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Rhetoric

By Aristotle

Written 350 B.C.E

Translated by W. Rhys Roberts

I.

Part 1

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alie are concerned !ith such thin"s as co#e$ #ore

or less$ !ithin the "eneral en of all #en and belon" to no definite science. Accordin"ly all #en#ae use$ #ore or less$ of both% for to a certain e&tent all #en atte#pt to discuss state#ents and

to #aintain the#$ to defend the#sel'es and to attac others. (rdinary people do this either at

rando# or throu"h practice and fro# ac)uired habit. Both !ays bein" possible$ the sub*ect canplainly be handled syste#atically$ for it is possible to in)uire the reason !hy so#e speaerssucceed throu"h practice and others spontaneously% and e'ery one !ill at once a"ree that such an

in)uiry is the function of an art.

+o!$ the fra#ers of the current treatises on rhetoric ha'e constructed but a s#all portion of that

art. The #odes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art, e'erythin" else is #erely

accessory. These !riters$ ho!e'er$ say nothin" about enthy#e#es$ !hich are the substance ofrhetorical persuasion$ but deal #ainly !ith non-essentials. The arousin" of pre*udice$ pity$ an"er$

and si#ilar e#otions has nothin" to do !ith the essential facts$ but is #erely a personal appeal to

the #an !ho is *ud"in" the case. Conse)uently if the rules for trials !hich are no! laid do!n

so#e states-especially in !ell-"o'erned states-!ere applied e'ery!here$ such people !ould ha'enothin" to say. All #en$ no doubt$ thin that the la!s should prescribe such rules$ but so#e$ as in

the court of Areopa"us$ "i'e practical effect to their thou"hts and forbid tal about non-

essentials. This is sound la! and custo#. t is not ri"ht to per'ert the *ud"e by #o'in" hi# toan"er or en'y or pity-one #i"ht as !ell !arp a carpenter/s rule before usin" it. A"ain$ a liti"ant

has clearly nothin" to do but to sho! that the alle"ed fact is so or is not so$ that it has or has not

happened. As to !hether a thin" is i#portant or uni#portant$ *ust or un*ust$ the *ud"e #ustsurely refuse to tae his instructions fro# the liti"ants, he #ust decide for hi#self all such points

as the la!-"i'er has not already defined for hi#.

+o!$ it is of "reat #o#ent that !ell-dra!n la!s should the#sel'es define all the points they

possibly can and lea'e as fe! as #ay be to the decision of the *ud"es% and this for se'eralreasons. irst$ to find one #an$ or a fe! #en$ !ho are sensible persons and capable of le"islatin"

and ad#inisterin" *ustice is easier than to find a lar"e nu#ber. +e&t$ la!s are #ade after lon"consideration$ !hereas decisions in the courts are "i'en at short notice$ !hich #aes it hard for

those !ho try the case to satisfy the clai#s of *ustice and e&pediency. The !ei"htiest reason of

all is that the decision of the la!"i'er is not particular but prospecti'e and "eneral$ !hereas#e#bers of the asse#bly and the *ury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brou"ht before

the#. They !ill often ha'e allo!ed the#sel'es to be so #uch influenced by feelin"s of

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friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear 'ision of the truth and ha'e their

*ud"e#ent obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. n "eneral$ then$ the *ud"e

should$ !e say$ be allo!ed to decide as fe! thin"s as possible. But )uestions as to !hetherso#ethin" has happened or has not happened$ !ill be or !ill not be$ is or is not$ #ust of

necessity be left to the *ud"e$ since the la!"i'er cannot foresee the#. f this is so$ it is e'ident

that any one !ho lays do!n rules about other #atters$ such as !hat #ust be the contents of the/introduction/ or the /narration/ or any of the other di'isions of a speech$ is theori2in" about non-

essentials as if they belon"ed to the art. The only )uestion !ith !hich these !riters here deal is

ho! to put the *ud"e into a "i'en fra#e of #ind. About the orator/s proper #odes of persuasionthey ha'e nothin" to tell us% nothin"$ that is$ about ho! to "ain sill in enthy#e#es.

ence it co#es that$ althou"h the sa#e syste#atic principles apply to political as to forensic

oratory$ and althou"h the for#er is a nobler business$ and fitter for a citi2en$ than that !hichconcerns the relations of pri'ate indi'iduals$ these authors say nothin" about political oratory$

but try$ one and all$ to !rite treatises on the !ay to plead in court. The reason for this is that in

political oratory there is less induce#ent to tal about nonessentials. 4olitical oratory is less

"i'en to unscrupulous practices than forensic$ because it treats of !ider issues. n a politicaldebate the #an !ho is for#in" a *ud"e#ent is #ain" a decision about his o!n 'ital interests.

There is no need$ therefore$ to pro'e anythin" e&cept that the facts are !hat the supporter of a#easure #aintains they are. n forensic oratory this is not enou"h% to conciliate the listener is

!hat pays here. t is other people/s affairs that are to be decided$ so that the *ud"es$ intent on

their o!n satisfaction and listenin" !ith partiality$ surrender the#sel'es to the disputants insteadof *ud"in" bet!een the#. ence in #any places$ as !e ha'e said already$ irrele'ant speain" is

forbidden in the la!-courts, in the public asse#bly those !ho ha'e to for# a *ud"e#ent are

the#sel'es !ell able to "uard a"ainst that.

t is clear$ then$ that rhetorical study$ in its strict sense$ is concerned !ith the #odes of

persuasion. 4ersuasion is clearly a sort of de#onstration$ since !e are #ost fully persuaded !hen

!e consider a thin" to ha'e been de#onstrated. The orator/s de#onstration is an enthy#e#e$ andthis is$ in "eneral$ the #ost effecti'e of the #odes of persuasion. The enthy#e#e is a sort of

syllo"is#$ and the consideration of syllo"is#s of all inds$ !ithout distinction$ is the business of

dialectic$ either of dialectic as a !hole or of one of its branches. t follo!s plainly$ therefore$ thathe !ho is best able to see ho! and fro# !hat ele#ents a syllo"is# is produced !ill also be best

silled in the enthy#e#e$ !hen he has further learnt !hat its sub*ect-#atter is and in !hat

respects it differs fro# the syllo"is# of strict lo"ic. The true and the appro&i#ately true are

apprehended by the sa#e faculty% it #ay also be noted that #en ha'e a sufficient natural instinctfor !hat is true$ and usually do arri'e at the truth. ence the #an !ho #aes a "ood "uess at

truth is liely to #ae a "ood "uess at probabilities.

t has no! been sho!n that the ordinary !riters on rhetoric treat of non-essentials% it has also

been sho!n !hy they ha'e inclined #ore to!ards the forensic branch of oratory.

Rhetoric is useful 16 because thin"s that are true and thin"s that are *ust ha'e a natural tendency

to pre'ail o'er their opposites$ so that if the decisions of *ud"es are not !hat they ou"ht to be$ the

defeat #ust be due to the speaers the#sel'es$ and they #ust be bla#ed accordin"ly. 7oreo'er$

6 before so#e audiences not e'en the possession of the e&actest no!led"e !ill #ae it easy

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for !hat !e say to produce con'iction. or ar"u#ent based on no!led"e i#plies instruction$

and there are people !ho# one cannot instruct. ere$ then$ !e #ust use$ as our #odes of

persuasion and ar"u#ent$ notions possessed by e'erybody$ as !e obser'ed in the Topics !hendealin" !ith the !ay to handle a popular audience. urther$ 36 !e #ust be able to e#ploy

persuasion$ *ust as strict reasonin" can be e#ployed$ on opposite sides of a )uestion$ not in order

that !e #ay in practice e#ploy it in both !ays for !e #ust not #ae people belie'e !hat is!ron"6$ but in order that !e #ay see clearly !hat the facts are$ and that$ if another #an ar"ues

unfairly$ !e on our part #ay be able to confute hi#. +o other of the arts dra!s opposite

conclusions, dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts dra! opposite conclusionsi#partially. +e'ertheless$ the underlyin" facts do not lend the#sel'es e)ually !ell to the

contrary 'ie!s. +o% thin"s that are true and thin"s that are better are$ by their nature$ practically

al!ays easier to pro'e and easier to belie'e in. A"ain$ 86 it is absurd to hold that a #an ou"ht to

be asha#ed of bein" unable to defend hi#self !ith his li#bs$ but not of bein" unable to defendhi#self !ith speech and reason$ !hen the use of rational speech is #ore distincti'e of a hu#an

bein" than the use of his li#bs. And if it be ob*ected that one !ho uses such po!er of speech

un*ustly #i"ht do "reat har#$ that is a char"e !hich #ay be #ade in co##on a"ainst all "ood

thin"s e&cept 'irtue$ and abo'e all a"ainst the thin"s that are #ost useful$ as stren"th$ health$!ealth$ "eneralship. A #an can confer the "reatest of benefits by a ri"ht use of these$ and inflict

the "reatest of in*uries by usin" the# !ron"ly.

t is clear$ then$ that rhetoric is not bound up !ith a sin"le definite class of sub*ects$ but is as

uni'ersal as dialectic% it is clear$ also$ that it is useful. t is clear$ further$ that its function is notsi#ply to succeed in persuadin"$ but rather to disco'er the #eans of co#in" as near such success

as the circu#stances of each particular case allo!. n this it rese#bles all other arts. or

e&a#ple$ it is not the function of #edicine si#ply to #ae a #an )uite healthy$ but to put hi# as

far as #ay be on the road to health% it is possible to "i'e e&cellent treat#ent e'en to those !hocan ne'er en*oy sound health. urther#ore$ it is plain that it is the function of one and the sa#e

art to discern the real and the apparent #eans of persuasion$ *ust as it is the function of dialectic

to discern the real and the apparent syllo"is#. What #aes a #an a /sophist/ is not his faculty$but his #oral purpose. n rhetoric$ ho!e'er$ the ter# /rhetorician/ #ay describe either the

speaer/s no!led"e of the art$ or his #oral purpose. n dialectic it is different, a #an is a

/sophist/ because he has a certain ind of #oral purpose$ a /dialectician/ in respect$ not of his#oral purpose$ but of his faculty.

9et us no! try to "i'e so#e account of the syste#atic principles of Rhetoric itself-of the ri"ht

#ethod and #eans of succeedin" in the ob*ect !e set before us. We #ust #ae as it !ere a freshstart$ and before "oin" further define !hat rhetoric is.

Part 2

Rhetoric #ay be defined as the faculty of obser'in" in any "i'en case the a'ailable #eans of

persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. E'ery other art can instruct or persuade aboutits o!n particular sub*ect-#atter% for instance$ #edicine about !hat is healthy and unhealthy$

"eo#etry about the properties of #a"nitudes$ arith#etic about nu#bers$ and the sa#e is true of

the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric !e loo upon as the po!er of obser'in" the #eans of

persuasion on al#ost any sub*ect presented to us% and that is !hy !e say that$ in its technical

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character$ it is not concerned !ith any special or definite class of sub*ects.

(f the #odes of persuasion so#e belon" strictly to the art of rhetoric and so#e do not. By thelatter #ean such thin"s as are not supplied by the speaer but are there at the outset-!itnesses$

e'idence "i'en under torture$ !ritten contracts$ and so on. By the for#er #ean such as !e can

oursel'es construct by #eans of the principles of rhetoric. The one ind has #erely to be used$the other has to be in'ented.

(f the #odes of persuasion furnished by the spoen !ord there are three inds. The first inddepends on the personal character of the speaer% the second on puttin" the audience into a

certain fra#e of #ind% the third on the proof$ or apparent proof$ pro'ided by the !ords of the

speech itself. 4ersuasion is achie'ed by the speaer/s personal character !hen the speech is so

spoen as to #ae us thin hi# credible. We belie'e "ood #en #ore fully and #ore readily thanothers, this is true "enerally !hate'er the )uestion is$ and absolutely true !here e&act certainty is

i#possible and opinions are di'ided. This ind of persuasion$ lie the others$ should be achie'ed

by !hat the speaer says$ not by !hat people thin of his character before he be"ins to spea. t

is not true$ as so#e !riters assu#e in their treatises on rhetoric$ that the personal "oodnessre'ealed by the speaer contributes nothin" to his po!er of persuasion% on the contrary$ his

character #ay al#ost be called the #ost effecti'e #eans of persuasion he possesses. :econdly$persuasion #ay co#e throu"h the hearers$ !hen the speech stirs their e#otions. (ur *ud"e#ents

!hen !e are pleased and friendly are not the sa#e as !hen !e are pained and hostile. t is

to!ards producin" these effects$ as !e #aintain$ that present-day !riters on rhetoric direct the!hole of their efforts. This sub*ect shall be treated in detail !hen !e co#e to spea of the

e#otions. Thirdly$ persuasion is effected throu"h the speech itself !hen !e ha'e pro'ed a truth

or an apparent truth by #eans of the persuasi'e ar"u#ents suitable to the case in )uestion.

There are$ then$ these three #eans of effectin" persuasion. The #an !ho is to be in co##and of

the# #ust$ it is clear$ be able 16 to reason lo"ically$ 6 to understand hu#an character and

"oodness in their 'arious for#s$ and 36 to understand the e#otions-that is$ to na#e the# anddescribe the#$ to no! their causes and the !ay in !hich they are e&cited. t thus appears that

rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies #ay fairly be called

political% and for this reason rhetoric #as)uerades as political science$ and the professors of it aspolitical e&perts-so#eti#es fro# !ant of education$ so#eti#es fro# ostentation$ so#eti#es

o!in" to other hu#an failin"s. As a #atter of fact$ it is a branch of dialectic and si#ilar to it$ as

!e said at the outset. +either rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate

sub*ect, both are faculties for pro'idin" ar"u#ents. This is perhaps a sufficient account of theirscope and of ho! they are related to each other.

With re"ard to the persuasion achie'ed by proof or apparent proof, *ust as in dialectic there isinduction on the one hand and syllo"is# or apparent syllo"is# on the other$ so it is in rhetoric.

The e&a#ple is an induction$ the enthy#e#e is a syllo"is#$ and the apparent enthy#e#e is an

apparent syllo"is#. call the enthy#e#e a rhetorical syllo"is#$ and the e&a#ple a rhetoricalinduction. E'ery one !ho effects persuasion throu"h proof does in fact use either enthy#e#es or

e&a#ples, there is no other !ay. And since e'ery one !ho pro'es anythin" at all is bound to use

either syllo"is#s or inductions and this is clear to us fro# the Analytics6$ it #ust follo! that

enthy#e#es are syllo"is#s and e&a#ples are inductions. The difference bet!een e&a#ple and

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enthy#e#e is #ade plain by the passa"es in the Topics !here induction and syllo"is# ha'e

already been discussed. When !e base the proof of a proposition on a nu#ber of si#ilar cases$

this is induction in dialectic$ e&a#ple in rhetoric% !hen it is sho!n that$ certain propositionsbein" true$ a further and )uite distinct proposition #ust also be true in conse)uence$ !hether

in'ariably or usually$ this is called syllo"is# in dialectic$ enthy#e#e in rhetoric. t is plain also

that each of these types of oratory has its ad'anta"es. Types of oratory$ say, for !hat has beensaid in the 7ethodics applies e)ually !ell here% in so#e oratorical styles e&a#ples pre'ail$ in

others enthy#e#es% and in lie #anner$ so#e orators are better at the for#er and so#e at the

latter. :peeches that rely on e&a#ples are as persuasi'e as the other ind$ but those !hich rely onenthy#e#es e&cite the louder applause. The sources of e&a#ples and enthy#e#es$ and their

proper uses$ !e !ill discuss later. (ur ne&t step is to define the processes the#sel'es #ore

clearly.

A state#ent is persuasi'e and credible either because it is directly self-e'ident or because it

appears to be pro'ed fro# other state#ents that are so. n either case it is persuasi'e because

there is so#ebody !ho# it persuades. But none of the arts theori2e about indi'idual cases.

7edicine$ for instance$ does not theori2e about !hat !ill help to cure :ocrates or Callias$ butonly about !hat !ill help to cure any or all of a "i'en class of patients, this alone is business,

indi'idual cases are so infinitely 'arious that no syste#atic no!led"e of the# is possible. n thesa#e !ay the theory of rhetoric is concerned not !ith !hat see#s probable to a "i'en indi'idual

lie :ocrates or ippias$ but !ith !hat see#s probable to #en of a "i'en type% and this is true of

dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllo"is#s out of any hapha2ard #aterials$ such asthe fancies of cra2y people$ but out of #aterials that call for discussion% and rhetoric$ too$ dra!s

upon the re"ular sub*ects of debate. The duty of rhetoric is to deal !ith such #atters as !e

deliberate upon !ithout arts or syste#s to "uide us$ in the hearin" of persons !ho cannot tae in

at a "lance a co#plicated ar"u#ent$ or follo! a lon" chain of reasonin". The sub*ects of ourdeliberation are such as see# to present us !ith alternati'e possibilities, about thin"s that could

not ha'e been$ and cannot no! or in the future be$ other than they are$ nobody !ho taes the# to

be of this nature !astes his ti#e in deliberation.

t is possible to for# syllo"is#s and dra! conclusions fro# the results of pre'ious syllo"is#s%

or$ on the other hand$ fro# pre#isses !hich ha'e not been thus pro'ed$ and at the sa#e ti#e areso little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonin"s of the for#er ind !ill necessarily be hard

to follo! o!in" to their len"th$ for !e assu#e an audience of untrained thiners% those of the

latter ind !ill fail to !in assent$ because they are based on pre#isses that are not "enerally

ad#itted or belie'ed.

The enthy#e#e and the e&a#ple #ust$ then$ deal !ith !hat is in the #ain contin"ent$ the

e&a#ple bein" an induction$ and the enthy#e#e a syllo"is#$ about such #atters. Theenthy#e#e #ust consist of fe! propositions$ fe!er often than those !hich #ae up the nor#al

syllo"is#. or if any of these propositions is a fa#iliar fact$ there is no need e'en to #ention it%

the hearer adds it hi#self. Thus$ to sho! that Dorieus has been 'ictor in a contest for !hich thepri2e is a cro!n$ it is enou"h to say /or he has been 'ictor in the (ly#pic "a#es/$ !ithout

addin" /And in the (ly#pic "a#es the pri2e is a cro!n/$ a fact !hich e'erybody no!s.

There are fe! facts of the /necessary/ type that can for# the basis of rhetorical syllo"is#s. 7ost

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of the thin"s about !hich !e #ae decisions$ and into !hich therefore !e in)uire$ present us

!ith alternati'e possibilities. or it is about our actions that !e deliberate and in)uire$ and all our

actions ha'e a contin"ent character% hardly any of the# are deter#ined by necessity. A"ain$conclusions that state !hat is #erely usual or possible #ust be dra!n fro# pre#isses that do the

sa#e$ *ust as /necessary/ conclusions #ust be dra!n fro# /necessary/ pre#isses% this too is clear

to us fro# the Analytics. t is e'ident$ therefore$ that the propositions for#in" the basis ofenthy#e#es$ thou"h so#e of the# #ay be /necessary/$ !ill #ost of the# be only usually true.

+o! the #aterials of enthy#e#es are 4robabilities and :i"ns$ !hich !e can see #ust

correspond respecti'ely !ith the propositions that are "enerally and those that are necessarilytrue. A 4robability is a thin" that usually happens% not$ ho!e'er$ as so#e definitions !ould

su""est$ anythin" !hate'er that usually happens$ but only if it belon"s to the class of the

/contin"ent/ or /'ariable/. t bears the sa#e relation to that in respect of !hich it is probable as the

uni'ersal bears to the particular. (f :i"ns$ one ind bears the sa#e relation to the state#ent itsupports as the particular bears to the uni'ersal$ the other the sa#e as the uni'ersal bears to the

particular. The infallible ind is a /co#plete proof/ te#erhiou6% the fallible ind has no specific

na#e. By infallible si"ns #ean those on !hich syllo"is#s proper #ay be based, and this sho!s

us !hy this ind of :i"n is called /co#plete proof/, !hen people thin that !hat they ha'e saidcannot be refuted$ they then thin that they are brin"in" for!ard a /co#plete proof/$ #eanin" that

the #atter has no! been de#onstrated and co#pleted peperhas#euou6% for the !ord /perhas/ hasthe sa#e #eanin" of /end/ or /boundary/6 as the !ord /te#arh/ in the ancient ton"ue. +o! the

one ind of :i"n that !hich bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to

uni'ersal6 #ay be illustrated thus. :uppose it !ere said$ /The fact that :ocrates !as !ise and *ustis a si"n that the !ise are *ust/. ere !e certainly ha'e a :i"n% but e'en thou"h the proposition be

true$ the ar"u#ent is refutable$ since it does not for# a syllo"is#. :uppose$ on the other hand$ it

!ere said$ /The fact that he has a fe'er is a si"n that he is ill/$ or$ /The fact that she is "i'in" #il

is a si"n that she has lately borne a child/. ere !e ha'e the infallible ind of :i"n$ the only indthat constitutes a co#plete proof$ since it is the only ind that$ if the particular state#ent is true$

is irrefutable. The other ind of :i"n$ that !hich bears to the proposition it supports the relation

of uni'ersal to particular$ #i"ht be illustrated by sayin"$ /The fact that he breathes fast is a si"nthat he has a fe'er/. This ar"u#ent also is refutable$ e'en if the state#ent about the fast breathin"

be true$ since a #an #ay breathe hard !ithout ha'in" a fe'er.

t has$ then$ been stated abo'e !hat is the nature of a 4robability$ of a :i"n$ and of a co#plete

proof$ and !hat are the differences bet!een the#. n the Analytics a #ore e&plicit description

has been "i'en of these points% it is there sho!n !hy so#e of these reasonin"s can be put into

syllo"is#s and so#e cannot.

The /e&a#ple/ has already been described as one ind of induction% and the special nature of the

sub*ect-#atter that distin"uishes it fro# the other inds has also been stated abo'e. ts relation tothe proposition it supports is not that of part to !hole$ nor !hole to part$ nor !hole to !hole$ but

of part to part$ or lie to lie. When t!o state#ents are of the sa#e order$ but one is #ore

fa#iliar than the other$ the for#er is an /e&a#ple/. The ar"u#ent #ay$ for instance$ be thatDionysius$ in asin" as he does for a body"uard$ is sche#in" to #ae hi#self a despot. or in

the past 4eisistratus ept asin" for a body"uard in order to carry out such a sche#e$ and did

#ae hi#self a despot as soon as he "ot it% and so did Thea"enes at 7e"ara% and in the sa#e !ay

all other instances no!n to the speaer are #ade into e&a#ples$ in order to sho! !hat is not yet

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alie to be able to ha'e at their co##and propositions about the possible and the i#possible$ and

about !hether a thin" has or has not occurred$ !ill or !ill not occur. urther$ all #en$ in "i'in"

praise or bla#e$ in ur"in" us to accept or re*ect proposals for action$ in accusin" others ordefendin" the#sel'es$ atte#pt not only to pro'e the points #entioned but also to sho! that the

"ood or the har#$ the honour or dis"race$ the *ustice or in*ustice$ is "reat or s#all$ either

absolutely or relati'ely% and therefore it is plain that !e #ust also ha'e at our co##andpropositions about "reatness or s#allness and the "reater or the lesser-propositions both

uni'ersal and particular. Thus$ !e #ust be able to say !hich is the "reater or lesser "ood$ the

"reater or lesser act of *ustice or in*ustice% and so on.

:uch$ then$ are the sub*ects re"ardin" !hich !e are ine'itably bound to #aster the propositions

rele'ant to the#. We #ust no! discuss each particular class of these sub*ects in turn$ na#ely

those dealt !ith in political$ in cere#onial$ and lastly in le"al$ oratory.