2018 Disarmament &

International Security

Committee Background Guide

The University of Notre Dame

Model United Nations Conference

February 2-4, 2018

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Dear Delegates,  

Welcome to the second annual Notre Dame Model United Nations Conference - I can’t 

wait to char this year’s DISEC committee. Growing up in Greenwich, CT, I participated in eight 

Model UN conferences starting my junior year of high school, and have gone to another three 

while at Notre Dame. I am currently a sophomore studying finance and economics, with a minor 

in public policy, and outside of Model UN I love to play golf, frisbee, and basketball.  

Some of my favorite high school memories are from Model UN conferences - the 

different people I’ve met and the discussions I’ve had have had profound impacts. One important 

lesson I learned from Model UN is that the conference is what you make of it. So, I would 

encourage everyone to give this conference your best effort and participate as much as possible. 

As a chair, two things I will value heavily in consideration of delegates are diplomacy and 

accuracy to country policy.  

To ensure that everyone comes prepared with an understanding of their country policy, 

anyone who wishes to be considered for awards should send their position paper to me via email 

(see below). While this background guide should give you a good start on your research, these 

topics are extensive and additional research is required on both topics to ensure the highest 

quality of debate during committee. I will also remind everyone that this is a no technology 

conference, so please have your notes printed or written out before committee. Please contact me 

with any questions you may have regarding research or Model UN in general, I’ll be sure to get 

back to you promptly. I look forward to seeing all of you in February! 

Sincerely,  

Alex Dunn (adunn5@nd.edu ) 

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Topic A: Non-Conventional Warfare 

Topic Overview: 

In 1993, shortly after the fall of the USSR, Samuel P. Huntington outlined what he believed to be

the future of modern conflict in his essay, “The Clash of Civilizations”. His argument stated that 1

traditional territory disagreements and nationalistic disputes would become obsolete in the new age of

warfare, and claimed that the divide between civilizations rather than nations would become the new

force of friction in 20th century warfare. Huntington’s prescience is visible from a 2015 perspective as

warfare has devolved into a battle of cultures The 20th century has also witnessed a transformation in how

wars are fought with the emergence of non-conventional and 4th generation warfare.

Non-conventional warfare marks the divergence from the “holy trinity” of traditional 

war, which includes the state, the people, and the army. Increasingly, we see that conflict is no 

longer marked by lines of uniformed soldiers and dictated battlefields. Guerilla style fighting is 

becoming the standard for battle today, as advanced technological weaponry and automation no 

longer require face-to-face combat. This sort of conflict has been labeled fourth generation 

warfare. First generation warfare was marked by line column fighting, uniforms, and 

professional armies. Second generation warfare came about with WWII, where firepower, 

advanced machinery, and the industrial revolution led to a war of attrition, where traditional 

column fighting was impossible due to the rise of the machine gun. Third generation warfare, 

pioneered by the Nazis, was marked by speed and risky invasions, as evident from Blitzkrieg . 

The idea with this type of warfare is to shorten the enemy’s decision time and force them to 

make a mistake. Fourth generation warfare came about during the cold war, when the US and the 

Soviets weren’t actually fighting, but instead engaged in arms races, balancing battles, and proxy 

1Huntington, Samuel P. "Foreign Affairs - The Clash of Civilizations? - Samuel P. Huntington." Foreign Affairs - Home. N.p., 25 Jan. 2009. Web. 31 May 2017. 

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wars. We have seen that fourth generation warfare has been a catalyst for great social, political, 

and economic change. Terrorist groups have come to be significant global forces, as fourth 

generation warfare allows violent non state actors (VNSAs) the best opportunity to propel 

themselves to prominence.  

In fourth generation warfare, the state loses the monopoly on warfare and violence. 

VNSAs like Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS are prime examples of groups 

that utilize fourth generation warfare to their benefit. The distinction between military personnel 

and civilians is blurred in fourth generation warfare, which leads to an advantage for VNSAs. 

Developed, professional armies, like that of the US, have moral and legal obligations to mitigate 

collateral damage as much as possible, and are responsible for the lives of civilians in their 

battlegrounds. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, can bring maximum damage to their enemies 

without regard for red tape or civilian casualties. ISIS controls 30,100 sq miles of territory in 

Syria and Iraq as of December 2016, an area about the size of the state of South Carolina . Their 2

success derives from the changing state of warfare, and their increased social media presence.  

The weaponization of social media is a major component in the discussion of fourth 

generation warfare. Since the Kosovo conflict in 1999, which was dubbed the “internet war”, 

states and VNSAs have began to use social media and greater internet connection to aid their 

physical and virtual goals. In a world dominated by fourth generation warfare, control of public 3

opinion is essential. The weaponization of social media allows VNSAs to easily spread their 4

messages and influence citizens, often times using social media as a recruiting technique. ISIS is 5

2"Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps." BBC News. BBC, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 31 May 2017. 3 Ibid.  4 Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. ##TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia: @Characteristics_of_Contemporary_Conflicts. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015. Print. 5 Ibid.  

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particularly well known for incorporating twitter into their terrorist activities; in 2014 the group 

announced a campaign against Northern Iraq with the use of the hashtag #ALLEyesOnIsis.  6

Development of new military systems and warfare dynamics should compel this body to discuss 

how best to confront the issue of the weaponization of social media, possible regulations, and 

potential benefits of a greater social media network. Historian Johanna Neuman once said on the 

invention of the telegraph, “the knowledge relayed by the telegraph would make nations so 

conversant with the national interests of their one-time enemies that war would come no more.”  7

It seems as though social media makes local wars into global wars. How can this force be 

utilized to realize the potential that Neuman saw in greater international connection? Resolutions 

and debate should also include discussion of the press’ roll in fourth generation warfare, and how 

the press can be utilized to inspire nationalism and ward off VNSAs who look to hijack a 

citizenry.  

Another issue that should be considered during this committee is how the international 

community can prepare undeveloped and developing nations for potential threats in the fourth 

generation of warfare. While more developed nations remain fairly entrenched in classical 

warfare techniques, they largely possess the capabilities and resources to adapt to their enemy’s 

styles of fighting. Should there be a burden on the international community to assist undeveloped 

and developing nations in their efforts to catch up to the more technologically savvy, advanced 

fourth generation warfare?  

The nation of Chad, which has consistently ranked at the bottom of several development 

and economic indexes, is fighting a guerilla style war against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad 

6 Brookings, Emerson T., and P. W. Singer. "War Goes Viral." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 11 Oct. 2016. Web. 31 May 2017. 7 Ibid.  

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region. While the Chadians are fighting a 4GW combatant, they persist with relatively arcane 8

weaponry and military technology. Infrastructure lacks heavily among the local communities 

which prohibits efficient communication of emergencies from terrorist threats. This is one case 9

study that should be considered by the committee in their attempt to devise a plan that adequately 

outfits nations with the capabilities to defend against 4GW threats, while mitigating the side 

effects of the weaponization of social media.  

Bloc Positions:  

● The Middle East 

○ Middle eastern states should place a high premium on stricter regulations of the 

use of social media. While terrorist groups do have a global reach when it comes 

to recruitment, a good majority of radicalized members have been recruited 

locally. States in this category should also exhibit a desire to better mitigate the 

negative humanitarian effects of 4GW.  

● Global Leaders of the War on Terror  

○ States who have been heavily involved in the fight against terrorism should have 

the most experience combatting forces who use 4GW to their advantage. The US, 

for example, has combatted guerilla forces in the middle east for over 15 years. 

Many nations have struggled to adequately defeat VNSAs who utilize 4GW, as 

ground conquest is very difficult when a group has no definitive territory. 

Delegates representing states in this category should have a good understanding 

of the different approaches their nation has taken to combatting 4GW, and should 

8 "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures." Crisis Group. International Crisis Group, 19 May 2017. Web. 31 May 2017. 9 Ibid.  

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be ready to take their experience and implement it into a resolution that will aid 

other states.  

● APAC Nations  

○ Asian and Pacific nations have not been estranged from 4GW in their own states. 

Several terrorist organizations, such as Xinjiang, a group seeking secession in 

Northwest China, and Taliban extensions in the Philippines and Indonesia, have 

wreaked havoc and killed many through largely isolated attacks. China 

specifically should look to discuss its own experiences and successes with 

moderating social media, and is expected to suggest greater measures of 

regulation against terrorist groups on the internet.  

Questions to Consider:  

● How can the international community (IC) regulate the use of social media so as to avoid the spread of violent content without limiting the free speech of users? 

● Is there a way that social media can be used to lessen violent conflict and educate civilians about the danger of VNSAs? What are some potential avenues to achieve this?  

● How necessary is it that states have a deep understanding of the cultural landscape of their 4GW combatants? How can they utilize cultural knowledge to create peace or, if need be, defeat their enemy?  

● To what extent should diplomatic ties be created with VNSAs? Should such groups be allowed to enter into formal negotiations with other states, or be able to sign treaties regarding proper styles of warfare? 

● How can 4GW be clearly redefined by this committee, to include present and future issues regarding non-conventional warfare?  

● How can this committee address the humanitarian externalities that arise from 4GW? What other UN agencies or NGOs can be implemented to assist with this issue?  

● Is your country well adapted to combat in 4GW? How could you improve, or how could you better aid other nations who aren’t well equipped or adapted?  

Helpful Sources: ● Interesting article discussing how Twitter aids terrorist agendas 

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goes-viral/501125/ 

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● Overview of the weaponization of social media http://www.stratcomcoe.org/thomas-nissen-weaponization-social-media  

● Basic overview of fourth generation warfare http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html  

● Definition of Key Terms, testimonials about fighting in 4GW http://www.munish.nl/pages/downloader?code=ga104&comcode=ga1&year=2013  

                              

Topic B: Chemical Warfare  Topic Overview:  

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Many historians believe that chemical warfare was first pioneered during the 

Peloponnesian, when the Spartans burned sulfur to create toxic gasses, causing their opponents 

to choke and flee. Chemical weapons were first seriously used, however, during World War I. 10

Both axis and allies forces used chlorine and phosgene gases to blind, asphyxiate, and otherwise 

debilitate opponents. Over 90,000 soldiers were killed from the use of poisonous gasses, leading 

the Geneva Convention of 1925 to prohibit the use of chemical weapons in war. However, the 11

convention did not call for the prohibition of manufacturing or the destruction of stockpiles of 

chemical weapons. The convention also had little effect on the use of chemical weapons in 

World War II. Around 1.6 million, mainly jewish, civilians were killed by Nazi forces in 12

concentration camps. A mix of Zyklon B and carbon monoxide was used to commit one of 13

history’s most violent genocides. During the cold war, the Soviets and the US amassed enormous 

stockpiles of chemical weapons, which have since traded hands to various other nations and 

non-state actors.  14

Chemical weapons were used considerably during the Iran - Iraq war of the 1980s. The 

CIA reported that over 90,000 casualties resulted from Iraq’s use of various chemical weapons, 

with illness and permanent debilitations still affecting Iranians today. In 1986, the UN Security 

Council (UNSC) condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, with only the US voting against 

the action as they were a proponent of Iraq’s fight against Iran. Since the Iran-Iraq war, chemical 

weapons have been used occasionally by terrorist groups, individuals, and some state militaries. 

10 "Brief History of Chemical Weapon Use." History of CW Use. OPCW, n.d. Web. 31 May 2017. 11 Ibid.  12 "The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols." ICRC. N.p., 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 31 May 2017. 13 "Brief History of Chemical Weapon Use." History of CW Use. OPCW, n.d. Web. 31 May 2017. 14 "The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols." ICRC. N.p., 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 31 May 2017. 

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The most recent significant instance of chemical warfare occurred in 2013 when Syrian Military 

killed 1,429 civilians in Damascus. Twelve urban areas were targeted by rockets filled with sarin 

nerve gas, leading to the injury of an additional 2,200 civilians were injured.   15

The distinction between chemical and biological weapons will be important in this 

committee. While both are considered to be weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons 

specifically entail the weaponization of a bacterium, virus, protozoan, parasite, biological toxin, 

or fungus. Chemical weapons include any “toxic chemical or its precursor that can cause death, 

injury, temporary incapacitation or sensory irritation through its chemical action”. Chemical 16

weapons are particularly dangerous due to their easily transferrable qualities, as they can be 

dispersed through gas, liquid, and solid forms. The OPCW breaks down chemical weapons into 

three categories: schedule one chemicals are those typically used in very toxic and often 

weaponized gasses; schedule two include those that can be used in weapons, but also have 

alternative uses; schedule three chemicals include the least toxic substances that are used for 

research and the production of common goods .  17

Past Actions by the International Community: 

The first piece of international law regarding the use of chemical weapons came in 1899 

at the Hague Convention. Signatories of the agreement would abstain from using projectiles that 

were intended to be “asphyxiating or deleterious”. As mentioned earlier, the Geneva Protocol 18

was originally drafted in 1925, and has been signed by 133 nations since. The agreement 

15 Ibid.  16 "Brief History of Chemical Weapon Use." History of CW Use. OPCW, n.d. Web. 31 May 2017. 17Ibid.  18 "Laws of War: Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which Is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases." Yale, 1983. Web. 2017. 

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prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in acts of war, but does not address 

production, stockpiling, or transfer of these weapons.  

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) addressed some of the issues that the 

Geneva Protocol left out, as the agreement outlaws the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons 

by state parties. The CWC also imposed stringent measures to verify compliance, which are 19

administered by the Organisations for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The 

OPCW conducts inspections and administers destruction of stockpiles, and has been fairly 

successful; 92% of all chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed as of 2016. In 20

December of 2016 the General Assembly adopted a resolution which was birthed in DISEC. It 

mainly served to re-emphasize the importance and necessity of adherence to past international 

agreements, namely the CWC. It looks for a more cohesive relationship between the UN and 21

the OPCW, and begins to address the issue of economic repercussions on OPCW regulations.  

 

Current Issues  

Syria, who used extensive amounts of chemical weapons in its civil war, has recently 

joined the OPCW. However, it is violent non state actors (VNSA) like ISIS that cause trepidation 

today with regard to chemical weapons. ISIS has been known to use chemical weapons in its 

terrorist attacks in Syria and Iraq, mainly around Mosul. A report from an independent London 

based intelligence agency asserts that ISIS has used chemical weapons 52 times as of November, 

2016. The battle of Mosul tested ISIS’s mettle, as Iraqi forces slowly encroached on ISIS 22

19 "Chemical Weapons Convention." OPCW. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 May 2017. 20 Ibid.  21A/RES/71/69  22 Schmitt, Eric. "ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says." The New York Times. The New York Times, 21 Nov. 2016. Web. 31 May 2017. 

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controlled land. Many were nervous that this would lead to ISIS unleashing more chemical 23

weapons in a last stitch effort. US officials hypothesize that ISIS is either manufacturing their 

own crude brand of mustard gas themselves, or are purchasing them from undeclared stockpiles 

in Syria.   24

As of 2015, only four nations purportedly still have chemical weapons stockpiles: Israel, 

North Korea, Russia, and the US. With 94% of its stockpile already destroyed, it is likely that 

Russia will destroy its entire stockpile by 2018. Having never ratified the CWC, Israel is not 25

bound by its tenants. Although it has never declared it, the international community believes that 

Israel has a significant stockpile of chemical weapons in its arsenal. In 1992, an Israeli flight 

crashed with a significant amount of potentially toxic chemicals. It is unclear today whether 26

Israel still keeps any amount of chemical weapons. North Korea has never officially recognized 

the existence of chemical weapons within its borders. However, it is widely believed that North 

Korea has had the technology and has been stockpiling chemical weapons since the 1950s. As 27

of 2009, it is estimated that North Korea has around 5,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. Recent 

aggression by North Korea, including a failed ICBM launch attempt by Pyongyang in April of 

2017, suggests that North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpiling may be a legitimate threat for 

the future. In 1997 the US had the largest chemical weapons stockpile of all CWC signatories. 28

A series of extensions, failed destruction deadlines, and concern for environmental collateral 

23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 "Russia Continues Chemical Weapons Disposal". www.nti.org. November 8, 2010. Retrieved November 11, 2013. 26 "Background Information, 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons". United Nations. Retrieved 2006-07-02 27 Jon Herskovitz (18 June 2009). "North Korea chemical weapons threaten region: report". Reuters. Retrieved 9 August 2013. 28 Ibid.  

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damage has led to the original total destruction deadline of 2012 to be tentatively pushed back to 

2021. The US has stated that its reason for maintaining its stockpile is for retaliatory purposes, 29

mainly from potential attacks from unpredictable terrorist groups.   30

Bloc positions: 

● European Nations 

○ European nations, including Canada and some other highly developed nations, are 

large proponents of total elimination of all chemical weapons and have 

historically supported all international agreements furthering destruction of 

stockpiles.  

● North Korea, Israel  

○ These two nations are grouped together because both are believed to have large 

stockpiles of chemical weapons, but have not yet admitted to it. North Korea will 

try to steer away from any greater regulation on the issue, and may want to draw 

back regulations so they can obtain materials more conveniently. Israel will likely 

take similar actions, and will defend the notion of responsible storage and 

stockpiling of chemical weapons.  

● United States and Russia 

○ The US and Russia will likely try to find provisions and alternatives to 

demilitarization, so they can hold onto their stockpiles for a longer period of time. 

It is expected that both nations provide convincing arguments for why certain 

29 "Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical Weapons." USAASC. US Army.  30 Ibid.  

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countries should maintain stockpiles, while abiding by international regulations 

and storage compliances.  

● Undeveloped and Developing Nations 

○ Many of these nations do not have the capability to maintain a large stockpile of 

chemical weapons (CWs), but may deal with VNSAs in their areas which threaten 

the use of CWs. These nations will also fear stricter regulation of schedule one 

and two chemicals as it may lead to decreased economic productivity and 

increased costs.  

Questions to Consider: 

1. Is your country a signatory to the CWC? If not, why? 

2. Does international intervention following the deployment of chemical weaponry in 

autonomous states constitute an imposition on their sovereignty? 

3. How can the OPCW continue regulations without interfering with ongoing economic 

processes?  

4. How can the OPCW expand its actions to limit the stockpiles of non CWC states?  

5. Should greater legal action be taken against past offenders of chemical weapon 

international law? If so, how could this be executed?  

6. Can your country sympathize with the arguments from several states that retention of CW 

stockpiles is purely for retaliatory purposes? How can a state rationalize the retention of 

such a stockpile? How could such rationalizations be refuted through a resolution?  

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7. Should states be obliged to renew their CWC commitments if significant changes are 

made in a resolution? Is there another way to have an internationally legally binding 

agreement?  

8. Is there any plausible “peaceful-use” of chemical weapons? If so, how can a resolution 

provide for such a use? 

9. How can the international community (IC) mitigate the possibility of CWs falling into the 

hands of VNSAs, and halt private production of such weapons? 

 

Helpful Resources:  

● Statistics about past CW attacks http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html  

● Overview and timeline of Chemical weapons, including discussion of scheduling http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/4582-chemical-weapons 

● Most recent General Assembly resolution regarding CW http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/69 

● Discussion on the Future of Chemical weapons http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-future-of-chemical-weapons  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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 Bibliography 

"Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical Weapons." USAASC. US Army.  "Background Information, 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons". United Nations. Retrieved 2006-07-02 "Brief History of Chemical Weapon Use." History of CW Use. OPCW, n.d. Web. 31 May 2017.  Brookings, Emerson T., and P. W. Singer. "War Goes Viral." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media 

Company, 11 Oct. 2016. Web. 31 May 2017. "Chemical Weapons Convention." OPCW. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 May 2017. "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures." Crisis Group. International Crisis 

Group, 19 May 2017. Web. 31 May 2017. Huntington, Samuel P. "Foreign Affairs - The Clash of Civilizations? - Samuel P. Huntington." 

Foreign Affairs - Home. N.p., 25 Jan. 2009. Web. 31 May 2017. "Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps." BBC News. BBC, 28 Apr. 2017. Web. 

31 May 2017. Jon Herskovitz (18 June 2009). "North Korea chemical weapons threaten region: report". 

Reuters. Retrieved 9 August 2013. "Laws of War: Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which Is the Diffusion of 

Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases." Yale, 1983. Web. 2017.  Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia: 

@Characteristics_of_Contemporary_Conflicts. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015. Print. 

"Russia Continues Chemical Weapons Disposal". www.nti.org. November 8, 2010. Retrieved November 11, 2013. 

Schmitt, Eric. "ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says." The New York Times. The New York Times, 21 Nov. 2016. Web. 31 May 2017. 

"The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols." ICRC. N.p., 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 31 May 2017. 

  

 

 

 

 

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