2015 0614 - the people’s republic of debt _ mauldin economics

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  It's Time to Get Real About Your Investments  A Brand-New Book Available Onlin e The People’s Republic of Debt New York, Maine, and Boston It wasn’t that many centuries ago that China was the absolute economic center of the world. That center gravitated to Europe and then towards North  Amer ica and has now begun moving back to China. My colleague Jawad Mian provided this chart showing the evolution of Earth’s economic center of gravity from 2000 years ago to a few years and into the future: Most investors are well aware of the enormous impact China has had on the modern world. Thirty-five years ago China’s was primarily an agrarian society, with much of the nation trapped in medieval technologies and living standards. Today 500 million people have moved from the country to the cities; and China’s urban infrastructure is, if not the best in the world, close to that standard. The economic miracle that is China is unprecedented in human history. There has simply been nothing like it. Deng Xiaoping took control of the nation in the late ’70s and propelled it into the 21 st  century. But now the story is changing. Those who think that all progression is linear are in for a rude awak ening if they are betting on China to unfold in the future as it has in the past.  Among the most important questions for all investors and businessmen is, how will China manage its future and the problems it faces? There are many problems, some of them monumental – and at the same time there is an amazing amount of opportunity and potential. Understanding the challenges and deciphering the likely outcomes is itself an immense challenge.  A Brand-New Book Available Onlin e My colleague Worth Wray and I have been investigating and writing about China for some time now. Today I’m announcing a book that we have  written and edited in collaboration with 17 well-known experts on China. The book is ca lled  A Great Leap Fo rward? Making Sense of China’s Cooling Credit Boom, Technological Transformation, High Stakes Rebalancing, Geopolitical Rise, & Reserve Currency Dream, and we think it will help you to a solid understanding of both China’s problems and its opportunities. I know, the subtitle is a tad long, but the book does really cover all those aspects of today’s China. Like what you’re reading? Subscribe now and receive the full version of John Mauldin's Thoughts from the Frontline delivered to your inbox each week. Enter your email address...  Subscribe Now  Already ha ve an accoun t? Click here to log-in.  We never share your email with third parties. Notice that there is a “?” after the title “A Great Leap Forward.” The first Great Leap Forward, initiated by Mao Tse-tung in the early ’60s, was an utter disaster. It devastated the nation, bankrupted the economy, and caused the deaths of tens of millions of people. Let’s review a little history from the introduction to the book:  When C hairman Mao decided in 1958 to transform China’s larg ely agrarian economy into a socialis t pa radise through rapid industrialization, collectivization, and a complete subjugation of the market to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) central planners, the widespread misallocation of Thoughts from the Frontline The People’s Republic of Debt BY JOHN MAULDIN JUNE 14, 2015

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  • It's Time to Get Real About Your Investments

    ABrandNewBookAvailableOnlineThePeoplesRepublicofDebtNewYork,Maine,andBoston

    ItwasntthatmanycenturiesagothatChinawastheabsoluteeconomiccenteroftheworld.ThatcentergravitatedtoEuropeandthentowardsNorthAmericaandhasnowbegunmovingbacktoChina.MycolleagueJawadMianprovidedthischartshowingtheevolutionofEarthseconomiccenterofgravityfrom2000yearsagotoafewyearsandintothefuture:

    MostinvestorsarewellawareoftheenormousimpactChinahashadonthemodernworld.ThirtyfiveyearsagoChinaswasprimarilyanagrariansociety,withmuchofthenationtrappedinmedievaltechnologiesandlivingstandards.Today500millionpeoplehavemovedfromthecountrytothecitiesandChinasurbaninfrastructureis,ifnotthebestintheworld,closetothatstandard.

    TheeconomicmiraclethatisChinaisunprecedentedinhumanhistory.Therehassimplybeennothinglikeit.DengXiaopingtookcontrolofthenationinthelate70sandpropelleditintothe21stcentury.Butnowthestoryischanging.ThosewhothinkthatallprogressionislinearareinforarudeawakeningiftheyarebettingonChinatounfoldinthefutureasithasinthepast.

    Amongthemostimportantquestionsforallinvestorsandbusinessmenis,howwillChinamanageitsfutureandtheproblemsitfaces?Therearemanyproblems,someofthemmonumentalandatthesametimethereisanamazingamountofopportunityandpotential.Understandingthechallengesanddecipheringthelikelyoutcomesisitselfanimmensechallenge.

    ABrandNewBookAvailableOnline

    MycolleagueWorthWrayandIhavebeeninvestigatingandwritingaboutChinaforsometimenow.TodayImannouncingabookthatwehavewrittenandeditedincollaborationwith17wellknownexpertsonChina.ThebookiscalledAGreatLeapForward?MakingSenseofChinasCoolingCreditBoom,TechnologicalTransformation,HighStakesRebalancing,GeopoliticalRise,&ReserveCurrencyDream,andwethinkitwillhelpyoutoasolidunderstandingofbothChinasproblemsanditsopportunities.Iknow,thesubtitleisatadlong,butthebookdoesreallycoverallthoseaspectsoftodaysChina.

    Likewhatyourereading?SubscribenowandreceivethefullversionofJohnMauldin'sThoughtsfromtheFrontlinedeliveredtoyourinboxeachweek.

    Enteryouremailaddress... SubscribeNow

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    Noticethatthereisa?afterthetitleAGreatLeapForward.ThefirstGreatLeapForward,initiatedbyMaoTsetungintheearly60s,wasanutterdisaster.Itdevastatedthenation,bankruptedtheeconomy,andcausedthedeathsoftensofmillionsofpeople.Letsreviewalittlehistoryfromtheintroductiontothebook:

    WhenChairmanMaodecidedin1958totransformChinaslargelyagrarianeconomyintoasocialistparadisethroughrapidindustrialization,collectivization,andacompletesubjugationofthemarkettoChineseCommunistParty(CCP)centralplanners,thewidespreadmisallocationofresourcesledtotheworstfamineinrecordedhistoryandtheoutrightcollapseofChinaseconomy.

    WithverylittlecapitalatChinasdisposalafteritslongcivilwarandevenlongersubjugationtoforeigncolonialistsinthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,Maodecidedthebestwaytofundthecountrysrapidindustrializationwasforhisgovernmenttomonopolizeagriculturalproduction,usethenationsbountytosupportindustrializingurbanpopulations,andfinancefixedassetinvestmentswithcropexports.

    Thoughts from the Frontline

    ThePeoplesRepublicofDebtBYJOHNMAULDIN JUNE14,2015

  • 1959Prosperitybroughtbythedragon&thephoenix

    SeeinggrainandsteelproductionastheessentialelementsofChinasrapiddevelopment,Maoboastedin1958thatChinawouldproducemoresteelthantheUnitedKingdomwithinfifteenyears.

    1959Smeltalotofgoodsteelandacceleratesocialistconstruction.

    Maohadverylimitedknowledgeofagricultureorindustrialproduction,yetheruledChinawithanironfistandsilencedevenwellintentionedopposition.Chinasruralpeasantswereforcedintocollectiveshouseholdsweretornapartandprivatepropertyrightswerecompletelyabolished.Maoorderedagriculturalcollectivestoproducemoregrainwhileforcingfarmerstoemploylessproductivemethodshemobilizedfarmerstokilloffpestslikemosquitos,rats,flies,andsparrows(acampaignthatupsettheecologicalbalanceinChinasfarmlands)andinsistedonadoublingofsteelproductiontobeachievedbydivertingfarmerswithnoindustrialskillintooperatingpoorlysuppliedbackyardfurnaces(whichcouldnotburnhotenoughtoproducehighqualitysteel).

    1959UnskilledworkerssmeltsteelinChinasbackyardfurnaces.

    Steelproductionsurged,andtheeconomyappearedtoboombutatleasthalfofthatnewproductionwasunusable.Aproliferationofcropeatinglocusts(afterthesparrowshadbeenkilledoff)andthediversionoffarmworkerstoindustrialandpublicworksprojectsledtoacollapseincropyields.Still,localofficialsalloverChinafalsifiedtheirproductionfiguresinanefforttowinfavorwithBeijing(andtosparethemselvesMaoswrath),whichledtolargerandlargergrainshipmentstoChinascitiesandsmallerandsmallerrationsforthoselivinginitsagriculturalcollectives.

    InsteadoftakingaGreatLeapForwardtoaharmoniousindustrialsociety

  • 1959Thecommuneislikeagiganticdragon,productionisnoticeablyaweinspiring.

    MaoscommandandcontrolsystemdismantledtheChineseeconomy,ruinedmillionsoflives,andleftanenormousshareofChinaspopulationdisillusioned.

    Industrializationfailed.From1958to1961,millionsdiedofstarvationandexhaustionacrossChinascountryside(independentestimatesrangefrom30millionto70million,whiletheCCPstillinsiststhedeathtollwasonly17million),andthePeoplesRepublicremainedanetexporterofgrain.AsHarvardeconomistDwightPerkinsremembersit,Enormousamountsofinvestmentproducedonlymodestincreasesinproductionornoneatall....Inshort,theGreatLeapwasaveryexpensivedisaster.

    AsproductionandproductivitycollapsedalongwiththeCCPssocialcontract,MaostruggledtoretainpowerasanumberofinfluentialofficialssoughttoimplementmoremarketorientedpoliciesinresponsetotheGreatFamine.FearingthatgrowingoppositioncouldleadthePartytorejectitsMarxistspirit(astheSovietUnionhaddoneunderNikitaKhrushchevadecadeearlier),in1966MaoandhisRedGuardslaunchedtheCulturalRevolutionadecadelongseriesofpurgesintendedtorootoutenemiesofCommunistthoughtlurkingwithintheParty,cleanseChinesesocietyofmanyofitstraditionalvalues,eliminateelitisturbansocialstructures,andrenewthespiritofChinasCommunistrevolution.

    1967Scattertheoldworld,buildanewworld.

    UnderMaosleadership,thePartydestroyedculturalartifacts,bannedthevastmajorityofbooks,dismantledtheeducationalsystem,andsilencedmillionsforthoughtcrimesagainsttheParty.InadevastatingblowtoChinashumancapital,MaoorderedchildrenofprivilegedurbanfamiliesincludingcurrentPresidentXiJinping,whenhisfather,XiZhongxun,waspurgedtorelocatefarawayfromtheirfamiliestobereeducatedthroughmanuallaborinChinascountryside.WhatmayhavebeenthemostpromisingyouthofthatLostGenerationweredeprivedoftheireducationsandforcedintohardship.

  • 1972PresidentXiJinpingduringtheCulturalRevolution

    ConsideringthelegacyoftheGreatLeapForward,theGreatChineseFamine,andtheCulturalRevolution,itisanunderstatementtosaythatMaoshardlinepoliciesdevastatedtheeconomyandleftdeepscarsatalllevelsofChinesesociety.AfterMaosdeathin1976,itdidnttakelongforthepragmaticDengXiaopingtowincontrolofthePartyandtakeChinainaneweconomicdirectionthoughwithessentiallythesamerepressivepoliticalsystem.

    AndnowyoungXIJinpinghascomefromexperiencingtheCulturalRevolution,gettingreadytoembarkuponwhatwebelieveissomethingasequallyasrevolutionaryasthefirstGreatLeapForward.Thequestionmarkiswhetheritwillbeanotherdisasteroradecisiveleapintoanewfuture,perhapsevenanewworldorder.

    MyfriendWoodyBrockremindsusinhislatestPROFILEthatthetheoryofgrowthinemergingmarketsdatesfrom1960,withthepublicationofWaltWhitmanRostowsbookTheStagesofEconomicGrowth.Rostowgaveusadescriptionoffivedifferentstagesthatmarkthetransformationoftraditional,agriculturalsocietiesandmodern,massconsumptionsocieties.

    Thefirstthreestagescanbeaccomplishedjustasreadilyinatopdowneconomyasinabottomupeconomy,andtherearehistoricalreasonstobelieveacommandeconomymighthavesomeadvantages.Thetrickypartisintheevolutionfromasocietythatisindustrializingandbuildinginfrastructureintoaneconomythatisconsumerdrivenandthusbydefinitionmustbebottomupandentrepreneurial.

    Commandeconomies,withtheircronycapitalismandunequalruleoflaw,simplywillnotdevelopintofullfledged,economicallysuccessfulnations.Further,therehastobebothexplicitandimplicitpermissionforentrepreneurialachievements.Cronycapitalism,whichisafalsecapitalism,seekstokeeptheprofitsfromaneconomyinthehandsofasmallgroup.Andthatdynamiclimitsthegrowthoftheoveralleconomy.Toachieveafullconsumersocietytheremustbeopenadmissionforeveryoneintothehallsofbusinessandprivatepropertyownership.

    WhatXiJinpingisattemptinginChinaisnolessrevolutionarythanwhatDengXiaopingdidin1980.Inmanywaysitwillbeharder,becauseDengwasembarkingonaphaseinwhichatopdowneconomymightthrive.Xihastochangetheverynatureofthecurrentsysteminspiteofentrenchedforcesthatdonotwanttogiveuptheirprivileges.

    ThereisreasontobelievethatXiunderstandsexactlywhatneedstobedone.Thequestionis,canhepullitoff?Ifhedoes,Chinawillforatimegrowatamuchslowerrate,andthenatureofitseconomicprogresswillshift.Heunderstandsthathecannotcontinuetogrowtheeconomyondebtforever.Oratleastitappearsthathedoes.OnewaytolookatthecurrentanticorruptioneffortistoseeitasawaytodemonstratetodeeprootedcronycapitaliststhattheirtimeisatanendandthatitstimetofigureouthowtoworkinthenewChinathatXiistryingforcefullytopullthenationtowards.

    AnumberofourcontributorstothebookareoptimisticaboutthepotentialforChinatosucceed.Otherstheclearmajorityseelittlehope.Whatwehavetriedtodointhebookisgiveyouasenseofallsidesoftheargument.Fortheoptimiststoberightwewillneedtoseecertaineventsunfoldinareasonablytimelyfashion.Iftheydont,itwillbetimetotakeamorepessimisticview.Wehavetriedtobeevenhandedandopenmindedinourselectionofauthorsandtopics.Andwhilewehaveourownviews,wehaveletourcontributorspresenttheirsasforcefullyaspossible.

    ImimmenselyproudofthisbookandbelieveitwillbecomeoneofthedefinitiveexpositionsonmodernChina.Anditshouldbe,consideringthebreadthanddepthofthecontributingauthors,manyofwhomyouwillrecognizeandotherswhomyouwillbegladtohavemet.Takeaglanceatthelistofcontributingauthors(inalphabeticalorder),allfirstrateexpertsintheirfields:

    AndrewBatson,IanBremmer,ErnanCui,JasonDaw,AmbroseEvansPritchard,LouisVincentGave,DavidGoldman,MarkHart,NeilHowe,SimonHunt,GeorgeMagnus,JawadMian,LelandMiller,RaoulPal,MichaelPettis,SamRines,JackRivkin,NourielRoubini,GillemTulloch,LoganWright,andWeiYao.PlusanintroductionandeditingbyWorthWrayandyourhumbleanalyst.

    Likewhatyourereading?SubscribenowandreceivethefullversionofJohnMauldin'sThoughtsfromtheFrontlinedeliveredtoyourinboxeachweek.

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    Wenevershareyouremailwiththirdparties.

    Thebookisavailable(fornow)onlyinanebookformat.YoucangetitonAmazonKindle,iTunesBooks,andBarnes&NobleNook.Ifyouwanttoknowmoreaboutthebookandtheauthors,youcangotothispageonmywebsite.

    Amazingly,andthankfully,therehavebeenanumberofverypositivereviewsbeforeweveevenannouncedthebook.(Ithasbeenliveforafewdaysjusttomakesurethatallthetechnologywasworkingright.)

  • Andonelastdetail.Wehavesetthepriceofthebookat$8.99.Thatisnotatypo.Ifwetriedtodothebookinaprintformat,wewouldhavetosetthepricecloserto$50.Thereareatleast100fullcolorgraphsandchartsintheentirebook,anditwouldjustnotbethesametopublishtheminablackandwhiteformat.Attheendoftheletter,inmypersonalsection,IwillcommentontheprocessofselfpublishinganebookandhowonegoesaboutmarketinginthisbravenewInternetworld.Someofyoumightfindthosethoughtsinteresting,butfornowletslookatakeysectionfromtheintroductiontothebook:

    ThePeoplesRepublicofDebt

    ItsnosecretthatChinahasamassivedebtproblem.RaoulPal(Chapter1:TheresSomethingWronginParadise)warnedbackin2003thattherewassomethingamissinChinassuccessstory.Sincethattime,foreigncapitalchasingabullishgrowthstoryandnervouscentralplannersinBeijingactingtomaintainrapidGDPgrowthpost2008haveconjoinedtoenableoneofthelargestcreditboomsinhistory.

    AccordingarecentreportfromtheMcKinseyGlobalInstitute,Chinastotaldebtstockmorethantripledbetween2000and2007andnearlyquadrupledfrom2007to2014asprivatesectorandlocalgovernmentborrowersaddedmorethan$26trillioninnewdebt.ThatexplosionindomesticcreditliftedthecountrystotaldebttoGDPratiofrom121%in2000to158%in2007andto282%bytheendof2014andChinas$21trillioninnetnewdebtincurredbetween2007and2014accountedformorethan36%ofthe$57trillionincumulativeglobaldebtgrowthfollowingtheglobalfinancialcrisis.

    Byanothermeasure,theexplosivegrowthinChinasfinancialsystemisliterallyunprecedented,withtotalassets(outstandingloans)standingaround$27trillionorroughlyonethirdofglobalGDP.AccordingtoMedleyGlobalAdvisorsLoganWright,Chinasbankingassetshavegrownbyroughly$17trillionsince2008,whilenominalGDPhasgrownto$4trillion.AsWrightexplainsinChapter3(Deliquification&ChinasDeflationaryAdjustment),Therearenoavailablecomparisonsforacountryaddingaround20%ofglobalGDPinnewbankassetsoversuchashortperiodtheJapanesebankingsystempeakedataround20%ofglobalGDPintotalassets.AndweknowwhathappenedinJapan.

    Notonlyisthiskindofcreditboomunsustainable,itsalsoinherentlydestabilizing.Theharderandfasterthatcreditgrowthruns,thehigherthechanceofbroadbasedmisallocation,whicheventuallyexertsadragoneconomicactivityjustaspowerfulastheboostitprovidedinpreviousyears,andsometimesmoreso.AsGMTResearchsGillemTullochexplainsinChapter2(TheTyrannyofNumbers),Bubblesstartonthebackofvastquantitiesofcheapcredit,arefedbythecreationofevergreaterquantitiesofit,andcollapsewhenthetapsareturnedoff.

    ThismaximmayproveespeciallytrueforafinancialsystemlikeChinas,wherestateperpetuateddistortionsinthecostandavailabilityoffinancinghave(1)funneledhugeamountsofcapitaltowardincreasinglyunproductive,statefavoredfirms

  • and(2)pushedhouseholdandprivatebusinessborrowersliterallyintotheshadows(withtheveryrecentdevelopmentofthenowmassiveshadowbankingsystem),wheretheburdenofsubstantiallyhigherinterestratesdragsonhouseholdconsumptionandraisestheoddsofborrowerdefaults.

    NowthatChinasbankingsystemhasbecomedeliquified,thethreatofdeflationisloominginaveryrealway.

    AsChinascreditboomslows,theriskofborrowerdefaultsandtheburdenofbaddebtswillweighheavilyonthecountryslenders.Itsimportanttonotethatnoonereallyknowshowlargethatburdenistoday.Whiletheofficialnonperformingloan[NPL]ratioreportedbyChinesebankshasrisenby50%sinceearly2014,thecountrysregulatedlendinginstitutionscontinuetoclaimtheNPLsareonly1.54%ofallloans.

    Wehaveaveryhardtimebelievingthatnonperformingloansareonly1.5%(orevenlimitedtothehighsingledigits),consideringhowquicklythePeoplesBankofChinaloosenedcreditconditionsandmandateditsbankstolendwhentheglobalfinancialcrisishit.Underwritingstandardstendtogooutthewindowduringperiodsofstatemandatedrapidcreditgrowth,particularlyintimesofcrisis.

    Forexample,justlookatthechangeintotalsocialfinancinggrowthsince2005(redlinebelow)versusChinasbanklendingboomfrom1991to2004(blueline).Whilesomeanalystswouldarguetheeconomywasevenmorebeholdentothestatesectorinthe1990sandthatlendingpracticesthenwerefarlessefficient,wedoubtthatChinaslendershaveimprovedtheirunderwritingpracticestothepointthatnonperformingloanswoulddramaticallydifferbetweenthetwoepisodes.

    AsyoucanseeinthechartbelowfromTheEconomist,itiswidelybelievedthatChinasnonperformingloanratiopeakedsomewherebetween30%and40%bythelate1990salthoughsomeanalysts(likeSocieteGeneralesWeiYao)arguethatthetruenumberwasmorelike50%higherthanRussiasin1995,Chilesin1981,orMalaysiasin1997,andtwicethatofMexicosin1994.ThebottomlineisthatChinaslastcomparablelendingboomproducedanonperformingloanburdenatleast20xlarger(asapercentageoftotalloans)thanthefigureChineselendersarereportingtoday(andperhaps30x!).

  • IfyoutalkwiththemanagementatmajorChinesebanks,asChinaBeigeBookInternationalsLelandMiller(Chapters8and19)doesonaregularbasis,theyallconfessthatnonperformingloansareaMAJORprobleminChinabutaskifnonperformingloansareaproblemattheirparticularbanks,andthemanagersconsistentlyreportthattheirbanksareinperfecthealth.ThatdynamicisuncomfortablyreminiscentofJapaninthelate1980s,whichservesasachillingreminderthatmanageablerotwithinalargelystatecontrolledbankingsystemcanexplodeintohigherthanexpectedNPLsintheeventofarealcrisis.

    HereswhatLelandMillerhastosayaboutChinasNPLproblem:

    TheNPLsituationiscompletelyopaqueit'sthedeepestanddarkestofBeijing'sstatesecrets.Butwecanbeveryconfidentofafewthings:

    a.ThelevelofreportedNPLsiscompletelyunrealistic(take,e.g.,ChinaDevelopmentBank'ssub1%NPLlevelformanyyears...despiteaportfolioofborrowersthatincludesCentralAsiankleptocrats,unprofitableChineseSOEs[stateownedenterprises],Africansmallbusinesses,andLatinAmericanenergyplays)

    b.NPLlevelshavealwaysbeenkeptartificiallylowsimplybyrollingoverthedebt,sothatthedebtnevertechnicallybecomesnonperformingand

    c.NPLsarerecordedaspartofa5levelclassificationsystem,butthelevelsaresubjectquiteeasilytomassmanipulationsimplybytweakingtheparticularclassificationoftheloan.Ifyouhavetoomanylevel3loans,e.g.,thenjustmoveabunchofthemtolevel2asanadministrativematter.

    Withallthatinmind,theofficialNPLnumbersaresimplynotbelievableandthetrueburdenofbaddebtsmaynotbemanageable.

    WhileBeijinghadthewherewithaltocleanupitsbanksintheearly2000sbyrecapitalizingmajorlendersandshiftingthebadassetstoassetmanagementcompanies(AMCs),ithasntactuallyresolvedthebaddebts,evenaftermorethanadecade.AccordingtoTheEconomist,

    NPLs[theworstoftheworstbadloans]werehivedoffintofournewAMCs:Huarong,ChinaOrient,ChinaGreatWallandCinda.From1999to2004loansworthover2trillionyuan($242billion)weretransferred.Thoughmostlybad,theloanswereusuallysoldatfullfacevalue.Theywerepaidforwithtenyearbonds,backedbythefinanceministry,thattheAMCsissuedtothebigstateownedbanks.ButsincemostNPLsfailedtorecoverinthattime,thesebondswereextendedanotherdecade.Inshort,thebailoutisstillgoingon.WhattheAMCshavedonewiththeirassetsisunclear,astheyhavenotreleasedproperaccounts.SomeNPLshavebeensoldbutreportedlyatonly20%offacevalue.

    AcomparableNPLproblem(orevenatrueNPLrateonethirdofthesize)wouldbefarmoredifficulttomanagefifteenyearslaterbecause,whileChinasGDPhasgrownnearlyeightfoldsincetheyear2000,growthinbankingsystemassetshasdramaticallyoutstrippedthecountryseconomicgrowth.If,aswesuspect,NPLsarecloserto11%(ataminimum)thantotheofficial1.54%,Chinamayhaveamountainofbadloansequaltomorethan20%ofitsGDPandmaybemorethan40%ofGDP.Wearenowtalkingtrillionsofdollars.EvenforChina,thatisagreatdealofmoney.

    RecapitalizingChinaslenderswouldlikelyrequireamassivetransferoftoxicprivatesectorassetsdirectlyontothestatesbalancesheetandasweveseeninJapansincethelate1980sandacrossthedevelopedworldsince2008,majorpublicsectorbailoutstendtodragheavilyoneconomicgrowth(asdothelongertermheadwindsofChinasdemographicdecline,whichSaeculumResearchsNeilHoweoutlinesinChapter4:ACrisisLoomsinChina.)

    ButasLoganWrightexplainedtousrecently,Beijingdoesnthaveasmuchincentivetocleanupitsbankstodayasitdidintheearly2000s,withtheintenttoissuebankequitytotherestoftheworld.TheCCPleadershipismoreinterestedinmakingsuretheNPLsecretstayshidden.Fornow,theproblemremainsunconfronted,tothedetrimentofChinasfinancialsystem.AsLoganexplainsinChapter3(Deliquification&ChinasDeflationaryAdjustment),thebanksareforcedtopretendthatthismountainofbadassetsisperformingbutthatpretensedoesntchangethefactthatimpairedcashflowsfromthebanksloanportfolioswhatLogancallsdeliquificationareforcingmanyofthebankstoscrambletoborrowcashfromoneanotherorfromthePBoCjusttostayliquid.

    Itsarecipeforinevitabledeleveraginganddeflation,ifnotdisaster.

    ButtheproblemisnotfullycontainedwithinChinasregulatedbankingsystem.Wevealsoseensubstantialgrowthoverthepastfewyearsinshadowlending.Thesumsinvolvedcould,accordingtoNomuraSecurities,standatmorethan$3.5trillion.Alotoftheseloansmade

  • throughwealthmanagementproductsandtrustsareactuallyoffbalancesheetassetsofChinasbanks,butverylittleisknownabouttheirassetquality.Defaultsintheshadowscouldcastacloudofnegativeconfidenceontheentirefinancialsystem,whichinturnincreasestheriskthatBeijingcouldlosecontrol.

    Fornow,creditgrowthisslowingasChinasinherentlydeliqufiedbankingsystemscramblestostayliquid,anditishavingamaterialimpactoneconomicactivity.Asyoucanseeinthechartbelow,ChinasyearoveryearcreditgrowthisstilloutpacingthecountrysGDPgrowthratebutbothareslowingmaterially.AndsinceitdoesnotseempossibleforrapidcreditgrowthtocontinueformuchlongerwithouttriggeringsomenastyconsequencesinChinasfinancialmarkets,growthshouldslowsubstantiallymore.

    OurconcernatthisjunctureisthatamaterialslowdowninbothcreditgrowthandeconomicactivitydoesnotseemconsistentwithBeijingsimmediateplans.PremierLiKeqianghasadamantlymaintainedthatBeijingwillhitits7.1%growthtargetin2015andinsiststhattheStateCounciliscommittedtobothmanagingcreditgrowthandmaintainingmediumtohighspeedgrowthwhilemakingsurethattheChineseeconomyachievesamediumtohighlevelofdevelopment(intermsofrealGDPpercapita).AsformerUBSChiefEconomistGeorgeMagnusoutlinesinChapter10(TheContradictionattheHeartofChinasGrowthStrategy),thesegoalsareindirectcontentionwithoneanother.

    UntilPresidentXiJinpingandhisreformersmoveforwardwithmeaningfulreformstorebalanceChinaseconomytoahealthiergrowthmodel(whichwewilldiscussshortly,butsufficeittosayitwillrequireatleastasubstantialslowdowntoactuallywork),thereisnochanceofmaintaining5%+growth,muchlesstheStateCouncils7.1%GDPtarget,withoutrelyingoncreditexpansion.

    Thereinliestheproblem,asyoucanseeinthegraphbelowfromGMTResearchsGillemTulloch(Chapter2:TheTyrannyofNumbers).Chinasprivatesectoristakingonmoreandmoredebtwithlessgrowthtoshowforiteveryyear.Andasthatcreditmultipliercontinuestofall,moreandmorecreditgrowthwillbeneededjusttomeetBeijingstarget...oreventosupportagradualslowdownoverthenextseveralyears.

    Gillemelaborates:

    Inordertoachievethe7%[annual]realGDPgrowthtargetoverthenextfiveyears(20142018),thebankingsystemwillneedtocreate

  • RMB106trillion(US$17trillion)ofnewcredit.ThisassumesnominalGDPgrowthof9%[peryear]andbasedonthe2013creditmultiplierof0.3x.ThisistheequivalentofreplicatingthebalancesheetofCitigroupninetimesover.Moretothepoint,itmeansalmostreplicatingtheentirelistedUSfinancialsectorinjustfiveyears,afeatthattooktheworldsrichest,largestandmostsophisticatedeconomy200yearstoachieve[IfChinacontinuesatthisrate,]by2018itwillhavebuiltenoughnewapartmentsovertheprevious15yearstopotentiallyrehouse55%ofitspopulation[and]willcommand65%oftheworldscementproductionand59%ofitssteel.

    IfthecreditboomthatledtoanoutrightexplosioninChinasdebtfrom$2.1trillionto$28.2trillionin14yearswasunsustainable,thekindofcreditgrowthrequiredtomeettheChineseCommunistPartysgrowthtargetoverthenextfiveyearsisliterallyimpossible.ThisdynamiccouldsetupacrisisofconfidenceinthecomingyearsifBeijingdoesnotmateriallyloweritsgrowthtargetandtakeurgentstepstowardreformmovesthatrepresentamajorbutnecessaryriskforadangerouslyoverleveragedeconomy.

    Thatriskbegsthemostimportantquestionofall:isChinasdebtburdenmanageablewithoutdisastrousconsequences?Analystsbroadlydisagree,asyouwillseeinthisbook,butitsaconversationweneedhave.Theanswertothisquestionwillhaveaprofoundimpactonglobalgrowthandyourinvestmentportfolio.Therearefewmoreimportantquestionsinthemacroeconomicworld.

    Whatsmore,thereareNOexamplesofANYcountrysaddingbankingassetsasquicklyhasChinahasoverthepastseveralyearsandcertainlynotonthisscale.Therearesimplynogoodhistoricalprecedentsbutifwemakeasimplecomparisontothelargestfiveyeardebtboomsinmodernhistory,ChinasexplosivegrowthinTotalSocialFinancingfrom2009to2013(whencreditgrowthwasthemostintense)ranksinthetopfive.

    Lookingatasampleof43majoreconomiesoverthelast50years,IMFeconomistsGiovanniDellAriccia,DenizIgan,andLucLaevenfoundonlyfourothercasesofcomparablelendinggrowthandeachofthosecountriesexperiencedabankingcrisisand/orasharprecessionwithinthreeyearsoftheirrespectivebooms.

    Inotherwords,therearenocasesinmodernhistorywhereaneconomyhasmanagedtoavoidanoutrightbustafterexperiencingrapidlendinggrowthanywhereintheneighborhoodofChinasongoingcreditboom.None.Andevenifwelooktothe48instancesoverthelast50yearswherelendingmeasuresexpandedbyaslittleas30%overfiveyears(lessthanhalfthemagnitudeofChinascreditexplosion),thereisstilla50%chanceofabankingcrisisoranabruptfallingrowthduringthepostboomperiod.

    Moreover,themodelforatypicalcreditboom(outlinedinDellAriccia,Igan,Laeven,&Tongs2012paperPoliciesforMacrofinancialStability:HowtoDealwithCreditBooms)suggeststhatpainfulpostboomadjustmentstendtooccurwhenthepaceofcreditgrowthsimplycoolsbacktowarditslongtermmedian.ThatcoolingprocessisalreadywelladvancedinthePeoplesRepublic,whichmeanswehavetoconsiderwhatthelackofcheapandindiscriminatefundingwillrevealaboutthequalityofloans(andthevalueoftheunderlyingcollateralmostlyrealestatebutalsocommoditystockpiles)madeinpreviousyears.Itsnotaprettypicture.

    AsidefromtheclearandpresentdangerthateachofthesevulnerabilitiesposestoChinasfuturegrowth,thesituationinthePeoplesRepublicdoesstandoutfrompastcreditboomsinoneway.ThePeoplesRepublichassubstantialbuffersoratleasttheoutwardappearanceofbuffers,basedonofficialdatatosupposedlydefendagainstcapitalflight,absorbsuddenlossesinabankingcrisis,andcommuteahardlandingintoalongerperiodofsubduedgrowth(whichBeijingmightormightnotallowtobeshowninitsheadlineGDPfigures).AccordingtoofficialdatasanctionedbytheChinesegovernmentandoutlinedbytheIMFinitslatestannualChinastaffreport,Totalpublicdebtisrelativelylowpublicsectorassetsarelarge(includingforeignexchangereserves)domesticsavingsarehigh,andforeigndebtexposureslowcapitalcontrolslimittheriskofcapitalflightandthegovernmentretainssubstantialleverstocontroleconomicandfinancialactivity.

    Thelegitimacyandadequacyofthesebuffersinarealcrisisiscertainlyupfordebate,butitishardtoarguethattheChinesegovernmentdoesnothaveatleastsomeresourcestocontainanimminentcrisisandbuymoretime.

  • JudgingfromanIMFpodcastreleasedinAugust2014,thesebuffersareoneoftheonlyreasonsforoptimism,evenifBeijingdoesmaketheharddecisiontoexpediteitshighstakesreformagenda.ThoughtheIMFsChinamissionchief,MarkusRodlauer,isagenerallyoptimisticquasigovernmentstaffeconomist,hesclearlysoundingthealarm:

    Ourassessmentaftercarefulanalysisisthattheneartermriskofahardlandingreallyislow.Andwecometothisjudgmentbecauseweseeaneconomythatstillhassubstantialbuffersbothintermsoftherealeconomyandthewaythegovernmentcanmanagetheeconomyinthenearterm,andthereforepreventahardlanding....

    Bythesametoken,weneedtosaythatgiventhewaytheeconomyisgrowing,giventhewaytheriskshavebeenaccumulatingandarecontinuingtoaccumulateintheeconomy,unlessreformsareimplementedtoredirecttheeconomytoasomewhatsafergrowthpath,theriskofahardlandingwillcontinuetoincrease....Generallythesesortsofrapidcreditgrowthdoleadtoeitherabankingcrisisorasharpslowdownofgrowth[emphasisours].

    Ifpastperformanceispredictiveoffutureoutcomes,growthmiraclesbuiltoncreditboomsalwaysendthesameway.Anepicbustmaynotcomeasquicklyasitmighthaveotherwise,butabustwillultimatelybedifficulttoavoidifBeijingrefusestoacceptalastingslowdown.Broadbased,debtfueledoverinvestmentmayappeartokickeconomicgrowthintooverdriveforawhilebuteventuallydisappointingreturnsandconsequentsellingleadtoinvestmentlosses,defaults,andbankingpanics.Chinacandefyhistoryabitlonger,butnotforever.

    NewYork,Denver,Maine,andBoston

    TomorrowIleaveforNewYork,whereIwillspendthenextfourweeksworkingandtryingtoplaytouristwhenIcan.BusinessrequiresthatIspendamonthinManhattan,butIhavetoadmitthatIvealwayswantedtospendamonthinTheCityThatNeverSleeps,livinginoneoftheneighborhoodsandabsorbingthecultureandspendingsomewhatmorecasualtimewithfriends.Dutycalls,butIdontthinkitsgoingtobehardduty,evenforthisTexasboy.

    LaterinthemonthIwillgotoDenvertobewithmypartnersAltegrisInvestmentsataFinancialAdvisormagazineconferenceonalternativeinvesting,whereIseeIwillbewithmyfriendLarryKudlow.ThenIandmyyoungestson,Trey,willonceagaingotoGrandLakeStream,Maine,fortheannualCampKotok(a.k.a.TheShadowFed)migration.ThiswillbetheninthsummerthatTreyandIhavebeentothefishingandeconomicsfest.Heisnow21yearsold,anditwilltechnicallybelegalforhimtoparticipateinthewinedrinking,althoughafewofmyfellowfishereconomistshaveindulgedhimhereandthereovertheyears.LaterinAugustIintendtospendsometimewithWoodyBrockandotherfriendsinMassachusettsbeforeresumingmyperipateticwaysthisfall.

    ImentionedthatIwouldsayawordortwoaboutthequandariesofpublishingAGreatLeapForward?asanebook.Choosingatraditionalpublisherwouldofcoursegetmeareasonableadvance,andthereiscertainlynoassurancethatthisbookwillbringinthesamesortofincomewithoutaprintversion.Itmightsurprisereaderstoknowthatauthorsreallydontgetallthatmuchfromabooksoldbyatraditionalpublisherinanebookformat.Maybe10to15%.Technically,wewillbegetting70%.Isaytechnicallybecause

    (1)Wehavetoassumeallthecostofeditingandformatting,whichisnotinconsequentialifyouretryingtodoitright,whichistheonlywayIwilldoit.And,

    (2)Thisbookisactuallyfairlygraphicallydense.Andthevariousformats(Kindle,iTunes,andNook)actuallychargefortheextrabandwidththatittakestodownloadabookaboveafewmegabytes.Andbelieveme,weareaboveafewmegabytes.Dependingontheformatandthequantities,ourauthorssharecaneasilydropto50%.

    Alotofpeopleassumethattodaythemajorityofbooksaresoldasebooks.Nottrue.Whiletheebookformatisstillgrowing,therateofgrowthnowisnowherenearitstrajectoryinearlieryears.Therearealotofpeople(andIexpecttohearfromyou)whostillwanttheirbooksinphysicalform.Asonereviewersaid,hewishedhecouldunderlineanddogearthepages.

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    ButasaformerLudditewhothoughthewouldnevergiveuphisphysicalbooks,letmeofferthisthought.InowalmostalwaysrefusetoreadabookifIcantfinditonKindle.IcanstillhighlighteverythinginKindlewithmyfinger,makenotesinthemargins,anddocrossreferencesthatIcouldneverdoinprintedform.Further,andamazingly,AmazonoffersmeatabsolutelynocosttheabilitytocheckandcrossreferenceallofthosehighlightsonmypersonalAmazonKindlepage.Ithinkbackovermylast50yearsofbookreadingandrealizethatalltheparagraphsIunderlinedandnotesIwroteareessentiallylost.IfIdonthavethebookandcantrememberwhatpagesomethingwason,Icantfindit.Now,withKindle,IcanandIfindthatabilityremarkablyliberatingandempowering.WhileIdespairoverwhattimeandanimperfectmemoryhavecostme,IcannowspendapleasantafternoonreviewingmyhighlightsandnotesandremindingmyselfofwhatIthoughtwasimportantatthetime.

    AndsinceIcanreadonanyelectronicdevice(youdontneedaKindleoriPadorNook)andIcannowreadthesamebookonmultipledevices,Ienjoythefreedomofnothavingtocarry10poundsofbookswithmethroughanairportinordertohavesomethingtoread.

    Andsoletmeclose(itstimetohitthesendbutton)withablatantmarketingmoment:ifyouhaventalreadyembracedwhattechnologycandoforreaders,youshouldseeournewbookasyourimpetustolaunchyourforayintotheworldofelectronicbooks.Again,youcangetthebookatKindle,iTunesorNook,orcheckusoutatMauldinEconomics.

    Youaregoingtothankmenotlongafteryoubeginreading.AnddareIpointoutthat$8.99isnotahugepricetopayforexploringanewtechnology.Youcandownloadallthosebookappsonwhatevercomputerorotherdeviceyoumayhave.Forwhatitsworth,IhavemyKindleonmyiPhone,myiPad,andmybrandnewMSIcomputer.(Afewofyoumightbesurprisedatmychoiceofboxes,asMSIisahardcoregamingcomputerbutitjusthassomuchpowerpackedintosuchasmallformatthatIthoughttheextrafewhundreddollarswasworthit.Butthen,askmeagaininafewmonths.IthoughtmyMicrosoftSurfaceProtabletcomputerwasgoingtobeagoodinvestmentandithaditsadvantagesbutattheendofthedayIjustfoundittobetoounderpoweredformetoworkon.)

  • Haveagreatweek.Iseealotofpoliticsandfundinnersandwritinginmynearfuture.IdontwanttoeventhinkaboutthenextbookIllwrite,butIhavetoadmit,therearethreeorfourprojectsbrewinginthebackofmyhead.AtsomepointthissummerIwillhavetoletoneofthemintomyforebrain.Untilthen,IwillconcentrateonmyweeklyletterandgivingyouthebestofwhatIcomeupwith.

    YourehopingChinacanleapthechasmanalyst,

    [email protected]

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    Allmaterialpresentedhereinisbelievedtobereliablebutwecannotattesttoitsaccuracy.Opinionsexpressedinthesereportsmaychangewithoutpriornotice.JohnMauldinand/orthestaffsmayormaynothaveinvestmentsinanyfundscitedaboveaswellaseconomicinterest.JohnMauldincanbereachedat8008297273.