2012 - non-fideistic interpret 1

8/9/2019 2012 - Non-Fideistic Interpret 1

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A NON-FIDEISTICINTERPRETATION

OF IIILTIL IN PLUTARCH'SWRITINGS:

THE HARMONYBETWEENIIILTIL AND KNOWLEDGE

In this paper I would like to challenge the straightforward applicability

of modern categories such as "belief' in the study of ancient philosophers

such as Plutarch, and early Christians such as Paul. It seems possible that

the modern concept of "belief', the English rendition of1tlo-rlt;, is heavily

indebted to a particular Christianizing interpretation, that of Luther, who

took 1tlO"'t'lt; for the central notion in Christianity. His emphasis on faith

was then subsequently reinforced in Kantian philosophy, in which belief,

as the characteristic of religion, became opposed to knowledge, as the hall-

mark of philosophy.1 Contemporary philosophers also see "belief' as anti-

philosophical. The modern philosopher Alain Badiou, for instance, empha-

sizes the anti-philosophical nature of Paul's concept of1tlo-rlt; in terms of

proclamation and declaration. According to Badiou, Paul's "discourse is one

of pure fidelity to the possibility opened by the event. It cannot, therefore,

in any way (and this is the upshot of Paul's anti-philosophy) fall under the

remit ofknowledge".2 Yet, in some New Testament scholarship it has been

suggested that 1tlO"'t'It;also has an argumentative quality. This gives rise to the

question of whether Paul's terminology can be contextualized in the phi-

losophy of his time. Is the concept of1tlo-rlt; unique to Paul? Is it specifically

Christian? Do ancient philosophers contemporary with Paul use the term,

and if so, in what sense?

I Cf.the vies of Novalis and Von Baader, on whom seeU.Dierse, uGlauben und Wissen n",in]. Ritter (ed.), Historisches Worterbuch der Philosoph ie,3 (Basel 1974)648-649: 'Wie Novalis

fiihrt F. von Baader den Zwiespalt von Glauben und Wissen auf einen von der Reformation

verursachten ''Verfall" zurUck, der nur behoben werden kann, wenn zwischen Glauben und

Wissen wieder ein unormales und eintriichtiges Verhalten" hergestellt wird".

2 A. Badiou, Saint PauL Lafondation de l' universalisme (Paris 1997);idem, Saint Paul: The

Foundation of Universalism (trans!. by Ray Brassier; Stanford 2003) 45.


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This paper calls attention to the uneven approach to the interpreta-

tion of the terminology of1t[(rt"l~ and 1tl


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A different meaning, however, is found when rrlCT't'li) occurs in lists of

virtues, acquires the meaning of trust in a relational sense, or is even re-

garded as an act of "persuasion" in a rhetorical strategy. Most remarkable,

however, is the way in which Plutarch can also speak of "believing" in philo-

sophical statements (ConsoL ad ux. 611D)or "believing" that philosophers

such cfs Socrates were true philosophers-a belief which is founded upon

their alts, words and lives(DeALex.fort. 328B).Plutarch even talks of "belief'

in figures such as Homer and Pythagoras. Most relevant are those passages

in which Plutarch frequently emphasizes that "our belief (rrlCT't'li) in all our

notions, except those derived from the senses, comes from three sources:

myth, law, and rational explanation; so it is undoubtedly the poets, the legiS-

lators, and thirdly the philosophers who have been our guides and teachers

in what we think about the gods" (Amat. 763C). It is important to note that,

according to ancient philosophers such as Plutarch, belief is not by defini-

tion anti-philosophical, but only so if it remains on a mythological level.

According to Plutarch, faith needs to be rescued from the merely mytholog-

icallevel and strengthened with philosophical reflection (De aduLat. 3SF).

It is apparent that according to Paul's pagan contemporaries faith is not in

itself anti-philosophical; there are two kinds of belief, an "unskillful faith"

(literally an chE)(Voi) rrlCT't'li)and a "strengthened faith".5

First, then, I shall discuss those passages in Plutarch in which rrlCT't'li)seems

to acquire the meaning familiar to modem ears, of faith in a fideistic sense,

in other words, of an unfounded religious faith as opposed to knowledge.

In Plutarch's treatise on brotherly love, for instance, he argues, among

other things, how we should conduct ourselves towards a brother while our

parents are alive or dead:

After the father is dead, however, even more than before it is right for the

brother to cling fast to his brother's goodwill ... believing all the mythological

tales about the brotherly love of the Dioscuri (...xalmO"tEuovra TOle;T' ctt.AOle;ex folueOAoyoucTl1tEpl TWV~lo(jJ(6pwv tile; eplAa5EAep[ae;)and in particular the one

which relates that Polydeuces killed with a blow of his fist a man who whis-

pered to him something against his brother.6

5 Plu., Qu. cony. 72SC.

6 Plu., De frat. arnOT.483C.


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In this passage it seems clear that what one does with regard to mytho-

logical tales is "to believe them".

The same impression is given in another passage in Plutarch's essay On

Isis and Osiris, which talks about the hoi poLLoi("ordinary people"), whom

he describes as tiresome, and who delight in associating aspects of the gods

with particular phenomena in reality, either "1th the seasonal changes in

the surrounding atmosphere, or with the gro~ of the crops and seedtimes

and ploughing".7 Examples given by Plutarch are the burial of Osiris, which

is associated with the sowing of the grain and his coming to life when plants

begin to sprout, and the premature birth of Harpocrates by Isis at the time

of the first fruits.8 According to Plutarch:

When the people hear these things, they are satisfied with them and believe

them ('t"c&rcx yap ,h:ouovrl::~ &YCX1tWCTLJc:cxlmcrrl::uouo'lV), deducing the plausible

explanation directly from what is obvious and familiar.9

Clearly, then, it are hoi poLLoi who believe in things regarding the gods and

associate them with visible reality, which is explained with reference to the

world of the gods.

Again, another text on superstition seems to communicate that belief is

equivalent to superstition and opposed to atheism. Whereas belief is the

domain of the superstitious person, atheism is the domain of supposing,

thinking and opinion. As Plutarch writes:

The atheist thinks there are no gods; the superstitious man wishes there were

none, but believes in them against his will; for he is afraid not to believe.

(OuJc: O'(l::'t"CXlel::OU~l::lVCXl6 ael::O~, 6 at al::lO"laCX[J.lWVou ~OUM't"CXl,mcrrdl::l a' aJc:wv:


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of those who demand demonstration and proof regarding issues which

pertain to the gods. When one of the interlocutors in Plutarch's dialogue

On Love, a certain Pemptides, questions whether Love is indeed a god

and challenges Plutarch to hear from him "what criterion those who first

declared Eros to be a god had in mind when they made the statement",11

Plutart unleashes the following attack, as his son Autobulus relates in the

dialoga~:

"Pemptides", he said, "it is, I believe, a grave and dangerous matter that you

are broaching; or rather, you are altogether violating our inviolable opinion

regarding the godsl2 when you demand an account and proof of each of them

(flcXAAOV 5' OAWC; 'ta chdvl')'tcx KIVEIV 't"fjc; TrEpl eEWV M~l')C; ~v E)(OflEV, TrEpl EKcXCTrOl>

A6yol> aTrCXI'twv Kcxl aTr65EI~IV). Our ancient traditional faith is good enough

(apKEI yap ~ TrcX'tpIOC;KcxlTrCXAcxla TrlCTrIC;).It is impossible to assert or discover

evidence more palpable than this faith, 'Whatever subtle twist's invented by

keen wit' (E.,Ba.203). This faith is a basis, as it were, a common foundation,of reverence towards the godsl3 (aAA' E5pcx 'tIC; cxu't"l'j Kcxl ~cXCTIC;UCPECTrWCTCXKOIV~

TrpOC; EUCTE~EICXV);if confidence and settled usage are disturbed or shaken at a

single point, the whole edifice is enfeebled and discredited".14

Whereas Pemptides demands an account and proof (cbr6oEI~l~) of-the

actual divinity of-each of the gods, Plutarch wishes to stick to "the invi-

olable opinion (06~cx) regarding the gods which we hold", which he charac-

terizes as ~1((hPlO~ xcx11tcxAcxlcX1t[crtl~, "the ancestral and ancient faith", and

which functions, as he says, as what should be regarded as a common foun-

dation for piety.15 In this passage, 7t[O"Tl~ seems to acquire a strongly fideisticcolor. Pemptides is rebuked for questioning this ancient faith by his request

for proof and demonstration ofwhat, in Plutarch's mind, should be common

knowledge of the gods, in this case of the god of Love, Eros. Hence, Plutarch

asks Pemptides:

So what is to be gained by the use of argument (A6yoc;) to make our opinion

(a6~CX)16 regarding Zeus or Athena or Eros debatable or uncertain. Love is not

now requesting his first altar and sacrifice. He is no alien intruder from some

II Plu.,Amat. 7s6A.

12 W.e. Helmbold, Plutarch's Moralia, IX (Cambridge 1969) 347, confusingly and ratheranachronistically, reads "our inviolable belief in the gods".

13 Helmbold, Plutarch's Moralia, IX,347,translates eusebeia as "religion", thus pushing the

virtue of piety into a specific religious post -Kantian domain.

14 Plu.,Amat. 7s6A-B.

15 On Plutarch andpatrios pistis, see Frazier, "Platonisme etPatrios pistis".

16 Helmbold, ibid. again translates a6~~as "belief': "Sowhat is to be gained by the use of

argument to make our belief in Zeus or Athena or Eros debatable or uncertain?"


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barbaric superstition (EX 'tlVO~ ~cxp~cxpllcri~ aElO"lacxq..tOV(cx~)... He does not ...

smuggle himself in to reap a harvest of honours to which he has no rightY

In other words, the reverence for Eros is not newly invented but is respect-

able and ancient, is distinguished from barbaric superstition and should, for

these reasons, need no additional proof. Demanfing such proofs, Plutarchargues against Pemptides, is a sign of one's soph*ic inclinations:

.1.

If you are going to demand a proof ('tEXI..l~PlOV)18 of each one of them [Le., of

each one of the gods], probing every temple and attacking each altar with

sophistic assault, not a god will you exempt from malicious prosecution and

inquisition. 19

Moreover, if one questions the existence of the gods and interprets them in

terms of virtues and other qualities which they symbolically embody (as do

the Stoics, according to Plutarch), the request for additional proofs is even

a sign of atheism:

You surely perceive the abyss of atheism that engulfs us if we list each several

god on a roster of emotions, functions, and virtues.2o

Plutarch's defense of the n&-rploc; xed mXAomx nl


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the reverence and faith (1t[crnc;) implanted in nearly all mankind at birth,

opening wide the great doors to the atheistic throng, degrading things divine

to the human level, and giving a splendid licence to the deceitful utterances

of Euhemerus ofMessene.22

Interestingly, whereas Plutarch defends the faith (1tlcrt'l~) which is "im-plantedl,in nearly all mankind at birth", he criticizes Euhemerus for erect-

ing a 8.1:Jlwman for his Euhemeristic interpretation by first developing an

incredible, untrustworthy (&1tlcrro~)mythology which he subsequently sets

out to criticize:

... Euhemerus of Messene ... of himself drew up copies of an incredible and

non-existent mythology, and spread atheism over the whole inhabited earth

by obliterating the gods of our belief and converting them all alike into

names of generals, admirals, and kings, who, forsooth, lived in very ancient

times and are recorded in inscriptions written in golden letters at Panchon,

which no foreigner and no Greek had ever happened to meet with, save only

Euhemerus.23

In this way the trustworthy 1t[crrl~ of ancient tradition is contrasted with

the incredible, untrustworthy, tendentious inventions of Euhemerus. Nev-

ertheless, this seems to be the only justification which Plutarch appears to

give for his otherwise apparently fideistic notion of 1t[crrl~.Yet other pas-

sages make clear that his understanding of1t[crrl~ is rather more subtle than

meets the modern, anachronistic, post-Kantian eye. As is clear in some of

the passages discussed above, and which is rendered even more clearly in afurther passage not yet discussed, Plutarch takes care to distinguish 1t[crrl~

from mere superstition (OElCTlOOU/-lOV[cx) and uses it effectively as a synonym

for ~ 1tEpl eEWV o6~cx ("the opinion regarding the gods"). In his treatise That

Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, Plutarch has Aristode-

mus arguing against the Epicureans, claiming that their theory, although

removing the anxiety caused by superstitious fear of the gods, "allows no

joy and delight to come to us from the gods".24 Instead, Aristodemus states:

... itis better that our opinion about the gods(~m;pl SEWV a6~cx) should include

an intermixture of a certain emotion that is part reverence and part fear, thanthat, by trying to escape this, we should leave ourselves no hope of divine

favour, no confidence in prosperity, and in adversity no refuge in God. Now

we should, I grant you, remove superstition (OElCTlOCXlflovicx)from our opinion

about the gods (~ 1tEpl SEWV o6~cx) like a rheum from the eye; but if this proves

22 PIu., De Is. 359F-36oA.

23 PIu., De Is. 36oA.

24 PIu., Non pass. nolA.


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impossible,we shouldnot cut awayboth together (IlYJOE't"uqlAoilv n1v n:((J"["lV,~v01 n:AE'l(J"["olm:pl (JEWVEx0uow), and blind the faith (n:((J"["lC;)that most men havein the gods.25

In this passage it is Plutarch's clearly stated intention to distinguish between

superstition on the one hand, and opinion about and belief in the godson the other. Using the imagery of eye surg~ during which rheum is

removed, he states that if it is impossible to ~rry out such an operation,

care should be taken against drastic action by which not only the rheum

(that is, superstition) is removed, but the eye itself (that is, faith or belief in

the gods) is severely damaged and blinded.

In the various passages discussed above Plutarch shows himself very pro-

tective of faith, both against Euhemeristic and Epicurean ways of thinking.

Although superstition should ideally be separated from belief in the gods,

Plutarch, in the interest of faith, is reluctant to emphasize this too stronglyas faith may also fall victim and become seriously wounded. However, in

other contexts in which Plutarch is not so deeply involved in anti-Epicurean

polemics, he is indeed interested in purging belief and saving it from false

and fabulous representations of the gods in poetry. In this way it is possible

to strengthen faith:

... just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against cheapand harmful poems the sayingsand maximsof men of repute and statesmen,we were indUcinga revolt and revulsion of faith (n:((J"["lC;) from such poetry,

so whenever we find any edifyingsentiment neatly expressed in the poetswe ought to foster and amplifyit by means of proofs and testimonies fromthe philosophers ... Forthis is right and useful,and our faith gains an addedstrength and dignity (laxuv njc; n:L(J"["EWC;)(cxl cX~(wIlCXn:pocrAcxll~cxvoual')C;) when-ever the doctrines of Pythagorasand of Plato are in agreement with what isspoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school ...26

Apparently, according to Plutarch it is possible for faith to acquire "added

strength and dignity". Although he defends "the ancestral and ancient faith"

in a rather fideistic way, over against those who demand proof of the gods,

at the same time his actual concept of faith appears to allow for additional

strengthening. Indeed, as we shall see, in Plutarch's view there are two kinds

of faith: misfounded and strengthened faith.

25 Plu., Non poss. 110lB-C.

26 Plu., De adulat. 3SE-F.


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It is stated or implied in several passages that faith takes two forms. For

example, in Table-Talks, Plutarch refers to a particular story as EV'tl 'tWV

Elldj 1tE1t!O''tEUj.lEVWV("one of those stories that gain credence without goodgroun~").27 Apparently some things gain credence and are believed on

good gJ'bunds, while others are believed without good grounds. Hence, faith

may be' justifiable or not. Similarly, in his Dinner of the Seven Wise Men,

Plutarch has someone say that "a good many things, come to be believed

quite contrary to fact" (1tOAAa ... 1t!O"t'EUE'tCXltj;EU5wC;).28Consequently, it is also

possible to induce firm belief in one's cause, or fail to do so. For example,

in the context of his discussion of ill will in the writing of history, Plutarch

distinguishes between sophists and true historians; whereas the former "are

not really inducing any firm belief in their cause (OUyap Ej.l1tOlOUO'I1tlO"t'IVIOXUpcXv1tEpi'tOU1tPayj.lcx'tOC;)and ... may even admit that they are trying

to startle people by a defense of the incredible", the historian "declares as

true what he knows to be the case and, when the facts are not clear, says

that the more creditable appears to be the true account rather than the less

creditable".29 The point for our present discussion is that Plutarch does not

take 1tlO"t'lC;in a fideistic sense to the extent that everyone can claim that

his 1tlO"t'IC;is as good as that of everyone else, but differentiates between

1tlO''tlC;which is strong (loxup&) and 1tlO"t'lC;which lacks this quality. Hence,

there are two forms of 1tlO"t'IC;,strong belief and, by implication, weak belief.Elsewhere in his writings Plutarch explicitly calls the latter an ChE)(VOC;1tlO"t'lC;,

"an unskillful, unprofessional, or unsystematic faith",30 rendered in the Loeb

translation as "a layman's faith".3J The topic of the passage in question is very

specific, but what is important is that in this section it appears possible to

bolster this "layman's faith" with the confirmation of a specific, professional

experience. The background to this notion of ChE)(V0C;1tlO"t'IC;is Aristotle's

rhetorical theory, in which he differentiates between ChE)(V0C;1tlO''tlC;-proofs

which are not invented by the orator-and proofs which are. According to

Aristotle:

... rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion

on almost any subject presented to us ... Of the modes of persuasion some

27 Plu., Qu. conl'. 624A.

28 Plu., Sept. sap. conl'. 151F.

29 Plu., De Her. malig. 855E-F.

30 Plu., Qu. conl'. 725B.

31 E.L. Minar, Plutarch's Moralia, IX (Cambridge 1969) 155.


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are technical, others non-technical ('rwv aE nlcT'rE:wv exi flEV eX'rE)(VOlIdcm exi a'

Ev'rE)(VOl).By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker

but are there at the outset-witnesses, evidence given under torture, written

contracts, and so on. Bythe former I mean such as we can ourselves constructby means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the

other has to be invented.32

This rhetorical concept of ChEXVO~ 1t(crrl~ is no..J applied by Plutarch in a

wider sense of "a layman's faith", which can still be bolstered by an addi-

tional argumentation.33 This is indeed how we have come to understand

Plutarch's notion of 1t((""Cl~. Contrary to the first impression given by some

passages, which seemed to suggest, when read in a post-Kantian light, that

Plutarch's understanding of1t(crrl~ is rather fideistic, on closer scrutiny Plu-

tarch appears to be of the opinion that it is possible for the right, justifiable

kind of faith to gain "an added strength and dignity" and to be bolstered

by further argumentation. What is already noticeable in various passagesis that 1t(crrl~ has such an argumentative potential that it can also be trans-

lated as "persuasion". This is also the case for Aristotle's rhetorical theory, in

which Evt'EXVOl1t(crt'El~ and Ctt'EXVOl 1t(crrEl~ are "proofs" which are or are not

invented by the speaker, respectively.

It is apparent from Plutarch's writings that 1t(crrl~ has such an argumenta-tive potential that, if successful, and contrasted with mere opinions, it can

also be translated as "persuasion". In his essay Concerning TaLkativeness,

Plutarch censures chatterers, who "keep their mouths without lock or door",

and hence:

... appear to regard speech as the least valuable of all things. They do not,

therefore, meet with belief, which is the object of all speech C08EV ~UaE nlCTtW

E)couaw ~~ 1t(X~A6yo~ Ecp1E'rexl).For this is the proper end and aim of speech,

32 Arist., Rh. 13SSb3S;See 137Sa22.The notion is also applied by Philo in De spec. leg. 4.40.

33 A similar wider application occurs in Numenius, fro26.84-90 (apud Eus., PE 14.7.12):

"And Lacydes for a while was at a loss, seeing that the support of his own doctrines was of

no help to him; and thinking that, if he could not convict them, everything he had would

be upset, he fell into perplexity, and began to cry out upon his neighbours and upon the

gods, Oh! Oh! and Alas! Alas! and By all the gods, and By the goddesses, and all the other

artless affirmations of men who in cases of distrust take to strong language (((/,ACtlTEeaCH

EVdtmaT(CXl~IlElVOAOyOUflEVWVE!atV((TE)(\IOlTdaTEl~)-alithese were uttered with loud shouting

and asseveration". Trans. E.H. Gifford, Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae praeparationis libri XV

(Oxford 1903).


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to engender belief in the hearer (,0 yap olxElovcxu,oil,EAO~,oil,' ECT'rl,1tlCT't"lV

EVEpycXO'cx0'8cxl'Ol~ aXOUOUO'lV).But chatterers are disbelieved even if they are

telling the truth (a1tlO"rOilv-rCXI5' OtAeXAOl,xiXvcXA}}8EUWO'LV).For as wheat shut

up in a jar is found to have increased in quantity, but to have deteriorated

in quality, so when a story finds its way to a chatterer, it generates a large

addition offalsehood and thereby destroys its credit (w5lCXcp8dpEl-rYjV1tlO"rlv).34, ,

In this Jt>assage, nlO"tlC; is indeed concerned with the rhetorical act of per-

suading and being persuaded. It is about meeting with belief, engendering

belief in the hearer or, conversely, about credit being destroyed. In this light

the following passage from Plutarch's anti-Epicurean Reply to Colotes is also

relevant. Here Plutarch also quotes from the Proem of Parmenides' well-

known hexameter poem, in which Truth is sharply contrasted with "the

opinions of mortals, in which there is no true persuasion".35 The goddess

Dike addresses Parmenides as he approaches her on his heavenly journey:

Young man, you who come to my house in the company of immortal char-

ioteers with the mares which bear you, greetings. No ill fate has sent you to

travel this road-far indeed does it lie from the steps of men-but right and

justice. It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart

of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no 1tlO"rl~

cXA}}8~~,no true reliance.36

According to Plutarch, who quotes from this Proem, the criteria of Par-

menides' world-view are:

"The unerring heart of most persuasive Truth" which deals with what isintelligible and forever unalterably the same, "And man's beliefs, that lack all

true persuasion" because they consort with objects admitting all manner of

changes, accidents, and irregularities.37

As in the previous passage from Plutarch's Concerning Talkativeness (S03D),

nla-,lC; acquires the meaning of persuasion, reliance and trustworthiness.

All these meanings revolve around the centrality of trust, which is the best

way to render nlO"tlC; in various passages. "Persuasion" and "trust" appear

to be closely related because they are realized in relationships: people

are persuaded and are persuasive because they trust and are trusted; andvice versa, they trust because they have been persuaded by someone's

34 Plu., De garr. 503D.

35 Plu., Adv. Cof. 1114D-E.

36 Translation by S. Kirk - J.E. Raven &M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: a Critical

History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge 21983), fro 288 (B. Einarson & Ph.H De Lacy,

Plutarch's Moralia, XIV [London-Cambridge 1967] 233 translate "no true persuasion").

37 Plu., Adv. Col. 1114D-E.


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trustworthiness, for example on the authority of someone's great wisdom.

This we can we deduce from the following examples.

5. IIf(JTl~ in the Sense of Trust

,

That Tt[o-rl~is about trust which is realized in rt$tion to other people who

appear to be trustworthy, transpires readily fr~m a passage in Plutarch's

Dinner of the Seven Wise Men, which quotes the following remark from

Thales ofMilete:

... Thales is responsible also for this sage remark, that one should not believe

enemies, even about things believable, and should believe friends even about

things unbelievable (OEl "rOLe;flEV E)(SpOle; xiXl1tEpl "rwv ma-rwv eXma-rElv, "rOLe;oE

cplAOle;xiXl "reXama-riX ma-rEuElv).38

The concept of Ttl


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Homer's very great wisdom here is something which persuades people to

trust him and to be persuaded by him. In this way persuasion and trust are

closely linked and this variety of meanings which Tela-Tll;acquires shows that

Plutarch does not understand it in a fideistic sense, as something like blind

faith. As we have seen thus far, Tela-Tll;is something which can be further

strengltlened and it is part of a process of persuasion and trust. It comes

as no ~rprise then, that in Plutarch's view there is no innate opposition or

tension between Tela-Tll;and philosophy.

Indeed, if Tela-Tll;is not a fideistic notion but is about persuasion and trust,

there is nothing to impede its application to philosophical contexts. A very

moving example of such an application is found in Plutarch's Consolation to

hisWife, written on the occasion of the death of one of their children, Timo-

xena. Plutarch, being absent from home, writes instructions to his wife and,

although fully confident of his wife's strength, sketches the possible intru-

sion of two different groups. Firstly, he mentions the "pernicious women"

who might attempt to visit the bereaved, uttering cries and lamentations,

"adding fire to fire".42Secondly, he mentions the Epicureans, whose solace

is their message that death is nothing to humanity but the dissolution of

which human beings are unaware. Plutarch tells his wife that she is neither

susceptible to the influence of the "pernicious women", nor to that of the

Epicureans:

You doubtless hear the statements of that other set, who win many to their

way of thinking when they say that nothing is in any way evil or painful to

"what has undergone dissolution" (Kedfl~Vex TWV&..wv ,h:ouElt;,0'1m:leouC7l1CoA-

AOUl;AiYOVTEI,;WI,;ouaEvouaafln Tc'l>alaAUeEV['l>c:a>c:ov~UaEAU101poVtC7m); I know

that the teaching of our fathers and the mystic formulas of the Dionysiac rites,

the knowledge of which we who are participants share with each other, pre-

vent you from believing them (ola' OTl>C:WAUEIC7E1C!C7TEUElV0 mXTplOI,;AOyOI,;>c:al

TeXflUC7Tl>C:eXcrUfl~OAaTWV1CEpl-rov~lOVUC70V6pYlaC7flwv,ex

crUVlC7flEVcX"~AOII,;01>C:Ol-VWVOilVTEI,;).43

Highly relevant to our topic is that Plutarch describes the adherence to a

philosophical position such as that of the Epicureans in terms of believing.

Despite the attempt of the Epicureans to persuade others of their view

42 PIu., ConsoL ad ux. 6lOB-D.

43 PIu., ConsoL ad ux. 611D.


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of death, Plutarch's wife, he asserts, cannot believe them. Philosophical

convictions, thus, are a matter of persuasion and belief. Similarly, at the end

of his letter to his wife Plutarch also describes their own adherence to the

Platonic view of death as something they "believe in". Havingjust invoked

the laws which according to Plutarch:II

... forbid us to mourn for infants, holding it i~piety to mourn for those who

have departed to a dispensation and a regiffn too that is better and moredivine44 .

And since this is harder to disbelieve than to believe (E1tEl 8ETO cX1tl


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linked with the realm of the dead and the expectation of an afterlife. It is

for this reason that Plutarch mentions the Dionysiac mysteries in his con-

solatory letter to his wife. The experiences of these mysteries, apparently,

strengthen their philosophical convictions and beliefs. Also relevant in this

context is what Plutarch says elsewhere about the initiation into the mys-

teries ib relation to an assurance about the existence of an afterlife. Those

initiat~lI into the mysteries become convinced that there is an afterlife, and

enriche'd by this experience they also become aware that the uninitiated

masses do not believe in this other world. They are characterized (X7tlCT'Tl~

1'WV EXEl cXyiXeWV (by a lack of belief in the blessings of the other world):

... he surveys the uninitiated, unpurified mob here on earth, the mob of

living men who, herded together in mirk and deep mire, trample one another

down and in their fear of death cling to their ills, since they disbelieve in the

blessings ofthe other world.46

Both passages thus make it clear that the mysteries are concerned with an

experience of the existence of an afterlife, that the non-acceptance of this

is called CX7tlCT'TliX (unbelief), and that the initiation into the mysteries can

dissuade one from believing in the Epicurean view of death. In this way,

belief, mysteries and philosophical conviction are mingled in a way which

cannot be easily disentangled through a post-Enlightenment approach.

Plutarch applies the notion ofnlCT'Tll; not only with regard to the Platonic-

Epicurean controversy regarding the afterlife, but also in very different

philosophical discussions. This notion is also at stake when the very ques-tion of who qualifies as a true philosopher is discussed. Plutarch raises this

question in his oration On the Fortune or the Virtue of ALexander. Accord-

ing to Plutarch, the criterion with which to answer this question does not

concern whether someone has written something:

... it is obvious that Alexander wrote nothing ... And yet even Pythagoras

wrote nothing at all, nor did Socrates, nor Arcesilaiis, nor Carneades, who

were all most notable among philosophers ...Whence, then, comes our belief

that they were true philosophers? (TCOSEV ouv E1ClCi't'EUS}jCTIXV EXElvOI CPIAOCTOCPEIV;)

Surely from what they said, or from the manner of life which they led, orfrom the principles which they taught (acp' wv ElTCOV ~ acp' wv E~[WCTIXV ~ acp' wv

EO[OIX~IXV). Bythese criteria let Alexander also be judged! For from his words,

from his deeds, and from the instruction which he imparted, it will be seen

that he was indeed a philosopherY

46 Plu.,fr.178 (apud Stobaeus 4.52-49).

47 Plu.,De Alex.fort. 328A-B.


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Thus, the claim that someone is a true philosopher is a matter of belief

and trust, neither ofwhich are blind, but rather are dependent on the words,

deeds and instruction of such men. This very much reminds us of those

passages in which Plutarch talks of believing in Homer on account of his

great wisdom.48

Against this background, I would suggest that the manypassages in Paul's writings about "belief in Christ" should not be taken to

reflect a specifically religious belief in Christt'kather, what is at stake here

is the trustworthiness of a particular figure as 'reflected in his words, deeds

and instruction.49

Finally, within a philosophical context, Plutarch also discusses the issue

of 7t[(rn~ when he explicitly focuses on the compatibility of 7t[O',l~and

philosophy. We have already gained an impression of this discussion from

a passage discussed above, in which Plutarch stated that "our faith gains

an added strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and ofPlato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre

or studied at school".50As we have seen, this is part of Plutarch's strategy

to save faith from the fables about and misrepresentations of the gods in

poetry. It is Plutarch's intention "to induce a revolt and revulsion of faith

from such poetry" (3SF). Through this process, faith is strengthened and

acquires further dignity. This discussion of the relationship between poetry,

faith and philosophy also comes to the fore in other passages, among others,

in his On Love. As we have seen, Plutarch criticizes Pemptides here for

questioning the divinity of Eros and accuses him of "altogether violatingour inviolable opinion regarding the gods when you demand an account

and proof of each of them".51According to Plutarch, "our ancestral and

ancient faith is good enough" and "a basis, as it were, a common foundation

48 See Plu., Qu. conv. 627E; Sept. sap. conv. 164D.

49 This is also apparent in the gospels, which, as examples of the genre of ancient biogra-

phies, are concerned with portraying the words, deeds and instruction of Jesus. This holds

particularly true for the Gospel of Matthew which, as an example of a specific hermeneuticalancient biography shows the mutual confirmation and coherence ofJesus' words and deeds.

According to Matthew, such harmony is missing from the Pharisees, who reveal themselves

to be hypocrites. For the gospels as ancient biographies, see C.H. Talbert, What Is a Gospel?:

The Genre of the Canonical Gospels (Philadelphia 1977); C.H. Talbert, "Biography, Ancient",

Anchor Bible Dictionary, 1 (1992) 745-749 at 748 and 749 on Matthew and the hermeneuti-

cal function of some ancient didactic biographies; R.A. Burridge, What Are the Gospels?: A

Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography (Grand Rapids 22004). For the similar intentions

of Paul and the gospel writers in emphasiZing the trustworthiness and exemplarity of Christ

in his words and deeds, see particularly Burridge, What Are the Gospels, 305-306.

50 Plu.,De adulat. 35F.

51 Plu.,Amat. 756A-B.


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of reverence towards the gods",52 which should not become debatable or

questionable because of sophistic and atheistic inquisitions.53 Although, as

noted above, Plutarch's notion of 1tlcrnc; seemed to be rather fideistic here,

this impression was not confirmed by our exploration of other passages in

Plutarch's writings. Moreover, further on in his On Love,Plutarch shows that

his vie~s on 1ticrrlc; are compatible with particular philosophical positions.

Accori\ng to Plutarch:

... our belief (nlcrnc;) in all our notions, except those derived from the senses,

comes from three sources: myth, law, and rational explanation; so it is

undoubtedly the poets, the legislators, and thirdly the philosophers who have

been our guides and teachers in what we think about the gods. They are alike

in stating that gods exist; but they hold widely varying views about their num-

ber and rank, as well as their nature and function. 54

Plutarch adduces this argument because, despite their divergence, all three

factions, as he calls them, agree about the divinity of Eros. In this way,

Plutarch finally responds to Pemptides' challenge, although he presents

the argument in a "detour"55 through a specific discussion with Daphnaeus,

another partner in the dialogue:

... the three factions who theorise about the gods are at variance: they differ in

their votes and find it difficult to accept each other's candidates. Yet there is

one god about whom all firmly agree. The most eminent of poets, legislators,

philosophers,join together in enrolling Eros among the gods ... Sowe see Love

chosen as king, chief magistrate, and harmoniser by Hesiod, Solon and Plato.56

The belief (1ticrrlc;) in the very notion of the gods thus also derives from the

myths of the poets, the laws of the legislators and the rational explanations

of the philosophers. Hence, "the belief' in them is based, Plutarch argues, on

the concordance of the most eminent poets, legislators and philosophers,

such as, Hesiod, Plato and Solon, respectively.

This view on the harmony between faith and philosophy is also expressed

in another discussion, in which Plutarch criticizes both the materialism of

Democritus and EpicuTUs on the one hand, and the monism of the Stoics

on the other, while embracing a particular form of dualism himself whichaccounts for both the bad and the good being present in reality. Plutarch

52 Plu., Amat. 7s6B.53 Plu., Amat. 7S6C-7S7C.

54 Plu., Amat. 763B-C.

55 Plu., Amat. 764A.

56 Plu., Amat. 763E.


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claims that this form of dualism is already voiced by the poets, legislators

and philosophers of old:

... this very ancient opinion comes down from theologians and from lawgivers

to poets and philosophers; it can be traced to no source, but it carried a strong

and almost indelible belief (TYJv cipxYJv ciaEO"1to't"ov ExouO"a, TYJVat 1t{O"'t"lVIOXUPciv

Jc:al aUO"E~cXAEl1t't"Ov),57and is in circulation i~many places among barbarians

and Greeks alike, not only in story and traditftm but also in rites and sacrifices,

to the effect that the Universe is not of itself suspended aloft without sense

or reason or guidance, nor is there one Reason which rules and guides it by

rudder, as it were, or by controlling reins, but ...we may assert that ... [Nature]

has come about, as the result of two opposed principles and two antagonistic

forces ... The great majority and the wisest of men hold this opinion: they

believe that there are two gods, rivals as it were, the one the Artificer of good

and the other of evil. There are also those who call the better one a god and

the other a daemon, as, for example, Zoroaster ...58

Although Plutarch's plea for dualism over against materialism and Stoic

monism is irrelevant for our present purposes, the passage shows that in

Plutarch's view theologians, poets, lawgivers and philosophers can reach

agreement in their views on the gods, and that their concordance produces

"a strong and almost indelible belief (1t[(jn~)". He may well call this belief

"strong" because he regards it as an example of faith, which as we have

seen in another passage gains "an added strength and dignity" when it is

confirmed by the doctrines of the philosophers.

For this reason, I believe this paper to have established that Plutarch'snotion of faith is not fideistic, despite some suggestions to the contrary. In

addition, it also belongs to the domain of philosophy-as we have seen par-

ticularly in the present section-and for that reason often occurs together

with philosophical and cognitive vocabulary. Not only can philosophical

doctrines confirm expressions of1t[(j'["l~, but particular philosophical views

are also the object of faith and are, conversely, reinforced by initiation into

the mysteries. Faith and philosophy are thus interrelated. Moreover, as the

previous sections have shown, "faith" is not the only, straightforward mean-

ing of1t[(j't"l~. The notion of1t[(j'["l~ is deeply rooted in the relational sphere oftrust and is also at home in the domain of rhetorical persuasion.

Against this background, it seems that the often fideistic understanding

of1t[(j'["l~ in Pauline studies and its monopoly in reconstructions of Pauline

theology need to be corrected. It does not seem correct to list various mean-

57 F.e. Babbitt, Plutarch's Moralia, V (London-Cambridge Ig6g) 109 renders TC!(jTl~ as

"conviction".

58 Plu.,De Is. 36gB-E.


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ings of 1r[crn~-which are reflected in our discussion of its occurrence in

Plutarch-with precision in LS] (1408), while a presupposed theological

meaning, according to which "faith" is opposed to sight and knowledge, is

reserved for the Pauline writings (1.4).The same applies to the terminology

of the mysteries. While in several passages in Plutarch we have seen that themysteItes and belief and disbelief are closely associated (ConsoL ad ux. 611D;

fro178~it is incorrect to separate Christian "mystery" as it occurs in Paul's

writings from these other mysteries, interpreting the former as a "secret

revealed by God, i.e. religious or mystical faith" (LS]1156sub 1.4;emphasis

mine). Further comparative research into early Christian and ancient philo-

sophical notions, values and virtues might show that, in many respects, they

are more closely related than a modem, anachronistic understanding of the

difference between philosophy and religion seems to allow.


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Plutarch in the Religious

and Philosophical Discourse

~ of Late Antiquityr

Edited by

Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta

Israel Munoz Gallarte

LEIDEN . BOSTON

2012


21/21

Ancient Mediterranean

and Medieval Texts,

and ConteXts

Robert M. Berchman

Jacob Neusner

Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism,

and the Platonic Tradition

Edited by

Robert M. BerchmanDowling College and Bard College

John F. Finamore

University of Iowa

JOHN DILLON (Trinity College, Dublin) - GARY GURTLER (Boston College)

JEAN-MARC NARBONNE (Laval University. Canada)

2012 - non-fideistic interpret 1

Documents