Global Navigation Satellite Systems and/or Multi-sensor Fusion Platform? A Look into the Future of Positioning,

Navigation and Timing Dr. ing. Marco Lisi

European Space Agency Special Advisor to the European Commission

(marco.lisi@esa.int)

20th Ka-Band Conference, Vietri, Italy October 2, 2014 4

Summary • EGNOS and Galileo are the key elements of the European

navigation “system of systems”, a strategic and critical infrastructure of the European Union;

• As any large and complex system, GNSSs, such as GPS and Galileo, besides suffering from some intrinsic limitations (e.g. too weak radio signals, not allowing for indoor, underground and underwater applications), are vulnerable and exposed to many threats, such as cyber-attacks, jamming and spoofing;

• The only way to guarantee to the world a reliable, continuous and resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) service comes from a full, seamless integration of GNSS and of non-GNSS infrastructures and platforms;

• An ever closer integration of all global infrastructures will take place in the future, mainly among telecommunications, Earth observation and positioning, navigation and timing applications.

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GNSS Multi-Constellation Scenario

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The SBAS Worldwide Infrastructure

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Galileo System Architecture

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Galileo: a Large and Complex ICT System

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Galileo Centers in Europe

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Galileo Ground Control Centres

© Axel Schultes Architekten

2 Complementary Control Centres: • Ground Mission Segment (GMS) in Fucino has the responsibility for the mission aspects , • Ground Control Segment (GCS) in Oberpfaffenhofen, to control and monitor the constellation. Both centres will be completed to become fully redundant.

GCC-I at Telespazio - Fucino

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Galileo Stations for Early Services

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GNSSs Threats and Vulnerabilities

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• Cyber Attacks (Cyber War)

• Jamming

• Spoofing

• Organizational Weaknesses

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11 September 2001

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11 September 2014

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11 September 201?

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An Escalating Threat

• In 2012 nearly 200 cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure targets were reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security – an increase of more than 50% vs. the previous year;

• Growing evidence indicates that many of these attacks originated from military and/or government institutions in foreign countries.

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Critical Infrastructures are Interdependent

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Simpler, Cheaper…

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GNSS Threats: Jamming

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Commercial GNSS (GPS) Jammers

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Susceptibility to Interference/Jamming

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GNSS Threats: Spoofing • Spoofing is the possibility to generate, through relatively inexpensive

and technologically simple equipment, fake replicas of GNSS signals. In this way, it is possible to provide to the attacked user or infrastructure inaccurate information about both location and time;

• The reality of this type of threat was glamorously proven in 2013 by a team of researchers from the University of Texas. They boarded a 65-meter, $80 million luxury yacht named “White Rose of the Drachs”, sailing from Monaco to the island of Rhodes in the Mediterranean.

TECHNOLOGY IS NOT ENOUGH!

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GLONASS Suffers Temporary Systemwide Outage; Multi-GNSS Receiver Overcomes

Problem

GLONASS Gone . . . Then Back

Explanation for GLONASS outage?

GLONASS GNSS Constellation Suffered 11 Hours Outage

GLONASS navigation system suffers outage

GLONASS Loses Control Again

Altus Positioning Systems Pinpoints Cause for GLONASS Default

Glonass Plagued by Glitches for 2nd Time This Month

Is GNSS a Time Bomb?

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IT DOES NOT NEED TO BE!

Pillars of a Resilient PNT Infrastructure

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• Interoperability

• Service Oriented Organization

• Non-GNSS Systems

• Multi Sensors, Data Fusion Platforms

GNSS System of Systems

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From Products to Systems to Services

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Galileo Service Organization

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GSA

OS EU Citizens

PRS EU States

CS Providers

SAR Cospas-Sarsat

ESA

External Entities

External Entities

Operator(s)

Galileo System

Service Operatore

EC Technical Support

Galileo Service Value Chain

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System Development

& Procurement

ESA/Industry

Service Operations & Logistics

Service

Operator

Full Service

Provision

GSA

EC, Member States,

Cospas-Sarsat,

Downstream Industry

USERS

• System design authority

• Design changes • System evolution • System

Engineering Support

• Operations • Logistics • Service

Engineering • GDDN • Configuration

Management • Performance

Reporting

• O/A Service Management

• Security Management & Operations

• Users Relationship Management

• Legal Affairs and IPRs

• Independent Performance Monitoring

• Market Development

• European Commission (all services)

• Member States (PRS)

• Cospas-Sarsat (SAR Service)

• Commercial Service Providers

• Applications Providers

• Receiver Manufacturers

“Loyola de Palacio” GNSS Service Centre

Come and visit us at: www.gsc-europa.eu

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North Korea’s e-Loran System

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Signals of Opportunity (SOP) PNT Systems

Multi-Sensor, Data Fusion Platforms

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DARPA's “timing & inertial measurement unit” (TIMU)

MICRO-TECHNOLOGY FOR POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING

(MICRO-PNT)

Chip-Scale Atomic Clocks (CSAC)

Future PNT System of Systems Infrastructure

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Non-GNSS PNT Systems

Autonomous PNT Platforms

GNSSs

eLoran Wi-Fi

GSM SOPs

Future PNT Infrastructure: the US DoT View

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The Global Systems of Systems Infrastructure

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GEOSS Telecomms

Conclusion: Integration & Fusion

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The future asks for an ever closer integration and fusion of telecommunications, Earth observation and positioning, navigation and timing applications.

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EGNOS and Galileo: eager to serve

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