes of inquiry as theydevelop in their specifics, and the links to practical life in the society whichthey may variously possess.Therefore the debate can be given a sharper focus, I believe, if we avoidblurring the differences between Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty. This is theopposite of Bernstein's procedure who has them all express a vision ofdialogical communities. For Bernstein, Rorty also appears to favour the valueswhich the mentioned Europeans share. For Rorty displays an affinity to theliterary culture and its notions of conversation, which Gadamer has identifiedas our guide for the interpretation of texts and of the cultural tradition of theWest. ISBernstein minimizes cultural and historical differences which stand in thebackground of the philosophies discussed. American pragmatism and socialscience have in common, that they regard social experimentation andproblem-solving as a dimension of public debate or the other way around.This is one of the contexts for the pursuit of more dialogue on Rorty's part.However, the understanding of culture derived from nineteenth centuryGerman historicism and fin de siecle antiidealist stirrings in Germany whichGadamer's work resonates with, has other preoccupations: There can be nogreater contrast for it than the one between the great works of the past andmodern technological production geared toward mass-consumption. 16Therefore civilized conversation, conversation as the love of historical erudition informs Gadamer's understanding of dialogue.Habermas' position is quite different. For him a reflection on history isneeded, which transcends the boundaries of both problem-solving and ofcultural conversation, connecting both with the defense of and an argumentfor the further development of democracy. In his case, the issue is not somuch the creation of dialogical communities, rather the institutionalisation ofdialogue as a principle in all the relevant dimensions of modern societies.Habermas responds to the traditions of democratic socialism in WesternEurope. 17 By failing to trace these differences Bernstein does not address theabsence of democracy as a theme in the thought of Heidegger or Adorno,Gadamer or Lukacs. Primarily they do not regard democracy as a significantdimension of modernity. When democracy moves to the centre of theinterpretation of modernity, as it does with Habermas and Rorty, the relationbetween democratic civic culture and problem solving as an attitude ofpractical mastery becomes central. If Bernstein and Rorty begin from theassumption, that philosophy cannot be disengaged from the civic culture ofdemocracy, German cultural pessimism and the disdain with modernity,coupled with the fatalism which it expressed-from Weber to Heidegger andGadamer-tends to regard poetry, philosophy or masculine individual heroism as the opponents of mass-democracy. 18 Modern democracies do notpossess the civic culture nor the civic virtues of (for example) ancient Greece


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272 Praxis Internationalor Rome. They are suffused with the spirit of social engineering. Democracyand technology coalesce into one system of domination and control, as forAdorno and Heidegger. Philosophy must seek ways to escape from this cageor to live in it without being of it.

If Gadamer increasingly learns to accept modernity and contemporaryliberal democracy, 19 he is still far from endorsing struggles for the realizationof political and social freedoms. But he also learns to accept that having thesestruggles may not be a loss. If Rorty fuses democracy with problem solving,and sees social engineering both as a danger and a promise,20 he is still farfrom the doubts about modern societies which inform the German philosophers mentioned. Even Habermas perceives a deep division in modern societybetween the culture of discourse and technological/administrative progress.Therefore he can hardly welcome more instrumental knowledge as part of thesolution, as Rorty still is inclined to do. 21

If German philosophy (of the kind discussed) raises the broadest questionsconceivable about the future of the West, a world civilization and its nature,pragmatists such as Rorty favour questions, which can be practicallyaddressed, which are answerable on those grounds. This entails thinking lessof philosophy and more of social practice (to speak with Rorty).The lesson to be learned from these criss-crossing observations weavingtogether different cultural histories and philosophies, different societies in theabstract, so to speak, is that we need to ask broad and far reaching questionsabout modern civilization and its practices, without being certain that ourtheories can provide answers to these questions. Nevertheless, keeping thesequestions alive is important. It may help us develop the social visions22required for the future. And, for the time being proceeding this way allows usto employ hermeneutics and critical theory on the one hand, neopragmatismon the other, as each correcting a onesidedness of the other.This is what Bernstein has begun to do and similar clues can be elicitedfrom Rorty's treatment of Gadamer as a critic of epistemology, as well fromhis attempt to split the difference, as he says, between Lyotard andHabermas.23 And, as far as Gadamer and Habermas are concerned, they havetransformed the critique of modernity engaged in by Heidegger and, respectively, Adorno; in their hands questions of the broadest possible rangeencompassing the entire history of Western societies have been refashioned toaddress uncertainties about the future of modern societies in such away, thatwe can at least understand them as looking for practical answers, thus meetingRorty and his neopragmatism mid-way.(2) Social Engineering and Discourse

Pragmatists, neopragmatist philosophers as well as social scientists andsociologists influenced by pragmatism do not share the general abhorrence ofsocial engineering so typical of some of their European interlocutors primarilyinfluenced by the classical traditions of philosophy on the continent and bytraditional humanism.Where philosophers from Nietzche to Heidegger or Adorno and a


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Praxis International 273sociologist such as Weber recoil from the idea of the rational regulation ofsociety advocated by either Comte or Durkheim, pragmatists think thatrational regulation maybe a good idea, as long as it is made to be compatiblewith democracy, i.e. the extension of social communication.24

But what if in the course of the historical development of methods for theregulation ofwork, and leisure, of private and public life, the democratic formof experimenting with education and community-organization has given wayto the prevalence of time-motion studies and the organization of work inassembly-lines? If it has led to the massive growth of advertising in contemporary culture, the systematic attempt to harness needs, desires and phantasies to a gigantic machinery of wish-fullfilment using scientific technologiesin the organization of behaviour?The historical changes in question demand an analysis of the transformationof democracy, especially in the United States. While American democracymay once have been rooted in the local community and in face-to-face socialrelations (as Dewey always stressed, perhaps making too much of this) it isnow organized more abstractly into media-bound plebiscitary forms. In short,a theory of late capitalism is needed to take account of these changes. It iscentral to recent critical theory. This theory also addresses the theme of thetransformation of community-based types of morality into instrumentalisthedonism and into a widespread materialist ethics linked with theconsumption-patterns of late capitalist societies. These developments take usfar beyond the social vision of Deweyan pragmatism, no matter how muchDewey expressed doubts about the development of American capitalism anddemocracy in some of his writings. 2sAnd neopragmatist social philosophers such as Rorty or Bernstein have noteven begun to elaborate a social vision reaching beyond that of classicalpragmatism. They have not developed its critique ofAmerican society. Bernsteinimplicity favours Gadamer's Aristotelianism and Arendt's revolutionarypolitical humanism and her philosophy of 'praxis' over Dewey's socialdemocratic reformism, thus blunting the modernist and progressive intent ofthe pragmatism which he still retains, or the links between it and Habermas'radically democratic ethos.26 Rorty is more concerned than Bernstein todefend the emancipatory elements of American culture and to keep it apartfrom European social thought. He endorses social engineering and thepossible increase in instrumental knowledge which it may provide as achievements transcending the limits of traditional European culture. With him andDewey one may interpret socially engineered forms of social regulation asmodes of practical deliberation. They entail the controllability of sequences ofaction in specific situations and with respect to particular goals. Growth insocial engineering techniques, from advertizing to educational psychology andmental health programmes, certainly is not an unmixed blessing, but it alsomay not merely be a disaster. It is a part of a process of the intellectualisationof culture, a phenomenon on which Dewey and Weber agreed. For Dewey (asnow for Rorty) this process is all for the better; thus education-as theconscious development of intelligence in society-was said by Dewey to be thechief vehicle of social reform.27 For him America already was past the point of


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274 Praxis Internationaldefending the status quo, represented by the older European civilizations.Intellectualization, the widening of a culture's grasp of the practices constitutive of its organization, is for the better, insofar as it allows for the constantreadjustment of practices. Under suitable conditions it could even mean thewidening of experience in the earlier mentioned sense. For Dewey experiencecould become more social, and inclusionary, culture less aristocratic and moreopen to popular participation, if the spirit of experimentation and thecommunal process of inquiry practiced in the sciences could be extended to allof culture. Rorty's metaphilosophical arguments point into the samedirection.However, Dewey's overall optimism was sustained by assumptions, whichmade him regard nature, history and culture as one continuous whole. He didnot see human societies as standing outside nature, but as organized systemsof responses to their environment. Some of these responses could include, ofcourse, the making over of nature, adjusting it to human purposes, especiallyin modernity.Not so for a neopragmatist like Rorty. There is a gap between nature andsociety, even if there is no deep metaphysical divide between methods ofinquiry applying to both.But culture is sustained in conversation, modes of inquiry geared towardproblem-solving are not. Social policy may be, must be oriented to problemsolving. But culture is not. Edifying discourse is about interesting ways tothink of ourselves and to speak accordingly. Natural scientific inquiry andpublic policy are there for coping with whatever imposes the requirement onus to be coped with.As interesting as these suggestions are, however, they fail to respond to thedeeply rooted tendency in modern societies (especially in American society),to regard all action as designed and designable, as forms of "techne", to speakwith Gadamer, Arendt and Bernstein. Dewey's vision of education as thedevelopment and creative application of intelligence in social experience isitself preparatory of these tendencies, because he regards the broadening andenriching of social experience as being of one piece with an increase incapacities for instrumental mastery. For him (possibly for Rorty as well) socialinstitutions have not kept pace with the progress of knowledge in science.28Already at the time of th publication of Dewey's "Democracy andEducation" attempts were made in the U.S. to (for example) organizeeducation just like factory work. Education was separated from the process ofinterpreting and transforming cultural meanings. The mastery of bits ofinformation became the hallmark of behaviorist redesigns of school andcollege cirricula.29Neopragmatists have failed to address these phenomena. Were they to facethese developments, they would notice, that democratic civic culture primarily eithergoes with the preservation and creative rearticulation of cultural meanings or withsocial engineering conceptions, the myth of ever more efficient action. They wouldhave to take on the industrial model of activity first developed in conjunctionwith liberal economics, then fused with conceptions of scientific inquiry inearly pragmatism, and finally generalized by Dewey to become a general


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Praxis International 275model of social cooperation. This model still responds to ideas of socialcooperation as a strategic coordination of perceptions, ideas, and needs. Itdoes not sufficiently recognize cultural tradition as the horizon for thetransformation of social values, thus failing to account for this process as oneof interpretation an.d reflection. 30Were neopragmatists to pursue these critical inquiries into their owntradition, they could no longer simply opt for the strengthening of dialogicalcommunities (as Bernstein does) without considering the conditions whichmake this aim difficult to achieve, even to understand. They could no longersidestep the difficlllties contained in Dewey's vision of a society unitingefficient action with cultural and aesthetic creativity as Rorty does, by relyingon the old liberal distinction between the public domain of policy-making andthe private sphere of aesthetic fulfilment. 31Therefore, Rorty's tentative affinity to European skepticism and its sense ofcultural malaise, aIld Bernstein's more explicit incorporation of Habermas,Gadamer, Arendt into one conception of civic democratic culture do not facethe issues.But Rorty may still be right in believing that a view of social practices asdesigned to help us cope, looking at them as if they are, is the essence ofwhatis good about the I)ragmatist vision. In his view we need not look for somebasic epistemological rationale, with reference to which we can say, once andfor all, that human action relevant to the coordination of social behaviour is ofeither one conceptu.al kind or another. We need not look for some basic set ofexplanatory or even descriptive terms, which identify the meaning of action insome conclusive way.Rather the point is, that given certain kind of social and cultural history,actions of any kind which contribute to the coordination of social behaviourcan be taken to be designed, deliberately constructed, whenever we find ituseful to look at them this way. That North-American societies have a longerhistory of social engineering than other societies simply means, that membersof these societies find it more natural to look at social behaviour in theseterms.Under the historical conditions mentioned it therefore becomes natural tobelieve that social customs, conventions and long accepted beliefs are no morethan habits of thinking and doing. They have been found to work, tillchallenged by some other way of doing things. Thus Rorty need not challengesocial engineering as a fundamentally misguided practice of organising socialbehaviour. It just doesn't happen to be good or useful for all we want to doand can do. And he can also argue that social engineering need not be what thesocial sciences primarily endeavour to do. 'If we get rid of traditional notionsof "objectivity" and "scientific method" we shall be able to see the socialsciences as continuous with literature-as interpreting other people to us, andthus enlarging and deepening our sense of community'.32 The social sciencescan bring the poor, the disadvantaged, the handicapped closer to the educatedmembers of the middle classes.When reaching this point or a similar crossroads as mentioned earlier, onewonders, of course, whether Habermas has not expressed the same views


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276 Praxis Internationalmore cogently. Habermas argues, after all, that as long as we operate withconcepts of technically controllable action as our primary model of socialaction, we can only adopt policies toward the poor and disadvantaged, whichare inspired by concepts of social engineering. They have the consequencethat aiding the poor and handicapped becomes indistinguishable fromcontrolling them. Social work can become a form of policing, as it often is,and Skinnerian behaviour modification or sociological systems-theory, forexample, can be used as a blue print for a technocratic utopia, in which allhuman and social practices, all institutions are seen as designed.In that event, everyone's capacities and competencies will be registeredobjectively and a giant apparatus of objectifying methods results, whichundermines the sources of social solidarity and conscious reflection.Habermas also believes, with Weber, that modern societies are inescapablysubject to the pressures of rationalization. People in modern societies cannotbut tend to regard all practices and conventions as redesignable. This is theforce of the economic, administrative and military apparatus to which we allare subject.33But we should also strive to get out from under this pressure of rationalization, so that it does not merely compel us onward, as if we were driven by anatural force. We should learn to identify possibilities for a more consciousappropriation of cultural practices, which permit their regulation throughdiscourse. Discourse and argumentation are regarded as the alternative tosocial engineering, which helps us keep it under control.

Thus the poor, disadvantaged and handicapped are thought of as having arightful claim to better treatment. Practical discourses about respectiveentitlements ensue, which only makes sense from a position, which acceptsthe equality of all as a principle, as well as the principle of the liberty of all toengage in discourse.Here the Kantian distinction between practical and theoretical reasonreturns, and with it the primacy of practical reason, which Gadamer defendsas well.Pragmatism and sometimes neo-pragmatism as well, lack the persuasiveness of this position, because they do not sufficiently recognize inprinciple differences, the discontinuity between the designing processesengaged in by social engineers, and practical discourse as deliberation aboutprinciples of fair treatment. Thus pragmatism, taken by itself, cannot defendthe civic culture ofmodern democratic societies with sufficient force. It fails toeven notice how the terrain has changed in the relevant kind of societies, sincethe emergence of the welfare state, and the refinement of techniques ofadministration, managerial supervision and policing (although even Rorty andcertainly Bernstein are aware of these developments). Thus pragmatistscannot face the fact, that the theoretical employment of reason often takes theform of designing methods for the organization and reorganization of life,which are divorced from the cultural understandngs formative for our socialand cultural existence.For Habermas, there cannot be a significant diagnosis of our times whichdoes not take account of deep divisions in modern cultures and societies.


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Praxis International 277Modernity, a term evocative of the transformations having taken place inWestern-Europe and North-America since the 18th century (at least), hasemerged through repeated resolutions to profound conflicts, in struggles fordemocracy and social emancipation, often (and increasingly in our times) inthe face of increasingly powerful economic and administrative systems.Questions about the relations between the future of civic culture in modernsocieties and social engineering therefore cannot be posed without anexamination of this history as a whole. 34Neopragmatism also needs to be confronted with a culturalist view ofhistory, such as Gadamer's. This view has its bearings in a conception ofeducation resting on grounds neither geared toward the production ofefficiency in action as the primary goal nor mastery knowledge.Indeed, Gadamer's work is so important, because it is one of the fewconclusive constructions of this conception of education. It reflects forms ofcultural learning connected with those spheres of social communication,which do not appear as economically or administratively regulated forms, atleast not primarily. They are the background to Gadamer's rehabilitation ofpractical philosophy in the face of the modern preoccupation with technique. 35

(3) Modernity, Discourse and PracticeIs practical rationality still in a position to cope with the progressivelyforceful rationalisation of social practices due to the employment of socialtechnologies?Habermas and Gadamer share the assumption that practical reason andpractical rationality are endangered. Practical reason represents social solidarity. Solidarity is sustained in communication. Whatever regulates socialaction without recourse to deliberative practices sustained in communication,is a danger for those practices.Any regulation of social action without such recourse can only engineerconsent to decisions already taken. It is indifferent to the cultural grounds for

making consent recognizable as consent or to its democratic realization.Members of modern societies therefore become subject to the application oftechnical rules and strategies, which ignore their self-understanding aspractical subjects.Developments of this kind may endanger personal identity and the identityof cultures. The critique of utilitarianism and individualism, or of materialistcivilization, which took shape in various European countries since the 18thcentury and was very strongly expressed in Germany since Hegel and Germanromanticism, furnishes an ambivalent background to this critique of socialengineering. Gadamer and Habermas differ in their respective evaluations ofthis background, but they agree that resistance to social engineering can onlyarise from domains of culture and society which never will be (Gadamer) orhave not yet been subject (Habermas) to the corresponding i m p e r a t i v ~ s ofrationalisation. Yet there are important differences: For Gadamer progress


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278 Praxis Internationalalways only means technological progress, even if he concedes that theacceptance of the freedom of all as a principle is indeed a historical gain. Butthis insight remains without consequence due to the absence of a theory ofdemocracy in his work. 36 For Habermas the continued democratisation ofknowledge claims and social i ~ t e r e s t s remains a central aim; it requires theovercoming of obstacles to the development of discourse, including theobstacles resulting from a one-sided growth in technical, administrative andeconomic rationality. Therefore his theory has forms of domination (and theircritique) as a theme, while Gadamer fails to address them, as Bernstein hasnoted. 37But this difference mostly concerns the mode of legitimation ofdomination:For Habermas th power of instrumental rationality legitimates new forms ofdomination in modern societies. They require analysis beyond the critique oftechne engaged in by Gadamer in his frequent references to the tyranny ofexperts. Habermas also differs from Gadamer insofar as he has littleconfidence in the power of phronesis as an antidote to the power of technicalreason. Phronesis may have been a living force in small communities oflike-minded citizens (the utopia of conservatives). But modern societies are farremoved from this state. 38 The prudent application of general norms toparticular cases thus hardly seems to be sufficient as a counterforce to thepredominance of techne or social engineering. Rather, a new interpretation ofthe pragmatist idea ofproblem-solving has to be given, which helps us identifythe entire conceivable range and the possible types of social learning. Thecritique of domination must be located in this domain.Gadamer cannot raise the issue of domination as Habermas does, because heshares Max Weber's skeptical (or even desperate) antiutopianism: There areno human societies, ancient or modern, in which power is not a problem. Thequestion is whether much can be done about it and whether attempting to domuch might not lead to more domination. The answer is that little can be doneother than to curtail the abuse of power. But domination in one form oranother will not go away. Moderation in practice and in its theoretical critiqueis integral to Gadamer's position.Hermeneutical anti-utopianism disciplines cultural pessimism and transforms it into conservatively cautious pragmatism, not far removed from ideasof crisis management applicable under conditions of an emerging planetarycivilization. This is the hard edge of Gadamer's position neglected byBernstein39 (and other American commentators). It reveals another side ofGadamer's notion of dialogue, less inspired by Plato and German romanticismthan by the political realism implicit in Hegel's conservative legacy. Thereforeone needs to distinguish two tendencies in Gadamer's thought:(a) He argues at times, as if cultural traditions, historical languages,customs or institutions (e.g. the "family") are constitutive features of ourlives, just like distinctions between "public" and "private" or "art" and"science". They therefore cannot be called into question at all, as theyunderlie any question we may raise about them. The ontological shift ofhermeneutics40 seals such (supposedly) fundamental realities into permanentdimensions of human life, even if what they mean to us will change


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Praxis International 279historically. Thus these terms are treated at times as if their meaning wasfixed, once and for all. 41(b) But Gadamer also believes that it is practically dangerous to believethat inherited customs, traditions or institutions can no longer provideguidance with respect to the present.These two arguments are not compatible. The ontological argument ofhermeneutics places institutions and practices beyond the realm of practicalappraisals and beyond social contestation. But these are the domains inwhich their significance is discovered. The warnings against the neglect ofhistorical awareness really should have their place in a debate about theviability of institutions and practices, as we know them, i.e. as modern ones.It follows that Habermas has done greater justice to this issue. By studiouslyavoiding ontology he has made room for discourse and a public process ofdebate, in which the various appraisals made in modern societies ofinherited institutions and practices can be challenged. It follows that he isright when he argues that only the conscious pursuit of agreement can lead toacceptable resolutions of conflict. Gadamer retreats from this solution byonly arguing, in general terms, for the need to compromise in all matters ofmajor public concern. Indeed compromise, cautious management of conflictsbecomes the essence of politics for him, or a version of enlightened"Realpolitik". Thus Gadamer grants indirectly that tradition, authority, thefamily no longer have an uncontested meaning, beyond the meaning given tothese terms in the course of their publicly negotiated interpretation. But likeothers of his generation he is misled by doubts about modernity intoadopting the belief, that there are great traditions of civilization reachingbeyond modernity which can still be known to us. Even if he was right, wewould need accounts of them as they might enter into modern life throughour practical appraisals of present-day institutions and practices. Otherwise,one can only fail to comprehend the force of this conservative vision criticalof the present.So far hermeneutical philosophers have not given such accounts, other thanby appealing to phronesis, conversation and discriminating judgment in verygeneral terms. In the face of this, theories addressing the self-transformativepotential of modernity (such as Habermas's) seem to have the upper hand.Contrary to hermeneutics, pragmatists and neopragmatists alike are quite athome in modernity as the terrain in which new forms of social cooperationalready have been and may yet be worked out in the future. By arguing formore conversation in the present (as Bernstein and Rorty do) they avoid theconflict about the relation between our historical past and a conceivablefuture, which lies at the centre of the argument between hermeneuticalphilosophers and critical theorists. His neopragmatist endorsement ofDewey's concern with the daily detail, the every-day practice of inquiry andsocial reconstruction, locates Rorty in particular beyond the struggles for the

meaning of modernity as a whole which philosophers such as Habermas orGadamer can never ignore, embroiled as they are in deep conflicts betweensocialist-avantgarde, liberal-democratic, and conservative/aristocratic socialand cultural traditions. With Bernstein and Rorty American consensus


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280 Praxis I ntemationalpolitics is sanctioned as a principle of debate even for the articulation ofintellectual differences.42Neopragmatists depend on liberal democracies in their existing state. Theirvision of the future of modernity relies on it. Comprehensive theories ofmodernity which critical theorists favour have the advantage that they enableus to look beyond liberal democracies in their existing state. This is a stepwhich neither Rorty nor Gadamer take. But it is doubtful, on the groundsprovided by hermeneutics and neopragmatism, that comprehensive theoriesof modernity can ever amount to more than narratives addressing the future,the details of which can only be articulated in the course of practice and inconfrontation with specific issues of the times. Certainly one such issue issocial engineering and the possible atrophy of capacities for normative andpractical deliberation. The philosophies discussed all agree that what mattersin the end is how things are worked out in practice. Yet they differ withrespect to the nature and meaning of practice. Critical theory, hermeneutics,and neopragmatism will meet their final test in a confrontation with sociallyconsequential contemporary forms of practical knowledge. These encompasspolicy studies and applied social science as well as the interpretive knowledgeof daily life.In this confrontation cultural pessimism and the reserved acceptance ofmodernity by hermeneutics need to be transformed into detailed practicalskepticism informed by a profound appreciation of the historical dimensionsof human life.By comparison critical theory represents a theory of modernity primarilyreferring to its conceivable future. Its appraisal of the past always also takesthe form of a defense of modernity coupled with its critique. Among thetheories in question it is the only one providing the conceptual means foracquiring a comprehensive understanding of all possible dimensions of socialprogress.Once again turning to neopragmatism one can easily grant it the last word:Social visions of any kind need to be worked out in practice. But taken byitself, this last word embodies a truism. It only gains its force vis-a.-viscomprehensive reflections on the historical past and the societal future.Hermeneutics and critical theory engage in this reflection. Both have thecritique of instrumental reason as their central theme. So far neopragmatistshave not been able to fully incorporate this critique. They lack the determination to either continue or reject Dewey's defense and critique of NorthAmerican culture, their assimilation of the European thinkers mentionednotwithstanding.43

NOTES1. Habermas's review of Gadamer's Wahrheit undMethode, originally published in 1967 and republishedin his Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: 1970 and 1982, Sukrkamp), pp. 89-330, initiated thedebate. The text has appeared in English translation in R. Dallmayr, Th. A. McCarthy, Understan

ding and Social Inquiry (Lafayette, ind.: 1977, University of Notre Dame Press) pp. 335-363. Thenext phase of the debate is well documented in the collection Hermeneutik und I deologiekritik


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Praxis International 281(Frankfurt: 1971, Sukrkamp). J. Habermas's "Interpretive Social Science vs Hermeneuticism" In N.Haan et aI, Social Science as Moral Inquiry (New York: 1983, Columbia University Press) is the lastexplicit contribution to the debate either by him or by Gadamer.

2. Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror ofNature (Princeton: 1979, Princeton University Press), andR.J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia:1983, University of Pennsylvania Press), as well as his Philosophical Profiles. Essays in a PragmaticMode (Philadelphia: 1986, University of Pennsylvania Press). Rorty's Consequences of Pragmatism(Minneapolis: 1982, University of Minnesota Press), makes clear how deeply he is influenced byDewey's pragmatism, more so than one could have expected when reading his earlier work. He evensays somewhere that his formulations appear to him at times to be mere restatements of Deweyanviews. However, R.W. Sleeper's critical comments make one doubt the plausibility of his modestself-characterization. Cf. R.W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven: 1986, YaleUniversity Press).Pragmatism is hardly mentioned at all in R. Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, apartfrom his discussion of Rorty's neopragmatism. But his Philosophical Profiles contain a recent essay onDewey (cf. "John Dewey on Democracy, The Task Before us." pp. 260-272). And his instructiveessay "What is the Difference that Makes a Difference? Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty" (1986, pp.58-93) exemplifies the pragmatic strategy of minimizing theoretical differences for the sake of givingprofile to a common theme, that of a "non-foundational pragmatic humanism", which may "enable usto cope with the darkness of our times and of our praxis" (p. 93). In one instance he even makesGadamer and Dewey speak with one voice (p. 92) while also noting, that Gadamer has never come toterms with the American pragmatic tradition (p. 91). My own essay is meant to oppose this tendencytoward the levelling of differences, which Bernstein practices, despite the promise contained in thetitle of his study.

3. Cf. Habermas' account of Lukasc's and Horkheimer/Adorno's dependency on Weber's theory ofoccidental rationalization in Theory ofCommunicative Action, Vol. 1 (Boston: 1984, Beacon Press), pp.339-402. In Der philosophische Diskurs dec Moderne (Frankfurt: 1985, Suhrkamp), pp. 153-158, heargues that the Dialectic of Enlightenment interprets cultural modernity on the background ofNietzsche's critique of modernity. Kulturkritik even shapes the structural relation between Adorno'sNegative Dialektik and his Asthetische Theorie. Aesthetic modernity becomes the guide for the critiqueof morality and science.

4. Heidegger 's affinity to Kulturkri tik has been analysed sociologically by Pierre Bourdieu in his"L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger." Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, Nr. 5-6, 1975.H.G. Gadamer takes exception to Bourdieu's "sociological reductionism". But otherwise he grantsthe correctness of Bourdieu's historical reconstruction. Cf. his review in Philosophische Rundschau,1979, Nr. 3, p. 143. In Gadamer's own case, one needs to take note of his relation to Stefan Georgeand his circle. Cf. Philosophische Lehrjahre. Frankfurt , 1977, Klostermann, p. 16/17. Adorno'srelation to Kulturkritik is balanced by his commitment to avantgarde art and to the defense of culturalmodernity. However, in his important book Kritik dec Macht (Frankfurt 1985, SUhrkamp) AxelHonneth mentions resemblances between theDialectic ofEnlightenment and a theme to be found in L.Klages' work (cf. p. 54 and note 25 to Chapter 2). Klages was an important representative ofKulturkritik influenced by Lebensphilosophie, he decried the destruction of life or the 'soul' by theanalytically oriented intellect. For further information see the fascinating book by R. Wiggershaus,Die Frankfurter Schule. Geschichte. Theoretische Entwicklung, Politische Bedeutung, (Munchen: 1986,Carl Hanser).

5. Adorno's metacritique of Kulturkritik notwithstanding Cf. Prisms (Cambridge: 1981, MIT Press), pp.17-34. The term 'mass' is used quite naively in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Adorno's discussions ofthe culture industry and his use of the notion of affirmative culture (even in his Asthetische Theorie)assume the frictionless integration a of large section of the population in late capitalist societies intoimposed patterns of the consumption of culture. This view has never gained much ground inAnglo-American social criticism. It presupposes the perspective of German Kulturkritik.6. Cf. J. Herfs interesting book Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar andthe Third Reich (Cambridge: 1984, Cambridge University Press). It contains a chapter on the ideologyof engineers and its relation to the German system of higher education.

7. For a recent revival of the theme of 'Vernunftkritik' in a socially critical context cf. Dieter Misgeld"Kritische Theorie und Postmoderne", in; Soziologische Revue, 1987, No, 4.


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282 Praxis International8. Cf. Hans Freyer, Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, (Leipzig: 1930), and H. Schelsky's essay,"Sociology as a Science of Social Reality" in V. Meja, D. Misgeld, N. Stehr (eds.), Modern German

Sociology, (New York: 1987, pp. 119-137). See also R. Wiggershaus, as cited, pp. 639-641 and pp.647-657.9. Nietzsche's interpretation of science as an expression of 'Wille zur Macht' entails a rejection of thebelief in the realization of reason through progress in the development of knowledge. By insisting onthe sobriety of the social scientist's calling and thus making social scientists subject to the ethos of thenatural sciences rather than to their methods, Max Weber has continued the Nietzschean projectcritical of idealism. This is the basis of 'Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft'. Cf. my introductionto Meja, Misgeld, Stehr, Modern German Sociology, pp. 1-30, in which I illustrate how thisconservative legacy of German social theory is the background to Habermas's efforts to integrate atheory of the social sciences into a theory of democracy, i.e. a theory of discursive will-formation andof the public sphere.

10. Nothing is more indicative of this position than Ernst Juenger, Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt(Hamburg: 1932).11. Cf. the comprehensive study by J.T Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory. Social Democracy and

Progressivism in European andAmerican Thought. 1870-1920 (Oxford: 1986, Oxford University Press).Especially important for Dewey's views on social democracy are pp. 329, 349-352, as well as pp.373-394. In a novel interpretation Kloppenberg places Max Weber among the progressives. Cf. alsoJohn Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: 1939, A Paragon book), and Liberalism and SocialAction (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935).

12. Cf. Rorty's recent paper "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein," Political Theory, forthcoming.As far as I can see Bernstein does not call himselfa social democrat. But he has clearly aligned himselfwith a Deweyan conception of democracy, cf. note. 2. Rorty's paper also comments very favourablyon Habermas's political writings.

13. Cf. R. Bernstein, 1983, as cited in Note 2, p. 214. And elsewhere.14. Ibid. p. 231, and p. 206.15. I regard this affinity to be central, because Rorty replaces the scientist as the cultural hero of classical

pragmatism (Peirce, Dewey) with the poet. Cf. Bernstein 1986 as cited in Note 2, p. 85. Rorty doesnot put literary culture above science, as a matter of principle; but he values it more cf. his recent"contingency of self', London Review ofBooks, May 8th, 1986, p. 11.16. Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode presupposes and reaffirms the integrity, accessibility and thecontinued value of classical Greek philosophy. He fails to note that this 'tradition' is an artifact ofhighly specialized forms of erudition hardly shared by most members of modern societies.17. Cf. J. Habermas, Die Neue Unubersichtlichkeit (Frankfurt: 1985, Suhrkamp), pp. 59-78, 41-166.18. Here one may also think of Weber's charismatic politician resolutely facing the implications of hiscommitment to an ethics of responsibility, and of Heidegger's 'Eigentliches Selbstsein'.19. Certainly Habermas's challenge has helped Gadamer along in achieving this subtle and hardly fullyarticulated transformation of his thought. Cf. J. Habermas/H.G. Gadamer, Das Erbe Hegels(Frankfurt: 1979, Suhrkamp),p. 16 for a characterization ofGadamer which beautifully captures the

modern ethos of Gadamer's emphasis on classical humanism: "Gadamer is far from being a Prussianand most certainly a civilian". One only needs to think of Heidegger's "Rektoratsrede" of 1933 torecognize the difference in attitude between Gadamer and his teacher Heidegger. Bernstein hasdiscussed the change in Gadamer's work in Bernstein, 1983, as cited, pp. 163-65 and 1986, pp.63-72. But cf. notes 36 and 41 for a critical discussion of this interpretation. I do not believe, asBernstein does, that there is a "radical" strain in Gadamer's thinking. Gadamer never accepts, forexample, Habermas's argument that we need to adopt an hypothetical attitude toward everydaycertainties sanctioned by tradition.20. Cf. R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, as cited, pp. 203.21. R. Rorty: "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity", in R. Bernstein (ed.),Habermas andModernity(Cambridge: 1985, The Mit Press), p. 174.22. I agree with Bernstein, that it is useful to apply this term to comprehensive analyses of the kindalluded to here.23. Cf. Rorty, in Bernstein 1985, as cited in note 21.24. Cf. Hans Joas, Praktische Intersubjektivitiit. Die Entwicklung des Werkes von G. H. Mead (Frankfurt:1980, Suhrkamp, especially, pp. 195-209.


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Praxis International 28325. Cf. J. Dewey, Freedom and Culture as cited in note 11; and J. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems(New York: 1927, Henry Holt).26. On Arendt cf. Bernstein 1983, as ci ted in Note 2, pp. 207-223. Of course, Bernstein is fully awarethat lIabermas has always favoured pragmatism as a progressive, radically democractic philosophy.

He also identifies a 'pragmatic voice' in Habermas's theory of communicative action, to bedistinguished from a transcendental voice. cf.p. 184. But his juxtaposition of Habermas, Arendt,Gadamer conceals Habermas's much greater proximity to Dewey or Mead as theorists of socialcommunication and of democracy than to Arendt or Gadamer.27. Cf. J. Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897) in R.D. Archambault (ed.), John Dewey on Education(Chicago: 1964, The University of Chicago Press), p. 427.

28. Cf. J. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: 1935, Capricorn Books), p. 72: 'The crisis indemocracy demands the substitution of the intelligence that is exemplified in scientific procedure forthe kind of intelligence that is now accepted'. He adds that the "engineering mind" is to be emulatedin social planning. He thus contributes to the technocratic philosophy of New Deal progressivism. Cf.also, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: 1957, Beacon Press), pp. XXIV and XXV. Here Deweyargues that morals lag behind science and need to be updated accordingly by themselves becoming'scientific'.

29. Cf. D. Misgeld "Educat ion as Cultural Invasion: Critical Social Theory, Education as Instruction andthe Pedagogy of the Oppressed ," in J. Fores ter (ed.), Critical Theory and Public Life (Cambridge:1986, The MIT Press) , pp. 77-121. I refer to literature detailing reforms of American educationderived from skills training in the trades and in the military around world-war one.30. Cf. J. Dewey, 1935, as cited in note 29: 'The habit of considering social realities in terms of cause andeffect and social policies in terms of means and consequences is still inchoate.' Scientific method andengineering are to define the meaning of intelligence in politics, not merely discussion and persuasion.For a compelling critique from a perspective similar to Gadamer's, yet rooted in American traditionsof civic humanism cf. W.M. Sullivan, "The Humanities in the Civic Conversation: John Dewey'sPublic Philosophy Reconsidered". Philadelphia 1986, MS. Department of Philosophy, LaSalleUniversity. Cf. also, R.N. Bellah et. aI., Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment inAmerican Life (New York: 1986, Harpr and Row), pp. 256-271.31. In an essay entitled "Nineteenth Century Idealism and Twentieth Century Textualism," The Monist64(1981) p. 173. Rorty indirectly grants this point: 'A full-scale discussion of the possibility ofcombining private fulfillment, self-realization, with public morality, a concern for justice' seems to liebeyond the scope of his thought at least for the time being. He fails to notice that calling "fulfillment"private already places happiness outside the domain of what is attainable in some employment ofpublic policy.32. Cf. Rorty, 1982, as cited in note 2. p. 103. Cf. D. Misgeld "Modernity and Social Science: Habermasand Rorty" for a comparison of the different theories of social science at issue here. In Philosophy andSocial Criticism, 11,(4), pp. 335-372 (1986).33. Cf. J. Habermas: Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns 2. (Frankfurt : 1981, SUhrkamp), pp.480-488, 521-547. Habermas argues that the communicative practice of everyday life in contemporary developed societies is subverted by systems-imperatives which fragment it. As a consequenceeveryday-consciousness is assimilated to planning processes which refashion it without respect for itsown integrity. This dynamic requires the regeneration of every-day communication in a process ofreflection, provoked by social movements which attempt to counteract the force of systems-rationalisation. Habermas discusses the 'new' social movements from this perspective.

34. For this reason the sections in Habermas, 1981, referred to above are most significant (cf. pp.420-594).35. Cf. Berstein, 1986, as cited in note 2 p. 63/64: He notes that during the past twenty years Gadamer hasbeen concerned primarily with 'exploring the consequences of hermeneutics for praxis.'36. Bernstein has drawn attention to Gadamer's endorsement of Hegel's view of modernity. 'Theprinciple that all are free never again can be shaken.' And 'has not history since then been a matter ofjust this, that the historical conduct of man has to translate the principle of freedom into reality?' Cf.H.G. Gadamer "Hegel's Philosophy and Its After effects until Today," in Reason in the Age ofScience(Cambridge: 1981, MIT Press), p. 80. Cf. Bernstein 1983, p 164. Bernstein argues that during the lasttwenty years Gadamer has become increasingly radical, that 'the depth of his critique of all forms ofdoglnatism and fanaticism' even has a subversive quality (cf. p. 252, note 66). Bernstein is mistaken.


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284 Praxis InternationalGadamer is only radical in his insistence on moderation. His is a liberal position in the best sense.However, his liberalism becomes conservative when it opposes any form of egalitarian radicalism, nomatter how undogmatic and carefully considered it is. This is the weakness in Gadamer's oppositionto the utopian elements in Habermas's position. Bernstein suppresses this aspect of Gadamer'sconsistent rejection of ' Ideologiekritik ', his unwillingness to enter into a full dialogue with the'critique of instrumental reason'. Despite Gadamer's endorsement of freedom as a principle there isno indication that he (a) appreciates or could even begin to advocate processes of democratisation, nomatter how reasonably such projects are put forward, that (b), he has a grasp of modern politicalhistory a history also formed by emancipatory social movements, and (c), that he has even given creditto social democracy in Germany as the major force defending liberal democracy before the Nazis. Asfar as I can see, he has never accepted the overcoming of structures of domination as a central politicalproject for the future.37. Cf. Bernstein, 1983, pp. 156.

38. Ibid., p. 157/158.39. Cf. H.G. Gadamer, "Notes on Planning for the Future" in, Daedalus, 95 (2), pp. 574--589, 1966.Beside once again displaying Gadamer's magnificent sense of moderation and tolerance as a virtue ofacivic culture (cf. p. 588), the essay also illustrates how little Gadamer expects there to be space inmodern societies and modern history for the emergence of a more rational politics. Cf. 'To beawakened to consciousness' (to be awakened from the technological dream and the expectation of apolitics mastering problems-D. Misgeld) 'could also mean to become aware of how little thingschange, even where everything appears to be changing.' Ibid, p. 589. Politics is an art practiced bystatesmen oriented toward maintaining or restoring equilibrium. It is a kind of piloting or steering.Ibid., p. 582. There is no direct concern here with identifying the achievements of modernity, muchmore with a reconciliation between the structures of modernity and older traditions. Many of thequestions covered in this essay have been discussed in detail with Hans-Georg Gadamer during July1986, in extensive interviews conducted by Graeme Nicholson and myself. In one case Gadamerbeautifully expressed his attitude toward politics by saying: The only available choice is between oneevil and another. Prudently choosing means to choose the lesser evil. One can hardly have a lessdisillusioned view of the prospects for social change through politics than the one which he expresseshere.40. Cf. Truth andMethod (New York: 1975, The Seabury Press), p. 345. Language, institutions, customsare beyond criticism, so to speak, whenever in understanding them "we are drawn into an event oftruth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we ought to believe." Ibid, p. 446. Thissentence expresses the ontological shift of hermeneutics quite well.41. Gadamer often argues, that human beings generally accept some exercise of authority in their livesand that this happens as a matter of course. Most people grow up in families and accept their parents'authority, for example, prior to reachingmaturity. He then argues that it is false to denounce any andevery exercise of authority as authoritarian. The acceptance of authority thus becomes a regularfeature of human life. This argument fails, of course, when measured by the standards of theoriescritical of domination and authority, from Marx and critical theory to contemporary feminism. All ofthese theories want to explain, why and how people so frequently fail to distinguish between theirblind acceptance of authority and a critical attitude toward it. But they need not claim, that therenever are good reasons for accepting authority. Gadamer implicitly relies on Hegel's judgment, thatthe institutions of the bourgeois age (family, law, state) are here to stay; regardless of the radicalchallenges issued to them since the major social movements of the 19th century.42. Bernstein's and Rorty's methods of discussion differ, of course. Bernstein hardly ever highlightsdifferences to the point of incompatibility, Rorty refashions differences ironically, thus giving themadditional profile, but only in order to offer a pragmatic synthesis in the end which glosses thedifferences.Rorty has a well preserved awareness of the distance of American thought from the major'Continental European' traditions. As a transatlantic diplomat of the first order he employs ironicself-characterization and provocative challenge to get the transcultural conversation going. Bernsteinacts as the gentle emissary to foreign territories, who brings the news back home that some foreignersare not so terribly foreign afterall and that we (North-Americans) can even learn from them. He iselusive as a critic, but highly persuasive as a mediator between prima facie incompatible points ofview.


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Praxis International 28543. One only needs to consider that German philosophers from Scheler and Horkkeimer, to Adorno andHeidegger have been explicitly hostile to pragmatism. Cf. especially (written before 1928), M.Scheler, Erkenntnis und Arbeit (Frankfurt: 1977, V. Klostermann), and M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of

Reason (New York: 1947, Oxford University Press). Adorno and Heidegger assimilate "blindlypragmatised thought" (a phrase used in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment) either to instrumental reason orthe thoughtless surrender to the technical-scientific worldview.Gadamer has always regarded Dewey as a philosopher holding views opposite to his own; he couldhardly agree with Dewey, that our social institutions, as they are, are insufficiently rational, becausethey predate the development ofmodern science, or that the practice ofmorals and politics have to begrounded in attitudes originally tried out in scientific experimentation and engineering. Habermas'srelation to pragmatism is primarily mediated by his interest in Peirce's epistemology. Hitherto hispossible affinity to Dewey has remained unexplored.

3.5 - misgeld, dieter - modernity, democracy and social engineering (en)

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