24 draft asmgcs operating procedures

8/8/2019 24 Draft Asmgcs Operating Procedures

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EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONFOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL

EUROPEAN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

Draft A-SMGCS OperatingProcedures

Edition Number : 1.5Edition Date : 01/12/04Status : Released IssueIntended for : General Public


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Draft A-SMGCS Operating Procedures

Page ii Proposed Issue Edition Number: 1.5

DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS

TITLE


EATMP Infocentre Reference:

Document Identifier Edition Number: 1.5

Edition Date: 01/12/04

Abstract

This document contains draft Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Operating Procedures for Level 1 and 2. They are part of the A-SMGCS Project 1 of theEurocontrol Airport Operations Program (APR)

KeywordsSensors MultilaterationNon-Co-operativeSensors

Surface MovementRadar (SMR)

Co-operative SensorsMode S

Contact Person(s) Tel Unit

Paul Adamson 93308 DAP/APT

STATUS, AUDIENCE AND ACCESSIBILITY

Status Intended for Accessible via

Working Draft General Public IntranetDraft EATMP Stakeholders ExtranetProposed Issue Restricted Audience Internet: www.eurocontrol.int/airportsReleased Issue Printed & electronic copies of the document can be obtained from

the EATMP Infocentre (see page iii)

ELECTRONIC SOURCE

Path: P:\euro\DUpwood

Host System Software Size

Windows_NT Microsoft Word 10.0 535 Kb


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Edition Number: 1.5 Released Issue Page iii

EATMP InfocentreEUROCONTROL Headquarters96 Rue de la FuseB-1130 BRUSSELS

Tel: +32 (0)2 729 51 51

Fax: +32 (0)2 729 99 84E-mail: [email protected]

Open on 08:00 - 15:00 UTC from Monday to Thursday, incl.

DOCUMENT APPROVAL

The following table identifies all management authorities who have successively approved

the present issue of this document.

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

Please make sure that the EATMP Infocentre Reference is present on page ii.

A-SMGCSProject Manager

DAP/APTPaul Adamson


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Page iv Released Issue Edition Number: 1.5

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the presentdocument.

EDITIONNUMBER

EDITIONDATE

INFOCENTREREFERENCE

REASON FOR CHANGEPAGES

AFFECTED

1.0 25/02/04 Documentation Creation All

1.1 16/04/04 Update after Coordination Meeting All

1.3 01/07/04 Update following internal editorial review All

1.4 26/07/04 Update following internal editorial review All

1.5 01.12.04 Update following internal editorial review All


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Edition Number: 1.5 Released Issue Page v

CONTENTS

DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS.............................................................................ii

DOCUMENT APPROVAL..........................................................................................iii

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD..............................................................................iv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................................1

1. Scope of the Document ......................................................................................2

2. A-SMGCS Introduction .......................................................................................2

2.1 Sensors .....................................................................................................................................2

2.2 Non Co-operative Sensors........................................................................................................4

2.2.1 Primary Surface Movement Radar (SMR) ........................................................................4

2.2.2 Other Sensors ...................................................................................................................4

2.3 Co-Operative Sensors...............................................................................................................4

2.3.1 Vehicle Equipment ............................................................................................................4

2.3.2 A/C Transponders .............................................................................................................4

2.3.3 Mode S Multilateration.......................................................................................................5

2.3.4 Mode S Gates....................................................................................................................5

2.4 Dependent Sensors ..................................................................................................................5

2.5 Data Fusion Equipment.............................................................................................................6

2.6 HMIs (Surveillance Display A-SMGCS Level 1) .......................................................................6

2.7 Anti Collision Modules: (A-SMGCS Level 2 Control Function)...............................................6

2.8 Future Models ...........................................................................................................................72.9 A-SMGCS Operational Impact..................................................................................................7

3. The Regulatory Aspect .......................................................................................8

4. Identification Procedures ...................................................................................9

4.1 Introduction................................................................................................................................9

4.2 Identification Procedures.........................................................................................................10

4.2.1 Standard A-SMGCS Surveillance Identification Procedure ............................................10

4.2.2 Contingency A-SMGCS Surveillance Identification Procedures .....................................10


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Page vi Released Issue Edition Number: 1.5

4.2.3 Lost Identification.............................................................................................................11

5. Transponder Operating Procedures................................................................11

5.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................................11

5.2 Departure ................................................................................................................................12

5.2.1 At the Gate / Stand..........................................................................................................12

5.2.2 On Requesting Push Back / Taxi (whichever is earlier)..................................................12

5.2.3 When Lining Up...............................................................................................................12

5.3 Arrival ......................................................................................................................................12

5.3.1 When Still on the Runway ...............................................................................................12

5.3.2 After Vacating the Runway..............................................................................................12

5.3.3 Fully Parked on Stand.....................................................................................................13

5.4 Miscellaneous .........................................................................................................................13

6. A-SMGCS Level 1 ATC Procedures .................................................................13

6.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................................13

6.2 Departure (start up) Clearance Delivery.................................................................................13

6.3 Push-back, Power back and towed-out Clearance.................................................................14

6.3.1 When Gates are Visible to the Controller........................................................................14

6.3.2 When Gates are not Visible to the Controller..................................................................15

6.4 Taxi Clearance........................................................................................................................16

6.4.1 When the manoeuvring Area is Visible to the Controller.................................................16

6.4.2 When the Manoeuvring Area is not Visible to the Controller ..........................................16

6.5 Control of Taxiway Intersection...............................................................................................18

6.5.1 The Intersection is Visible to the Controller.....................................................................18

6.5.2 The Intersection is not Visible to the Controller...............................................................19

6.6 Co-ordination Ground Controller-Airport Controller ................................................................20

6.7 Taxiing on the Runway............................................................................................................21

6.7.1 The Full Length of the Runway is Visible to the Controller .............................................21

6.7.2 The Full Length of the Runway is not Visible to the Controller .......................................22

6.8 Line Up Procedures ................................................................................................................22

6.8.1 Line Up from the Runway Threshold...............................................................................22

6.8.2 Line Up from Intersection ................................................................................................23

6.8.3 Multiple Line Up...............................................................................................................24

6.9 Take Off Clearances ...............................................................................................................25


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Page viii Released Issue Edition Number: 1.5

8.4.1 Information.......................................................................................................................37

8.4.2 Alarm ...............................................................................................................................38

8.4.3 Summary .........................................................................................................................38

9. A-SMGCS Level 1 & 2 Phraseology.................................................................389.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................................38

9.2 Procedures Changes ..............................................................................................................38

9.3 Summary.................................................................................................................................39

10. A-SMGCS Level 1 & 2 Contingency Plan & Failure Mode Procedures .........39

10.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................................39

10.1.1 Purpose ...........................................................................................................................40

10.1.2 Scope ..............................................................................................................................40

10.1.3 Process............................................................................................................................40

10.2 Specific Issues ........................................................................................................................41

10.2.1 A-SMGCS Functions .......................................................................................................41

10.2.2 Ground Facilities..............................................................................................................41

10.2.3 Airborne Facilities ............................................................................................................41

10.2.4 Vehicle Facilities..............................................................................................................41

10.3 Failure Mode ...........................................................................................................................4110.4 Mitigation.................................................................................................................................42

10.5 Summary.................................................................................................................................42

ANNEX 1: Definitions ........................................................................................................................43

ANNEX 2: Acronyms.........................................................................................................................45

ANNEX 3: A-SMGCS Additional Phraseology ..................................................................................46


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Edition Number: 1.5 Error! Reference source not found. Page 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document describes the draft ATC operating procedures for A-SMGCS Levels 1 & 2,developed by the APR A-SMGCS Project (through the A-SMGCS Procedures DraftingGroup). These draft procedures address:

Transponder operating procedures;The use of A-SMGCS Level 1 in the provision of an aerodrome control service;

The use of A-SMGCS Level 2 in the provision of an aerodrome control service;The impact of visibility changes in the use of A-SMGCS;

Phraseology;

Contingency & failure mode.

The document also scopes the technology involved, including details of the different sensorsinvolved, equipment for aircraft, vehicles and the display systems required by ATC. Inaddition, information on future advances is discussed.

Regulatory aspects are covered briefly, dealing with the current ambiguity surrounding theuse of radar equipment for aerodrome surface movement control.

These procedures will be validated during 2004-2005 through real-time simulations andoperational trials. Proposals for appropriate amendments to ICAO documentation will then bedeveloped.


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Page 2 Released Issue Edition Number: 1.5

1. SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT

The scope is a compendium of Eurocontrol Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and

Control System (A-SMGCS) Project developing concept provisions, analysis, procedures andrelated documents. It can serve as a central Eurocontrol A-SMGCS Project repository forinformation to all aspects of A-SMGCS development, in particular ATC procedures.

It should only be used in conjunction with all other current ICAO documentation that arespecifically related to the subject of ATC procedures applicable to such operations.

2. A-SMGCS INTRODUCTION1

The primary aim of a surveillance system is to have situational awareness of the position andidentification of all moving vehicles and aircraft in real time, with assured reliability andintegrity. (The present four levels of A-SMGCS defined in the A-SMGCS manual are reportedin the table page 3) No single sensor, even the most highly sophisticated radar, can displayboth the position and identification of all moving vehicles and aircraft continuously at thesame time. The only practical way to achieve this high level of coverage is to use severalsensors and several complementary techniques, and to merge the results. This merged datawill then be used in the various A-SMGCS modules.

2.1 Sensors

A number of combined resources to provide indications concerning the position oridentification of a moving vehicle or aircraft can be used. These can be classified into severalcategories:

Non co-operative Co-operative

Non dependentTotal coverage

Human resourcesPrimary surface radar

VHF or UHFmultilaterationMode S multilateration

Non dependentPeriodic coverage

Microwave sensorsOptical sensorsAcoustic sensorsInfrared sensorsMagnetic loops

Mode S gateSecondary radar in theapproach path

DependentADSADS/B

Non-co-operative sensors are those that can detect a moving vehicle or aircraft withoutany action from the vehicle or aircraft (e.g. SMR). This type of sensor will always beuseful for detecting intruders or vehicles or aircraft that have unserviceable co-operativesensors.

Co-operative sensors have an active element of the transponder type and can provideboth positional and discrete information concerning the mobile.

For dependent sensors, it is equipment in the moving vehicle or aircraft that generatesthe information and transmits it.

1Text compiled from an original written by J.C VALLEE, STNA FRANCE.


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Edition Number: 1.5 Released Issue Page 3

Surveillance Control Route

Planning

Guidance

Levels

Users Mobiles and areascovered

Users Conflictsdetected

Users Users Type

0 Strict application of SMGCS

I A-SMGCS

Surveillance

Controller All vehicles in themanoeuvring area

All aircraft in themovement area

II

Control GuidanceController All vehicles in themanoeuvring area


Controller RWYincursions

Drivers Airport Static Map & mobileposition on a screen as an option

III

RoutePlanning

Controller

Allparticipatingmobiles

All vehicles in themanoeuvring area


Controller

Equippedmobiles

All conflicts

Controller

Pilots

Drivers

Airport Dynamic Map (withrunway status,), mobile positionon a screen

Automatic switch of groundsignals

IV

Controller


All vehicles in themanoeuvring area


Controller


All conflicts +ConflictResolution

Controller

Equippedmobiles

Pilots

Drivers

Airport Dynamic Map (withrunway status,), mobile position& route from route planningfunction on a screen

Automatic switch of groundsignals


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2.2 Non Co-operative Sensors

2.2.1 Primary Surface Movement Radar (SMR)

Primary Surface Movement Radar (SMR) remains the most effective way of obtaininginformation on the position of moving vehicles and aircraft in the whole airport area. It is abasic element for monitoring ground movements. Several frequencies and varioustechniques have been used, with advantages and disadvantages in all cases.

SMR is an established technology, which, despite technical improvements remains deficient.There are always areas where detection is not adequate because of masking or propagationdifficulties. Also, primary radar is sensitive to variations in the environment: poor detection incase of precipitation, and very poor detection in grassy areas. Progress over the last fewyears has been made through the use of adapted data processing.

The conversion to digital processing of moving vehicle/aircraft positions has allowed trackingalgorithms to be used, generating tracks and configuration criteria permitting detection ofsmall objects, thereby allowing the best detection potential.

2.2.2 Other Sensors

Other sensors can be used to protect specific areas, to improve coverage in difficult areas, orto control equipment such as stop bars. They can use various technologies: microwave,optical, acoustic, infrared, or magnetic sensors. Some sensors may use artificial intelligencesoftware to recognise types of moving vehicle (for example this is possible with theinformation from magnetic loops). Sensors using, for example, camera images also have

potential. With a visual acuity 10 times higher than that of the human eye, the camera cansee situations that can be analysed automatically to recognise the shape of moving vehicles.

2.3 Co-Operative Sensors

Co-operative sensors require a transponder (or beacon) to be installed in the moving vehicleor aircraft. Although this is relatively easy for vehicles moving around an airport, it is muchmore difficult for aircraft, which are subject to international legislation and standardisation.

2.3.1 Vehicle Equipment

A specific beacon can be placed on vehicles, which transmits or replies to a specificfrequency in the UHF or VHF range. The vehicle is then located by triangulation. This alsoallows the vehicle driver to be warned when entering runway-protected or restricted areas.

2.3.2 A/C Transponders

For aircraft, co-operative sensors will normally use the existing equipment such as theSecondary Surveillance Radar transponder (SSR), Mode A or S.

The Mode A transponder allows aircraft to be identified on the approach path by correlationwith the flight plan data. This identification information is used to identify aircraft on landing.


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The label is retained as far as the aircraft stand, by using the ground radar trackingprocessing module.

However resolution performance of the Mode A transponder is not assured when the aircraftis on the ground (hence they are normally switched off while the aircraft is on the ground).

2.3.3 Mode S Multilateration

The transponder's Mode S function has the advantage of being able to work in selectivemode, which greatly limits the saturation phenomenon and means it can be used on theground.

Among Mode S signals, "squitters" (spontaneous asynchronous transmissions) and replies toselective interrogations are best adapted for ground surveillance. Replies to general calls("all call" mode) are to be avoided due to the garbling of signals.

Reception and processing of squitters give access to the aircraft's Mode S address.Knowledge of this Mode S address enables a selective dialogue to begin.

Rather than deploying the complete Mode S radar, multilateration (MLT) systems aresometimes preferred since they are better adapted to smaller coverage areas, with novertical extension and sometimes with complex shapes. They provide far more accuratepositions of moving vehicles and aircraft.

In these triangulation or multilateration systems, the message (squitter) is transmitted everysecond by the transponder and is received at several points. This enables the preciseposition and identification (with the Mode S number contained in the squitter) to be

determined. Then the system interrogates in selective mode to obtain the movement identity,which, according to the transponder category, can be either Mode A or the aircraftidentification (the three letter ICAO designator of the operator, followed by flight identificationnumber, e.g. SAS945). This principle can also be extended to vehicles, which can beequipped with simplified transponders.

2.3.4 Mode S Gates

Mode S gates can be an alternative for medium sized airports that cannot bear the cost of amultilateration system. With this application, departing aircraft are identified periodically whenleaving the apron by a Mode S receiver installed at the edge of the taxiway. This receiverpicks up the squitters and, through a process of selective interrogation and remote

discrimination, identifies the passing aircraft.

2.4 Dependent Sensors

The last category of sensors, which is still in the development stage, is termed dependentsensors. The aircraft or vehicle calculates its position and transmits it to the ground stationalong with its identification. This is known as ADS (Automatic Dependent Surveillance). Forthe ground application, this principle is particularly interesting in the ADS/B version, becauseit continuously broadcasts position and identification information. For ground surveillance,information only needs to be received at one point to be exploited. Although this system isnot in widespread use today, some airports use it to track vehicles.


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2.5 Data Fusion Equipment

Data fusion is a key element of A-SMGCS systems. Good surveillance can only be achievedby combining different and complementary sensors. The data provided by these sensors canbe asynchronous, have varied accuracy, or even be misleading. The purpose of fusion is toextract the best possible information and indicate its quality, all of this of course in real time,or at least compensating for calculation time. It is a difficult exercise that involves complexalgorithms and quite powerful calculations.

Data fusion quality is therefore of prime importance in an A-SMGCS system since it affectsthe systems final performance and the degree of confidence the operator can have.

The format of this fused information has been standardised by Eurocontrol with the ASTERIX11.

2.6 HMIs (Surveillance Display A-SMGCS Level 1)HMIs (Human Machine Interfaces) in A-SMGCS are the link between the system and theusers who are controllers, pilots and drivers of vehicles.

The controller's HMI must enable the ATCO to obtain all the information needed andcontinue to process the information accurately and automatically. Although an HMI requiredfor the surveillance function is well understood, it is very difficult to define the developmentsrequired for guidance and routing functions. However, this HMI should allow an improvementin the controller's working conditions. It should save time and increase awareness of thetraffic situation that previously could not have taken into account. It must, of course, beinteractive to enable the controller to process in real time.

The pilot's HMI is integrated into the on-board equipment and is unlikely to be very specificfor the ground segment. It could be envisaged (at A-SMGCS Level 3) that the pilot has arepresentation showing the ground situation on his navigation display, with obstacles, othermoving vehicles and aircraft, alerts and instructions. This futuristic vision is certainly not yetan operational reality, but numerous studies are being carried out. It is the same for thepilot's vision, which could be enhanced by specific systems such as cameras with far betterperception that the human eye, or a head-up representation saving him time and making himmore efficient.

The vehicle driver's HMI is not limited by standardisation of on-board equipment, but ratherby the space available in the vehicle, and the real operational requirement. This HMI can

simply be an alarm in the vehicle for when it enters a specific area, but could also be a visualdisplay representing the ground traffic situation. For the future maybe guidance systems canbe envisaged that would enable the driver to follow a particular route.

2.7 Anti Collision Modules: (A-SMGCS Level 2 Control Function)

The possibility of a ground collision is one of the airport management's main areas ofconcern. The development of systems to prevent or give warnings of collisions is a mainpriority in the development A-SMGCS systems. The only problem is that there cannot be agood anti-collision system without previously having a good surveillance system. The anti-collision module called the "control function" in the ICAO A-SMGCS manual will usesurveillance data from the data fusion to detect potentially hazardous situations. However,


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errors in the surveillance system can cause false alarms or intruders, which may lead toconfusing or even hazardous situations (which should of course be minimised).

These modules can generate two types of messages: medium-term information thatrepresents a potentially hazardous situation but which does not require immediate action (i.e.Information), and short-term alarms requiring immediate action (i.e. Alarm).

These modules can cover runway and runway strip areas to prevent runway incursionsand/or prevent traffic entering closed areas on the manoeuvring area. Runway anti-incursionmodules are presently installed and are operational at several airports. The runway areas arewhere surveillance is at its highest integrity and where there is the most risk due to thespeed of aircraft.

2.8 Future Models

Future modules will enable the system to move towards a complete system (i.e. A-SMGCSLevels 3 & 4). These will include routing and guidance systems that do not exist at present,and also other types of automatic functions or data transmission to moving vehicles andaircraft.

In the area of guidance, modules that automatically switch centreline lights have been testedwithout much success to date. Other ideas under consideration are to transmit to aircraftsystem information to give routeing guidance to the parking stand.

For routing, a system could be imagined that can propose the best route for each movingvehicle or aircraft, either given through the controller or directly.

Much research is being carried out on all of this, but it still remains futuristic.

2.9 A-SMGCS Operational Impact

A-SMGCS concepts have existed for around ten years but procedures for Levels 1 and 2are still under development. However, there are some airports which do have experience ofoperational systems and there is evidence of the actual operational impact.

The main impact is that controllers have increased situational awareness and can help thepilot in difficult circumstances. The "control function", with the installation of anti-incursionalerts, also represents major progress in the safety area.

However, in the areas of capacity and efficiency, progress is more difficult to measure. Ofcourse, for an airport with no surveillance system, the introduction of new equipment, suchas SMR, will ease the controllers workload. But, in order to observe an impact on efficiencysuch as a reduction in taxiing time, a limit in waiting time, or an improvement in the flow oftraffic, a highly sophisticated system with all A-SMGCS functions must be installed:surveillance, control, routing and guidance.

In the area of surveillance, the primary system to be used for the transmission of informationfrom aircraft and the determination of position is likely to be Mode S for the foreseeablefuture. Mode S Mutilateration Systems are or will be installed at many major airports.


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Newer techniques such as ADS/B may also offer an improvement in the area of datatransmission but there is unlikely to be a system for ATC use for some years to come.

Concerning the "control function", runway anti-incursion alert modules already exist. Alertmodule performances should be improved and extended progressively to all the surfaceareas used by mobiles. Data transmission resources will enable the pilot to be warnedimmediately of a hazardous situation.

Regarding routing and guidance functions, they will certainly be installed much more slowlyand progressively. Guidance systems have not yet been clearly defined. The use of taxiwaycentreline lights, controlled by the system, in front of the aircraft requires a large and costlyinfrastructure and investment. This could be envisaged at a new airport, but would be difficultto implement at existing airports. The future seems to lean towards the development of on-board equipment that would enable the pilot to guide the aircraft on the airport surface.

As stated previously A-SMGCS is really right at the beginning of its implementation and stillinvolves some uncertainties. In order to really be able to use it, regulations would have toevolve on an international basis, and controllers and pilots would have to adapt their workingpractice to the new agreed procedures.

3. THE REGULATORY ASPECT

The current provisions governing an aerodrome control service are laid down in ICAO Doc4444 Chapter 7 "procedures for aerodrome control service". In particular it is stated that:

"Aerodrome control towers shall issue information and clearances to aircraft under their

controlwith the object of preventing collision(s)

And:

"Aerodrome controllersshall maintain a continuous watch on all flight operationson andin the vicinity of an aerodrome as well as vehicles and personnel on the manoeuvring area.Watch shall be maintained by visual observation, augmentedin low Visibility Conditionsby radar.

In the case of SMR, the nature of this augmentation is laid down in Doc 4444 Chapter 8 asfollows:

The information displayed on an SMR display may be used toassistin:a) Monitoring of aircraft and vehicles on the manoeuvring area for compliance withclearances and instructions;

b) Determining that a runway is clear of traffic prior to a landing or take-off;

c) Providing information on essential local traffic on or near the manoeuvring area;

d) Determining the location of aircraft and vehicles on the manoeuvring area;

e) Providing directional taxi information to aircraft when requested by the pilot ordeemed necessary by the controller. Except under special circumstances, e.g.emergencies, such information should not be issued in the form of specific headinginstructions;


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f) Providing assistance and advice to emergency vehicles.

In the ATS Planning Manual (ICAO Doc. 9426) the use of SMR is summarised as follows:

SMR can makea valuable contributionto the safety and efficiency of aerodrome surfacemovement control in low Visibility Conditions and at night. However, it should beemphasised that SMR is an adjunct and not an alternative to the visual aids andprocedures currently used for the control of aircraft and vehicles on the manoeuvring area.

Additionally, for the control of surface traffic in low Visibility Conditions it is stated in the ICAOManual of Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (ICAO Doc. 9476) that:

"When there is a requirement for traffic to operate on the manoeuvring area in conditions ofvisibility, which prevent the aerodrome control tower from applying Visual separationbetween aircraft, and between aircraft and vehicles, the following shall apply:"

"At the intersection of taxiways, an aircraft or vehicle on a taxiway shall not bepermitted to hold closer to the other taxiway than the holding position limit"

"The longitudinal separation on taxiways shall be as specified for each particularaerodrome by the appropriate ATS authority."

The use of words such as augment, assist and adjunct in these important documentsleads to discrepancies between different paragraphs in the same document. This then leadsto different interpretations by different users: e.g. "Radar data should not be used alone inthe provision of an aerodrome control service" (i.e. the term radar control is not applicable toaerodrome control using SMR).

The procedures laid down in this document describe how A-SMGCS surveillance data maybe used in the provision of and aerodrome control service. The intention is that theaerodrome controller be able to use A-SMGCS surveillance data as a replacement for visualobservation, when appropriate. It is also intended that the ambiguity surrounding the use ofSMR be clarified.

4. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES

4.1 Introduction

Identification is a prerequisite for the provision of any form of radar service and is defined as:

The situation that exists when the radar position of a particular aircraft is seen on aradar display and positively identified by the air traffic controller.

The procedure as it exists today is aimed at the use of radar (PSR, SSR & SMR), and in theA-SMGCS environment we need identification procedures that are appropriate for alreadyexisting, MLT, ADS and perhaps others.


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4.2 Identification Procedures

4.2.1 Standard A-SMGCS Surveillance Identification Procedure

A-SMGCS surveillance identification shall be undertaken using the following action:

For Aircraft: Direct recognition of the aircraft identification of a Mode S2equipped aircraft in a Surveillance label;

The aircraft identification feature available in Mode S transponders provides the means toidentify directly individual aircraft on surveillance displays and thus offers the potential toeliminate ultimately the recourse to Mode A discrete codes for individual identification. Thiselimination will only be achieved in a progressive manner depending on the state ofdeployment of suitable ground and airborne installations

For Vehicles: Direct recognition of the vehicle identification of a suitablyequipped 3vehicle in a Surveillance label;

4.2.2 Contingency A-SMGCS Surveillance Identification Procedures

When the direct recognition of aircraft/vehicle identification through the surveillance label isno longer possible:

Due to individual aircraft/vehicle failure of co-operative tool (e.g. transponder); or

Due to a ground control system failure (e.g. multilateration).

The surveillance display is downgraded to a lower level of surveillance, such as SMGCSsurveillance display (e.g. labelled SMR) or SMR display only, subject to the quality of thecontingency surveillance tool available after failure(s).

In that case the procedures already established by ICAO in Doc 4444 Chapter 8 are appliedas hereafter:

Where SMR is used, aircraft may be identified by one or more of the following procedures:

a) By correlating a particular radar position indication with:

i. An aircraft position visually observed by the controller;

ii. An aircraft position reported by the pilot; or

iii. An identified radar position indication displayed on a surveillance radardisplay.

2Or any kind of equivalent tool that provides co-operative exchanges between aircraft and the groundsurveillance system (e.g.; ADS B)3Many systems can fit for that purpose which are or not linked with the Mode S system. Each vehicle

should have its own individual system address


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Note: It could be e.g.:

Entering a runway or taxiway intersection;

Abeam a building or airfield feature which either shows as a permanent echo onthe display, or is marked on the video or appropriate reference document (e.g.crash grid map);

On a taxiway or runway, provided that there are no other unidentified vehicles oraircraft on that runway or taxiway segment.

b) By transfer of radar identification when authorised by the appropriate ATS authority;(Using methods described in Doc 4444 8.6.3 "transfer of radar identification" aparte) f) g) which are not relevant on a ground surveillance display).

And

c) By automated identification procedures when authorised by the appropriate ATSauthority.

Plus reminder from preceding :

Aircraft and vehicle radar position indications may be displayed in symbolic or non-symbolicform. Where radar labels are available for display, the capability should be provided forinclusion of aircraft and vehicle identification by manual or automated means (Doc 4444 8.10.2.1.3).

4.2.3 Lost Identification

If identification is lost, the pilot shall be informed accordingly and, when applicable,appropriate instructions issued.

If identification is lost, the controller should take immediate action to:

Re-identify the aircraft; or

Discontinue the use of A-SMGCS surveillance data.

5. TRANSPONDER OPERATING PROCEDURES

5.1 Introduction

The use of a surveillance display, instead of the present visual activity of the controller foraerodrome control procedures, has introduced the notion of "identification" of traffic on thatdisplay. Today the surveillance systems in use or expected to be used in the short term arebased on Mode S transmission of identification data. It is mandatory for air traffic control toidentify (and verify when being the "first in the loop") the aircraft ID prior to the use of thesurveillance display. For that purpose, crews should input data and set their transponder box


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in accordance with the new ATC needs. This introduces some changes from the presentaircrew operating procedures, and these are described in the following paragraphs.

5.2 Departure

5.2.1 At the Gate / Stand

Select STBY

Enter the discrete mode A code received from ATC

According to aircraft equipment, enter the Airline 3-letter ICAO designator, followed bythe flight identification number through the FMS or the transponder control panel.

These operations will prepare the transponder to start exchanging data with no delay when

needed.

5.2.2 On Requesting Push Back / Taxi (whichever is earlier)

Select XPDR

At this time the aircraft ID (used as the call sign by ATC) will be displayed on the surveillancedisplay giving the opportunity to ATC to process the mandatory identification procedure (andverification of data's) before to use the radar data.

5.2.3 When Lining Up

Select TA/RA

To ensure that the performance of systems based on SSR frequencies (including airborneTCAS units, SSR and A-SMGCS) is not compromised, TCAS should not be selected beforereceiving the clearance to line up.

5.3 Arrival

5.3.1 When Still on the Runway

Keep TA/RA selected

5.3.2 After Vacating the Runway

Select XPDR

There is a need that the transponder remain able to exchange datawith the A-SMGCS system. However, to ensure that the performance of systems based onSSR frequencies (including airborne TCAS units, SSR and A-SMGCS) is not compromised,TCAS should be deselected when vacating the runway.


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5.3.3 Fully Parked on Stand

Select STBY

When STBY is selected, the transponder is not transmitting or replying to interrogation. Thediscrete Mode A code given to that particular flight can be recycled for other flights

5.4 Miscellaneous

These procedures cover other needs than Departure and Arrival (e.g. an aircraft needed tomove on a taxiway between two stands could be given a conspicuity code (i.e. A1000) andwill apply the same procedures.

If vehicles are Mode S transponder equipped, drivers should apply local Transponder

Operating Procedures agreed by ANSP that should not interfere with aircraft transponderoperation.

6. A-SMGCS LEVEL 1 ATC PROCEDURES

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter aims to establish the current chronological and operational practice in use byAirport ATC, from the initial clearance delivery to the holding position and from vacating therunway to engine stop at the gate for arrival.

Then by applying future and expected A-SMGCS surveillance capability, procedures shouldbe reviewed, adapted or changed if it seems necessary.

Each procedure is described through 4 items:

When traffic is visible to the Controller;

When traffic is hidden by permanent obstacle with or without SMR;

When traffic is not visible to the Controller due to reduced visibility with or without SMR;

And

What is expected with the use of an A-SMGCS.

6.2 Departure (start up) Clearance Delivery

ICAO prescribed procedures applicable for delivery of ATC clearances prior to start up arenot specifically described.

One function of the Clearance delivery sector is to activate the FPL/RPL life by imputing theFDPS with the start up request of the flight crew.


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At this time, and according to the sophistication level of the input device and automatedinformation display, ATC should need to know:

The gate number;

The runway that will be used by the flight and FPL data to set up ATC clearance;

The flow management constraints;

The discrete SSR code;

And all supplementary information which could be stated in the AIP.

The flight crew can transmit by R/T or data link, relevant information needed on the flight butnot known yet by ATC.

After ATC clearances (SID, SSR code, Slots. etc) are relayed to the flight crew start up canbe approved or this clearance could be requested or transmitted on the ground control

frequency.

All of these exchanges could be performed by data-link. Being able to see outside is notmandatory for the controller and at some locations the clearance delivery position is not inthe tower visual control room.

A-SMGCS Regulation

A-SMGCS surveillance tool may have very limited opportunity to improve the ATCprocess at this working position.

6.3 Push-back, Power back and towed-out Clearance

(Note: Definitions for Power Back and Towed Out procedures to be developed by ICAO)

6.3.1 When Gates are Visible to the Controller

ATC actions:

ATC check that the aircraft requesting clearance is positioned at the right gate.

According to the situation of other traffic already taxiing, pushing or towing:

Clearance to leave the gate is approved;

Clearance to leave the gate is delayed;

A conditional clearance is transmitted subject to potential conflicting traffic.

A-SMGCS Regulation

A-SMGCS surveillance (in VIS1) could help to add more accurate situational awareness onwhat is happening on the manoeuvring area when gates are visible to the controller butdistant from the ground control working position.

The aircraft ID will be displayed at the gate.

The A-SMGCS identification procedures defined in Chapter 4 should be performed.


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See and avoid actions by pilots, after traffic information is done by ATC, are remaining likethey are to day.

6.3.2 When Gates are not Visible to the Controller

6.3.2.1 Due to Layout or Permanent Obstacle

ATC action:

ATC check that the aircraft requesting clearance is positioned at the right gate bychecking with the pilot or using supplemental tools (e.g. SMR) agreed on a localbasis;

Then resume as 6.3.1 until visual contactis established with the traffic;

If an SMR is available, and if the radar covers the area of the gate concerned, thearriving of the aircraft on the manoeuvring area could be confirmed with this tool.

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on the controllers display, the aircraft ID at thegate helping to remove the use of supplemental tools to check the exact position of theaircraft.


The A-SMGCS surveillance regulation will replace the SMR regulation. To assure that pushback or towed out clearance can be executed with no potential conflict on the manoeuvringarea, the ground controller can rely on the identified aircraft and vehicles positions on thesurveillance display.

Under VIS1 and VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned the present rulingconditions see and avoid continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display. An intermediate solution should be the useof procedural R/T reports released by ATC upon the use of the surveillance display.

VIS4 requires the study of appropriate provisions associated with implementation ofguidance tools for the pilot, ATCO and vehicle driver.

6.3.2.2 Due to Reduced Visibility

ATC action:

ATC checks that the aircraft requesting clearance is positioned at the right gate byasking the pilot on R/T;

ATC control mainly through a procedural process, using Planning devices (e.g. theflight strip display etc.) and using position reports requested from flight crews atspecific point or stop bars, in order to plan and transmit the ATC clearances to theaircraft leaving the gate;

If an SMR is available, and if the radar covers the area of the gate concerned, thearriving of the aircraft on the manoeuvring area could be confirmed with this tool.


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A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool will provide on a controllers display an approved situation of

identified mobiles providing the controller with accurate real time situation awareness.


The A-SMGCS surveillance regulation replaces the SMR regulation.

Until end of VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned, the present rulingconditions see and avoid will continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display. An intermediate solution should be the useof procedural reports released by ATC upon the use of the surveillance display.


6.4 Taxi Clearance

6.4.1 When the manoeuvring Area is Visible to the Controller

ATC actions:

ATC check that the aircraft requesting clearance is positioned at the right gate;

Transmit the taxi clearance if no potential conflict is expected in the near future;

Delay the taxi clearance;

Transmit a taxi clearance according to one or more conflicting traffic in the vicinity.

A-SMGCS Regulation

A-SMGCS surveillance (in VIS1) helps to add more accurate situational awareness of what ishappening on the manoeuvring area when aircraft on taxiways are visible but remote fromthe ground control working position. The aircraft ID will be automatically displayed andmaintained within an approved regulation environment so that ATC could rely on it.


Subject to present situation, the ATC service is performed equally head-up or head-downaccording to the best information quality available, looking outside or on the surveillancedisplay.

6.4.2 When the Manoeuvring Area is not Visible to the Controller

6.4.2.1 Due to Layout or Permanent Object

ATC action:


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ATC verifies that the aircraft requesting clearance is positioned at the right gate byrelying on the pilot message or using supplemental tools agreed on a local basis.

Then resume as 6.3.1 until the aircraft is visible to the controller.

If an SMR is available, and if the radar covers the area concerned, the monitoring ofthe aircraft compliance with the clearance on the manoeuvring area could beperformed with this tool as soon as the mobile has been correctly identified.

Reminder: The use of SMR is related to the operational conditions and requirements of theaerodrome (i.e. traffic density, aerodrome layout, visibility conditions).

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a display an approved situation of identified

aircraft and vehicles.The A-SMGCS surveillance regulation replaces the SMR regulation.

To ensure that taxi clearance can be executed with no potential conflict on the manoeuvringarea, the ground controller can rely on the identified aircraft and vehicles positions on thesurveillance display.


Until end of VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned, the present rulingconditions see and avoid will continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display.

An intermediate solution could be the use of procedural reports released by ATC upon theuse of the surveillance display (Such like clearance to taxi further before the pilotsmandatory report).



ATC actions:

ATC relies on the aircraft position given by the flight crew requesting taxi clearance.

ATC controlmainly throughaprocedural process, using planning devices (e.g. theflight strip display) and using position reports requested from flight crews at specificpoints or stop bars, in order to plan and transmit the ATC clearances to the aircraftleaving the gate.

If an SMR is available, and if the radar covers the area concerned, the monitoring ofthe aircraft compliance with the ATC clearance on the manoeuvring area could beperformed with this tool. as soon as one of the identification procedure has beenapplied successfully to it. (ICAO Doc 4444 8.10.2.2.2).


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Reminder: The use of SMR is related to the operational conditions and requirements of theaerodrome (i.e. traffic density, aerodrome layout, visibility conditions).

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a display an approved situation of identifiedaircraft and vehicles.



Under VIS1 and VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned the present rulingconditions see and avoid will continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display.

An intermediate solution should be the use of procedural reports released by ATC upon theuse of the surveillance display.


6.5 Control of Taxiway Intersection

6.5.1 The Intersection is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

As ATC is maintaining a continuous watch on all operations on the aerodrome, if arisk of conflict occurred it should be detected by ATC, with the help of the planningtool, (e.g. flight strips display etc.).

When a potential conflict is detected at an intersection, clearances or instructions aretransmitted to aircraft together with traffic information in order to achieve a safe andorderly flow of traffic, that flight crews give or receive priority at this intersection. It isup to the flight crew to decide what distance is needed to cross behind or to follow theprevious aircraft as no separation standards are applicable. Jet blast and propellersdriven aircraft slipstream warnings may still need to be given.

A-SMGCS Regulation

A-SMGCS surveillance (in VIS1) helps to add more accurate situational awareness on whatis happening on the manoeuvring area, especially at taxiways intersections when aircraft ontaxiways are visible by the controller but far away from the ground control working position.The flight ID will be automatically displayed and maintained within an approved regulationenvironment so that ATC could rely on it. Subject to present situation, the ATC service isperformed equally head-up or head-down.


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6.5.2 The Intersection is not Visible to the Controller

6.5.2.1 Due to Layout or Permanent Obstacle

ATC action:

If a potential conflict is expected at a taxiway intersection not visible to the controller,detection and resolution by giving priority or stop order is realised as early as possiblebased on procedural actions, or dedicated tools like stop bars. Flight crews will beasked to report resuming taxiing, after the crossing problem is solved, until traffic isonce again visible to the controller.

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on the controllers display, the aircraft ID at theexact position of the aircraft.


To assure that clearances or instructions can be executed with no potential conflict on themanoeuvring area, the ground controller can rely on the identified mobile positions on thesurveillance display. The controller will also be able to monitor compliance with the controlinstruction.

Under VIS1 and VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned the present rulingconditions see and avoid will continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display. An intermediate solution should be the use

of procedural R/T reports based upon the use of the surveillance display.VIS4 requires the study of appropriate provisions associated with implementation ofguidance tools for the pilot, ATCO and vehicle driver.


ATC action:

ATC control by a procedural process using Planning device (e.g. the flight stripdisplay etc) and reporting position requested from flight crews at specific point: e.g.stop bars, in order to planand transmit the ATC clearance to the aircraft.

If a conflict is expected at an intersection, the traffic for which ATC decided not to give

priority is instructed to hold short before the holding position defined by clearance bar,stop-bar or taxiway intersection markings.

If visibility conditions allow, traffic information is passed to the waiting traffic in orderto substitute the procedural action by a visual crossing.

If a visual crossing is not possible, ATC will wait for that crossing traffic to report clearof the intersection using procedures prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority.

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a display an approved situation of identifiedmobiles.


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Under VIS2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned the present ruling conditionssee and avoid will continue to be applied.

VIS3 requires the study of appropriate provisions linked to the ability of ATC to use suchprovisions by reference to a surveillance display. An intermediate solution could be the useof procedural R/T reports based upon the use of the surveillance display.


6.6 Co-ordination Ground Controller-Airport Controller

Co-ordination between sectors is regulated by ICAO in Doc 4444 10.4.5 and shall mainlyrely on procedures applicable at ATC units.

Doc 4444 10.4.1 states the generic organisation of co-ordination and transfer of control.

There is no co-ordination specific ruling in Doc 4444 8.10.2 (Use of SMR) but transfer ofradar identification using Mode S is covered by Doc 4444 8.6.3 c) and use of a discretecode by 8.6.3 b).

ATC action:

Co-ordination and hand over when all traffic is in direct eyesight of both ground andairport (local) controller:

1. Based on local regulation, the flight strip (paper or electronic) used by the groundcontroller for departing traffic is transferred to the airport (local) controller where orwhen deemed necessary.

2. This flight strip should contain all information on the traffic including updatesneeded by tactical actions such like use of intersection take off taxiwayidentification of Rapid Exit Taxiway (RET) identification.

3. The receiving controller should verify visually that the contacting traffic ispositioned on the right taxiway (intersection or RET) before giving furtherclearance;

4. Vice-versa for arrival traffic.

Co-ordination and hand over when all traffic is not in direct eyesight of both groundand airport (local) controller:

1. Based on local regulation, the flight strip used by the ground controller fordeparting traffic is transferred to the airport (local) controller where or whendeemed necessary. Information on position is relayed from pilots reports with thehelp of SMR if approved;

2. Vice-versa for arrival traffic

This flight strip should contain all information on the traffic including updates neededby tactical actions such like use of intersection take off identification or runway exitidentification.


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The receiving controller should verify with the pilot report that the contacting traffic ispositioned on the right taxiway (intersection or runway exit) before giving furtherclearance.

A-SMGCS Regulation


The A-SMGCS surveillance regulation will replace the SMR regulation.

In VIS1 and VIS2 conditions the automated identification process will provide to both groundand airport controllers with the same traffic situation avoiding the need to request additionalinformation on traffic position.

In VIS1 condition when runway entry or exit is distant from the controller working position,and the degree of aircraft similarity critical, the surveillance tool will help to confirm the hand

over elements.

In VIS2 condition the surveillance tool will give accurate real time traffic situation awarenessfor both ground and aerodrome controller without the need for pilots reporting position.

Flight strips presentation: unambiguous and accurate information must be provided to allcontrollers as in VIS3 and VIS4 the need to revert to procedural control will force the use offlight strips as the main support for their task.

6.7 Taxiing on the Runway

For the seven procedures hereafter it is assumed that permanent obstacles will not obstruct

the controllers view of the runway

It should be first considered if the runway is a closed runway or an active runway when itis used as a part of the taxi route.

A closed runway is considered as a taxiway under the responsibility of the ground controllerand taxiway procedures are in use.

In case of using an active runway the procedures will be under the responsibility of theaerodrome controller who will apply the procedures described below. These proceduresapply equally for aircraft or vehicles.

The specific point of these procedures is that aircraft which could be at the origin of potentialconflicts may be moving at high speed, giving only a short time for ATC reaction.

6.7.1 The Full Length of the Runway is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

ATC check that the position transmitted by the pilot/driver requesting to taxi on therunway is consistent with observedposition and:

Dependent on traffic information available (visual, procedural, or with the use of airradar surveillance display) of airborne conflicting traffic allow, delay or deny the ATCclearance to enter the runway (ICAO Doc 4444 7.5.3.1.2);


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When the clearance is transmitted to the pilot/driver, confirm visually the conformanceto the ATC clearance;

Check when the runway is vacated and if in doubt (e.g. exit distant from the tower)

request the pilot/driver to report runway vacated; or

If the clearance to the flight crew was aiming to backtrack in order to take off, followup the procedures with further ATC clearances.

6.7.2 The Full Length of the Runway is not Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

ATC requests the pilot/driver to report (or confirm) his position by using visualidentifying marks (panels, painting marks, stop bars, etc.);

If an SMR is available and identification procedure carried out, verify that the positiontransmitted is coherent with the position observed on controllers display;

Subject to information provided by other sources (visual, procedural, or with the useof air radar surveillance display) of airborne conflicting traffic allow, delay or deny theATC clearance to enter the runway (ICAO Doc 4444 7.5.3.1.2);

Request the pilot/driver to report when runway is vacated, or follow up ATCclearances when taxi on the runway is used to backtrack in order to take off;

If an SMR is available, and subject that identification procedures have been carriedout, verify that runway is vacated by the authorised aircraft/vehicle.

A-SMGCS Regulation



Under all Visibility Conditions the surveillance of the runway will be improved by a continuousfollow up of identified and labelled traffic. R/T exchanges will be reduced to a minimum(position reports would not be required).

It will help to anticipate ATC planning by for example, monitoring traffic commencing its takeoff roll.

6.8 Line Up Procedures

6.8.1 Line Up from the Runway Threshold

6.8.1.1 Runway Threshold is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

ATC check that the position transmitted by the flight crew requesting to line up on therunway is consistent with observed position, and;


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Subject to information provided by other sources (visual, procedural, or with the useof air radar surveillance display) of airborne conflicting traffic, allow, delay or deny theATC clearance to enter on the runway (ICAO Doc 4444 7.5.3.1.2);

6.8.1.2 Runway Threshold is not Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

ATC requests the pilot/driver to report (or confirm) his position by using visual marks(panels, painting marks, stop bars, etc.);

If an SMR is available and identification procedures have been carried out, verify thatthe position transmitted is coherent with the position observed on display;

Subject to his knowledge (procedural, or with the use of air radar surveillance displayif allowed) of airborne conflicting traffic, allow, delay or deny the ATC clearance toenter on the runway.

A-SMGCS Regulation



Under VIS2, VIS3 and VIS4 conditions the A-SMGCS surveillance tool will provide the realposition of the traffic (Under VIS1 it will help to confirm traffic position if it is distant from thecontrol tower).

It will help to anticipate ATC planning and instructions by seeing traffic starting to roll.

6.8.2 Line Up from Intersection

The general conditions of application are described in Doc 7030 Part 3 2.0 IntersectionTake off.

6.8.2.1 The Intersection is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

If intersection take off is agreed by national or local ATC authorities the sameprocedure as for line up from runway threshold ( 5.2.1.1) is applied.

6.8.2.2 Intersection is not Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

If intersection take-off is agreed by national or local ATC authorities under thatspecific meteorological conditions, the same procedure as for line up from threshold ( 5.2.1.2) is applied.


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6.8.3 Multiple Line Up

The general conditions of application are described in Doc 7030 Part 3 3.0 Multiple line up

on the same runway.

The text is issued from previous studies that encompass multiple line up from different pointson the same runway. (Doc 7030 Part 3 3.1.1).

6.8.3.1 From Different Intersection

The appropriate authority, shall establish a minimum visibility if this procedure is authorised.Conditions of applications shall rely on Doc 7030 Part 3 3.1. and associated phraseologyPart 3 3.2.

6.8.3.1.1 Intersection is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

ATC check that the position transmitted by the flight crews requesting to line up onthe runway is what is observed outside and;

Subject to information provided by other sources (visual, procedural, or with the useof air radar surveillance display) of airborne conflicting traffic, allow, delay or deny theATC clearance to enter on the runway. (Doc 4444 7.5.3.1.2);

When transmitting the line up clearance the aerodrome controller must advise allconcerned flight crews of the respective position of others traffic involved in multipleline up;

The aerodrome controller exercises a strong awareness on the flight crew read-back.

6.8.3.1.2 Intersection is not visibleto the controller

ATC action:

There are no current procedures that provide for this option (Doc 7030 Part 3 3.1.1.a)

A-SMGCS Regulation



ATC will be allowed to use that procedure under reduced Visibility Conditions (i.e. VIS2).

Under VIS2, VIS3 and VIS4 conditions the A-SMGCS surveillance tool will provide anaccurate and real time position of the different traffic waiting at different intersections (UnderVIS1 it will help to confirm traffic position if it is distant from the control tower).

It will help to anticipate ATC planning and instructions by seeing traffic starting to taxi.

Note: the A-SMGCS surveillance data will not override the need for the pilot of the followingaircraft to see and identify the previous cleared traffic.


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6.8.3.2 From the Same Intersection

This procedure is not considered by the condition of application of multiple line up on the

same runway (Doc 7030 3.1.1) which state that line up instructions may be issued to morethan one aircraft at different points on the same runway.

ANSPs which are using multiple line ups from the same runway access point consider thisprocedure as an application of a conditional ATC clearance to sequence departure traffic(see 6.11.1 for this aspect of the procedure).

6.9 Take Off Clearances

6.9.1 Take Off Clearance from Runway Threshold

6.9.1.1 The Runway is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

Assuming that the conditions prescribed in Doc 4444 7.6.7.8.4 are combined;

The aerodrome controller issues the take off clearance with the appropriatephraseology and monitors the pilot read back.

6.9.1.2 The Runway is not Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

The aerodrome controller has already instructed other traffic to report when the

runway is vacated;

Assuming that the conditions prescribed in Doc 4444 7.8.4 are combined;

The aerodrome controller issues the take off clearance using the prescribedphraseology and monitors the read-back, ensuring that it is correct;

If an SMR is available, the controller can check that the runway is clear and it will helpto anticipate ATC planning and instructions by monitoring traffic commencing its takeoff roll.

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a display an approved situation of identified

mobiles.


In all VIS conditions the A-SMGCS surveillance tool will increase the situational awarenessof runway occupancy and thereby reduce the R/T workload by limiting the number of R/Texchanges with pilots.


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6.9.2 Take Off Clearance from Intersection

6.9.2.1 The Intersection is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:

The aerodrome controller checks visually if the aircraft is lined up at the correctintersection and in case of multiple line ups from different intersection that it is theaircraft N1 in the sequence (no traffic ahead);

Transmit the take off clearance with the appropriate phraseology and monitor the pilotread back (Doc 7030 Part 3 2.0).

6.9.2.2 The Intersection is not Visible to the Controller

If the procedure is agreed by the ATC authorities:ATC action:

The aerodrome controller should check, by asking the pilot to report that he is lined-up at the correct intersection giving the intersection identification;

If an SMR is available, the controller can check that the runway is clear and it will helpto anticipate ATC planning and instructions by monitoring traffic commencing its take-off roll;

Transmit the take off clearance with the appropriate phraseology and monitor the pilotread back (Doc 7030 Part 3 2.0).

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a controllers display an approved situation ofidentified mobiles.


In all VIS conditions the A-SMGCS surveillance tool will increase situational awareness onrunway occupancy and reduce the R/T workload. The correct position (intersection number)can be verified on the controllers display.

6.10 Landing Clearance

6.10.1 The Runway is Visible to the Controller

ATC action:


After a visual check on the runway, transmit the landing clearance with theappropriate phraseology.


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6.10.2 The Runway is not Visible to the Controller

ATC action:


If an SMR is available, the controller can check that the runway is clear and it will helpto anticipate ATC planning and instructions by monitoring traffic commencing its takeoff roll;

Transmit the landing clearance with the appropriate phraseology.

A-SMGCS Regulation

The A-SMGCS surveillance tool provides on a controllers display an approved situation ofidentified mobiles.


In all VIS conditions the A-SMGCS surveillance tool will increase the situational awarenessof runway occupancy and reduce the R/T workload.

6.11 Conditional Clearance

6.11.1 Preamble

Considering the Aerodrome control service, conditional clearances are not described asdedicated ATC procedures in the Doc 4444 Chapter 7 but introduced in Chapter 12 as a

specific use of phraseologies,ANT/APDSG recently studied a proposed amendment to ICAO Doc 4444 on the subject ofconditional clearances. In that proposal, the recommendation was that:

a) The procedure be relocated to Chapter 7, procedures for Aerodrome ControlService;

b) A strengthening of the requirement for unambiguous identification by the aircraftreceiving a conditional clearance, of the aircraft or vehicle being the subject of thecondition was required;

c) The APDSG envisaged that the visual identification of the aircraft might be reviewedin light of A-SMGCS techniques, but agreed to focus on current operations. As soonas detailed A-SMGCS procedure requirements and tools become available, actionwould be taken to address this issue.

The proposal has been forwarded to ICAO. At this time, there has been no finalisation to theprocess.

6.11.2 Conditional Clearance Existing Provisions

The current provisions relating to conditional phrases and clearances are that:

1) They shall not be used for movements affecting active runways except when the aircraftor vehicles concerned are seen by the appropriate controller and pilot;

2) In all cases, a conditional clearance shall be given in the following order and consist of:


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Identification;

The condition;

The clearance; and

Brief reiteration of the condition.

6.11.3 A-SMGCS Aspects concerning Conditional Clearances

The main concern, for the efficient use of the procedure, is that the crew receiving theconditional clearance shall be able to unambiguously identify as early as possible the objectof the condition. This is the flight crew ability to visually acquire the aircraft on final ordeparting ahead of him which give the possibility to anticipate by a short time figure his taxito the line up position

It is clear that the A-SMGCS surveillance data does not provide the flight crew with a better

and anticipated view (visual recognition) of the incoming or departing aircraft, but it will givethe opportunity to lift the constraint of visual observation imposed on the controller by ICAODoc 4444 7.1.1.2

A-SMGCS Regulation

A-SMGCS provides on a controllers display an approved situation of identified mobiles.

A-SMGCS regulation will replace SMR regulation.

In all VIS conditions A-SMGCS will increase the situation awareness on runway occupancyand reduce the R/T workload as the controller will use the data's coming from thesurveillance tool when lacking of outside visual references.

A-SMGCS will provide the possibility to use conditional clearances procedures when visibilityis below VIS1 conditions.

6.12 Summary

If an airport is fitted with an A-SMGCS, the new procedures on the manoeuvring area thatwill be used:

1. Will not change in VIS1 and VIS2 from the present procedures (pre-departure, pushback or towed out, taxi clearance and control of taxiway intersection, taxiing onrunway) in the sense that the pilot will remain in charge of visual separation. The

approved surveillance tool given to the controller will increase his situationalawareness and decrease its R/T exchanges workload in VIS2 conditions but thepresent sharing of responsibility will remain the same.

2. The approved surveillance tool given to the controller will improve situationalawareness and reduce workload in VIS2 conditions, but the present sharing ofresponsibility will remain the same.

3. Will require further study in VIS3 conditions to establish additional prescribed collisionavoidance procedures and the appropriate use of the HMI. Otherwise the proceduralreporting procedures as used today could be used when a conflict is detected, using


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the surveillance tool to confirm or release the instruction, in that case with a reducedcapacity, but within a reduced R/T environment.

4. Will require the presence in VIS4 of a guidance tool as a prerequisite to establishingthe surveillance standards rules.

5. On the runway or entering the runway (line-up, multiple line up, conditional clearance,take off and landing):

Will reduce R/T workload;

Increase situational awareness of the controller by giving him a real time identifiedtraffic display (for these procedures separation is provided by other means) in allVIS conditions;

For all conditional procedures where the pilot is involved the gain in reducedvisibility should be studied further.

All figures used for visibility thresholds should be carefully studied in order to reduce them toa safe minimum. In determining these visibility thresholds, due account should be taken offigures contained in existing documents.

A dedicated study, using an aircraft simulator and airlines pilots, will be held 2 nd semester2004, in order to find the best transition visibility value between VIS2 and VIS3

7. VISIBILITY TRANSITION

7.1 Definition of values for A-SMGCS visibilitys threshold

There are four Visibility Conditions defined in the A-SMGCS manual and there is a need todefine the transition between each of these as these transitions may require the use ofdifferent rules.

Also, rules governing the transmission of visibility (or RVR) and operational data are alreadydefined by ICAO.

7.2 ICAO A-SMGCS Manual Definitions

a) Visibility Condition 1 (VIS1)

Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other traffic ontaxiways and at intersections by visual reference, and for personnel of controlunits to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance;

b) Visibility Condition 2 (VIS2)

Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to avoid collision with other traffic ontaxiways and at intersections by visual reference, but insufficient for personnel


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of control units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visualsurveillance;

c) Visibility Condition 3 (VIS3)Visibility sufficient for the pilot to taxi but insufficient for the pilot to avoidcollision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference,and insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over all trafficon the basis of visual surveillance.For taxiing this is normally taken as a visibility equivalent to a RVR of lessthan 400m but more than 75m; and

d) Visibility Condition 4 (VIS4)

Visibility insufficient for the pilot to taxi by visual guidance only.This is normally taken as a RVR of 75m or less.

The above Visibility Conditions apply for both day and night operations.

It is not stated if visibility is referring to horizontal visibility, as provided by theMeteorological Office to ATS.

7.3 Air Traffic Control Operational Concerns

7.3.1 Visibility Condition 1

Nothing involving the use of A-SMGCS.


During Visibility Condition 2 (which could be caused by either ceiling or horizontal visibility),control over the traffic can no longer be exercised on the basis of visual reference. Whenhorizontal visibility is the main reason for Visibility Condition 2, both pilots and air trafficcontrollers will have reduced visual reference and their situational awareness is modified asfollows:

The Controller is unable to assess the traffic situation visually and will then have tomake more use of the surveillance display;

The pilot is less able to anticipate other traffic and apply the see and avoid principle.

If the ceiling is the reason for Visibility Condition 2, this may affect only the air trafficcontroller. Pilots taxiing on the ground may not experience any change to their situationalawareness and may not be aware of the change to the controllers situational awareness(e.g. still taxiing at a high speed).

There may be a need to warn aircrew of the ATC change of situational awareness when thevalue of the cloud base is the fact that makes ATC going to VIS2 conditions.


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To avoid collision, within the provision of air traffic control services, there are two

methodologies: Separation or Traffic information

7.3.3.1 Separation

There are currently no separation standards on the ground. Traffic information is given topilots so that they can avoid other traffic (by distances determined through their ownjudgement).

7.3.3.2 Traffic Information

In the air, when traffic information is mandatory to provide Air Traffic Control Service (e.g. forVFR against IFR in Class D airspace or in controlled runway traffic pattern) meteorological

minimas are established (horizontal and vertical values) to help ensure the success of thetraffic information.

When traffic information is not successful (which may be the case when the actual visibilityexperienced by the pilot is at the limit of VMC), the issuance of avoiding action by thecontroller (even if this has not been requested by the pilot) is available as an ultimate lastsolution. However, this is outside the strict application of the regulatory provisions.

7.3.4 Application to Movements on the Surface

24 draft asmgcs operating procedures

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