LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTION1. Banogan v. Zerna

2. Ledesma v. Climaco

3. Cui v. Cui

4. Alawi v. Alauya

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process.

5. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho

6. Chua v. Mesina

7. Soriano v. Dizon

8. Stemmerik v. Mas

9. De Ysasi III v. NLRC

10. Cordon v. Balicanta

CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.

CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

11. In re Tagorda

12. Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo

13. Canoy v. Ortiz

14. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice.

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.

15. Suarez v. Platon

16. Ramos v. Imbang

17. Catu v. Rellosa

18. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar.

19. In re Galang20. In re Arthur M. Cuevas

21. Samaniego v. Ferrer

22. Arnobit v. Arnobit

23. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz

24. Advincula v. Macabata

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

25. Reyes v. Chiong

26. Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro

27. Alcantara v. Pefianco

28. Camacho v. Pagulayan

29. Torres v. Javier

30. Linsangan v. Tolentino

CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

31. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.

32. Cayetano v. Monsod

33. Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio

34. Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR

35. Aguirre v. Rama

36. Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

37. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon

38. Rivera v. Corral

39. Johnny Ng v. Alar

40. Fudot v. Cattleya Land

41. Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan

CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

42. Berbano v. Barcelona

43. Sebastian v. Bajar

44. Hegna v. Paderanga

45. Plus Builders v. Revilla

46. Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez

CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.

47. Foodsphere v. Mauricio

48. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao

CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.

49. Hilado v. David

50. Nakpil v. Valdes

51. Hornilla v. Salunat

52. Northwestern University v. Arquillo

53. Quiambao v. Bamba

54. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio

55. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez

CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

56. Licuanan v. Melo

57. Posidio v. Vitan

58. Lemoine v. Balon

59. Re: Atty. Maquera

60. Reddi v. Sersbio

61. De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag

62. Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya

63. Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him.

CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

64. Hernandez v. Go

65. PANELCO v. Montemayor

66. Sps. Adecer v. Akut

67. Belleza v. Macasa

68. Overgaard v. Valdez

69. Angalan v. Delante

70. Santon-Tan v. Robino

71. Somosot v. Lara

CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law.

72. Briones v. Jimenez

73. Pena v. Aparicio

AUTHORITY OF THE LAWYER

74. Manalang v. Angeles

75. Garcia v. CA

76. Santiago v. De los Santos

CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.77. Sesbreno v. CA

78. Bautista v. Gonzales

79. Gamilla v. Marino

80. Pineda v. De Jesus

81. Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui

82. Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA

CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.83. Regala v. Sandiganbayan

84. Pfleider v. Palanca

85. Mercado v. Vitriolo

86. Genato v. Silapan

87. Hadjula v. Madianda

88. Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.

Canon 22 A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.89. Wack Wack Gold and Country Club v. CA

90. Venterez v. Cosme

91. Santero v. Vance

92. Francisco v. Portugal

93. Metrobank v. CA

94. Doronila-Tioseco v. CA

95. Sesbreno v. CA

SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT

96. Gatchalian Promotions v. Naldoza

97. Santos v. Llamas

98. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo

99. Vda. de Barrera v. Laput

100. Barrientos v. Daarol

101. Berbano v. Beltran

102. Tabas v. Malicden

103. Sesbreno v. CA

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCTCANON 1 Independence104. Libarios v. Dablos

105. Go v. CA

106. Sabitsana v. Villamor

107. Tan v. Rosete

108. Dimatulac v. Villon

CANON 2 Integrity109. Fernandez v. Hamoy

110. Dawa v. De Asa

111. In re judge Marcos

112. Lachica v. Flordeliza

113. Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana

114. Olga v. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero

CANON 3 Impartiality115. Dimo Realty & Development v. Dimaculangan

116. Pimentel v. Salanga

117. Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.

118. Oktubre v. Velasco

119. Sandoval v. CA120. The Law Firm of Chavez v. Justice Dicdican, etc.

CANON 4 Propriety121. J. King & Sons v. Hontanosas

122. Centrum Agri Business Realty Corp v. Katalbas-Moscardon

123. Rizalina v. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante

124. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay v. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr.

125. Concerned lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10 Malolos City126. Venancio Ino, Anna Jane D. Lihaylihay, etc. Judge Alejandro Canda127. In Re: Undated Letter of Louis Biraogo

CANON 5 EqualityCANON 6 Competence and diligence128. Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, etc.

129. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc v. Judge William Simon P. Peralta

130. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen

131. Danilo David S. Mariano v. Judge Jose P. Nacional

132. Atty. Antonio G. Caneda v. Judge Eric F. Menchavez

133. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

INTRODUCTIONBANOGAN V. ZERNA

Facts:The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners.

The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto.

For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court.

It is shown that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.

Issue:W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.

Held:YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.

One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

Facts: Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases. Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election registrar, which was still denied.

Issue: Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?

Held: No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of his fees.

CUI V. CUI

Facts:The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the convenio or of his brothers assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.

The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

ALAWI V. ALAUYAFacts:Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney

Held:He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

CANON 1

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO

FACTS:

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in the courts safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team advised him that he should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho complied with the directives.

Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then recommended that its report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty. Kho is liable.

HELD: YES. OCA recommendations VALID.

RATIO:

Dishonesty Conduct

Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.

Unlawful conduct

Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

CHUA V. MESINAFacts:

Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building (Burgos Property) owned by Mesinas family, and another property (Melencio Property), also owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m.

The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.

After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years.

Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property.

Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.

Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina.

Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them.

Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990.

In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?

HELD

This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty.

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length.

In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.

SORIANO V. DIZON

Facts:A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:

a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;

b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;

c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);

d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);

e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);

f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)

Issues:(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude

(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?

Held:(1) Yes.

Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals

Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.

(2) Yes.

His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)

Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS:

Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly drawing up the necessary paperwork.

When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property registered in his name, Atty Mas cant be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldnt own Philippine Lands and that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:

Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

Deceitful Conduct

By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.

Illegal Conduct

By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.

DE YSASI III V. NLRCFacts:Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.

Issues:(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.

Held:The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."

Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.CORDON V. BALICANTA

FACTS:

Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband with the help of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporation to develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the properties were registered in the corp.s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who single-handedly ran the corp.s affairs, by being its Chairman, President, General Manager, and treasurer. By being such officers, he made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2) made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as collateral; 2) Sold the Corps right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished the ancestral home of the Cordons and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty Balicanta did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.

The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons terminated Balicantas services and filed a complaint for disbarment against the latter in the IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for Balicantas disbarment as well. The IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.

ISSUE/S: W/N Balicanta be disbarred.

HELD: YES! Disbarred.

RATIO:

Deceitful Conduct

The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered into dishonest transactions under the cloak of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

Side Doctrine:

Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.CANONS 2 & 3

IN RE: TAGORDA

Facts:

Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.). He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).

Issue:

W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising

Held: Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.

The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly, solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLOFACTS

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published.

An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD

Yes!

The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest.

Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.

Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.CANOY V. ORTIZ

Facts:

A complaint was filed on April 2001 by Canoy against Atty. Ortiz, accusing him for misconduct and malpractice. It is alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the process of the case. On April 2000, Canoy was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998 for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case.

Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes his failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer.

Issue: W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?

Held: Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.

Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyers duties.

The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as councilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO

Facts:

A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents calling card:

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINOLAW OFFFICECONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICESW/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. LabianoParalegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-78206th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCETO OVERSEAS SEAMENREPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATHAND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMSABROAD.

In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card.

Issue:

W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services

Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation).

With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.

As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:(a) lawyers name;(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;(c) address;(d) telephone number and(e) special branch of law practiced. Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

CANONS 4, 5 & 6SUAREZ V. PLATON

Facts: Suarez was charged with sedition which was subsequently dismissed. He in turn filed a case for arbitrary detention against Lieutenant Orais. After the case was handed to Judge Platon following several changes in trial judge and several refusals by fiscals to prosecute the case.

Issue:

Should mandamus issue to compel the fiscal to reinstate the case?

Held: Yes. It is unquestionable that in the proper cases, the prosecutors must reinvestigate in order to properly dispense justice. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that a prosecutor is the representative of a sovereignty; he is interested only in the fact that justice is served, and this also includes his refusing to prosecute if the innocence of the accused is quite clear. He is a servant of the law, and his two-fold aim is not to let the guilty escape nor let the innocent suffer. He is not at liberty to strike foul blows because it is his duty to refrain from doing so as much as it is to use legitimate methods of prosecution.

RAMOS V. IMBANGFACTS

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.She gave respondentP8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt forP5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged herP350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

HELD

Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited.Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7.Prohibited Acts and Transactions.-- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxxxxxxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxxxxxxxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.In this instance, respondent receivedP5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14.xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses.He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)

CATU V. RELLOSAFACTS

Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 and RA 6713. The committee recommended Rellosas suspension from practice for 1 month.

ISSUE

W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03

HELD

No.

Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of.

As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 7160, which actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do.

SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyers oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

__________

Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession?

Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says if the constitution or law allows it Public officers however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from their department head.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYANFACTS

General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.

After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza.

PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

ISSUE

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

HELD

NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.

The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.CANON 7

IN RE GALANG

Doctrine:

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled.

IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVASFACTS

Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was precluded from taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court

This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result of hazing.

Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.

He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995

May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and attached to his petition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character.

ISSUE

May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character?

HELD

Yes.

Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.

SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER

(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate child)Facts:

Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer and their lawyer-client relationship became intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love. They lived together as "husband and wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born. The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed to give support to their daughter.

Before the IBP Samaniego testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he was already married. Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since he did not want to see Samaniego.

Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their daughter in a position paper. He also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Samaniego.

IBP Board of Governors imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension for his refusal to support his daughter. Atty. Ferrer filed MRwith prayer for to reduce the penalty because it will further cause extreme hardship to his family of 10 children. Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a member of the bar, his prayer for reduced penalty was denied.

Held:

SC finds Atty. Ferrerguilty of gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for 6 months.

Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. Although it is true that Samaniego was not entirely blameless for knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it does not make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether both are inpari delicto.

Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY AND STAFF V. ATTY. DELA CRUZ

Facts:

Disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela Cruz, its principal, on the ff grounds:

a. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed against the respondent: criminal case for child abuse; admin case for unethical acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal deduction of salary.

Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. He was married in 1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after, he contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for being bigamous.

Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in total), from 88-97 despite the expiration of his notarial commission in 87.

Respondent denied the charges in the cases pending against him, but admitted his second marriage and its subsequent nullification. He also admitted having notarized documents when his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.

IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Dela Cruz for 1 year for his bigamous marriage and 1 year also for notarizing without commission (2 years total)

Held:

SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the practice of law for 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents.

Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous marriage. However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until the 2nd marriage, showed his good intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and he never absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty of disbarment is too harsh.

As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the necessary commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. For doing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of falsification of public documents. Respondent also violated the Notarial Law for so doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.

The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.

ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT

FACTS

Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him.

Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12 children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery.

Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates.

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report:

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. It averred that an indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent supports himself through the practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him of this at this time when he is already advanced in age.

HELD

The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.

Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.

The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of his license.

Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against him, irresistibly suggesting that they are true.

Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore be disbarred.

ADVINCULA V. MACABATA

FACTS

Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty. Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents occurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2nd kissing incident.

Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula.

ISSUEIs Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment?

HELDThe Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character.

Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.

Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.

While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.

(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)

CANON 8REYES V. CHIONG

FACTS

Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC referred the case to the IBP.ISSUE

W/N the civil complaint was groundless W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil complaint

HELD

Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.

IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspensionSC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salangas decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis.Relevant Provisions:

Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO

Facts:

Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya.Respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case.

Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy? Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent then replied that complainant shouldve notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, respondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and shouted,Ukinnam nga babai!(Vulva of your mother, you woman!)

Later, complainant filed amanifestationthat she wont appear in the hearing of the case in view of the respondents public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already.Held: Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.

Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.

His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of the complainants subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.

The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

Facts:

Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in the PAO office when the wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted at Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would realize his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, Gago ka!

The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8 Held:Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefiancos meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco was moved by the womans plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down. Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTS

AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE

Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics

HELD

YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.

In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel.

Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

TORRES V. JAVIER

Facts:

Atty. Torres and Mrs. Celestino charge Atty. Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney an/or violation of the lawyers oath. This stemmed from the remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Assoc. (UEFA) as counsel: 1. Motion to Expedite contained false statements with malicious imputation of robbery and theft of UEFAs funds upon their persons; and 2. In the atty.s fees case, Javier in his Reply used abusive and improper language, and made a statement demeaning to the integrity of the profession (not uncommon for trial lawyers to hear notaries asking their family members to sign for them).

Javier explained that he was angry because Torres had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. With respect to the atty.s fess case, he alleged that Torres, in his Answer, did not confront the issues but mocked and made malicious accusations against his wife.

The IBP found Javier guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: W/N Javier is guilty of violation of the Code Held:Yes. For reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motion, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be (must be material and relevant). This privilege does not extend to those matters not related to the controversy.

The allegations in the Motion to Expedite fall under this privilege, but not those in the Reply. The SC does not countenance Torres incorporation of criticisms against Javiers wife as past president of UEFA, but this does not justify Javiers retaliating statements (What kind of lawyer is Torres? He lies through his teeth).

Canon 8 instructs that a lawyers arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINOFACTS

Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by offering, in some instances, a 50K loan.

ISSUE

Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,?

HELD

Yes.

Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.

CANON 9MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

FACTS:

This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.

The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce.

Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE:

W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.

W/N the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of.

HELD/RATIO: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice of law.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a