2017 conference on economi design programme · all keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will...

11:30-13:30, Jun 16

0

THE UNIVERSITY OF YORK

2017 CONFERENCE ON ECONOMI DESIGN

PROGRAMME

1

Organisers and Committee

Main Organiser: Zaifu Yang

Programme Committee: Chair: Zaifu Yang Co-Chairs: Yuan Ju and Paul Schweinzer Committee Members:

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tommy Andersson Peter Biro Anna Bogomolnain Tilman Börgers Eric Budish Bo Chen Yan Chen Youngsub Chun Kim-Sau Chung Federico Echenique Lars Ehlers Eytek Erdil Pierre Fleckinger Alex Gershkov Claus-Jochen Haake John Hatfield Jean-Jacques Herings Johannes Hörner Sergei Izmalkov Bettina Klaus Fuhito Kojima Stephan Lauermann Qingmin Liu Jingfeng Lu Jinpeng Ma David Manlove Debasis Mishra Hervé Moulin Michael Ostrovsky Hans Peters Michael Schwarz Arunava Sen Roberto Serrano Shigehiro Serizawa Jay Sethuraman Luigi Siciliani Jacco Thijssen William Thomson Walter Trockel Utku Ünver

Local Organisers: Mauro Bambi Anindya Bhattacharya Annette Johnson Alan Krause Andrew Pickering Makoto Shimoji

2

Contents

Instruction and Advice 3

Lunches and Social Events 4

Programme Overview 5

Keynote Addresses 6

Parallel Session Overview 7

Day 1 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017 10



Day 2 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Thu 15th Jun 2017 16

Day 2 Parallel Sessions 11:30-13:30, Thu 15th Jun 2017 18

Day 3 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017 20



Emergency Calls 26

Acknowledgements 27

3

Instruction and Advice

All keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will be held at the Law

and Management Building (LMB), Campus East, University of York.

In each parallel session, the last speaker should chair all but her/his

own presentation, while the first speaker should chair the last

speaker’s presentation. Each presentation is 30 minutes long and

should be strictly observed.

For your presentation, you need to upload your PDF or PPT file to the

local system and cannot use your own laptop for presentation.

In all lecture rooms, no food or drinking except water is allowed.

During lunch, tea and coffee, the welcome reception and the gala

dinner time, every participant is kindly requested to wear the

conference badge.

There are frequent buses such as Nos 56 and 66 from the city centre

and railway station to the University of York campus (West and East)

during the day. It is about 3.1 miles between York Railway Station and

Campus East and takes 20 minutes by bus and 70 minutes by walking.

You should keep your belongings at a safe place and be vigilant on

any suspicious person or object.

If you are allergic to certain food or drinking, you should take all

reasonable precautions to protect yourself.

4

Lunches and Social Events

Lunches (13:30—14:30), tea, coffee and biscuits (11:00—11:30,

15:30—16:00) will be provided at the Atrium, LMB, June 14-16,

2017.

The welcome reception (18:15—19:00) and the gala dinner (19:00-

21:00) will be held at the Principal York Hotel, Thu 15th June 2017.

The hotel is next to York Railway Station. You could arrive there by

yourself by bus or on foot.

You will be given a gala dinner table number when you receive this

brochure. You are kindly requested to find your place (name) card

on your assigned dinner table.

The tickets for visiting York Minster can be repeatedly used for one

year starting from 9th June 2017 when they are issued.

5

Programme Overview

Day 1: Wed 14th June 2017

1 Parallel Sessions 09:00-11:00


Keynote Address 14:30-15:30


Day 2: Thu 15th June 2017




Gala Dinner 19:00-21:00

Day 3: Fri 16th June, 2017





6

Keynote Addresses

Wed 14th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X

Paul Kleindorfer Lecture

Sanjeev Goyal (University of Cambridge)

Title: The Strategy of Conquest

Chair: Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal

Thu 15th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X

Leo Hurwicz Lecture

Philip Reny (University of Chicago)

Title: Sequential Equilibrium in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of

Signals and Actions

Chair: Zaifu Yang, University of York

Fri 16th Jun 2017; 14:30—15:30 Place: LMB/30X

Murat Sertel Lecture

Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Title: Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New

Orleans' OneApp

Chair: Utku Ünver, Boston College

http://economics.mit.edu/files/12745

http://economics.mit.edu/files/12745

7

Parallel Session Overview: Day 1

Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Wed 14th Jun 2017)

Auction 1, LMB/030

Matching 1, LMB/2XA

Voting and Election 1, LMB /031

Contests, LMB/36X

Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1,

LMB/37X

Bargaining 1, LMB/2XB


Auction 2, LMB/030

Matching 2, LMB/031

Refugee Assignment and Diversity, LMB/36X

Growth and Development, LMB/37X

Networks and Matching, LMB/38X

Information, Communication, Disclosure 1,

LMB/008


Trading Processes and Markets 1, LMB/030

Implementation, LMB/36X

Information, Communication, Disclosure 2,

LMB/031

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1, LMB/37X

Division and Provision Rules, LMB/2XA

Domain Restrictions, LMB/2XB

8


Parallel Sessions 4 (09:00-11:00, Thu 15th Jun 2017)

Auction 3, LMB/030 Bargaining 2, LMB/031

Division, Claim and Related Problems, LMB/36X

Trading Processes and Markets 2, LMB/37X

Information and Contracts 1, LMB/2XA

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2, LMB/2XB

Parallel Sessions 5 (11:30-13:30, Thu 15th Jun 2017)

Voting and Election 2, LMB/2XA Organ Exchange and Related Topics, LMB/36X

Trading Processes and Markets 3, LMB/37X

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3, LMB/030

Allocation Rules and Auction, LMB/031

Allocation and Assignment 1, LMB/2XB

9


Parallel Sessions 6 (09:00-11:00, Fri 16th Jun 2017)

Teams and Organisations, LMB/36X

Allocation and Assignment 2, LMB/030

Implementation and Mechanisms,

LMB/37X

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4, LMB/031

Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2, LMB/2XA

School Choice and Assignment 1, LMB/2XB


Allocation and Assignment 3, LMB/2XA

Experiments and Empirics 1, LMB/2XB

School Choice and Assignment 2, LMB/030

Coordination, Timing and Investment,

LMB/36X

College, School Admission and Related Topics,

LMB/37X

Rules and Mechanisms, LMB/031


Information and Contracts 2, LMB/2XA

Contest, Implementation and Identification,

LMB/36X

Experiments and Empirics 2, LMB/030

Choice, Contract and Matching, LMB/37X

Trading Processes and Markets 4, LMB/031

09:00-11:00, Jun 14

10

Parallel Sessions 1 (09:00-11:00, Jun 14) Day 1

Auction 1 LMB/030

Nicolas Fugger, Centre for European Economic Research. Exploiting

Uncertainty about the Number of Competitors in Procurement Auctions.

Philippe Gillen, University of Cologne. Preferences and Decision Support

in Competitive Bidding.

Olga Gorelkina, University of Liverpool. Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey

Auction.

Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado at Boulder. Efficient Dynamic Auction

for Private Valuations

Matching 1 LMB/2XA

Takashi Akahoshi, Waseda University. Sharing Properties with the Core in

Matching Problems: von Neumann-Morgenstern Pairwise Stability.

Albin Erlanson, Stockholm School of Economics. Organizing Time Banks:

Lessons from Matching Markets.

Francis X. Flanagan, Wake Forest University. Manipulation of Stable

Matching Mechanisms: Polarization of Interests Revisited.

Dinko Dimitrov, Saarland University. Gender Consistent Resolving Rules in

Marriage Problems.

Voting and Elections 1 LMB/031

Swarnendu Chatterjee, Maastricht University. Frequency Based Analysis of

Voting Rules.

Hayrullah Dindar, Istanbul Bilgi University. Party-List Proportional

Representation in Partisan Politics: A New Voting Paradox.

Yoko Kawada, Keio University. Consistent Representation and Electoral

Systems.

Anke Gerber, Universität Hamburg. A Shut Mouth Catches No Flies:

Consideration of Issues and Voting.

09:00-11:00, Jun 14

11

Contests LMB/36X

Toomas Hinnosaar, Collegio Carlo Alberto. Dynamic Common-Value

Contests.

Arijit Sen, Indian Institute of Management at Calcutta. Contests with Foot-

Soldiers.

Marco Serena, Universidad Carlos III and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law

and Public Finance. Sequential Contests Revisited.

John Howard, London School of Economics. Silent Duels and the Optimal

Design of Research Contests.

Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 1 LMB/37X

Francisco Llerena Garrés, Rovira i Virgili University. Consistency

Distinguishes the (Weighted) Shapley Value, the (Weighted) Surplus Division

Solution and the Prenucleolus, co-authored by Pedro Calleja, Universitat de

Barcelona.

Chih-Chun Yang, Academia Sinica (Taipei). Subjective Coalition-Proof

Equilibrium.

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Saint-Petersburg State University. Centrality

Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games.

Walter Trockel, Istanbul Bilgi University and Bielefeld University.

Competitive Payoffs in Coalitional Games.

Bargaining 1 LMB/2XB

Deepal Basak, Indian School of Business. Transparency and Delay in

Bargaining.

Simon Hoof, Paderborn University. The Recursive Bargaining Solution for

NTU Differential Games.

Chiu Yu Ko, National University of Singapore. Decentralized One-to-Many

Bargaining.

Claus-Jochen Haake, University of Paderborn. On the Decomposability of the

Nash Bargaining Solution: An Approach to Labour Markets.

11:30-13:30, Jun 14

12


Auction 2 LMB/030

Cedric Wasser, University of Bonn. Optimal Favouritism in All-Pay Auctions

and Lottery Contests.

Alex Suzdaltsev, Stanford University. Distributionally Robust Pricing in

Auctions.

Xiaogang Che, Durham University. Deposit Requirements in Auctions:

Theory and Empirical Evidence.

Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, University of Bristol. On the Core of Auctions

with Externalities: Stability and Fairness.

Matching 2 LMB/031

Gaoji Hu, National University of Singapore. Resource-Consuming Deferred

Acceptance.

Shashwat Khare, Maastricht University. Stability in Matching with Couples

Having Non-Responsive Preferences.

Irene Yuan Lo, Columbia University. Information Acquisition Costs of

Matching Markets.

Vincent Iehle, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Timely Matching.

Refugee Assignment and Diversity LMB/36X

Philip Grech, ETH Zurich. Undesired Properties of the European

Commission’s Refugee Distribution Key.

Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford. Refugee Resettlement, co-authored

by David Delacretaz, University of Melbourne.

Chia-Ling Hsu, Kyushu University. Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market

Design Approach.

Tommy Andersson, Lund University. Assigning Refugees to Landlords in

Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings.

11:30-13:30, Jun 14

13

Growth and Development LMB/37X

Rong Zhang, Chongqing University. A Growth Model with Welfare Effect, co-

authored by Zaifu Yang, University of York.

Agnieszka Lipieta, Cracow University of Economics. Schumpeterian Evolution

as the Composition of Adjustment Processes, co-authored by Artur Lipieta,

Cracow University of Economics.

Sharanya Basu Roy, University College Cork. Ganga Action Plan (GAP): The

Challenge of Regulatory Quality.

Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, University of Derby. Impact of Remittances on

Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Openness.

Networks and Matching LMB/38X

Benjamin Sperisen, Tulane University. Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative

Matching to Play a Dynamic Game.

Spiros Bougheas, University of Nottingham. Contagion in Stable Networks

Sonal Yadav, University of Padua. Matching with Homophily

Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht University. An Axiomatization of the

Proportional Rule in Financial Networks.

Information, Communication, Disclosure 1 LMB/008

Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. The Enforcement of Mandatory

Disclosure Rules.

Stefan Terstiege, Maastricht University. Disclosure Regulation.

Sergey Stepanov, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Reputation Concerns and Information Aggregation.

Yangbo Song, The Chinese University of Hong Kong at Shenzhen. Dynamic

R&D Competition under Uncertainty and Strategic Disclosure

16:00-18:00, Jun 14

14


Trading Processes and Markets 1 LMB/030 Ayse Yazici, Durham University. A Closer Look at Incentives in Senior Level Random Matching Markets. Emiliya Lazarova, University of East Anglia. A Look Upstream: Market Restructuring, Risk, Procurement Contracts and Efficiency. Yu Zhou, Osaka University. Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms. Jordi Massó, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility of Truth-telling in Stable Mechanisms in Monotonic Matching Markets. Implementation LMB/36X Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow. Sequential Implementation without Commitment. Boaz Zik, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Implementation with Interdependent Payoffs. Ritesh Jain, Ohio State University. Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences. Naoki Yoshihara, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization. Information, Communication, Disclosure 2 LMB/031 Qinggong Wu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coarse Communication and Institution Design. Claudia Herresthal, University of Cambridge. Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence. Avi Lichtig, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Enemy of My Enemy is (Better than) My Friend. Angel Hernando-Veciana, Universidad Carlos III. Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions.

16:00-18:00, Jun 14

15

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 1 LMB/37X Inácio Bó, Berlin Social Science Centre. Consistent Hiring by Rankings and Rules. Sumiyo Nishiguchi, Tokyo University of Science. Dynamic Social Choice for Disambiguation of Pronouns. Jens Gudmundsson, University of Copenhagen. Ranking Individuals on the Basis of Collaborations. Hans Peters, University of Maastricht. Effectivity and Power. Division and Provision Rules LMB/2XA Katharina Huesmann, University of Cologne. Public Provision of Scarce Resources when Preferences Are Non-Linear. Ryusuke Shinohara, Hosei University. Self-Representation Equilibria and Cost-Matching Grants with the Lindahl Price in Interregional Bargaining over Public Projects María Gómez-Rúa, Universidade de Vigo. A New Solution for Allocating the Costs of Cleaning a River: Fairness versus Incentive Compatibility. Min-hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh, National Chung Cheng University and Academia Sinica at Taipei. Relations among the Central Rules in Bankruptcy Problems: A Strategic Justification Perspective. Domain Restrictions LMB/2XB Peng Liu, Singapore Management University. Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Rule on Sequentially Dichotomous Domains. Panos Protopapas, University of Lausanne. On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness: Median-Voting over Intervals. Hirofumi Yamamura, Hokusei Gakuen University. On Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness: A Full Characterization. Anup Pramanik, Osaka University. On Strategy-Proof Social Choice between Two Alternatives.

09:00-11:00, Jun 15

16


Auctions 3 LMB/030

Peter Katuscak, RWTH Aachen University. How to Boost Revenues in First-

Price Auctions? The Magic of Disclosing Only Winning Bids from Past

Auctions.

Helene Mass, University of Cologne. Endogenous Worst-Case Beliefs in First-

Price Auctions.

Noriaki Okamoto, Keio University. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for

Multiple Objects: Comments.

Ella Segev, Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Heterogeneous Risk/Loss

Aversion in Complete Information All-pay Auctions.

Bargaining 2 LMB/031

Xu Lang, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.

Characterization of The Minimal Norm Solution in Bargaining with

Incomplete Information.

Soumendu Sarkar, TERI University. Bargaining for Land Acquisition:

Competition and Contiguity.

Oriol Tejada, ETH Zurich. Divide the Dollar and Conquer More: Sequential

Bargaining and Risk Aversion.

Shiran Rachmilevitch, University of Haifa. Bargaining with Periodic

Participation Costs.

Division, Claim and Related Problems LMB/36X

Ricardo Martinez, Universidad de Granada. The Problem of Dividing a

Budget among Several Districts.

Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow. Competitive Division of a Mixed

Manna.

Ryan Tierney, University of Montreal. Gale’s Flat Tax.

William Thomson, University of Rochester. New Properties of Rules to

Adjudicate Conflicting Claims.

09:00-11:00, Jun 15

17

Trading Processes and Markets 2 LMB/37X

Acelya Altuntas, University of Rochester. Trading Probabilities in Cycles.

Renaud Foucart, Humboldt University. Metasearch and Market

Concentration.

Yuan Ju, University of York. The English Housing Market Mechanism.

Kim-Sau Chung, Chinese University of Hongkong. Selling to Consumers with

Intransitive Indifference.

Information and Contracts 1 LMB/2XA

Vital Gretschko, Centre for European Economic Research. Contract Design

with Limited Commitment.

Menghan Xu, Xiamen University. Debt Contract with Limited Enforcement.

Colin Negenborn, Humboldt University. Lemons versus Collusion.

Anindya Bhattacharya, University of York. Local Institutional Structure and

Clientelistic Access to Employment: A Model for Less-Developed Rural

Economies.

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 2 LMB/2XB

Remzi Sanver, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Evalutionwise Strategy-Proofness.

Bo Chen, University of Warwick. Who Should Cast the Casting Vote? Using

Sequential Voting to Amalgamate Information, co-authored by Steve Alpern,

University of Warwick.

Ata Atay, University of Barcelona. Multi-Sided Assignment Games with m-

Partite Graphs.

Shurojit Chatterji, Singapore Management University. Random Social Choice

Functions on Multidimensional Domains.

11:30-13:30, Jun 15

18


Voting and Elections 2 LMB/2XA

Jean Lainé, LIRSA-CNAM. Manipulation by Vote Pairing in Single-Winner

Large Elections.

Dmitriy Vorobyev, Ural Federal University. Information Disclosure in

Elections with Sequential Costly Participation.

Matias Nunez, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for

Large Populations.

Ming Li, Concordia University. Optimal Majority Rule in Referenda.

Organ Exchange and Related Topics LMB/36X

Jörgen Kratz, Lund University. Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group

Barrier.

Yao Cheng, University of York. Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous

Preferences.

Francisco Robles, University of Barcelona. Axioms for the Minimum

Walrasian Equilibrium in Assignment Problems with Unitary Demands

Utku Unver, Boston College. Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver

Exchange.

Trading Processes and Markets 3 LMB/37X

Maciej Kotowski, Harvard University. Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange.

Radoslav Raykov, Bank of Canada. Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized

Two-Sided Markets with Weak Preferences.

Jinpeng Ma, Rutgers University. Convergence of Averaging Price Processes

under the Centralized Walrasian Auction and the Decentralized Double

Auction.

Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland. Market design and FCC incentive

auction.

11:30-13:30, Jun 15

19

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 3 LMB/030

Patrick Harless, University of Glasgow. Solidarity in Social Choice: A Robust

Impossibility and a New Compromise Family.

Ville Korpela, Turku School of Economics. Social Choice Theory: A Neglected

Path to Possibility.

Norihito Sakamoto, Tokyo University of Science. A Class of Equity Criteria

Based on Dominance Principle and Individual Preferences: A New Concept of

Economic Equity.

Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University. A Rawlsian Approach to the

Queueing Problem.

Allocation Rules and Auction LMB/031

Daniel Z. Li, Durham University. Optimal Sequential Search Auctions with a

Deadline.

Abdul Quadir, Birla Institute of Technology and Science. Weak Envy-freeness

for Equals in Multi-Unit Auctions.

Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University. Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue

Maximization with no Wastage.

John A. Weymark, Vanderbilt of Economics, USA. Dominant Strategy

Implementability, Zero Length Cycles, and Affine Maximizers.

Allocation and Assignment 1 LMB/2XB

Peter Troyan, University of Virginia. Efficient and Essentially Stable

Assignments.

Jingyi Xue, Singapore Management University. Equal Quantiles Rules in

Resource Allocation with Uncertain Demands.

Kiyong Yun, Seoul National University. Characterizations of the Probabilistic

Serial Rule for the Simple Random Assignment Problem.

Huaxia Zeng, Lingnan (University) College. Random Assignments on

Preference Domains with a Tier Structure.

09:00-11:00, Jun 16

20


Teams and Organizations LMB/36X

Alberto Vesperoni, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. A Team Theory of Strategic

Agglomeration.

Endre Csoka, Afred Renyi Institute of Mathematics. Efficient Teamwork.

Krzysztof Szczygielski, University of Warsaw. Incentives in Self-Regulatory

Organizations.

Paul Schweinzer, Alpen-Adria-Universitat. Optimal Team Composition and

the Apollo Effect

Allocation and Assignment 2 LMB/030

Jinyong Jeong, Boston College. Parking Slot Assignment Problem.

Tomoya Kazumura, Osaka University. Equal Treatment of Equals and

Strategy-Proofness in Object Allocation with Non-Quasilinear Preferences.

Mengling Li, Xiamen University. Pareto Efficient Assignments in the

Generalized Roommates Problem.

Yan Long, New York University. Optimal Strategy-Proof and Budget Balanced

Mechanisms to Assign Multiple Objects.

Implementation and Mechanisms LMB/37X

Makoto Hagiwara, Tokyo Institute of Technology. Ex Post Implementation: A

Full Characterization.

Lukas Block, University of Paderborn. Legislation Effects on Lobby Group

Formation.

Joosung Lee, University of Edinburgh. Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG

Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms.

Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan. Simple Mechanisms.

09:00-11:00, Jun 16

21

Topics in Individual and Collective Choice 4 LMB/031

Andrea Gallice, Università di Torino. Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

through Position Uncertainty

Justin Kruger, Universite Paris-Dauphine. Restricting the Domain Allows for

Weaker Independence.

Laura Kasper, Saarland and Maastricht University. On Condorcet Consistency

and Two Instances of Participation Failure.

Huseyin Yildirim, Duke University. A Capture Theory of Committees.

Cooperation and Coalitional Behaviour 2 LMB/2XA

Oihane Gallo, University of the Basque Country. Rationing Rules and Stable

Coalition Structures.

Mert Kimya, Koc University. Equilibrium Coalitional Behavior.

Seckin Ozbilen, Istanbul Bilgi University. Strong Exchange Stability in Hedonic

Games.

Elena Molis, University of Granada. Random Paths to Stability in Hedonic

Games.

School Choice and Assignment 1 LMB/2XB

Toshiji Kawagoe, Future University Hakodate. The Skipping-down Strategy

and Stability in School Choice Problems with Affirmative Action: Theory and

Experiment.

Lucien Frys, Humboldt University. University Entrance Test and High Schools

Segregation.

Nadja Maraun, University of Paderborn. Boston School Choice Mechanism

and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Priorities Depending on Students’

Preferences.

Martin Van der Linden, Vanderbilt University. Manipulability and Tie-

Breaking in Constrained School Choice.

11:30-13:30, Jun 16

22


Allocation and Assignment 3 LMB/2XA

Marina Nunez Oliver, University of Barcelona. The Dual Assignment Game,

Rational Allocation and Exactness.

Ryosuke Sakai, Osaka University. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in

Assignment Problem with Discrete Payments.

Josue Alberto Ortega Sandoval, University of Glasgow. Fair Assignments for

Generalized Tennis Problems.

Madhav Raghavan, University of Lausanne. Efficient Pairwise Allocation via

Partner Trading.

Experiments and Empirics 1 LMB/2XB

Angelika Endres, Paderborn University. Network Formation and Disruption –

An Experiment: Are Efficient Networks too Complex?

Siqi Song, University of York. Evidence of Herding Behaviour on eBay

Inventory Listing

Rustamdjan Hakimov, Berlin Social Science Centre. Iterative Versus Standard

Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence

Maria Montero, University of Nottingham. Communication with Partially

Verifiable Information: An Experiment

School Choice and Assignment 2 LMB/030

Christian Basteck, Université Libre de Bruxelles and F.R.S. Cognitive Ability

and Games of School Choice.

Fatma Aslan, Istanbul Bilgi University. Job Mobility of Couples when

Distance Matters.

Umut Dur, North Carolina State University. Competitive Equilibrium in

School Assignment.

Peter Biro, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Efficiency and Fair Access in

Kindergarten Allocation Policy Design.

11:30-13:30, Jun 16

23

Coordination, Timing and Investment LMB/36X

Huanhuan Zheng, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Coordinated Trading

and Market Efficiency.

Chun-Ting Chen, National Taiwan University. Coordination in Social

Networks: Communication by Actions.

Tomomi Miyazaki, Kobe University. Public Investment and Stock Prices: The

Case of Japan.

Jacco Thijssen, University of York. On Quality Standards and the Timing of

Pharmaceutical Investment.

College, School Admission and Related Topics LMB/37X

Eun Jeong Heo, Vanderbilt University. Financial Aids in College Admissions:

Need-Based versus Merit-Based.

Mustafa Oguz Afacan, Sabanci University. Graduate Admission with Financial

Support.

Josep Izquierdo, Universitat de Barcelona. Core Incentives Properties in Joint

Investment Problems.

Lars Ehlers, Universite de Montreal. (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice.

Rules and Mechanisms LMB/031

Yuta Nakamura, Keio University. Dispute Mediation Mechanisms.

İpek Özkal Sanver, Istanbul Bilgi University. Compromise Rules Revisited.

Justus Winkelmann, University of Bonn. A Ranking Mechanism for Coupled

Binary Decision Problems.

Bettina Klaus, University of Lausanne. A Characterization of Serial

Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices.

16:00-18:00, Jun 16

24


Information and Contracts 2 LMB/2XA

Alexandros Rigos, Lund University. A Beauty Contest with Flexible

Information Acquisition.

Thomas Schacherer, Humboldt-University. Long-Term Contracting with

Unequal Discounting.

Xinyi Xu, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Existence of Optimal

Deterministic Contracts in Moral Hazard Problems.

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, University of Southern Demark. Co-Authorship and

the Measurement of Individual Productivity.

Experiments and Empirics 2 LMB/030

Oktay Sürücü, Bielefeld University. Asymmetric Dominance Effect with

Multiple Decoys.

Zhen Lei, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Does More

Corruption Generate Less Resistance? An Experimental Study.

Karl Robert Jandoc, University of the Philippines-Diliman. An Experimental

Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions.

Alex Possajennikov, University of Nottingham. The Choice of Voting Rules

under a Veil of Ignorance: Experimental Evidence.

Trading Processes and Markets 4 LMB/031

Vincent Meisner, Technical University Berlin. Competing for Strategic

Buyers.

Dimitris Voliotis, University of Piraeus. The Dark Side of Trading: A Strategic

Model.

Bernhard Kasberger, University of Vienna. Welfare in the Auction After-

Market.

16:00-18:00, Jun 16

25

Contest, Implementation and Identification LMB/36X

Wonki Jo Cho, Korea University. Identifying Groups in a Boolean Algebra.

Zhewei Wang, Shandao University. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Rank-Order

Contest.

Mehmet Barlo, Sabanci University. Behavioural Implementation under

Incomplete Information.

Choice, Contract and Matching LMB/37X

Li Chen, University of Gothenburg. Time-Constrained School Choice.

Rongzhu Ke, Chinese University of Hong Kong. A General Solution Method

for Moral Hazard Problem.

Sean Horan, University of Montreal. How to ``Reveal’’ Hidden Substitutes.

26

Emergency Calls

999 is the official emergency number in the UK. You should call this

number, when there is danger to life or when violence is being used

or threatened.

101 is the number to call when you want to contact local police –

when it’s less urgent than a 999 call.

For other non-emergency matters, please contact at

[email protected].

27

Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge all financial and administrative support from

the Department of Economics and Centre for Mechanism and Institution

Design, University of York. We wish to thank Jo Swaffield for her never-

failing support, Vin McDermott for his generous help, and Annette

Johnson for her excellent assistance.

2017 conference on economi design programme · all keynote addresses and all parallel sessions will...

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