2.4: air power - stanford universityweb.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.4/2.4.pdf ·...
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2.4: Air Power
Alex Montgomery
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2.4: Air Power• Theories of Coercion
and Deterrence• Pape’s Model of
Coercion• Predictions from the
Model• Testing the Model
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Definitions
• Coercion/Compellence: A threat to punish theenemy or deny the enemy’s military objectives ifthe enemy does not change its behavior
• Deterrence: A threat to punish the enemy if theenemy changes its behavior
• Defense: A threat to deny the enemy’s militaryobjectives if the enemy changes its behavior
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Coercion is more difficult
• Not deterring against homeland strike– Homeland easier to defend– Attacker risk-averse in gains
• Requires first hostile act– No way to save face– Bears responsibility for initiating hostilities
• Target willing to accept higher costs– Must have defenses against counterstrike
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Theories of Coercion
• Balance of resolve (reputation)• Balance of interests• Vulnerability of civilian population to air attack• Vulnerability of domestic military forces to
attack• Existing theories all employ punishment logic
vs. civilians, not denial logic v. military
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2.4: Air Power• Theories of Coercion
and Deterrence• Pape’s Model of
Coercion• Predictions from the
Model• Testing the Model
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Methodology
• Disregard domestic, organizational, andpsychological factors (mostly)
• Hypotheses– Denial, not punishment, provides critical leverage– Nuclear and conventional weapons different due to
destructive power• Test using statistics and case studies of strategic
air campaigns
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Models of Rational Action
• Utility Maximization– Maximize Expected Utility
• (Expected Probability of success*reward –Expected Probability of failure*punishment) - Costs
– Bayesian:• Update probability of success based on new information
– Risk Propensity• May be averse, acceptant, or neutral
– Sunk Costs
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Risk Calculation
R = Bp(B) – Cp(C)
Probability of gaining benefits(Denial Strategy)
Probability of paying costs(Risk Strategy)
Costs (Punishmentstrategy)
Benefits (nostrategy)
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Variables
• IV:– Strategy of the coercer– Denial or Punishment/Risk
• DV:– Reaction of the coerced– Concessions before defeat
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2.4: Air Power• Theories of Coercion
and Deterrence• Pape’s Model of
Coercion• Predictions from the
Model• Testing the Model
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Predictions
• Three strategies– Punishment– Risk– Denial
• Two types of weapons– Nuclear– Conventional
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Weapon Types• Conventional
– Punishment: not effective– Risk: even less effective– Denial: sometimes effective– Takes time
• Nuclear– Punishment: not effective– Risk: can be successful– Denial: not useful– Requires superiority
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Why Punishment Fails
1. Stakes are very high2. Nationalism, propaganda3. Willing to suffer costs during war4. Only limited damage5. Vulnerability can be minimized6. Population does not revolt
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Why Risk Fails
1. Lack of capability erodes difference betweenrisk and punishment
2. Slower punishment increases ability to resist,decreases punishment
3. Restraint attributed to political limitations
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When Denial Works
1. Exploiting weaknesses of enemy’s strategya. Mechanized: Cutting logistical flowsb. Guerrilla: separation from population
2. Limiting demands3. Continuous military pressure
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Why success comes late
1. Domestic costs to admitting defeat2. Government may pay a heavy price3. Military may resist4. Costs and benefits poorly evaluated5. Ability of government to conceal situation6. Psychological difficulties in admitting defeat
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2.4: Air Power• Theories of Coercion
and Deterrence• Pape’s Model of
Coercion• Predictions from the
Model• Testing the Model
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Why strategic air power?
• Easy to separate out denial and punishment• Land power mostly for denial now• Sea power weak, only effective in concert• Tactical air power mostly denial• Variation across IV and DV• Easier to measure strategy
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Coding
• Civilian Vulnerability (Punishment)– 1%+ “high” or “very high”
• Military Vulnerability (Denial)– Defense or conquest of territory cannot be assured
(attrition may be possible)• Criteria for failure:
– Stops coercion before concession– Attacks continue but don’t produce compliance– Demands imposed after total defeat.
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Statistical Test
• 33 disputes, 40 cases• 93% predicted (7% failures when high military
vulnerability) of denial theory: doesn’t fail whenstrategy is tried
• 82% success when following a denial strategy• Excluding nuclear cases, a punishment strategy
is not related to outcome success
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Case Studies
• US->Japan:WWII• US->NKorea, China:Korean War• US->NVietnam: Vietnam War• US->Iraq: Gulf War• Allies->Germany: WWII
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Case Study Results
• Strategic punishment doesn’t work• Strategic denial doesn’t either• Tactical denial does, but with marginal results
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ConclusionsPape“Consequently, coercion based
on punishing civilians rarelysucceeds. The key to successin conventional coercion isnot punishment but denial,that is, the ability to thwartthe target state’s militarystrategy for controlling theobjectives in dispute.” (10)
Sun Tzu“To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.”(III.3)
Attack the enemy’s (III.4-7)• …strategy• …his alliances• …his army• …his cities
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Discussion• Ian Hinsdale • Ryan White