2013 supreme court labor jurisprudence

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JURISPRUDENCE ON LABOR STANDARDS AND LABOR RELATIONS 1 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

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Page 1: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

JURISPRUDENCE ON LABOR STANDARDS AND LABOR RELATIONS

1

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

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• LABOR STANDARDS:

• MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS SET BY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND OTHER ISSUANCES RELATING TO: WAGES, HOURS OF WORK, COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCES, AND OTHER MONETARY AND WELFARE BENEFITS, INCLUDING THOSE SET BY OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS

LABOR RELATIONS

• RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES

• MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NEGOTIATED, ADJUSTED AND ENFORCED

• INTERACTIONS AND PROCESSES ON HOW THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARE EXERCISED, HOW AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED, AND HOW WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIP IS ENHANCED

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EMPLOYEE

DIRECTLY HIRE

EMPLOYEE

HIRE THROUGH A

RECRUITMENT AGENCY

CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEE

ENGAGE A CONTRACTOREMPLOYER

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TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

1. Regular employment2. Casual employment3. Seasonal employment4. Probationary employment5. Project employment

6. Fixed-term employment

INDEFINITE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT

DEFINITE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT

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REGULAR EMPLOYEE

WHERE, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE TO THE CONTRARY:

1) THE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN ENGAGED TO PERFORM ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE IN THE USUAL BUSINESS OR TRADE OF THE EMPLOYER; OR

2) THE EMPLOYEE HAS RENDERED AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE, WHETHER SUCH SERVICE IS CONTINUOUS OR BROKEN, WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE IS EMPLOYED AND HIS EMPLOYMENT SHALL CONTINUE WHILE SUCH ACTIVITY EXISTS; OR

3) THE EMPLOYEE IS ALLOWED TO WORK AFTER A PROBATIONARY PERIOD.

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CASUAL EMPLOYEE

WHERE AN EMPLOYEE IS ENGAGED TO PERFORM A JOB, WORK OR SERVICE WHICH IS MERELY INCIDENTAL TO THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER, AND SUCH JOB, WORK OR SERVICE IS FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD MADE KNOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF ENGAGEMENT; PROVIDED, THAT ANY EMPLOYEE WHO HAS RENDERED AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE, WHETHER SUCH SERVICE IS CONTINUOUS OR NOT, SHALL BE CONSIDERED A REGULAR EMPLOYEE WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE IS EMPLOYED AND HIS EMPLOYMENT SHALL CONTINUE WHILE SUCH ACTIVITY EXISTS.

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SEASONAL EMPLOYEE

WHERE AN EMPLOYEE IS ENGAGED TO WORK DURING A PARTICULAR SEASON ON AN ACTIVITY WHICH IS USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE IN THE USUAL BUSINESS OR TRADE OF THE EMPLOYER.

PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE

Where the employee is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines the qualification of the employee for regular employment.

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PROJECT EMPLOYEE

WHERE THE EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN FIXED FOR A SPECIFIC PROJECT OR UNDERTAKING, THE COMPLETION OR TERMINATION OF WHICH HAS BEEN DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE.

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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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FARM WORKERS GENERALLY FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF SEASONAL EMPLOYEES. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT SEASONAL EMPLOYEES MAY BE CONSIDERED AS REGULAR EMPLOYEES. REGULAR SEASONAL EMPLOYEES ARE THOSE CALLED TO WORK FROM TIME TO TIME. THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMPLOYER IS SUCH THAT DURING THE OFF SEASON, THEY ARE TEMPORARILY LAID OFF; BUT REEMPLOYED DURING THE SUMMER SEASON OR WHEN THEIR SERVICES MAY BE NEEDED. THEY ARE IN REGULAR EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THEIR JOB, AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF TIME THEY HAVE WORKED.

JAIME N. GAPAYAO, vs.ROSARIO FULO, JUNE 13, 2013

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CONSIDERING THAT MCBURNIE, AN AUSTRALIAN, ALLEGED ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND SOUGHT TO CLAIM UNDER OUR LABOR LAWS, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR HIM TO ESTABLISH, FIRST AND FOREMOST, THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED AND DULY AUTHORIZED TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT WITHIN OUR JURISDICTION. A REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGNERS WHO INTEND TO WORK WITHIN THE COUNTRY IS AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT, AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE 40, TITLE II OF THE LABOR CODE.

Andrew James McBurnie Vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., . October 17, 2013.

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IN WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. GALERA, WE HELD THAT A FOREIGN NATIONAL’S FAILURE TO SEEK AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT POSES A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN SEEKING RELIEF FROM THE COURT.

CLEARLY, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE ON THE FAILURE OF MCBURNIE TO OBTAIN AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT, BY ITSELF, NECESSITATES THE DISMISSAL OF HIS LABOR COMPLAINT.

Andrew James McBurnie Vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers, Inc. and E. Ganzon, Inc., . October 17, 2013.

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1. THE UNION WILL RECEIVE 100% OF THE SEPARATION PAY BASED ON THE EMPLOYEES’ BASIC SALARY AND THE REMAINING 50% SHALL BE RELEASED BY MANAGEMENT AFTER THE NECESSARY DEDUCTIONS ARE MADE FROM THE CONCERNED EMPLOYEES;

2. BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RELEASE OF THESE BENEFITS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF THE CASE BY THE UNION WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION;

3. THE UNION UNDERTAKES TO SIGN THE QUITCLAIM BUT SUBJECT TO THE 2ND PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT.

PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013

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THE COURT IS UNCONVINCED.

AS CORRECTLY OBSERVED BY THE CA, THE SEPTEMBER 1999 QUITCLAIMS MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 AGREEMENT, TO WIT:

2. BOTH PARTIES AGREE THAT THE RELEASE OF THESE BENEFITS IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF THE CASE BY THE UNION WITH THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION;

3. THE UNION UNDERTAKES TO SIGN THE QUITCLAIM BUT SUBJECT TO THE 2ND PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT.

PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013

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THE LANGUAGE OF THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 AGREEMENT IS STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE USE OF THE TERM "SUBJECT" IN THE 3RD CLAUSE OF THE SAID AGREEMENT CLEARLY MEANS THAT THE SIGNING OF THE QUITCLAIM DOCUMENTS WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF A CASE WITH THE NLRC. HENCE, WHEN RESPONDENTS SIGNED THE SEPTEMBER 1999 QUITCLAIMS, THEY DID SO WITH THE REASONABLE IMPRESSION THAT THAT THEY WERE NOT PRECLUDED FROM INSTITUTING A SUBSEQUENT ACTION WITH THE NLRC.

PEPSI VS. MOLON, February 18, 2013

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The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled that the Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires employers to provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male workers. It must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men.

LABOR CODE

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There was no violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit provisions under Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines. As shown in the foregoing, the removal of the chairs was compensated by the reduction of the working hours and increase in the rest period. The directive did not expose the bottling operators to safety and health hazards.

OSHS

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The CBA between the Union and CCBPI contains no provision whatsoever requiring the management to provide chairs for the operators in the production/manufacturing line while performing their duties and responsibilities.

CBA

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Since the matter of the chairs is not expressly stated in the CBA, it is understood that it was a purely voluntary act on the part of CCBPI and the long practice did not convert it into an obligation or a vested right in favor of the Union.

CBA

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The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the chairs did not violate the general principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators’ working time was considerably reduced from two and a half (2 ½) hours to just one and a half (1 ½) hours and the break period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The bottling operators’ new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases their working time. A break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only one and a half (1 ½) hours is a just and fair work schedule.

JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY

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The operators’ chairs cannot be considered as one of the employee benefits covered in Article 100 of the Labor Code. In the Court’s view, the term "benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or privileges given to the employee with monetary equivalents.

PRINCIPLE OF NON-DIMINUTION

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Employment Contract

Service Contract

CONTRACTING AND SUBCONTRACTING

COMPANY

WORKER

(CONTRACTOR & SUBCONTRACTOR)

REGULAR EMPLOYEE

PROJECT EMPLOYEE

CASUAL EMPLOYEE

SEASONAL EMPLOYEE

PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEEFIXED-TERM EMPLOYEE

PRINCIPAL

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Employment Contract

Service Contract

ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ

JUNE 13, 2013

ALPS

WORKER

(CONTACT TOURS MANPOWER )

PRINCIPAL

Page 31: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it has substantial capital, investment, tools, and the like. While ALPS Transportation is not the contractor itself, since it is invoking Contact Tours status as a legitimate job contractor in order to avoid liability, it bears the burden of proving that Contact Tours is an independent contractor.

ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ

JUNE 13, 2013

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It is thus incumbent upon ALPS Transportation to present sufficient proof that Contact Tours has substantial capital, investment and tools in order to successfully impute liability to the latter. However, aside from making bare assertions and offering the Kasunduan between Rodriguez and Contact Tours in evidence, ALPS Transportation has failed to present any proof to substantiate the former's status as a legitimate job contractor. Hence, the legal presumption that Contact Tours is a labor-only contractor has not been overcome.

ALPS TRANSPORTATION vs. ELPIDIO M. RODRIGUEZ

JUNE 13, 2013

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BENIGNO M. VIGILLA, ALFONSO M. BONGOT, ROBERTO CALLESA, LINDA C. CALLO, NILO B. CAMARA, ADELIA T. CAMARA, ADOLFO G. PINON, JOHN A. FERNANDEZ, FEDERICO A. CALLO, MAXIMA P. ARELLANO, JULITO B. COST ALES, SAMSON F. BACHAR, EDWIN P. DAMO, RENA TO E. FERNANDEZ, GENARO F.CALLO, JIMMY C. ALETA, and EUGENIO SALINAS, Petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF CRIMINOLOGY INC. and/or GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 200094 June 10, 2013

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Employment Contract

Service Contract

PCCr

JANITOR AND JANITRESS

(MBMSI)PRINCIPAL

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FACTS

SOMETIME IN 2008, PCCR DISCOVERED THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF MBMSI HAD BEEN REVOKED AS OF JULY 2, 2003.

ON MARCH 16, 2009, PCCR, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, RESPONDENT GREGORY ALAN F. BAUTISTA (BAUTISTA), CITING THE REVOCATION, TERMINATED THE SCHOOL’S RELATIONSHIP WITH MBMSI, RESULTING IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEES OR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL UNDER MBMSI, EXCEPT ALFONSO BONGOT (BONGOT) WHO WAS RETIRED.

IN SEPTEMBER 2009, THE DISMISSED EMPLOYEES, LED BY THEIR SUPERVISOR, BENIGNO VIGILLA (VIGILLA), FILED THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPLAINTS FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT, BACK WAGES, SEPARATION PAY (FOR BONGOT), UNDERPAYMENT OF SALARIES, OVERTIME PAY, HOLIDAY PAY, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE, AND 13TH MONTH PAY AGAINST MBMSI, ATTY. SERIL, PCCR, AND BAUTISTA.

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FACTS

FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ______________, AS AND BY WAY OF SEPARATION PAY DUE TO THE CLOSURE OF THE COMPANY BROUGHT ABOUT BY SERIOUS FINANCIAL LOSSES, RECEIPT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED, I _______________, X X X FOREVER RELEASE AND DISCHARGE X X X METROPOLITAN BUILDING MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., OF AND FROM ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, DEMANDS, CAUSES OF ACTIONS, DAMAGES, COSTS, EXPENSES, ATTORNEY’S FEES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER, KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, IN LAW OR IN EQUITY, WHICH THE UNDERSIGNED HAS, OR MAY HEREAFTER HAVE AGAINST THE METROPOLITAN BUILDING MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL OR CRIMINAL, AND WHETHER OR NOT ARISING OUT OF OR IN RELATION TO MY EMPLOYMENT WITH THE ABOVE COMPANY OR THIRD PERSONS.

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QUITCLAIM AND RELEASE

THE NLRC AND THE CA CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RELEASES, WAIVERS AND QUITCLAIMS EXECUTED BY PETITIONERS IN FAVOR OF MBMSI REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF PCCR PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1217 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.

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NATURE OF LIABILITY

AS CORRECTLY POINTED OUT BY THE RESPONDENTS, THE BASIS OF THE SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL WITH THOSE ENGAGED IN LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING IS THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 106 OF THE LABOR CODE, WHICH IN PART PROVIDES: “IN SUCH CASES LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING, THE PERSON OR INTERMEDIARY SHALL BE CONSIDERED MERELY AS AN AGENT OF THE EMPLOYER WHO SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE WORKERS IN THE SAME MANNER AND EXTENT AS IF THE LATTER WERE DIRECTLY EMPLOYED BY HIM.”

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NATURE OF LIABILITY

SECTION 19 OF DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18-02 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), WHICH WAS STILL IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF THE SUBJECT DECISION AND RESOLUTION, INTERPRETS ARTICLE 106 OF THE LABOR CODE.

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NATURE OF LIABILITYTHE DOLE RECOGNIZED ANEW THIS SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF THE PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR WHEN IT ISSUED DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 18-A, SERIES OF 2011, WHICH IS THE LATEST SET OF RULES IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 106-109 OF THE LABOR CODE.

Page 41: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

CONSIDERING THAT MBMSI, AS THE LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTOR, IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE RESPONDENTS, AS THE PRINCIPAL EMPLOYER, THEN THE NLRC AND THE CA CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE RESPONDENTS’ SOLIDARY LIABILITY WAS ALREADY EXPUNGED BY VIRTUE OF THE RELEASES, WAIVERS AND QUITCLAIMS EXECUTED BY EACH OF THE PETITIONERS IN FAVOR OF MBMSI PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1217 OF THE CIVIL CODE WHICH PROVIDES THAT "PAYMENT MADE BY ONE OF THE SOLIDARY DEBTORS EXTINGUISHES THE OBLIGATION."

QUITCLAIM AND RELEASE

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BPI CASE, G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24,

2013

Whether or not the act of BPI to outsource the cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping functions to BOMC is in conformity with the law and the existing CBA.

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Employment Contract

Service Contract

BPI

EMPLOYEES

(BOMC)PRINCIPAL

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BPI CASE,

G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

It is to be emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal perse. It is an

exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the

management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere

with the exercise of judgment by an employer. In this case, bad faith cannot be

attributed to BPI because its actions were authorized by CBP Circular No. 1388,

Series of 1993 issued by the Monetary Board of the then Central Bank of the

Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas). The circular covered amendments

in Book I of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial

Intermediaries, particularly on the matter of bank service contracts. A finding of

ULP necessarily requires the alleging party to prove it with substantial evidence.

Unfortunately, the Union failed to discharge this burden.

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BPI CASE, G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

BPI stresses that not a single employee or union member was or would be dislocated or terminated from their employment as a result of the Service Agreement. Neither had it resulted in any diminution of salaries and benefits nor led to any reduction of union membership.

As far as the twelve (12) former FEBTC employees are concerned, the Union failed to substantially prove that their transfer, made to complete BOMC’s service complement, was motivated by ill will, anti-unionism or bad faith so as to affect or interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization.

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BPI CASE, G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

The Court agrees with BPI that D.O. No. 10 is but a guide to determine what functions may be contracted out, subject to the rules and established jurisprudence on legitimate job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting. Even if the Court considers D.O. No. 10 only, BPI would still be within the bounds of D.O. No. 10 when it contracted out the subject functions. This is because the subject functions were not related or not integral to the main business or operation of the principal which is the lending of funds obtained in the form of deposits. From the very definition of "banks" as provided under the General Banking Law, it can easily be discerned that banks perform only two (2) main or basic functions – deposit and loan functions.

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BPI CASE, G.R. NO. 174912, JULY 24, 2013

Thus, cashiering, distribution and bookkeeping are but ancillary functions whose outsourcing is sanctioned under CBP Circular No. 1388 as well as D.O. No. 10. Even BPI itself recognizes that deposit and loan functions cannot be legally contracted out as they are directly related or integral to the main business or operation of banks. The CBP's Manual of Regulations has even categorically stated and emphasized on the prohibition against outsourcing inherent banking functions, which refer to any contract between the bank and a service provider for the latter to supply, or any act whereby the latter supplies, the manpower to service the deposit transactions of the former.

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BERNARDO WAS EMPLOYED FOR ALMOST TWENTY-NINE

(29) YEARS5 BY THE METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) IN MAKATI CITY. HE WORKED AT THE MMDA AS LABORER, METRO AIDE AND METRO AIDE I.

SOMETIME IN FEBRUARY 2004, BERNARDO WAS DIAGNOSED WITH PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS (PTB) AND COMMUNITY ACQUIRED PNEUMONIA (CAP). ON MAY 13, 2004, HE WAS CONFINED AT THE OSPITAL NG MAKATI. HE WAS DISCHARGED ON MAY 19, 2004 WITH THE FOLLOWING DIAGNOSIS: ACUTE DIFFUSE ANTEROLATERAL WALL MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, KILLIPS IV-1, CAP HIGH RISK, PTB III AND DIABETES MELLITUS TYPE 2.6

ON JANUARY 15, 2005, BERNARDO WAS FOUND DEAD AT THE BASEMENT OF THE MMDA BUILDING.

GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

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GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

1. Myocardial infarction which caused Bernardo’s death cannot be said to have been aggravated by the nature of his duties. 2. There was no evidence showing that it was the performance of his duties that caused the development of myocardial infarction as it was a mere complication of diabetes mellitus, a non-occupational disease. 3. His heart ailment, therefore, cannot be considered an occupational disease.

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GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

To be sure, a reasonable mind analyzing these facts cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the risks present in his work environment for the entire duration of his employment precipitated the acute myocardial infarction that led to his death.

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GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

Based on the evidence on record, we find as the CA did, that the nature of Bernardo’s duties and the conditions under which he worked were such as to eventually cause the onset of his myocardial infarction. The stresses, the strain, and the exposure to street pollution and to the elements that Bernardo had to bear for almost 29 years are all too real to be ignored. They cannot but lead to a deterioration of health particularly with the contributing factors of diabetes and pulmonary disease.Bernardo had in fact been a walking time bomb ready to explode towards the end of his employment days. Records show that the debilitating effect of Bernardo’s working conditions on his health manifested itself several months before his death. As early as May 3, 2004, Bernardo was already complaining of shortness of breath and dizziness. From May 13 to 19, 2004, he had to be confined at the Ospital ng Makati and was diagnosed with acute myocardial infarction which caused his death on January 15, 2005 while he was at work.

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GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

With the resolution, it should be obvious that by itself, a heart disease, such as myocardial infarction, can be considered work-related, with or without the complicating factors of other non-occupational illnesses. Thus, the Court so ruled in Rañises v. ECC,20 where it emphasized that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for compensation.

Resolution No. 432 provides (as one of the conditions) that a heart disease is compensable if it was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.

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GSIS vs. ALCARAZ, FEBRUARY 6, 2013

As a final point, we take this occasion to reiterate that as an agency charged by law with the implementation of social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution – the ECC (as well as the GSIS and the SSS) – should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employees in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection to the accident or to the illness. This is what the Constitution dictates.

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TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER

• JUST CAUSE – REFERS TO A WRONGDOING COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEE ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY TERMINATE THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. 

• AUTHORIZED CAUSE - REFERS TO A CAUSE BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGING ECONOMIC OR BUSINESS CONDITIONS OF THE EMPLOYER.

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JUST CAUSES OF TERMINATION

• SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE BY THE EMPLOYEE OF THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF HIS EMPLOYER OR REPRESENTATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS WORK; 

• GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT BY THE EMPLOYEE OF HIS DUTIES; 

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• FRAUD OR WILLFUL BREACH BY THE EMPLOYEE OF THE TRUST REPOSED IN HIM BY HIS EMPLOYER OR DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE; 

• COMMISSION OF A CRIME OR OFFENSE BY THE EMPLOYEE AGAINST THE PERSON OF HIS EMPLOYER OR ANY IMMEDIATE MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY OR HIS DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES; AND 

• OTHER CAUSES ANALOGOUS TO THE FOREGOING.

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AUTHORIZED CAUSES

• INTRODUCTION OF LABOR SAVING DEVICE;

• REDUNDANCY

• RETRENCHMENT

• CLOSURE OR CESSATION NOT DUE TO SERIOUS BUSINESS LOSSES;

• DISEASE 57

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INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLAAugust 28, 2013

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not its Resolution dated January 14, 2013 should be reconsidered. Among others, IMI contends that to award Pionilla reinstatement and full backwages would not only be excessive and unfair, but would be contrary to existing principles of law and jurisprudence.

The motion for reconsideration is partly granted.

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INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLAAugust 28, 2013

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not its Resolution dated January 14, 2013 should be reconsidered. Among others, IMI contends that to award Pionilla reinstatement and full backwages would not only be excessive and unfair, but would be contrary to existing principles of law and jurisprudence.

The motion for reconsideration is partly granted.

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IN CERTAIN CASES, HOWEVER, THE COURT HAS CARVED OUT AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOREGOING RULE AND THEREBY ORDERED THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE WITHOUT BACKWAGES ON ACCOUNT OF THE FOLLOWING: (A) THE FACT THAT DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEE WOULD BE TOO HARSH OF A PENALTY; AND (B) THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS IN GOOD FAITH IN TERMINATING THE EMPLOYEE.

INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLAAugust 28, 2013

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IN THIS CASE, THE COURT OBSERVES THAT: (A) THE PENALTY

OF DISMISSAL WAS TOO HARSH OF A PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED AGAINST PIONILLA FOR HIS INFRACTIONS; AND (B) IMI WAS IN GOOD FAITH WHEN IT DISMISSED PIONILLA AS HIS DERELICTION OF ITS POLICY ON ID USAGE WAS HONESTLY PERCEIVED TO BE A THREAT TO THE COMPANY'S SECURITY. IN THIS RESPECT, SINCE THESE CONCURRING CIRCUMSTANCES TRIGGER THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON BACKWAGES AS ENUNCIATED IN THE ABOVE-CITED CASES, THE COURT FINDS IT PROPER TO ACCORD THE SAME DISPOSITION AND CONSEQUENTLY DIRECTS THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF BACK WAGES IN FAVOR OF PIONILLA, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ILLEGALITY OF HIS DISMISSAL.

INTEGRATED MICROELECTRONICS, INC., VS. ADONIS A. PIONILLAAugust 28, 2013

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UNDER THE FOREGOING STANDARDS, THE DISOBEDIENCE ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER COULD NOT BE JUSTLY CHARACTERIZED AS WILLFUL WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 296 OF THE LABOR CODE. HE NEITHER BENEFITTED FROM IT, NOR THEREBY PREJUDICED THE BUSINESS INTEREST OF RAPID MOVERS. HIS EXPLANATION THAT HIS DEED HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BENEFIT RAPID MOVERS WAS CREDIBLE. THERE COULD BE NO WRONG OR PERVERSITY ON HIS PART THAT WARRANTED THE TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE.

NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28, 2013

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FOR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE TO BE A GROUND, IT IS

REQUIRED THAT: (A) THE CONDUCT OF THE EMPLOYEE MUST BE WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL; AND (B) THE ORDER THE EMPLOYEE VIOLATED MUST HAVE BEEN REASONABLE, LAWFUL, MADE KNOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE, AND MUST PERTAIN TO THE DUTIES THAT HE HAD BEEN ENGAGED TO DISCHARGE.

NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28, 2013

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WILLFULNESS MUST BE ATTENDED BY A WRONGFUL AND PERVERSE MENTAL ATTITUDE RENDERING THE EMPLOYEE’S ACT INCONSISTENT WITH PROPER SUBORDINATION. IN ANY CASE, THE CONDUCT OF THE EMPLOYEE THAT IS A VALID GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER THE LABOR CODE CONSTITUTES HARMFUL BEHAVIOR AGAINST THE BUSINESS INTEREST OR PERSON OF HIS EMPLOYER. IT IS IMPLIED THAT IN EVERY ACT OF WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE, THE ERRING EMPLOYEE OBTAINS UNDUE ADVANTAGE DETRIMENTAL TO THE BUSINESS INTEREST OF THE EMPLOYER.

NATHANIEL N. DONGON, vs.RAPID MOVERS AND FORWARDERS CO., INC., August 28, 2013

Page 65: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

THE COURT HAS RULED, TIME AND AGAIN, THAT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, OR WHATEVER NAME IT IS CALLED, AS A MEASURE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IS ALLOWED ONLY IN INSTANCES WHERE THE EMPLOYEE IS VALIDLY DISMISSED FOR CAUSES OTHER THAN SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR THOSE REFLECTING ON HIS MORAL CHARACTER.

JEROME M. DAABAY, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INCAugust 19, 2013

Page 66: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

UNDER THE NEW POLICY, ONE OF THE GROUNDS IS THE "COMMISSION OF ACTS THAT BRINGS DISCREDIT TO THE COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION, ESPECIALLY, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, CONVICTION OF ANY CRIME, ILLICIT MARITAL AFFAIRS, SCANDALOUS ACTS INIMICAL TO ESTABLISHED AND ACCEPTED SOCIAL MORES.

ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., now known as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

Page 67: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

TO BE SURE, AN EMPLOYER IS FREE TO REGULATE ALL ASPECTS OF EMPLOYMENT. IT MAY MAKE REASONABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ITS EMPLOYEES WHICH BECOME PART OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT PROVIDED THEY ARE MADE KNOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE. IN THE EVENT OF A VIOLATION, AN EMPLOYEE MAY BE VALIDLY TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND THAT AN EMPLOYER CANNOT RATIONALLY BE EXPECTED TO RETAIN THE EMPLOYMENT OF A PERSON WHOSE LACK OF MORALS, RESPECT AND LOYALTY TO HIS EMPLOYER, REGARD FOR HIS EMPLOYER’S RULES AND APPLICATION OF THE DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY, HAS SO PLAINLY AND COMPLETELY BEEN BARED.

ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., now known as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

Page 68: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

WHILE RESPONDENT’S ACT OF ENGAGING IN EXTRA--MARITAL AFFAIRS MAY BE CONSIDERED PERSONAL TO HIM AND DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS ASSIGNED TASK AS BOOKKEEPER, ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE ACT WAS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY PETITIONER’S PERSONNEL POLICY AS ONE OF THE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, SAID ACT RAISED CONCERNS TO PETITIONER AS THE BOARD RECEIVED NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS FROM THE COOPERATIVE MEMBERS THEMSELVES ASKING FOR THE REMOVAL OF RESPONDENT BECAUSE OF HIS IMMORAL CONDUCT.

ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., now known as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., February 25, 2013

Page 69: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

BASED ON WHAT WE SEE IN THE RECORDS, THERE SIMPLY CANNOT BE A CASE OF GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY AGAINST MICHELLE. EVEN ASSUMING THAT SHE FAILED TO PRESENT A MEDICAL CERTIFICATE FOR HER SICK LEAVE ON MAY 8, 2000, THE RECORDS ARE BEREFT OF ANY INDICATION THAT APART FROM THE FOUR OCCASIONS WHEN SHE DID NOT REPORT FOR WORK, MICHELLE HAD BEEN CITED FOR ANY INFRACTION SINCE SHE STARTED HER EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY IN 1994. FOUR ABSENCES IN HER SIX YEARS OF SERVICE, TO OUR MIND, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED GROSS AND HABITUAL NEGLECT OF DUTY, ESPECIALLY SO SINCE THE ABSENCES WERE SPREAD OUT OVER A SIX-MONTH PERIOD.

CAVITE APPAREL, INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZFebruary 06, 2013

Page 70: 2013 Supreme Court Labor Jurisprudence

MICHELLE MIGHT HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF VIOLATING COMPANY RULES ON LEAVES OF ABSENCE AND EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE, STILL WE FIND THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IMPOSED ON HER UNJUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

CAVITE APPAREL, INCORPORATED, vs. MICHELLE MARQUEZFebruary 06, 2013

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GOD BLESS US ALL…

Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord , not for men.

Colossians 3:23