SUNBANUN V. GO, GR 1683280, 2/2/10 2ND DIV. CARPIO, J.

FACTS:Sunbanun is the owner of a residential lot in Cebu City. On July 1995, Sunbanun leased the premises to Go for one year which would expire on July 1996. As required under the lease contract, respondent paid a deposit of P16,000 to answer for damages and unpaid rent. To earn extra income, respondent accepted lodgers, mostly her relatives, from whom she received a monthly income of P15,000. Respondent paid the monthly rental until March 1996 when petitioner drove away respondent’s lodgers by telling them that they could stay on the rented premises only until April 1996 since she was terminating the lease. The lodgers left the rented premises by April 1996, and petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated by respondent’s lodgers. On May 1996, respondent Go filed an action for damages against petitioner Go and alleged that she lost income for the months April, May and June since the lease contract would only expire on July. The Trial court ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay respondent actual damages of P45,000 for respondent’s lost income from her lodgers for the months of April, May, and June 1996, and attorney’s fees of P8,000. The case was appealed to the CA and judgment was favored against the petitioner with the modification that exemplary and moral damages be awarded to respondent. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the award of damages with the modification that exemplary and moral damages be awarded to the respondent.

HELD:No.In this case, the trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings. Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.

The award of moral damages according to Articles 2219, 2220, and in relation to Article 21, also with Article 2232 and 2208 of the Civil Code has been correctly applied by both the trial court and the appellate court.

GALOFA v. NEE BON SING, 22 SCRA 48 1968

FACTS:Direct Appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon on whether or not the defendant’s answer to the complaint tendered a genuine issue.

The plaintiff Galofa filed a complaint for recovery of possession and to quiet title over a parcel of land situated in Barcelona, Sorsogon against respondent Nee Bon Sing. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges further that that he was unable to take actual possession of the land due to conflicting claims over ownership with the respondent Nee Bon Sing and that he(Galofa) availed the services of a counsel to have the case settled in court.

In his(Defendant)’s answer, he denies the material averments in pars. 4, 5 and 6 of the complaint, that the defendant never asserted title of ownership to the property described in the Complaint to anybody

Upon motion by the plaintiff that the defendant's answer failed to tender an issue, the lower court rendered judgment on the pleadings, declaring the plaintiff the owner of the property "free from any cloud arising from any assertion of adverse claim or interest whatsoever on the part of the defendant", ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.

ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff for damages.

HELD:No.The defendant, however, had specifically denied the plaintiff's allegations in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint. He traversed these allegations in his answer by stating that he "does not possess any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the (original) Complaint and therefore, denies the same." But paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint referred to damages, while paragraph 5 of the complaint merely alleged a conclusion (that by defendant's acts a cloud over plaintiff's title had been raised) so that the defendant's specific denials served no purpose at all. As to the amount of damages, alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint (P2,000.00 per agricultural year) and specifically denied by the defendant, as aforesaid, a specific denial is not required by the Rules. (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court) At any rate, the appealed judgment did not condemn the defendant-appellant to pay damages.

Aside from what has been previously stated, the plaintiff is barred from recovery of his alleged damages for having prayed for a judgment on the pleadings, as thereby he is deemed to have admitted the truth of the defendant's denial on the alleged damages and to have rested his motion for judgment on those allegations taken together with such of his own as are admitted in the pleadings.

MARCELO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 531 SCRA 385

FACTS:The petitioner Primitivo Marcelo was indicted for violation of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act. That on March 1982, Marcelo, being the Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan while armed with a writ of execution seized properties owned by Sanz Steel Corp to satisfy the latter’s creditors. Along with the seized properties, a Ford Fiera was likewise seized which was not included in the list written in the writ of execution. No receipt was issued by Marcelo for the Ford Fiera. The owner of the Ford Fiera (private petitioner Sanchez) then filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan which judgment was rendered gainst Marcelo.

ISSUE:Whether or not the “taking” of the Ford Fiera by Marcelo constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

HELD:No.The Supreme court is persuaded from a study of the evidence that Marcelo was not actuated by a dishonest purpose or ill will partaking of a fraud or some furtive design or ulterior purpose to do wrong and cause damage.

In fact, the SC see here is a rather confused person(Marcelo), prodded on the one hand by the judgment creditor's counsel and resisted on the other by the president of the judgment debtor. Both apparently exerted some kind of influence upon him that befuddled his mind and warped his judgment. In the end, he was left holding the bag so to speak, and hardly able to explain himself.

But despite its general confusion, this much he could say convincingly about the Ford Fiera. It was not unreasonable for him to mistake it as property of the judgment debtor because the name of the Sanz Steel Corporation was clearly painted on its sides. Anyone would have assumed that it belonged to the corporation. Sanchez claimed having exhibited his registration certificate, but the petitioner denies this; and the respondent court noted that this document was produced only much later. Significantly, after the vehicle had been towed away, Sanchez merely reported to the police that it had been "carnaped" and then simply left it at that. As the respondent court observed:

. . . Sanchez could have filed a third-party claim with the court issuing the writ of execution or he could have officially notified the Sheriff that he was adversely claiming the same. The fact remains that he submitted the certificate of registration long after the seizure.

SOLID BANK CORP. V. CA, ET AL., GR 120010, 10/3/02

FACTS:On July 5, 1985, to settle several assets and liabilities, the PBC (Pacific Banking

Corporation) was placed under receivership and invited several banks to buy PBC’s assets and franchises. FEBTC (Far East Bank and Trust Company) became the highest bidder and PBC thru its liquidator and FEBTC executed a purchase agreement enumerating all items purchased under such agreement. On May 27, 1987, Solidbank filed its claim with the liquidating officer to collect from PBC computer machines totaling P8 million, including lease rentals amounting to P24 million due on October 1988 and several deposits. On November 1988, Solidbank filed special civil action against PBC for the payment of its liabilities impleading FEBTC as co-defendant. FEBTC filed its answer and prayed that motion to impleaded be denied. FEBTC’s main contention is that the computer machines were not included among the properties purchased by FEBTC from PBC. The court granted Solidbank’s motion and Solidbank filed a motion for summary judgment. The court decided that PBC and FEBTC are jointly and severally liable to pay Solidbank. Aggrieved, FEBTC appealed and the appellate court reversed the decision contending that there is a need to evaluate the memorandum of agreement executed by PBC and FEBTC.

ISSUE:Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.

HELD:Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn

out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which require the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that the foregoing requisites are present. There is a genuine issue, the resolution of which requires the presentation of evidence, i.e., whether or not Solidbank’s claim is included in the purchase agreement as among the properties and items purchased and assumed by FEBTC from Pacific Bank/Central Bank. While the counsel for FEBTC did say that in principle he is not objecting to the motion for summary judgment and "that they will have no objection if the Court will just require the parties to submit affidavit and counter-affidavits in support to their respective contentions," this should not be taken out of context for in the same manifestation, said counsel clearly expressed that he does not agree that there are no material issues raised in the pleadings. The appellate court is correct.

RIVERA V. SOLIDBANK, 487 SCRA 512

FACTS:River worked as an employee of Solidbank for 18 years. In 1995, he retired and availed of the Special Retirement Program offered by Solidbank where he received the amount of P936, 619.28 as retirement benefits. Subsequently, he signed a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim. Rivera acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind. On May 1, 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable) employed Rivera as Manager of its Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers’ Banking Group. Solidbank then demanded Rivera to return what he received otherwise a case may be filed against him. Rivera was not able to return the amount hence Solidbank filed a case with the trial court for the return of the amount. In Rivera’s answer, he contended that the prohibition for his employment is unreasonable. Solidbank then filed a motion to submit the case to summary judgment which was granted. The trial court ruled in favor of Solidbank and so did the Court of Appeals upon appeal. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the present case.

HELD:No.

In the present case, the trial court ruled that the prohibition against petitioner accepting employment with a competitor bank or financial institution within one year from February 28, 1995 is not unreasonable. The appellate court held that petitioner was estopped from assailing the post-retirement competitive employment ban because of his admission that he signed the Undertaking and had already received benefits under the SRP.

The rulings of the trial court and the appellate court are incorrect. There is no factual basis for the trial court’s ruling, for the simple reason that it rendered summary judgment and thereby foreclosed the presentation of evidence by the parties to prove whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable or not. Moreover, on the face of the Undertaking, the post-retirement competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no geographical limits; respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any competitive bank within the proscribed period. Although the period of one year may appear reasonable, the matter of whether the restriction is reasonable or unreasonable cannot be ascertained with finality solely from the terms and conditions of the Undertaking, or even in tandem with the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.

NEYPES V. CA, GR 141524, 9/14/05

FACTS:Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for annulment of titles against respondents. During the proceedings, both the petitioners and the private respondents filed several motions. On the part of the petitioner, they claim that respondents should be in default whereas for the respondents, the case should be dismissed. The RTC rendered a decision declaring some of the respondents in default while the others are not. RTC also held that the motion to dismiss filed by respondents should be denied. When the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, the RTC in an order dated February 12, 1998, dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal.On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA but in vain, hence the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the 15-day reglementary period to file an appeal starts on the day upon receiving the order of dismissal of the case or the order of dismissing a motion for reconsideration.

HELD:The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The SC also noted the ff:

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we

already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

DELOS SANTOS V. ELIZALDE, GR 141810 & 141812, 2/02/07

FACTS:The herein petitioner and respondents were declared rightful owners of a disputed lot in a previous case decided on April 29, 1996. Both parties, thereafter, filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 and May 16, 1996, respectively. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners and respondent Elizalde to file their briefs within forty-five (45) days from receipt of said notice. The herein petitioners filed this present petition, alleging that the CA’s decision dismissing their appeal for failure to file their respective appellants’ briefs and considered them withdrawn. Petitioners filed a Prayer for Reinstatement of Appeal on June 17, 1999 which was verified solely by petitioner Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners alleged that: (1) they did not have any knowledge of the promulgation of the assailed Decision of the CA until June 2, 1999; (2) they never entered into any amicable settlement with respondents delosSantos; (3) their alleged signatures in the May 27, 1997 Agreement were forged; and (4) they never authorized their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their appeal. Thus, petitioners prayed that: (1) their Motion for Reconsideration be considered as filed on time; (2) the said Agreement allegedly entered into by petitioners and respondents delos Santos be considered as invalid; (3) the portion of the assailed Decision dismissing their appeal be reconsidered; (4) their appeal be reinstated; and (5) they be granted a period of ninety (90) days within which to file their appellants’ brief. CA denied the said motion saying that appellants had only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

HELD: No. The petition must be denied.

Petitioners argue that their Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time as the reglementary period for the filing of it should be counted from the time when petitioners themselves obtained a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA on June 2, 1999, and not from the time that their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, received a copy of said Decision on May 24, 1999.

Reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration--Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides for the period within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed, to wit: Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.—Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party: The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Thus, the fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the assailed Decision of

the CA, and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been informed of the CA decision.

VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORP. V. CA; GR NO. 143794, JULY 13, 2004

FACTS:In 1993, petitioner Viking extended a loan to Luison(private respondent) of a loan amounting to 20 million secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Thereafter, Viking threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage if Luison does not pay the amount so Luison filed a petition with the RTC for inter alia, prohibition and declaratory relief. Viking never answered the petition for it claims it was erroneously impleaded as "Viking Trading Corporation," instead of "Viking Industrial Corporation." RTC rendered a decision in favor of Luison(respondent herein. Petitioner did not appeal.

Viking refused to comply with the writ of execution ordered by the RTC thus prompting Luison to file two petitions with the RTC: (1) ordering Viking to cancel the annotation on the title, and (2) prohibiting the sheriff from selling at public auction the subject property. The RTC presided by a different judge denied the petitions by reason of improper service of summons, later the petitions consequently overturned upon MOR by respondent. Petitioner filed a MOR but was denied. Petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari with the CA but in vain. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner’s “honest mistake” could grant them a new trial.

HELD:No, Surprisingly, the RTC was convinced. On April 7, 1999, then Presiding Judge Vivencio S. Baclig granted petitioner’s motion, holding that petitioner’s failure to file an answer to respondent’s petition was due to its "honest mistake" that it had no legal obligation to answer the petition erroneously impleading it as Viking Trading Corporation instead of Viking Industrial Corporation. He set aside the judgment by default and ordered a new trial.

Succinct and unmistakable is the consistent pronouncement that this Court is not a trier of facts. And well entrenched is the doctrine that pure questions of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. Corollarily, a question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts.Petitioner’s "honest mistake" hardly qualifies as a ground for a new trial. Section 1 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

"SECTION 1, Grounds of and period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration. -- Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or"

Definitely, petitioner’s reliance on "honest mistake" is misplaced. The mistake referred to above is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law. Its lawyer believed that he should not file an answer because his client is erroneously impleaded. Had petitioner’s counsel reviewed more closely the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, particularly Section 4, Rule 10 and Section 1, Rule 16, he would not have committed a mistake which, unfortunately, binds his client. MULTI-TRANS AGENCY V. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE, GR NO. 180817, 6/23/09

FACTS:A collection of sum of money was filed by respondent against petitioner Multi-Trans and Neptune before the RTC of Manila. Imrex enterprises engaged the services of Multi Trans Agency to deliver to the former 72 boxes and 1 box of various colors of opacolor which was imported from England to its destination in Manila. Such shipment was insured by respondent Oriental against loss and/or damage for 1M. Upon arrival of the shipment, only 72 boxes were delivered to Imrex thus Imrex filed a claim against respondent which respondent immediately paid under the insurance policy. Respondent made demands upon petitioner and Neptune to pay, but they refused to satisfy the former’s claim. Neptune filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim while petitioner through its counsel Jose Ma. Q. Austria, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. It argued that the complaint stated that petitioner Multi-Trans was the "operator/ship agent of the vessel "Tokyo Bay." However, in the Bill of Lading attached to the complaint, petitioner was named agent of Multimodal Transport Operator and not of the vessel "Tokyo Bay." Neither can it be the operator of the said vessel, there being no allegation that said vessel was on a bareboat charter to Transtainer Lines, the principal of petitioner. It maintains that the evidence presented by plaintiff defeats its own allegations as to the participation of petitioner in the transaction.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and declared petitioner and Neptune solidary liable to pay oriental. A month after, counsel for petitioner withdrawn as counsel and Melgar Tria & Associates entered its appearance for petitioner Multi-Trans simultaneously filing a petition for new trial and to admit attached answer contending that due to the negligence of the previous counsel, petitioner was denied due process to present evidence and participate in the trial of the case. The RTC denied the motion for new trial. In the CA, petitioner’s motion for new trial was denied and Neptune was absolved from liability. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the negligence of counsel amounted to denial of due process.

HELD:Petitioner contends the ff reasons why they should be granted new trial because the previous counsel: 1) failed to file its Answer to the Complaint despite receipt of the Court’s Order denying his motion to dismiss.2.) He failed to inform his client of the fact of his failure to file its Answer and of the Court Order declaring them in default and allowing plaintiff to present evidence ex-parte. 3.) He failed to file the Motion to Lift Order of Default to regain his client’s standing in Court. 4.) He misrepresented that he already filed the Motion to Lift Order of Default when confronted by client when it learned of said Order of default. 5.) He never bothered to verify what transpired at the ex-parte hearing and was not able to file the necessary pleadings to lift order considering that the case was submitted for decision without petitioner’s evidence.6.) He miserably failed to inform

client of the adverse decision despite receipt and practically did nothing to protect its client’s interest.

The SC held that the gross negligence of previous counsel amounted to denial of due process. I quote SC:

“In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer’s mistakes and should be afforded another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.”GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN; GR NO. 174414; 3/14/08

FACTS:Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service. She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.

Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition stating that counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC granted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether or not the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC is proper.

HELD:NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds include fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to

disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against her through mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However, under the discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in her petition.

Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside.

DELA CRUZ V. QUIAZON, GR NO. 171961; 11/28/08

FACTS:Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a parcel of land brought under the coverage of PD 27. In 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued a CLT over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property. In 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both of their parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.

In 1993, A, Quiazon filed a Complaint with the PARAD against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with A. Quiazon, by virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, petitioner F. dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship

Consequently, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs but a petition for relief from judgment was filed by respondents which was by the DARAB. Petitioners argue that there was no basis for the grant of the petition for relief from judgment because it was respondent’s own neglect, and not her counsel’s demise, that caused the loss of her right to appeal. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the relief from judgment was proper.

HELDNo. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise, the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

In this case, respondent’s failure to avail herself of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the CA was due to her inexcusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The SC note that a copy of the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision was in fact served on the respondent herself at her residence, based on her narration that when she arrived from

the U.S.A., her helper handed to her the envelope containing the DARAB Decision. By her own account, she arrived on September 10, 1999. She cannot, therefore, feign ignorance of the said decision and blame the death of her counsel for such ignorance.

Moreover, the SC cannot disregard the fact that respondent was able to engage the services of a new counsel to represent her in another case pending before the RTC as early as June 5, 1995, in compliance with the court’s directive for her to hire a substitute for her deceased counsel. Given this, respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of the death of her former counsel, and use it as an excuse for her failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the said DARAB Decision.

MESINA V. MEER; GR NO. 46845; 7/2/02

FACTS:A complained was filed by respondent Meer with the trial court against Mesina for cancellation and correctness of real estate title. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners but was reversed by the RTC on appeal. Upon appeal by petitioners with the CA, the same was denied.

ISSUE:Whether or not the availability of Petition for Relief under Rule 38, as a remedy against the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is proper.

HELDAfter careful examination of the case, the SC resolved to deny the petition.

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the PETITION FOR RELIEF must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it must be filed with the same court which rendered the decision.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, the petitioners' allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the MTC. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudices their rights, they should have questioned this from the very beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings ans actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the MTC rules in their favor.

When the respondent appealed the case to the RTC, they never raised this issue. Even after the RTC reversed the finding of the MTC, and the CA sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. The SC will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.

PURCON V. MRM PHIL.; GR NO. 182718; 9/26/08FACTS:The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical expenses, and etc. before the NLRC. The NLRC ruled against the petitioner prompting the former to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA but was denied due to formal infirmities. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC but was denied. Finally, petitioner filed an instant petition for relief from judgment before the SC on the grounds that the labor arbiter committed GROSS MISTAKE when the latter penned his decision and that the factual findings of the Labor arbiter and NLRC are not based on substantial evidence.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 from an SC resolution denying his petition for review.

HELD:No. Although Section of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court and a petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 originally cognizable by the SC. Moreover, a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the CA and SC. If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the SC.

Nevertheless, even if the merits of the petition are considered, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief.

The exception to the rule is when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, in which case a party may be afforded a second opportunity to vindicate his right.