27640565 autonomie 2

Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority RadicalizationAuthor(s): Erin K. Jenne, Stephen M. Saideman and Will LoweSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Sep., 2007), pp. 539-558Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640565 .

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? 2007 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 5, 2007, pp. 539-558 Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://jpr.sagepub.com DOI 10.1177/0022343307080853

Separatism as a Bargaining Posture:

The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization*

ERIN K. JENNE

Department of International Relations and European Studies, Central

European University

STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN

Department of Political Science, McGill University

WILL LOWE

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

Why do some minorities seek affirmative action while others pursue territorial autonomy or secession,

given similar conditions at the substate level? This article attempts to unpack the puzzle of minority radicalization, focusing on group claim-making as an important dynamic that has been overlooked by

much of the recent quantitative literature on ethnic conflict. To address this gap, the authors introduce a new claims' variable, which codes the demands made by groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset for

three five-year periods from 1985 to 2000. The authors examine the relationship between minority

claim-making and rebellion and conclude that they are similar but distinct forms of group mobilization.

Groups use claims as a means of bargaining with the center; relative power, therefore, has a critical influ ence on the extremity of demands that groups advance against the government. The authors test this

model against alternative arguments using ordinal logit analysis and find that factors related to strate

gic power -

including a history of autonomy, outside military support, and territorial concentration -

are all positively correlated with a group's propensity to advance more extreme demands. This study shows that minorities with greater power vis-?-vis the center are more likely to both rebel and mobilize

around separatist demands. However, minority rebellion ? unlike separatist claims ? may also be

triggered by group deprivation, indicating that violent resistance may be driven by grievances as well as

opportunities.

Introduction

Why do some aggrieved minorities advance radical demands, while others pursue mod

erate goals or none at all? Minority-state

* The dataset is available at http://www.prois-polisci.mcgill. ca/saideman/sepbarjpr.zip and http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Please direct email correspondence to Stephen Saideman

([email protected]) or Erin Jenne ([email protected]).

conflicts over claims of secession are now

among the most common and intractable

forms of organized violence in todays world

(Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; Fearon,

2004). Given the apparent association

between minority claims and violent rebel

lion, it may be useful to identify the condi tions that predispose minorities to abandon

peaceful stances in favor of separatism. This

539



540 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51 September 2007

article presents several explanations of

minority claim-making and tests these

against the theory that minority demands are a function of bargaining leverage against the center.

There is by now an impressive literature on

the causes of minority rebellion and ethnic

conflict, including a number of studies that utilize the Minorities at Risk dataset to iden

tify factors that predispose minorities to sepa ratism or rebellion (Saideman & Ayres, 2000; Toft, 2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The

present article builds on these studies by intro

ducing a bargaining theory of group demands as well as a new

conceptualization of radical

ization that captures the degree of minority challenge

over institutions of the state. Rather

than merely identifying the conditions under which the threshold of secessionism or civil war is breached, the claims' variable permits an exploration of gradations of minority mobilization. This variable is coded as the

extremity of separatist demands advanced

against the center - ranging from no claims to

cultural or language rights to territorial auton

omy to secessionism/ irredentism. The

authors then conduct ordinal logit analysis on

the claims variable to test competing expla nations of minority mobilization. The results

of this investigation generally disconfirm eco

nomic and grievance-based explanations of

claim-making, while lending support to con

structivist and bargaining accounts.

The article proceeds as follows. The next

section introduces the claims variable and

justifies its usefulness in the study of minor

ity?majority relations. We then present five

theories of minority radicalization, each of

which yields testable hypotheses concerning the causes of minority claim-making. The

article proceeds to describe the data and

research design used to test these competing

hypotheses and then presents the results of

these analyses. The final section outlines

general conclusions as well as policy implications

for managing minority?state conflicts.

Minority Claims: Variation over

Time and Space

Ethnic groups can be seen to rally around a

wide range of goals. Some seek relatively modest concessions, such as street signs in

their native language, while others demand

political independence. To complicate matters, most groups vary their stated agen

das from one point to the next. Much of the

scholarly work on group mobilization focuses on

explaining secession and/or organized

insurgency, effectively ignoring these vari

ations. Studies that focus on only one state of

the dependent variable (secession or civil war)

produce indeterminate explanations of

minority radicalization. This is because many

predictors' of extremism are also present

during periods of relative moderation. This

problem is avoided by employing a more

finely graded measure of minority radicaliza tion. This measure permits us to identify the

factors that are systematically correlated

with such variation, allowing for more rigor

ous tests of theories of group mobilization.

For this study, the authors have developed a scaled indicator of minority radicalization

against the center. As a proxy for minority rad

icalization, this claims' variable has advantages over both (1) a secession variable - which

simply captures whether or not a minority seeks independence, and (2) the much-used

minority rebellion index ? which measures the

degree of organized violence by the group. These variables are appropriate for examining the causes of minority secessionism and vio

lence, respectively. When exploring the degree of political mobilization against the state, however, a ranked measure of group goals is to

be preferred.1 As a more comprehensive

measure of

minority radicalization, the claims variable is

1 While the rebellion index does constitute a graded proxy of

minority challenge, it is a measure of group violence only and thus excludes peaceful minority radicalization such as

Quebec separatism. It is also unclear the extent to which such violence constitutes a direct challenge to the state center.



Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism as Bargaining Posture 541

also (unsurprisingly) correlated with the minority rebellion index. Although the correlation is

weak (.188), it is significant, indicating that extreme claims, such as secession or even

territorial autonomy, are more likely to be

accompanied by violence than are moderate

demands. This is because demands for terri torial autonomy or secession constitute more

direct challenges to the majority's control

over the state. Such declarations may provoke a

reaction on the part of the central government,

which can, in turn, trigger a violent uprising

on

the part of the minority. Given the link between extreme claims and guerilla attacks or even civil

war, it would be useful to identify the conditions under which groups are likely to pursue moder

ate goals rather than separatism.

Ethnic Bargaining vs. Alternative

Explanations

This section seeks to account for different

degrees of minority challenge. The authors first

present the theory of ethnic bargaining and then consider a series of alternative arguments.

Ethnic Bargaining Ethnic bargaining holds that minority radi calization is driven by negotiations between the minority and the center over institutions

of the state (Jenne, 2007, 2004; Cetinyan, 2002). Demands against the center serve as a

bargaining tool for extracting concessions

such as net transfer payments or power

sharing agreements. If the minority believes

it enjoys significant strategic leverage against the center such that ? if challenged

? it can

withstand an organized military attack, it is more likely to advance extreme demands,

such as secession, as a means of obtaining

greater concessions from the state. Strategic rather than economic sources of power are

critical in this respect, for economic advan

tages alone cannot protect a group from vio

lations by the state. Examples include the

economically advantaged, but politically

vulnerable, Europeans in Namibia, Cote

dTvoire, and Zimbabwe, and the Chinese in

Malaysia and Singapore. Because strategically powerful minorities

can credibly threaten secession, they are more

likely to mobilize around extreme demands than are weak minorities. Enhanced minority

leverage is thus linked with more extreme claims against the center, while diminished

leverage is associated with relatively moderate

claims. If a minority already has an institu

tional position that reflects its relative power vis-?-vis the center, it is unlikely to radicalize

its demands.2 However, if the group perceives that it enjoys greater leverage (due to increased

support from external patrons or a weakened

central government), its leaders may make

more extreme demands in an effort to extract

greater concessions from the center. If, on the

other hand, the group has little prospect of external assistance, its leaders are likely to

make mild claims or none at all. Ethnic bar

gaining thus explains variation in group

behavior as a function of strategic leverage

against the center. The sources of strategic

power may be internal or external.

Internal Sources of Power It is reasonable to

assume that the upper bounds of the demands a minority will make are determined by its internal traits (particularly territorial compact

ness), which serve as base indicators of minor

ity strength. Since these traits are observable to

all players, internally weak minorities are

unlikely to use separatist demands to extract

concessions from the center, because such

demands would not be seen as credible.3

Indeed, secessionist challenges are usually

credible only for territorially compact groups,

2 The authors are grateful to an anonymous reader for

raising this point. 3 The authors originally hypothesized that relative group size is associated with extreme claims as it confers strategic benefits upon the group. However, this analysis reveals that size is correlated with neither rebellion nor claims. Even

when interacted with group concentration, group size does not seem to influence minority radicalization.



542 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 441 number 51 September 2007

since the political, social, and economic self

sufficiency necessary for statehood requires a

certain degree of territorial concentration.

Second, as Toft has pointed out, territorially concentrated groups justify their claims for

independence partly on the basis of ethnic

homogeneity within a particular region.4

Groups that lack a clear regional majority are

unlikely to seek independence, as they would not be able to establish legitimate ownership of their territory.5 Third, geographical con

centration constitutes an important strategic

advantage in mounting and defending a sep

aratist position through force. The territori

ally compact Chechen minority in Russia, for example, succeeded in inflicting serious

casualties on much larger government forces

in the 1990s (Toft, 2003: 78-79). The minor

ity's ability to challenge the center militarily renders its secessionist threats all the more cred

ible. This logic yields the following hypothesis:

HI: All else being equal, territorially compact minorities are more likely to advance

extreme demands against the central

government.

External Sources of Power External sources

of minority power include (1) outside states,6

organizations, or interest groups that provide

military or political support to the minority; and (2) external national homelands that threaten to intervene on behalf of the minor

ity against the center. All else being equal, minorities with outside patronage should be more likely than those without to advance

4 According to Toft, groups concentrated within a 'minor

ity region are more likely to view the territory as their homeland and, therefore, non-negotiable or 'indivisible' in the event of conflict with the center. If the center or major ity also deems this region indivisible from the state, then violent conflict is likely to ensue (Toft, 2003: ch. 2). 5 The secessionist Abkhazis in Georgia are a minority in their own region, making them an exception to this rule.

However, Russian support for the minority (and Georgia's relative weakness) more than compensate for this strategic disadvantage. 6 Saideman (2001) considers several explanations for why external actors might support secessionist movements.

extreme claims against the center.7 Moreover,

their demands should fluctuate in intensity over time in response to shifts in support

from their external patrons.8 For example, Tamil separatism gathered momentum in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s after having received

military aid from Tamil expatriates as well as assistance from their co-ethnics in the Indian

state ofTamil Nadu Qenne, 2003: 228-229). This leads to the following prediction:

H2: All else being equal, minorities with external sources of power are more likely to advance

separatist demands against the center.

Four alternative theories of minority mobilization are given below:

Institutionalist Arguments Institutionalist theories of group claims hold that autonomous structures ?

including local

government, veto power, and tax authority -

lead ethnic groups to make extreme demands

for independence. In this view, national insti

tutions serve to construct' or create nations

around which separatist movements can

gather momentum based on the perceived

right to national self-determination. It

follows that the possession of autonomous

structures, even if only on paper, inclines

minorities to separatism. Such theories were ascendant in the early

1990s, when the multi-ethnic states of the

7 One might reasonably ask why, if extreme demands are used to obtain concessions such as power-sharing or transfer

payments, groups do not simply negotiate for these benefits

directly. This critique overlooks the mobilizing power of nationalism in the modern era. Given the salience of minor

ity rights and national self-determination in today's world, group claims have assumed unprecedented global legitimacy. Collective rights are something that ethnic groups can mobi lize around, outside patrons can support, and central govern

ments are increasingly obliged to take seriously under the watchful eye of the international community. 8

Although perceptions of leverage are the actual drivers of

claim-making, it was not possible to measure group per ceptions directly in the context of this analysis. The authors therefore used objective measures of relative group leverage (e.g. external military support or the collapse of state

power) as a rough proxy of minority perceptions.



Erin K. fenne et al. SEPARATISM AS Bargaining POSTURE 543

Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia fractured along ethno-federal lines. National

symbols - installed by Soviet leaders to

appease the constituent Soviet nations' prior to

assimilating them into a homogenous

Soviet society -

paradoxically reinforced, and

in some cases created, national identities

around which groups rallied for independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Suny, 1994; Slezkine, 1994; Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 1991; Gurr, 1993: 76-82). Suny (1994) argues that national institutions need not have functional

utility to produce this effect. The former Soviet republics provide a striking illustration of this phenomenon. Although

most of these struc

tures had no functional value under centralized

Kremlin rule, Suny demonstrates that the insti

tutions generated salient republican identities around which groups mobilized for indepen dence once the Soviet center

began to implode.9

Brueilly (1994) advances a similar explana tion for the same set of cases. While agreeing that the quasi-state structures of the Soviet

Republics played an important role in the

collapse of the Soviet empire, he argues that this was primarily due to their rent-seeking

potential rather than their symbolic value.

Self-interested national elites ? anticipating

the collapse of centralized Soviet control ?

engineered popular independence movements

to capture valued republican institutions

such as local tax authorities and legisla tures.10 The two arguments are not mutually

contradictory. In fact, they actually comple ment one another by providing

an institu

tionalist account for elite as well as mass

participation in collective autonomy move

ments. The logic of this approach yields the

following hypothesis:

H3: All else being equal, minorities with a

legacy of political autonomy are more

likely to mobilize around more extreme

demands against the center.

9 See also Anderson (1991: ch. 8). 10 For a more recent formulation, see Cornell (2002).

Political Economy Arguments Economic theories of separatism broadly hold that campaigns for autonomy are the outcome

of economic differentials between the minor

ity region and the state as a whole. There are

two distinct and seemingly contradictory schools of thought

on minority separatism. One is that economically advanced groups or

regions advance demands for autonomy to

avoid subsidizing poorer regions of the state;

examples include Slovenia, in former Yugoslavia, and the Katanga region, in the Congo (Horowitz, 1985: 243-244).n

A contrasting set of arguments holds that

?feadvantaged groups will seek autonomy from the center, owing to their inability to

compete with the dominant group over jobs and other state resources (Horowitz, 1985:

236-237). This may seem counter-intuitive,

since poor regions stand to lose net subsidies

with political independence. To account for

this, Hechter (1975) and Gellner (1983: chs

6, 7) argue that 'backward' region national

ism emerges as a response to exploitation by the center in conjunction with barriers of

access to economic, cultural, or social insti

tutions - Bangladesh

serves as an exemplar.

Independence thus becomes an attractive

alternative to systematic exploitation and mar

ginalization by the dominant ethnic group. Such arguments need not be mutually con

tradictory. Backward and advanced autonomy movements may exist simultaneously. Indeed,

Horowitz (1985, ch. 6) argues for the coexis tence of both types of movements. In order to

test for all possibilities, the authors have con

structed the following hypothesis:

H4: The greater the economic differentials between the minority (or region) and the state, the more likely the minority is

to mobilize around demands for auton

omy or secession.

11 See also Gourevitch (1979: 303-323). For a discussion of advanced region secessionism in post-1991 Russia, see Treisman (1997: 212-249).



544 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51September 2007

Ethnie Fears Arguments The ethnie security dilemma holds that ethnic

groups mobilize in response to the internal

security dilemma brought about by state col

lapse (Posen, 1993: 27-47). Posen argues that the breakdown of multi-ethnic states

creates a security dilemma by reproducing international anarchy on the substate level.

When the central government implodes, indi viduals mobilize around the default political category of ethnicity to ensure their survival.

Particularly where ethnic populations are

intermingled, each group has a significant first-strike advantage. This creates incentives

for both groups to strike pre-emptively, increas

ing the likelihood of ethnic war. Groups may also pursue autonomy or secession as a means

of protecting against ethnic attacks. The

problem with this as an explanation of sepa

ratism is that state governments rarely implode or cease to exist; this theory therefore applies to

very few cases.12 More commonly, ethnic fears

are driven by uncertainty over the new govern ment's intentions toward the minority.13

Credible commitment theories of minority mobilization build on this logic. Here, a minor

ity pursues autonomy or secession when the

center cannot credibly promise the minority as

much as it can expect to gain from fighting for

independence (Fearon, 1998; Weingast, 1998; de Figueiredo & Weingast, 1999). These argu ments

largely rest on the assumption ?12& fears

of victimization drive minority mobilization.

Crucially, the majority is least able to commit to minority protection when the state's political institutions are in flux. Thus:

H5: All else being equal, minorities are more likely to mobilize for autonomy or secession in the

wake of state transition or regime change.

12 Saideman (1998) expands the ethnic security dilemma

beyond Posen's focus on military variables, so that intragroup elite competition interacts with intergroup competition to create insecurity in some situations and stability in others. 13 For a critique of the ethnic security dilemma, see

David (1997).

Grievance Explanations Grievance theories of minority radicalization

hold that groups are more likely to mobilize

against the center when they harbor signifi cant resentment toward the dominant group or central government owing to economic

disparities or political exclusion (Gurr, 1970, 2000). The logic follows that people tend to mobilize around salient political cleavages in

response to perceptions of collective discrimi

nation. Grievances due to economic differ

ences are implied in the economic differences

hypothesis. This hypothesis tests for the effect of grievances due to

political exclusion.14

H6: All else being equal, minorities are more

likely to mobilize around extreme demands when they are subjected to

high levels of political discrimination.

Research Design and Claims Variable

The authors use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset to test these competing hypotheses.15 The MAR dataset includes information on 284 minority groups around the world from 1945 to 2003.16 It includes all minorities that are

politically relevant - whether because of

previous mobilization or negative

or positive

14 The authors tested for the impact of ethnic (linguistic, cultural, regional, and religious) differences between the

minority and the majority on group claims and found no

consistently significant relationships. 15 This project, initiated by Gurr and his associates, is

perhaps the most widely used dataset in quantitative studies on ethnic conflict. The full dataset and manual may be downloaded from the website, http://www.cidcm.umd. edu/inscr/mar/data.asp. Published versions of the dataset can be found in Gurr (1993, 2000). The version used in this analysis, together with the new claims variable, is

posted on the JPR website. 16 The MAR dataset includes information on ethno-politi cal groups with a population of at least 100,000 (or 1% of the country's population) and that reside in a country with a population of at least 500,000. The group also had to

satisfy at least one of the two criteria established for being 'politically significant': (1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-?-vis other groups in a society, and (2) the group is the basis for

political mobilization and collective action in defense or

promotion of its self-defined interests (Minorities at Risk Phase IV Dataset Users Manual: 5).



Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism AS Bargaining POSTURE 545

discrimination. The dataset therefore comprises the universe of groups that could plausibly advance collective demands against the center.17

The authors conduct ordinal logit analysis on these data to determine which argument(s) best

predicts the extremity of minority demands.

Claims as the Dependent Variable The claims' variable is coded for three five-year periods from 1985 to 2000, using the existing variables in the MAR dataset, as well as infor mation gathered from the MAR project files for each minority. This variable is designed to

capture gradations of minority challenge against the center. It is coded as follows:

Dependent variable: Claims

4 = group seeks secession or irredentism

3 = group seeks regional/territorial autonomy 2 = group seeks cultural or

linguistic autonomy 1 = group seeks affirmative action or protec

tion from discrimination 0 = no salient claims

In the context of ethnic bargaining, group claims serve primarily as an indicator of state chal

lenge and may be ordered along a continuum from affirmative action to secession or irre

dentism.18 When a group abandons calls for

17 This dataset has been criticized for having selection bias. The problem is most severe when using the data to deter mine why groups become mobilized in the first place, as unmobilized groups have been left out of the dataset. For studies such as the present one that ask why already-mobil izedgroups increase their demands or engage in acts of vio lence, this bias is less relevant. 18 There is strong empirical support for placing group claims on a continuum. In the course of politicking, minority leaders routinely shift their demands up and down this spec trum to indicate relative radicalization or moderation,

respectively. Secession (establishing sovereignty over a piece of state territory) and irredentism (annexation of a piece of state territory by another state) represent the most extreme

demands, as they challenge the integrity of the state itself. Demands for regional autonomy are less extreme, since they call for devolution of state power to minority regions', while

leaving state borders unchallenged. Claims of cultural ot lin

guistic autonomy are more moderate still, since they call for

power-sharing in the spheres of culture and education, while

leaving unchallenged majority control over the state's

politico-territorial institutions. Claims of affirmative action are the least extreme, since they call for greater integration into the majority-controlled state (Jenne, 2007).

regional autonomy in favor of demands for

language rights, it signifies that it has de radicalized its challenge against the state. If,

instead, xhe minority moves from calls for

regional autonomy to secessionism or irreden

tism, it has intensified its challenge. Recognizing that group demands rarely enjoy universal

support within the minority rank and file, group demands are coded as the claims of minority leaders who (1) enjoy a plurality of support among members of the minority as indicated by the most recent election results or

opinion polls, or (2) are recognized by both the minority rank and file and the center as the de facto represen tatives of the minority (i.e. those with whom the central government must negotiate to reach a

genuine settlement with the minority). Although this proxy cannot be taken to represent the claims

or preferences of ?# members of the minority, it does capture the claims that enjoy the greatest

popular support vvdthin the group. To test whether

nonviolent and violent mobilization are driven by similar processes, the authors run the same tests on

a second indicator of radicalization: minority rebellion. This variable ranges in intensity from 0 to 7, with a coding schema as follows:

Dependent variable: Rebellion

7 = protracted civil war 6 =

large-scale guerrilla activity 5 = intermediate guerrilla activity 4 = small-scale guerrilla activity 3 = local rebellion 2 =

campaigns of terrorism

1 = political banditry 0 = none reported

Independent Variables To test the ethnic-bargaining prediction that

strong minorities are more likely than weak

minorities to advance extreme demands against the center, proxies for minority strength have

been included in the analyses. The first

hypothesis relates to internal sources of

strength ?

group size and compactness. To

test this hypothesis, the authors have added an



546 journal of Peace Research volume 44 / number 51 September 2007

indicator for group compactness, groupconP The causal logic is that concentrated groups enjoy greater leverage against the center,

leading them to bargain more aggressively using extreme demands.20 The second bar

gaining hypothesis relates to external sources

of strength. The expectation is that minori

ties whose ethnic kin control a neighboring state (those that have a national homeland,

GC11), or that receive external military

support (ismil), enjoy greater strategic lever

age against the center and are therefore more

likely to make extreme demands.

The institutionalist hypothesis is that minorities with a legacy of political auton

omy are more likely to advance extreme

claims than those without (Hypothesis 3). To test this, the authors include a dummy vari

able, auton, that codes 1 if the group was his

torically autonomous' and 0 otherwise.

Political economy theories hold that eco nomic disparities between the region and center

drive minority separatism (Hypothesis 4). The authors include a proxy for economic differ

ences to test this claim, ecdifioc. This variable is a

seven-category scale of intergroup economic

differences that indexes relative income levels,

land holdings, access to higher education, pres

ence in commerce, and so on. It ranges from -2

for economically advantaged minorities to 4 for

very disadvantaged minorities.21

19 Variable names in italics correspond to variable labels in the MAR dataset unless otherwise indicated. 20 To test the effects of group size, a dummy variable was created for groups that are both large (more than 10% of the state s population) and territorially concentrated (using the highestgroupcon value). This dummy predicted neither the

extremity of group claims nor rebellion. However, when included with the dummy, the group size variable became

significantly inversely related to the dependent variables. This interaction suggests that large, diffuse groups are actu

ally less likely to make claims or engage in violence, perhaps because they are better able to acquire resources through the existing political system. 21 It is possible that the extremity of economic differences

matters more than the direction of differences. To test for this, the ecdifioc variable was recoded into a new variable that takes the absolute value of the original values, thereby capturing the degree of economic differentials between the

minority and majority. This variable was found to be sta

tistically insignificant.

Credible commitment logic leads us to

expect that regime change triggers minority radicalization because it annuls the status quo

deal between the minority and the majority. When this happens, the central government

can no longer credibly commit to protect the

minority's welfare (Hypothesis 5). A dummy variable for state transition was constructed

using the state 'standardized authority codes'

in the Polity IV dataset, which measure whether the state was

undergoing state tran

sition or regime change in any given year. From

these, a composite variable 'transition was

created for each of the three five-year panels ?

coding 1 if the minority's host government underwent either type of political transition

during that time period and 0 otherwise.

Control Variables Control variables have been included in each model to isolate the effect that each indepen dent variable had on minority claims while

holding potentially confounding state-level factors constant. These include country wealth

(measured as GDP per capita) and regime type (measured as degree of democracy).22 The authors expect that minorities are less likely to

advance extreme demands in wealthy countries

because there are higher opportunity costs for

mobilizing against the state.

The minority's decision to pursue sepa ratism may also be affected by its political freedom to do so. To control for this effect, the

authors have included a variable that captures the degree of democracy in each host state.23

Here, the results could go either way. One

possibility is that democratic governance is

positively correlated with minority secession

ism, since democracy provides the political

space for groups to mobilize on a collective

basis. Conversely, low levels of democracy may be correlated with group secessionism, since

22 This variable has been logged in order to normalize its distribution, which is significantly skewed to the right. 23 This variable is derived from Polity III data, available at

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.



Erin K. fenne et al. SEPARATISM AS BARGAINING POSTURE 547

Table I. Ordinal Logit Analyses, 1985-2000

Dependent variable

Claims Rebellion

Late

1980s Early 1990s

Late

1990s Late

1980s Early 1990s

Late

1990s

Bargaining Concentration

Neighbor kin-state

Intl military

support

Autonomy Institutions

Political Economic

economy differences

Ethnic fears Transition

Grievance

Controls

Political

discrimination

Regime type

Log GDP/cap

Cutl

Cut 2

Cut 3 Cut 4 Cut 5 Cut 6 Cut 7

N

Wald chi2 Prob > chi2

Pseudo R2

0.24*

(0.13) -0.25

(0.16)

0.09

(0.48) 0.05

(0.09) -0.23

(0.67) -0.06

(0.11) 0.10***

(0.04) -0.41**

(0.20) -3.36

-2.39

-1.94

-1.28

158 18.51

0.0177

0.0494

0.37***

(0.12) 0.15

(0.16) 0.26**

(0.13) 0.88**

(0.41) 0.20**

(0.08) 0.41

(0.56) 0.09

(0.12) 0.03

(0.03) -0.17

(0.19) -0.69

0.35

1.51

3.08

156 36.86

0.0000

0.0684

0.38***

(0.11) -0.03

(0.14) 0.37***

(0.11) 0.98***

(0.33) 0.14*

(0.07) -1.93**

(0.80) 0.02

(0.10) 0.02

(0.02) 0.02

(0.15) 0.06

0.91

2.16

3.73

192 43.01

0.0000

0.0861

0.59**

(0.20) -0.33

(0.23)

0.69

(0.48) -0.05

(0.10) 2.73***

(0.65) 0.30**

(0.15) 0.04

(0.04) -0.53*

(0.27) -1.92

-1.51

-1.27

-1.17

-0.83

0.04

1.21

156 51.26

0.0000

0.1485

0.32**

(0.16) -0.34

(0.22) 0.47***

(0.11) 0.44

(0.45) -0.01

(0.10) 0.13

(0.48) 0.17

(0.14) -0.01

(0.03) -0.61**

(0.28) -4.07

-3.36

-3.02

-2.56

-1.92

-1.26

-0.57

155 75.12

0.0000

0.1460

0.33**

(0.17) -0.14

(0.21) 0.54***

(0.11) 0.54

(0.37) 0.06

(0.10) 1.41

(0.85) 0.20

(0.13) 0.03

(0.03) -0.59***

(0.22) -2.44

-2.00

-1.79

-1.33

-0.88

-0.28

0.35

191 43.78

0.0000

0.1445

? p <0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01, one-tailed.

minorities in repressive states have greater

incentives to seek institutional exit.

Discussion of Results

The authors use ordinal logit to analyze three

separate panels of data ? the most extreme

claims advanced by each of the minorities

from 1986 to 1990, from 1991 to 1995, and

from 1996 to 2000. The independent vari

ables are measured at or near the beginning

of each five-year period in order to minimize

the problem of reverse causality. The findings are reported in Table I. The analyses

were

then re-run using only the significant vari

ables, the results of which are reported in

Table II. To ascertain the substantive impact

of the findings that remain robust across



548 journal of'Peace Research volume 44 / number 51 September 2007

Table II. Ordinal Logit Analyses 1985-2000, Restricted Models

Dependent variable

Claims Rebellion

Late

1980s Early 1990s

Late

1990s Late

1980s Early 1990s

Late

1990s

Bargaining Concentration

Institutions

Political

Intl military

support

Autonomy

Economic

economy differences

Ethnic fears Transition

Grievance

Controls

0.33***

(0.11)

Political

discrimination

Regime type

Log GDP/cap

Cut 1

Cut 2

Cut 3

Cut 4 Cut 5 Cut 6 Cut 7

N

Wald chi2 Prob > chi2

Pseudo R2

0.11***

(0.03) -0.32**

(0.16) -1.95

-0.99

-0.59

-0.11

220 23.83

0.0000

0.0474

0.31***

(0.10) 0.18**

(0.09) 0.89***

(0.30) 0.12**

(0.05)

-0.54

0.49

1.43

2.84

261 32.21

0.0000

0.0401

0.29***

(0.10) 0.31***

(0.10) 1.04***

(0.29) 0.14**

(0.05) -0.82

(0.64)

-0.63

0.34

1.41

2.99

261 39.33

0.0000

0.0590

0.68**

(0.16)

2.77***

(0.61) 0.32***

(0.11)

-0.20

(0.16) 1.64

2.01

2.35

2.42

2.72

3.50

4.36

220 53.03

0.0000

0.1090

0.37**

(0.12) 0.56**

(0.10)

-0.47***

(0.17) -2.30

-1.76

-1.44

-1.04

-0.36

0.22

0.91

224 84.84

0.0000

0.1085

0.38**

(0.14) 0.60***

(0.09)

-0.59***

(0.15) -2.92

-2.52

-2.27

-1.81

-1.43

-0.86

-0.43

275 62.85

0.0000

0.1199

*p < 0. 1; **/>

< 0.05; ***/> < 0.01, one-tailed.

analyses, Tables III and IV present the pre dicted probabilities of radicalization using software created by Long & Freese (2001).24

Table V gives the summary results of these

24 In the tables and graphs, all of the independent variables are set at their minimums (except for transition, which is set at its maximum) to create a baseline representing groups that are least likely to make claims or engage in violence.

The baseline probabilities are 24.4% for no claims, 21.6% for modest claims, 11.2% for limited autonomy, 14.9% for autonomy, and 27.9% for secession or irredentism in the late 1990s panel. A second reason to set the values at their

minimums or maximums (rather than their means) is that nearly all of the variables are either dichotomous or ordinal. Setting a baseline at the variables' mean values would mean

relying on values that do not exist in the dataset.

tests, which are discussed in further detail below. Overall, the authors find support for the theory of bargaining.

Bargaining This analysis indicates that group concentra

tion is a significant predictor of both claims and rebellion in all three time periods.

Territorially concentrated groups are both

more likely to advance extreme claims and

more likely to launch violent uprisings. Table III shows that highly concentrated groups are

nearly 27% more likely to be secessionist or




Table III. Predicted Probabilities for Claims, Late 1990s

No

claims

Affirmative action,

protection

Linguistic/ cultural

autonomy

Territorial

autonomy

Group concentration

Military

support

Autonomy

Dispersed

Primarily urban or

minority in

one region

Majority in

one region, others dispersed

Concentrated

None

Low

Moderate

Strong

Very strong

No

Yes

0.244

0.181

0.131

0.094

0.244

0.182

0.133

0.096

0.069

0.244

0.108

0.216

0.187

0.154

0.121

0.216

0.188

0.155

0.123

0.094

0.216

0.134

0.112

0.109

0.100

0.085

0.112

0.109

0.100

0.087

0.071

0.112

0.092

0.149

0.161

0.163

0.153

0.149

0.161

0.163

0.154

0.137

0.149

0.158

Secessionism/

irredentism

0.279

0.361

0.452

0.547

0.279

0.359

0.448

0.540

0.629

0.279

0.508

Table III is a based on the logit analysis presented in Table I. All independent variables are set at their minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).

Figure 1. The Impact of Group Concentration on the Probability of Claims, Late 1990s

0.60

0.50

? 0.40

0.30

0.20

0.10

0.00 1 2

Group Concentration

None Auton Sec/I rr

Figure 1 is based on the logit analysis presented in Table 1. All independent variables are set at their mini

mums, except for transition which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).

irredentist than are dispersed groups. Figure 1

shows that the likelihood of making no claims

drops with increased territorial concentration.

As can be seen in Table IV, group concen

tration is also a strong predictor of violent rebel

lion. Highly concentrated groups are more than



Ut o <2> > O m w W > n N

Table IV. Predicted Probability of Rebellion, Late 1990s

None

Political banditry

Campaigns of terrorism

Local rebellion

Small-scale guerilla

activity

Intermediate guerilla

activity

Large-scale

guerilla Protracted

activity civil war

Concentration

External military support GDP/cap

Dispersed Primarily urban or minority in one region Majority in one region,

others dispersed

Concentrated

None Modest

Moderate Strong

Very Strong

Min.

Mean

Max.

0.408 0.330

0.261 0.202

0.408

0.286

0.189

0.119

0.073 0.345 0.693 0.867

0.108

0.103 0.092

0.079

0.108 0.097

0.076

0.054

0.035 0.125 0.099

0.049

0.051 0.051 0.048 0.043 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.031

0.021

0.080 0.048

0.021

0.109

0.115

0.115

0.109

0.109 0.116 0.107

0.086 0.062

0.091 0.045 0.019

0.089

0.100 0.108

0.110 0.089

0.106

0.110 0.099

0.078

0.088

0.036 0.014

0.091

0.110 0.128 0.142 0.091 0.122 0.144

0.149

0.133

0.156 0.050

0.019

0.062

0.079 0.099 0.119 0.062 0.091

0.124

0.149 0.157 0.060 0.016

0.006

0.082 0.111 0.148 0.196 0.082 0.133

0.209 0.313 0.440

0.055

0.013

0.005

Table IV is based on the logit analysis presented in Table II. All independent variables are set at their minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to

least likely to engage in violence).




Figure 2. The Impact of External Military Support on Claims, Late 1990s

0.70 -

1 3

External Military Support

None Auton Sec/I rr

Figure 2 is based on the logit analysis presented in Table 1. All independent variables are set at their

minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).

Table V. Summary Findings

Theory Prediction Evidence

Ethnic bargaining

Institutionalist arguments

Political-economy arguments

Ethnic-fears theories

Group grievances

Concentration -> extreme claims

External leverage -^ extreme

claims

Autonomy -> claims

Economic differentials -^ claims

Regime change, transition -> claims

Discrimination -^ claims

Significant and sizable impact in

the predicted direction on both

claims and rebellion

Supported by analyses

Positive association with claims

but not rebellion

Relatively poor regions are more

likely to advance separatist demands, but only in the 1990s;

regional disparities have no effect

on violent rebellion

No relationship with claims;

transition does predict violent

rebellion, but only for the

late 1980s

No relationship with claims; does

positively influence violent

rebellion, but only in the

late 1980s



552 journal of Peace RESEARCH volume 44 / number 51 September 2007

23% more likely to engage in the most severe

forms of violence (small-scale guerilla activity or

more) than are dispersed groups. This is con

sistent with Toft (2003) and others. Minorities that enjoy external support are

also more likely to radicalize their demands than those that do not. Indeed, groups with

the strongest levels of assistance are more than

twice as likely to pursue secession or irreden

tism as those that have no external support.

Figure 2 shows this relationship quite clearly. The strong association between external

military support and radicalization should not be surprising,

as minorities are unlikely to challenge their governments without sig nificant external backing. Having ethnic kin in control of a

neighboring state, however, is

not a significant predictor of group claims for

any of the three periods, indicating that the mere presence of an external national home

land does not confer bargaining advantages

upon the minority in question.25 At the same

time, the presence of a kin state also does not

appear to dampen minority rebellion in any of the three periods. These results would seem to contradict Van Houtens (1998) claim that the presence of a kin state serves

as a credible guarantee of minority protec

tion, effectively deterring majority aggression and thereby diminishing the minority's incentives to rebel. Van Houten qualifies this

argument, however, by noting that the kin

state promotes ethnic accommodation only when it sends ambiguous signals of support to the minority, generating the requisite

uncer

tainty on both sides to induce a compromise solu

tion. In contrast, an interventionist homeland

state can be expected to exacerbate a minor

ity?state conflict. These expectations are

consistent with those of ethnic bargaining in that what matters is not so much the poten

25 Collier & Hoeffler (2004: 575-576) investigate the causes of civil conflict around the world using the Polity III data and find that, although the presence of a large kin

group over the border does not appreciably increase the risk of an initial civil conflict, it does increase the probability of a repeated conflict in the said state.

Hal, but rather the actual partisan support for the minority.

Altogether, the bargaining variables perform far better than the other variables in accounting for both claim-making and violent rebellion

against the state. This suggests that the logic of

minority claim-making is not dissimilar to that of minority rebellion - both are processes of

minority radicalization, which has a powerful strategic component.

Institutionalist Findings Table I shows that a history of minority autonomy has a significant impact on sepa

ratism in the 1990s.26 Groups with the

experience of autonomy are almost 24%

more likely to pursue secession or reunion

with a kin state. This lends some confirma tion to the institutionalist argument that

autonomous structures construct' a state

like identity that can form the basis for an

independence movement when opportunities for claim-making emerge. It should be noted that this finding is also consistent with the

bargaining explanation of group demands, in that institutions confer significant mobiliza

tional (and therefore strategic) advantages upon groups, making them more likely to use extreme demands to extract concessions

from the center. However, this factor appears to have had no impact on claim-making in the 1980s - with or without controlling for the former communist bloc. A possible explanation for this is that the breakup of ethno-federations at the end of the Cold War lent greater legitimacy to collective rights, encouraging minorities with autonomous

status to use their status to bargain with the

center in the post-Cold War period. The fact that the mean extremity of group claims in

the 1990s is fully twice that of the 1980s pro vides support for this contention.

26 This result holds even when a dummy variable is included to control for residing in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union.



Erin K. Jenne et al. Separatism AS Bargaining POSTURE 553

Interestingly, autonomy is not a significant

predictor of minority rebellion. This may be because the use of violence is governed,

at least

in part, by a logic other than bargaining. In this respect, it is important to remember that

engaging in violence is very costly from an

individual standpoint. Given its considerable

costs, it may require something greater than

expected rewards to motivate people to par

ticipate in collective rebellion. To summarize,

a history of autonomy seems to encourage more assertive claims in the direction of sepa

ration from the center. However, it has at most

an indeterminate effect on the likelihood of violent rebellion.

Political Economy Findings These tests show that economic differences

between the minority and the majority are

significant predictors of separatist claims

throughout the 1990s, but insignificant pre dictors of violence in all three periods. This indicates that regional disparities

are associ

ated with separatism but not violence.

Groups that are relatively worse off than the

majority appear, at least in the 1990s, to have used separatist claims to negotiate with the

center over a greater share of state resources.

The fact that this effect does not hold for the late 1980s may mean that the greater legiti

macy of collective demands after the Cold War encouraged disadvantaged groups to use

separatist claims to negotiate a better deal

with the center. However, economic dispari ties do not appear to have predisposed groups to engage in violence, possibly because rela

tively impoverished groups are in a poor

position to challenge their more advanced

state centers through force.

Ethnic Fears

Contrary to ethnic-fears expectations, Table

I shows that state/regime transition actually had an inhibiting effect on minority sepa ratism, but only in the late 1990s. Changing institutions ought to have increased fears

about government performance. Instead,

political change in the late 1990s was associ ated with weaker claims. Possible expla nations are that institutional change during this time either satisfied groups or under

mined their leverage against the center. The

available data cannot help us distinguish between these two

plausible accounts; case

studies are needed to sort out the causal

mechanism at work.

There is also no consistent relationship between regime change and violence.

Political transition is significantly and posi tively correlated with violent minority rebel

lion, but only in the late 1980s. This pattern holds even when controlling for the post-com munist cases. When substituting

a democra

tization variable for regime change, this too

is found to be insignificant, indicating that the direction of regime change is not driving this effect. Because the transition indicator is

somewhat blunt, it is difficult to determine

exactly what is going on here. What is clear is that these findings call into question the notion that institutional change is associated

with ethnic separatism and violence (Snyder, 1999). Interestingly, political transition

appears to influence claims and violence dif

ferently; this indicates that, while related,

claim-making and rebellion are not identical

processes of minority radicalizaron. More

work - case studies and/or better data - are

necessary to determine why political change has such an inconsistent impact on group mobilization.

Grievances

Political discrimination was found to have a

significant effect only on rebellion in the late 1980s and not on claims in any period. This

suggests that grievances do not predispose minorities toward separatism, although

they may increase the likelihood of violent rebellion. This pattern has an intuitive inter

pretation. Repressed minorities are unlikely to attempt to bargain with the center using



554 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 441 number 51September 2007

Separatist demands, as they generally lack the

strategic resources with which to advance

extreme agendas. They may, however, engage

in sporadic violence in response to barriers to

institutional access (examples include the

repressed groups in Pakistan and the Hutus and Tutsis in the Democratic Republic of

Congo). By extension, the most aggrieved

groups are the least likely to challenge the center using extreme demands. Indeed, the

most repressed groups in contemporary

Europe are the Roma in nearly every country.

Despite ample motives for doing so, they have engaged in neither separatism nor vio

lence. What they lack is leverage -

they are neither territorially concentrated, nor do

they have a history of autonomy nor even

access to political institutions. Moreover,

they enjoy almost no foreign support, despite recent efforts by the EU, the OSCE, and the

Council of Europe to improve their con

dition (Jenne, 2000; Barany, 2002).27 The control variables had inconsistent

effects on minority radicalization. Table I indicates that country wealth had an inhibit

ing influence on both separatist claims (in the late 1980s) and violent rebellion. In other

words, residing in a wealthy country makes a

group less likely both to advance extreme claims and to engage in violence. This, too,

has an intuitive interpretation, for minorities

that reside in relatively wealthy countries pre

sumably have more to lose economically from radicalizing against the state. That

country wealth did not have a similarly dampening effect on claims in the 1990s may be because many groups

? such as Quebec

separatists ? were able to

challenge the center

through normal political channels, thereby avoiding the costs of violent rebellion.

Regime type is an insignificant predictor of claims and rebellion across all panels, with the exception of claims in the late 1980s,

27 In another study, Saideman (2001) finds that Roma receive far less political and military support than other groups.

which were positively associated with the

degree of democracy. This effect may be driven by the prevalence of extremely unde

mocratic governments in Eastern Europe, Central and South America, sub-Saharan

Africa, and Southeast Asia in the late 1980s - under such regimes, minorities had limited

political space in which to bargain. By the

1990s, many of these governments had begun to democratize, providing greater opportuni ties for group activism. Consequently, the

variation in the level of democracy across

countries could no longer account for the

variation in minority claims.

It should be noted that these analyses, par

ticularly with respect to group claims,

explain only a small part of the variation in

minority rebellion and demands, as indicated

by the low pseudo-i?2. Bargaining and claim

making are more

complex than what can be

captured in this or any other structural analy

sis, as state governments anticipate what

groups are likely to demand and act to contain emerging crises. Indeed, there is

simply no way that such analyses can ade

quately measure the effects of all the elements

of bargaining, which include signaling resolve,

establishing credibility, inferring intentions, and selecting tactics. Still, both the individ ual results and the models are

statistically sig

nificant, indicating meaningful associations between key strategic factors, on the one

hand, and group claim-making and rebellion, on the other.

Conclusions

This article develops and tests the argument that variation in minority claims is largely a function of variation in strategic leverage

against the center. Groups with greater power vis-?-vis their governments are more likely to

make extreme claims, while relatively weak

groups are unlikely to ask for much. The

authors demonstrate that, although claim

making and violence are related forms of




radicalization, they differ in important ways. These findings indicate that variables that

capture minority strength (e.g. territorial

concentration and external support) are pos

itive predictors of both forms of minority radicalization. This may be attributed to the

strategic advantage that such factors confer

upon groups. Other things being equal, minorities with greater leverage vis-?-vis the

center are more likely to advance separatist

claims and engage in violent rebellion.

However, the likelihood of violent rebellion

may also be influenced by things such as

ethnic fears and political discrimination.

When there is considerable uncertainty

about majority intentions, or when the

group suffers repression, the minority may

decide to challenge the government through violence. Chechen separatism has been

violent in part because it has not been possi ble to bargain with Moscow through peace ful channels. In contrast, Quebec separatism

has been largely peaceful as they have been

able to advance their demands through the

existing political system. These results have important policy

implications for resolving internal conflicts.

In the last decade, scholars and policymakers have increasingly favored de jure or de facto

ethnic partition through protectorates or

territorial autonomy as a means of resolving

the most intractable secessionist conflicts.28

Examples include the partitions, quasi-parti

tions, and proposed partitions of Israel,

Bosnia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and

Northern Ireland, to name but a few. This

'last resort' solution is largely a consequence

of taking extreme minority demands at face

value. It is widely believed, for example, that

minorities such as the Chechens and the Sri

Lankan Tamils will accept nothing less than

quasi- or fully independent statehood in

return for disarmament. Such conflicts are

28 For some of the key academic works in this debate, see

Downes (2001) and Kaufmann (1996). For criticisms of

partition, see Sambanis (2000) and Kumar (1997: 2-8).

also attributed to ethnic fears borne of

minority persecution or state collapse. The

findings in this study suggest, however, that

minority claims are a function neither of

grievances nor of commitment problems, but

rather of relative bargaining power between the minority and center. Ethnic partition cannot by itself resolve such power imbal ances. The creation of de jure ethnic enclaves

may instead exacerbate such conflicts by cre

ating disincentives for interethnic coopera

tion within the existing state framework.

This analysis points to three possible methods of managing counterproductive

power differentials. First, an international task

force could be created to restrict the access of

secessionist minorities to outside military

assistance such as troops, training camps, 'safe

havens', and other military aid. Doing so may

dilute popular support for secessionist demands,

inducing minority representatives to negotiate

with the government over policies of ethnic

accommodation. This strategy may be fruit

fully applied to the ongoing conflict between

the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan govern ment. Longitudinal analysis of the Tamil movement demonstrates that separatist vio

lence gained momentum only after the Tigers

gained significant strategic advantages against

the center (Rotberg, 1999: 7-8) ,29 Limiting their access to outside sources of military aid

may assist in negotiating a real and lasting

peace with the Tamil rebels. Indeed, the global war on terrorism -

including restrictions on

the flow of money to the leaders of organized

insurgencies ?

may have already had such an

impact. However, given the manifest difficul

ties that the international community has had

in persuading states and interest groups to

restrict support to minorities in conflict, there

are serious limitations to this approach.

29 Smith (1999: 26) writes that the intensified LTTE sep aratist campaign in the second Eelam War 'was facilitated

by the ability of the Tamil Tigers to procure more sophis ticated weaponry'.



556 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51 September 2007

Second, regional security regimes can be

used to manage shifting power differentials in deeply divided societies. Regional organiz ations are ideally suited for this task, as they operate close to the ground. Moreover, the

members of such regimes typically have a

vested security interest in resolving internal

conflicts that threaten to destabilize the

region. Transparent decisionmaking and

multistate interventions may also limit the

partisan involvement of any single state,

which usually does more harm than good. Finally, regional security regimes are well

positioned to undertake the long-term con

flict management necessary for resolving entrenched territorial wars. ECOMOG is one such regime that has recently begun

to

manage conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

ASEAN could develop a similar peacekeep ing capacity for South and Southeast Asia.

One of the key predictors of minority rad icalization -

territorial concentration - is also

one of the most difficult to manipulate in the interest of achieving ethnic peace. There is little the international community can do,

particularly in the short run, about a states

ethnic configuration. Efforts to create more

integrated polities (particularly through popu lation transfers) smack of the discredited social

engineering projects undertaken by Soviet

style governments, which have since been

denounced as cultural genocide. Relocating

people on the basis of ethnicity is simply not a viable policy option in todays political climate. Moreover, resettlement policies are

likely to generate far more problems than they solve, increasing the humanitarian toll and

giving rise to entirely new security problems.

Governments may, however, be persuaded to

adopt an incremental approach to ethnic

integration -

using economic incentives, edu

cational regulation, and the like to encourage

people to co-habitate rather than live in eth

nically segregated communities. Gradually decreasing the concentration of ethnic groups, while controversial, is likely to yield long-term

dividends in terms of discouraging separatism and violence.

This analysis suggests (1) that what

groups seek is not necessarily what they will

settle for, and (2) that this calculation is

largely based on the minority's strategic assets. Given the fluidity of such assets, it should not be surprising that deals over

ethnic accommodation are continually being made and remade. These findings also indi cate that separatism and rebellion are gov

erned by related, yet distinct, logics. Not all

separatist groups are violent, and not all

violent groups are separatist. Given this, we

would do well to pursue solutions that facili tate peaceful minority-majority bargaining, rather than those that inhibit separatism but do little to discourage violence.

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ERIN K. JENNE, b. 1970, PhD in Political Science (Stanford University, 2000); Post

doctoral Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs, Harvard University

(2000-02); Associate Professor, Central Euro

pean University (2002- ). Most recent book:

Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority

Empowerment (Cornell University Press, 2007).

STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN, b. 1966, PhD in Political Science (UC, San Diego, 1993); Canada Research Chair in International

Security and Ethnic Conflict and Associate

Professor, McGill University (2002- ). Most

recent book: The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2001).

WILL LOWE, b. 1973, PhD in Cognitive Science (University of Edinburgh, 2000); Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Basic Research

in the Social Sciences, Harvard University (2000-03); Research Fellow, Trinity College

Dublin (2004-05). Currently Research Fellow at the Social Science Methods and Data

Institute, University of Nottingham.



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