312882

Visions of the Rebels: A Study of 1857 in BundelkhandAuthor(s): Tapti RoySource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Special Issue: How Social, Political and CulturalInformation Is Collected, Defined, Used and Analyzed (Feb., 1993), pp. 205-228Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312882 .Accessed: 09/03/2011 12:25

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Modern Asian Studies 27, I (I993), pp. 205-228. Printed in Great Britain.

Visions of the Rebels: A Study of I857 in Bundelkhand

TAPTI ROY

Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta

I

The available literature on the uprising of 1857 is fairly voluminous. Successive generations of historians have studied the subject in its varied aspects. Their concern, however, quite often lay with long-term political issues, with questions of the growth of the colonial state, of nationalism, of the unity and integrity of the country. These problems were made central to the study of the rebellion not because they were of any relevance to the rebels but because contending imperialist and nationalist historians were seeking to accommodate the event in a longer time span of history. The rebellion of I857 was thereby assimilated to a linear order related to a context that largely lay outside of the occurrence itself. To most early English writers the mutiny marked the watershed between Company rule and Crown rule, an interlude in the transition to a better imperial system. For Indian writers it was the beginning of India's struggle for national independence.'

Such interpretive analyses leave out of their review the experience of the rebels and how they viewed the events through which they lived. What, for instance, was the meaning and significance of their actions to themselves? What was their ultimate end in mind? This essay seeks to locate the experience and actions of the rebels in 1857 in the context of the time and the place and to understand how they perceived them.

I am grateful to Rajat Kanta Ray and Gautam Bhadra for their comments and Suggestions. I am responsible for all the weaknesses that still remain in the paper.

Eric Stokes and Rudrangshu Mukherjee are, among others, notable exceptions. See Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India (London, 1978); Stokes, The Peasant Armed: The Indian Revolt of 1857 ed. by C. A. Bayly (Oxford, I986); Mukherjee, Awadh in Revolt, 1857-1858. A Study of Popular Resistance (New Delhi, 1984). oo26-749X/93/$5.oo + .0oo ( 993 Cambridge University Press

205

The uprising is often seen as a series of negative actions. Attacks, assaults, depredations, destruction, all directed towards uprooting the British State were regarded as elements constituting the phenomenon. Any positive attempts at coordinating and organizing men and actions were seen to have emerged almost accidentally. As if several negative moments came together unintentionally in a temporary 'flash'. The colonial state thereby laid claim to the only positively construed power that staged a comeback.

The present paper argues that the rebels were involved in a fight for power, in an endeavour to capture the apparatus of the State. This itself was a positive end but not an end in itself. Months after the transfer of power different sets of rebels very consciously set out to build their alternatives to the colonial State and to defend them. An assessment of the strength of the adversary determined their strategies of action. This was an area where one could trace out the pattern of convergence of diverse actions towards a totality of political consciousness.

What needs to be done with more rigour is simply to chart out sequentially and chronologically the actions and events constituting the rebellion. The importance of stringing together the varied acts of protest, of seeking to disclose how different sections of rebels organized themselves and how they chose to demolish and build structures of power, is self-evident. It would then be a viable exercise to work backwards into the history, social existence, perception and consciousness of rebels at different, dissimilar levels.

II

Our knowledge is derived from the information that English officials documented and preserved. The beginning of the uprising, those moments that 'sparked' it off were recorded in great detail, as were those rebels and their actions perceived as most threatening to the existence of the State. A period of relative silence persisted over months when the officials were absent from their respective stations and information was gathered from some safe distance away. With the march of counter-insurgency forces, news once again came more regularly. Such disjointed information spaced out over time was par- ticularly applicable to places like Bundelkhand, slightly remote as it was from centres of focal attention. For places like Delhi and Kanpur, narratives would be relatively more continuous.

206 TAPTI ROY

A STUDY OF 1857 IN BUNDELKHAND

The East India Company acquired the division of Bundelkhand in fragments. The area constituted by the districts of Banda and Hamirpur fell to the British as early as in I804. The kingdom of Jalaun lapsed to the English administration in 1840 when its infant Raja died. Jhansi was temporarily governed by the English between 1839 and 1842,. When Gangadhar Rao died in 1853 they took over the

kingdom immediately, disallowing any adoption. Rebellion in Bundelkhand began with the mutiny of soldiers

belonging to the 2th Native Infantry regiment at Jhansi on 5June. It was around 3 in the afternoon when some soldiers raised a false alarm that dacoits had attacked, rushed to the magazine and seized it.2 This set off a series of standard actions associated with mutinies in all stations. The treasury was captured as the i 4th Irregular Cavalry and artillery regiments rose by the following evening. Jails were thrown open and several civilian Indian officials in the town joined the soldiers. Together they went up to town, and threw open the Orchha gate to the cry of 'Deen ka Jai'.3 A general plunder and looting of property of the Europeans and their Indian accomplices followed. Records were taken out and made a bonfire of in the open field. Most of the English officers and their families had meanwhile taken shelter at the Jhansi Fort. Those who had not were killed. Besieged Europeans finally surrendered on the evening of the 8th; they were herded to a nearby garden and slain.

On I oJune, the right wing of the 12th Native Infantry and left wing of the i4th Irregular Cavalry posted at Nowgong revolted.4 Thirty- two miles from Jhansi yet another detachment at Kurrera also mutinied.5

In Lalitpur the sequence was in some senses reversed. Initiative to withdraw from the station was taken by the paranoid English officials on the 12 June. They feared most the thakurs who had risen up in arms

2 From R. Hamilton, Agent Gov. Gen. for Central India to G. F. Edmonstone, Secy to the Govt of India with Gov. Gen. camp Jhansi, 24 April 1858, Foreign Political Proceedings [For. Pol. Progs], 30 Dec. 1859, nos 280-8, National Archives of India (NAI). S. A. A. Rizvi and M. L. Bhargava (eds), Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh vol. III (Uttar Pradesh, I959), pp. 14-20 (hereafter FSUP). 3

'Victory to Religion', G. W. Forrest, Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers preserved in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-58, 4 vols (Calcutta, 1893-I912), FSUP, pp. 42-6.

4 Deposition of Sewak Singh Kshatriya Kanburya, Sipahi of Palton Hewett, Regi- ment I2. Lucknow Collectorate Mutiny Basta, Uttar Pradesh State Archives Luck- now (UPSAL), FSUP, p. 4.

5 From S. Thornton, Dy Coll. To Maj. W. C. Erskine, Commr Samthar, 21 Aug. 1857, for Sec. Cons, 30 Oct. 1857, nos 602-3 (NAI), FSUP, pp. 8-14.

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in the country surrounding Lalitpur. As the officers prepared to leave, however, the soldiers refused to accompany them. '. . . not a man of us [sic] will go with you, however we wont take your lives, but you must be off', they told the foreigners and claimed for themselves on behalf of the king of Delhi, the treasure that they had earlier been entrusted with.6 They seized the magazine and made off for Jhansi.

The first to rise in Orai, the district town ofJalaun, were not the infantry soldiers but chaprasis of the custom department followed by the police. English officials were forced to evacuate. As Orai fell on the way north from all stations of Bundelkhand, soldiers came pouring in. Troops from Jhansi on arriving released prisoners, plundered government treasure and property, and burnt down and destroyed all records and buildings. A week later soldiers from Nowgong plundered again. Contingents from Lalitpur arrived on the 2 ISt; later all left for Kanpur.7

In Hamirpur soldiers revolted on the I4th, replicating the actions of their counterparts elsewhere. In addition, wealthy men were looted and the Christian preacher and his family killed along with some of those officials who could not escape. The Bengali babus were attacked and plundered as in Jhansi for 'writing English'. On 20 June a troop of cavalry and a company of infantry soldiers came from Kanpur to assist in the carrying of treasure from Hamirpur the following day.8

Mutiny in Banda began as in Hamirpur on the I4th even though villagers in the north had been up in rebellion for some time. A verbal message from a Deputy Collector posted at the northern ghat that mutinous cavalry troops were crossing the Jamuna into Banda, was conveyed to F. O. Mayne, the Collector, in an open Kacheri. News spread like 'wild fire' and the situation was no longer the same again. Police would not 'obey' orders and soldiers now refused to give up a single rupee out of the treasure entrusted to them. They seized the magazine and plundered among other things the missionary schools. Europeans in the school were released only after they had been con- verted to Muslims.9

6 From Lt A. C. Gordon, Dy Commr 2nd class Chanderi to Maj. Erskine, Commr Sagar Dvn, Sagar, 17 Sept. 1857. For Sec. Cons. I8 Dec. I857, no. 237, NAI.

7 Further Papers (no. 7) relative to the Mutinies in the East Indias. Enclosure 34 in no. 8, pp. I55-6. Narrative of Events (N.E.) attending the outbreak of disturbances by G. Passanah, Dy Coll. ofJalaun, May 1858, para. 2, p. 498. Statements of Makhan Kumar & Bisasu Lakshman, servants of Lt Browne, who left Orai on or about i Sept. I857. Agra, 9 Sept. 1857. Home Dept Public Branch, 6 Nov. I857, no. I8, NAI.

8 N.E. in Hamirpur, 1857-58, para. 9, p. 491. 9 N.E. in Banda, 1857-58, pt I, paras 18-22, pp. 318-20.

208 TAPTI ROY


We do not know very much about the times when these acts of protest were decided upon. News of mutinies in Meerut and other stations in the north had been rife since the time when they began. Yet it was on different days that soldiers in the four towns chose to move. One can, however, discern a pattern in these uprisings. The headquarters usually took the lead with splinter battalions following. In Bundelkhand, Jhansi certainly showed the way. It was the headquarters of both the 2th Native Infantry regiment and i4th Irregular Cavalry. Elsewhere in Lalitpur was stationed the 6th Regiment of Gwalior Contingent, at Orai were two companies of the 53rd and 56th Native Infantry. A detachment of the 56th Native Infantry was gar- risoned at Hamirpur while soldiers at Banda belonged to the Ist Native Infantry. The headquarters of the two latter regiments was at Kanpur. Being fewer in number and lesser in strength these smaller units rose later and upon doing so then headed for their headquarters.

According to the written deposition of a Bengali, a letter was brought to Jhansi from Delhi stating that the entire armed forces of Bengal Presidency had mutinied. Since the regiment inJhansi had not done so, the soldiers would be regarded as outcastes. Four men took the lead and mobilized others to rise. They asked all men of the 'deen' to flock to their standard and offered to remunerate each person for his service at the rate of I2 rupees per month.'? As regards prior planning and deliberations there is available only one reference to a meeting held at Hamirpur on I2 June. It was attended by the head men of each band of auxiliary troops, the Subahdar of the 56th Regi- ment and one or two Indian civilians. Next day, guards at the treasury refused to give up the keys when asked. On the morning of the i4th, troops posted over the Collector's bungalow withdrew their guns and turned them on the house." On the morning of 12 June a party of forty sowars belonging to the I4th Irregular Cavalry regiment arrived at Latitpur from Nowgong. Later that day, the 6th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent posted there, mutinied.

Overthrowing British rule from their respective cantonments was the first step in the grander design of the soldiers of constructing an alternative rule with Delhi or Kanpur as the capital. They therefore moved out of their stations initially on to Delhi where already a new political order had been proclaimed. The administrative structures that were set up in Delhi and later in Kanpur served not only as

10 Written deposition of a native of Bengal G. W. Forrest, Selections from the State Papers, vol. IV, FSUP, pp. 42-6.

' N. E. Hamirpur, i857-58, para. 9, p. 491.

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models but also provided a centralized direction to the mutinies everywhere. The soldiers' inclination to move was more than a blind impulse to go to Delhi or Kanpur. In their conceived strategy of actions, it was imperative to build, uphold and strengthen a supra- local political order.

The soldiers were seldom involved with routine administrative affairs locally. As the former potentates set out to assume power, however, they had to reckon with the soldiers' authority that the latter drew from their actions. Quite often the Rajas could take up the charge of their regions only after that was formally sanctioned by the soldiers who at the same time devolved powers to a council of minis- ters and retained for themselves a major share in decision-making. Immediately after rising, soldiers in Jhansi demanded assistance from Lakshmi Bai, threatening to kill her if she did not comply or if she extended any assistance to the English.'2 In Banda, when the Nawab proclaimed his rule following the mutiny, soldiers brought out another proclamation that read: 'Khulq khodi ki, mulk Badshah ka, Hukm Subahdar sepoy Bahadur ka'. The Nawab was forced to acknowledge them and patch a reconciliation on their terms.'3

In the process of rearranging local political structures, soldiers also patched local differences so that the over-arching order would not be disrupted. Ali Bahadur's right to rule in Banda was disputed by a local chieftain of Ajaigarh, a small independent principality. Soldiers decided that pending a reference to Nana Sahib, Ali Bahadur should be left in charge.'4 Loyalty to the king-Peshwa or the Mughul Bad- shah was an indispensable prop in their political design. On several occasions, the soldiers refused to hand back the treasure entrusted to them by the English on the ground that they considered it as belonging to the king in Delhi.'5

In order to consolidate defences against English forces in the capital, soldiers had to assemble and congregate there. Bundelkhand witnessed a two-way movement of soldiers; while regiments posted there marched out, several others came in on their way up north. Those who came from the east or southeast stopped at Banda, those from the south and southwest halted at Jhansi. After Delhi and

12 Written deposition of a native of Bengal (see fn. io). 13 'The world is God's the country is the Emperor's and it is the rule of the soldiers'. N.E. in Banda, paras 18-22, pp. 318-20.

14 From Ellis, Pol. Asstt for Bundelkhand & Rewa to Secy to the Govt. of India, Nagode, 2 July I857, For. Sec. Cons, 31 July I857, no. I82, NAI.

15 From Gordon to Erskine, 17 Sept. I857, For. Sec. Cons, i8 Dec. 1857, no. 237, NAI. N.E. in Banda, paras I8-22, pp. 318-20.

210 TAPTI ROY


Kanpur were reoccupied by the English, Kalpi in Jalaun was chosen as the new headquarters from about September I857. Nana Sahib and his lieutenant Tantia Topi moved here around October and the latter took upon himself the leadership and organization of defence.16 Soldiers thereafter came pouring into their new capital. The estimated strength of soldiers in Kalpi by November-December 1857 was near- ing I2,000. They included among others contingents from Mhow, Jhansi, Banda, Mandla.17

The fort of Kalpi was being reinforced with guns, ammunition and treasure at the de facto command of Tantia Topi. Ultimately, however, both he and Nana Sahib represented, impersonated, the strength of those innumerable soldiers up in arms against the English.

Tantia Topi's first move was to mobilize local chiefs and bring their efforts together. Written proclamations and letters were sent to inform all of the progress of the rebellion, the dangers that assailed it and the need to safeguard it. Messages also carried open calls for action, for outright war against the enemy. Religion was proclaimed to be in danger. The means for reaching solidarity was sought in Christian heresy that had to be rooted out of the soil lest it desecrated the latter's purity and defiled its sanctity. The agents of pollution had to be purged; hence all Europeans killed. The jeopardized religion allowed no choice. There could either be total crusade against the infidels or identification with them. If one supported rebellion it had to be an active one for the sake of the safety of religion. If one did not, he himself would become a polluting agent, an infidel, a Christian. He had to be destroyed.'8 Therefore, when the Raja of Chirkhari, a small State in southern Bundelkhand, refused to cooperate with the rebels his fort was attacked and invaded.'9 In Orai they seized the Chief of Gurserai, an English nominee, and laid aside his authority over Jalaun.20

The best efforts failed to arrest British forces and crucial battles

16 From Durand to Edmonstone, 15 Oct. 1857, For. Sec. Cons, i8 Dec. 1857, no.

838, NAI. 17

Copy of a Service Message received by Electric Telegraph from Panna, 19 Nov. 1857, For. Sec. Cons, i8 Dec. i857, no. I86, NAI.

18 Translation of a circular letter from Tantia, dated 31 Dec. x857, For. Pol. Progs, 30 Dec. 1859, Suppl. no. 619 FSUP, p. 211 . Trans. of a circular letter addressed to the chiefs of Bundelkhand by an individual styling himself Mohamad Ishaq, Aide-de- camp to Maharaja Sreemunt Peshwa, 2 Jan. 1858, For. Pol. Cons, 31 Dec. I858, no. 2132, FSUP, pp. 21 1-I2.

19 Abstract translation of a letter from Ramchand Pandurang Topi, Chirkhari, 7 Feb. I858, For. Pol. Progs, 30 Dec. 1859, Suppl. no. 633, FSUP, pp. 234-5. 20 N.E. inJalaun, para. 7, p. 50I.

21 I

were fought over Jhansi between 3 and 6 April. We learn from the daily diary of Hugh Rose, general in command of the Central India Field Force deployed in Bundelkhand, about the grim determination with which soldiers resisted. Perfect discipline and coordination were maintained and English forms of battle formations retained. Even words of command for drill, grand rounds were often given out in English.21

A last die-hard effort was made to hold Kalpi. It was unusually well-fortified; there was an arsenal full of stores and ammunition, a subterranean magazine and four foundries for making cannons. Bat- teries were erected on the ghats over Jamuna and on the Hamirpur road, in order to prevent British forces from marching in. Fresh levies were also raised from the local people while more and more soldiers gathered.22 The battle over Kalpi began on 22 May. Soldiers swore by the waters ofJamuna that they would either drive the British force into the river or die themselves. After some hard fighting Rose finally was able to take over the town on 23 May. Soldiers dispersed in disorderly bands; the mutiny in Bundelkhand was over.

Soldiers constituted a community apart, acted in rebellion as a community whose norms were laid down by the exigencies of the State. The specified regimental formations, the definite arrangements imposed, became the very basis of their existence as men in uniform. The notion of order, hierarchy and power that was impressed upon the minds of soldiers informed their actions in I857. Their political vision extending beyond their immediate world and centring on a capital was derived largely from their shared experience of service under the colonial State. News of the uprising and collapse of British rule was disseminated with remarkable rapidity among regiments as widely distanced as Meerut and Dinapur. It was also with remarkable consonance that soldiers aspired to rebuild and uphold their own substitute for the British State, their endeavours being once again to build another centralized, supra-local political realm.

In rebellion, even while overturning the colonial structure of power, soldiers retained their regimental formations as long as they could. One of the three units of the army would take the initiative and others followed. Again, outbreak in the headquarters prompted splintered battalions stationed in the sub-areas to rise. Within each regiment,

21 From Maj. Gen. Hugh Rose to Maj. Gen. W. H. Mansfield, Gwalior, 22 June 1858. Forrest, Selectionsfrom State Papers, vol. IV, FSUP, pp. 387-405. 22 Ibid. Abstract of Intelligence, 9 April 1858, For. Sec. Cons, 28 May 1858, no. i28, NAI.

212 TAPTI ROY

A STUDY OF I857 IN BUNDELKHAND

the hierarchy of ranks was adhered to. In Jhansi, for instance, most decisions were taken by Kala Khan, a Risaladar of Cavalry and Lal Bahadur, Subahdar of Infantry, seniormost ranks among Indians in the army.23 Interestingly, Lal Bahadur, the only junior commissioned officer had tried hard to dissuade other soldiers from mutinying.24 This, however, did not stop him from taking charge once the order had been turned over. Even in Hamirpur, the Subahdar of 56th Infantry took command after the mutiny had begun, proclaiming the rule of the Emperor here.25

The code of service in the army, the ethics and conduct of the 'sipahi', however, preserved more than just the identity of the uniform. The soldiers in Jhansi forced open the city gate to the call of Deen ka Jai and it was with frequent references to words like Deen and Dharam that the urgency for rising in arms was stressed. In the proclamations and parwanas issued during the mutiny from all the major cities, rebellion was perceived not so much as a struggle for political aspirations as an imperative course of action for upholding a religion that was in danger under the English. It was a contest for preserving faith, therefore its outcome was postulated in terms of the victory of religion.26 This was the ideological framework within which all actions and counter-actions were arranged. Service in the army, serving as soldiers was a matter of honour (izzat), a notion that complemented a sense of duty, a moral pledge to obey the master/State who was the bread giver (provided salt). That pledge could be flouted only if some loftier cause as one of religion was involved.27

Local potentates of Bundelkhand, the Rajas and chiefs came to be associated with the mutiny soon after its outbreak. Yet, unlike soldiers or the thakurs, they rarely if ever took any initiative during its com- mencement. In fact, we hear about the Rajas because they were handed over charge of administration by the English before leaving

23 From G. Browne to Commr Sagar Dvn, Agra, I i Sept. 1857, Home Dept Public Branch, 6 Nov. I857, no. I8, NAI. Abstract trans. of the Statement of Sahibuddin, Khansamah of Maj. Skene, FSUP, pp. 20-4.

24Abstract trans. of the statement of Aman Khan, 14 April i858, For. Pol. Progs, 30 Dec. 1859. Suppl. no. 283, FSUP, pp. 24-7.

25 N.E. in Hamirpur, para. 9, p. 49I1 26 Trans. of a Procl. addressed to the Native Soldiers of the Regiments of Infantry,

Cavalry & Artillery & cantoned at Lahore. Trans. of a Procl. issued by the Hindus and Mussulmans assembled at Delhi. From offg secy to the Chief Commr Punjab to G. F. Edmonstone, Rowalpindi, i9 June i857, For. Dept Sec., 30 April i858, nos 13- 14, NAI.

27 Conversation between Simon Fraser, Commr of Delhi, and the soldiers is inter- esting in this context. S. A. A. Rizvi, Swatantra Dilli (Varanasi, 1957), p. 52.

213

their respective stations. The first to come to our notice were Lakshmi Bai ofJhansi, Ali Bahadur of Banda, Mardan Singh of Banpur in the Lalitpur Subdivision and Kesho Rai of Gurserai in Jalaun. The first two were physically present at the place of mutiny, Mardan Singh and Kesho Raj were asked by the English to come to Lalitpur and Orai. It was their presence in the towns that compelled the Rajas to contend with the mutiny and a situation where English order had been replaced.

In Jhansi, soldiers had early forced the Rani to furnish them with guns, ammunition and money. Besieged English simultaneously sent out urgent messages for assistance, most of which did not reach her. Her own soldiers and retainers joined the mutineers and put pressure on her to comply with their demands.28

Mardan Singh of Banpur happened to be the Chief of the senior branch of Bundela Rajputs who had risen up in arms immediately after the mutiny in Jhansi. This made him a suspect in the eyes of the English and yet the Deputy Commissioner, left with no alternative, asked Marden Singh to take charge of Lalitpur. And A. C. Gordon wrote that the Raja had acted quite 'correctly' professing to do his best in the interest of the English.29

It was under similar circumstances that Ali Bahadur found himself left responsible for Banda, his own retainers and soldiers having joined the mutineers of the Ist Native Infantry. F. O. Mayne, the English Collector, extolled the exemplary behaviour of the Raja in extending them shelter and assistance.30 Kesho Rao was also asked by the Deputy Commissioner of Jalaun to assist district officials in his absence.31

Under these altered conditions the local Rajas set out to reorder their surroundings and come to grips with the political situation. They issued proclamations in their own names and started working the bare minimum of an administrative system. But these potentates did not perceive the mutiny as a source of their authority; on the contrary they looked upon themselves as successors to English rulers. They made sure, for instance, that the officers gave them written testimonials regarding their conduct and their acts of assuming office.

28 Deposition of a native of Bengal. FSUP, pp. 44-6. Trans. of the statement of Bhugwan Brahmin for Pol. Progs, 30 Dec. I859, no. 284, FSUP, p. 28.

29 From Gordon to the Commr S & N. Territories, 19 June 1857, For. Sec. Cons, I8 Dec. i857, no. 237, NAI.

30 N.E. Banda, pt I, para. 20, p. 319. 31 Parl. Papers, H.C. vol. 44, pt III, 1857-58. Further Papers (No. 7) relative to the Mutinies in the East Indias, Enclosure 34 in no. 8, pp. 155-6.

TAPTI ROY 214


Mardan Singh attacked soldiers of the 6th Regiment and fought with them outside Lalitpur.32 Lakshmi Bai and Ali Bahadur regularly cor- responded with the English expressing their helplessness in the face of 'disorder' caused by the soldiers and earnestly solicited help.33 Lakshmi Bai also wrote to the ruler of Datia urging the need for all chiefs to combine efforts and 'check the disturbances'. She was said to have told representatives from Datia and Orchha that 'till arrangements were made from Jabalpur [by the English] such measures should be taken at Jhansi that no disturbances would occur'.34 Notions of 'order', 'disorder', 'alignment', 'confrontation' were derived from the experience of the Rajas as former rulers and as yet they were in the 'right' and the mutiny was 'wrong'.

As the return of the English seemed no longer imminent, with their authority receding from larger and larger regions of northern and central India, local political forces were resurrected. Bundelkhand once again swarmed with a number of small independent principali- ties. Attempts by these local rulers to refurbish their power were accompanied by a scramble for more areas and larger shares of ter- ritory. In this pursuit, Chiefs often failed to avoid open armed conflict. Troops of opposing Chiefs vying for the same region clashed and almost every district had its own internal battle to witness.

Out of this process of resetting the political mosaic emerged new patterns of alignment among the Chiefs. Mardan Singh of Banpur came to relieve Jhansi with reinforcements in the face of which troops of the Tehri State withdrew.35 Ali Bahadur was supported by Narain Rao of Kirwi to combat forces of the Rani of Ajaigarh.36 Caste ties brought Rajas of the two Bundela States, Banpur and Shahgarh, together.

The political situation, however, had not quite put the clock back to its pre-British days. The situation in which the Chiefs could operate had been determined by the mutiny and the power that soldiers and civil officials had gained as a result decisively constricted the freedom

32 N.E.Jhansi, paras 58, 70, pp. 518, 520-I. 33 Trans. of Kharitas of the Rani ofJhansi to the address of the Commr & Agent Lt

Gov. Sagar Dvn, I2 June I857, I4 June 1857, Trans. of Kharita detailing Narrative of Events which transpired in Jhansi on 5 June I857, For. Sec. Progs, 31 July 1857, pt II, no. 354, FSUP, pp. 67-9. From Ellis to Secy to the Govt of India, Nagode, 2 July I857, For. Sec. Cons, 31 July I857, no. I82, NAI.

34 Deposition of Lalu Bakshi on 6 April 1858. Trial proceedings in the case 'Govt vs. Lalu Bakshi'Jhansi Collectorate Mutiny Basta, FSUP, pp. 48-57. 35 N.E. Jhansi, para. 78, p. 522.

36 Narrative of events in the N.W.P. for the week ending the 13 March i858, Home Dept Public Branch, 30 April i858, no. 9I, NAI.

2I5

of action of these erstwhile rulers. Most decisions, especially the crucial one of fighting English forces or surrendering to them, were taken by soldiers and officials, and the potentates were quite powerless to go against them. This is all the more true for Bundelkhand as it witnessed a continuous movement of troops through places like Banda and Jhansi. Once this region became the primary theatre of action, the Rajas' line of communication with the English snapped and they were drawn into the mainstream of rebellion.

The pressure on all Rajas was not uniform. Soldiers chose to rally around one instead of the other Chief and the former was thereby forced into working out strategies of defence against the English. In Banda, it was Ali Bahadur against the Ajaigarh Rani, in Jalaun the Rani of Tehri and not Kesho Rao of Gurserai, in Jhansi she was Lakshmi Bai instead of the Rani of Orchha. As the mutiny decided upon them to symbolize the centre of its political focus, they increasingly came to be identified with it.

Individually, circumstances and reactions differed. For Mardan Singh as the chief Bundela leader the options had closed quite early. He represented the Rajputs long up in arms. He moved out of Banpur to assist personally the rebel forces early in I858.37 Around the same time, Ali Bahadur was exchanging letters with other Chiefs planning moves and counter moves to forestall the English.38 Lakshmi Bai till January I858 was yet to make up her mind. She sent a Vakil to Sipri to meet the English. If the Vakil was treated well, she would not fight but if he was shown displeasure, she would fight till the end.39 The march of Hugh Rose's forces upon Bundelkhand left her with no choice. In contrast, the Raja of Chirkhari was not touched by the mutiny and he remained to support the English.

Counter-insurgency forces compelled the Chiefs in some senses to act on their own initiative. They set out to make provisions for the contest they realized they would have to face. Successive battles and defeats threw rebel defences into disarray. To make fresh reinforcements and build new bastions of defence rulers often had to move out of their own cities. With the battle of Gwalior in May 1858, the chapter of the Rajas was closed as the English set out to recapture principal towns in Bundelkhand.

37 News for Bundelkhand, 5Jan. I858, For. Sec. Cons, 25June 1858, no. I 5, NAI. 38 From F. O. Mayne, to Thornhill, 4 Aug. I858, For. Pol. Cons, 8 Oct. I858, no.

13, NAI. 39 Abstract of Intelligence from Bundelkhand 26 Jan. I858. For. Sec. Cons, 26

March 1858, nos 32-3, NAI.

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Lakshmi Bai died fighting in Gwalior; death turned her into a martyr. As all the others surrendered, their actions eclipsed into oblivion.

Rajas had never rebelled against the British State and yet they were seen in the frontiers of action to stall counter-insurgency forces. In the absence of the English, these regional potentates stood for an alternative order and thereby provided rebellion with its political nucleus. They were in the process drawn into the midst of actions over which they had little control in a context that they were in no way responsible for. This caused a degree of ambivalence and vacillation in their behaviour in I857-58. Effectively none of them wielded any great power over regions where they were supposed to be rulers during the uprising. To the English forces, however, the Chiefs appeared leaders of rebellion. Once again, the latter were forced into confrontation which, given a choice, they would perhaps have all avoided.

Close on the heels of the mutiny, the thakurs rose up in arms in the different districts of Bundelkhand. Bundela, Puar, Kuchwaha Rajputs collected in large numbers, surrounded local thanas and forced the police to evacuate. They reoccupied and reinforced their garhis (mud forts). Driving out local government officials, they carved out niches of control for themselves collecting revenue from their newly founded dominions. These thakurs by and large operated quite independently of the actions of the soldiers and the local potentates. They put up their own kings, raised their own flags, framed their own rule, rarely seeking legitimacy from their immediate superiors, Lakshmi Bai or Ali Bahadur.

A short-lived collaboration was forged during the months between January and May 1858. In Chanderi thakurs with their men flocked around the Rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh to mobilize strong opposition to English forces. Once Chanderi was taken by Hugh Rose attention turned toJhansi. Just before the battle overJhansi, the town had some 7,000 rebels fortifying it. Among them 1,500 were soldiers while the rest were thakurs and their retainers.40 The final defeat of the rebels at Kalpi on 22 May I858 broke up the confederacy. Soldiers led by Tantia Topi proceeded towards Gwalior and the thakurs returned to their respective countries.

Hardly had the English forces turned their backs on Bundelkhand when the thakurs raised a fresh rebellion. A formidable concentration

40 Abstract of Intelligence from Tehri, Io Feb. 1858, For. Sec. Cons, 26 March I858, no. 42, NAI, FSUP, p. 250. Abstract of Intelligence, Alipura I6 March 1858. For. Sec. Cons, 30 April 1858, no. I47, NAI, FSUP, pp. 295-7.

217

of Rajput forces in several pockets of the districts attacked and uprooted the newly erected government establishments. Their insurgency spread apace with instances of British reoccupation being neutralized by the success of the thakurs in negating them.

Documents now throw up names of individual thakurs who led the others. In Jhansi, there were Bundela Chattar Singh, Bakht Singh and Jowahar Singh while in Jalaun Kuchwaha Dowlat Singh and Puar Burjore Singh emerged as leaders at the head of large bodies of men. Despat, the celebrated and much-feared Bundela, denied English officials any entry into Hamirpur. Thakurs would not only attack and demolish thanas and tahsilis but would actually occupy a particular region, fortify it and even try to extend their dominion. Burjore Singh put up his own flag over Lahar tahsil in western Jalaun in June i858.41 Despat formally proclaimed Khalq khoda ki, mulk badshah ka, Raj Peshwa ka, Hukm despat ka42 in the town of Rath in Panwari pargana of southern Hamirpur. The proclamation was read out in several villages. Revenue was collected and all suspected accomplices of the English eliminated.43 Different sets of alignments brought two or three thakurs together. Dowlat Singh, for instance, was always reported to have been with Burjore Singh while Despat was accompanied by his younger brother Nanhey Diwan and Chattar Singh.

English reoccupation of the principal towns and their presence all over northern India increasingly altered the situation for these thakurs. As British arms came heavily against them, their area of operations grew progressively more curtailed and leverage of actions more constrained. Driven constantly by counter-insurgency forces, thakurs had to be always on the move, scurrying across the country from one place to another. Sporadic raids, sudden attacks and sur- prise marches now came to characterize their protests, and open resistance turned into partisan and guerilla warfare. They were pushed further and further away from the open country and forced to seek shelter in hills, ravines or neighbouring independent states and eventually to be on the run. Their defiance, however, continued till I859, long after the last rumblings of the mutiny had been decisively muted.

41 Urdu-Persian Records, Jalaun From Sayyid Munawar Ali, Thanadar Deva, 7 July 1858, Basta no. I, File no. i, Uttar Pradesh Regional Archives Allahabad (UPRAA).

42 'The world is God's the country is Emperor's the rule is Despat's'. 43 Urdu-Persian Records, Hamirpur. Thanadar of Islampur, reporting from

Jalolpur, n.d. Basta no. 8, sl. no. io. File no. io, UPRAA.

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The word 'thakur' is used here as in English documents and popular parlance in its widest connotation to mean Rajput landed magnates of all ranks. The resistance of these men cannot really be encompassed within the time-frame of the rebellion of 1857-58 with a definite beginning and a fairly tangible end. The thakurs of Bundelkhand had a long tradition of resistance both in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. English officials in their characteristic language described them as men 'prone to turbulence', 'men impatient of control, who acknowledged no law but that of force'.

The English, too, periodically had faced the opposition of these thakurs. As they acquired the region in fragments it was usually on the eve of such transfer of power that Rajput landed magnates stood up to resist. Once control of the State became more entrenched and certain, despite greater economic distress, their protests became a lot more muffled. Their response to the uprising of I857-58 was largely determined by their past tradition of resistance, what in the eyes of those in power was perpetual insubordination. In 1833-34, a number of ghariband4 thakurs in Jhansi and Jalaun, resenting their regional Chiefs' measures to reduce them, took to arms.45 Again in 1839, when the English took control of Jhansi, thakurs of Udgaon, Jigna, Noner and Bilhari withheld revenue payments and levied their own tax, 'taki' on people in direct defiance of the regulations of the government.46 It was the same thakurs who carried their protest into the conflagration of I857-58. When Scindia handed over Kuchwahagar parganas to the English in 1844, the thakurs had been up in rebellion against the Mahrathas.47 Kuchwahas once again rose in I857. Individually too, the interaction of the thakurs with government had not been without tension, as experiences of Despat or Burjore Singh show. Their uprising contained residues of their former political behaviour and preserved their normative patterns of linkages, alliances and forms of action.

Being members of endogamous clans that subscribed to groups agnatically related, thakurs belonged to a wide but defined kinship

44 A particular tenure of Bundelkhand where the holder, nearly always a Rajput, held several villages and resided in a garhi or a small mud fort, paying quit rent to the regional king.

45 Trans. of a letter from Maharaja ofJhansi to the Rt Hon'ble the Gov. Gen. For Ootacamund, Pol. Cons, 15 Aug. 1834, nos 40-4I, NAI.

4 From S. Fraser to Offg Secy to the Govt. NWP, 8 March 1840, For. Pol. Progs, 6 April I840, no. 53, NAI.

47 From D. Ross, Suptd of Jalaun to Sleeman, 30 Sept. I844, C.O.A. Jhansi Records, vol. II, File no. 22, UPRAA.

2I9

network which extended beyond their own estate but was placed within a definite geographical confine. In moments of crisis, these relationships and connections were translated into political linkages, alliances and loyalties that formed the basis of their actions in I857- 58. Thakurs had each a given cognizable sphere of operations whence they took off in 1857 and whither they retreated in I858-59.

Within this immediate world, ordinary villagers provided them with shelter and provisions. Popular support for these thakurs, partially out of deference for their social status, partially from fear and partially from genuine sympathy towards their cause decisively withheld the English from apprehending rebel Rajputs.

A common motif of action resorted to by thakurs in 1857 was deliberately to prevent people from cultivating land in the English- settled districts, a practice they undertook in their prescriptive 'bhumiawat'. This was a prevailing custom among Rajputs in Bundelkhand to fight for landed inheritance. When any member of the aristocracy, no matter how small, had a dispute with his ruler he would collect followers and wage war on the latter's territories, plundering and burning his towns and villages till the rebel was called back on his own terms. During such a war, it was a point of honour not to allow a single acre of land to be tilled upon the estate which the dissenting thakur had deserted or from which he had been driven out. Anyone trying to drive the plough was invariably put to death often with his family. In such ventures thakurs using their numerous ties of brotherhood and caste, were often able to raise a formidable and successful opposition to the government.48 Now in 1857, this form of protest was used for deliberately forestalling the restoration of a beaten political order.

We have to narrate actions at still another level, actions that appear in records fragmented, piecemeal and episodic. They were undertaken by actors denied the importance of the Rajas, the influence of the thakurs or the organization of the soldiers. Their individual identities were dissolved in categories that lumped them together as 'villagers', 'city-bad-mashes', 'followers' or just 'people'. The very nature of our information also denies this narrative any continuity. Official reports, our only evidence, were concerned with trying to capture the entire gamut of the struggle from a distance. Actions that could be easily graphed in a sequence gained greater attention. Those that did not fit

48 W. H. Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official (Karachi, 1973), p. 245; Col. I. Davidson, Report on the Settlement of Lalitpur, N.W.P. (Allahabad, 1871), para. 43.

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into the structure of progression were generally overlooked unless they directly challenged the apparatus of power. The attempts of the

'people' to challenge the State directly were continually intercepted by the politics of the dominant groups. It was only when their insurrection preceded or was able to prevaiLpver the resistance of soldiers or thakurs that the State took cogniza~d : of them.

The insurrection commenced in the Banda District in the villages of Murka, in Purganah Buberoo, in Mow on theJumna and in the Dursenda Purganah. I first heard of the assembling of armed men, of secret councils, and loudly uttering threats from the Purgunahs. This was in the beginning ofJune, and they were soon followed up by the mutineers at Cawnpoor and Allahabad, before which no actual outbreak or even a dacoitee had taken place in the Banda District. The released convicts from Allahabad and Cawnpoor, however, soon spread over the country and forced the Ghats on the Jumna, not withstanding previous precautions, which had been more for the purpose of apprehending fugitives than to resist armed masses, and the insurrection of the whole country followed too soon upon the disasters of Allahabad to allow of any strengthening the Ghats--... The released convicts found the Banda people only too ready to join them. (emphasis mine)

F. O. Mayne, Magistrate and Collector of Banda, narrated the course of events of September I857. He continues: 'The loss of the Kumasin, Buberoo, Simounee and Pylanee Tehseelees soon followed in a like manner. I saw Tehselee after Tehselee going and the waves of the rebellion rapidly approaching Banda itself, and was totally helpless to

prevent it. The whole District went to the bad in less than a week.'49 There is quite a noticeable reference in the third person to 'people' who could mean anyone from the zamindar to the peasant. What is

specific is the acts of resistance. It was in pargana Chiboo that government establishments first

gave in under pressure of popular rebellion. This followed the coming in of prisoners from Allahabad on 8 June. The next day villagers of Murka and Sungurra in the adjoining pargana Augasi rose up in arms. When the tahsildar went to pacify them they attacked and turned him out. On returning to his headquarters at Buberu, the tahsildar found it surrounded by people from villages Murka, Sungurra, Buberu. They plundered the tahsili office and treasury, destroyed all records, dismantled the building and killed the Karinda. Some three or four thousand men of Johurpur, Bainda, Simree and Wasilpur in pargana Simouni assembled at Tindwari on I I June. The tahsili office was destroyed, the treasury sacked, records burnt and

49 N.E. Banda, para. IO, p. 3I6.

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officials forced to flee. Indian officials without exception were driven out.50 Inhabitants ofJalalpur in Hamirpur district imprisoned Hyder Hossein Khan, munsif of that place, in order to recover from him the amount of fines which he had in his capacity of munsif imposed on them.5'

Auction-purchasers and decree-holders were ousted in most places. G. H. Freeling, Collector and Magistrate of Hamirpur, was dismayed by 'the universal ousting of all bankers, buniyas, Marwarees etc from landed property in the district, by whatever means they acquired it, whether at auction, by private sale or otherwise ... it is strange that in no instance do the class so favoured by our rule, the bankers and other traders appear to have been able to keep their own in the struggle.'52

Plundering and overrunning of neighbouring towns or villages was another widely performed act. The town and bazaar of Rajapur in Banda was attacked by inhabitants of surrounding villages but the latter were repulsed by local merchants who got together a large force. Orun, a town southeast of Banda, was plundered by neighbouring zamindars and peasants.53 Every mutiny in town followed by the expulsion of government officials would precipitate loot and plunder by local townsmen and neighbouring villagers. In Banda, once the message that mutinous cavalry was crossing over into the district got around, 'badmashes rose in the city, and plundering commenced'.54 Wealthy men in the town of Hamirpur were plundered by the rebel- ling soldiers and following their departure, as the official narrative goes on to describe, '. . . the villagers in the neighbourhood completed the work of pillage and destruction of property ... The usual jacquerie commenced throughout the district, and the inevitable war between ex-zamindars and auction-purchasers'.55

Officials quite typically characterized this as 'outrages committed by the village communities one upon another'.56 Villagers of Gurha in southern Banda stopped roads, plundered travellers and neighbour-

50 Ibid., pp. 337-40.

51 Trans. of a letter from Chester to Sreemunt Narain Rao & Madhav Rao, 30July 1857, Banda Coll. Records, Box no. 2, S1. no. 30, File no. 31, Dept XVIII, UPRAA. 52 N.E. Hamirpur, para. 19, p. 493.

53 N.E. Banda, para. o1, p. 316; From the Spl. Commr Banda, 31 Dec. 1858. Banda Coll. Records, S1. no. 40, File no. 41 (II), Dept XVIII, UPRAA.

54 N.E. Banda, para. 14, p. 318. 55 From Chester to Strachey, 22 Oct. 1857 Home Dept Public Branch, 27 Nov.

1858, no. 6, NAI. 56 From Western to Erskine, For. Soc. Cons, 30 Sept. I857, no. 573, NAI.

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ing villages. They had stopped English officials fleeing from Banda to

Nagode. Inhabitants of Murka overran neighbouring villages. People of Pipra, a village in pargana Pailani blocked surrounding roads, set

up their own king and sacked the neighbourhood. Descriptions and instances could be multiplied.57

Mayne closes his account on popular rebellion in Banda thus: 'Tulwars and matchlocks were scarce in Bundelkhand, but armed with spears and scythes, and iron-bound lathies, and extemporary axes, formed of chopping knives fastened on sticks, they imagined to be warriors, chose their own kings, and defied all comers. Never was revolution more rapid-never more complete'.58 European officials

fleeing their respective stations passed villages where in many instances people turned up armed. P. G. Scot, an officer of the I2th Native Infantry was escaping from Nowgong to Allahabad en route to Banda. In his personal narrative he observed how almost every village they passed was guarded and armed with whatever weapon people could muster. Light country-made matchlocks and big bamboos were all that they had but now they proved more effective than English arms. '... shots from clumsy village-made matchlocks were coming among us with awful force, while our shots fell half-way', Scot observed.59

European fugitives in several places confronted hostile villagers. J. W. Sherer, Magistrate of Fatehpur, recounted his experience of flee-

ing to Allahabad through Banda together with others. Tacitly and

openly villagers opposed them.60 Scot wrote: 'the feeling throughout the country [is] that our rule was at an end', and Mayne concluded:

As for the people, ruined as they were by over assessment and bad seasons, and half starving, still they would I think not have risen in rebellion, if they had been left to themselves. It was only when excited by the reports from other Districts, and hearing of the excesses committed elsewhere, and of what was then supposed the total massacre of all Europeans at Allahabad, that they too came to the conclusion that the British rule was now at an end, and every man had best take care of himself.61

The narrative is then interrupted till counter-insurgency forces

57 List of Persons sentenced under the special Comm. for the week ending 25 Dec. i858. Banda Coll. Records, Si. no. 40, File no. 41 (II), Dept XVIII, UPRAA.

58 N.E. Banda, para. 8, p. 325. 59 Capt. P. G. Scot, Personal Narrative of the Escapefrom Nowgong to Banda and Nagode

(n.d.), pp. 21-2.

60 Francis Cornwallis Maude, Memoirs of the Mutiny with which is incorporated the Personal Narrative ofJohn Walter Sherer, vol. I, 2nd edn (London & Sydney, I894). 61 Scot, Personal Narrative, pp. 20-3; N.E. Banda, para. I, p. 317.

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come marching in through Bundelkhand. Stray information, that two

villages in Hamirpur, for instance, drove out agents of the Nana sent to collect revenue from them, is all we have for the period roughly from July-August 1857 till about February-March 1858. Hugh Rose

passed villages and confronted a totally different scenario.

The country we marched through, in reaching the place [hansi] gave little evidence of the change that had come over it since last traversed by Europeans. Excepting that a few or no inhabitants were seen, the cultivation had been carried on as of old, and the fields were teeming with corn ripe for the sickle, but it seemed as though a plague had swept over the land, and carried off its occupants. The villages were deserted.... 62

Inhabitants of Bhandere pargana in Jhansi crossed over to the sur-

rounding independent states;63 people of a great many villages in southern Lalitpur were likewise found deserting.64 Returning to

Banda, English officials reported: 'The district generally quiet, but in

many of the villages the entire population had fled and settled in the

independent states, whence though no criminal charge is made

against them they will not return'.65 One major impediment to English assumption of power in i858 was

'want of cooperation on the part of the rural population and their not

supplying British detachment with information or assistance ...).66 There were many instances where villagers called in rebel forces or one or the other thakur leader to occupy their immediate country so that the English rule would not be re-established. Several villages in the Jalalpur pargana of Hamirpur resorted to this measure.67 Vil-

lagers of Serowlie Buzurg in Sumerpur pargana of the same district sent for two guns in order to attack English boats passing along the Jamuna. They also erected batteries against forces sent from Kanpur and fought with them.68 When revenue collection began in July i858 in Madhogarh in Jalaun, villagers summoned the rebels and collec-

62 J. H. Sylvester, Recollections of the Campaign in Malwa and Central India under Maj. Gen. Sir H. Rose G.C.B. (Bombay, I860), pp. 84-5.

63 Intelligence of 15 April 1858, For. Sec. Cons, 28 May 1858, nos 134-5, NAI.

64 From Maj. Gaussen to Brig. Sage, I6 June 1858, For. Sec. Progs, I8 Dec. 1858, no. 232, NAI.

65 From Bayley to Edmonstone, 29July I858, For. Dept N.W.P. Narratives, sl. no. 77, vol. 82, i858, UPSAL.

66 From Hamilton to the Secy to Govt of India, For. Dept, 15 Feb. I859. Mil. Dept Progs 18 March 1859, no. 361, NAI.

67 Urdu-Persian Records Hamirpur Dist. From the Thanadar of Jalalpur, 27 July I858, Basta no. 8, sl. no. 9, File no. 9, UPRAA.

68 From Freeling to Pinkney, 26 Aug. I858. Hamirpur Magistracy Records, Box no. 4, sl. no. 86, File no. I29, Dept XIII, UPRAA.

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tion had to be stopped.69 Otherwise, people would just join Burjore Singh or Dowlat Singh or any other thakur chief in their attacks. Revenue collection was generally met with great hostility everywhere.

Rebel thakurs, on the other hand, by and large enjoyed support and assistance from villagers. As late as in 1859, an English officer was reporting from Jalaun: '. .. the sympathies of the villagers entirely with the rebels. Information there is none, or what is far worse only false information, and I find it impossible even from the inhabitants of a plundered village to extract any reliable or useful information respecting rebels'.70 Besides, each leading rebel thakur had his own area of operations within which the 'whole population of the country', the 'general feeling of the people' would be in his favour.

A repertoire of these actions and behaviours does indicate conscious designs to invert English rule locally together with attempts to erect alternative political structures in 857-58. A positive course of action was evolved for building and fortifying their realms. Officials repeatedly observed that people chose their own kings. In a village of Banda, Geora Mugli, Scot recollected how with the beat of tom-tom it was being proclaimed that a certain Zunowar Ali was the King of Delhi and India. The latter was very busy having meetings and committees that deliberated in different places.7' That is about all we know of Zunowar Ali and his government. Lacking the resources of Despat or Burjore Singh, the struggle of such village Kings was easily swept aside by State forces. While details about the thakurs' physical appearance have survived, Zunowar Ali and others like him fade into oblivion.

Protests at this level were organized within the space of individual villages and derived strength from them. The state recognized its threat in collective participation and retaliated by annihilating all. Nunora, a village in Panwari pargana, Hamirpur was fined Rs 3,000 for being notorious in every way for assisting the rebels. The whole village was implicated as 'every inhabitant of the village is doubtless an accomplice in the crime'.72 A harsher sentence would simply ravage and destroy the entire settlement. Resistance appeared to be staged by all cultivators and zamindars together. If they were

69 Urdu-Persian Records, Jalaun Dist. From Lala Bulgarilal Muharee, thana Madhogarh, July I858, Basta no. I, sl. no. 3, UPRAA.

70 From Osborn to Dy Commr Orai, Camp Mohana, 23 June 1859. Comm. Office Jhansi, Basta no. 11.5 (iii), sl. no. 41, File no. 46, Dept XXI of 1859, UPRAA.

71 Scot, Personal Narrative, pp. 31-2. 72

Report on Nunora, parg. Panwari, 21 Oct. 1859, Hamirpur Magistracy Records, Box no. I, sl. no. 8, File no. I8, Dept XIII, UPRAA.

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deviants they were lost in the multitude as all were branded villains. Three lists tabulated by local tahsildars in Urdu are instructive not so much for the information they provide as for the official perspective they give away.73 In most instances, they computed 'full village' joined, 'entire village' rebels or all are rebels. In stray instances, castes were specified but there again, clusters and 'mass' swamped individ- uals or even groups. A cross-section of people ranging from lam- bardars, chowkidars, patwaris to a brotherhood of Rajputs, Ahirs, Lodhis, Chamars, Brahmins and generally kashtgars or cultivators joined the rebellion. In the absence of detailed village notes we are unable to do better than reproduce their actions in terms of their plurality, collectivity and togetherness.

III

The complexities of the uprising of 1857 have to be understood in the context of its specificity in time and space. It was through the unique political experience of that summer of 1857 that the rebellion evolved, gathering different strands of protest into one single concerted defiance. Local situations and immediate conditions determined patterns of mobilization, motifs of actions and articulations and the varied expressions of political consciousness. The movement in effect was a product of a particular time juncture and local responses to the situation created by the former.

Responses were multifarious. The element of deliberate decision and conscious participation was related to the experience and perception of men belonging to dissimilar positions. The sum total of responses made for a varied pattern, multiple layers of actions and behaviours disguising a myriad assemblage of hopes, aspirations and political vision. The features of the mutiny were different from the uprising of the thakurs just as the reactions of the Rajas could be distinguished from the behaviour of the people in I857.

Yet, they were all units that composed the uprising of 1857 as a whole. Their specificity was subsumed by the general political atmo- sphere of the year, territorial limits were thrown open by the interven-

73 Urdu-Persian Records, Jalaun Basta, no. 4. File no. 94, p. 8. List of villages that joined the rebels. From the tahsildar ofJalaun, 7 Sept. 1858, Basta no. 4, File no. 94, p. 22. List of villages some of whose residents joined the rebels. From the tahsildar of Deva, 30 Aug. i858, Basta no. 4, File no. 94, pp. 4-6. Names of villages whose residents voluntarily joined the rebels. From Debiprasad, Naib Tahsildar, Kunar, 31 Aug. 1858, UPRAA.

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tion of broader politics. The villagers of Banda heard of revolts elsewhere from released prisoners of Allahabad and as if to confirm the news, fleeing Europeans were seen hurrying all over the region, frightened, defeated and deprived of authority. Such incidents were unprecedented. Never before had people seen such irrefutable proofs of the British state being overthrown and ousted. Never before had there been such feverish activity across a large stretch of the country of rebel and counter-rebellious forces. Never before had the people of villages stood up in defiance at a time when the soldiers were in mutiny in the towns; never before had the Rajput thakurs flocked around towns to fight alongside the soldiers. Times were different, the situation was unmatched. At every level, men were forced to respond, motivated to act, compelled to take some initiative. It was, however, the particular situation of 1857, the specific context of rebellion that formed the backdrop of all actions. The mutiny or the thakur uprising or the people's actions did not stand individually as episodes by themselves. They both contributed to and were products of the conflagration that replaced British rule in the year 1857-58; and it was in their totality that the protests at all levels held significance.

It was this historical conjuncture that contained points at which the fragments converged and despite dissimilarities, protests at different levels conformed to a general pattern. It was in this wider political context that all men located their common adversary, the British state, and it was in counteracting this, that all layers of political actions found a common factor in one another. Opposition to the state and alienation from the British assimilated the fragments into a whole and arranged the splinters into an alternative political structure, albeit multi-layered. True the conjuncture of the units emerged in negativity. All came together to contrive a concerted resistance to the British attempt at staging a come-back. They did not always work together. But the very act of resistance crystallized the parts to form a whole. The spectre of the re-establishment of the British state brought the myriad responses together in a collage of political actions.

Yet, the rationale of the movement did not lie solely in negativity. Men cherished positive and constructive visions of the future to be and worked towards that end. In all those months of 1857 and I858, all were engaged in building an alternative political order in agree- ment with their aspirations and ideals. Destruction and depredation, too, contained political actions, positive choice, discrimination and calculations. In their own way Despat, the villagers of Geora Mugli, the soldiers of Delhi were all engaged in reconstructing their own

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228 TAPTI ROY

world. That was how the context of the uprising emerged in its entirety.

It would be unfair to the makers of rebellion to treat their actions within the general and linear framework of being a stage, a mere disjuncture in the interface of a colonial state and the people; 1857 has to be relived in the experience of all those who contributed to make the struggle what it was.